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Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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self-regulation through <strong>the</strong> adoption of codes of conduct or ‘corporate social responsibility’<br />

initiatives 13 – is largely ineffective in bringing about improved standards of health, safety or<br />

environmental performance. For instance, in a wide-ranging review of <strong>the</strong> regulation of<br />

workplace safety in 1999, Gunningham and Johnstone find “significant evidence of <strong>the</strong> limits<br />

of voluntarism”. 14 In particular, one major study on environmental protection from <strong>the</strong><br />

Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands found that companies were not motivated to introduce safety management<br />

systems until legislation had been put in place. Wright observes in relation to <strong>the</strong>se findings that,<br />

“<strong>the</strong>re is a cost-benefit argument that legislation is needed to encourage<br />

systematic management and that more broadly… <strong>the</strong>re is evidence of<br />

mandatory requirements being effective”. 15<br />

Recent research by <strong>the</strong> OECD on <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of voluntary approaches for environmental<br />

policy concluded that <strong>the</strong> environmental effectiveness of voluntary approaches is often<br />

questionable, and that <strong>the</strong>ir economic efficiency is generally low. The researchers found that<br />

it was highly unlikely that most of <strong>the</strong> voluntary approaches contributed much to emission<br />

reductions and that achievements often did not exceed a ‘business as usual’ scenario, except<br />

in those cases where ‘credible threats’ were incorporated into <strong>the</strong> approach if targets were<br />

not met. The researchers also found that combining voluntary approaches with o<strong>the</strong>r types of<br />

instruments (for example, permitting systems, subsidies, related taxes and charges and<br />

emission trading systems) tended to weaken <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of <strong>the</strong> latter instruments. In<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r words, where participation in emissions trading systems, for example, was voluntary<br />

many businesses chose not to ‘opt-in’ to <strong>the</strong> schemes. 16<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>r support for <strong>the</strong> importance of law and regulation in bringing about real changes in<br />

corporate behaviour comes from <strong>the</strong> experience and research of NGOs, labour rights activists<br />

and trade unions. NGOs were instrumental in getting multinational companies to adopt<br />

voluntary workplace codes of conduct. However, many human rights NGOs are increasingly<br />

realising <strong>the</strong> limitations of both voluntary codes of conduct and ‘corporate social<br />

responsibility’ initiatives in national and international contexts.<br />

A number of case studies have shown that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes<br />

adopted by multi-national and transnational corporations have not brought any tangible<br />

benefits to <strong>the</strong> workers and communities adversely affected by <strong>the</strong>ir operations. 17 Similarly,<br />

<strong>the</strong> experience of workers in developing countries is that many companies are simply failing<br />

to properly implement <strong>the</strong>ir codes of conduct within individual workplaces, and that workers<br />

are wholly unable to protect <strong>the</strong>ir rights in <strong>the</strong> absence of <strong>the</strong> possibility ei<strong>the</strong>r of legal/ state<br />

enforcement or of trade union enforcement and organising structures. 18 Thus, one observer<br />

has commented:<br />

“We have put too much emphasis on codes and probably too much emphasis on<br />

voluntary enforcement. It is untenable to expect companies to enforce <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

codes voluntarily.” 19<br />

As a consequence of <strong>the</strong>se failures, and as observed in a recent letter to Patricia Hewitt signed<br />

by more than 20 leading charities in <strong>the</strong> UK:<br />

“CSR is coming under growing attack from different quarters on <strong>the</strong> basis that it<br />

is not delivering results. Recent reports from think tanks and civil society<br />

organisations call into question <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of existing initiatives”. 20<br />

20<br />

One example of this is research published in March 2004 by <strong>the</strong> consultancy Article 13. It said<br />

that less than 3 per cent of FTSE 350 firms have acted seriously on challenges such as climate<br />

change, waste and poverty. 21 Ano<strong>the</strong>r example is <strong>the</strong> chemical industry’s ‘Responsible Care’<br />

program - a voluntary self-regulatory program set up by <strong>the</strong> industry in response to a loss of<br />

public confidence in <strong>the</strong> US chemicals sector. The stated aim of <strong>the</strong> program is to: “reduce<br />

chemical accidents and pollution, [and] to build public confidence through improved<br />

performance, continuous improvement and increased communication.” 22 However, research<br />

in <strong>the</strong> early 1990s demonstrated that firms which relied on Responsible Care alone did not<br />

achieve better environmental performance. 23 And more recently, research in <strong>the</strong> US has<br />

shown that <strong>the</strong> number of chemical ‘accidents’ each year (including worker fatalities and

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