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0 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 1<br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia<br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania<br />

Honorary Consulate of Latvia in Bucharest<br />

The Romanian Association for Baltic and Nordic Studies<br />

THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS<br />

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS<br />

(1918-1958)<br />

Edited by<br />

Silviu Miloiu, Ēriks Jēkabsons<br />

Laima Jēkabsone, Alexandru Ghişa


Translations:<br />

Eva Eihmane: Latvian to English<br />

S.C. Acta.Doc SRL: Romanian to English<br />

Cover: Dan Mărgărit<br />

Desktop-publishing: Mihaela Moagher<br />

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României<br />

The Romanian-Latvians <strong>relations</strong> : <strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>documents</strong> : 1918-<br />

1958 /<br />

Silviu Miloiu, Ēriks Jēkabsons, Laima Jēkabsone, Alexandru Ghişa<br />

–<br />

Târgovişte : Cetatea de Scaun, 2012<br />

ISBN 978-606-537-149-1<br />

I. Miloiu, Silviu<br />

II. Jēkabsons, Ēriks<br />

III. Jēkabsone, Laima<br />

IV. Ghişa, Alexandru<br />

327(498:474.3)<br />

94(498:474.3)<br />

Volumul apare cu sprijinul Administrației Fondului Cultural Național<br />

Prețul unui exemplar este de: 40,60 ron fara tva<br />

© ARSBN, Targoviste, 2012<br />

ISBN 978-606-537-149-1<br />

Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgovişte, 2012<br />

Tel./Fax.: 0245 218318; email: editura@cetateadescaun.ro www.cetateadescaun.ro


Table of Contents<br />

Preface ..................................................................................................................................... 5<br />

Editors’ note and acknowledgements ............................................................................ 17<br />

List of <strong>documents</strong> ............................................................................................................... 19<br />

Documents ........................................................................................................................... 39<br />

Proper Names Index ....................................................................................................... 480


Preface<br />

By <strong>the</strong> mid of <strong>the</strong> 1920s <strong>the</strong> concept of Border States had already been established in <strong>the</strong><br />

political and <strong>diplomatic</strong> vocabulary of European chancelleries. It referred to <strong>the</strong> belt of<br />

countries from Finland to <strong>the</strong> north and down to Romania to <strong>the</strong> south, neighbouring <strong>the</strong><br />

most ideologically charged border of Europe. It stood witness of a divided Europe,<br />

functioning at differing speeds and acting based on most urgent security needs and<br />

concerns. While <strong>the</strong> dialogue between Western and Central Europe was unlocked at least<br />

temporarily following <strong>the</strong> Locarno Pact (1925), <strong>the</strong> Border States persisted to be widely seen<br />

as a locus of clash between <strong>the</strong> old bourgeoisie world and <strong>the</strong> rising communist one. The<br />

countries situated on this belt were still in search of <strong>diplomatic</strong> and political tools to back<br />

up stability and regional balance. The Polish-Romanian and <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian political<br />

and military alliances, set up in 1921, were <strong>the</strong> foundations of international order in <strong>the</strong><br />

area, and plans to merge <strong>the</strong>m into a grand Border States league continued to be nurtured<br />

although with less enthusiasm than it had been done a few years earlier. The Declaration of<br />

Common Aims of <strong>the</strong> Independent Mid-European nations adopted in <strong>the</strong> convention<br />

assembled at Independence Hall of Philadelphia in 1918 remained a generous statement of<br />

goodwill but a chimera in practical terms. Particularly <strong>the</strong> Polish-Lithuanian confrontation with<br />

regard to <strong>the</strong> belonging of <strong>the</strong> historical capital of <strong>the</strong> Grand Duchy of Lithuania proved to be<br />

Achilles' heel of Border States solidarity. It paved <strong>the</strong> way to German and Soviet policy of Divide<br />

et Impera and backfired <strong>the</strong> creation of a Baltic union or a Border States league spanned<br />

between Helsinki and Bucharest. The lack of mutual knowledge, particularly when it comes to<br />

Romanian-Baltic or Romanian-Finnish relation, <strong>the</strong> divergent national aspirations, <strong>the</strong><br />

ideological clashes, Polish bossy attitude in <strong>the</strong> region stood in <strong>the</strong> way of reaching an<br />

agreement between <strong>the</strong> small and mid-sized nations situated in <strong>the</strong> area. The answer to <strong>the</strong><br />

question what to do with Soviet Russia also evoked conflicting answers. The Right typically<br />

believed that Russia should be closely monitored but surrounded by a cordon sanitaire. It<br />

should not be allowed to participate in decisions ei<strong>the</strong>r at regional or European level. The Left<br />

customarily had a different opinion. It sought for rapprochement between East and West in<br />

order to safeguard not solely <strong>the</strong>ir independence but <strong>the</strong>ir economy and trade, too. The<br />

Baltic Left placed emphasis on <strong>the</strong> economic gains to be achieved from <strong>the</strong> restoration of<br />

trade between Europe and Russia. Torn between conflicting aspirations, it was never easy<br />

to find a lasting reconciliation between <strong>the</strong> Border States and <strong>the</strong> USSR. The Soviet policy<br />

would not encourage that, too, transmitting conflicting signals to its neighbours also given<br />

<strong>the</strong> twofold policy of <strong>the</strong> Soviet state and <strong>the</strong> Third International. Even when <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

Union proclaimed its support for <strong>the</strong> international order based on Paris peace treaties, <strong>the</strong><br />

Komintern continued to be perceived as an instrument devised to weaken resistance of <strong>the</strong><br />

Border States from inside. By 1928, <strong>the</strong> Briand-Kellogg Pact was signed and <strong>the</strong> same year<br />

Romania opened a Legation in Riga, <strong>the</strong> biggest town in Baltic States, centrally located on<br />

<strong>the</strong> flow of information concerning <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. But what was <strong>the</strong> intention behind<br />

Romania’s interest to establish a permanent legation on <strong>the</strong> eastern shores of <strong>the</strong> Baltic?


6 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

To answer this question, we have to fare ten years back in time when <strong>the</strong> independent<br />

states of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Moldovan Democratic Republic were given birth from <strong>the</strong> ashes of<br />

<strong>the</strong> succumbing empire of Russia. The former emerged as an independent state from a<br />

combination of domestic ideological clashes and armed expulsion of foreign intruders. The<br />

young state gained international recognition from, inter alia, <strong>the</strong> inheritor of <strong>the</strong> former<br />

mo<strong>the</strong>r country, Soviet Russia, according to <strong>the</strong> Peace Treaty of August 11 th , 1920. The<br />

Supreme Council of Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Belgium) on<br />

January 26 th , 1921, <strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Romania on February, 15 th 1921 (communicated to Latvia<br />

on February 26 th ), <strong>the</strong> United States of America (July 1922) and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r sovereign nations<br />

on <strong>the</strong> globe gave a few years later <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>diplomatic</strong> recognition to <strong>the</strong> country situated on<br />

<strong>the</strong> eastern shores of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea. The Moldovan Democratic Republic had but a brief<br />

existence and grasped <strong>the</strong> first opportunity to join <strong>the</strong>ir fellow Romanians in <strong>the</strong> Kingdom<br />

of Romania on April 9 th (or Old Calendar: March 27 th ) 105 years after <strong>the</strong>ir separation from<br />

<strong>the</strong> Principality of Moldova. The unification was backed at <strong>the</strong> time by <strong>the</strong> Central Powers<br />

in <strong>the</strong>ir power game in <strong>the</strong> Balkans and in Eastern Europe. It was eventually recognized<br />

internationally by <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Paris of October 28 th , 1920 signed by France, Great Britain,<br />

Italy, Japan and Romania, but never ratified by <strong>the</strong> Land of Rising Sun and strongly<br />

denounced by Soviet Russia. In fact, <strong>the</strong> need to secure <strong>the</strong> belonging of Bessarabia to<br />

Romania and <strong>the</strong> ideological threat posed by <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy by spreading its ideological<br />

values constituted <strong>the</strong> fundamentals of Bucharest’s eastern policy. This created immediate<br />

incentives of cooperation with <strong>the</strong> states situated on <strong>the</strong> western border of Soviet Russia,<br />

and not in <strong>the</strong> least with Latvia.<br />

When <strong>the</strong> inter-state dialogue between Latvia and Romania begun in <strong>the</strong> early 1920s, it<br />

already had incentives and needs of two societies to answer. One of <strong>the</strong> first areas of<br />

cooperation was in terms of humanitarian relief granted to <strong>the</strong> large number of soldiers<br />

and civilians caught by <strong>the</strong> Civil War on Russian territory. With <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Nansen<br />

Commission, various relief agencies and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States 18,373 Romanians, 88% of whom<br />

had travelled through <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea, reached <strong>the</strong>ir homes in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of World War I. 1<br />

Similarly Latvian refugees were repatriated to <strong>the</strong>ir country using Romanian territory, as<br />

this volume of <strong>documents</strong> demonstrates.<br />

As <strong>the</strong> atrocities of <strong>the</strong> Russian Civil War threatened <strong>the</strong> very existence of <strong>the</strong>se refugees<br />

and POWs, <strong>the</strong> Soviet policy of “export of revolution” endangered <strong>the</strong> stability and<br />

sovereignty of <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries which sought means to safeguard <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

existence. Their geopolitical position was not enviable by any possible means. Latvia,<br />

central among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, sometimes considered as <strong>the</strong> only Baltic nation due to<br />

Estonia’s bonds to Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe and Lithuania’s connections to Central Europe, is<br />

linked up with <strong>the</strong> sea and with <strong>the</strong> river of Daugava which connects it to <strong>the</strong> inner areas of<br />

western Russia. This historically encouraged <strong>the</strong> inflow of people towards and from <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic Sea. Latvia’s situation was also affected by <strong>the</strong> fact that it possessed <strong>the</strong> only western<br />

ice-free ports for <strong>the</strong> Russian hinterland. The Latvian harbours of Ventspils, Riga and<br />

Liepāja have traditionally played an important role in connecting <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea human<br />

1<br />

Silviu Miloiu, "The Baltic escape from hell. The Nansen Office and <strong>the</strong> Romanian POWs (1919-1921)." Valahian<br />

Journal of Historical Studies 15 (2011): 65-82.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 7<br />

communities. 1 It must also be emphasized that in <strong>the</strong> case of Latvia a large share of its<br />

population lived in one single city, <strong>the</strong> capital Riga.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, Romania, although a larger (295,000 sq.km), better populated (over<br />

19 million inhabitants in 1939) country enjoying wider recognition on international arena,<br />

was not faring better during <strong>the</strong> interwar period. The length of its frontiers was no less than<br />

3,400 km and three of its neighbours harboured revisionist aims against Romanian<br />

territory: <strong>the</strong> USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria. Moreover, its natural riches attracted <strong>the</strong><br />

interest of o<strong>the</strong>r powers such as Germany. 2<br />

Alike Latvia, Romania also placed its trust in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and concluded<br />

regional alliances such as <strong>the</strong> Little Entente (1920-1921), <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish Alliance<br />

(March 1921) and <strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente (February 1934), some of which served as a model for<br />

<strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente which will be finally concluded among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States in 1934. It, too,<br />

lost its trust into <strong>the</strong> League of Nations by <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s and attempted a policy of<br />

balance between <strong>the</strong> Great Powers. 3 Romania was <strong>the</strong> Little Entente’s most devoted<br />

member just like Latvia was <strong>the</strong> most faithful member of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente. Romania<br />

shared <strong>the</strong> concern of both Soviet and German designs, although it was more afraid of<br />

Soviet revisionism than of German imperialism. Control over <strong>the</strong> Black Sea was also a long<br />

term concern of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union as it was <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea. Both Romania and<br />

Latvia’s interests were better served if <strong>the</strong> sea was not under <strong>the</strong> control of any Great Power<br />

and <strong>the</strong> connection to wide sea was maintained. Latvia could but remember that it was by<br />

sea that it had received <strong>the</strong> essential British help that supported it safeguard its<br />

independence in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of WWI.<br />

Given <strong>the</strong>se prerequisites, Latvia and Romania had a rich common agenda. Indeed, at<br />

<strong>the</strong> beginning of <strong>the</strong> interwar period projects had been under way for concluding a grand<br />

alliance binding Poland, <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and Finland toge<strong>the</strong>r, sometimes talks being held<br />

on joining <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish alliance to this system. Between 1919 and 1926 thirty-one<br />

conferences were held among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, Finland and Poland (or some of <strong>the</strong>se<br />

countries) at various levels, only one of which, held in September 1922 in Warsaw, was<br />

attended by Romania. 4 Romania and Latvia were co-signatories on April 1 st 1925 of The<br />

protocol concerning informative cooperation against Soviet Union and started to exchange<br />

information about issues such as <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union’s troop deployment, <strong>the</strong> strategic<br />

situation <strong>the</strong>reof etc. 5 Talks about an extension of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish alliance to <strong>the</strong><br />

eastern Baltic shores or <strong>the</strong> merging of <strong>the</strong> aforementioned alliance with a Baltic Union<br />

were topical at <strong>the</strong> beginning of 1920s and continued to be so for a decade despite <strong>the</strong><br />

Finnish decision to pull out of this cooperation in 1922. Public speeches, newspapers<br />

interviews, handling of ceremonies such as <strong>the</strong> award of credentials to <strong>the</strong> Heads of States<br />

1<br />

Joseph S. Roucek, “Geopolitical Trends in Central-Eastern Europe”, The Annals of <strong>the</strong> American Academy of<br />

Political and Social Science 271 (1950): 12-13.<br />

2<br />

Petre Otu, “Situaţia geopolitică a României în anii 1939-1940. Consideraţii de ordin militar,” E.I. Emandi, Gh.<br />

Buzatu, V.S. Cucu , eds, Geopolitica, vol. 1 (Iaşi: Glasul Bucovinei 1994): 476-477.<br />

3<br />

This is treated in Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy Towards Germany, 1936-40 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).<br />

4<br />

Marko Lehti, A Baltic League as a construct of <strong>the</strong> New Europe. Envisioning a Baltic region and small state<br />

sovereignty in <strong>the</strong> aftermath of <strong>the</strong> First World War (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999), 547-548<br />

5<br />

Centrul pentru Studierea şi Păstrarea Arhivelor Militare Istorice, Piteşti [Center for <strong>the</strong> Study and Preservation of<br />

Historical Military Archives], Fund Ministerul Apărării, Cabinetul Ministrului [Defence Ministry. The Cabinet of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Minister], vol. 91/1925, sheets 18-29


8 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

occasioned <strong>the</strong> voicing of <strong>the</strong> shared aims of <strong>the</strong>se nations. They professed “Soviet<br />

exception” with regard to disarmament plans put forward in <strong>the</strong> 1920s. Thereby, <strong>the</strong> Border<br />

States underlined <strong>the</strong> huge risk of <strong>the</strong>ir disarming in a situation where Soviet Union was<br />

undertaking a rearming policy and where <strong>the</strong> Soviet arsenal could not be assessed in any<br />

possible way. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> Border States insisted on a common handling of <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>relations</strong><br />

with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union, although this gentlemen’s agreement looked better on paper than in<br />

reality.<br />

Never<strong>the</strong>less, this solidarity did not restrain <strong>the</strong> Border States when <strong>the</strong> need was felt<br />

for negotiating and concluding separate treaties or economic agreements with <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

Union. Sometimes a certain Border State had to hold out to <strong>the</strong> pressure exerted on <strong>the</strong>m<br />

by o<strong>the</strong>rs as it was <strong>the</strong> case with <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> demarche of Romanian, Polish, Estonian<br />

and Finnish envoys in early February 1932 designed to postpone Latvia’s signing of nonaggression<br />

treaties with Soviet Union (<strong>documents</strong> 64 and 65 in this volume).<br />

As a new state on <strong>the</strong> international arena, Latvia was interested after 1918 in integrating<br />

itself into <strong>the</strong> existing system of international <strong>relations</strong> before attempting to domesticate<br />

<strong>the</strong>m based on Latvian interests. The Romanian Government also approved Latvia’s<br />

proposal to appoint a diplomat to Bucharest in <strong>the</strong> person of its envoy with residence in<br />

Warsaw. This was achieved in May 1922 and <strong>the</strong> Latvian representation in Romania will<br />

remain entrusted to <strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw for much of <strong>the</strong> interwar period. 1 The first<br />

Latvian diplomat to fill <strong>the</strong> position of envoy to Bucharest was Martiņš Nukša (1878-1942).<br />

An architect by training 2 , Nukša commenced his <strong>diplomatic</strong> career in 1920 with an<br />

appointment to Paris as First Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Legation. He was eventually assigned<br />

in 1921 as envoy to Warsaw. After having been appointed to Romania (where he was<br />

accredited until March 1930), he also received <strong>the</strong> credentials for serving his country’s<br />

interests in Czechoslovakia in 1923 and Austria in 1925 with residence in <strong>the</strong> capital of<br />

Poland. When he started his <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Romania, this country had concluded,<br />

in March 1921, an alliance with Poland 3 and <strong>the</strong> possibility of enlarging this alliance along<br />

<strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea shore was being assessed.<br />

Nukša will eventually be appointed for six years as <strong>the</strong> envoy of his country in<br />

Czechoslovakia (1933-1939) and in this capacity he was re-appointed to Bucharest in 1935<br />

with residence in Prague (November 1935 to May 1939). 4 Perhaps, this decision was taken as<br />

recognition of Romania’s worsening <strong>relations</strong> with Poland and <strong>the</strong> enhancing Romanian-<br />

Czechoslovakian bonds. By <strong>the</strong>n, Poland had improved its <strong>relations</strong> with Germany<br />

following <strong>the</strong> Non-Aggression Pact signed in January 1934 and Romania gravitated around<br />

<strong>the</strong> French-Czechoslovakian-Soviet constellation of powers. Being represented by <strong>the</strong><br />

1<br />

Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe ([The Diplomatic Archives of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs] hereafter,<br />

DARMFA), fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. General, vol. 1, s. 2-4, Alexandru Florescu’s dispatch no. 12 of 11 July 1924;<br />

Idem, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, The Legation, vol. 93, s. 1; Florin Anghel, “O încercare românească de politică<br />

baltică. România şi Letonia în perioada interbelică”, in Gheorghe Lazăr, Ovidiu Cristea, coord., Naţional şi<br />

universal în istoria românilor (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică 1998), 437; Silviu Miloiu, România şi Ţările Baltice<br />

în perioada interbelică (Târgovişte: Ed. Cetatea de Scaun, 2003).<br />

2<br />

He is <strong>the</strong> author of an elegant apartment building in Art Nouveau fashion on Strēlnieku Street 2 in Riga<br />

3<br />

Pe larg la Florin Anghel, Construirea sistemului „Cordon sanitaire”. Relaţii româno-polone, 1919-1926 (Cluj-<br />

Napoca: Editura Nereamia Napocae, 2003).<br />

4<br />

Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale (The Romanian National Archives hereafter, RNA), fund Casa Regală-Regele<br />

Carol al II-lea. Mareşalat, file 140/1935, s. 251, Pro Memoria Martiņš Nukša; Ē. Jēkabsons, V. Ščerbinskis, Latvijas<br />

ārlietu dienesta darbinieki. 1918 – 1991 (Rīga, 2003), 217-218, 367.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 9<br />

envoy in Czechoslovakia was likely to be tantamount to receiving better information with<br />

regard to Romania’s foreign policy. Therefore, Nukša established a long-standing relation<br />

with Romania where he travelled every now and <strong>the</strong>n and reported to Riga based mostly on<br />

information he received from <strong>the</strong> Polish and eventually Czechoslovak political and<br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> circles.<br />

As Nukša was travelling only seldom to Romania in order to solve <strong>the</strong> current issues<br />

involving citizens of <strong>the</strong> two countries and <strong>the</strong>ir businesses, a network of consulates was<br />

established. The Consulate in Bucharest was funded in December 1923 and turned into a<br />

General Consulate in November 1928 until incorporation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States into Soviet<br />

Union in August 1940, when it was closed down. The position was held all <strong>the</strong>se years by<br />

Theodor Orghidan (born 1888) 1 . Orghidan was often delegated to attend public ceremonies<br />

on behalf of Latvia such as, for instance, <strong>the</strong> burial of King Ferdinand I in 1927. 2 In his<br />

capacity of Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Trade Chamber, he was also assigned <strong>the</strong> duty of streng<strong>the</strong>ning<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian export to Romania and solving <strong>the</strong> difficult bureaucratic hindrances standing in<br />

<strong>the</strong> way of its progress. Also, a Vice-Consulate was set up in Bucharest in November 1928 at<br />

<strong>the</strong> head of which Iuliu Sfetea (born 1898) was assigned. Consulates were also established<br />

for a short while in <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian city of Chişinău (August 1921-July 1922) with Jänis<br />

Viksne at its lead, in <strong>the</strong> Danubian harbour of Galaţi (November 1925-1940) headed by<br />

Panait Avghenio (born 1885) and in <strong>the</strong> Black Sea harbour of Constanţa (November 1926-<br />

1940) under Constantin Constantinescu (born 1883). The location of <strong>the</strong>se consulates<br />

reflect Latvian state’s interests in promoting to <strong>the</strong> maximum possible extent commercial<br />

ties with Romania given that exports of <strong>the</strong>se two countries where partly overlapping. 3<br />

The need to open a Romanian <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular office was felt already in 1921<br />

when Romanian Bessarabians residing temporarily in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States (perhaps, among<br />

<strong>the</strong>m, also former POWs) were asking for visas to travel to Romania in order to regulate<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir juridical status. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs empowered <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation of<br />

Helsinki under <strong>the</strong> head of Dimitrie Plesnilă to deal with <strong>the</strong>se issues. 4 Soon, o<strong>the</strong>r issues<br />

surfaced that required <strong>the</strong> presence of a Romanian representative. Such was <strong>the</strong> case of a<br />

Romanian citizen expropriated without compensation according to <strong>the</strong> Latvian land<br />

reform. 5<br />

The Romanian envoy to Warsaw Alexandru Florescu (1863-1925) also pressed for <strong>the</strong><br />

opening of a legation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Government appointed<br />

1<br />

He may be one and <strong>the</strong> same person with Teodor Orghidan, descend of a well-known Transylvanian family, <strong>the</strong><br />

founder in 1919 of <strong>the</strong> first Romanian-US Chamber of Commerce where <strong>the</strong> most important banks where<br />

represented, Ion Stanciu, În umbra Europei. Relaţiile României cu Statele Unite în anii 1919-1939 (Bucureşti, 1996),<br />

37.<br />

2<br />

RNA, fund Casa Regală-Regele Ferdinand I, file 54/1925, Notification no. 41.558 of 24 July 1927 of <strong>the</strong> Direction of<br />

Personal, Protocol and Chancellary of <strong>the</strong> Orders to <strong>the</strong> Marshal of <strong>the</strong> Royal House.<br />

3<br />

DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Legation, Vol. 88 bis; Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 387.<br />

4<br />

DARMFA, fund 82, Estonia, 1925-1940, vol. 88 bis, Tel. no. 466 of 26 August 1921 from <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in<br />

Stockholm (signed I.D. Conduraki).<br />

5<br />

Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. General, vol. 1, s. 2-4, dispatch no. 12 of 11 July 1924 from Romanian Legation in<br />

Riga. In fact, <strong>the</strong> Latvian land reform was one of <strong>the</strong> most radical in Europe, <strong>the</strong> manorial estates (belonging<br />

mostly to Baltic Germans) being distributed to as many Latvians as possible “for all Latvian farmers to feel at<br />

home”, Katrina Z. S. Schwartz, ''The Occupation of Beauty'': Imagining Nature and Nation in Latvia, East European<br />

Politics and Societies 21 (2007), 265.


10 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Florescu by Royal decree of March 21 st , 1924 as <strong>the</strong> first Romanian envoy to Riga with<br />

residence in <strong>the</strong> Polish capital. His mandate started on April 1 st . 1<br />

In a report of August 3 rd , 1924, <strong>the</strong> experienced diplomat Florescu confessed to <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs that <strong>the</strong> Baltic States constituted a “marvellous observation<br />

point not only for what is going on in Russia but also in-between Germany and Russia”.<br />

Already in this report Florescu emphasized <strong>the</strong> geopolitical pressure over <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />

He insisted for a legation to be established in Riga consisting of an envoy and a Legation<br />

secretary. In his opinion, Riga was best suited for this purpose because it was “more<br />

civilized” and centrally located. Florescu had been accredited to Warsaw from 13 August<br />

1921 and will be replaced in January 1925 by his deputy, Alexandru Iacovaky. 2<br />

In his first <strong>diplomatic</strong> dispatch from Riga, a copy of which was circulated to King<br />

Ferdinand I and to Prime Minister Ioan I.C. Brătianu, Florescu finds new arguments for<br />

opening a permanent Romanian legation in Riga. Some countries such as France, Italy,<br />

Germany, Russia, Great Britain, <strong>the</strong> USA, <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands had appointed a representative<br />

for all Baltic States in Kaunas or Riga. Poland had an envoy in Riga and ano<strong>the</strong>r envoy in<br />

Tallinn (for obvious reasons due to <strong>the</strong> Vilnius dispute it was not represented in Kaunas),<br />

while Hungary had a representative for Estonia and Latvia (Budapest’s good <strong>relations</strong> with<br />

Poland prevented <strong>the</strong> appointment of an envoy to Kaunas). Only Austria and Belgium had<br />

appointed <strong>the</strong>ir envoys to Warsaw in <strong>the</strong> same capacity in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, but, as he<br />

rightly concluded, <strong>the</strong> interests of those states in <strong>the</strong> area could not be compared with <strong>the</strong><br />

interests of Romania. 3<br />

However, <strong>the</strong> Romanian diplomacy seemed still unresolved over its interests in <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic States. The international situation was gradually improving and one may say that <strong>the</strong><br />

period from 1925 (when <strong>the</strong> Locarno Agreements were signed) to 1929 (at <strong>the</strong> advent of <strong>the</strong><br />

world depression) was <strong>the</strong> most peaceful throughout <strong>the</strong> entire interwar period.<br />

Alexandru Iacovaky (1876-1949) was appointed to Latvia and Estonia in January 1925 4<br />

and presented his credentials to <strong>the</strong> first President of Latvia Jānis Čakste (1859-1927) on<br />

March 5 th . While Iacovaky stressed in his discourse <strong>the</strong> common interests of <strong>the</strong> two<br />

countries and <strong>the</strong> idea of peace, President Čakste was more unreserved when arguing that<br />

countries situated on <strong>the</strong> Western borders of Russia ought to struggle to ensure <strong>the</strong> peace<br />

<strong>the</strong>y needed for <strong>the</strong>ir free development. He insisted that his country’s efforts were to be<br />

directed towards founding a Baltic union because “union means strength”. 5 Thus, President<br />

Čakste employed an “O<strong>the</strong>rness” discourse referring to Soviet Union 6 and included <strong>the</strong><br />

Estonia and Lithuania in <strong>the</strong> inner circle of Latvia’s foreign policy and Romania and <strong>the</strong><br />

o<strong>the</strong>r Border States (as <strong>the</strong> countries surrounding <strong>the</strong> USSR on its Western border were<br />

1<br />

Idem, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940. The Legation, s. 2.<br />

2<br />

Anuar <strong>diplomatic</strong> şi consular (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1942), 185.<br />

3<br />

Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Lithuania. Relations with Germany, Italy, Romania, Sweden, USA, Vatican, vol. 4, s. 255-<br />

256, Forescu’s dispatch no. 3358 of 3 August 1924. A resolution on <strong>the</strong> document required its expedition to <strong>the</strong><br />

King Ferdinand I and to Prime Minister Ioan I.C. Brătianu.<br />

4<br />

DARMFA, fund 82, Estonia, 1925-1940, vol. 88 bis, s. 9.<br />

5<br />

DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 53-54, Iacovaky’s<br />

dispatch from Riga no. 4 of 5 March 1925.<br />

6<br />

Even nowadays such a o<strong>the</strong>rness discourse deemed as “cultural geopolitics” is blamed on Central European<br />

intellectuals (who also hold political power), Merje Kuus, “Intellectuals and geopolitics: The ‘cultural politicians’<br />

of Central Europe”, Geoforum 38 (2007), 241–251


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 11<br />

called) in <strong>the</strong> outer (or surrounding) circle. The signal was clear and required a more<br />

decisive step to be taken in <strong>the</strong> cooperation between <strong>the</strong>se states with regard to <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />

One of <strong>the</strong> most influential Latvian politician, Foreign Minister Zigfrīds Anna<br />

Meierovics (1887-1925), was even more outspoken in a private conversation when he<br />

confessed his opinion that when Soviet Union will attack one of its Western neighbours <strong>the</strong><br />

war will spread in <strong>the</strong> whole Border States area. He remarked that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union only<br />

cared for power and insisted on <strong>the</strong> importance of unity among <strong>the</strong> Border States.<br />

Meierovics also stressed <strong>the</strong> importance of exchanging information about Russia’s politics<br />

as part of an anti-Communist cooperation with Romania. 1 Opposing to rumours circulating<br />

in Riga that between May and August a Soviet attack on Romania to retake Bessarabia was<br />

forthcoming, Meierovics calmed down <strong>the</strong> Romanian diplomat’s apprehensions by arguing<br />

that a rapprochement was in progress between <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and France and thus an<br />

attack was excluded. 2 No clearer signal could have been sent to Bucharest from Riga.<br />

However, due to <strong>the</strong> lack of knowledge about <strong>the</strong> Baltic States both within political circles<br />

and public opinion, <strong>the</strong>re was almost no person prepared to hear it and thus <strong>the</strong> signal was<br />

not translated into activation of Romania’s policy vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />

When Iacovaky travelled again to Latvia to participate in this country’s celebration of its<br />

independence on 18 November 1925, he was again offered a long talk to President Čakste<br />

who proved his interest in Romanian developments. 3 The conversation occasioned <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian President <strong>the</strong> expression of hopes that a bond similar to <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish<br />

alliance will be created among <strong>the</strong> eastern Baltic States, too. The President of Latvia<br />

confessed his wish of seeing Latvia consolidating <strong>the</strong> defence line against <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.<br />

Čakste also recognized Poland’s “pivot” role in <strong>the</strong> eastern Baltic, but he complained of<br />

Polish aggressive policy towards Lithuania and of Polish inability to turn its potential into<br />

power. 4<br />

During Iacovaky’s mandate to Estonia and Latvia <strong>the</strong> Romanian Consulate to Riga was<br />

created on May 1 st , 1925 in order to deal with <strong>the</strong> current issues of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian<br />

<strong>relations</strong> and encounters. The first Romanian consul to Riga from August 1925 to 1927 was<br />

Jänis Zebergs (1871-1927) who will be succeeded by Alexandre Percy von Zimmrmann or<br />

under his Latvian name Aleksandrs Persijs Cimmermans from November 1927 to 1940. 5<br />

Carol Davilla (1886-1963) was <strong>the</strong> last Romanian envoy residing in Warsaw to represent<br />

<strong>the</strong> interests of his country in Latvia and Estonia, his appointment starting November 10 th ,<br />

1927. 6 Nicolae Titulescu who started his first mandate as Minister of Foreign Affairs of<br />

Romania on November 24 th , 1927 was resolute to open <strong>the</strong> Legation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States for<br />

which Alexandru Florescu and Alexandru Iacovaky had so eagerly insisted. While writing in<br />

his recount of his foreign policy handling in 1937, he notices that by 1928 only <strong>the</strong> common<br />

vicinity of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union marked <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong>se countries. Instead, he<br />

recognized in <strong>the</strong>se countries “elements of <strong>the</strong> first order” in Europe given <strong>the</strong> level of<br />

1<br />

DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 44-49, Iacovaky’s<br />

dispatch from Riga no. 9 of 9 March 1925.<br />

2<br />

Ibid., s. 50-52, Iacovaky’s dispatch from Riga no. 3 of 3 March 1925.<br />

3<br />

Ibid., s. 65-66, Iacovaky’s dispatch from Riga no. 64 of 19 November 1925.<br />

4<br />

Ibid., s. 67-69, Iacovaky’s dispatch from Riga no. 67 of 21 November 1925.<br />

5<br />

Idem, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, vol. 93, s. 21; Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland,<br />

Romania, vol. 8, s. 127-132, Vasile Stoica’s dispatch no. 86 of 27 February 1937 from Riga.<br />

6<br />

Anuar <strong>diplomatic</strong>…, 185.


