Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 9 (EISS 9 ... - CSSP - CNRS
Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 9 (EISS 9 ... - CSSP - CNRS
Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics 9 (EISS 9 ... - CSSP - CNRS
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like s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>and</strong> one. S<strong>in</strong>ce sole performs double-duty as an exclusive adjective <strong>and</strong> a card<strong>in</strong>ality<br />
adjective, it has the positive properties of both: Like only, <strong>and</strong> unlike s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>and</strong> one, it can<br />
comb<strong>in</strong>e with plural noun phrases (the only/sole/*s<strong>in</strong>gle/*one people I trust), <strong>and</strong> like s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>and</strong><br />
one, it can be used emphatically <strong>in</strong> superlative constructions (That was the #only/sole/s<strong>in</strong>gle/one<br />
deadliest assault s<strong>in</strong>ce the war began). F<strong>in</strong>ally, we argue <strong>in</strong> §3.3 that there is a quantificational<br />
use of sole mean<strong>in</strong>g ‘(only) one’, which can be derived as a special case of ‘anti-comitative’<br />
sole.<br />
2. Anti-uniqueness effects<br />
2.1. A closer look at the problem<br />
Recall the contrast between (1) <strong>and</strong> (2), show<strong>in</strong>g that by <strong>in</strong>sert<strong>in</strong>g an exclusive <strong>in</strong>to a def<strong>in</strong>ite<br />
description, one <strong>in</strong>creases the number of entities implied to satisfy the nom<strong>in</strong>al predicate. At first<br />
glance, this would seem to suggest that the <strong>in</strong>sertion of an exclusive elim<strong>in</strong>ates the uniqueness<br />
implication normally associated with def<strong>in</strong>ite descriptions. But on closer <strong>in</strong>spection, it turns out<br />
to be the existence implication of the def<strong>in</strong>ite article that is miss<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
To see this, it might help to have some lexical entries. For only <strong>and</strong> sole, we can use the<br />
follow<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
(6) Proposed lexical entry for sole/only (first version)<br />
ONLY = λP . λx : P(x) . ∀y[x ≠ y → ¬P(y)]<br />
Applied to ‘author of Waverley’, which we represent simply as AUTHOR, this gives:<br />
(7) ONLY(AUTHOR) = λx : AUTHOR(x) . ∀y[x ≠ y → ¬AUTHOR(y)]<br />
Thus we analyze adjectival only, like its adverbial cous<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> terms of two mean<strong>in</strong>g components,<br />
a negative universal which is its at-issue content (noth<strong>in</strong>g other than x is P), <strong>and</strong> a presupposition<br />
(x is P). For adverbial only, the presupposition is typically what is referred to as the ‘prejacent’,<br />
viz. the proposition that would be expressed by the clause conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g adverbial only if the only<br />
were not there. For adjectival only, we analyze the presupposition analogously, as a proposition<br />
derived from the nom<strong>in</strong>al that only modifies. 3 Evidence for the presuppositional status of this<br />
mean<strong>in</strong>g component comes from sentences we have already seen: a negated sole/only predication<br />
as <strong>in</strong> (2b) implies that the subject bears the nom<strong>in</strong>al property. The presupposition plays an<br />
essential role <strong>in</strong> deriv<strong>in</strong>g anti-uniqueness effects, as we will see <strong>in</strong> §2.3.<br />
In order to analyze (1) <strong>and</strong> (2), we need a lexical entry for the that is compatible with predicative<br />
def<strong>in</strong>ite descriptions. These are not quite like def<strong>in</strong>ite descriptions <strong>in</strong> argument position,<br />
as Strawson (1950:320) po<strong>in</strong>ts out at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of On referr<strong>in</strong>g, by way of sett<strong>in</strong>g these<br />
aside:<br />
[I]f I said, ‘Napoleon was the greatest French soldier’, I should be us<strong>in</strong>g the word<br />
‘Napoleon’ to mention a certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual, but I should not be us<strong>in</strong>g the phrase,<br />
3 In general, Coppock <strong>and</strong> Beaver (2011) argue that exclusives all presuppose that there is some true answer to<br />
the current question under discussion (CQ) that is at least as strong as p, <strong>and</strong> assert that there is no true answer that<br />
is stronger than p, where p is the prejacent. Exclusives differ with respect to semantic type (adjectival exclusives like<br />
only <strong>and</strong> mere be<strong>in</strong>g of type 〈et,et〉) <strong>and</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts imposed on the CQ. Adjectival only requires the question to be<br />
‘What th<strong>in</strong>gs are P?’, where P is the property denoted by the modified nom<strong>in</strong>al, so the way that it <strong>in</strong>stantiates the<br />
general schema for exclusives is equivalent to the lexical entry <strong>in</strong> (6) (which is much simpler than the statement of it<br />
that br<strong>in</strong>gs out how it <strong>in</strong>stantiates the schema).<br />
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