03.11.2012 Views

DUCATI - HEC

DUCATI - HEC

DUCATI - HEC

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>DUCATI</strong><br />

By the end of 2000, Ducati had transformed from a company on the verge of bankruptcy into one of the<br />

most profitable motorcycle manufacturers in the world. Revenues had quadrupled since 1996; EBITDA<br />

had grown from 33 million Euros in 1997 to 60 million in 2000; Ducati’s market share had gone from 5%<br />

in the sport bike segment in 1997 to 6.7% in 2000. Analysts generally considered that a goal of 10%<br />

market shares within the next few years was reachable.<br />

Within the company, however, a question kept coming back: What should the company do next? Was<br />

doing nothing an alternative for Ducati? If not, should they attack Harley Davidson’s niche?<br />

The market for motorcycles in 2001<br />

Products<br />

1.6 million motorcycles were sold around the world in 2001. The market was divided into four segments:<br />

off-road, cruisers, touring and sport bikes. Off-road were designed for both on-road and off-road use and<br />

were characterized by a specific ergonomics to accommodate this dual use. The largest players within the<br />

off-road segment were the Japanese manufacturers. Cruisers were big motorcycles with an upright riding<br />

position. Their design emphasized styling over comfort and speed, and was preferred by many American<br />

riders. Harley-Davidson dominated this segment, while Japanese companies such as Honda, Yamaha,<br />

Suzuki, and Kawasaki imitated the traditional Harley style. In 1997, BMW introduced its own<br />

interpretation of a cruiser, which enjoyed a stunning commercial success. Touring bikes were larger<br />

motorcycles equipped for longer rides and greater comfort. BMW, Harley-Davidson and Honda<br />

controlled this segment. Sport bikes had lighter frames, a more forward seated position, and emphasized<br />

speed, acceleration, and minimal comfort. This niche could be further disaggregated into four subsegments:<br />

hyper sport (extreme performance, close to real racing machines), super sport (high<br />

performance, good handling and low weight), naked (good performance and urban riding) and sport<br />

touring (speed and handling, married with comfort for longer rides). Japanese companies dominated this<br />

niche, while European firms such as Ducati, BMW, and Triumph also vied for market share. Harley-<br />

Davidson entered the sport bike market by acquiring Buell Motorcycles in 1998. This segment was<br />

Ducati’s reference market.<br />

Customers<br />

A wide variety of inviduals, with very different tastes (and also differed by age, income, education,<br />

gender), bought motorcycles, from racing fans to week-end riders (who associated motorcycles with a<br />

certain life style). A large portion of ‘undecided bikers’ preferred more balanced and versatile bikes. The<br />

median age for a Harley-Davidson customer in 2000 was 46, while most Ducati buyers, ranged between<br />

25 and 35 years old (and was constantly decreasing over the years, while it was increasing for Harley).<br />

Women had become an attractive new customer base for motorcycle manufacturers, and were particularly<br />

important to some manufacturers like Harley and Ducati. Harley’s proportion of female buyers had<br />

increased from 2% in 1987 to 9% in 2000. Ducati claimed that women were attracted by the low seat<br />

height and weight of its motorcycles and accounted for 8% of sales of its most popular bikes, the<br />

Monster.<br />

1


Advertising happened essentially through specialized press. Motorcycle firms also gained media coverage<br />

by participating in racing events. In addition, movies brought cachet to motorcycles (especially<br />

Hollywood movies such as Easy Rider with Jack Nicholson and Peter Fonda).<br />

Technology and R&D<br />

Since its introduction at the end of the 19 th century, motorcycles’ comfort, performance, reliability and<br />

ease of maintenance had improved vastly. In the more recent periods, both engine innovations and<br />

improvements in pain, chrome and exhaust pipe shaping were introduced by manufacturers to appeal<br />

customers. Starting in the 1970s, the most important trend had been the progressive introduction of<br />

electronic components. More recently, advances in materials science led companies to introduce<br />

composites, titanium and magnesium to make their bikes lighter and more reliable. In-house R&D<br />

expenditures ranged between 2% and 5% of sales.<br />

Since the early 80s, companies such as Honda, Kawasaki, Yamaha and Ducati had also used racing<br />

competitions to develop technical solutions and test materials, and eventually transferred effective<br />

solutions to their production series. The racing circuit encompassed many competitions, the most<br />

important being the Grand Prix (125cc, 250cc and 500cc categories) and the Superbike Championship<br />