12 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

civilization <strong>the</strong>y had reached and confessed that he wanted a “business card” of Romania (a<br />

legation) in this area. 1 Foreign Minister Titulescu initiated <strong>the</strong> opening of this legation<br />

approved by <strong>the</strong> Parliament on December 21 st and by <strong>the</strong> Regency on December 31 st , 1927 2 .<br />

This was devised to increase Romania’s ability to project its influence among <strong>the</strong> Border<br />

States. On December 26 th , Titulescu requested <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Warsaw to<br />

inform <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities on <strong>the</strong> decision of Romanian authorities to open a legation<br />

in Riga, a piece of news that enjoyed a good reception in Latvia. 3<br />

The Legation was officially set up on January 1 st , 1928 4 , but <strong>the</strong> first Romanian diplomat<br />

to reside in Latvia, Charge d’Affaires Prince Mihail R. Sturdza travelled to Riga only in May.<br />

He was assisted in his <strong>diplomatic</strong> tasks by Legation secretary Eugeniu Lukasiewicz. This<br />

was exactly <strong>the</strong> arrangement Alexandru Florescu had pleaded for in 1924. Mihail R. Sturdza<br />

(1886–1980), a former diplomat in <strong>the</strong> United States and a future Iron Guard Foreign<br />

Minister of Romania in 1940-1941, held conservative and right-wing political views prone to<br />

see <strong>the</strong> international scene in a Cold War dichotomist tone. His first <strong>diplomatic</strong> report<br />

bears witness to his world views. He saw his <strong>diplomatic</strong> assignment at <strong>the</strong> head of a<br />

Legation as an occasion to affirm himself and assumed that <strong>the</strong> most important task laying<br />

ahead was to ga<strong>the</strong>r information about Soviet Union from local politicians, diplomats,<br />

traders, travellers, local press and from <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions established in Riga. In this<br />

purpose, he acknowledged “<strong>the</strong> extraordinary richness of this land” and <strong>the</strong> espionage and<br />

counter-espionage in which <strong>the</strong> bigger legations of <strong>the</strong> USSR, <strong>the</strong> USA and Great Britain<br />

and <strong>the</strong> locals were engaged. 5 In his memoirs, he also recalls <strong>the</strong> informational support he<br />

had received from local politicians, intellectuality, clerks, etc. who were familiarized with<br />

<strong>the</strong> situation and state of affairs in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. 6<br />

Sturdza’s assessment is partly supported and party invalidated from o<strong>the</strong>r sources.<br />

George F. Kennan who spent few years (1931-1933) in <strong>the</strong> Russian Section of <strong>the</strong> US Legation<br />

in Riga terms <strong>the</strong> section “a research unit” and remembers <strong>the</strong> guidelines of his activity as<br />

being more routine-like than Sturdza believed. They read newspapers and o<strong>the</strong>r written<br />

sources and acquired information from <strong>the</strong> local diplomats and reported to <strong>the</strong> US<br />

Government to <strong>the</strong> best of <strong>the</strong>ir ability about <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong> USSR and especially<br />

about economic developments. He denies that this unit was “a sinister espionage centre” as<br />

accused by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and underlined that <strong>the</strong>re were no spies employed at <strong>the</strong><br />

Legation. 7 This assertion is confirmed by researches of historian Eero Medijainen who<br />

emphasized <strong>the</strong> lack of involvement of <strong>the</strong> members of this section in Baltic affaires. 8<br />

1<br />

Nicolae Titulescu, Politica externă a României (1937), ed. De George Potra, Constantin Turcu şi Ion M. Oprea<br />

(Bucureşti: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1994), 224.<br />

2<br />

Constantin I. Turcu, “Nicolae Titulescu – promotor al largirii relatiilor <strong>diplomatic</strong>e ale Romaniei,” in Gh. Buzatu<br />

coord., Nicolae Titulescu si strategia pacii (Iasi: Ed. Junimea, 1982), 96.<br />

3<br />

DARMFA, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, vol. 93, s. 5, 7, Titulescu’s address of 26 Dcember 1927 to Carl Davilla,<br />

Warsaw and Gheorghe Davidescu’s dispatch no. 5268 of 30 December 1927 to Titulescu.<br />

4<br />

Ibidem, s. 8-9, Decree of <strong>the</strong> Regency no. 3809 of 31 December 1927.<br />

5<br />

Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 76-79.<br />

6<br />

Mihail Sturdza, România şi sfârşitul Europei. Amintiri din ţara pierdută (Alba Iulia-Paris: Editura Fronde, 1994),<br />

65.<br />

7<br />

George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 47-48.<br />

8<br />

Eero Medijainen, „The Riga Group” and <strong>the</strong> Origins of <strong>the</strong> Cold War”, în „Muille maille vierahille…”.Kalervo Hovi<br />

ja yleinen historia” (Vaasa: Julkaisija Turun Historiallinen Yhdistys, 2002), 73-90.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 13<br />

During Sturdza’s appointment in Riga, Romania and Latvia were among <strong>the</strong> cosignatories<br />

on February 9 th , 1929 of <strong>the</strong> agreement on putting into effect ahead of schedule<br />

<strong>the</strong> Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) on <strong>the</strong> renunciation of war as an instrument of national<br />

policy. Eventually, in 1932 Finland (January 21 st ) 1 , Latvia (February 5 th ) 2 and Estonia ( May<br />

4 th ) 3 , <strong>the</strong> three countries where Sturdza was accredited, signed non-aggression treaties with<br />

Soviet Union to <strong>the</strong> dismay of Romanian diplomat.<br />

After a failed attempt to appoint <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian politician Ion Pelivan as envoy to Riga<br />

in 1930, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Government finally raised Sturdza to <strong>the</strong> position of envoy<br />

extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary on June 1 st , 1932. 4 Sturdza had just been<br />

involved in <strong>the</strong> Riga-held failed negotiations of 1932 with <strong>the</strong> USSR. Despite <strong>the</strong> USSR’s<br />

promises that it would not bring into discussion <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian issue, <strong>the</strong> Bulgarian born<br />

Soviet diplomat Boris Spiridonovich Stomoniakov (1882–1941) did not hold on to that<br />

promise which he wanted to address in a preamble to <strong>the</strong> treaty. 5 This will leave Sturdza<br />

with a lasting grievance towards Titulescu who opposed to <strong>the</strong> negotiations with <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />

in <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong>y were conducted by foreign ministers Dimitrie Ghica (1931-1932) and<br />

Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (1932). In his memoirs, Sturdza bluntly accuses Titulescu of being<br />

“Moscow’s Trojan Horse”. 6<br />

To replace Nukša, Oļģerds Grosvalds was selected (1884-1962), who represented his<br />

country in Romania starting with March 1930. Similar to his predecessor, he also started his<br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> career in France in 1919 as a secretary of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Delegation to <strong>the</strong> Peace<br />

Conference before being appointed as a diplomat in Belgium and <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands and<br />

eventually posted to Warsaw in 1930. According to Latvian Foreign Ministry publications,<br />

Grosvalds ended his assignment in Romania in September 1934. 7 However, he was<br />

designated as Latvia’s representative at <strong>the</strong> Romanian National Holiday celebration of May<br />

10 th , 1935. 8 Already at <strong>the</strong> time he was <strong>the</strong> envoy of his country in France, Spain and<br />

Portugal with residence in Paris. 9 During <strong>the</strong> tenure of <strong>the</strong>ir position as envoys by<br />

Grosvalds and Sturdza, Romania and Latvia were again co-signatories of an important<br />

international instrument, <strong>the</strong> Convention for <strong>the</strong> Definition of Aggression signed in<br />

London on July 3 rd , 1933. 10 The Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu interpreted this<br />

document as a new unbeatable juridical guarantee for his country’s integrity.<br />

Whereas in November 1935 Nukša was re-appointed as envoy to Bucharest, Romania<br />

chose to entrust <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> Legation to Constantin Văllimărescu (1896-1972) who will<br />

also be <strong>the</strong> first Romanian envoy accredited to Kaunas in January 1936. 11 In fact, President<br />

Kārlis Ulmanis of Latvia will be numbered among <strong>the</strong> personalities who insisted for a<br />

Romanian <strong>diplomatic</strong> presence in Kaunas. Ulmanis was assessing favourably in September<br />

1<br />

The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 27, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents (Oct., 1933), 171-174.<br />

2<br />

Ibid., 182-184.<br />

3<br />

Ibid., 167-169.<br />

4<br />

DARMFA, fund 82, Latvia, 1925-1940, vol. 93, s. 10, King Carol II’s decree no. 1762 of 20 May 1932.<br />

5<br />

Sturdza, 69-71.<br />

6<br />

Ibid., 73-75.<br />

7<br />

Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 367.<br />

8<br />

RNA, fund Casa Regală- Regele Carol al II-lea, file 140/1935, s. 142-147.<br />

9<br />

Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 126.<br />

10<br />

The Soviet designs are approached in Christi Scott Bartman, Lawfare. Use of <strong>the</strong> Definition of Aggressive War by<br />

<strong>the</strong> Soviet and Russian Federation Governments (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 36-41.<br />

11<br />

DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Lithuania, vol. 4, s. 265, 141-145.


14 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1935 <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>relations</strong> with Romania in a speech occasioned by <strong>the</strong> cessation of<br />

Sturdza’s mandate in Riga, while Sturdza emphasized ideals of peace, harmony, order and<br />

frontier stability as a basis for <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two countries. 1 At <strong>the</strong><br />

beginning of Văllimărescu’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Riga in November 1935, Ulmanis also<br />

remarked <strong>the</strong> “perfect harmony” between two states that support peace and stability in<br />

Europe. 2<br />

Eventually, Vasile Stoica (1895-1967) will be <strong>the</strong> dissatisfied but effective envoy of<br />

Romania in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. 3 Stoica’s feeling of being side-lined by his posting to Riga<br />

resonated perhaps to <strong>the</strong> perception of many a Romanian diplomat at <strong>the</strong> time. Although<br />

he will soon be charmed by <strong>the</strong> good organization and progress of <strong>the</strong>se countries, he was<br />

still complaining to Foreign Minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen in September 1938 that “I<br />

cannot shake off <strong>the</strong> feeling that I‘m wasting my time”. 4 Despite his continuous complaints,<br />

Stoica’s contribution to <strong>the</strong> development of Romania-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> until spring 1939<br />

when he ended his mission was notable. 5 He will also insist for <strong>the</strong> maintenance of a<br />

legation in Riga at least under <strong>the</strong> head of Chargé d'Affaires, a proposal that will be<br />

accepted by <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6<br />

At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s, <strong>the</strong> Soviet diplomacy and espionage agreed to <strong>the</strong> conclusion<br />

that Germany planned <strong>the</strong> attack of Soviet Union through <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

regarded this area as being of a key strategic importance. Soon, news arrived at Kremlin<br />

informing that Estonia and Lithuania were almost ready to accept an inevitable German<br />

occupation, while Latvia was engaged in secret talks with <strong>the</strong> Reich. Although such<br />

apprehensions were greatly exaggerated as we know it today, <strong>the</strong> Soviet leaders were very<br />

concerned and decided to slow down <strong>the</strong> process by inviting in 1936 <strong>the</strong> heads of <strong>the</strong><br />

general staffs of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States to Moscow for “consultations”. In 1937, Foreign Minister of<br />

Latvia Vilhelms Munters visited Moscow and held a long talk with Stalin. 7<br />

To some extent Soviet Union’s evaluations of German interests were well placed and<br />

Germany did look at <strong>the</strong> Baltic States as a part of <strong>the</strong> German Lebensraum. Never<strong>the</strong>less,<br />

by 1939 <strong>the</strong>se states were “fairly incidental among Hitler’s concerns and objectives” as<br />

noted by Alexander Dallin. 8 The Germans were also prepared to trade <strong>the</strong> fate of Baltic<br />

States as <strong>the</strong>y will soon give ample proof. Never<strong>the</strong>less, it is impossible to document any<br />

Baltic governments’ plan of giving up sovereignty to Germany, nor any proof can be found<br />

to state that Baltic nations’ public opinion was pro-German. On <strong>the</strong> contrary, as a result of<br />

previous tensions between German Balts minority and local majorities, even in what<br />

Moscow considered <strong>the</strong> most pro-German state of Estonia, a survey of April 1939<br />

1<br />

Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 93, Sturdza’s dispatch no.<br />

86 of 13 September 1935.<br />

2<br />

Ibid., s. 127-132, Stoica’s dispatch no. 86 of 27 February 1937; RNA, fund Casa Regală-Regele Carol II, file 145/1930,<br />

s. 15.<br />

3<br />

He complained on 23 February 1937 about being “thrown up” to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States to his friend, historian Charles<br />

Upson Clark, Idem, fund Vasile Stoica, file I/69, s. 16.<br />

4<br />

DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 3, s. 138-141, Stoica’s letter of 8 September 1938.<br />

5<br />

Ioan Opriş, Vasile Stoica în serviciul României (Bucureşti: Ed. Oscar Print, 2008), 220-253; Miloiu 2003, 188-194.<br />

6<br />

DARMFA, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with o<strong>the</strong>r states, vol. 7, Stoica’s dispatch no. 152 of 4 February<br />

1939.<br />

7<br />

L Sotskov, “The Baltics and Geopolitics”, International Affairs 53 (2007), 105-107.<br />

8<br />

Alexander Dallin, “The Baltic States between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia,” in V. Stanley Vardys, Romuald J.<br />

Misiunas eds., The Baltic States in Peace and War, 1917–1945 (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 102.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 15<br />

discovered that in nine out of eleven counties Germany was considered <strong>the</strong> bigger threat<br />

and <strong>the</strong> population believed that it was better to accept <strong>the</strong> arrival of <strong>the</strong> Russians than <strong>the</strong><br />

arrival of <strong>the</strong> Germans. 1 As regards <strong>the</strong> foreign policy of Latvia and Estonia, especially, after<br />

placing <strong>the</strong>ir trust for a long time in <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, at <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s <strong>the</strong>y<br />

began recognizing <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> League and started to move into <strong>the</strong> direction of<br />

neutrality. As Munters confessed to British envoy to Riga Charles William Orde in February<br />

1939, “Latvia has always said, and proved, that it would join no bloc, and its independent<br />

stance has preserved it from getting involved in <strong>the</strong> conflicts of o<strong>the</strong>rs.” Therefore, Latvia<br />

and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States, members of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente, decided in September 1938 that<br />

<strong>the</strong>y will take part in <strong>the</strong> sanctions imposed by <strong>the</strong> League of Nations only on a case by case<br />

basis. 2<br />

At <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> 1930s Romania will be represented in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States by chargé<br />

d’affaires, first by Marcel Romanescu, <strong>the</strong> gifted son of a Craiova magnate and former<br />

mayor family, from July 1 st 1939 3 , and after his nervous breakdown by chargé d’affaires<br />

Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (from September 1 st 1939) 4 who will witness Latvia’s<br />

incorporation by <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. His testimonies are included in this volume. It is ironic<br />

that Vice-Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> People's Commissaries, Andrey Januarevich<br />

Vyshinsky, was <strong>the</strong> main actor of <strong>the</strong> play designed to incorporate Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

Union and communize Romania. The first event found Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti as<br />

Chargé d’Affaires in Riga, <strong>the</strong> second one as Foreign Minister of Romania.<br />

The German conquest of Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1939 will open <strong>the</strong> possibility of<br />

setting up a permanent Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Bucharest, which was first brought<br />

into discussion in November 1938 soon after <strong>the</strong> Munich Agreement. 5 In a conversation<br />

with envoy Stoica, Foreign Minister Munters had expressed his intention to upgrade <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>relations</strong> with Romania. 6 Indeed, on October 18 th , 1939 a new Latvian envoy, Ludvigs Ēķis<br />

(1892-1943), a former Finance Minister of Latvia, presented his credentials to King Carol II,<br />

his residence being set in Bucharest. 7 Ēķis was very energetic and tried to be involved as<br />

much as possible with his colleagues in order to understand <strong>the</strong> nature of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-<br />

German <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> consequences on small and mid-sized nations of Eastern<br />

Europe. 8 He happened to be <strong>the</strong> last Latvian diplomat appointed to Romania and<br />

important accounts of <strong>the</strong> closing of <strong>the</strong> Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in Bucharest are<br />

included in this volume.<br />

1<br />

Olaf Mertelsmann, “How <strong>the</strong> Russians turned into <strong>the</strong> image of <strong>the</strong> “national enemy” of <strong>the</strong> Estonians”, Pro<br />

Ethnologia 19 (2005), 48.<br />

2<br />

John Hiden, Patrick Salmon, editors, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers from <strong>the</strong> Foreign<br />

Office Confidential Print, Part II: From <strong>the</strong> First to <strong>the</strong> Second World War, Series F, Europe, 1919-1939, Vol. 67,<br />

Scandinavia and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, 1938-1939 (University Publications of America, 1996), 29-30.<br />

3<br />

DARMFA, fund Marcel Romanescu, Vol. II, Royal decree no. 2229 of 30 May 1939.<br />

4<br />

Ibid., Royal decree of 30 August 1939.<br />

5<br />

Idem, fund 71/1920-1944, Latvia. Relations with Lithuania, Poland, Romania, vol. 8, s. 157, Stoica’s dispatch no.<br />

1254 of 14 November 1938.<br />

6<br />

Ibid., s. 158, Stoica’s dispatch no. 152 of 4 February 1939.<br />

7<br />

RNA, fund Preşedinţia Consiliului de Miniştri, file 269/1939, s. 45, Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti’s dispatch no. 1263<br />

of 4 October 1939; Regele Carol al II-lea al României, Însemnări zilnice, vol. II, 13 martie – 15 decembrie 1939<br />

(Bucureşti: Ed. Scripta, 1997), 253; Ē. Jēkabsons and V. Ščerbinskis, 95-97.<br />

8<br />

Ulkoasiainministeriön arkisto [The Archives of <strong>the</strong> Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs], fund 5 C14, Ensio<br />

Hiitonen’s dispatch no. 27 of 4 December 1939.


16 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

The annexation of <strong>the</strong> Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> communization of Romania<br />

created a half a century hiatus in <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two states. Moreover, according<br />

to a protocol signed in Moscow on March 7 th 1958 between <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Popular<br />

Republic of Romania and <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Union of <strong>the</strong> Socialist Soviet Republics<br />

regarding <strong>the</strong> regulation of <strong>the</strong>ir mutual claims related to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia,<br />

included in this volume, Romania consented to give its recognition, implicitly though, to <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet incorporation of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />

Several decades later, when Latvia re-proclaimed its independence according to <strong>the</strong><br />

Constitutional Law of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia "On <strong>the</strong> Statehood of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia"<br />

of August 21 st , 1991, Romania numbered among <strong>the</strong> first countries to give international<br />

recognition to <strong>the</strong> reborn Baltic state on August 26 th by a note from <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />

Affairs of Romania, Adrian Năstase 1 . This formed <strong>the</strong> basis of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two<br />

states, which are today partner countries in <strong>the</strong> EU and <strong>the</strong> NATO.<br />

Silviu Miloiu<br />

1<br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/ministry/exhibitions/20-anniversary/ (accessed,<br />

10.10.2012).


Editors’ note and acknowledgements<br />

This volume of <strong>documents</strong> appears as a pay tribute to <strong>the</strong> 90 th anniversary of <strong>the</strong><br />

establishment of <strong>the</strong> first Latvian Legation in Romania with residence in Warsaw. Martiņš<br />

Nukša, <strong>the</strong> first Latvian Minister in Romania, presented his credentials to King Ferdinand I on<br />

May 31 st , 1922. Two years later, on March 21 st , 1924, Romania also appointed its first Envoy<br />

Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Latvia in <strong>the</strong> person of its experienced diplomat<br />

settled in Warsaw Alexandru G. Florescu. It was not by chance that <strong>the</strong> first envoys of <strong>the</strong> two<br />

countries resided in Poland. The reborn state of Poland, winner over <strong>the</strong> Red Army, was at <strong>the</strong><br />

time <strong>the</strong> strongest political actor in <strong>the</strong> region and <strong>the</strong> mediator of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between<br />

Romania and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. To a large extent <strong>the</strong> Romanian Baltic policy, subordinated to<br />

<strong>the</strong> larger Romanian Eastern policy, was subsumed to <strong>the</strong> priorities of its alliance with Poland<br />

set up in March 1921. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> also had <strong>the</strong>ir own agenda,<br />

extending from <strong>the</strong> collective security centred around <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, <strong>the</strong> trade <strong>relations</strong><br />

between <strong>the</strong> two countries, <strong>the</strong> travellers or scientists’ interactions, <strong>the</strong> connections between<br />

<strong>the</strong> radical right-wing movements to <strong>the</strong> bonds between <strong>the</strong> German and Jewish minorities.<br />

When Czechoslovakia and Poland fell pray to <strong>the</strong> aggressive goals of Nazi Germany in 1939,<br />

Latvia decided to appoint a former distinguished Finance Minister Ludvigs Ēķis as its Envoy<br />

Extraordinary in Romania and Hungary with residence in Bucharest.<br />

A significant part of this complex reality is incorporated into this volume. The selected 205<br />

<strong>documents</strong> are presented in full in Romanian and Latvian language original and <strong>the</strong>ir English<br />

language translation in order to provide access to a larger audience from Romania, from Latvia<br />

and from abroad to <strong>the</strong>ir content. The editors’ interventions in <strong>the</strong> text are minor and are only<br />

meant to correct some obvious grammar or spelling mistakes. Whenever it was deemed<br />

necessary, <strong>the</strong> editors inserted footnotes with additional explanations or comments meant to<br />

facilitate a better understanding of <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> respective <strong>documents</strong>. A list containing a<br />

brief description of each of <strong>the</strong> selected <strong>documents</strong> was integrated into this volume in order to<br />

give readers an overview of <strong>the</strong> content of this book and to facilitate <strong>the</strong>ir access to <strong>the</strong> desired<br />

material. A proper names index was also appended with <strong>the</strong> purpose of giving <strong>the</strong> readers a<br />

leisurely access to information.<br />

The editors would like to express <strong>the</strong>ir gratitude to a number of institutions and persons<br />

who contributed to <strong>the</strong> publication of this volume. We would like to express <strong>the</strong> earnest<br />

gratitude to <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Romanian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and especially to His<br />

Excellency Mr. Einars Semanis for <strong>the</strong>ir patronage of this book. The main support into<br />

completing it came from <strong>the</strong> Honorary Consulate of Latvia in Bucharest and Niro Investment<br />

Group. His Excellency Ambassador Ioan Donca, The Honorary Consul of Latvia in Bucharest,<br />

and Mr. Nicolae Dumitru, President of Niro Investment Group, extended <strong>the</strong>ir generous<br />

support to this project and made it possible to be accomplished. The National Cultural Fund<br />

Administration deserves <strong>the</strong> merit of showing <strong>the</strong>ir awareness to <strong>the</strong> significance of this project<br />

and offering <strong>the</strong>ir full assistance and sponsorship.<br />

The editors wish to seize this opportunity to express to all <strong>the</strong>se highly respected<br />

institutions and persons <strong>the</strong> deepest appreciation and reverence.


18 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Our gracious gratefulness also goes to Latvian historian Eva Eihmane, for <strong>the</strong> marvellous<br />

adaptation of Latvian <strong>documents</strong> into English language. We would also like to thank <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian company S.C. Acta.Doc SRL for <strong>the</strong>ir consistent translation of Romanian <strong>documents</strong><br />

into English language. Mihaela Moagher and Laima Jēkabsone did an excellent job as regards<br />

<strong>the</strong> transcription of <strong>the</strong> archival <strong>documents</strong> enclosed in this volume. I would also like to<br />

express my gratitude to Magdalena Ionescu who helped translating some <strong>documents</strong> from<br />

French language into Romanian.<br />

Last but not least, we would like to express our appreciation to our collaborators of <strong>the</strong><br />

Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House for <strong>the</strong>ir commitment and assistance in <strong>the</strong> appearance of<br />

this book.<br />

This volume continues <strong>the</strong> consistent efforts of The Romanian Association for Baltic and<br />

Nordic Studies (www.arsbn.ro) of bringing <strong>the</strong> Baltic sea region nations and <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />

closer toge<strong>the</strong>r by means of enriched knowledge, awareness and interchange.


19189<br />

1920<br />

1921<br />

LIST OF DOCUMENTS<br />

Document 1 ......................................................................................................................... 39<br />

Declaration of Common Aims of <strong>the</strong> Independent Mid-European nations in convention<br />

assembled at Independence Hall Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States of America,<br />

1918<br />

Document 2 ........................................................................................................................ 40<br />

January, The Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Warsaw to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

informing on <strong>the</strong> transit through Romanian territory of Latvian refugees from Russia<br />

Document 3 ......................................................................................................................... 41<br />

16 January, The Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia to Latvia’s<br />

military representative in Poland with regard to <strong>the</strong> transit through Romanian territory of<br />

Latvian refugees from Russia<br />

Document 4 ......................................................................................................................... 41<br />

24 February, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of<br />

Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus granting permission to Latvian nurses and officers to travel from<br />

Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />

Document 5 ........................................................................................................................ 42<br />

2 March, The Representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus to <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong><br />

General Staff of Romania with respect to <strong>the</strong> permission granted to Latvian nurses and<br />

officers to travel from Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />

Document 6 ........................................................................................................................ 42<br />

2 March, Representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister of<br />

Romania with respect to <strong>the</strong> permission granted to Latvian nurses and officers to travel<br />

from Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />

Document 7 ........................................................................................................................ 43<br />

2 March, The Representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus to <strong>the</strong> Military Attaché<br />

of Poland in Romania with regard to <strong>the</strong> permission granted to Latvian nurses and officers<br />

to travel from Russia to Latvia through Romania<br />

Document 8 ........................................................................................................................ 43<br />

26 February, Envoy of Romania in Copenhagen to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia<br />

communicating <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Government of Romania has recognised Latvia’s<br />

independence<br />

Document 9 ........................................................................................................................ 43<br />

15 April, The Envoy of Latvia in Finland to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia<br />

following a conversation with <strong>the</strong> new Minister of Romania in Helsinki with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Polish alliance and <strong>the</strong> creation of a Border States defence union against Russia


20 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1922<br />

1923<br />

1924<br />

Document 10 ....................................................................................................................... 44<br />

16 April, The Minister of Romania in Finland to Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> Latvian appeal<br />

to Romania to contribute to <strong>the</strong> lowing of <strong>the</strong> political tension between Poland and<br />

Lithuania<br />

Document 11........................................................................................................................ 45<br />

23 April, Director of <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />

of Latvia to Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki commenting on Latvia’s position in regard to<br />

Romania, Poland and <strong>the</strong> Border States’ cooperation<br />

Document 12 ....................................................................................................................... 47<br />

20 May, The Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki to Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Latvian political and <strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Romanian desire to support<br />

<strong>the</strong> Border States cooperation<br />

Document 13 ....................................................................................................................... 49<br />

22 May, The Romanian Minister in Finland to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry following talks with<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister concerning <strong>the</strong> cooperation of <strong>the</strong> Border States<br />

Document 14 ........................................................................................................................52<br />

26 May, The interim head of <strong>the</strong> Legation of Latvia in Poland to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />

Affairs about <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Border States defence union, <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian<br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> situation in Bessarabia and Ukraine<br />

Document 15 ........................................................................................................................ 53<br />

28 May, The Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw about <strong>the</strong> Latvian <strong>diplomatic</strong> representation in Romania<br />

Document 16 ....................................................................................................................... 54<br />

31 May, The speech of Martiņš Nukša, <strong>the</strong> first Minister Plenipotentiary appointed in<br />

Romania with residence in Warsaw, on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> presentation of his credentials<br />

in <strong>the</strong> hands of King of Romania Ferdinand I<br />

Document 17 ....................................................................................................................... 56<br />

4 November, Envoy of Latvia in Warsaw to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to<br />

<strong>the</strong> coronation of <strong>the</strong> sovereigns of Romania<br />

Document 18 ....................................................................................................................... 63<br />

14 December, The Romanian Minister in Poland to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning a<br />

Soviet proposal of Non-Aggression Pact with Latvia<br />

Document 19 ....................................................................................................................... 64<br />

21 March, The decree of King Ferdinand I of appointing a Romanian Minister in Latvia and<br />

Estonia


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 21<br />

1925<br />

1926<br />

1927<br />

Document 20 ...................................................................................................................... 66<br />

March, Report by Envoy in Warsaw to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about his visit to<br />

Romania in February 1925 and <strong>the</strong> talks with Romanian leading politicians about <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong>, consular, political and economic <strong>relations</strong> between Romania and Latvia and<br />

<strong>the</strong> Border States cooperation<br />

Document 21 ....................................................................................................................... 79<br />

2 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

menace to <strong>the</strong> Border States and <strong>the</strong> latter’s cooperation in order to keep <strong>the</strong> Soviet threat<br />

at bay<br />

Document 22 ....................................................................................................................... 85<br />

3 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with respect to an<br />

interview given to Latvian newspaper Rīgas Ziņas on <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 23 ....................................................................................................................... 87<br />

4 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with<br />

regard to <strong>the</strong> Riga Military Conference (March-April 1925) of <strong>the</strong> Border States designed to<br />

improve <strong>the</strong> exchange of information among <strong>the</strong> participating countries concerning Soviet<br />

Union<br />

Document 24 ...................................................................................................................... 88<br />

24 April, Latvia’s Minister of War to Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to sound <strong>the</strong><br />

opinion of <strong>the</strong> Romanian party on <strong>the</strong> entrusting of <strong>the</strong> acting military agent in Poland<br />

also with <strong>the</strong> duties of military agent in Romania<br />

Document 25 ....................................................................................................................... 89<br />

28 July, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs about<br />

<strong>the</strong> Soviet proposals to Poland and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States of mutual non-aggression treaty<br />

Document 26 ...................................................................................................................... 89<br />

21 November, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry following a<br />

conversation with <strong>the</strong> Latvian President Jānis Čakste on <strong>the</strong> role of Latvia, Romania, Soviet<br />

Union and Poland in <strong>the</strong> Border States area<br />

Document 27 ....................................................................................................................... 94<br />

19 August, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with<br />

respect to <strong>the</strong> prospect of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian trade <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> economic<br />

situation of Romania<br />

Document 28 ...................................................................................................................... 95<br />

9 May, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian-Romanian trade <strong>relations</strong>


22 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1928<br />

1929<br />

1930<br />

Document 29 ...................................................................................................................... 96<br />

11 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />

informing about his talks in Bucharest concerning <strong>the</strong> appointment of a new Romanian<br />

envoy in Latvia<br />

Document 30 ...................................................................................................................... 97<br />

22 February, The instructions of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian Legation in Latvia restricting its ability to issue visas to former Bessarabian<br />

subjects of <strong>the</strong> Russian Empire<br />

Document 31 ....................................................................................................................... 97<br />

2 March, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />

analysing <strong>the</strong> visit of Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to Warsaw and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-<br />

Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 32 ....................................................................................................................... 98<br />

June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry approaching <strong>the</strong><br />

perspectives of regional cooperation in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea rim area and <strong>the</strong> choices opened to<br />

Latvia in this respect<br />

Document 33 ...................................................................................................................... 104<br />

30 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />

role of plaque tournante of Riga as a center of diplomacy and espionage with regard to<br />

Soviet Union<br />

Document 34 ...................................................................................................................... 107<br />

28 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry,<br />

miscellaneous: <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian prospects of a trade and financial agreement, <strong>the</strong><br />

reflection of Romania in Latvian press, <strong>the</strong> evolutions in Lithuania and <strong>the</strong> regional<br />

implications<br />

Document 35 ...................................................................................................................... 110<br />

October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry following a<br />

meeting with <strong>the</strong> Latvian Prime Minister on <strong>the</strong> spontaneous solidarity of Border States<br />

against <strong>the</strong> Soviet menace<br />

Document 36 ..................................................................................................................... 110<br />

November, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning a<br />

Latvian proposal of concluding a trade treaty with Romania<br />

Document 37 ....................................................................................................................... 111<br />

4 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with<br />

<strong>the</strong> regional policy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea area with effect on <strong>the</strong> solidarity of <strong>the</strong> Border States<br />

against <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />

Document 38...................................................................................................................... 114


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 23<br />

14 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire and <strong>the</strong> Achilles' heel of <strong>the</strong> defense, Bessarabia<br />

Document 39 ..................................................................................................................... 116<br />

20 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry emphasizing<br />

<strong>the</strong> necessity of continuity at <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga due to <strong>the</strong> pivotal role of t<strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> mission situated at <strong>the</strong> crossroads of <strong>the</strong> bourgeoisie and communist systems<br />

Document 40 ...................................................................................................................... 117<br />

24 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />

appointment of a new Latvian envoy to Romania with residence in Warsaw<br />

Document 41 ...................................................................................................................... 118<br />

5 June, Instructions of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign Minister to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia<br />

asking him to summon Latvia’s support for <strong>the</strong> Romanian candidate for <strong>the</strong> Permanent<br />

Court of International Justice<br />

Document 42 ..................................................................................................................... 120<br />

