Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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For example, the ‘Good Health is Good Business’ campaign – one of the largest campaigns to have been launched by the HSE in recent years, which ran for 5 years –reached only 28 per cent of small companies, compared to 73 per cent of larger organisations. 11 Similarly, the ‘Breathe Freely’ campaign reached only one in four small companies as compared to two in five medium-sized companies. 12 In relation to this question of audience, Hillage et al. observe that: “the evidence suggests that there is a significant element of ‘preaching to the converted’, i.e. those most likely to register awareness of the campaign are those most likely to be interested in and aware of health and safety issues.” This in turn means that, “the additionality of such campaigns may be questionable, as many of those saying that they have taken action as a result of a campaign may have done so in any case, without HSE intervention. However, the campaign may have speeded up such action and/ or made it more extensive and /or appropriate.” 13 Seminars and Mailshots Whilst campaigns typically employ a variety of mediums to raise awareness, studies that have focused on specific techniques suggest that different awareness-raising mediums may be more or less effective. One of these studies was a two-year project, carried out by HSE’s Field Operations Directorate (FOD) and reviewed by the University of East Anglia, to assess the relative effectiveness of seminars and mailshots as techniques for persuading employers to improve their standards of health and safety in the SME environment. 14 Following different contact techniques, firms were visited by HSE inspectors who attempted to assess the quantity and quality of changes in knowledge, arrangements and precautions stimulated by inspections, seminars and mailshots. In terms of ‘quantity’, seminars appeared to be very effective at stimulating action compared to mailshots. The proportion of HSE assessments associated with ‘action taken’ was considerably higher (47%) for seminars than for mailshots (9%), although results varied by sector. The level of ‘action taken’ following inspections was 43 per cent. This suggests that SMEs prefer direct contact with regulators over impersonal contact techniques such as mailshots. Further evidence for this finding comes from other studies. 15 Whilst seminars appeared to be as effective as, if not more effective than, inspections in stimulating action in the study by Rakel et al., 16 there are a number of reasons why we should interpret these results with caution. First, seminars tend to attract businesses that may be more highly motivated to comply. Companies that are less motivated to comply are unlikely to attend such events. The converse is true for inspections, since HSE targets poorly performing firms. This was a problem acknowledged by the researchers, and in fact the study confirms that ‘more highly motivated’ companies attended seminars, since it found that standards before the contact technique were lower amongst the inspection sample than the seminar sample. 17 Inspections, therefore, may actually be more effective than seminars in securing compliance. And this suggestion is supported by other (albeit less methodologically rigorous) studies, which have ranked inspection-based advice as much more effective than seminars. 18 Second, whilst the construction sector performed particularly well in relation to seminars and might therefore be considered as a future candidate for this type of activity, it was acknowledged by the researchers that insufficient data existed in relation to the quality of the action taken and therefore no judgement could be made as to whether the seminars had stimulated a sufficient quality of change. 19 Also, there had not been a sufficient number of inspections undertaken within this cluster for researchers to compare the relative effectiveness of inspections with seminars for this industry sector. The research has not, therefore, excluded the possibility that inspections may be more successful than seminars in prompting action, and /or produce a better quality of change. An additional consideration for the HSE is that seminars are less likely to be attended by small firms than large ones. 20 They are therefore not an obvious solution to the problems HSE inspectors face in reaching small firms. 61
The relationship between knowledge and action ‘Voluntary compliance’ strategies are based on an assumption that most employers want to protect their employees from workplace risks but simply lack the relevant knowledge. Raising standards is therefore seen as being largely a matter of providing information and advice, rather than enforcing the law. A key part of this question of the role of educational and advisory activities is the extent to which ‘having knowledge’ actually results in “action” that results in appropriate compliance with the law. A number of studies have demonstrated that there is an association between the levels of knowledge employers’ possess about OHS and employers propensity to take action. 21 For instance, research on the impact of the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations found that whilst interviewees reported that the regulations were a major driver in improving health and safety standards it was also reported that lack of health and safety knowledge, particularly amongst clients and designers, was one reason for the limited implementation of the regulations. 22 And Eakin identified lack of awareness of health hazards and legal requirements as a significant factor in the failure of some organisations to comply with the law or to improve their occupational health and safety performance. 