(with bikes ranging from 750cc to 1000cc).<br />

Manufacturing<br />

Most motorcycle companies invested heavily to automate production lines and worked with parts<br />

suppliers to improve quality and delivery. Only a few firms such as Triumph in 2000 outsourced around<br />

60% of its production. Many outsourced a considerable portion of their inputs, and therefore had very<br />

flexible production structures. Outsourcing minimized fixed asset investment, but the quest for quality,<br />

reduced costs and responsiveness to market fluctuations forced final assemblers to create strong<br />

commitment at the level of suppliers (Harley-Davidson was one of the leaders of this). The production<br />

had thus essentially become an assembly line where motorcycle components were assembled.<br />

Distribution<br />

All companies had some presence in the three major markets: United States, Europe and Japan. Their<br />

typical distribution systems comprised two types of agents: wholesale distributors and retailers.<br />

Depending on the strategic importance of the area, they used independent, partly, or totally owned<br />

wholesale distributors (subsidiaries).<br />

The size of the network, and therefore the degree of penetration into the market, were largely a function<br />

of the company’s strategy. Large Japanese mass-producers such as Honda and Yamaha, tended to<br />

maximize penetration, while companies such as Harley, BMW or Ducati emphasized the quality of the<br />

dealer and, where possible, used single-franchise agreements. This allowed them to control prices and<br />

brand positioning by allowing direct communication with customers. The most extreme case was Harley-<br />

Davidson, which had single-franchise agreements with the majority of its dealers (about 600 dealers in the<br />

US) and was really working on developing dealership loyalty.<br />

Competitors<br />

Over the 20 th century, the number of motorcycle manufacturers had decrease dramatically. In 2001, there<br />

was one major American manufacturer, four Japanese manufacturers and a handful of European firms<br />

(see Exhibit).<br />

2


Harley-Davidson – Harley was the major US manufacturer and dominated the US heavyweight (> 650<br />

cc) market. In 2000, it achieved its fifteenth consecutive year of record revenues and net income,<br />

increasing the former by 18.5% to $2.2 billion and the latter by 30% from 1999. Since going public in<br />

1986, its stockholders had realized a compound annual growth rate of over 40%, and Harley Davidson<br />

was the most profitable motorcycle manufacturer in the world.<br />

It produced 205,000 motorcycles, a 15% increase over 1999 (in addition, Buell sold 10,200 motorcycles a<br />

year). Its parts and accessories businesses made strong gains in 2000, with increases in revenues of 24%<br />

and 14% respectively over 1999. Relative to other manufacturers, Harley had a smaller global presence<br />

and kept a strong focus on the US market. Its presence in Europe was, however, increasing.<br />

Harley was considered as the typical example of a lifestyle company. In the US, particularly, it was a<br />

social and cultural phenomenon embodying values such as freedom and rebelliousness, and representing<br />

the history of motorcycle. The Harley brand was the strongest in the country. Harley sold 23 models, with<br />

prices ranging between $6,000 to $20,000 (with an average price of $14,000).<br />

Honda - With 5.4 million bikes produced (including scooters and small bikes), Honda was the world<br />

largest manufacturer of motorcycles. The company shared technology, engineering capabilities,<br />

marketing, distribution and know-how with its automobile division. It competed in all segments of the<br />

industry, and had a strong reputation for reliability and technical excellence. With its capabilities in fourstroke<br />

technology, Honda also led the industry in producing motorcycles and scooters utilizing low<br />

emission, fuel-efficient engines. Honda entered the US market in 1959, and had prices ranging from<br />