9 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry conveying <strong>the</strong><br />

positive answer of <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities for <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Romanian candidate for<br />

<strong>the</strong> Permanent Court of International Justice<br />

Document 43 ...................................................................................................................... 120<br />

15 July, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Prime Minister and Minister of<br />

Foreign Affairs describing <strong>the</strong> enthronement of King Carol II, <strong>the</strong> Romanian domestic and<br />

foreign policies and <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 44 ..................................................................................................................... 126<br />

9 September, The Romanian legation secretary in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with<br />

respect to <strong>the</strong> reflection in <strong>the</strong> Latvian press criticism of <strong>the</strong> treatment by Romanian<br />

authorities of Latvian pilots in Bucharest<br />

Document 45...................................................................................................................... 127<br />

22 September, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia with<br />

regard to <strong>the</strong> circumstances leading to <strong>the</strong> troubled reception of Latvian pilots in<br />

Bucharest<br />

Document 46 ..................................................................................................................... 128<br />

24 September, The Romanian legation secretary in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

informing on <strong>the</strong> explanations given to <strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong> visit<br />

of Latvian pilots to Bucharest accepted by <strong>the</strong> Latvian authorities<br />

Document 47...................................................................................................................... 129<br />

23 October, Commercial agreement between Romania and Latvia<br />

Document 48 ..................................................................................................................... 132<br />

9 December, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard<br />

to Polish-Romanian alliance and possibilities to improve it modeled on <strong>the</strong> Estonian-<br />

Latvian treaty, thus streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea – Black Sea anti-Soviet front


24 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1931<br />

Document 49 ..................................................................................................................... 138<br />

15 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />

on <strong>the</strong> Border States cooperation with regard to Soviet Union<br />

Document 50 ..................................................................................................................... 139<br />

13 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Ministry of Foreign Affairs with<br />

regard to <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Little Entente customs union and <strong>the</strong> evolutions of <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 51 ...................................................................................................................... 140<br />

14 April, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet attempts to fragment <strong>the</strong> Border States bloc and <strong>the</strong> financial incentives given to<br />

Latvia in this respect<br />

Document 52 ...................................................................................................................... 145<br />

15 May, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia detailing <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Polish plans of having <strong>the</strong> non-aggression treaties between Soviet Union and<br />

<strong>the</strong> Border States signed concomitantly<br />

Document 53 ...................................................................................................................... 146<br />

17 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />

economic bases of Soviet growing influence in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> interest of<br />

Romania of keeping tightly united <strong>the</strong> Border States group in order to avoid <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />

isolation<br />

Document 54....................................................................................................................... 151<br />

June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dispatched in <strong>the</strong><br />

circumstances of <strong>the</strong> preparations for <strong>the</strong> opening of <strong>the</strong> disarmament conference,<br />

emphasizing <strong>the</strong> necessity of Border States cooperation and outlining <strong>the</strong> alleged Soviet<br />

secret plans of divide et impera<br />

Document 55 ...................................................................................................................... 155<br />

July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing on <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian General Staff commitment to maintain <strong>the</strong> Border States solidarity<br />

Document 56 ..................................................................................................................... 156<br />

6 October, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia concerning<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade agreement and <strong>the</strong> need for Latvian consensus of <strong>the</strong><br />

provisions of this treaty<br />

Document 57 ...................................................................................................................... 157<br />

12 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

concerning <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade settlement and <strong>the</strong> need for Latvian consensus of<br />

<strong>the</strong> provisions of this treaty<br />

Document 58 ..................................................................................................................... 158<br />

October, The Romanian Foreign Ministry to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-German trade agreement and <strong>the</strong> need for Latvian consensus of <strong>the</strong> provisions<br />

of this treaty


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 25<br />

1932<br />

Document 59 ..................................................................................................................... 158<br />

October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Latvian trade <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 60 ..................................................................................................................... 159<br />

16 December, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />

about <strong>the</strong> Latvian wholehearted endorsement of Romanian-Soviet negations to take place<br />

in Riga<br />

Document 61 ...................................................................................................................... 159<br />

8 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing on<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Minister support for a common Border States policy in dealings with<br />

Moscow<br />

Document 62 ..................................................................................................................... 160<br />

16 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with respect<br />

to <strong>the</strong> Polish withdrawal from a common position of <strong>the</strong> Border States in negotiations<br />

with Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> consequences for <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />

Document 63 ..................................................................................................................... 161<br />

30 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister emphasizing<br />

<strong>the</strong> necessity of a common standing of <strong>the</strong> Border States on <strong>the</strong> issue of ratifying <strong>the</strong> nonaggression<br />

treaties with Soviet Union<br />

Document 64 ..................................................................................................................... 163<br />

4 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister detailing <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> demarche of Romanian, Polish, Estonian and Finnish envoys in order to<br />

postpone Latvia’s signing of non-aggression treaties with Soviet Union<br />

Document 65 ..................................................................................................................... 164<br />

5 February, The Romanian Prime Minister to <strong>the</strong> legations in Paris and Geneva asking <strong>the</strong><br />

French support for <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> demarche of Romanian, Polish, Estonian and Finnish<br />

envoys in Riga in order to postpone Latvia’s signing of non-aggression treaties with Soviet<br />

Union<br />

Document 66 ..................................................................................................................... 165<br />

7 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister informing on<br />

<strong>the</strong> concluding of <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact between Latvia and <strong>the</strong> USSR<br />

Document 67 ..................................................................................................................... 166<br />

12 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister evoking <strong>the</strong><br />

evolution of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Soviet negotiations in Riga, <strong>the</strong> atmosphere in which <strong>the</strong>y took<br />

place and <strong>the</strong> regional implications of <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong>se discussions<br />

Document 68 ..................................................................................................................... 173<br />

11 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

sketching out <strong>the</strong> main topics of conversation between Romanian Foreign Minister and<br />

<strong>the</strong> Polish leaders during <strong>the</strong> former’s visit to Poland


26 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1933<br />

Document 69 ..................................................................................................................... 174<br />

15 April, The Romanian Foreign Minister to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia about <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Polish exchange of views, occasioned by a visit of Marshal Józef Piłsudski to<br />

Bucharest, on <strong>the</strong> Polish position towards <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts proposed by Soviet<br />

Union<br />

Document 70 ..................................................................................................................... 176<br />

3 May, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about<br />

<strong>the</strong> dissolution of <strong>the</strong> Border States’ common stance with regard to Soviet Union<br />

Document 71 ...................................................................................................................... 180<br />

16 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Prime Minister regarding <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

interest in Bessarabia and <strong>the</strong> desire to dissolving <strong>the</strong> Border States bloc<br />

Document 72 ...................................................................................................................... 185<br />

31 December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet economic and political pressure on Latvia<br />

Document 73 ...................................................................................................................... 187<br />

10 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet menace and <strong>the</strong> debates on disarmament<br />

Document 74...................................................................................................................... 191<br />

20 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry outlining <strong>the</strong> first<br />

consequences in Latvia following Hitler’s appointment as chancellor of Germany<br />

Document 75 ...................................................................................................................... 193<br />

April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> security<br />

concerns in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> growing Latvian interest in <strong>the</strong> Little Entente<br />

Document 76 ..................................................................................................................... 194<br />

3 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry sketching <strong>the</strong> German-<br />

Latvian tensions and <strong>the</strong> lowering of <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Baltic alliance<br />

Document 77 ...................................................................................................................... 195<br />

15 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> renewed<br />

interest in <strong>the</strong> neutrality of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />

Document 78 ..................................................................................................................... 197<br />

4 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> personality and<br />

political views of <strong>the</strong> new Latvian Minister in France<br />

Document 79 ..................................................................................................................... 198<br />

26 July, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> common<br />

demarche with <strong>the</strong> Czechoslovak Minister in protest of a defamatory article on a ga<strong>the</strong>ring<br />

of veterans to be held in Cluj-Napoca published by a Riga German right-wing newspaper . 3


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 27<br />

1934<br />

Document 80 ..................................................................................................................... 201<br />

2 October, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> leading<br />

Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> in<br />

September 1933<br />

Document 81 ....................................................................................................................... 211<br />

30 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

dealing with <strong>the</strong> appointment of a new Soviet Minister and his political views as expressed<br />

in an interview given to <strong>the</strong> Latvian press<br />

Document 82 ..................................................................................................................... 214<br />

1 November, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

on <strong>the</strong> leading Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian<br />

<strong>relations</strong> in October 1933<br />

Document 83...................................................................................................................... 222<br />

21 November, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

detailing <strong>the</strong> evolutions of <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> Little Entente and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />

and <strong>the</strong> developments in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />

Document 84 .....................................................................................................................228<br />

2 December, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

on <strong>the</strong> main Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />

in November 1933<br />

Document 85 ..................................................................................................................... 234<br />

18 January, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />

consequences of <strong>the</strong> various European and regional projects of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers and <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian interest in bringing about a Scandinavian-Baltic union<br />

Document 86 ..................................................................................................................... 236<br />

29 January, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong><br />

consequences in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States of <strong>the</strong> German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (26 January) .<br />

Document 87 ..................................................................................................................... 239<br />

20 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> extension<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Estonian alliance and its regional implications<br />

Document 88 .................................................................................................................... 240<br />

3 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> main Latvian<br />

domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> in February 1934<br />

Document 89 ..................................................................................................................... 247<br />

6 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> extension of<br />

<strong>the</strong> non-aggression pacts between Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States until 1945<br />

Document 90 .................................................................................................................... 249<br />

18 May, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong><br />

circumstances leading to Kārlis Ulmanis’s coup d’etat in Latvia


28 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1935<br />

Document 91 ...................................................................................................................... 252<br />

4 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong> nature of<br />

<strong>the</strong> new political regime in Latvia and its foreign policy orientation<br />

Document 92 ..................................................................................................................... 255<br />

13 July, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> ideas<br />

circulated in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States about a North-Eastern mutual assistance pact<br />

Document 93 ..................................................................................................................... 257<br />

5 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on<br />

<strong>the</strong> main Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> in<br />

July 1934<br />

Document 94 .................................................................................................................... 260<br />

14 August, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> prospects of<br />

a mutual assistance pact in eastern Baltic and Latvian attitude in this respect<br />

Document 95 .................................................................................................................... 262<br />

27 August, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />

position towards <strong>the</strong> various projects of regional security and <strong>the</strong>ir reluctance to accept a<br />

scheme which will leave Germany and Poland among <strong>the</strong> non-signatory powers or to<br />

approve <strong>the</strong> passage of Red Army through <strong>the</strong>ir territory<br />

Document 96 .....................................................................................................................265<br />

3 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

content of <strong>the</strong> Agreement of Solidarity and Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and.<br />

Lithuania initialed on 29 August 1934, in Riga, which will be signed on 12 September<br />

Document 97 .................................................................................................................... 270<br />

18 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />

content of <strong>the</strong> Agreement of Solidarity and Cooperation between Estonia, Latvia and.<br />

Lithuania<br />

Document 98 ..................................................................................................................... 273<br />

25 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong><br />

appointment of a new Latvian Minister in Poland<br />

Document 99 ..................................................................................................................... 274<br />

9 October, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> Polish and<br />

Latvian views of <strong>the</strong> projected French-Soviet alliance<br />

Document 100 ....................................................................................................................276<br />

December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong> Eastern<br />

Pact project and <strong>the</strong> Latvian views in this respect<br />

Document 101 .................................................................................................................... 283<br />

23 January, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong><br />

German reintegration of Saar territory and <strong>the</strong> implications for <strong>the</strong> evolutions in <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />

States, especially given <strong>the</strong> prospects of an Eastern Locarno


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 29<br />

Document 102 ................................................................................................................... 286<br />

2 April 1935, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

following talks with Romanian Minister in Poland regarding <strong>the</strong> issue of Klaipeda, <strong>the</strong><br />

Polish foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> regional security in Central Europe<br />

Document 103 ................................................................................................................... 289<br />

5 July, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />

position towards <strong>the</strong> Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet constellation of powers<br />

Document 104 ................................................................................................................... 290<br />

24 July, The Ministry of Commerce and Industry of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Western Department of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs with respect to <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian trade <strong>relations</strong> and<br />

<strong>the</strong> regime of import taxation in Romania<br />

Document 105 .................................................................................................................... 291<br />

15 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry<br />

about <strong>the</strong> prospects of a Latvian agreement with <strong>the</strong> Franco-Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance<br />

Document 106 ................................................................................................................... 292<br />

30 August, Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to Latvian<br />

position towards <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian international tensions<br />

Document 107 .................................................................................................................... 293<br />

5 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on<br />

<strong>the</strong> main Latvian domestic and foreign evolutions in September 1934<br />

Document 108 ....................................................................................................................295<br />

14 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on<br />

<strong>the</strong> prospects of a Latvian-Soviet consultation agreement and <strong>the</strong> Italian-Abyssinian<br />

conflict<br />

Document 109 ................................................................................................................... 296<br />

21 October, The Latvian Minister in Poland and Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs on<br />

Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong> and Germany’s policy in <strong>the</strong> Balkans following <strong>the</strong> Latvian<br />

military attaché attending of Romanian military manoeuvres<br />

Document 110 ....................................................................................................................297<br />

25 November, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing his<br />

conversations with Latvian Prime Minister about <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong><br />

regional implications of <strong>the</strong> majority/minority tensions in Lithuania<br />

Document 111 .................................................................................................................... 298<br />

4 December, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of<br />

Romania concerning <strong>the</strong> new regime of external trade of Romania and <strong>the</strong> impact on <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian-Romanian commercial <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 112 ..................................................................................................................... 303<br />

7 December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong><br />

presentation of his credentials to <strong>the</strong> President of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> conversations about <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> Latvian political leaders


30 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1936<br />

1937<br />

Document 113 .....................................................................................................................305<br />

7 December, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about an interview<br />

given to <strong>the</strong> newspaper Rigasche Rundschau regarding <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 114 .................................................................................................................... 306<br />

21 February, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />

Foreign Affairs revealing <strong>the</strong> subject of his talks to <strong>the</strong> new Romanian representative in<br />

Warsaw and <strong>the</strong> directions of Polish foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 115 .................................................................................................................... 309<br />

10 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong> role of a<br />

model of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente for <strong>the</strong> Baltic Entente<br />

Document 116..................................................................................................................... 310<br />

22 October, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to<br />

Nicolae Titulescu’s sacking from <strong>the</strong> position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and changes in<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanian <strong>diplomatic</strong> apparatus<br />

Document 117 ..................................................................................................................... 312<br />

26 November, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning<br />

<strong>the</strong> visit of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romanian Victor Antonescu to Warsaw and <strong>the</strong><br />

restoration of confidence in <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 118 ..................................................................................................................... 316<br />

27 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />

presentations of his credentials to <strong>the</strong> Latvian Head of State and <strong>the</strong> political<br />

conversations with respect to <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian <strong>relations</strong> with Latvian leaders<br />

Document 119.................................................................................................................... 320<br />

24 March, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry requesting printed<br />

material for <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Lithuanian newspapers showing an interest in publishing<br />

articles about Romanian issues<br />

Document 120 .................................................................................................................... 321<br />

10 April, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> British<br />

policy in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States aiming at maintaining peace and political stability in <strong>the</strong> area<br />

Document 121 ..................................................................................................................... 323<br />

27 April, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />

comments with regard to Polish Foreign Minister visit to Bucharest<br />

Document 122 .................................................................................................................... 324<br />

10 May, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> premises of<br />

Polish Foreign Minister visit to Bucharest<br />

Document 123 .................................................................................................................... 325<br />

13 May, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs about trade negotiations with Romania


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 31<br />

1938<br />

Document 124 .................................................................................................................... 325<br />

20 May, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to head of <strong>the</strong> Law Department of <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs about trade negotiations with Romania<br />

Document 125 .................................................................................................................... 326<br />

7 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> reflection in<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> circles of <strong>the</strong> visit of Polish President in Romania and <strong>the</strong> future directions<br />

of Romanian foreign policy<br />

Document 126 .................................................................................................................... 327<br />

12 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing with <strong>the</strong> visit of<br />

<strong>the</strong> British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ivor Miles Windsor-Clive, 2nd Earl<br />

of Plymouth to <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> message of economic, cultural and political<br />

support conveyed by <strong>the</strong> United Kingdom to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania<br />

Document 127 .................................................................................................................... 336<br />

28 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to <strong>the</strong><br />

visit of Romanian King in Poland<br />

Document 128 .................................................................................................................... 337<br />

30 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />

Polish-Romanian plan to upgrade <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions to <strong>the</strong> rank of embassies<br />

Document 129 .................................................................................................................... 338<br />

3 July, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs about <strong>the</strong><br />

streng<strong>the</strong>ning of <strong>the</strong> position of <strong>the</strong> belt between Soviet Russia and Germany as a<br />

consequence of <strong>the</strong> improved Romanian-Polish <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 130 .................................................................................................................... 341<br />

17 September, Administrative and Protocol Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />

of Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Law Department about <strong>the</strong> agreement on holding trade negotiations<br />

between Latvia and Romania<br />

Document 131 ..................................................................................................................... 341<br />

30 December, First Secretary of Latvia’s Legation in Prague to Envoy M. Nukša detailing<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian Bucharest trade negotiations which settled favourably for <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian interests<br />

Document 132 ....................................................................................................................344<br />

12 January, The Latvian Minister in Czechoslovakia to Minister of Foreign Affairs analysing<br />

<strong>the</strong> visit of Romanian Foreign Minister to Prague and <strong>the</strong> state of Romanian-<br />

Czechoslovakian <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 133.................................................................................................................... 348<br />

5 February, Director of Trade and Industry Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Finance to<br />

Acting Director of Legal and Administrative Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br />

concerning <strong>the</strong> Latvian-Romanian trade <strong>relations</strong>


32 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1939<br />

Document 134 ................................................................................................................... 348<br />

31 May, Agent “Liepa” of <strong>the</strong> Political Authority of Latvia’s Ministry of Interior to Chief of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Authority’s Jelgava division about a meeting between <strong>the</strong> extreme right-wing Latvian<br />

and Romanian leaders Gustavs Celmiņš and Corneliu Zelea Codreanu<br />

Document 135 ................................................................................................................... 349<br />

4 June, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Polish military <strong>relations</strong> and <strong>the</strong> position of Romania in case of a Red Army<br />

transit request in order to give assistance to Czechoslovakia<br />

Document 136 ....................................................................................................................350<br />

22 August, Latvia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Legation in Prague about <strong>the</strong> business<br />

trip of Latvian administrator of State Sugar Monopoly to Poland, Romania and Bulgaria<br />

Document 137 .................................................................................................................... 351<br />

13 September, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

information that Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish Jews travelling to Palestine by Romanian<br />

territory settled in Romania<br />

Document 138 .................................................................................................................... 351<br />

21 October, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs analysing <strong>the</strong><br />

results of Polish Foreign Minister visit to Romania and <strong>the</strong> latter’s position with regard to<br />

<strong>the</strong> consequences of <strong>the</strong> Munich Agreement<br />

Document 139 .................................................................................................................... 353<br />

25 October, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing on <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian and Lithuanian perception of Romania’s international behavior in respect to its<br />

ally Czechoslovakia dismembered according to <strong>the</strong> Munich Agreement<br />

Document 140 .................................................................................................................... 353<br />

6 November, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry requesting <strong>the</strong><br />

mandate to represent Romania at <strong>the</strong> 20 th anniversary of Latvia’s independence and<br />

suggesting a music program dedicated to Latvia at Radio Romania<br />

Document 141 ..................................................................................................................... 354<br />

4 February, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />

representation of Latvia in Bucharest and of Romania in Riga<br />

Document 142 .................................................................................................................... 355<br />

8 March, The Latvian Minister in Poland to Minister of Foreign Affairs about <strong>the</strong> visit of<br />

Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigore Gafencu to Poland, <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Polish<br />

<strong>relations</strong> project of a waterway channel to connect <strong>the</strong> Baltic and <strong>the</strong> Black Seas<br />

Document 143 .................................................................................................................... 358<br />

5 May, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> prospect of<br />

a German-Latvian non-aggression pact


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 33<br />

Document 144 .................................................................................................................... 359<br />

28 June, The Romanian Minister in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong> and Latvia’s perspectives on <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet<br />

negotiations in Moscow<br />

Document 145 ................................................................................................................... 360<br />

11 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with respect to<br />

<strong>the</strong> visit of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Ministry Political Director Artūrs Stegmanis to Bucharest<br />

Document 146 .................................................................................................................... 361<br />

12 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on Latvia’s<br />

approach with respect to <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow<br />

Document 147 .................................................................................................................... 361<br />

14 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry outlining <strong>the</strong><br />

perfect symmetry of Romania and Baltic States’ policies toward <strong>the</strong> Anglo-French-Soviet<br />

negotiations in Moscow<br />

Document 148 .................................................................................................................... 362<br />

8 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry with regard to<br />

<strong>the</strong> visit of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Foreign Ministry Political Director Artūrs Stegmanis to Bucharest<br />

Document 149 .................................................................................................................... 362<br />

8 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry dealing<br />

with <strong>the</strong> Latvian perspectives of <strong>the</strong> Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and <strong>the</strong> beginning of World<br />

War II<br />

Document 150 ................................................................................................................... 364<br />

14 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry requesting<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanian agreement for a Latvian Minister to be posted in Bucharest<br />

Document 151 ..................................................................................................................... 365<br />

18 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry evoking<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian and Baltic States concerns following <strong>the</strong> Red Army aggression against Poland<br />

Document 152 ................................................................................................................... 366<br />

21 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />

about <strong>the</strong> Soviet accusations against alleged Baltic States’ violations of neutrality rules<br />

Document 153 .................................................................................................................... 367<br />

29 September, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian perceptions of <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Treaty (28 September)<br />

and <strong>the</strong> hopes that Latvia will get better deal from its big neighbor<br />

Document 154 ................................................................................................................... 368<br />

6 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analysing and<br />

comparing <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Latvian and <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Estonian mutual assistance treaties<br />

Document 155 ................................................................................................................... 369<br />

8 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong><br />

repatriation of Baltic Germans to <strong>the</strong> Reich


34 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Document 156 ....................................................................................................................370<br />

9 October, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to<br />

Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> representation in Romania and Hungary<br />

Document 157 .................................................................................................................... 371<br />

23 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />

new economic and commercial understandings between <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

Union and <strong>the</strong>ir implications<br />

Document 158 .................................................................................................................... 375<br />

24 October, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing<br />

on <strong>the</strong> agreement to put into force <strong>the</strong> Soviet-Latvian Mutual Assistance Treaty<br />

Document 159 .................................................................................................................... 375<br />

26 October, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to<br />

Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> representation in Romania<br />

Document 160 .................................................................................................................... 376<br />

4 November, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry passing <strong>the</strong><br />

information leaks from <strong>the</strong> Latvian party concerning <strong>the</strong> Soviet plan to move against<br />

Romania after <strong>the</strong> completion of <strong>the</strong> Winter War<br />

Document 161..................................................................................................................... 377<br />

9 November, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about <strong>the</strong><br />

developments in South-eastern Europe at <strong>the</strong> beginning of World War II and <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian perceptions of developments in <strong>the</strong> Eastern Baltic<br />

Document 162 .................................................................................................................... 381<br />

17 November, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs following a<br />

meeting with <strong>the</strong> Romanian Prime Minister about <strong>the</strong> Romanian external and internal<br />

stakes<br />

Document 163 .................................................................................................................... 385<br />

4 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs concerning<br />

<strong>the</strong> impact of <strong>the</strong> Soviet attack against Finland on Romanian foreign policy and <strong>the</strong><br />

German growing influence in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />

Document 164 ................................................................................................................... 389<br />

9 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect<br />

to <strong>the</strong> perception of <strong>the</strong> Winter War in Romania and <strong>the</strong> defence preparations in<br />

Bessarabia<br />

Document 165 .................................................................................................................... 391<br />

9-19 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs following a<br />

meeting with <strong>the</strong> Romanian Prime Minister about Romanian foreign and domestic<br />

policies and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-Latvian <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 166 ................................................................................................................... 394<br />

19 December, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs describing<br />

<strong>the</strong> handing of his letters of credence to King of Romania Carol II


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 35<br />

1940<br />

Document 167 ................................................................................................................... 396<br />

10 January, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />

perception of Baltic States of <strong>the</strong> Winter War and <strong>the</strong>ir support for a pacific resolution of<br />

<strong>the</strong> conflict<br />

Document 168 .................................................................................................................... 397<br />

15 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs assessing <strong>the</strong><br />

mood of Romanian ruling circles about <strong>the</strong> Winter War<br />

Document 169 ................................................................................................................... 399<br />

18 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about<br />

Romanian foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> situation of Polish refugees<br />

Document 170 ................................................................................................................... 402<br />

29 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about<br />

Romanian neutrality and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 171 .................................................................................................................... 403<br />

31 January, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about<br />

Romanian external and internal policies and <strong>the</strong> Romanian-German trade <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 172 ................................................................................................................... 406<br />

13 February, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs with regard to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Balkan Entente meeting and <strong>the</strong> Romanian foreign policy goals<br />

Document 173 .................................................................................................................... 410<br />

23 February, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>relations</strong> between Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States in <strong>the</strong> context of <strong>the</strong> Winter War<br />

Document 174 .................................................................................................................... 411<br />

6 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian<br />

foreign policy and <strong>the</strong> rumours circulating in Bucharest in this respect<br />

Document 175 .................................................................................................................... 415<br />

13 March, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry detailing <strong>the</strong><br />

views of Baltic governments of <strong>the</strong> Winter War and <strong>the</strong> subsequent Moscow Peace Treaty<br />

and <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> two war coalitions in <strong>the</strong> war unfolding in Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe<br />

Document 176 .................................................................................................................... 416<br />

15 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian<br />

foreign policy concerns and <strong>the</strong> lesson of Finnish resistance<br />

Document 177 .................................................................................................................... 418<br />

26 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian<br />

foreign and economic policy<br />

Document 178 .................................................................................................................... 423<br />

27 March, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs describing <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> environment in Romania and <strong>the</strong> censorship of <strong>the</strong> press


36 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Document 179 .................................................................................................................... 425<br />

4 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Latvia’s<br />

Honorary Consul T. V. Orghidan<br />

Document 180 .................................................................................................................... 427<br />

13 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> impact of<br />

<strong>the</strong> German attack on Norway and Denmark, Romania’s military preparations <strong>the</strong> British-<br />

German economic war on <strong>the</strong> Danube and <strong>the</strong> Romanian perception of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States<br />

Document 181 ..................................................................................................................... 431<br />

22 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs about Romanian-<br />

Soviet and Baltic States-Soviet <strong>relations</strong><br />

Document 182 ....................................................................................................................434<br />

27 April, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs on Romanian-<br />

German trade <strong>relations</strong> and miscellaneous<br />

Document 183 .................................................................................................................... 435<br />

2 May, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry pointing out to<br />

<strong>the</strong> views of Baltic governments of <strong>the</strong> war scenarios and drawing parallels with <strong>the</strong><br />

international behavior of Balkan states<br />

Document 184 ................................................................................................................... 436<br />

14 May, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding <strong>the</strong><br />

impact of <strong>the</strong> German attack on France, Belgium and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands on Romanian decisionmakers<br />

and <strong>the</strong> Romanian domestic and foreign policies<br />

Document 185 ................................................................................................................... 442<br />

3 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about<br />

information leaks from <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff with regard to <strong>the</strong> Soviet troop<br />

concentrations at <strong>the</strong> border with Romania<br />

Document 186 ....................................................................................................................443<br />

13 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry informing about<br />

<strong>the</strong> political contacts between Soviet Union and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States preliminary to a possible<br />

streng<strong>the</strong>ning of Soviet military presence on <strong>the</strong> eastern shores of <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea<br />

Document 187 ................................................................................................................... 444<br />

14 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about<br />

information leaks from <strong>the</strong> Latvian General Staff with regard to <strong>the</strong> Soviet troop<br />

concentrations at <strong>the</strong> border with Romania<br />

Document 188 ................................................................................................................... 445<br />

18 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry describing <strong>the</strong><br />

atmosphere surrounding <strong>the</strong> Soviet military occupation of Latvia<br />

Document 189 ................................................................................................................... 446<br />

21 June, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> new<br />

Latvian puppet government installed into power by Andrey Januarevich Vyshinsky


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 37<br />

Document 190 ................................................................................................................... 447<br />

4 July, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />

Affairs regarding <strong>the</strong> new security regulations issued by <strong>the</strong> military commandant’s office<br />

of Bucharest in preparation for war<br />

Document 191.................................................................................................................... 449<br />

5 July, The Latvian Minister in Romania to Prime Minister about <strong>the</strong> evacuation of<br />

Bessarabia and <strong>the</strong> new foreign policy of Romania<br />

Document 192 ................................................................................................................... 450<br />

10 July, Note of conversation between Romanian Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu and<br />

Latvian Minister in Romania Ludvigs Ēķis with respect to <strong>the</strong> Soviet occupation of Latvia<br />

Document 193 ................................................................................................................... 450<br />

11 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet style elections designed to pave <strong>the</strong> way to <strong>the</strong> Soviet takeover of Baltic States<br />

Document 194 .................................................................................................................... 452<br />

15 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry analyzing <strong>the</strong> new<br />

political climate in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> process of Soviet annexation<br />

Document 195 .................................................................................................................... 453<br />

16 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> Soviet<br />

arrest of Latvian former Minister of Foreign Affairs Vilhelms Munters<br />

Document 196 ................................................................................................................... 454<br />

19 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry predicting <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet annexation of Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> closing up of foreign <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular<br />

missions in <strong>the</strong>se states<br />

Document 197 .................................................................................................................... 455<br />

21 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry regarding <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet-imposed Parliament decisions of communization and annexation of Latvia to<br />

Soviet Union<br />

Document 198 ................................................................................................................... 456<br />

21 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry emphasizing <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic States achievements in 22 years of independence before <strong>the</strong> Soviet annexation<br />

Document 199 ................................................................................................................... 456<br />

26 July, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry on <strong>the</strong> end of<br />

Baltic States’ independence and <strong>the</strong> preparations to be made in order to close up <strong>the</strong><br />

foreign legations and consulates in <strong>the</strong>se states<br />

Document 200 ................................................................................................................... 457<br />

12 August, The Romanian Foreign Ministry’s instructions to <strong>the</strong> chargé d'affaires in Latvia<br />

to close up <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga<br />

Document 201 ................................................................................................................... 458<br />

13 August, Decree of King Carol II of recalling diplomat Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti from<br />

<strong>the</strong> position of Romania’s chargé d'affaires in Riga


38 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

1942<br />

1957<br />

1958<br />

Document 202 .................................................................................................................. 459<br />

21 August, The Romanian chargé d'affaires in Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry about <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet arrests and deportations of Latvian political and national elites<br />

Document 203 ................................................................................................................... 460<br />

23 December, Latvia’s former Envoy in Bucharest L. Ēķis to Head of Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong><br />

service K. Zariņš, Washington, D.C. giving an account of his <strong>diplomatic</strong> mission in<br />

Bucharest and <strong>the</strong> closing down of <strong>the</strong> local Latvian Legation he headed<br />

Document 204 ................................................................................................................... 477<br />

26 August, Note of conversation between a Romanian Foreign Ministry diplomat and a<br />

diplomat of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Embassy in Romania with regard to <strong>the</strong> mutual renouncing of all<br />

patrimonial and financial claims between Romania and <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union resulting from<br />

<strong>the</strong> interwar Romania’s <strong>relations</strong> with former republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania<br />

Document 205 .................................................................................................................... 477<br />

7 March, Moscow Protocol between <strong>the</strong> Government of <strong>the</strong> Romanian People’s Republic<br />

and Government of <strong>the</strong> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on <strong>the</strong> settlement of mutual<br />

claims related to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia


1. Declaration of Common Aims 1 of <strong>the</strong> Independent Mid-European 2 nations in<br />

convention assembled at Independence Hall Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United States<br />

of America, 1918 3<br />

We, representing toge<strong>the</strong>r more than fifty million people constituting a chain of nations<br />

lying between <strong>the</strong> Baltic, <strong>the</strong> Adriatic and <strong>the</strong> Black Seas, comprising Czecho-Slovaks, Poles,<br />

Jugoslavs, Ukrainians, Uhro-Rusyns, Lithuanians, Roumanians and Italian Irredentists,<br />

Unredeemed Greeks, Albanians, Zionists and Armenians, wholly or partly subject to alien<br />

domination, deeply appreciating <strong>the</strong> aid and assistance given our peoples by <strong>the</strong> government<br />

and people of America and of <strong>the</strong> entente allies, on behalf of ourselves and our brethren at<br />

home, do hereby solemnly declare that we place our all - peoples and resources - at <strong>the</strong> disposal<br />

of our allies for use against our common enemy, and in order that <strong>the</strong> whole world may know<br />

what we deem are <strong>the</strong> essential and fundamental doctrines which shall be embodied in <strong>the</strong><br />

constitutions hereafter adopted by <strong>the</strong> peoples of our respective independent nations, as well as<br />

<strong>the</strong> purpose which shall govern our common and united action, we accept and subscribe to <strong>the</strong><br />

following as basic principles for all free peoples.<br />

First. That all governments derive <strong>the</strong>ir just power from <strong>the</strong> consent of <strong>the</strong> governed.<br />

Second. That it is <strong>the</strong> inalienable right of every people to organize <strong>the</strong>ir own government on<br />

such principles and in such form as <strong>the</strong>y believe will best promote <strong>the</strong>ir welfare, safety and<br />

happiness.<br />

Third. That <strong>the</strong> free and natural development of <strong>the</strong> ideals of any state should be allowed to<br />

pursue <strong>the</strong>ir normal and unhindered course unless such course harms or threatens <strong>the</strong><br />

common interest of all.<br />

Fourth. That <strong>the</strong>re should be no secret diplomacy, and all proposed treaties and agreements<br />

between nations should be made in public - prior to <strong>the</strong>ir adoption and ratification.<br />

Fifth. That we believe our peoples, having kindred ideals and purposes, should coordinate<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir efforts to insure <strong>the</strong> liberties of <strong>the</strong>ir individual nations for <strong>the</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>rance of <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

common welfare, provided such a union contributes to <strong>the</strong> peace and welfare of <strong>the</strong> world.<br />

Sixth. That <strong>the</strong>re should be formed a league of <strong>the</strong> nations of <strong>the</strong> world in a common and<br />

binding agreement for genuine and practical cooperation to secure justice and <strong>the</strong>refore peace<br />

among nations.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> course of our history, we have been subject to, and victims of aggressive and selfish<br />

nations and autocratic dynasties, and held in subjection by force of arms.<br />

We have suffered destruction of our cities, violation of our homes and lands, and have<br />

maintained our ideals only by stealth, and in spite of <strong>the</strong> tyranny of our oppressors.<br />

We have been deprived of proper representation and fair trial. We have been denied <strong>the</strong><br />

right of free speech, and <strong>the</strong> right freely to assemble and petition for <strong>the</strong> redress of our<br />

grievances. We have been denied free and friendly intercourse with our sister states, and our<br />

men have been impressed in war against <strong>the</strong>ir bro<strong>the</strong>rs and friends of kindred races.<br />

1<br />

Elaborated on 26 October at <strong>the</strong> meeting of <strong>the</strong> Democratic Mid-European Union held at Independence Hall of<br />

Philadephia between 23-26 October 1918, Romanian National Archives, fund Vasile Stoica, file I/137, sheets 1-36<br />

2<br />

The Democratic Mid-European Union was founded in Washington on 2 October 1918. Vasile Stoica, future<br />

Romanian envoy to Latvia, was First Vice-President of <strong>the</strong> organisation.<br />

3<br />

http://www.archive.org/stream/1919internationa01carnuoft/1919internationa01carnuoft_djvu.txt (accesed on<br />

12.09.2012).