23 While research does show an association between levels of knowledge and understanding and propensity to initiate OHS improvements, this relationship is far from perfect. A number of studies indicate that firm knowledge does not necessarily translate into firm action. For example, the study by Rakel et al., discussed above, 24 found that non-compliance – across industrial sectors and in relation to specific health hazards – were present even when levels of knowledge and awareness were adequate. This was true, for instance, in relation to asbestos and chemical hazards, where levels of awareness amongst the firms inspected were judged to be extremely high, but where arrangements and precautions were judged to be inadequate. Rakel et al. observe that: “This may be related to the intuitive wisdom that suggests that it is one thing to know about health and safety issues and another to translate this knowledge into action which might involve considerable expenditure.” 25 Similarly, a comparative survey of OHS performance in the residential building sectors of Britain and Australia demonstrates that knowledge does not necessarily equate with action to improve OHS performance. Whilst British self-employed builders were found to have greater knowledge about OHS issues, this did not translate into greater regulatory compliance. Breaches of regulations were rationalised by employers in both countries on the basis of economic survival and minimal chances of detection. 26 Wright also found that even amongst employers with good levels of OHS awareness and knowledge, organisational action taken in relation to different health or safety hazards could be highly inconsistent, and that a ‘genuine concern for safety’ for instance, ‘does not always lead to a concern for health management.’ 27 This is illustrated by a study on industry attitudes towards noise-induced hearing loss. Thomson-MTS found that noise was not generally viewed as a priority hazard, and this was true even amongst managers reported as being “very health and safety conscious”. 28 This was primarily because noise was seen by management as a hazard that did not have an immediate impact and was not life-threatening. Similarly, Brazabon et al. found that less priority is placed on managing health hazards than safety hazards in the construction industry. 29 Other studies have found that compliance is uneven in relation to separate provisions within a single set of regulations. For instance, after reviewing a number of HSE-commissioned studies, Hillage et al. conclude that many employers: 62 “did not fully comply with the regulations, despite being aware of them. In some cases it was specific details of the regulations that employers did not comply
Page 1 and 2:
Making companies safe: What works?
Page 3 and 4:
Acknowledgments: Courtney Davis wou
Page 5 and 6:
Contents INTRODUCTION 7 MAIN FINDIN
Page 7 and 8:
So for example, the new Strategy do
Page 9 and 10: “In recent years, there had been
Page 11 and 12: Chapter eight is a short chapter lo
Page 13 and 14: • The only sector-specific data o
Page 16: PART ONE Legal Regulation v Volunta
Page 19 and 20: self-regulation through the adoptio
Page 21 and 22: • A number of studies evaluating
Page 23 and 24: Gap in the law Yet despite the impo
Page 25 and 26: By September 2002 the Government ha
Page 27 and 28: Conclusion In conclusion, the Green
Page 29 and 30: effectiveness of safety representat
Page 32 and 33: Chapter Four Conclusion There is ve
Page 34: PARTS TWO & THREE Strategies to sec
Page 37 and 38: A recent HSE discussion paper illus
Page 40 and 41: Chapter Five The Health and Safety
Page 42 and 43: Support for these findings comes fr
Page 44 and 45: Gray and Scholz attempt to understa
Page 46 and 47: perceived low level of current fine
Page 48 and 49: Chapter Six The Implications for th
Page 50 and 51: five times greater than if one had
Page 52: Select Committee on Work and Pensio
Page 56: The evidence reviewed in part two s
Page 59: health risk management between “a
Page 63 and 64: Conclusion Whatever factors prompt
Page 65 and 66: 16 This was at an aggregate level.
Page 67 and 68: - the year that the initiative was
Page 69 and 70: When safety does not pay (or does n
Page 71 and 72: Similarly, firms might make an econ
Page 73 and 74: However, even in the context of mul
Page 75 and 76: does, exert a negative influence on
Page 77 and 78: to cost “a little” or “nothin
Page 79 and 80: For instance, when BP Grangemouth r
Page 82 and 83: Chapter Ten ‘Earned Autonomy’ T
Page 84 and 85: A similar experiment in self-regula
Page 86 and 87: Whilst the original focus of TQM wa
Page 88 and 89: “the more firms incorporate ethic
Page 90 and 91: “In Norway the mandated model is
Page 92 and 93: odies, pressure groups and/or the m
Page 94 and 95: Health and Safety Management System
Page 96 and 97: Gunningham and Johnstone argue that
Page 98 and 99: Conclusion Proposals that some comp
Page 100 and 101: 37 The Norwegian Internal Control R
Page 102 and 103: PART FOUR Conclusion 103
Page 104 and 105: Chapter Eleven Conclusion The Healt
Page 106 and 107: Appendix Select Committee on Work a
Page 108 and 109: References Alder A., Tipping A. and
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Health and Well-Being’, in Frick
Page 112 and 113:
Honey S., Hillage J. et al. (1997)
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Nichols T. and Armstrong P. (1973)
Page 116 and 117:
Wokutch R.E. and VanSandt C.V. (200
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Making Companies Safe - what works? (CCA ... - Unite the Union

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