$5,000 to $19,000 (with an average price of $9,300).<br />

BMW – One of the top European automakers, BMW had been in the motorcycle business since 1984. It<br />

was the strongest European competitor in the US market, where it was growing. Its bikes had introduced<br />

several technical innovations such as advanced suspension systems, fuel injection, and anti-lock brakes,<br />

giving the brand a reputation for exceptional quality, reliability and comfort. The US average price of<br />

BMW motorcycles was $14,500, ranging from $8,000 to $20,000.<br />

Other Japanese manufacturers – In 2001, the other three Japanese manufacturers held a market share of<br />

57% of Ducati key market. Yamaha, Suzuki and Kawasaki entered the US motorcycle market in the<br />

1970s by selling small motorcycles. They then moved to the heavyweight segment. In Europe, Suzuki had<br />

a larger market share than Honda. In Asia, Kawasaki trailed only Harley and Honda. These companies<br />

competed on technological innovation and price.<br />

Ducati<br />

Ducati was founded in 1936 and its first bike, “il Cucciolo” became a blockbuster after the second world<br />

war. Followed several highly sophisticated and powerful models, all based on innovative engine systems.<br />

Thanks to this technical superiority, Ducati motorcycles rapidly achieved success in international racing,<br />

which fueled the company’s growth among sport-oriented customers and built a strong reputation for high<br />

performance. In spite of this, Ducati declined in the 1980s, was sold to Cagiva, regained momentum for a<br />

while, but faced important financing problems in the 1990s. In 1996, the company was one step from<br />

going bankrupt and was acquired by a private equity firm. The main partner had a passion for high-end<br />

businesses and was driven by the firm belief that Ducati had an enormous unexploited potential. To<br />

realize this potential, he hired a high profile new management team.<br />

The new management found three things at Ducati when it arrived:<br />

- good products: unique and beautiful bikes, even though regarded as less efficient and reliable than the<br />

Japanese<br />

- top-notch engineers: both in R&D and for the racing division<br />

3


- a brand with a strong potential. In most European markets, Ducati’s brand recognition was the highest<br />

in the motorcycle industry.<br />

With these aspects in mind, the new team worked at Ducati’s turnaround.<br />

The first thing that the new team designed was an ambitious plan, called the ‘World of Ducati’, to support<br />

and develop the brand. This started with the decision to build a museum, in order to show that Ducati was<br />

more than a motorcycle company: a dream and a passion. Investments in the racing team were also<br />

implemented. This generated an important change: in 1996, the racing division spent approximately 3.9<br />

million Euros with almost no revenue; in 2000, it spent around 10 million Euros, but revenues increased<br />

to 7.9 million Euros. The racing team was also a sophisticated R&D laboratory, where new features were<br />

continuously created and tested, and then introduced (for some of them) in series road bikes. Ducati also<br />

organized many events which were great public successes, attracting thousands of motorcycles lovers.<br />

Other aspects of Ducati’s turnaround strategy included the organization of production, and more precisely<br />

the role of outsourcing. In 1996, about 80% of Ducati’s production activities were outsourced. In 2001,<br />

that number had climbed up to 90%, a number which was significantly higher than other motorcycle<br />

producers. This allowed Ducati to increase its productivity from 76 bikes per workers in 1996 to 87 in<br />

2000. The majority of Ducati’s suppliers were concentrated in a district in Italy (known as the “Engine<br />

Technology District”), in which about over 2,000 small and medium companies had created clusters and<br />

served many other companies including Ferrari, Maserati, etc.). This allowed for joint activities in R&D,<br />

purchasing, suppliers’ quality control, etc.<br />

Regarding distribution, Ducati originally distributed its motorcycles through multi-franchise and<br />

independent dealers. The decision was made in 1997 to take more control of the distribution, especially in<br />

strategic markets. Subsidiaries were established in France, Germany, Japan, the UK and Holland, and a<br />

chain of mono-franchise dealers was created. Distinctive characteristics of Ducati were displayed in these<br />

dealer stores. Investments were also made to increase the average quality of the dealers (competent sales<br />

force, good technical assistance, etc.) everywhere in the world. This came with a decrease in the number<br />

of dealers (for instance, from 165 to 65 in Italy). Annual registrations per dealers therefore increased<br />

significantly (from 14 to 150 per dealers).<br />

Finally, the company also invested heavily in R&D, especially in new design technologies, product<br />

development and human capital. R&D investments went from 3.2 million Euros in 1997 to 12.9 million<br />