40 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

The signers of this declaration, and representatives of o<strong>the</strong>r independent peoples, who may<br />

subscribe <strong>the</strong>ir names hereunto, do hereby pledge on behalf of <strong>the</strong>ir respective nations, that<br />

<strong>the</strong>y will unitedly strive to <strong>the</strong> end that <strong>the</strong>se wrongs shall be righted, that <strong>the</strong> sufferings of <strong>the</strong><br />

world war shall not have been in vain, and that <strong>the</strong> principles here set forth shall be<br />

incorporated in <strong>the</strong> organic laws of whatever governments our respective peoples may hereafter<br />

establish.<br />

2. Latvijas diplomātiskā pārstāvja Varšavā 1 A. Ķeniņa 2 1920. g. janv. (bez datuma)<br />

raksta ārlietu ministram Z. Meierovicam 3<br />

Jūsu rakstu no 20. novembra p[agājušā] g[ada] saņēmu tikai 1. janvārī š. g. 4 Stājos tūliņ<br />

sakaros ar vietējo Rumānijas priekšstāvi Floresku kungu, lai panāktu no Rumānijas valdības<br />

atļauju mūsu Dienvidu-Krievijas bēgļu caurbraukšanai. Floresku kungs laipni apsolījās mūsu<br />

rakstu nosūtīt tālāk viņa valdībai, bet aizrādīja uz ārkārtīgi lielām transporta grūtībām<br />

Rumānijā. Kad poļu valdība griezusies pie Rumānijas valdības ar līdzīgu lūgumu, pēdējā<br />

apsolījusi palīdzību tikai ar noteikumu, ja Polija nodos Rumānijas valdības rīcībā vajadzīgos<br />

vagonus, lokomotīves, smēreļļas un ogles.<br />

Neskatoties uz to, daži mūsu Dienvidu-Krievijas bēgļi laimīgi izbrauc Rumāniju un ierodas<br />

Varšavā. Ar pietiekošiem naudas līdzekļiem apgādātas personas sekmīgi pārvar pat Rumānijas<br />

ārkārtīgi grūtos transporta apstākļus.<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 11. l., 69. Lp.<br />

2. Note by Latvia’s <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Warsaw 5 A. Ķeniņš 6 to Minister of<br />

Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics 7 , January 1920 (undated)<br />

Your note of 20 th November l[ast] y[ear] I received only on 1 st January, this year. 8 I<br />

immediately contacted <strong>the</strong> local representative of Romania Mr. Florescu, in order to obtain<br />

from Romania’s government a transit permit for our refugees from Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Russia. Mr.<br />

Florescu kindly promised to forward my note to his government but mentioned <strong>the</strong> extreme<br />

transport difficulties in Romania. When Poland’s government turned to Romania’s government<br />

with a similar request, <strong>the</strong> latter promised assistance only on condition that Poland provides<br />

Romania’s government with <strong>the</strong> required number of wagons and carriages and <strong>the</strong> necessary<br />

amount of lubricants and coal. In spite of that some of our refugees from Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Russian<br />

1<br />

Šeit un turpmāk diplomātisko pārstāvju gadījumā virsrakstos minēta viņu rezidences jeb sēdekļa vieta.<br />

2<br />

Atis Ķeniņš (1874–1961), Latvijas dzejnieks, diplomāts. 1919.–1921. g. diplomātiskais pārstāvis Varšavā, 1941.–1944.<br />

un 1951.–1955. g. padomju apcietinājumā.<br />

3<br />

Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics (1887–1925), Latvijas valstsvīrs. 1918.–1924. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1921.–1922. un 1923.–1924.<br />

g. Ministru prezidents.<br />

4<br />

1919. gada otrajā pusē aktualizējās jautājums par latviešu bēgļu, karagūstekņu un dažādu armiju karavīru<br />

atgriešanos dzimtenē no dažādām Krievijas un Eiropas vietām, turklāt viens no lielākajiem šādiem centriem bija<br />

Dienvidkrievija. Tādēļ šajā laikā Latvijas Ārlietu ministrija sāka kārtot minēto jautājumu.<br />

5<br />

Here and hereinafter <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> representatives are listed after <strong>the</strong>ir place of residence.<br />

6<br />

Atis Ķeniņš (1874–1961), Latvian poet and diplomat. 1919–1921 <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Warsaw, 1941–1944<br />

and 1951–1955 – in Soviet imprisonment.<br />

7<br />

Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics (1887–1925), Latvian statesman. 1918–1924 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1921–1922 and<br />

1923–1924 Prime Minister.<br />

8<br />

In <strong>the</strong> second half of 1919 <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> repatriation of Latvian refugees, prisoners of war and soldiers serving in<br />

different armies from different places in Russia and Europe became topical. Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Russia was among <strong>the</strong><br />

largest of such centres. For this reason in <strong>the</strong> respective period <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia began to<br />

deal with <strong>the</strong> respective issue.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 41<br />

successfully travel through Romania and come to Warsaw. Persons who have sufficient amount<br />

of money successfully overcome even <strong>the</strong> extremely difficult transport conditions in Romania.<br />

State Historical Archives of Latvia (hereinafter SHAL), fund (hereinafter f.) 2575, description<br />

(hereinafter d.) 15, file 11, sheet (hereinafter s.) 69.<br />

3. Latvijas armijas virspavēlnieka štāba priekšnieka P. Radziņa 1 1920. g. 16. janv.<br />

raksts militārajam pārstāvim Varšavā M. Hartmanim 2<br />

Latvijas sūtnim Varšavā ir uzdots stāties sakarā ar Rumānijas sūtni dēļ Latvijas pavalstnieku<br />

caurlaišanas caur Rumāniju. Gadījumā, ja būtu vajadzīgs vest sarunas tieši ar Rumānijas valdību<br />

Bukarestē, uzdodu Jums tādā gadījumā doties uz turieni un tur atrisināt minēto jautājumu vai<br />

arī sūtīt savu palīgu.<br />

LVVA, 3601.,1. apr., 469. l., 59. lp.<br />

3. Note by Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia<br />

P.Radziņš 3 to Latvia’s military representative in Warsaw M. Hartmanis 4 , 16 th January,<br />

1920<br />

The Envoy of Latvia in Warsaw is instructed to contact <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Romania on <strong>the</strong> matter<br />

of <strong>the</strong> permission of transit of Latvia’s citizens through Romania. In case direct negotiations<br />

with Romania’s government in Bucharest become necessary, I instruct you to go <strong>the</strong>re in person<br />

or to send your assistant <strong>the</strong>re and to resolve <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned issue.<br />

SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 59.<br />

4. Rumānijas Ārlietu ministrijas 1920. g. 24. febr. raksts Latvijas armijas pārstāvim<br />

Kaukāzā H. Rācenim 5<br />

Ārlietu ministrija pagodinās paziņot Latvijas armijas pārstāvim Kaukāzā kapteinim H. L.<br />

Rācenim, ka viņa griezusies pie attiecīgām iestādēm, lai tiktu sperti attiecīgi soļi priekš<br />

apmēram 40–50 žēlsirdīgo māsu un 200–250 virsnieku caurbraukšanai Rumānijai. Virsnieki<br />

brauks partijās pa 15–20 vīru, pie kam tiem jābūt atbruņotiem.<br />

LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />

1<br />

Pēteris Radziņš (1880–1930), Latvijas armijas ģenerālis (1920). 1919.–1920. g. Armijas virspavēlnieka štāba<br />

priekšnieks, no 1924. g. armijas komandieris, no 1928. g. – Virsnieku akadēmisko kursu priekšnieks.<br />

2<br />

Mārtiņš Hartmanis (1882–1941), Latvijas armijas ģenerālis (1929). 1919.–1921. g. militārais pārstāvis Polijā. 1934.–<br />

1939. g. Armijas štāba priekšnieks. 1940.–1941. g. padomju apcietinājumā, nogalināts.<br />

3<br />

Pēteris Radziņš (1880–1930), general of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1920). In 1919–1920 Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />

Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army, from 1924 Commander of <strong>the</strong> Army, from 1928 – chief of Academic officers’ course.<br />

4<br />

Mārtiņš Hartmanis (1882–1941), general of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1929). 1919–1921 military representative in Poland.<br />

1934–1939 Chief of Staff of <strong>the</strong> Army. 1940-1941 in Soviet imprisonment, executed.<br />

5<br />

Herberts Leo Rācenis (1894–1960), Latvijas armijas kapteinis, diplomāts. No 1919. g. Latvijas armijā, 1920.–1921. g.<br />

Armijas virspavēlnieka štāba pārstāvis Kaukāzā. No 1924. g. sekretārs, atašejs diplomātiskajā un konsulārajās<br />

pārstāvniecībās Vācijā, 1939.–1940. g. goda vicekonsuls Antverpenē.


42 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

4. Note by <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania to representative of <strong>the</strong> Army<br />

of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis 1 , 24 th February, 1920<br />

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has <strong>the</strong> honour to inform representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of<br />

Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus Captain H. L. Rācenis that it has addressed <strong>the</strong> relevant institutions to<br />

ensure that adequate steps are taken for approximately 40–50 sisters of mercy [nurses] and<br />

200–250 officers to have <strong>the</strong> permission to travel through Romania. Officers will travel in<br />

groups of 15–20 and <strong>the</strong>y must be disarmed.<br />

SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />

5. Latvijas armijas pārstāvja Kaukāzā H. Rāceņa 1920. g. 2. marta raksts Rumānijas<br />

armijas Galvenā štāba priekšniekam<br />

Ar savu lēmumu Nr. 3809 Ārlietu ministrija man ziņo par no viņas spertiem soļiem, lai<br />

nodrošinātu Sulinā apmēram 250–300 virsnieku caurbraukšanu cauri Rumānijai partijās pa 15–<br />

20 cilvēku. Es ceru, mans ģenerāli, ka jūs būsiet labvēlīgi pret šo priekš mums tik svarīgo<br />

lēmumu, kurš dod latviešiem iespēju atgriezties pēc ilgas prombūšanas dzimtenē, lai strādātu<br />

Latvijas un viņas draugu labā.<br />

Es ceru, ka visi jautājumi, kuri varētu celties sakarā ar šo lietu, tiks nokārtoti starp Jūsu<br />

Galveno štābu un Polijas sūtni Rumānijā, kurš laipni uzņēmies vadīt latviešu tranzītu.<br />

LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />

5. Note by representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis to <strong>the</strong><br />

Chief of <strong>the</strong> General Staff of Romania, 2 nd March, 1920<br />

By its resolution No. 3809 <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs me of <strong>the</strong> measures it has<br />

taken to ensure <strong>the</strong> transit of approximately 250–300 officers through Sulina in Romania in<br />

groups of 15–20. I hope, my General, that you will consider favourably this resolution, which is<br />

so important for us and gives Latvians <strong>the</strong> chance after a long absence to return to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

mo<strong>the</strong>rland in order to work for <strong>the</strong> good of Latvia and its friends.<br />

I hope that all issues that may arise in connection with this matter will be resolved between<br />

Your Main Staff and <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Poland to Romania who has kindly assumed <strong>the</strong> management<br />

of <strong>the</strong> transit of Latvians.<br />

SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />

6. Latvijas armijas pārstāvja Kaukāzā H. Rāceņa 1920. g. 2. marta raksts Rumānijas<br />

Ministru Prezidentam<br />

Pagodinos paziņot par raksta Nr. 3809 saņemšanu un reizē ar to izsaku Jūsu personā<br />

pateicību Karaliskajai valdībai par lietas ātru izšķiršanu.<br />

Es ceru, ka nākotnē Jūs izpalīdzēsiet mums tikpat labvēlīgi kā līdz šim un paziņoju Jums, ka<br />

Polijas atašejs laipni uzņēmies rūpēties par latviešu caurbraukšanu.<br />

LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />

1<br />

Herberts Leo Rācenis (1894–1960), Captain of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia, diplomat. In <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia as of 1919, 1920–<br />

1921 representative of <strong>the</strong> staff of <strong>the</strong> Supreme Commander in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus. From 1924 Secretary and attaché in<br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular missions in Germany, 1939–1940 Vice Consul in Antwerp.


6. Note by representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis to <strong>the</strong><br />

Prime Minister of Romania, 2 nd March, 1920<br />

I have <strong>the</strong> honour to inform you of <strong>the</strong> receipt of note No. 3809 and at <strong>the</strong> same time<br />

through you, I thank <strong>the</strong> Royal Government for <strong>the</strong> speedy resolution of <strong>the</strong> matter.<br />

I hope that you will continue to assist us with <strong>the</strong> same benevolence and I inform you that<br />

<strong>the</strong> Attaché of Poland has kindly assumed care for <strong>the</strong> transit of Latvians.<br />

SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />

7. Latvijas armijas pārstāvja Kaukāzā H. Rāceņa 1920. g. 2. marta raksts Polijas<br />

militārajam atašejam Rumānijā<br />

Nosūtu Jums raksta Nr. 3809 norakstu un, tā kā man jābrauc darīšanās uz Kaukāzu, tad<br />

laipni lūdzu Jūs uzņemties latviešu tranzīta nokārtošanu.<br />

LVVA, 3601. f., 1. apr., 469. l., 163. lp. (1920. g. veikts tulkojums no franču valodas).<br />

7. Note by representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia in <strong>the</strong> Caucasus H. Rācenis to <strong>the</strong><br />

Military Attaché of Poland in Romania, 2 nd March, 1920<br />

Hereby I forward to you a copy of note No. 3809 and as I have to go to <strong>the</strong> Caucasus on<br />

business, I kindly ask you to assume <strong>the</strong> organisation of <strong>the</strong> transit of Latvians.<br />

SHAL, f. 3601, d. 1, file 469, s. 163 (translated from French in 1920).<br />

8. Rumānijas sūtņa Kopenhāgenā M. Păclianu 1921. g. 26. febr. telegramma Latvijas<br />

ārlietu ministram Z. Meierovicam<br />

Priecājos paziņot Jūsu Ekselencei, ka Karaļa Valdība man uzdevusi Jums darīt zināmu, ka<br />

Rumānijas Valdība ir atzinusi Latvijas neatkarību. Izmantoju gadījumu, lai izteiktu Viņa<br />

Ekselencei manus personīgos vēlējumus Jūsu valsts labklājībai. Lūdzu apstipriniet šīs<br />

telegrammas saņemšanu.<br />

LVVA, 2570. f., 3. apr., 1148. l., 60. lp.<br />

8. Telegram by Envoy of Romania in Copenhagen M. Păclianu to Minister of Foreign<br />

Affairs of Latvia Z. Meierovics, 26 th February, 1921<br />

I have <strong>the</strong> pleasure to inform Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> King’s Government has instructed me<br />

to communicate to you <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Government of Romania has recognised Latvia’s<br />

independence. I avail myself of <strong>the</strong> opportunity to convey to Your Excellency my personal best<br />

wishes for <strong>the</strong> welfare of your country. Please confirm <strong>the</strong> receipt of this telegram.<br />

SHAL, f. 2570, d. 3, file 1148, s. 60.<br />

9. Latvijas sūtņa Helsinkos K. Zariņa 1 1921. g. 15. apr. ziņojums ārlietu ministram<br />

Šodien legācijā ieradās jaunais Rumānijas pilnvarotais sūtnis Somijā Plesnilă, iepazinušies ar<br />

viņu bijām jau agrāk, un izteica prieku, ka Rumānijai izdevies tagad Latviju atzīt de iure.<br />

1<br />

Kārlis Reinholds Zariņš (1879–1963), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. No 1919. g. sūtnis Somijā, no 1923. g. – arī<br />

Zviedrijā, Norvēģijā un Dānijā ar sēdekli Helsinkos, 1925.–1930. g. sūtnis Zviedrijā, Norvēģijā un Dānijā ar sēdekli<br />

Stokholmā, 1930.–1933. g. sūtnis Igaunijā, 1931.–1933. g. arī ārlietu ministrs. No 1933. g. sūtnis Lielbritānijā. 1940. g.<br />

piešķirtas ārkārtējās pilnvaras pārstāvēt valsts intereses ārvalstīs valdības darbības ierobežošanas dēļ. Latvijas<br />

diplomātiskā un konsulārā dienesta vadītājs. Miris Lielbritānijā.


44 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Plesnilă kungs aizrādīja, ka viņu valdība ar Poliju noslēgušas vienību, tagad gribot to pašu<br />

darīt ar Somiju, Igauniju un Latviju. Kā Ār[lietu] ministrijā, tā arī citur Plesnilă ir uzstājies<br />

vienmēr par Baltijas valstu savienību, sākot no Somijas un ejot uz dienvidiem līdz Rumānijai un<br />

vēl tālāk.<br />

Sūtnis Plesnilă izteicās, ka viņu zeme vēl ļoti maz mūs pazīstot, un tamdēļ būtu no liela<br />

svara, ja mēs ieceltu sūtni Bukarestē, to pašu arī viņu valdība darīšot attiecībā pret Latviju.<br />

Sūtnis noteikti uzstājas par defensīvu apvienību pret Krieviju, jo kāda vara Krievija pie stūres<br />

arī nebūtu, nedz tagadējai Rumānijai, kurā ietilpstot agrākā Besarābija, nedz pārējām jaunām<br />

valstīm viņa labvēlīga nebūs.<br />

Sūtnis Plesnilă ļoti lūdza arī viņu informēt par mūsu ieskatiem Krievijas jautājumos, kā arī,<br />

kā mēs skatāmies par ciešākas draudzības noslēgšanu ar Rumāniju.<br />

Lūdzu dodat man kādus aizrādījumus attiecībā uz mūsu jauno draugu Rumāniju.<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 66. Lp.<br />

9. Report by Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki K. Zariņš 1 to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

of Latvia, 15 th April 1921<br />

Today Romania’s new Plenipotentiary Envoy to Finland Plesnilă came to me on a legation<br />

visit, we had met already before, and he voiced his pleasure with <strong>the</strong> fact that Romania had now<br />

succeeded to recognise Latvia de iure.<br />

Mr. Plesnilă remarked that his government had concluded an alliance with Poland and<br />

wanted to do <strong>the</strong> same with Finland, Estonia and Latvia. Both in <strong>the</strong> Foreign [Affairs] Ministry<br />

and elsewhere Plesnilă had always spoken in favour of a union with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States that would<br />

stretch southwards from Finland to Romania and beyond.<br />

Envoy Plesnilă said that his country still knew very little about us and <strong>the</strong>refore it would be<br />

very important if we appointed an Envoy in Bucharest, his country would do <strong>the</strong> same with<br />

regard to Latvia.<br />

The Envoy firmly spoke in favour of a defence union against Russia, because no matter what<br />

kind of government stood at <strong>the</strong> helm of Russia, it would not be favourable ei<strong>the</strong>r to Romania<br />

that encompasses <strong>the</strong> former Bessarabia, or to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r young states.<br />

Envoy Plesnilă entreated me to share with him our views on <strong>the</strong> issue of Russia and to voice<br />

our position on making friendship with Romania closer.<br />

Please give me some kind of instructions with regard to our new friend Romania.<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 66.<br />

10. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă 1 nr. 24<br />

către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Take Ionescu 2 , 16 aprilie 1921<br />

Ministrul Letoniei care mi-a mărturisit dorința întregii sale națiuni de a-și apăra<br />

independența pănă la ultima picătură de sânge, crede că România ar trebui să-și folosească<br />

1<br />

Kārlis Reinholds Zariņš (1879–1963), Latvian diplomat and statesman. From 1919 Envoy to Finland, from 1923 –<br />

also to Sweden, Norway and Denmark with seat in Helsinki. In 1925–1930 Envoy to Sweden, Norway and Denmark<br />

with seat in Stockholm, in 1930-1933 Envoy to Estonia, 1931–1933 – also Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1933 –<br />

Envoy to <strong>the</strong> UK. In 1940 he was vested with extraordinary authority to represent <strong>the</strong> interests of Latvia abroad<br />

due to <strong>the</strong> restricted possibilities of action of Latvia’s government. Head of <strong>the</strong> <strong>diplomatic</strong> and consular service of<br />

Latvia. Died in <strong>the</strong> UK.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 45<br />

toată influența în Polonia aliată pentru ca aceasta din urmă să ajungă cât mai repede la o<br />

înțelegere amiabilă cu Lituania pentru a o împiedica să se alieze cu Germania sau Rusia. 3<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />

Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 38.<br />

10. Report by Envoy of Romania in Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă 4 no. 24 to Minister of<br />

Foreign Affairs Take Ionescu 5 , 16 th April 1921<br />

The Minister of Latvia, who confessed to me <strong>the</strong> determination of his entire nation to<br />

defend its independence to <strong>the</strong> last drop of blood, believes that Romania should use all its<br />

influence with its ally Poland in order to bring about an early rapprochement with Lithuania<br />

with <strong>the</strong> purpose of preventing it from joining ranks with Germany or Russia.<br />

The Diplomatic Archives of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter<br />

DARMFA), fund (hereinafter f.) 71/1920-1944, Latvia, 1921-1940. Relations with Lithuania,<br />

Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Hungary, Vatican (hereinafter 71, Latvia), volume<br />

(hereinafter vol.) 8, sheet (hereinafter s.) 38.<br />

11. Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas Politsiski-ekonomiskā departamenta direktora L.<br />

Sējas 6 1921. g. 23. apr. raksts sūtnim Helsinkos K. Zariņam<br />

Ar savu 15. apr. ziņojumu par satikšanos ar Rumānijas sūtni Jūs mūs tā pārsteidzāt, ka<br />

negribas pat ticēt tam, ka Plesnilă kunga domas par defensīvu apvienību no Somijas līdz<br />

Rumānijas ir ņemamas pilnīgi nopietni. Vēl pagājušā ziemā, kad Ķeniņš ar līdzīgu pret Krieviju<br />

vērstas defensīvas apvienības projektu iepazīstināja Rumānijas toreizējo ārlietu ministru, tad tas<br />

ar sevišķu interesi un labvēlību bija uzklausījis, bet atbildējis, ka praktiski rumāņu tauta nekad<br />

nesapratīšot, ja to nosūtīšot karā par Latviju, kuru tā vēl nepazīstot pat vārda pēc. Mēs esam šīs<br />

apvienības piekritēji. Bet pagaidām varētu notikt tikai savstarpēja iepazīšanās, informēšanās un<br />

defensīvas draudzības politikas vešana. Tikai pēc krievu – rumāņu miera noslēgšanas varēsim<br />

sākt nopietnas sarunas par apvienības slēgšanu. Nelabvēlīgo finansiālo apstākļu dēļ mums grūti<br />

būtu uzturēt savu sūtni Rumānijā. Tamdēļ minētais informēšanās un politikas veids pagaidām<br />

jāuzņemas mūsu jau pastāvošām sūtniecībām Somijā, Polijā un citur. Ar lielāko prieku un<br />

gandarījumu mēs redzētu Rumānijas priekšstāvja ierašanos Rīgā. Tas atvieglotu priekšdarbus<br />

apvienības slēgšanai un minētais priekšstāvis varētu arī savu valdību par mums skaidri<br />

1<br />

Dimitrie Plesnilă a fost un ziarist român apropiat de Take Ionescu. Primul ministru plenipotențiar al României la<br />

Helsinki (1921-1922).<br />

2<br />

Take Ionescu (1858-1922) a fost un om se stat și diplomat român. Inițial membru al Partidului Național-Liberal,<br />

ulterior s-a alăturat Partidului Conservator (1886) pentru ca mai târziu să fondeze și să conducă Partidului<br />

Conservator-Democrat. Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (Dec. 1921 – Ian. 1922), ministru al afacerilor străine<br />

(1920-1922), deținător al mai multor portofolii de ministru în diverse guverne. A fost unul dintre fondatorii Micii<br />

Înțelegeri. S-a stins din viață la Roma.<br />

3<br />

Originalul în limba franceză.<br />

4<br />

Dimitrie Plesnilă was a Romanian journalist and <strong>the</strong> first Romanian Minister in Finland (1921-1922).<br />

5<br />

Take Ionescu (1858-1922), Romanian statesman and diplomat. Initially a member of <strong>the</strong> National-Liberal Party,<br />

he joined <strong>the</strong> Conservative Party in 1886 and founded <strong>the</strong> Conservative-Democrat Party in 1908. President of <strong>the</strong><br />

Council of Ministers (Dec. 1921 – Jan. 1922), minister in various governments, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1920-<br />

1921). One of <strong>the</strong> founders of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. Died in Rome.<br />

6<br />

Ludvigs Kārlis Sēja (1885–1962), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1920.–1921. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Politiskiekonomiskā<br />

departamenta direktors. No 1921. g. pārstāvis ASV, no 1923. g. sūtnis Lietuvā, 1924. g. – ārlietu<br />

ministrs, no 1925. g. – sūtnis ASV, no 1927. g. ģenerālkonsuls Londonā, 1933.–1934. g. departamenta direktors,<br />

1934.–1940. g. sūtnis Lietuvā.1945.–1954. g. padomju ieslodzījumā, miris Latvijā.


46 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

informēt. Interesanti būtu noskaidrot rumāņu–ukraiņu attiecības. Poļu nedraudzīgā iekšējā<br />

politika pret ukraiņiem un baltkrieviem un arī leišiem bez šaubām ir traucēklis apvienības<br />

realizēšanai. Mēs vēlētos, lai šie jautājumi tiktu visās apvienības valstīs nokārtoti puslīdz<br />

vienādi, jo sevišķi tamdēļ, ka ukraiņi var izvērsties par mūsu daudz aktīvākiem draugiem kā<br />

rumāņi. Vispār Ukraina jāuzskata par zemi, kura var lielā mērā bremzēt Lielkrievijas agresivitāti<br />

un ekspansijas kāri. Tamdēļ taisni šīs tautības apspiešana Rumānijā un Galīcijā skalda un dala<br />

viņas nacionālo enerģiju un līdz ar to pamazina spiedienu uz Lielkrieviju kā galveno<br />

ienaidnieku.<br />

Tagadējā brīdī mums šķiet šai jautājumā būtu jārīkojas sekojoši:<br />

1) Jānoskaidro, cik Plesnilă kunga projekti tiek ņemti nopietni.<br />

2) Kādi būtu Rumānijas priekšnoteikumi šīs apvienības dibināšanā.<br />

3) Mūsu priekšnoteikums būtu godīga miera noslēgšana ar Krieviju.<br />

4) Jānoskaidro, kā Rumānija skatās uz Ukrainas neatkarību un tālāku bijušās Krievijas<br />

dalīšanu patstāvīgās valstīs.<br />

Jūsu ziņojumu, kā arī mūsu atbildes norakstu piesūtam arī mūsu sūtniecībai Polijā.<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 65. Lp.<br />

11. Note by Director of <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />

Affairs of Latvia L. Sēja 1 to Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki K. Zariņš, 23 rd April, 1921<br />

You surprised me so much by your report of 15 th April about your meeting with <strong>the</strong> Envoy of<br />

Romania that I can hardly believe that Mr. Plesnilă’s ideas about a defensive union stretching<br />

from Finland to Romania are to be taken entirely seriously. Still last winter when Ķeniņš<br />

presented a project of a similar defensive union targeted against Russia to <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>n Minister of<br />

Foreign Affairs of Romania, <strong>the</strong> latter listened to him with great interest and benevolence but<br />

replied that in practice <strong>the</strong> Romanian people would never understand it if <strong>the</strong>y were sent to war<br />

to fight for Latvia, which <strong>the</strong>y did not know yet even by name. We are in favour of such a union.<br />

But for <strong>the</strong> time being only mutual becoming acquainted, exchange of information and<br />

pursuance of defensive policy of friendship are possible. Only after <strong>the</strong> Russian–Romanian<br />

peace is concluded we will be able to start serious negotiations on creating such a union. Due to<br />

an unfavourable financial situation it would be difficult for us to have an envoy in Romania. For<br />

this reason for <strong>the</strong> time being <strong>the</strong> mutual exchange of information and pursuance of <strong>the</strong> abovementioned<br />

type of policy have to be assumed by our existing legations in Finland, Poland and<br />

elsewhere. It would be with greatest pleasure and satisfaction that we would welcome a<br />

representative of Romania in Riga. It would facilitate <strong>the</strong> preparation for <strong>the</strong> conclusion of such<br />

a union and such a representative could also provide clear information about us to his/ her<br />

government. It would be interesting to inquire into Romanian–Ukrainian <strong>relations</strong>. Poland’s<br />

domestic policy, which is unfriendly to ethnic Ukrainians and Byelorussians as well as to<br />

Lithuanians, is no doubt an obstacle to such a union. We would like to see <strong>the</strong>se issues resolved<br />

in more or less <strong>the</strong> same way in all <strong>the</strong> member states of <strong>the</strong> union especially because <strong>the</strong><br />

Ukrainians may become much more active friends to us than Romanians. In general Ukraine<br />

1<br />

Ludvigs Kārlis Sēja (1885–1962), Latvian diplomat and statesman. 1920–1921 Director of <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic<br />

Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 1921 – Latvia’s representative in <strong>the</strong> USA, from 1923 – Envoy to<br />

Lithuania, in 1924 – Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 1925 – Envoy to <strong>the</strong> USA, from 1927 – General Consul in<br />

London, in 1933–1934 – Director of a Department, in 1934–1940 Envoy to Lithuania. 1945–1954 – in Soviet<br />

imprisonment, died in Latvia.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 47<br />

should be regarded as a country, which can to a great extent hamper <strong>the</strong> aggression and<br />

expansion-craze of <strong>the</strong> Great-Russia. It is for this reason that <strong>the</strong> oppression of this ethnic group<br />

in Romania and Galicia splits and divides its national energy and thus lessens pressure on <strong>the</strong><br />

Great-Russia as <strong>the</strong> main enemy.<br />

Thus at <strong>the</strong> present moment we believe that we should act in <strong>the</strong> following way with regard<br />

to this issue:<br />

1) We should find out how seriously Mr. Plesnilă’s projects are perceived.<br />

2) [We should find out] what preconditions Romania sets for creating such a union.<br />

3) Our precondition would be fair peace with Russia.<br />

4) We should find out Romania’ position on Ukraine’s independence and on fur<strong>the</strong>r division<br />

of <strong>the</strong> former Russia into independent states.<br />

We forward your report as well as a copy of our reply to it to our Legation in Poland.<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 65.<br />

12. Latvijas sūtņa Helsinkos K. Zariņa 1921. g. 20. maija ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />

Meierovicam<br />

Sakarā ar ministrijas š. g. 26. aprīļa rakstu man šodien bija atkal garāka saruna ar Rumānijas<br />

ministru Somijā Plesnilu.<br />

Sūtnis Plesnilă man noteikti paskaidroja, ka, lai gan viņam nav bijis tieši uzdots Rumānijas<br />

valdības vārdā runāt ar Latvijas valsts priekšstāvi, bet viņš kā ilggadīgs Rumānijas ār[lietu]<br />

ministra Jonesku draugs un tuvākais līdzstrādnieks ļoti labi zinot Rumānijas ārpolitikas ieskatus<br />

un centienus. Plesnilă 25 gadus strādājis kopā kā jurists un žurnālists ar ār[lietu] ministru<br />

Jonesku.<br />

Viņš, sūtnis, zinot, ka Rumānija visu Pasaules kara laiku ar lielu sajūsmu apbrīnojusi latvju<br />

kareivju varonību. Tāpat pēc mūsu patstāvības proklamēšanas pastāvīgi sekojusi mūsu ārlietu<br />

politikai, apsveikusi mūsu panākumus un noteiktu virzienu. Tamdēļ Rumānijas simpātijas<br />

bijušas sevišķi par Latviju un vispār par Baltijas savienību.<br />

Augšējo kopā ņemot, sūtnis Plesnilă nepielaiž domas, ka Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs varētu<br />

vienaldzīgi izturēties attiecībā pret Latviju. Bet viņš pielaiž divas varbūtības – 1. varbūtība, ka<br />

mūsu sūtnis būtu viņu ār[lietu] ministru pārpratis, resp., pesimistiski uzķēris Jonesku vārdus un<br />

2., ka varbūt arī ministrs Jonesku, lai piespiestu Latviju drīzāki akreditēt sūtni pie Bukarestes<br />

valdības, teicis, ka rumāņu tauta un zaldāti vēl nezin, ko nozīmē vārds Latvija.<br />

Tālāk sūtnis aizrāda, cik liela nozīme tam, lai Latvijai tiešām būtu sūtnis Bukarestē. Nevar<br />

būt šaubu, saka sūtnis, ka Rumānijas viskarstākā vēlēšanās ir savienība ar Latviju un pārējām<br />

Baltijas valstīm, bet, lai savienība būtu reāla, ir nepieciešami vajadzīgs, lai rumāņu tauta,<br />

inteliģence un sabiedrība vairāk zinātu par Latviju. Nav vairs tie laiki, kur savienības un<br />

konvencijas noslēdz ministri aiz slēgtām durvīm, vajadzīgs, lai arī pašas tautas viena otru<br />

pabalstītu. Latvijas eventuālam sūtnim Rumānijas sabiedrībā, presē u. t. t. būtu ļoti labvēlīgs<br />

darba lauks, jo visur atrastu vislielāko pretimnākšanu. Arī Rumānijas karaļa nama durvis būtu<br />

atvērtas Latvijas sūtnim.<br />

Plesnilă vēl piebilda, ka sabiedrības dzīve Rumānijā esot stipri attīstīta un tamdēļ viņu<br />

informācijai liela nozīme.<br />

Sūtnis Plesnilă domā, ka vajadzētu Bukarestē pastāvīgu Latvijas sūtni, bet, ja nu tas nemaz<br />

nebūtu iespējams, tad varētu savienot ar mūsu Varšavas sūtniecību.