Euros in 2000. This helped to reduce the time to market for new product launches. Ducati’s latest models<br />

were developed in 15 months versus 36 months in earlier periods. In 2001, Ducati’s team of engineers<br />

was reputed as one of the most expert and skilled in the industry. The R&D department operated in close<br />

collaboration with the racing division but also the marketing department.<br />

The turnaround strategy didn’t involve major changes in the firm’s pricing strategy (see Exhibit).<br />

The current situation<br />

Now that the company’s turnover seemed practically over, Ducati’s executives were considering other<br />

alternatives for growth. The one that was receiving the most attention was entering Harley’s niche: the<br />

cruiser market. With about 400,000 units sold in 2000, this was a very large segment in the industry. To<br />

develop a cruiser model, however, Ducati would need to make additional investments (evaluated to 17<br />

million Euros) and would incur additional costs (evaluated to 26 million Euros). Using Ducati’s L-twin<br />

engine, Ducati had in mind a line of vehicles that could directly attack Harley’s line, and which would be<br />

priced between $10,000 and $20,000.<br />

4


Exhibit 1 – Ducati’s products<br />

EXHIBITS<br />

Ducati products were present in several market segments: Hyper Sport, Super Sport, Naked, Sport<br />

Touring. In addition, Ducati was selling spare parts, accessories and apparel.<br />

Hyper Sport: The company offered two basic models there in 2001: the 996 and the 748, each produced<br />

in three different versions. The 996S was Ducati’s flagship motorcycle and sold for $21,895 and<br />

contributed for 43% to the total revenues generated by motorcycles.<br />

Super Sport: The first Ducati Super Sport bike was launched in 1973 and remained for a long time<br />

Ducati’s most popular product. A new version, with a very futuristic design, was launched in 1998.<br />

Naked: Ducati’s naked motorcycle was called The Monster. It quickly became a very popular bike and<br />

the number of models in this family had been continually increasing since 1996 (with prices ranging from<br />

$6,000 to $13,000).<br />

Sport Touring: These motorcycles offered a more comfortable riding position than most other Ducatis.<br />

Different from other Ducati’s products, the number of Sport Touring models had not increased since<br />

1997.<br />

Sparte parts, accessories and apparel: All of this production was outsourced to two Italian companies.<br />

Many more spare parts were made available and distribution was improved, resulting in a considerable<br />

increase in the contribution of these spare parts to total revenues. Accessories and apparel businesses had<br />

become particularly important. In 2001, only Harley Davidson had a higher incidence on revenues (12%<br />

of revenues for HD, against 6% for Ducati).<br />

Exhibit 2 – The world market for motorcycles: New registrations 1996-2000<br />

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />

New registrations 935,000 1,111,000 1,261,000 1,463,000 1,566,000<br />

Ducati’s core<br />

Market (as a % of the total<br />

market)<br />

29.7% 30.3% 32% 32.7% 33.2%<br />

Touring market (as a % of<br />

total market)<br />

33% 33.9% 33.8% 33.8% 32.7%<br />

Exhibit 3 – Market shares of competitors in Ducati’s core market (the sport niche)<br />