48 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Lai apstiprinātu viņa ieteiktos ieskatus, tad sūtnis apsolīja mūsu sarunas telegrāfiski paziņot<br />

Ār[lietu] ministrijai Bukarestē un atbildi man nekavējoties paziņot. Viņš arī domāja, ka vai nu<br />

Ār[lietu] ministrija uzdošot viņam jeb viņa kolēģim Varšavā, nobraukt uz Rīgu un tuvāk<br />

parunāt un informēties vienam par otru jeb varbūt arī tūliņ akreditēšot kādu personu pie<br />

Latvijas valdības. Sūtnis pilnīgi tam piekrīt, ka mums vēl daudz kas jāpārrunā un vairākos<br />

jautājumos jāsaprotas, lai varētu stāties pie savienības noslēgšanas sarunām. Bet šai pirmai<br />

stadijai viņš piegriež lielu vērību. Par konkrētiem jautājumiem runājot, sūtnis aizrādīja, ka<br />

Rumānija labvēlīgi skatoties kā uz Ukrainas patstāvību, tā arī uz citām patstāvīgām valstīm,<br />

kuras jau atdalījušās no Krievijas un vēl atdalīties varētu.<br />

Par augšminētiem un vēl dažiem citiem jautājumiem sūtnis solījās pieprasīt tuvākas<br />

informācijas no Bukarestes.<br />

Arī Igaunijas ār[lietu] ministrs Pīps 1 bija vakar apmeklējis sūtni. Sarunas vilkušās vairāk par<br />

stundu. Plesnilă ļoti apmierināts ar sarunu gaitu. Runāts apmēram par Baltijas savienību un<br />

Rumānijas ieiešanu viņā.<br />

Ja Plesnilă brauktu uz Rīgu savas valsts uzdevumā speciālā misijā jeb nodot akreditīvus, vai<br />

man viņš jāpavada jeb ne?<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 45. lp.<br />

12. Report by Envoy of Latvia in Helsinki K. Zariņš to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z.<br />

Meierovics, 20 th May, 1921<br />

Owing to <strong>the</strong> Ministry’s note of 26 th April, this year today I again had a lengthy discussion<br />

with Romania’s minister [Envoy] in Finland Plesnilă.<br />

Envoy Plesnilă explained to me in a decisive manner that, although he had not been directly<br />

assigned to speak to a representative of <strong>the</strong> state of Latvia on behalf of Romania’s government,<br />

as a friend of many years standing of Romania’s Foreign [Affairs] Minister Ionescu and his<br />

closest colleague he knew very well <strong>the</strong> foreign policy views and aspirations of Romania.<br />

Plesnilă worked for 25 years toge<strong>the</strong>r with Foreign [Affairs] Minister Ionescu as a lawyer and<br />

journalist.<br />

He, <strong>the</strong> Envoy, said he knew that during all <strong>the</strong> years of <strong>the</strong> World War Romania with great<br />

enthusiasm admired <strong>the</strong> heroism of Latvian soldiers. After <strong>the</strong> proclamation of our<br />

independence it likewise constantly followed our foreign policy and congratulated us on our<br />

achievements and <strong>the</strong> determined course. For this reason Romania felt special affinity for Latvia<br />

and for <strong>the</strong> Baltic union in general.<br />

Considering <strong>the</strong> above-said, Envoy Plesnilă does not admit a possibility that Romania’s<br />

Minister of Foreign Affairs could be indifferent vis-à-vis Latvia. However, he admits two<br />

possibilities: 1 st possibility: our Envoy could have misunderstood <strong>the</strong>ir Foreign [Affairs] Minister,<br />

i.e. has interpreted Ionescu’s words in a pessimistic manner and 2 nd : probably Minister Ionescu<br />

said that <strong>the</strong> Romanian people and soldiers did not know yet what <strong>the</strong> name Latvia meant in<br />

order to force Latvia as soon as possible to accredit an envoy with <strong>the</strong> government in Bucharest.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Envoy remarked how important it would be for Latvia to have an envoy in<br />

Bucharest. There was no doubt, <strong>the</strong> Envoy said, that union with Latvia and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic<br />

States was Romania’s most ardent desire, but for <strong>the</strong> union to be realistic, it was absolutely<br />

1<br />

Ants Pīps (Piip; 1884–1942), Igaunijas literāts, valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1920.–1921. g. Ministru prezidents, 1921.–1922.,<br />

1925.–1926., 1932., 1933., 1939.–1940. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1923.–1925. g. sūtnis ASV.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 49<br />

necessary for <strong>the</strong> Romanian people, intellectuals and <strong>the</strong> society [in general] to know more<br />

about Latvia. It was no longer <strong>the</strong> time when unions and conventions were concluded by<br />

ministers behind a closed door, it was necessary for <strong>the</strong> peoples <strong>the</strong>mselves to support each<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r. The eventual Envoy of Latvia would have a very friendly working atmosphere in<br />

Romania’s society, <strong>the</strong> press etc., because everywhere he would encounter <strong>the</strong> greatest possible<br />

responsiveness. The doors of <strong>the</strong> house of <strong>the</strong> King of Romania would also be open to <strong>the</strong> Envoy<br />

of Latvia.<br />

Plesnilă added that social life in Romania was very well developed and thus its information<br />

[information obtained and spread in Romania] was of very great importance.<br />

Envoy Plesnilă thinks that <strong>the</strong>re is a need for a residing envoy of Latvia in Bucharest, but if<br />

that is not possible at all, representation of Latvia in Romania] could be combined with our<br />

legation in Warsaw.<br />

In order to give weight to <strong>the</strong> views that he had expressed, <strong>the</strong> Envoy promised by telegraph<br />

to inform <strong>the</strong> Foreign [Affairs] Ministry in Bucharest about our discussions and to advise me of<br />

its reply immediately. He also thought that <strong>the</strong> Foreign [Affairs] Ministry would ei<strong>the</strong>r instruct<br />

him or his colleague in Warsaw to go to Riga and to have a more detailed discussion and to<br />

share information about each o<strong>the</strong>r [‘s country] or probably would accredit a person with <strong>the</strong><br />

government of Latvia without any fur<strong>the</strong>r delay. The Envoy fully agrees that we still have many<br />

things to discuss and several issues to agree on before launching negotiations about <strong>the</strong><br />

conclusion of <strong>the</strong> union. But he attributes great attention to this first phase. Speaking about<br />

concrete issues, <strong>the</strong> Envoy noted that Romania regarded favourably <strong>the</strong> independence of<br />

Ukraine and o<strong>the</strong>r independent states, which had already seceded from Russia or could yet<br />

secede from it.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned and some o<strong>the</strong>r issues <strong>the</strong> Envoy promised to request more<br />

detailed information from Bucharest.<br />

Foreign [Affairs] Minister of Estonia Piip 1 had visited <strong>the</strong> Envoy yesterday. The discussion<br />

had lasted for more than an hour. Plesnilă is very satisfied with <strong>the</strong> course of <strong>the</strong> discussion.<br />

They had talked about <strong>the</strong> Baltic union and Romania’s joining it.<br />

If Plesnilă went to Riga on a special mission on instruction of his government or to submit<br />

<strong>the</strong> letter of credence, should I accompany him or not?<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 45.<br />

13. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă fără<br />

număr către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Take Ionescu, 22 mai 1921 2<br />

La câteva zile după sosirea mea am avut o întrevedere cu Ministrul Letoniei asupra<br />

intereselor noastre comune. Într-unul din rapoartele sale, Ministrul Letoniei, între altele, a<br />

comunicat guvernului său sosirea mea la Helsingfors 3 și bunele sentimente pe care le-am arătat.<br />

Ieri după-amiază Ministrul Letoniei a venit să mă vadă și fără niciun caracter oficial mi-a arătat<br />

o scrisoare primită de la Riga, în care Ministrul Afacerilor Străine spunea, printre altele, că este<br />

mulțumit de bunele sentimente ale Ministrului Românei la Helsingfors pentru Letonia, cu atât<br />

1<br />

Ant Piip (1884–1942), Estonian writer, statesman, diplomat. 1920–1921 Prime Minister, 1921–1922, 1925–1926, 1932,<br />

1933, 1939–1940 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1923–1925 Envoy to <strong>the</strong> USA.<br />

2<br />

Originalul raportului este în limba franceză.<br />

3<br />

Denumirea suedeză a orașului Helsinki.


50 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

mai mult cu cât el credea că România aproape ignoră existența Letoniei, întrucât în luna<br />

noiembrie a anului trecut domnul Take Ionescu, în timpul călătoriei sale la Varșovia, a declarat<br />

Ministrului Letoniei din Polonia, care era acolo pentru a participa la Conferința de la Dresda, că<br />

România nu este o țară care se conduce după himere, că Letonia este o țară necunoscută în<br />

România și că, în consecință, românii nu înțeleg de ce trebuie să lupte împotriva Rusiei dacă<br />

aceasta din urmă atacă Letonia.<br />

I-am răspuns imediat Ministrului Letoniei că nu știu nimic despre această pretinsă<br />

întrevedere de la Varșovia și nici despre ceea ce Ministrul leton din acest oraș ar fi putut să-l<br />

întrebe pe domnul Take Ionescu, dar i-am promis să vă comunic telegrafic chestiunea. I-am<br />

adăugat că în așteptarea răspunsului dumneavoastră nu pot decât să-mi manifest îndoiala<br />

asupra autenticității cuvintelor atribuite domnului Take Ionescu. I-am spus că ceea ce știam eu<br />

era că domnul Take Ionescu a fost unul dintre primii Miniștri ai Afacerilor Străine care au<br />

recunoscut oficial independența Letoniei a doua zi după decizia Societății Națiunilor și mi se<br />

pare că un om care a avut asemenea sentimente pentru Letonia nu ar putea în niciun caz să dea<br />

un răspuns care ar fi putut să-l autorizeze pe Ministrul Letoniei în Varșovia să concluzioneze și<br />

să comunice guvernului său că Ministrul Afacerilor Externe al României ar ignora existența sa.<br />

Trec la a doua problemă: Finlanda dorește să încheie cât mai repede un tratat de comerț;<br />

dacă acest lucru este adevărat sau dacă nu este decât o intrigă germană, a ajuns la urechile<br />

guvernului finlandez că Franța cere în schimb abolirea legii finlandeze care interzice consumul<br />

cu alcool. Guvernul finlandez acordă o mare importanță acestei legi și toate țările limitrofe<br />

Rusiei trebuie să-i fie recunoscătoare deoarece asigură menținerea ordinii împotriva anarhiei.<br />

În acest moment se află la Paris, cu scopul de a încheia tratatul comercial, o comisie<br />

finlandeză, sub președinția domnului Procopé 1 , fost ministru al Comerțului, un tânăr de viitor<br />

din care Franța trebuie să-și facă un prieten. Ministrul Franței la Helsingfors tocmai s-a întors<br />

de la Paris unde a fost în concediu. Am vorbit despre asta. El mi-a zis că a vorbit la Paris, dar<br />

crede că nu ar fi rău dacă domnul Daeschner 2 , Ministrul Franței la București, ar telegrafia la<br />

Paris, pentru a sfătui guvernul francez să menajeze sensibilitatea guvernului finlandez și, în<br />

scopul menținerii ordinii la granița Rusiei, să renunțe pentru moment la beneficiile celor câteva<br />

sute de mii .....(lipsă text) pe care producătorii de alcool francezi i-ar putea face pe piața<br />

finlandeză și să nu facă greșeala de a-l lăsa pe domnul Procopé 3 să plece cu mâinile goale de la<br />

Paris.<br />

Vă rog să binevoiți a comunica aceste lucruri domnului Daeschner..<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />

Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 39-40.<br />

1<br />

În text, Regcope.<br />

2<br />

Émile Daeschner (1863-1928) a fost un om politic și diplomat francez. Ministru plenipotentiar al Franței în<br />

Portugalia (1913-1920), România (1920-1924), S.U.A. (1924-1925) și Turcia (1926-1928).<br />

3<br />

Hjalmar Johan Fredrik Procopé (1889-1954) a fost un om politic și diplomat finlandez. Ministru al Comerțului și<br />

Industriilor (1920-1921, 1924), Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1924-1925, 1927-1931) și Ministru Plenipotențiar al<br />

Finlandei la Washington (1939-1944).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 51<br />

13. Diplomatic Report of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Helsinki Dimitrie Plesnilă to <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.G.Duca, Unnumbered, 22 nd May 1921 1<br />

A few days after my arrival I had a meeting with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia concerning our<br />

common interests. In one of his reports, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia announced my arrival to<br />

Helsingfors 2 and my good intentions. Yesterday afternoon <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia came to<br />

see me and unofficially showed me a letter that he had received from Riga, in which <strong>the</strong><br />

Minister of Foreign Affairs stated, among o<strong>the</strong>rs that he was content about <strong>the</strong> good<br />

intentions of <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania at Helsingfors concerning Latvia, <strong>the</strong> more so as he<br />

thought Romania almost ignored <strong>the</strong> existence of Latvia because during his trip to Warsaw<br />

from last November, Mr. Take Ionescu declared to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Poland, who<br />

was <strong>the</strong>re to participate at <strong>the</strong> Dresden Conference, that Romania was not a country ruled<br />

based on chimeras, that Latvia was an unknown country for Romania, and that, as a<br />

consequence, Romanians did not understand why <strong>the</strong>y should fight against Russia, if <strong>the</strong><br />

latter attacked Latvia.<br />

I immediately answered <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia that I did not know a thing about this so<br />

called meeting of Warsaw, nor what <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of this city could have asked Mr.<br />

Take Ionescu, but I promised him to telegraph you this information. I added that while<br />

waiting for your reply I could only express my doubt regarding <strong>the</strong> accuracy of <strong>the</strong> words<br />

that are attributed to Mr. Take Ionescu. I told him that I knew that Mr. Take Ionescu was<br />

one of <strong>the</strong> first ministers of foreign affairs who officially recognized <strong>the</strong> independence of<br />

Latvia <strong>the</strong> day after <strong>the</strong> release of <strong>the</strong> decision of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations, and I believe that –<br />

under no circumstance – could a man who nurtured such feelings for Latvia give an answer<br />

meant to allow <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Warsaw to conclude and communicate to his<br />

Government that <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania would ignore its existence.<br />

On to <strong>the</strong> second issue: Finland wants to sign a trade agreement as soon as possible; if<br />

this is accurate or if this is only a German intrigue, <strong>the</strong> information about France<br />

demanding <strong>the</strong> abolition of <strong>the</strong> Finnish law, which forbids <strong>the</strong> consumption of alcohol<br />

reached <strong>the</strong> Finnish Government. The Finnish Government considers that this law is<br />

extremely valuable, and all <strong>the</strong> countries neighboring Russia have to be grateful because<br />

this country maintains order against <strong>the</strong> anarchy.<br />

At this moment a Finnish committee, led by Mr. Procopé 3 , former Minister of Trade, a<br />

promising young man whom France must be a friend with is in Paris to sign <strong>the</strong> trade<br />

agreement. The Minister of France in Helsingfors has just returned from Paris where he<br />

was on vacation. We conversed about this. He told me that he talked in Paris but that he<br />

thinks that it would not be a worthless idea if Mr. Daeschner 4 , <strong>the</strong> Minister of France in<br />

Bucharest dispatched a telegram to Paris, in order to advise <strong>the</strong> French government to be<br />

careful about <strong>the</strong> sensibility of <strong>the</strong> Finnish Government and, in order to maintain <strong>the</strong> order<br />

at <strong>the</strong> Russian borders, to give up for a moment <strong>the</strong> benefits of some few hundred<br />

1<br />

Hjalmar Johan Fredrik Procopé (1889-1954) was a Finnish politician and diplomat. Minister of Trade and Industry<br />

(1920-1921, 1924), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1924-1925, 1927-1931), Finland’s Envoy to <strong>the</strong> United States (1939-<br />

1944).<br />

2<br />

The Swedish name for Helsinki.<br />

3<br />

In original, Regcope.<br />

4<br />

Émile Daeschner (1863-1928) was a French politician and diplomat. France’s envoy in Portugal (1913-1920),<br />

Romania (1920-1924), USA (1924-1925) and Turkey (1926-1928).


52 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

thousand ….(missing text) that could be earned by <strong>the</strong> French alcohol producers on <strong>the</strong><br />

Finnish market and not to make <strong>the</strong> mistake of allowing Mr. Procopé to leave Paris empty<br />

handed.<br />

Please be kind enough and communicate <strong>the</strong>se matters to Mr. Daeschner.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 39-40.<br />

14. Latvijas sūtniecības pagaidu vadītāja Varšavā P. Oliņa 1 1921. g. 26. maija raksts<br />

Ārlietu ministrijai<br />

Sakarā ar Jūsu rakstu no 26. aprīļa apmeklēju vietējo Rumānijas sūtni Floresku. Līdz šim<br />

sūtnim nekas vēl neesot zināms par viņa valdības nodomiem censties noslēgt defensīvu<br />

apvienību ne tikai ar Poliju, bet arī ar Baltijas valstīm – kā to Plesnilă kungs Helsingforsā 2 ziņojis<br />

sūtnim Zariņam, somu Ārlietu ministrijai un citur. Tamdēļ sūtnis Floresku pieprasīšot savai<br />

valdībai vajadzīgos norādījumus. Lūdzu tajā pašā reizē izteikt Rumānijas valdībai mūsu prieku,<br />

redzot viņas pastāvīgā diplomātiskā priekšstāvja ierašanos Rīgā, kaut gan paši pagaidām esam<br />

spiesti – budžeta grūtību dēļ – atturēties no sava priekšstāvja iecelšanas Bukarestē.<br />

Sūtnis konstatē, ka Rumānijai neesot vajadzības slēgt mieru ar padomju Krieviju, jo ar<br />

pēdējo viņa nekad nekarojusi. Tamdēļ arī Rumānijas delegāts Rēvelē 3 priekš sarunu vešanas ar<br />

padomju valdību esot bijis pilnvarots vienoties tikai par bēgļu repatriēšanas, par navigācijas un<br />

citiem jautājumiem. Attiecībā uz Besarābijas jautājumu Rumānijas valdība kategoriski noraidot<br />

katru apspriešanas priekšlikumu, jo Besarābijas iedzīvotāji esot jau reiz galīgi izteikušies par<br />

pievienošanos Rumānijai; bez tam līdzīgu lēmumu esot pieņēmusi arī Sabiedroto Augstākā<br />

padome.<br />

Ukrainas 4 jautājumu sūtnis apzīmē kā „delikātu”. Rumānija labprāt redzētu sev kaimiņos<br />

neatkarīgu Ukrainu un tamdēļ ar simpātijām sekojot notikumu attīstīšanai šajā virzienā. Bet<br />

Rumānijas valdība uzmanīgi atturoties no aktīvas Ukrainas politikas: pirmkārt, tamdēļ, ka<br />

Rumānijas politika esot tomēr subordinēta Sabiedroto politikai, un pēdējā labprāt redzētu<br />

Ukrainas federāciju ar Krieviju; otrkārt, tamdēļ, ka Ukrainas aktuālais stāvoklis esot par daudz<br />

haotisks un nenoteikts, lai varētu šeit paredzēt notikumu gaitu.<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 17. apr., 44. l., 257. lp.<br />

14. Note by interim Head of <strong>the</strong> Legation of Latvia in Warsaw P. Oliņš 5 to <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 th May, 1921<br />

Owing to your note of 26 th April I visited Envoy of Romania to this country Florescu. The<br />

Envoy said he did not know anything yet about his government’s intention of trying to<br />

conclude a defensive union not only with Poland, but also with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States – as Mr.<br />

1<br />

Pēteris Ziedonis Oliņš (1890–1962), Latvijas diplomāts.1919.–1921. g. Latvijas pārstāvniecības Polijā I šķiras<br />

sekretārs. Vairākkārt Ārlietu ministrijas nodaļas vadītājs, no 1935. g. pilnvarotais lietvedis Argentīnā un Brazīlijā ar<br />

sēdekli Buenosairesā. Miris Brazīlijā.<br />

2<br />

Helsingforsa – Helsinku oficiālais nosaukums līdz 1917. g.<br />

3<br />

Rēvele – Tallinas oficiālais nosaukums līdz 1918. g.<br />

4<br />

Runa ir par aplūkojamajā laikā savu teritoriju de facto nekontrolējošo, neatkarīgo Ukrainas Tautas Republiku,<br />

kuras valdība atradās Rietumos.<br />

5<br />

Pēteris Ziedonis Oliņš (1890–1962), Latvian diplomat. 1919–1921 First Secretary of Latvia’s mission in Poland. Head<br />

of several departments of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1935 – charge d’affaires in Argentina and Brazil with<br />

seat in Buenos Aires. Died in Brazil.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 53<br />

Plesnilă reported to Envoy Zariņš in Helsingfors 1 , to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland<br />

and o<strong>the</strong>r instances. Thus Envoy Florescu said he would request <strong>the</strong> necessary instructions<br />

from his government. I asked him at <strong>the</strong> same time to tell Romania’s government that we are<br />

pleased with <strong>the</strong> arrival of its permanent <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative in Riga although we<br />

ourselves are forced – due to budgetary difficulties – for <strong>the</strong> time being to restrain from<br />

appointing our representative in Bucharest.<br />

The Envoy has come to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that Romania has no need to sign peace with Soviet<br />

Russia as it has never been at war with <strong>the</strong> latter. For this reason <strong>the</strong> Romanian delegate sent to<br />

Reval 2 for negotiations with <strong>the</strong> Soviet government has been authorised to reach an agreement<br />

only on <strong>the</strong> repatriation of refugees, on navigation and o<strong>the</strong>r issues. As concerns <strong>the</strong> issue of<br />

Bessarabia, Romania’s government categorically rejects any proposal to discuss it, because <strong>the</strong><br />

population of Bessarabia has once and for all spoken in favour of joining Romania; besides, <strong>the</strong><br />

Allies’ Supreme Council has also adopted a similar decision.<br />

The Envoy describes <strong>the</strong> issue of Ukraine 3 as “sensitive”. Romania would be glad to have<br />

independent Ukraine as its neighbour and thus with feelings of affinity it followed <strong>the</strong><br />

developments in that direction [he said]. However, <strong>the</strong> Romanian government carefully<br />

restrained itself from an active Ukrainian policy: firstly because Romania’s policy was still<br />

subordinated to <strong>the</strong> Allies’ policy and <strong>the</strong> latter would prefer seeing Ukraine in Federation with<br />

Russia; secondly, because <strong>the</strong> actual situation in Ukraine was too chaotic and uncertain for <strong>the</strong><br />

eventual course of developments to be predicted [said <strong>the</strong> Envoy].<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 17, file 44, s. 257<br />

15. Latvijas Ārlietu ministrijas Politiski-ekonomiskā departamenta 1921. g. 28. maija<br />

raksts sūtniecībai Varšavā<br />

Piesūtam Jums informāciju dēļ K. Zariņa kunga ziņojuma par sarunām ar rumāņu sūtni<br />

Plesnilă kungu ar piezīmi, ka mūsu Rumānijas sūtņa uzdevumus Ministra kungs ir ar mieru<br />

uzlikt mūsu Varšavas sūtniecībai un šai ziņā ir sagaidāms attiecīgs rīkojums. Tamdēļ lūdzam arī<br />

Jūs interesēties par šo svarīgo jautājumu un par saviem novērojumiem un uzskatiem informēt<br />

Ārlietu ministriju.<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 3. l., 44. lp.<br />

15. Note by <strong>the</strong> Politico-Economic Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of<br />

Latvia to <strong>the</strong> Legation in Warsaw, 28 th May, 1921<br />

We are hereby sending you information with regard to Mr. K. Zariņš’ report about his<br />

discussion with Romanian Envoy Mr. Plesnilă with a comment that Mr. Minister agrees to<br />

assigning <strong>the</strong> duties of our Envoy to Romania to our Legation in Warsaw and a relevant<br />

resolution is to be expected. For this reason we ask you, too, to take interest in this very<br />

important issue and to inform <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs about your observations and<br />

views.<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 3, s. 44.<br />

1<br />

Helsingfors – <strong>the</strong> official name of <strong>the</strong> present-day Helsinki until 1917.<br />

2<br />

Reval – <strong>the</strong> name of <strong>the</strong> present-day Tallinn until 1918.<br />

3<br />

What is meant here is <strong>the</strong> Independent People’s Republic of Ukraine, which at that time was not in de facto<br />

control over its territory and had its government residing in <strong>the</strong> West.