Ducati<br />

Honda<br />

Kawa<br />

Suzuki<br />

Yamaha<br />

BMW<br />

Harley<br />

World Europe<br />

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000<br />

3.9 5.1 6.2 6 6.7<br />

4.3 5.2 6.5 6.4 7<br />

23.3 24.7 23.5 21.4 21.5<br />

23.8 25.8 24.2 21.5 22.7<br />

16.3 15 15.7 15.8 13.4<br />

15 15 15.3 15.8 12.3<br />

23.8 24.4 22.1 22.1 23.8<br />

24.5 24.1 21.3 21.9 23.5<br />

18.5 17 19 21.2 20.6<br />

21.3 18.7 18.4 21.8 22<br />

5.1 4.8 4.7 4.6 3.5<br />

5.8 5.4 4.8 4.8 3.6<br />

5.8 4.8 3.8 3.3 3.3<br />

1.5 1.2 1.2 1 1<br />

5


Exhibit 4 – A map of the market<br />

Knee down<br />

riders<br />

Fast riders<br />

Performance<br />

Urban riders<br />

Function<br />

Weekend<br />

cruisers<br />

Easy riders<br />

Lifecycle<br />

Highway<br />

lovers<br />

Exhibit 5 – Presence in different segments<br />

Ducati<br />

BMW<br />

Harley D.<br />

Honda<br />

Kawasaki<br />

Suzuki<br />

Yamaha<br />

Exhibit 6 – Customer profile<br />

Sex<br />

Age range<br />

Comfort<br />

Off road Cruiser Touring SPORT<br />

Hyper sport Super sport Sport touring Naked<br />

Ducati hyper Ducati super Ducati sport<br />

sport<br />

sport<br />

touring<br />

98% male 99% male 98% male<br />

62%: 18-35 64%: 18-35 73%: 31-43<br />

Ducati naked Harley<br />

Davidson<br />

96% male 91% male<br />

66%: 18-35 45.6 (median)<br />

Exhibit 7 – Ducati price premium vs. comparable products (average % premium per family)<br />

1997<br />

2001<br />

Hyper sport Super sport Sport touring Naked<br />

31.2%<br />

31.4%<br />

8.03%<br />

7.2%<br />

29.97%<br />

20.4%<br />

13.27%<br />

13.03%<br />

6


Exhibit 8 – Cost structure (% total revenues)<br />

Motorcycle materials a<br />

Related products<br />

Direct personnel b<br />

Indirect personnel<br />

Total<br />

R&D c<br />

Variable sales costs d<br />

Fixed sales costs e<br />

Administration<br />

Ducati 2000 Ducati 1996 Harley-Davidson<br />

43.4<br />

6.9<br />

5<br />

3.7<br />

59<br />

1.1<br />

5.9<br />

14.5<br />

4.7<br />

55.8<br />

2.2<br />

6<br />

4.2<br />

68.2<br />

0.1<br />

5.1<br />

10.4<br />

5.3<br />

Total<br />

26.2<br />

20.9<br />

a<br />

Includes parts, accessories and apparel (16.6% of total revenues in 2000)<br />

b<br />

Inbound logistics, quality management and operations<br />

c<br />

Part of Ducati’s R&D costs are capitalized (2.7% revenues)<br />

d<br />

Distribution, dealer bonus and warranties costs<br />

e<br />

Sales, marketing and after sales department costs, advertising, events, racing costs, subsidiaries costs<br />

Exhibit 9 – Ducati: Selected financials<br />

Total revenues<br />

Gross profit<br />

Other operating income<br />

SG&A<br />

EBITDA<br />

D&A<br />

EBIT<br />

Net income<br />

Market share<br />

45<br />

8<br />

6.4<br />

4.5<br />

65.9<br />

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br />

(estimates)<br />

195.63 240<br />

294.5 379.5 422.1<br />

74.57 91.71 118<br />

150.5 165.9<br />

0.53 1.18<br />

4.1<br />

4.9<br />

7<br />

41.7 52.4<br />

71.3<br />

95.4<br />

103<br />

33.4 46.49 50.8<br />

60.03 69.9<br />

16.7<br />

16.37<br />

2.7<br />

5.1<br />

19.17<br />

27.32<br />

(1.24)<br />

6.2<br />

24.4<br />

26.4<br />

8.9<br />

6<br />

29.6<br />

30.4<br />

10.5<br />

6.7<br />

2<br />

6<br />

5<br />

3<br />

16<br />

32.8<br />

37<br />

13.4<br />

7<br />

7

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!