54 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

16. Discursul lui Martiņš Nukša, trimis extraordinar și ministru plenipotențiar al<br />

Letoniei la București, rostit cu ocazia ceremoniei prezentării scrisorilor de acreditare în<br />

mâinile regelui Ferdinand I 1 , 31 mai 1922<br />

Sire,<br />

Am onoarea de a prezenta Majestății Voastre scrisorile prin care Președintele Adunării<br />

Constituante a Letoniei mă acreditează pe lângă Augusta Dumneavoastră persoană în calitate<br />

de Trimis Special și Ministru Plenipotențiar.<br />

Permiteți-mi, Sire, să fiu interpretul sentimentelor de mare stimă pe care șeful statului leton<br />

mărturisește a le manifesta într-o înaltă măsură pentru Majestatea Voastră și al dorințelor<br />

sincere pe care acesta le nutrește pentru prosperitatea Regatului României și a oamenilor care o<br />

locuiesc.<br />

Sunt extrem de încântat că am onoarea de a fi desemnat pentru înalta misiune care mă face<br />

primul reprezentant al țării mele în această frumoasă țară românească, leagăn al anticii<br />

civilizații latine de pe malul Mării Negre.<br />

Purtat de o vie simpatie pentru România, voi face uz de toate eforturile mele pentru a<br />

consolida și mai mult relațiile de prietenie și interes reciproc care unesc deja cele două națiuni<br />

și sper că îngăduința Majestății Voastre și sprijinul guvernului regal îmi vor facilita realizarea<br />

acestei înalte misiuni.<br />

AMAE, Fond 24/Reprezentanți străini, N. 1.<br />

16. The speech of Martiņš Nukša, <strong>the</strong> first Minister Plenipotentiary appointed in<br />

Romania with residence in Warsaw, on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> presentation of his<br />

credentials in <strong>the</strong> hands of King of Romania Ferdinand I 2 , 31 st May 1922<br />

Sire,<br />

I have <strong>the</strong> honor to tender to Your Majesty <strong>the</strong> letters by which <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong><br />

Constituent Assembly of Latvia accredits me to your Augusta person as Special Envoy and<br />

Minister Plenipotentiary.<br />

Allow me, Sire, to be <strong>the</strong> interpreter of <strong>the</strong> feelings of high esteem that <strong>the</strong> Latvian president<br />

testifies to cherish for Your Majesty and of <strong>the</strong> sincere desire that he fosters for <strong>the</strong> prosperity of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Romania and <strong>the</strong> people who inhabit it.<br />

I am extremely delighted that I am honored to be nominated for <strong>the</strong> high mission that<br />

makes me <strong>the</strong> first representative of my country in this beautiful Romanian country, cradle of<br />

ancient Latin civilizations on <strong>the</strong> shores of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea.<br />

Worn by a living sympathy for Romania, I shall use all my efforts to fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>ning<br />

<strong>the</strong> friendly <strong>relations</strong> and common interests that already unite <strong>the</strong> two nations, and I hope that<br />

Your Majesty’s indulgence and <strong>the</strong> support of <strong>the</strong> Royal Government will help me achieve this<br />

high mission.<br />

DARMFA, f. 24, Foreign Representatives, N. 1.<br />

1<br />

Ferdinand I (născut Ferdinand Viktor Albert Meinrad von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 1865-1927) a fost rege al<br />

României (1914-1927), jucând un rol important în alăturarea țării sale Antantei și în crearea României Mari.<br />

2<br />

Ferdinand I (born Ferdinand Viktor Albert Meinrad von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, 1865-1927) was <strong>the</strong> King of<br />

Romania (1914-1927), playing an essential role in Romania’s joining of <strong>the</strong> Entente and <strong>the</strong> creation of Greater<br />

Romania.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 55<br />

Document 1:<br />

The speech of Martiņš Nukša on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> presentation of his credentials


56 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

17. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1 1922. g. 4. novembra ziņojums Ārlietu<br />

ministrijai<br />

Rumānijas karaļa kronēšanas svētki. Par izpildīto uzdevumu reprezentēt Latviju Rumānijas<br />

karaļa kronēšanas svētkos, atļaujos sniegt īsu pārskatu, atzīmējot raksturīgākās vietas.<br />

Izbraucu no Varšavas apmēram nedēļu iepriekš, dabūjis zināt, ka karalis pieņems ārzemju<br />

misijas un priekšstāvjus dažas dienas pirms kronēšanas svētkiem, lai tie nodotu viņam pilnvaru<br />

grāmatas.<br />

Rumāņi izrādīja retu uzmanību pret viesiem. Jau tūliņ aiz Rumānijas robežas vagonā pie<br />

manis ienāca kāds augstāks policijas ierēdnis un paziņoja, ka viņam uzdots būt manā rīcībā līdz<br />

Bukarestei. Šo laipnību man nenācās izlietot. Bukarestē izkāpjot, ierēdnis atkal bija klāt un<br />

paziņoja, ka man istaba jau rezervēta viesnīcā.<br />

Divas dienas priekš kronēšanas, visas delegācijas izbrauca uz karaļa vasaras rezidenci<br />

Sinaiju, ļoti skaistā kalnu apgabalā, Karpatos, stundas 4 no Bukarestes. Nodevām savas pilnvaras<br />

un tikām ieaicināti pilī uz brokastīm. Visu misiju priekšnieki saņēma karaļa dāvātos ordeņus, to<br />

starpā arī Latvijas reprezentants – Grand Croix de la Couronne Roumaine. 2 Reprezentētas bija<br />

visas Eiropas valstis, Ziemeļamerikas Savienotās Valstis, Japāna un Persija, no Baltijas valstīm<br />

trūka Igaunijas, jo uzaicinājums viņai bija nonācis par vēlu. No delegātiem sevišķu vērību uz<br />

sevi vērsa maršals Fošs 3 un ģenerālis Vegāns. 4 Pirmais ar savām strupām, noteiktām replikām,<br />

otrais – ar lielo vienkāršību, klusumu un kautrību, īpašībām, kuras labi sakrīt ar savu sīko stāvu.<br />

Angliju reprezentēja Duke of York 5 – viens no prinčiem, Itāliju – Duc de Gênes, 6 kurš esot<br />

radnieciskos sakaros ar Rumānijas karaļa namu.<br />

Tās pašas dienas vakarā bijām atpakaļ Bukarestē un jau nākošā pēcpusdienā, sestdienā,<br />

izbraucām vairākos vilcienos uz Alba Juliju – priekš kara viņu sauca par Karlsburgu –<br />

Transilvānijā, kur notika kronēšana. Alba Julija ir maza provinces pilsētiņa, bet toties lielāka ir<br />

viņas nozīme Rumānijas tautas un valsts vēsturē. Nosaukums Alba Julija cēlies romiešu laikos,<br />

kad tie zem Trajana valdības še uzcēla vienu no tiem apcietinājumiem, kuri garā rindā stiepās<br />

caur veco Dačiju līdz pat Melnai jūrai.<br />

Alba Julija glabā Rumānijas vecākās tradīcijas jau tādēļ, ka rumāņi uzskata sevi par latīņu<br />

tautu un seno romiešu pēcnācējiem, bet jo vairāk aiz tā iemesla, ka taisni no šīs pilsētas Mihai<br />

Viteazul (Drosmīgais) ap 1600. gadu, kaut arī uz īsu laiku, apvienoja visas rumāņu apdzīvotās<br />

zemes, tās pašas, kuras no jauna sakusušas kopā tagad pēc pagājušā pasaules kara. Rumānija<br />

tura Mihai Viteazul par savu nacionālo varoni un viņa ģīmetni sliktā reprodukcijā sastop<br />

gandrīz katrā rumāņu būdā vai darbnīcā. Alba Julijā turēja apcietinājumā un notiesāja 1784. un<br />

1848. gadā rumāņu revolucionāru varoņus. Beidzot Alba Julijā proklamēja visu rumāņu zemju<br />

apvienošanu 18. novembrī 1918. gadā. Rumāņi bija patīkami aizkustināti, kad viņiem aizrādīju,<br />

ka taisni šinī pašā dienā Latvija pasludināja savu neatkarību.<br />

1<br />

Mārtiņš Augusts Nukša (1878–1942), Latvijas diplomāts. 1921.–1930. g. sūtnis Polijā, no 1922. g. – arī Rumānijā, no<br />

1925. g. – arī Austrijā ar sēdekli Varšavā, 1930.–1933. g. sūtnis Zviedrijā, Dānijā un Norvēģijā ar sēdekli Stokholmā,<br />

1933.–1939. g. sūtnis Čehoslovākijā, no 1935. g. – arī Rumānijā ar sēdekli Prāgā, 1939.–1940. g. Ārlietu ministrijas<br />

ģenerālsekretārs. Nogalināts padomju apcietinājumā.<br />

2<br />

Grand Croix de la Couronne Roumaine (franču val.) – Rumānijas Kroņa Lielkrusts.<br />

3<br />

Ferdināns Fošs (Fosh; 1851–1929), Francijas armijas maršals.<br />

4<br />

Maksims Veigāns (Weygand; 1876–1965), Francijas armijas ģenerālis.<br />

5<br />

Duke of York (angļu val.) – Jorkas hercogs.<br />

6<br />

Duc de Gênes (franču val.) – Dženovas hercogs.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 57<br />

Pēc svinīgā dievkalpojuma jaunuzceltā katedrālē gājiens iznāca ailu iežogotā baznīcu<br />

pagalmā, kur uz īpaša paaugstinājuma notika kronēšanas ceremonija. No karaļa proklamācijas<br />

tautai, ko nolasīja 4 ziņneši uz četrām debesu pusēm, atzīmēšu vietu attiecībā uz zemes<br />

reformu, kuru arī Rumānijā izved diezgan radikāli: „Es vēlos, lai zemnieki, pilntiesīgi īpašnieki<br />

par to zemi, kuru viņi saņēmuši, dod tai visu ražīguma spēju, kā savā, tā sabiedrības labā.”<br />

Ar proklamācijas nolasīšanu, kronēšanas ceremonija bija beigusies. Sākās apsveikumi no<br />

ārvalstu misijām, tad nāca brokastis galvenām oficiālām personām ar apmēram 400 kuveriem 1 ,<br />

kamēr kādās citās telpās mielojās dažāda līmeņa rumāņu delegācijas, ap 2000 personas. Pēc<br />

brokastīm – spīdoša karaspēka parāde, vakars un atgriešanās uz Bukaresti, kur nonācām otrā<br />

rītā.<br />

Lietaina diena lielā mērā traucēja svinības Bukarestē. Programma: iebraukšana Bukarestē,<br />

dievkalpojums katedrālē, brokastis parlamentā, vēsturisks gājiens gar Mihai Viteazul<br />

pieminekli, vakara dineja pilī. Sevišķu interesi skatītājos modināja vēsturiskais gājiens, kur<br />

hronoloģiskā kārtībā paslīdēja garām rumāņu tautas dzīves svarīgākie momenti, sākot no<br />

seniem dačiešiem, pāri viduslaikiem un nacionālās brīvības cīnītājiem 1784. un 1848. gadā, līdz<br />

pat tagadnei. Gājienu noslēdza 10.000 pilsētu un lauku komūnu vecākie (maires) no visas<br />

Rumānijas, grupējušies pēc provincēm un apvidiem, savos nacionālos izrakstītos kostīmos,<br />

kuros, skatoties pēc apgabaliem, ir liela dažādība krāsu un formu ziņā.<br />

Trešās svētku dienas rītā, karalis pieņēma visas ārzemju misijas atvadīšanās audiencē, pēc<br />

tam bija intīmas brokastis Kotrokeni pilī, Bukarestes priekšpilsētā. Vakarā – svinīga izrāde<br />

Nacionālā teātrī ar gadījumam piemērotu programmu. Ar to triju dienu ilgās kronēšanas<br />

svinības beidzās.<br />

Austrumu jautājums. Pirms aizbraukšanas no Rumānijas, man bija garāka saruna ar ārlietu<br />

ministru I. Duku par dažiem politiskiem un saimnieciskiem jautājumiem.<br />

Ministrs izteicās diezgan optimistiski par Dardaneļu un Bosfora jautājumu nokārtošanu,<br />

būdams pārliecināts, ka sarunu neitralitāti izdosies izvest priekšā stāvošā konferencē, kurā<br />

piedalīsies arī Rumānija (domājams, ka turp brauks pats ārlietu ministrs). Tomēr viņš neslēpa,<br />

ka Rumānija ar visu uzmanību sekos spēku pārgrupējumiem Austrumos: Francijas attiecībām<br />

pret Turciju un it īpaši pret Krieviju, sakarā ar Erio 2 sarunām Maskavā. Jo, ja Francijai un<br />

Krievijai ir kopīgas intereses Austrumos, kā izteicies Erio Maskavā, Francijai ir arī, kā to pierāda<br />

Ankāras norunas – tāda paša interešu kopība Tuvajos Austrumos ar Turciju. Vēl gan starp<br />

Krieviju un Franciju nekas nav izdarīts: sarunās ir liela daļa koķetēšanas, kaut arī uz<br />

saimnieciskiem pamatiem. Rumānijā valda uzskats, ka Erio ceļojums, ja arī nenesīs tūliņ tieši<br />

taustāmus rezultātus, tad tomēr jau tagad dod pilnīgu iemeslu domāt, ka Francijas vadošo<br />

personu līdzšinējā politiskā sistēmā notiek milzīga pārmaiņa. Un bez šaubām, tas ceļš, kuru<br />

patlaban taisa starp Parīzi un Maskavu, iet caur Ankāru, kas varbūt dos pirmo reizi vēsturē<br />

gadījumu redzēt ap šaurumiem, starp Melno un Vidusjūru, Krieviju un Turciju kopā ar Franciju.<br />

Rumānijai nāksies pielikt daudz pūļu, lai noturētu savu tagadējo privileģēto stāvokli pie Melnās<br />

jūras un viņas izejas plašākos ūdeņos.<br />

1<br />

Kuvers – aploksnes apzīmējums, acīmredzot domātas saskaņā ar etiķeti uz galda izvietojamās aploksnes ar<br />

brokastu dalībnieku vārdiem katram paredzētajā vietā.<br />

2<br />

Edvārs Erio (Herriot; 1872–1957), Francijas valstsvīrs, Lionas pilsētas galva. Radikālās partijas priekšsēdētājs,<br />

1924.–1925., 1926. un 1932. g. premjerministrs. Realizēja Padomju Savienībai labvēlīgu politiku.


58 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Zemes reforma. Pārrunājām arī par zemes reformu. Rumānija to izved plašos apmēros, īsā<br />

uzmetumā stāvoklis un reformas principi ir šādi.<br />

Bezzemnieku Rumānijā priekš kara bija ap 600 000 ģimeņu uz 6 milj. iedzīvotājiem. Lielās<br />

latifundijas atradās nedaudzu laimīgo rokās, kuri bieži vien ar zemkopību nemaz nenodarbojās<br />

un Rumānijā pat nedzīvoja, bet visu laiku uzturējās, skatoties pēc sezonas, Nicā, Parīzē vai<br />

Dovilā. Zemi izdeva apstrādāšanai zemes strādnieku asociācijām (arteļiem).<br />

Zemes reformu sāka izvest tūliņ pēc vācu karaspēka izvākšanas un, kā man stāstīja, pats<br />

karalis te devis pirmo priekšzīmi, sadalīdams savas muižas. Reformas iesākuma darbi tūliņ<br />

izvesti uz visas teritorijas, atdalot atsavināmās daļas no neatsavināmām un nododot atsavinātās<br />

plašības, vispirms bez sīkākas parcelācijas, 1 zemes strādnieku asociāciju apstrādāšanā. Tāds<br />

paņēmiens Rumānijā bija samērā viegli izvedams, jo ļaudis te dzīvo ciematos (sādžās) un šo<br />

ciematu iekārtu rumāņi paturēs arī pie galīgās zemes sadalīšanas individuālos gabalos. Iesākt ar<br />

sīku parcelāciju jau no paša pirmā gala nav bijis iespējams mērnieku, taksatoru un visu pārējo<br />

kompetento darbinieku trūkuma dēļ. Reformu galīgā veidā vispirms izvedīs tā sauktā karalistē<br />

un tad pāries uz Besarābiju un Transilvāniju.<br />

Agrākam īpašniekam tiesības paturēt vismazākais 100 hekt[āru] pēc pašas izvēles, bet<br />

vispārīgi, atstāj, skatoties pēc zemes pieprasījuma daudzuma, zemes labuma un stādu kultūras<br />

iespējamības 200–250–400 hekt[āru], bet nekādā ziņā ne vairāk par 500 hekt[āriem]. Tiem<br />

zemes īpašniekiem, kuru dēli studē zemkopību, ir tiesības vēl ņemt klāt priekš katra tāda dēla<br />

50 hekt[āru] ar noteikumu, ka šis dēls piecu gadu laikā pabeigs studijas un pēc tam tiešām pats<br />

sāks kopt viņam atstātos 50 hekt[ārus]. Zināmus atvieglojumus neatsavināmas plašības ziņā dod<br />

arī priekšzīmīgām saimniecībām. Visu zemi atsavina ārzemniekiem un tā sauktiem<br />

„promesošiem” t. i. Rumānijas pavalstniekiem, kuri, kā jau teikts, paši dzīvoja ārzemēs un par<br />

zemi neinteresējās. Pret pēdējiem zemē bijis zināms īgnums. Atmaksa ārzemniekiem tāda pati<br />

kā Rumānijas pavalstniekiem, izņemot Besarābiju, kuru pievienojot, angļu un franču valdības<br />

pieprasījušas no Rumānijas citu, stipri augstāku, zemes taksāciju. Bet angļu īpašumi Besarābijā<br />

kādi 3, franču – laikam 7.<br />

Zemnieks, kas 5 gadu laikā rentējis un pastāvīgi apstrādājis zināmu gabalu zemes, ja viņš tur<br />

uzcēlis ēkas, iekopis augļu jeb vīna dārzu, saņem šo gabalu par savu īpašumu.<br />

Zemes saņēmēji maksā atlīdzību agrākajiem īpašniekiem, izmaksāšana notiek 40 gados.<br />

Maksā pēc priekš kara vērtības. Agrākie īpašnieki, protams, nemierā, atzīdami atmaksu par<br />

mazu. Jāievēro tas, ka lielās latifundijas priekš kara atrada samērā ļoti maz pircēju, zeme reti<br />

kad pārgāja no rokas rokā un tādēļ arī tirgus vērtība zemei priekš kara bija maza. Bez tam,<br />

maksāšanu izdara ar tagadējo rumāņu leju, kura līdzinājas apmēram 2 L[atvijas] r[ubļiem].<br />

Vispārīgi ministrs, kurš, blakus piezīmējot, ir bijis galvenais zemes likuma izstrādātājs, atzīst, ka<br />

lielgruntnieki nav sevišķi daudz protestējuši pret reformu, nojauzdami viņas sociālo<br />

neizbēgamību. Ministrs vēl piebilda, ka likums par zemes reformu pieņemts agrākajā, cenza<br />

parlamentā.<br />

Lai jaunsaimniekiem nāktu palīgā ar kredītu, visā zemē nodibināts šim nolūkam īpašs banku<br />

tīkls.<br />

Produktivitāte šim brīžam nav tik liela, kā priekš kara, uz ko sevišķi aizrāda zemes reformas<br />

pretinieki. Bet, vai neatsavinot zemi un neizvedot reformu, būtu sasniegti labāki rezultāti? Maz<br />

cerams. Ražīguma pamazināšana izskaidrojama nevis ar reformas izvešanu, bet gan ar citiem<br />

1<br />

Domāta sadalīšana.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 59<br />

apstākļiem, kurus radījis karš, izpostīdams zemi, sagraudams mājas, iznīcinādams lopus,<br />

izklīdinādams un padarīdams nabagus iedzīvotājus. Šie apstākļi izsauktu ražīguma<br />

pamazināšanos tādā pat mērā, ja būtu palikušas agrākās lielsaimniecības.<br />

Uz priekšdienām ministrs sagaida produktivitātes pieaugšanu pāri pār priekš kara ražīgumu,<br />

ievērojot to, ka priekš kara lielsaimniecības Rumānijā veda visai ekstensīvu saimniecību.<br />

Mazsaimnieki turpretim ievedīs intensīvas saimniecības veidu. Mājlopu skaits arī Rumānijā,<br />

tāpat kā Latvijā, dažos apvidos jau esot pārsniedzis priekškara laika normu.<br />

Blakus ministra informācijai, iepazīstināju viņu ar zemes reformas stāvokli Latvijā, ko viņš<br />

uzklausījās ar lielu interesi.<br />

Šķiroties ministrs griezās pie manis ar uzaicinājumu nākošā braucienā uz Rumāniju atlicināt<br />

vairāk laika un apsolījās gādāt par to, lai tad mani iepazīstinātu uz vietas tieši darbā uz laukiem,<br />

ar Rumānijas zemes reformas stāvokli un panākumiem ar zemes sociālo iekārtu, parašām un ar<br />

galvenām industrijas nozarēm.<br />

Vai tas mums izdosies, to grūti pareģot, neskatoties uz optimismu no abām pusēm. Pa šo<br />

laiku Rumānijas liberāļiem, kuri ir šimbrīžam pie valsts stūres, gatavojās stiprs uzbrukums, jo<br />

opozīcijas partijas ved sarunas par apvienošanos, par kopīgu taktiku pret valdību un varbūt jau<br />

arī par nākamo kabinetu.<br />

LVVA 2575. f., 2. apr., 130. l., 37.–39. lp.<br />

17. Report by Envoy of Latvia in Warsaw M. Nukša 1 to <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs,<br />

4 th November, 1922<br />

The Coronation Festivities of <strong>the</strong> King of Romania. I take <strong>the</strong> liberty of giving a brief survey<br />

about <strong>the</strong> fulfilled task of representing Latvia in <strong>the</strong> festivities of <strong>the</strong> coronation of <strong>the</strong> King of<br />

Romania with focus on <strong>the</strong> most distinctive aspects.<br />

I left Warsaw about a week before [<strong>the</strong> festivities] because I had learned that a few days<br />

before <strong>the</strong> coronation festivities <strong>the</strong> King would receive <strong>the</strong> missions and representatives of<br />

foreign countries, so that <strong>the</strong>y can hand him <strong>the</strong>ir books [letters] of credence.<br />

The Romanians treated <strong>the</strong>ir guests with rarely surpassed attention. Right after we crossed<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanian border a high-ranking police officer entered <strong>the</strong> railway coach, approached me<br />

and announced that he had been assigned to be at my command until we reach Bucharest. I did<br />

not need to use this kindness. As I got off <strong>the</strong> train in Bucharest, <strong>the</strong> officer approached me<br />

again and announced that a hotel room had already been reserved for me.<br />

Two days before <strong>the</strong> coronation all <strong>the</strong> delegations left for <strong>the</strong> King’s summer residency in<br />

Sinaia, a very beautiful region in <strong>the</strong> Carpathian Mountains, 4 hours drive from Bucharest. We<br />

handed in our credentials and were invited to breakfast in <strong>the</strong> palace. The heads of all missions<br />

received from <strong>the</strong> King official decorations, among <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong> representative of Latvia – Grand<br />

Croix de la Couronne Roumaine. 2 All European countries, <strong>the</strong> United States of North America,<br />

Japan and Persia were represented, among <strong>the</strong> Baltic States Estonia was missing because <strong>the</strong><br />

invitation had reached <strong>the</strong>m too late. Among <strong>the</strong> delegates Marshal Foch 3 and General<br />

1<br />

Mārtiņš Augusts Nukša (1878–1942), Latvian diplomat. 1921–1930 Envoy to Poland, from 1922 – also to Romania,<br />

from 1925 – also to Austria with seat in Warsaw, 1930–1933 Envoy to Sweden, Denmark and Norway with seat in<br />

Stockholm, 1933–1939 Envoy to Czechoslovakia, from 1935 – also to Romania with seat in Prague, 1939–1940<br />

Secretary General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Executed in Soviet imprisonment.<br />

2<br />

Grand Croix de la Couronne Roumaine (French) – The Grand Cross of <strong>the</strong> Crown of Romania.<br />

3<br />

Ferdinand Foch (1851–1929), Marshal of <strong>the</strong> Army of France.


60 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Weygand 1 drew special attention to <strong>the</strong>mselves. The former with his abrupt, resolute remarks,<br />

<strong>the</strong> latter – with his great simplicity, calm and shyness, features that match well his small<br />

stature. England was represented by Duke of York – one of <strong>the</strong> princes and Italy – by Duc de<br />

Gênes 2 who is said to be a kinsman of <strong>the</strong> Royal House of Romania.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> evening of <strong>the</strong> same day we went back to Bucharest and already in <strong>the</strong> afternoon of<br />

<strong>the</strong> next day, which was Saturday, we left by several trains to Alba Iulia, before <strong>the</strong> war called<br />

Karlsburg, in Transylvania, where <strong>the</strong> Coronation Ceremony took place. Alba Iulia is a small<br />

provincial town, <strong>the</strong> importance of which for <strong>the</strong> people and in <strong>the</strong> history of Romania is<br />

however greater than its size. The name Alba Iulia comes from <strong>the</strong> Roman times when under<br />

<strong>the</strong> rule of Trajan <strong>the</strong>y built here a fortification, one in <strong>the</strong> long row stretching through <strong>the</strong> old<br />

Dacia to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea.<br />

Alba Iulia guards <strong>the</strong> most ancient traditions of Romania if only because <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />

regard <strong>the</strong>mselves as a Latin people and descendants of <strong>the</strong> ancient Romans, but even more so<br />

because it was from this town that around <strong>the</strong> year 1600 Mihai Viteazul (<strong>the</strong> Courageous) 3 ,<br />

although only for a short period, united all <strong>the</strong> lands inhabited by <strong>the</strong> Romanians, <strong>the</strong> same<br />

lands that now, after <strong>the</strong> last war have again melted toge<strong>the</strong>r. Romania regards Mihai Viteazul<br />

as its national hero and his portrait, in a poor-quality reproduction, can be seen almost in any<br />

Romanian hut and workshop. It was in Alba Iulia that <strong>the</strong> revolutionary heroes were kept under<br />

arrest and convicted in 1784 and 1848. Finally it was in Alba Iulia that <strong>the</strong> unification of all<br />

Romanian lands was proclaimed on 18 th November, 1918. The Romanians were pleasantly<br />

touched when I remarked that it was on this very day that Latvia, too, proclaimed its<br />

independence.<br />

After a solemn public worship in a newly built ca<strong>the</strong>dral <strong>the</strong> procession walked into a<br />

churchyard, surrounded by aisles, where <strong>the</strong> coronation took place on a special podium. Of <strong>the</strong><br />

King’s Proclamation to <strong>the</strong> People read out by four messengers [turned] towards <strong>the</strong> four<br />

cardinal directions, I will note <strong>the</strong> section, which concerns <strong>the</strong> land reform that Romania, too,<br />

carries out in a ra<strong>the</strong>r radical manner: “I wish farmers, full-fledged owners of <strong>the</strong> land, which <strong>the</strong>y<br />

have received, to fully utilize <strong>the</strong> potential of its productivity, both for <strong>the</strong>ir own and <strong>the</strong> public<br />

good.”<br />

The reading of <strong>the</strong> Proclamation concluded <strong>the</strong> Coronation Ceremony. Then followed<br />

congratulations from foreign missions and breakfast for <strong>the</strong> key officials with approximately<br />

400 envelopes 4 , while in some o<strong>the</strong>r rooms Romanian delegations of various ranks feasted,<br />

around 2000 persons in total. After <strong>the</strong> breakfast – a lustrous military parade, evening and<br />

departure for Bucharest where we arrived on <strong>the</strong> next morning.<br />

Rain to a large extent interfered with <strong>the</strong> celebrations in Bucharest. The programme: arrival<br />

in Bucharest, public worship in <strong>the</strong> Ca<strong>the</strong>dral, breakfast in <strong>the</strong> Parliament, a historical pageant<br />

past <strong>the</strong> monument to Mihai Viteazul, dinner in <strong>the</strong> palace. The onlookers were particularly<br />

interested in <strong>the</strong> historical pageant, which in a chronological order let slip by <strong>the</strong> most<br />

important moments in <strong>the</strong> life of <strong>the</strong> Romanian people, from <strong>the</strong> ancient Dacians, through <strong>the</strong><br />

1<br />

Maxim Weygand (1876–1965), General of <strong>the</strong> Army of France.<br />

2<br />

Duc de Gênes (French) – Duke of Genoa.<br />

3<br />

Michael <strong>the</strong> Brave (1558-1601) was <strong>the</strong> Prince of Wallachia (1593–1601), of Transylvania (1599–1600), and of<br />

Moldavia (1600). He ruled <strong>the</strong> three principalities in a personal union for a short period of time.<br />

4<br />

By „envelope” <strong>the</strong> Envoy obviously meant envelopes that in compliance with etiquette were placed on <strong>the</strong> table<br />

with names of <strong>the</strong> guests on <strong>the</strong>m to indicate where <strong>the</strong> respective person was to be seated.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 61<br />

Middle Ages and <strong>the</strong> national freedom fighters in 1784 and 1848 until our time. The pageant was<br />

tailed by <strong>the</strong> elders (maires) of 10 000 towns and rural communities from all over Romania,<br />

grouped according to <strong>the</strong>ir respective provinces and regions, dressed in <strong>the</strong>ir embroidered<br />

national costumes, which, depending on <strong>the</strong> region, display a great variety of colours and<br />

shapes.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> morning of <strong>the</strong> third day of festivities <strong>the</strong> King received all foreign missions on a<br />

farewell audience, followed by intimate breakfast in Cotroćeni palace in <strong>the</strong> outskirts of<br />

Bucharest. In <strong>the</strong> evening – a festive performance in <strong>the</strong> National Theatre with a programme<br />

that matched <strong>the</strong> occasion. With it <strong>the</strong> three days long Coronation Festivities were over.<br />

The Eastern issue. Before leaving Romania I had a lengthy discussion with Minister of<br />

Foreign Affairs I. Duca on miscellaneous political and economic issues.<br />

Minister spoke ra<strong>the</strong>r optimistically about <strong>the</strong> resolution of <strong>the</strong> Dardanelles and Bosporus<br />

issues, being confident that in <strong>the</strong> upcoming conference, where Romania, too, will take part<br />

(<strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs himself is expected to attend it) <strong>the</strong> neutrality would be<br />

affirmed. Yet he did not conceal that Romania with full attention would follow <strong>the</strong> re-grouping<br />

of forces in <strong>the</strong> East: <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> of France with Turkey and especially with Russia in<br />

connection with Herriot’s 1 talks in Moscow. Because, if France and Russia had shared interests<br />

in <strong>the</strong> East, as Herriot said in Moscow, in <strong>the</strong> Middle East France – as demonstrated by <strong>the</strong><br />

Ankara agreements – shared interests with Turkey, too. Nothing yet is done between Russia<br />

and France: <strong>the</strong> negotiations largely consist of coquetry, although on economic foundations. In<br />

Romania <strong>the</strong> opinion dominates that Herriot’s visit, even if it will not bring tangible result<br />

immediately, already now gives a good reason to believe that a huge change is taking place in<br />

<strong>the</strong> existing political system of <strong>the</strong> leading officials of France. And no doubt, <strong>the</strong> road, which is<br />

now being paved between Paris and Moscow, goes through Ankara that probably for <strong>the</strong> first<br />

time in history will give us a chance to see Russia and Turkey standing toge<strong>the</strong>r with France<br />

around <strong>the</strong> straits, between <strong>the</strong> Black and <strong>the</strong> Mediterranean Seas. Romania will have to exert<br />

much effort to safeguard its privileged position by <strong>the</strong> Black Sea and its access to <strong>the</strong> high<br />

waters.<br />

Land reform. We discussed <strong>the</strong> land reform, too. Romania carries it out on a large scale, in<br />

brief <strong>the</strong> situation and <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> reform are as follows:<br />

Before <strong>the</strong> war in Romania with <strong>the</strong> population of 6 million <strong>the</strong>re were about 600 000<br />

landless households. The large latifundia were in <strong>the</strong> hands of a few lucky ones, who often did<br />

not deal with agriculture at all and even did not live in Romania but spent all <strong>the</strong>ir time,<br />

depending on <strong>the</strong> season, in Nice, Paris or Doville. The land was rented to associations of rural<br />

workers (artels) for cultivation.<br />

The land reform was launched right after <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of <strong>the</strong> German troops and, as I was<br />

told, <strong>the</strong> King himself showed an example by distributing his manors. The first steps of <strong>the</strong><br />

reform were taken on <strong>the</strong> whole territory right way: <strong>the</strong> plots that were to be expropriated were<br />

separated from <strong>the</strong> ones that were not to be expropriated and <strong>the</strong> expropriated land was given<br />

to co-operative associations of workers for cultivation, at first without fur<strong>the</strong>r parcellation 2 . This<br />

1<br />

Edward Herriot (1872–1957), French statesman, head of <strong>the</strong> city of Lyon. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Radical Party, 1924–<br />

1925, 1926 and 1932 Prime Minister. Pursued a policy favourable to <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union.<br />

2<br />

This word is of <strong>the</strong> Envoy’s own choosing and was placed by him in <strong>the</strong> Latvian text, meaning dividing into<br />

smaller plots (translator’s note).


62 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

method was ra<strong>the</strong>r easy to be carried out in Romania, because here people live in villages and<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanians will keep this village system also after <strong>the</strong> final division of land into individual<br />

plots. It had been impossible to start with smaller parcellation from <strong>the</strong> very beginning due to<br />

<strong>the</strong> lack of surveyors, cruisers and o<strong>the</strong>r competent specialists. First of all <strong>the</strong> reform will be<br />

carried out to <strong>the</strong> completion in <strong>the</strong>-so-called kingdom and <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>y will turn to Bessarabia<br />

and Transylvania.<br />

The former owner has <strong>the</strong> right to keep at least 100 hect[ars], if he chooses to, but in general<br />

<strong>the</strong>y leave him 200–250–400 hect[ars], depending on <strong>the</strong> quantity of requests for land, <strong>the</strong><br />

quality of soil and <strong>the</strong> possible type of crop [that can be grown in <strong>the</strong> respective soil], but never<br />

more than 500 hect[ars]. Those landowners whose sons study agriculture have <strong>the</strong> right to<br />

receive 50 additional hect[ars] for each such son on condition that <strong>the</strong> son finishes his studies in<br />

five years and after that starts to cultivate <strong>the</strong> 50 hect[ars] left for him. Model farms also are<br />

given certain privileges in terms of non-expropriated land. Foreigners and <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />

“absentees”, i.e. citizens of Romania who, as mentioned before, lived abroad and did not take<br />

any interest in <strong>the</strong>ir land, are expropriated all of it. Towards <strong>the</strong> latter <strong>the</strong>re has been certain<br />

resentment in <strong>the</strong> country. Foreigners receive <strong>the</strong> same size of compensation as <strong>the</strong> citizens of<br />

Romania, except in Bessarabia, upon <strong>the</strong> incorporation of which <strong>the</strong> English and French<br />

governments required from Romania a different, much higher taxation of land. But in<br />

Bessarabia <strong>the</strong>re were about 3 English-owned estates and I guess 7 French-owned ones.<br />

The farmer who has rented and constantly cultivated a plot of land for five years, if he has<br />

built buildings on it, cultivated an orchard or a vineyard, receives <strong>the</strong> respective plot as his<br />

property.<br />

Those who receive land pay compensation to <strong>the</strong> former owners, <strong>the</strong> payment [of <strong>the</strong> value<br />

of <strong>the</strong> plot] takes place over 40 years. Payment is based on <strong>the</strong> pre-war value. The former<br />

owners certainly are dissatisfied, considering <strong>the</strong> compensation too small. It should also be<br />

considered that before <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong> large latifundia found ra<strong>the</strong>r few buyers, plots of land<br />

seldom changed hands and for this reason before <strong>the</strong> war <strong>the</strong> market value of land was low.<br />

Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, paying is done in <strong>the</strong> current Romanian lei, one leu being approximately 2<br />

L[atvian] r[oubles]. The Minister who, by <strong>the</strong> way, has been <strong>the</strong> main author of <strong>the</strong> Law on<br />

Land, admits that on <strong>the</strong> whole <strong>the</strong> large landowners have not protested much against <strong>the</strong><br />

reform, sensing its social inevitability. The Minister also added that <strong>the</strong> Law on Land was<br />

adopted by <strong>the</strong> former, <strong>the</strong> census parliament.<br />

To assist <strong>the</strong> new farmers with a bank loan, a special network of banks has been established<br />

for this purpose all over <strong>the</strong> country.<br />

The productivity so far has not been as good as before <strong>the</strong> war, which fact is especially<br />

remarked on by <strong>the</strong> opponents of <strong>the</strong> reform. But would <strong>the</strong> result have been better if <strong>the</strong> land<br />

was not expropriated and <strong>the</strong> reform not carried out? Unlikely. The decrease of productivity is<br />

due not to <strong>the</strong> reform but to o<strong>the</strong>r circumstances caused by <strong>the</strong> war that devastated land,<br />

ruined homes, killed cattle, dispersed and impoverished people. These circumstances would<br />

have caused decrease of productivity to <strong>the</strong> same degree, even if <strong>the</strong> large farms continued to<br />

exist.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> future <strong>the</strong> Minister expects <strong>the</strong> increase of productivity above <strong>the</strong> pre-war level,<br />

considering that in Romania before <strong>the</strong> war large farms pursued ra<strong>the</strong>r extensive agriculture.<br />

The small owners in contrast will introduce intensive type of agriculture. The numbers of cattle


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 63<br />

in Romania, same as in Latvia, in some regions is said to have already exceeded <strong>the</strong> pre-war<br />

figures.<br />

Apart from listening to <strong>the</strong> Minister I informed him about <strong>the</strong> situation with <strong>the</strong> land<br />

reform in Latvia that he listened to with great interest.<br />

As we were saying good-bye <strong>the</strong> Minister urged me to spare more time for my next trip to<br />

Romania and promised to arrange it that I am acquainted directly on site, in countryside with<br />

<strong>the</strong> situation of <strong>the</strong> Romanian land reform and achievements in <strong>the</strong> country’s social system,<br />

customs and <strong>the</strong> main branches of industry.<br />

Whe<strong>the</strong>r we shall be able to do it, it is difficult to predict, in spite of optimism from both<br />

sides. Meanwhile <strong>the</strong> Romanian liberals, who are currently at <strong>the</strong> helm of <strong>the</strong> state, are<br />

expecting a powerful attack as <strong>the</strong> opposition parties are negotiating a merger, a joint tactics<br />

against <strong>the</strong> government and perhaps already a new cabinet [of ministers] also.<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 2, file 130, s. 37–39.<br />

18. Telegrama ministrului României la Varșovia Alexandru Florescu 1 nr. 6086 către<br />

Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca 2 , 14 decembrie 1923<br />

Confidențial<br />

Subsecretarul de Stat la Ministerul Afacerilor Străine m-a informat că guvernul leton trebuia<br />

să răspundă chiar azi Sovietelor că propunerea ce i s-a făcut a unui pact de neagresiune nu se<br />

poate examina decât în urma unei discuții generale între puterile adunate la Moscova în<br />

decembrie anul trecut adică Finlanda, Estonia, Letonia și Polonia.<br />

Se pare că nu s-ar vorbi în acest răspuns de Lituania. Nici numele României nu este<br />

pronunțat.<br />

Nota de răspuns propune orașul Riga pentru o eventuală întrunire.<br />

Întrunirea însă ar fi [programată] ulterior Conferinței Statelor Baltice, care trebuie să aibă<br />

loc la Tallinn 3 la 21 ianuarie viitor.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1918-1944, Letonia, 1923-1940. U.R.S.S., vol. 9, fila 10.<br />

18. Telegram no. 6086 of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister in Warsaw Alexandru Florescu 4 to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.G. Duca 5 , 14 th December 1923<br />

Confidential.<br />

The Undersecretary of State at <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed me that <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian Government should have answered already today to <strong>the</strong> Soviets that <strong>the</strong> proposal<br />

concerning <strong>the</strong> non-aggression pact can only be examined following a general discussion<br />

1<br />

Alexandru G. Florescu (1867-1925) a fost un politician conservator, diplomat și autor dramatic. Secretar General<br />

la Ministerului Afacerilor Străine (1899-1901), numit în 1911 Ministru Plenipotenţiar la Atena, iar în 1919 a fost<br />

desemnat în calitate de cel dintâi Ministru Plenipotentiar al României la Varșovia (până în 1925).<br />

2<br />

I.G. Duca (1879-1933) a fost un om politic român, președinte al Partidului Național Liberal (1930-1933). A fost<br />

Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1933) și Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1922-1926). S-a stins din viață la Sinaia<br />

la 29 decembrie 1933 fiind asasinat la ordinele Legiunii Arhanghelului Mihail.<br />

3<br />

În text, Teheran.<br />

4<br />

Alexandru G. Florescu (1867-1925) was a conservative politician, diplomat and drama playwriter. Secretary<br />

General of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1899-1901), appointed Envoy to Greece (1911) and to Poland (1919-1925).<br />

5<br />

I.G. Duca (1879-1933) was a Romanian politician, President of <strong>the</strong> National Liberal Party (1930-1933). President of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1933) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1930-1933). Murdered in Sinaia by members of <strong>the</strong><br />

right-wing Legion of Archangel Michael.


64 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

between <strong>the</strong> powers that met in Moscow in December last year, namely: Finland, Estonia,<br />

Latvia and Poland.<br />

It seems that this answer makes no reference to Latvia. Romania’s name is not<br />

mentioned ei<strong>the</strong>r. The response note proposes <strong>the</strong> city of Riga for a possible meeting. The<br />

meeting is supposed to take place after <strong>the</strong> Conference of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, which should<br />

take place in Tallinn 1 next year on January 21 st .<br />

AMAE, f. 71, Latvia, 1923-1940. USSR, vol. 9, s. 10.<br />

19. Decretul regelui Ferdinand I nr. 1074 de acreditare a lui Alexandru G. Florescu<br />

din ziua de 1 aprilie 1924 în calitate de ministru plenipotențiar pe lângă Guvernele<br />

Republicilor Letoniei și Estoniei, 21 martie 1924<br />

Ferdinand I<br />

Prin grația lui Dumnezeu și voința națională<br />

Rege al României<br />

La toți de față și viitori Sănătate<br />

Asupra raportului Ministrului NOSTRU Secretar de Stat la Departamentul Afacerilor<br />

Străine, sub nr. 15143<br />

AM DECRETAT ȘI DECRETĂM:<br />

ART.I. – Domnul Alexandru G. Florescu, Trimis extraordinar și Ministru plenipotențiar al<br />

NOSTRU pe lângă Președintele Republicii Statului Polon, este acreditat pe ziua de 1 aprilie 1924<br />

în aceeași calitate și pe lângă Guvernele Republicilor Letoniei și Estoniei.<br />

ART.II. - Ministrul NOSTRU Secretar de Stat la Departamentul Afacerilor Străine este<br />

însărcinat cu executarea acestui decret.<br />

AMAE, Problema 77/Dosare personale, F. 13, vol. II, Alexandru G. Florescu<br />

19. Decree no. 1074 of King Ferdinand of April 1 st 1924 concerning <strong>the</strong> Accreditation of<br />

Alexandru G. Florescu as a Plenipotentiary Minister to <strong>the</strong> Governments of <strong>the</strong><br />

republics of Latvia and Estonia, 21 st March 1924<br />

Ferdinand I<br />

By <strong>the</strong> grace of God and <strong>the</strong> national will<br />

King of Romania<br />

Bless you all here present and those to come<br />

On <strong>the</strong> report no. 15143 of OUR Minister Secretary of State of <strong>the</strong> Department of<br />

Foreign Affairs<br />

I DECREED AND WE DECREE:<br />

ART.I. – Mr. Alexandru G. Florescu, Envoy Extraordinary and OUR Plenipotentiary<br />

Minister to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Polish Republic, is accredited on April 1 st , 1924 in <strong>the</strong> same<br />

capacity to <strong>the</strong> governments of <strong>the</strong> republics of Latvia and Estonia.<br />

ART.II. – OUR Minister State Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Department of Foreign Affairs is<br />

instructed to execute this decree.<br />

DARMFA, f. 77, Personal Files, F. 13, vol. II, Alexandru G. Florescu.<br />

1<br />

In <strong>the</strong> text, Teheran


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 65<br />

Document 2<br />

Decree of King Ferdinand concerning <strong>the</strong> Accreditation of Alexandru G. Florescu as<br />

a Plenipotentiary Minister of <strong>the</strong> Governments of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia and Estonia


66 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

20. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1925. g. marta ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />

Meierovicam par savu vizīti Rumānijā februārī<br />

[..] Iesākšu šo ziņojumu ar tā beigām – ar tiem slēdzieniem, pie kādiem nonācu. Tas<br />

vajadzīgs tādēļ, ka gribētos vispirms īsumā aizrādīt uz Rumānijā iegūtiem uzskatiem un<br />

izklaidēt jau pašā sākumā to tendenciozo, naidīgo informāciju, ko par Rumāniju snieguši vācu<br />

un krievu avoti.<br />

Sociālais stāvoklis Rumānijā jāatzīst par stabilu, no lieliniecisma izaugšanas valsts iekšienē<br />

nav daudz jābaidās. Zemnieki, galvenā iedzīvotāju masa, dabūjusi zemi, pēc kuras tie bija gadu<br />

desmitiem prasījuši un kuras dēļ tie bija pat reizēm dumpojušies. Zemnieku interese piegriezta<br />

zemei un savas iedzīves ierīkošanai. Tādēļ lielinieku aģitācijai, kura intensīva, ir maz panākumu.<br />

Pat Besarābijā, kur iedzīvotāji pieder pie vairākām tautībām, rumāņu un vācu elements<br />

izturoties naidīgi pret lieliniecismu.<br />

[..] Saimnieciskais stāvoklis Rumānijā grūts: trūkst naudas, trūkst kredītu [..]. Zemes reforma<br />

ir labi pavirzīta uz priekšu [..]. Nekāda politiskā pārgrupēšanās Balkānu valstu starpā nav<br />

paredzama; Mazās Antantes nozīme nav palikusi mazāka.<br />

Rumānijas strīds ar Vāciju nokārtosies bez muitas kara; pret šādu karu ir visas saimnieciskās<br />

aprindas. Pretēji vācu informācijas apgalvojumiem, Rumānija līdz šim nav lietojusi pret Vāciju<br />

vai vācu pilsoņiem nekādus spaidus, ne politiskus, ne ekonomiskus.<br />

No pārējām Balkānu valstīm stāvoklis politiskā ziņā visnedrošākais ir Bulgārijā, mazāk<br />

Jugoslāvijā un Grieķijā. Rumānijā pastāv uzskats, ka visās šinīs valstīs līdzšinējais režīms ņems<br />

virsroku pār nemiera kustību.<br />

Pēc šāda nomierinoša ievada varu pāriet pie stāstīšanas.<br />

Ceļā no Polijas robežas līdz Bukarestei jau var konstatēt, ka rumāņiem daudz darāms, lai<br />

uzlabotu dzelzceļu satiksmi; redzams, ka trūkst vagonu un lokomotīves, ka kara laikā<br />

uzspridzinātie tilti vēl nav atjaunoti pat uz galvenām līnijām. Iztiek ar vācu okupācijas varas<br />

celtiem dzelzs pagaidu tiltiem. Personāla un ierēdņu daudz, bet tie bieži vien nezin, kas viņiem<br />

darāms. Rodas tāds iespaids, ka, ja Rumānija būtu pret pašas gribu spiesta karot ar Krieviju<br />

Besarābijas dēļ, tad viena no viņas pirmajām un galvenajām grūtībām būtu nenoorganizētā un<br />

nepietiekošā dzelzceļa satiksme.<br />

Nobraucis Bukarestē, tūliņ pirmā dienā nodevu savu karti pie ārlietu ministra. Jau nākošā<br />

rītā no Protokola direkcijas man zvanīja un ziņoja, ka ministrs labprāt vēlētos mani redzēt<br />

zināmā stundā pie sevis. Tur nogājušu, ministrs Duka mani bez kavēšanās pieņēma un jau pie<br />

pirmiem vārdiem centās pastrīpot Rumānijas simpātijas priekš Latvijas, kuras attīstībai<br />

Rumānijā sākot sekot ar pastāvīgi augošu interesi; viņš ļoti priecātos, ja abu valstu kopdarbība jo<br />

vairāk izveidotos. Atbildēju ministram, ka tādas pat jūtas visā Latvijā ir pretim Rumānijai, un, ka<br />

arī mans uzdevums un mana vēlēšanās ir – strādāt pie šīs kopdarbības padziļināšanas. Abi par<br />

to priecājāmies. Pēc šī sirsnīgā ievada Duka steigšus uzstādīja jautājumu: Kādas Jums ziņas par<br />

Krieviju? Kas tur notiek, vai Jūs domājiet, ka viņa mums uzbruks, vai nē? Varēja redzēt, ka šis<br />

jautājums rumāņus jo sevišķi interesē; izrādījās arī, ka viņi ļoti maz par Krieviju informēti. Tas<br />

pilnīgi saprotams, jo Rumānijai pašai nav nekādu attiecību ar Krieviju, un visi Krievijas<br />

satiksmes ceļi ar Vakareiropu atrodas tālu no Rumānijas. Manu sniegto informāciju un uzskatus<br />

par Krieviju ministrs noklausījās, cik varēju redzēt, ar lielu interesi. Mūsu saruna šoreiz nebija<br />

gara, jo pienāca ziņa, ka karalis, kurš bija saslimis, vēlētos ministru tūliņ redzēt. Vēl Duka mani


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 67<br />

informēja īsumā par Rumānijas apstākļiem un šķiroties izteica vēlēšanos drīzumā redzēties, lai<br />

tuvāk pārrunātu mūs interesējošos jautājumus.<br />

Satiku ministru pēc tam pie viņa mājās brokastīs, kuras viņš man deva. Bez manis bija vēl<br />

klāt daži ministri un pāris sūtņi ar kundzēm.<br />

Norunājām satikties nākošā dienā ministrijā. Šoreiz Duka mani iepazīstināja vispārīgos<br />

vilcienos ar stāvokli Balkānos. Pēc viņa domām, visvairāk bažas rada Bulgārija. Komunistu<br />

aģitācija tur laidusi dziļas saknes Stambolijska 1 valdības laikā. Tauta esot tik tāl saviļņota, ka<br />

tagadējam kabinetam nākoties ļoti grūti atrast ceļu, pa kuru tikt pie zināma nomierinājuma [..].<br />

Tomēr, pēc ministra pēdējām informācijām, viņam liekoties, ka tagadējā valdība varēšot aso<br />

nemieru kustību noslāpēt, tā, ka līdz režīma apvērsumam nenonākšot.<br />

Bez Bulgārijas Rumānija lielu vērību piegriež ari kroātu 2 kustībai Jugoslāvijā. Duka<br />

neuzkrauj visu vainu kroātiem. Viņš atrod, ka kroātu tautas masa nebūt nesimpatizējot<br />

lieliniecismam. Kroātu zemnieks esot samēra turīgs un ja viņš pabalstot Radiču 3 ar tā<br />

politiskajiem draugiem, kuriem, bez šaubām, esot sakari ar Maskavu, tad šī pabalstīšana<br />

notiekot aiz tā iemesla, ka kroāti esot stipri nemierā ar līdzšinējo sastingušo Pašiča 4 režīmu.<br />

Pašičs esot stūrgalvīgs un vecs, tik vecs, ka ar viņu netiekot galā Serbijā neviens; pat karalim<br />

nākoties ārkārtīgi grūti sarunās ar viņu tikt pie kāda rezultāta. Duka domā, ka Jugoslāvijā<br />

stāvoklis drīzumā noskaidrošoties un zaudēšot asumu.<br />

Par Grieķiju komunistiskās imunitātes ziņā Duka izteicās vēl optimistiskāk. Viļņošanās un<br />

kustības, kas tur notiek, esot pazaudētā kara sekas. Arī Mazāzijas grieķu emigrantu novietošana<br />

darot lielas rūpes. Turcijā visi grieķi bijuši tirgotāji. Tagad, pārnākuši tēvijā, tie radot nevēlamu<br />

konkurenci. Grūtības viņai esot arī vēl ar Jugoslāviju; Rumānija mēģinot iespaidot abas valstis<br />

uz saprašanos. Tieši noteiktas komunistiskas kustības Grieķijā, pēc ministra domām, neesot.<br />

Komunistu aģitācijas centrs, kurš līdz šim atrodas Vīnē, tikšot pārnests uz Balkāniem, tomēr<br />

tas tur atradīšoties laikam zem Berlīnes centrālās vadības.<br />

Tā, visumā kopā ņemot, Rumānija mazāk baidoties no komunisma izcelšanās pie sevis, nekā<br />

pie saviem kaimiņiem, caur ko Rumānija būtu ielenkta no lieliniecisma. Pašā Rumānijā<br />

komunisti varot radīt atsevišķus terora aktus, bet ne vairāk. Lielinieku iebrukumu Tatarbunārā<br />

pagājušā gadā vietējie iedzīvotāji paši palīdzējuši atsist.<br />

Šādu ministra informāciju pēc tam apstiprināja vietējie ārvalstu sūtņi; arī tie atzina<br />

Rumānijas sociālo stāvokli par stabilu. Ja Besarābijā visas lietas nenorisinās gludi, tad tas, pēc šo<br />

kolēģu domām, notiekot trūcīgās administrācijas un pērkamo ierēdņu dēļ. Uz Besarābiju esot<br />

sūtīti par administratoriem ļaudis ar sakariem, bet ar pasīvu materiālu un morālu bilanci; savu<br />

materiālo bilanci viņi tur drīz uzlaboja, bet morālo – nē. Tas pilnīgi saprotams, jo pie zemā<br />

vispārīgā kultūras līmeņa valdībai nācās ļoti grūti atrast ierēdņus iegūtām provincēm Besarābijā<br />

un Transilvānijā. Ierēdņi saņem niecīgu atalgojumu; kā vācu sūtnis man teica, policists saņemot<br />

800 lejas (Ls 20) mēnesī. Ar šādu algu nav iespējams dzīvot, neskatoties uz to, ka dzīve<br />

Rumānijā ir lētāka nekā Latvijā.<br />

1<br />

Aleksandars Stambolijskis (1879–1923), Bulgārijas valstsvīrs. 1919.–1923. g. premjerministrs, nogalināts valsts<br />

apvērsumā.<br />

2<br />

Kroāti – horvāti.<br />

3<br />

Stepjans Radičs (Radić; 1871–1928), horvātu politisks darbinieks, Serbu, horvātu un slovēņu karalistes<br />

(Dienvidslāvijas) valstsvīrs. 1925.–1927.g. izglītības ministrs.<br />

4<br />

Nikola Pašičs (Pašić; 1845–1926), Serbijas, pēc tam Serbu, horvātu un slovēņu karalistes (Dienvidslāvijas)<br />

valstsvīrs. 1921.–1926. g. premjerministrs.


68 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Kad ievaicājos ministram, cik taisnības ir ziņām par jaunas pretlielinieciskas valstu koalīcijas<br />

dibināšanos Balkānos, pie kam Anglija iegūtu tur lielāku iespaidu, Duka ļoti noteikti atbildēja,<br />

ka no kādas jaunas grupēšanās Balkānos neesot un nevarot būt runas. Anglija, kura labprāt<br />

pavisam atteiktos no aktīvas politikas uz Eiropas cietzemes, neesot i domājusi ņemt dalību<br />

Balkānu politikā. Mazā Antante paliek joprojām kā aktīvs politisks faktors: sargāt Viduseiropā<br />

to stāvokli, kādu tur radījuši pēc lielā kara noslēgtie miera līgumi. Drīzumā Bukarestē jāsanāk<br />

Mazās Antantes valstu ārlietu ministriem un tur es varēšot pārliecināties, ka nekādu nesaskaņu<br />

starp viņiem nav [..].<br />

Pārgājām uz jautājumu par tirdzniecības līgumu. Uz manu ierosinājumu Duka atbildēja ar<br />

lielāko pretimnākšanu un, man liekas, neliekuļotu prieku. Man gribētos apgalvot, ka rumāņi<br />

šimbrīžam politiskā ziņā jūtas stipri vientuļi un tādēļ katru draudzības žestu, katru vēlēšanos<br />

stāties ar viņiem tuvāk attiecībās tie jo silti apsveic. Iepazīstināju ministru ar mūsu līdz šim<br />

noslēgtiem līgumiem, ar šo līgumu pamatprincipiem un īpatnībām – klauzulām, atbalstot tās ar<br />

attiecīgiem argumentiem. Pēc ministra uzskatiem, Rumānija pret šīm klauzulām iebildumus<br />

necelšot, tomēr viņš nevarot dot galīgu atbildi, jo viņam esot jāsazinās ar saviem kolēģiem –<br />

finanšu un tirdzniecības ministru. Tomēr, kā vēlāk sarunā ar ministrijas ģenerālsekretāru<br />

Filodoru noskaidrojās, Rumānija līdz šim nav tirdzniecības līgumus, vārda pilnā nozīmē,<br />

slēgusi; viņa šīs attiecības nokārtojusi vienkāršā īsu notu apmaiņas ceļā, piemērojot savstarpēji<br />

lielākās labvēlības principu. Tādā veidā Rumānijas tirdzniecības attiecības nokārtotas ar<br />

daudzām valstīm. Apmainījāmies iepazīšanās nolūkā ar dokumentiem. Savu atturību tuvāk<br />

precizēta tirdzniecības līguma slēgšanā rumāņi izskaidro ar nenokārtoto saimniecisko stāvokli<br />

zemē ar tarifu trūkumu un ekonomiskās politikas neizveidotību.<br />

Iztikām vispārīgos vilcienos arī jautājumu par juridiskās palīdzības konvenciju un par<br />

konvenciju, zīmējoties uz ekstradīciju. Juridiskās palīdzības konvencija mums vairāk vajadzīga<br />

nekā rumāņiem. Mūsu pilsoņu Rumānijā ir diezgan prāvs skaits un, kā mūsu konsuls Orgidans 1<br />

apgalvo, tie ieņemot tur diezgan labu stāvokli. Juridiskās palīdzības konvenciju Rumānija šī<br />

gada februārī parakstījusi ar Austriju. Vienu eksemplāru no tās paņēmu līdzi; tāpat arī no<br />

ekstradīcijas konvencijas, ko Rumānija pagājušā gadā noslēgusi ar Ziem[eļamerikas] Savienotām<br />

Valstīm. Pēdējā atzīmējams tas, ka Rumānija neapņemas izdot Amerikas Savienotām valstīm<br />

tos noziedzniekus, kam draud nāves sods. Rumānijā nāves sods nepastāv.<br />

Savā laikā jau ziņoju ministrijai Rīgā, ka Rumānija atvērs pie mums goda konsulātu. Izejot<br />

no šī nodoma un atbalstoties uz maniem novērojumiem, ka Duka un Filodors ir ļoti trūcīgi<br />

informēti par Krievijas apstākļiem – gandrīz vienīgi no poļu avotiem, novedu viņus pamazām<br />

pie domām par sūtniecības ierīkošanu Rīgā. Aizrādīju, ka šimbrīžam Rīga ir tas centrs, kurā<br />

saplūst visa informācija no Krievijas. Caur Rīgu notiek Krievijas satiksme ar Vakareiropu. Visi<br />

ārvalstu sūtņi pie padomju valdības brauc uz Maskavu un no turienes caur Rīgu; Rīgā pastāvīgi<br />

uzturas ārzemju laikrakstu un lielo telegrāfa aģentūru korespondenti; dažas sūtniecības uztur<br />

speciālu plašu ierēdņu štatu Krievijas novērošanai.<br />

Vēlāk kādā sarunā Filodors man pastāstīja, ka ministrs Duka gribot ar 1926. budžeta gadu<br />

atvērt Rīgā pastāvīgu sūtniecību un tam nolūkam nolēmis uzņemt budžeta projektā attiecīgās<br />

summas. Rumānijai bijusi sūtniecība Helsingforsā, bet to viņa likvidējusi priekš pāris gadiem.<br />

Kad satikos ar pašu ministru, tad neslēpu to, ko ģenerālsekretārs Filodors man bija teicis par<br />

1<br />

Teodors Orgidans (Orghidan; 1888 – pēc 1940), Rumānijas uzņēmējs, no 1923. g. Latvijas goda konsuls, 1928.–<br />

1940. g. goda ģenerālkonsuls Bukarestē.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 69<br />

sūtniecības atvēršanu. Duka šo ziņu apstiprināja, uz ko es reaģēju ar attiecīgu frāzi par labo<br />

iespaidu un jo dziļākām simpātijām, ko šāds Rumānijas valdības solis izsauks Latvijā un arī<br />

pārējās Baltijas valstīs.<br />

Mūsu uzaicinājums sūtīt delegātu uz kopējo apspriedi atbruņošanas jautājumā atstāja<br />

Bukarestē ļoti labu iespaidu. Tiklīdz Duka bija saņēmis šo ziņu, viņš bija licis aicināt mani uz<br />

Ārlietu ministriju, kur man paziņoja, ka Rumānija savu delegātu sūtīs un lūdza mani to darīt<br />

zināmu manai valdībai, kā arī izzināt apspriedes atklāšanas dienu. Diemžēl mans sekretariāts<br />

Varšavā man bija iedevis līdzi šifru nepilnīgā veidā (bez instrukcijas), tā kā nevarēju šifrēt.<br />

Sazināšanos bija jāizdara ar abu Varšavas sūtniecību starpniecību, kas aizņēma vairāk laika.<br />

Ziņu par nolikto apspriedes dienu rumāņi saņēma par vēlu, lai varētu laikā ierasties. Starp<br />

Bukaresti un Varšavu tiešā satiksmē ir tikai divi vilcieni nedēļā; arī gaisa satiksme vēl nav<br />

ierīkota. Tādēļ rumāņi nāca ar lūgumu atlikt apspriedi par dažām dienām vēlāk. Rumānijas<br />

delegāts ir pulkvedis Kenesku, bijušais ķēniņa adjutants, kurš tagad komandē pulku<br />

Transilvānijā. Pie delegāta izraudzīšanas, kā liekas, ir ņēmis dalību arī ķēniņš. Cik varēju manīt,<br />

tad poļiem šis delegāts nepatīk vai vismaz viņi bija vēlējušies redzēt citu personu, jo poļu kara<br />

priekšstāvis Rumānijā, Dzeržikraj-Moravskis 1 bija atnācis pie manis, teikdams, ka caur šādu<br />

izlasi delegāta sūtīšana novēlošoties. Kenesku neesot nemaz ar Baltijas valstīm pazīstams; viņu<br />

ģenerālštāba priekšnieks nebūtu sūtījis, bet pēdējais nemaz neesot ticis prasīts un tādēļ tas esot<br />

briesmīgi noskaities. Štāba priekšnieka kandidāts esot pulkvedis Dimitresku, kurš pārrunājamos<br />

jautājumus labi pārzinot. Ko lai darot. Izteicos, ka šī lieta ir rumāņu mājas lieta, kurā man, kas<br />

te tikai retumis ierodos, nav nekādi iespējams iejaukties, pat ne indirekti. Ar to jautājumu<br />

izbeidzām; palika, ka brauks Kenesku.<br />

Uzturēdamies Bukarestē, apmeklēju vairākas reizes mūsu konsulātu, kuru vada Teodors V.<br />

Orgidans, veikls, nepilnus 40 gadus vecs, neliela auguma vīrs, kurš pieder jau kopš vairākām<br />

paaudzēm pie turīgas tirgotāju ģimenes; pie tādas pat ģimenes, cik zinu, pieder arī viņa kundze.<br />

Studējis Vācijā. Bijis neilgi atpakaļ Bukarestes Tirdzniecības kameras viceprezidents un stāvējis<br />

rumāņu delegācijas priekšgalā pie sarunu vešanas Anglijā par privātparādu konsolidāciju, ko<br />

izvedis ar labām sekmēm. Tirdzniecības sakarus viņš uzturot galvenā kārtā ar Angliju (audumi<br />

vairumā).<br />

Konsulāts darbojas no 18. aprīļa 1924. g. Konsuls piegriezis atzīstamu vērību un uzmanību<br />

savam oficiālam pienākumam, piem[ēram]: neizdod vīzas, neapprasījies iepriekš policijā, tā<br />

vispārīgā, kā politiskā, vai vīzas lūdzējam tur nav kāds dossier. 2 Darbvedība norit kārtīgi. Daži<br />

sīki pārpratumi, kas notikuši, darbību uzsākot, izskaidrojami ar tuvāku instrukciju trūkumu<br />

tobrīd; tie tagad novērsti.<br />

Noskaidroju jautājumu par konsulārā tīkla paplašināšanu Rumānijā. Saņēmu arī ziņu, ka to<br />

vēloties saimniecisko organizāciju apspriede. Pēc mana ieskata, konsulāti būtu atverami Galacā<br />

un Konstancā. Abās pilsētās ieceļami goda konsuli. Galaca ar 73 000 iedzīvotājiem ir lielākā<br />

Rumānijas ostas pilsēta uz Donavas, augstāk par otru ostas pilsētu Brailu ar 67 000<br />

iedzīvotājiem [..]. Uz Melnās jūras krasta guļ Konstanca (28 000 iedzīvotāju). Tā ir ierīkota<br />

vispirms kā naftas osta; uz turieni iet tieši vadi no naftas apgabaliem. Kad Galacas osta ziemā<br />

nav pieejama, kustība pārceļas uz Konstancu.<br />

1<br />

Vitolds Dzeržikrajs-Moravskis (Dzierżykraj-Morawski; 1895–1944), Polijas armijas pulkvedis. 1923.–1926. g.<br />

militārais atašejs Rumānijā.<br />

2<br />

Dossier (franču val.) – dosjē, šajā gadījumā domātas kompromitējošas ziņas.


70 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Kas attiecas uz konsulāta ierīkošanu Kišiņevā, tad lai man būtu atļauts izteikties pagaidām<br />

pret to. Iemesli tam sekojošie: Kišiņeva ir galvenā pilsēta Besarābijā, kuras piederību pie<br />

Rumānijas Padomju Krievija, kā tas visiem zināms, ļoti skaļi apstrīd. Ja mēs tur atvērtu<br />

konsulātu, jau tuvākās dienās padomju valdība mums iesniegtu protesta notu, kuru pavadītu<br />

rinda uzbrukumu Maskavas presē. Citas valstis arī vēl nav steigušās atvērt konsulātus Kišiņevā.<br />

Bez tam, Kišiņevā vēl ir ļoti grūti atrast konsula amatam piemērotu personu. Tirdzniecība<br />

atrodas žīdu un pa daļai arī krievu rokās; kā vieni, tā otri ar Rumāniju tikpat kā nemaz nav<br />

saistīti. Par rumāņu firmām, kas tur beidzamā laikā nometušās, labākā gadījumā nevar teikt ne<br />

labu, ne ļaunu. Šaubīgu elementu ļoti daudz.<br />

Konsulāti tātad būtu atverami Galacā un Konstancā. Esmu jau interesējies par piemērotām<br />

personām, sazinoties ar attiecīgām saimnieciskām organizācijām un ar Rumānijas Ārlietu<br />

ministriju.<br />

Biju ļoti sagatavojies uz atgriešanos Varšavā, apgādājies ar dzelzceļa biļeti, kad saņēmu no<br />

galma maršala, ķēniņa uzdevumā, uzaicinājumu uz dineju pilī. Noskaidroju apstākļus, nācu pie<br />

slēdziena, ka izbraukšana jāatliek. Tādas dinejas misiju priekšniekiem un viņu kundzēm notiek<br />

tikai reizi gadā. Man, kas reti ierodas Rumānijā, bija jo sevišķi neērti braukt prom, kad ielūgumu<br />

jau biju saņēmis; to Rumānijā nesaprastu vai pārprastu. Pie dinejas ķēniņš nepiedalījās; bija<br />

saslimis. Prezidēja ķēniņiene un princese héritière, 1 kamēr pats kroņprincis sēdēja ķēniņienei pa<br />

labi. Pēc dinejas bija rauts ar koncertu. Viss galms un viņa iekārta ir visai demokrātiska, tomēr<br />

atstatums personīgās attiecībās starp valdošā nama locekļiem un pilsoņiem ir stipri lielāks, nekā<br />

starp republikas prezidentu un pilsoņiem.<br />

Pirms aizbraukšanas biju atvadīties no ārlietu ministra, pateikties par laipnu pretimnākšanu<br />

no Rumānijas iestāžu puses un par parādītām simpātijām pret Latviju. Ministrs vēlreiz un jo<br />

sevišķi uzsvēra, ka šīs simpātijas ir īstas un nevis konvencionālas, jo Rumānija, lai gan vecāka<br />

par Latviju, tomēr ļoti dzīvi vēl atceras, cik dārga ir neatkarība tiem, kas pēc viņas centušies un<br />

beidzot ieguvuši; aizrādīja, ka Rumānija ar patiesu prieku raugās uz Latvijas un pārējo Baltijas<br />

valstu attīstību un tautas enerģisko darbu; lūdza mani darīt zināmu manai valdībai un pastrīpot<br />

jo sevišķi, ka Rumānija vēlas strādāt arvienu jo lielākā un ciešākā kopdarbībā ar Latviju. Ar to<br />

šķīrāmies.<br />

[..]. Sakarā ar teritorijas paplašināšanu no kādiem 140 000 kv. kilometriem uz 295 000<br />

kilometriem Rumānija ir spiesta paplašināt arī savas politiskās darbības apvārsni. Agrāk Karpati<br />

šķīra Rumāniju no Viduseiropas, tagad viņa sevi uzskata kā pie tās piederošu. Tādēļ, kādas arī<br />

nebūtu viņas domstarpības ar dažām agrākās Austro-Ungārijas mantiniecēm, Rumānijai ir ar<br />

tām daudz kopēju interešu. Rumānija nevar palaist vienaldzīgi garām vācu–angļu–franču<br />

sarunas par drošības līgumu vakaros. 2 Viņas politiķi ne bez iemesla aizrāda, ka, ja Vakareiropā<br />

pastāv domstarpības par dažiem robežas punktiem, tad austrumos no Reinas nav vairs gandrīz<br />

nevienas drošas robežas, kaut gan tās ar līgumu atzītas. Attiecībā uz Rumānijas robežām<br />

Krievija, Ungārija, Bulgārija protestē katra izdevīga gadījuma. Lai tagadējo robežu aizsargāšanas<br />

iespēja būtu nodrošināta, Rumānija noslēgusi divas sabiedrības: ar Poliju un ar Mazo Antanti;<br />

viņa arī rēķinās ar Tautu Savienības pakta 10. pantu. 3 Bet tagad no 10. panta daudz vairs neatliek<br />

1<br />

Héritière (franču val.) – mantiniece.<br />

2<br />

Runa ir par t. s. Lokarno sarunām, kuru rezultātā tika noslēgti Vācijas Rietumu robežu garantējošie līgumi. Ar<br />

vārdu „vakari” domāti rietumi.<br />

3<br />

Tautu Savienības statūtu 10. pants uzlika dalībvalstīm par pienākumu aizstāvēt pret ārējiem uzbrukumiem visu<br />

savienības dalībvalstu teritoriālo neaizskaramību un politisko neatkarību.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 71<br />

pāri [..]. Principā Rumānija neceļ iebildumus pret atsevišķu valstu grupu izlīgumiem. Pēc viņas<br />

domām, angļu–vācu projektam ir zināmas pozitīvas vērtības. Šis priekšlikums ir nopietns<br />

mēģinājums organizēt Eiropu, iesākot no vakariem, kur grib ieviest kārtību, drošību un<br />

autoritāti, kas tad no šī centra izplatītos tālāk uz visu Eiropu. Rumānijā izsaka domas, ka caur<br />

šādu paktu Vācija tiks tuvāk saistīta ar Vakareiropas demokrātijām, ka līdz ar to lielā mērā<br />

mazināsies viņas revanša tieksmes un cenšanās šinī nolūkā saprasties ar Padomju Krieviju. Bez<br />

tam, Rumānija grib redzēt šajā solī Anglijas saistīšanos ar Eiropas kontinentu, caur ko tā<br />

uzņemtos līdz arī atbildību par šī kontinenta politisko un ekonomisko organizāciju. No Reinas<br />

tad miera attiecību organizēšanai būtu pakāpeniski jāattīstās uz austrumiem. Bet vai tas notiks,<br />

tā visi Rumānijā jautā. Atbildēs izskan šaubas. Politiskā doma še nosveras uz to, ka ja piecu<br />

valstu pakts garantē vienīgi rietumu robežu neaizskaramību, ja viņš pielaiž principā, atklāti vai<br />

aizklāti, iespējamību revidēt robežas austrumos, viņš ar to dos iespēju uzstādīt visas prasības,<br />

uzkūdīs visas tieksmes un pacels kājās visus tos, kas nemierā ar līgumiem, slēgtiem pēc lielā<br />

kara [..].<br />

Jāatzīst, ka Rumānija ar lielu neatlaidību mēģina organizēt un apvienot Balkānu valstis<br />

zināmā interešu kopībā. Pirmie mēģinājumi bija vairāk dinastiska rakstura: Rumānija saistījās<br />

tādā veidā ar Grieķiju un ar Jugoslāviju; no tā sagaidīja šo abu valstu attiecību uzlabošanos. Pēc<br />

dinastijas neveiksmes Grieķijā, kā dzirdams, šis plāns vēl nav atmests [..].<br />

Rumānijas attiecības ar Padomju Krieviju smaguma punkts guļ Besarābijas jautājumā, kura<br />

atrisināšana nebūt nav pavirzījusies uz priekšu. Arī Maskavas nodibinātā Moldāvijas republika<br />

viņpus Dņestras rada rumāņiem rūpes. Šinī republikā gan neesot vairāk kā 300 000–400 000<br />

iedzīvotāju, bet viņai ir nozīme kā propagandas centram. Maskava tur dibina skolas ar rumāņu<br />

valodu, atver mājturības kursus, ierīko zemkopības skolas priekš zemniekiem un arodu skolas<br />

priekš strādniekiem: dod visu to, ko Rumānija tādos apmēros nav spējīga sniegt otrā Dņestras<br />

krastā. Rumāņiem ir lielas bažas, ka ar šādas Moldāvijas republikas nodibināšanu Kominterne 1<br />

nesāk attīstīt vēl intensīvāku propagandu Besarābijā, nekā līdz šim; no tā var celties incidenti,<br />

no incidentiem var izaugt konflikts; Sarkanā armija var vēl lielākā daudzumā nostāties gar<br />

robežu. Rumānija ļoti baidās no bruņota konflikta; Padomju valdība to labi zin un tādēļ var sev<br />

visu atļauties. Tā rīkodamās, tā sasniedz jau ārpus tiešā Besarābijas jautājuma divus mērķus:<br />

pirmkārt, pabalsta komunistisko kustību Rumānijā un Balkānos; otrkārt, traucē Rumāniju<br />

dabūt kārtējo aizņēmumu [..].<br />

No lielvalstīm visiespaidīgākā Rumānijā vēl arvien ir Francija. Zināmu lomu te spēlē atmiņas<br />

par kara laikā sniegto palīdzību, kad sevišķi franču ģenerālis Bertlo 2 ieguvis lielu popularitāti, pa<br />

daļai tas izskaidrojams ar franču kultūras dziļo iespaidu rumāņu inteliģencē. Man liekas,<br />

Rumānijā daudz vairāk lasa franču grāmatu, nekā rumāņu. Pie katra avīžu pārdevēja var dabūt<br />

Parīzes laikrakstus samērā bagātā izvēlē. Satiekoties savā starpā, rumāņi bieži vien sarunājas<br />

franciski, gluži tāpat, kā pie mums Latvijā, teikšu, agrāk – vāciski. Daudzi no rumāņu<br />

valstsvīriem, juristiem studējuši Francijā. Viss tas rada dabiskas saites, kas franču iespaidam<br />

Rumānijā palīdz nostiprināties [..]<br />

Pāris reizes nogāju uz parlamentu – apakšnamu, lai gūtu vispārīgu iespaidu par viņa darba<br />

veidu. Apakšnams atrodas speciāli šim nolūkam celtā ēkā ar amfiteātra veidīgu sēžu zāli. Uzkrīt<br />

1<br />

Kominterne – Komunistiskās internacionāles nosaukuma saīsinājums.<br />

2<br />

Anrī Bertlo (Ber<strong>the</strong>lot; 1861–1931), Francijas armijas ģenerālis. 1916.–1919. g. Francijas militārās misijas vadītājs<br />

Rumānijā.


72 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

tas, ka priekš publikas ir sevišķi daudz telpu, kuras triju rangu veidā apliecas ap sēžu zāli.<br />

Deputātu bija maz; lielākā daļa no tiem ir pilsētnieki – inteliģenti; īstus zemniekus redzēju<br />

retumis. Iekšējā disciplīna dienvidnieciska [..].<br />

No manām sarunām ar parlamenta locekļiem un politiķiem dabūju iespaidu, ka Rumānijā<br />

vispārīgi partiju fizionomija nav noteikta un programma nav precizēta. Es to gribu izskaidrot ar<br />

vēlētāju masas zemo izglītības līmeni un politisko neattīstību. Kad par šo jautājumu sāku tuvāk<br />

interesēties, tad no rumāņu puses nāca atbilde, ka tagad parlamentārisma ziņā jau sperts liels<br />

solis uz priekšu. Agrāk opozīcijas cīņa ar pozīciju notikusi mazāk parlamentāriskā formā [..].<br />

LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 398. l., 35.–70. lp.; 2575. f., 15. apr., 18. l., 197.–213. lp.<br />

20. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics<br />

about his visit to Romania in February 1925, March 1925<br />

[..] I will start <strong>the</strong> report with [what should have stood at] <strong>the</strong> end of it – with <strong>the</strong><br />

conclusions that I reached. It is necessary because I would like first of all briefly to point out <strong>the</strong><br />

views that I developed in [on] Romania and at <strong>the</strong> very beginning to refute <strong>the</strong> biased, hostile<br />

information that German and Russian sources have provided on Romania.<br />

The social situation in Romania should be described as stable, <strong>the</strong> growth of Bolshevism in<br />

<strong>the</strong> country is not to be feared much. The farmers – <strong>the</strong> largest part of <strong>the</strong> population, have<br />

received land, which <strong>the</strong>y had demanded for years and for which <strong>the</strong>y had sometimes even<br />

rebelled. The farmers’ interest is now focused on land and <strong>the</strong> organisation of <strong>the</strong>ir households.<br />

For this reason <strong>the</strong> Bolshevik propaganda, which is intensive, has little success. Even in<br />

Bessarabia, a home of several ethnic groups, <strong>the</strong> Romanian and <strong>the</strong> German elements are said<br />

to be hostile against Bolshevism.<br />

[..] The economic situation in Romania is difficult: money is scarce, bank-loans are scarce<br />

[...] The land reform is well advanced [...] No political re-grouping among <strong>the</strong> Balkan states is to<br />

be expected; <strong>the</strong> importance of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente has not decreased.<br />

Romania’s discords with Germany will get settled without a customs war; all economic<br />

circles are against such a war. Contrary to German information statements, so far Romania has<br />

not exerted any pressure, ei<strong>the</strong>r political or economic, against Germany or German citizens.<br />

Among <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Balkan states situation in political sphere is most precarious in Bulgaria<br />

and least so in Yugoslavia and Greece. In Romania <strong>the</strong>y believe that <strong>the</strong> existing regimes will get<br />

<strong>the</strong> upper hand over <strong>the</strong> insurgence movements in all <strong>the</strong>se states.<br />

After such a reassuring introduction I may now proceed with my story.<br />

Already on <strong>the</strong> way from <strong>the</strong> Polish border to Bucharest one can see that <strong>the</strong> Romanians still<br />

have much work to do to improve <strong>the</strong> railway service; <strong>the</strong> lack of wagons and engines is<br />

obvious, same as <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> bridges, which had been blown up during <strong>the</strong> war, have not<br />

been renovated yet even on <strong>the</strong> main communication lines. They get along with temporary iron<br />

bridges built by <strong>the</strong> German occupation authorities. The personnel and civil servants are<br />

numerous, but <strong>the</strong>y often do not know <strong>the</strong>ir job. One gets <strong>the</strong> impression that if against its will<br />

Romania was forced to make war against Russia for Bessarabia, one of <strong>the</strong> first and foremost<br />

difficulties that it would face would be <strong>the</strong> ill-organized and inadequate railway service.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> very first day after arriving in Bucharest I sent my card to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign<br />

Affairs. Already on <strong>the</strong> next morning I got a call from <strong>the</strong> Protocol Department and was told<br />

that <strong>the</strong> Minister would be glad to see me in his office at a concrete hour. When I arrived <strong>the</strong>re,


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 73<br />

Minister Duca received me right away and with his very first words tried to underline<br />

Romania’s affinity for Latvia whose development <strong>the</strong>y in Romania had started to follow with<br />

constantly growing interest; he would be very happy if <strong>the</strong> co-operation between <strong>the</strong> two<br />

countries developed fur<strong>the</strong>r. I replied that all over Latvia <strong>the</strong>re were similar feelings towards<br />

Romania and that it was my task and my wish, too, to work on <strong>the</strong> deepening of such cooperation.<br />

We both were pleased about it. After <strong>the</strong> cordial introduction Duca hurried to ask<br />

me <strong>the</strong> question: What news do you have about Russia? What is going on <strong>the</strong>re and what do<br />

you think – will <strong>the</strong>y attack us or not? It was obvious that this issue was of particular interest to<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanians; it also turned out that <strong>the</strong>y are very poorly informed about Russia. It is fully<br />

understandable because Romania does not have any direct <strong>relations</strong> with Russia and all <strong>the</strong><br />

communication lines between Russia and Western Europe are far from Romania. As much as I<br />

could see <strong>the</strong> Minister listened to <strong>the</strong> information that I gave him and to my views with great<br />

interest. This time our discussion was not long because a message came that <strong>the</strong> King, who had<br />

fallen ill, wanted to see <strong>the</strong> Minister immediately. Duca also briefly informed me about <strong>the</strong><br />

situation in Romania and on parting expressed a wish to see me again soon in order to discuss<br />

<strong>the</strong> issues of mutual interest in more detail.<br />

Later I met <strong>the</strong> Minister at breakfast that he hosted in his home. Apart from me <strong>the</strong>re were<br />

some Ministers and a couple of envoys with <strong>the</strong>ir spouses present.<br />

We arranged a meeting on <strong>the</strong> next day at <strong>the</strong> Ministry. This time Duca along <strong>the</strong> general<br />

lines informed me about <strong>the</strong> situation in <strong>the</strong> Balkans. He believes that Bulgaria gives <strong>the</strong><br />

greatest reason for concern. The Communist propaganda had laid deep root <strong>the</strong>re during <strong>the</strong><br />

Stamboliyski’s 1 government [he said]. According to him, <strong>the</strong> people are so agitated [<strong>the</strong>re] that<br />

it is very difficult for <strong>the</strong> existing cabinet to find a way to some kind of appeasement [...] Yet<br />

based on <strong>the</strong> latest information at <strong>the</strong> Minister’s disposal, he thought that <strong>the</strong> existing<br />

government would be able to stifle <strong>the</strong> movement of acute unrest so that it would not go as far<br />

as <strong>the</strong> overthrowing of <strong>the</strong> regime.<br />

Romania, as he told me, besides Bulgaria attributed great attention also to <strong>the</strong> Croatian<br />

movement in Yugoslavia. Duca does not put all <strong>the</strong> blame entirely on <strong>the</strong> Croatians. He thinks<br />

that <strong>the</strong> mass of <strong>the</strong> Croatian people does not like Bolshevism at all. The Croatian farmer,<br />

according to him, is ra<strong>the</strong>r well-off and if he does support Radić 2 and his political friends, who<br />

no doubt have contacts with Russia, it is because <strong>the</strong> Croatians are very dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong><br />

existing stiff [conservative] Pašić’s 3 regime. Pašić is said to be stubborn and old, so old that<br />

nobody can cope with him in Serbia; even <strong>the</strong> King has extremely difficult time to come to any<br />

result in a discussion with him. Duca thinks that <strong>the</strong> situation in Yugoslavia will soon become<br />

clear and will lose <strong>the</strong> edge.<br />

About Greece Duca spoke even more optimistically in terms of its immunity to<br />

Communism. The agitation and movement taking place <strong>the</strong>re was <strong>the</strong> consequence of <strong>the</strong> lost<br />

war, he said. The settlement of Greek emigrants from Asia Minor also caused much concern. In<br />

Turkey all Greeks had been merchants. Now, having returned to <strong>the</strong>ir fa<strong>the</strong>rland <strong>the</strong>y caused<br />

undesirable competition. [The Minister said that] it [his country] also had difficulties with<br />

1<br />

Aleksandar Stamboliyski (1879–1923), Bulgarian statesman. 1919–1923 Prime Minister, killed during a coup d’etat.<br />

2<br />

Stepjan Radić (1871–1928), Croatian politician, statesman in <strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians<br />

(Yugoslavia). 1925–1927 Minister of Education.<br />

3<br />

Nikola Pašić (1845–1926), statesman in Serbia, later in <strong>the</strong> Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians.<br />

(Yugoslavia). 1921–1926 Prime Minister.


74 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Yugoslavia; Romania was trying to sway both countries towards a mutual agreement. According<br />

to <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>the</strong>re is no direct and established Communist movement in Greece.<br />

The Communist propaganda centre, which is currently located in Vienna, [he believes], will<br />

be transferred to <strong>the</strong> Balkans, yet <strong>the</strong>re it will probably be subordinated to <strong>the</strong> central<br />

administration in Berlin.<br />

Thus, all in all, [he told me], Romania was less afraid of <strong>the</strong> emergence of Communism at<br />

home than in <strong>the</strong> neighbouring countries because in such case Romania would be surrounded<br />

by Bolshevism. In Romania itself <strong>the</strong> Communists were in <strong>the</strong> capacity to organise individual<br />

acts of terror, but not more than that. In Tatar-Bunar <strong>the</strong> local population had <strong>the</strong>mselves<br />

helped to fight back a Bolshevik attack last year.<br />

The foreign envoys to Romania later confirmed <strong>the</strong> information that <strong>the</strong> Minister gave me;<br />

<strong>the</strong>y, too, recognised Romania’s social situation as stable. If not all things happen smoothly in<br />

Bessarabia, it, according to <strong>the</strong>se colleagues of mine, is because of <strong>the</strong> poor administration and<br />

<strong>the</strong> corrupt civil servants. To Bessarabia as administrators were sent people with contacts but<br />

with passive material and moral balance; <strong>the</strong>re <strong>the</strong>y soon improved <strong>the</strong>ir material balance but<br />

not <strong>the</strong> moral one. It is fully understandable because in <strong>the</strong> conditions of <strong>the</strong> low overall<br />

cultural level it was very difficult for <strong>the</strong> government to find civil servants for <strong>the</strong> acquired<br />

provinces in Bessarabia and Transylvania. Civil servants have low salaries: as <strong>the</strong> German Envoy<br />

told me, <strong>the</strong> policeman earned 800 lei (20 LVL) per month. It is not possible to live on such a<br />

salary although in Romania living is cheaper than in Latvia.<br />

When I asked <strong>the</strong> Minister how much truth <strong>the</strong>re was in <strong>the</strong> talks about <strong>the</strong> creation of a<br />

new anti-Bolshevism coalition of states in <strong>the</strong> Balkans through which, moreover England would<br />

acquire greater influence <strong>the</strong>re, Duca answered very firmly that no new grouping in <strong>the</strong> Balkans<br />

had been discussed and that it was out of <strong>the</strong> question. England, which [according to him]<br />

would prefer withdrawing from active politics on <strong>the</strong> continent of Europe altoge<strong>the</strong>r, had not<br />

even considered taking active part in <strong>the</strong> Balkan politics. The Little Entente still remained an<br />

active political factor: [its function was] to safeguard in Central Europe <strong>the</strong> situation created<br />

<strong>the</strong>re by <strong>the</strong> peace treaties concluded after <strong>the</strong> Great War. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Little Entente were to meet in Bucharest soon and <strong>the</strong>re [<strong>the</strong> Minister said] I would be able<br />

to see for myself that <strong>the</strong>re were no discords among <strong>the</strong>m [...]<br />

Then we turned to <strong>the</strong> issue of a trade agreement. Duca took my proposal in an extremely<br />

responsive manner and, it seemed to me, with true joy. I dare say that at present <strong>the</strong> Romanians<br />

feel very lonely in political sense and for this reason <strong>the</strong>y very warmly welcome any gesture of<br />

friendship, any wish to establish closer <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong>m. I informed <strong>the</strong> Minister about <strong>the</strong><br />

agreements that we have concluded to date, about <strong>the</strong> basic principles and specifics of <strong>the</strong>se<br />

agreements – <strong>the</strong> clauses and justified <strong>the</strong>m with relevant arguments. The Minister believes<br />

that Romania will not object to such clauses, however he said that he could not give a final reply<br />

yet because first he had to contact his colleagues – <strong>the</strong> ministers of finance and trade. However<br />

as it later turned out in a discussion with Ministry’s Secretary General Filodor 1 , to date Romania<br />

has not concluded any trade agreement, in <strong>the</strong> full sense of <strong>the</strong> word, yet; it [Romania] has<br />

organised such <strong>relations</strong> by way of a simple exchange of brief memoranda [and] by mutual<br />

application of <strong>the</strong> principle of most-favoured nation. In this way Romania’s trade <strong>relations</strong> have<br />

1<br />

Nicolae N. Filodor was a Romanian diplomat who accomplished <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions in A<strong>the</strong>ns (1913-1920)<br />

Prague (1925-1928). He was Secretary General of Romanian Foreign Ministry.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 75<br />

been settled with many countries. In order to become acquainted, we exchanged <strong>documents</strong>.<br />

The Romanians say that <strong>the</strong>ir reticence with regard to conclusion of a detailed trade agreement<br />

is due to <strong>the</strong> unsettled economic situation in <strong>the</strong>ir country, lack of tariffs and underdeveloped<br />

economic policy.<br />

In general lines we addressed also <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong> convention on legal assistance and <strong>the</strong><br />

convention pertaining to extradition. We need <strong>the</strong> convention on legal assistance more than<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanians do. There are a ra<strong>the</strong>r large number of our citizens in Romania and, as our<br />

consul Orghidan 1 said, <strong>the</strong>y are in a ra<strong>the</strong>r good situation <strong>the</strong>re. This February Romania signed<br />

a convention on legal assistance with Austria. I took a copy of it with me; same as of <strong>the</strong><br />

convention on extradition that Romania signed with <strong>the</strong> United States of North [America] last<br />

year. Concerning <strong>the</strong> latter one should note that Romania does not commit itself to extradition<br />

of <strong>the</strong> criminals who are punishable with death to <strong>the</strong> United States of America. Death penalty<br />

does not exist in Romania.<br />

I already informed <strong>the</strong> Ministry in Riga that Romania was planning to open an honorary<br />

consulate in our country. Following from this intention and based on my observations that<br />

Duca and Filodor are very poorly informed about <strong>the</strong> situation in Russia – [<strong>the</strong>y rely] almost<br />

solely on Polish sources – I gradually led <strong>the</strong>m to <strong>the</strong> thoughts about opening a legation in Riga.<br />

I noted that Riga currently was <strong>the</strong> centre where all information from Russia flowed toge<strong>the</strong>r. It<br />

was through Riga that Russia’s communication with Western Europe was taking place. All<br />

foreign envoys to <strong>the</strong> Soviet government went to Moscow and from <strong>the</strong>re [travelled] through<br />

Riga; correspondents of foreign newspapers and large telegraph agencies were permanently<br />

stationed in Riga; some legations kept a large staff of special civil servants [in Riga] to observe<br />

Russia.<br />

Later in a discussion Filodor told me that Minister Duca wanted to open a residing legation<br />

in Riga with <strong>the</strong> budget of <strong>the</strong> year of 1926 and for this purpose had decided to include <strong>the</strong><br />

required amount of money into <strong>the</strong> draft budget. Romania had a legation in Helsingfors but<br />

closed it a couple of years ago. When I met <strong>the</strong> Minister, I did not keep back what Secretary<br />

General Filodor had told me about <strong>the</strong> opening of a legation. Duca confirmed this information<br />

and I reacted to it with an adequate phrase about a good impression and even deeper feelings of<br />

affinity that such a step by <strong>the</strong> Romanian government would cause in Latvia and also in <strong>the</strong><br />

o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States.<br />

Our invitation to send a delegate to <strong>the</strong> joint meeting on <strong>the</strong> disarmament issue left a very<br />

good impression in Bucharest. As soon as Duca was informed about it, he had me invited to <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he announced that Romania would send its delegate <strong>the</strong>re<br />

and asked me to inform my government about it and to find out <strong>the</strong> opening date. Regretfully<br />

my secretariat in Warsaw had given me an incomplete cipher (without an instruction) so I<br />

could not decipher it. Communication had to be made via <strong>the</strong> two legations in Warsaw that<br />

required more time.<br />

The information about <strong>the</strong> planned date of <strong>the</strong> opening of <strong>the</strong> meeting reached <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanians too late for <strong>the</strong>m to be able to come in time. Between Bucharest and Warsaw <strong>the</strong>re<br />

are only two direct trains per week; air traffic has not been opened yet ei<strong>the</strong>r. For this reason<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanians came out with <strong>the</strong> request to postpone <strong>the</strong> meeting for a few days. The<br />

1<br />

Theodor Orghidan (1888 – after 1940), Romanian entrepreneur, from 1923 Honorary Consul of Latvia, 1928–1940,<br />

Honorary General Consul in Bucharest.


76 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Romanian delegate is Colonel Cenescu, <strong>the</strong> former aide-de-camp to <strong>the</strong> King who now<br />

commands a regiment in Transylvania. It seems that <strong>the</strong> King has participated in selecting <strong>the</strong><br />

delegate. As much as I could see <strong>the</strong> Poles do not like <strong>the</strong> delegate or at least <strong>the</strong>y would have<br />

preferred to see a different person instead: military representative of Poland in Romania<br />

Dzierżykraj-Morawski 1 visited me and said that such a choice would delay <strong>the</strong> sending of <strong>the</strong><br />

delegate. Cenescu [he told me] was not familiar with <strong>the</strong> Baltic States at all; <strong>the</strong> Chief of <strong>the</strong><br />

General Staff would not have sent him but <strong>the</strong> latter’s opinion had not even been asked and it<br />

had made him horribly angry. The Chief of Staff’s preferred candidate was colonel Dimitrescu<br />

who was well familiar with <strong>the</strong> issues to be discussed. Nothing doing. I remarked that it was<br />

Romanians’ internal matter, in which I, as a person who came here only from time to time, had<br />

no possibility to intervene, not even indirectly. With this we closed <strong>the</strong> issue; it remained so<br />

that Cenescu will go.<br />

During my stay in Bucharest I several times visited our consulate headed by Theodor V.<br />

Orghidan, an agile less than 40 years old short man who belongs to a family of wealthy<br />

merchants in several generations; as far as I know, his spouse comes from a similar family. [He]<br />

has studied in Germany. Not so long ago he was vice-president of <strong>the</strong> Bucharest Chamber of<br />

Commerce and headed <strong>the</strong> Romanian delegation in negotiations in England on consolidation<br />

of private debt that he had run successfully. He is said to maintain trade contacts mostly with<br />

England (wholesale of textiles).<br />

The Consulate is open as of 18 th April, 1924. The Consul is said to have attributed laudable<br />

attention and care to his official duties, for example: he does not issue visas without beforehand<br />

making inquiries in <strong>the</strong> Police, both in <strong>the</strong> general as well as in <strong>the</strong> political one, if <strong>the</strong>re is any<br />

dossier 2 on <strong>the</strong> visa-applicant <strong>the</strong>re. The clerical work is in good order. A few minor<br />

misunderstandings, which had taken place in <strong>the</strong> beginning of his work, were due to <strong>the</strong> lack of<br />

more detailed instructions; now <strong>the</strong>y [<strong>the</strong> flaws] have been rectified. I clarified <strong>the</strong> issue of <strong>the</strong><br />

extension of <strong>the</strong> consular network in Romania. I also received information that <strong>the</strong> meeting of<br />

business organisations wanted it. In my opinion consulates should be opened in Galați and<br />

Constanța. In both <strong>the</strong>se towns Honorary Consuls should be appointed. Galați with <strong>the</strong><br />

population of 73 000 is <strong>the</strong> largest Romanian port town on <strong>the</strong> Danube, higher upstream than<br />

<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r port city Brăila with 67 000 residents [..] Constanța (population 28 000) lies on <strong>the</strong><br />

shore of <strong>the</strong> Black Sea. At first it was meant to serve as an oil port; direct pipes from oil regions<br />

go <strong>the</strong>re. When Galați port is inaccessible in winter, <strong>the</strong> traffic moves to Constanța.<br />

As concerns <strong>the</strong> opening of a consulate in Chișinău, if I may, I would opt against it for <strong>the</strong><br />

time being. My reasons are following: Chișinău is <strong>the</strong> key city in Bessarabia, <strong>the</strong> belonging of<br />

which to Romania, as we all know, is very loudly contested by Soviet Russia. If we opened a<br />

consulate <strong>the</strong>re, already on <strong>the</strong> first days <strong>the</strong> Soviet government would hand us a note of protest<br />

followed by a range of attacks on us in <strong>the</strong> Moscow press. O<strong>the</strong>r countries, too, have not<br />

hurried to open <strong>the</strong>ir consulates in Chișinău. Moreover in Chișinău it is still very difficult to find<br />

a suitable person for <strong>the</strong> consul’s job. Trade <strong>the</strong>re is in <strong>the</strong> hands of Jews and partly also<br />

Russians; both have almost no connections with Romania. About <strong>the</strong> Romanian companies that<br />

had perched <strong>the</strong>re lately in <strong>the</strong> best case nothing good or bad can be said. There are very many<br />

shady elements <strong>the</strong>re.<br />

1<br />

Witold Dzierżykraj-Morawski (1895–1944), Colonel of <strong>the</strong> Army of Poland. 1923–1926 military attaché in Romania<br />

2<br />

Dossier (French) – dossier, in this case meant as compromising information.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 77<br />

Thus consulates should be opened in Galați and Constanța. I have already made inquiries<br />

about suitable persons by contacting <strong>the</strong> relevant business organisations and <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />

Foreign Affairs of Romania.<br />

I had very much prepared myself for returning to Warsaw and had acquired a train ticket<br />

when through <strong>the</strong> Marshal of <strong>the</strong> Court I received an invitation from <strong>the</strong> King to a dinner in <strong>the</strong><br />

palace. I investigated <strong>the</strong> circumstances and came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that my departure had to<br />

be postponed. Such dinners are hosted for heads of missions and <strong>the</strong>ir spouses once a year. I,<br />

[as a person] who seldom comes to Romania, felt especially uneasy about leaving after having<br />

already received <strong>the</strong> invitation; <strong>the</strong>y in Romania would not understand or would<br />

misunderstand it. The King did not attend <strong>the</strong> dinner; he had been taken ill. The Queen and<br />

princess héritière 1 were presiding [at <strong>the</strong> dinner], <strong>the</strong> crown prince himself sitting to <strong>the</strong> right of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Queen. After <strong>the</strong> dinner <strong>the</strong>re was a rout [reception] with a concert. The entire court and its<br />

structure is ra<strong>the</strong>r democratic, however <strong>the</strong> distance in <strong>the</strong> personal <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong><br />

members of <strong>the</strong> ruling house and <strong>the</strong> citizens is much larger than between <strong>the</strong> President and<br />

citizens in a republic.<br />

Before departure I paid a farewell visit to <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs to thank him for <strong>the</strong><br />

kind co-operation from <strong>the</strong> part of Romania’s authorities and for <strong>the</strong> affinity demonstrated<br />

towards Latvia. The Minister emphasised once again and strongly so that <strong>the</strong> affinity was<br />

genuine ra<strong>the</strong>r than conventional because Romania, although older than Latvia, still vividly<br />

remembered how precious freedom was to those who had strived for it and finally acquired it;<br />

[he] remarked that it was with true joy that Romania was following <strong>the</strong> development of Latvia<br />

and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Baltic States and <strong>the</strong> energetic work of <strong>the</strong> people; [he] asked me to inform my<br />

government and to underline particularly to it that Romania wished to work in ever closer cooperation<br />

with Latvia. With this we parted.<br />

[..] Due to <strong>the</strong> extension of its territory from around 140 000 sq. kilometres to 295 000 [sq.]<br />

kilometres Romania is forced to extend <strong>the</strong> horizon of its political activities as well. Earlier <strong>the</strong><br />

Carpathian Mountains separated Romania from Central Europe, now it [Romania] regards itself<br />

as part of it [Central Europe]. Thus, in spite of its controversies with a few heirs of former<br />

Austro-Hungary, Romania shares many interests with <strong>the</strong>m. Romania cannot observe<br />

indifferently <strong>the</strong> German–English–French negotiations on a security treaty in <strong>the</strong> West 2 . Its<br />

[Romania’s] politicians remark not without a reason that, while in Western Europe <strong>the</strong>re are<br />

controversies about some border issues, to <strong>the</strong> east of <strong>the</strong> Rhine <strong>the</strong>re is almost no secure<br />

border left although <strong>the</strong>y had been recognised in a treaty. Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria protest<br />

against Romania’s borders on every opportune occasion. In order to safeguard <strong>the</strong> existing<br />

borders, Romania has concluded two societies [unions]: with Poland and with <strong>the</strong> Little<br />

Entente; it takes into consideration Clause 10 of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations’ Pact. 3 Now however<br />

nothing much is left of Clause 10 [..] On principle Romania does not raise objections against<br />

reconciliation among separate groups of countries. It believes that <strong>the</strong> English–German project<br />

has some positive values. This proposal is a serious attempt to organise Europe, starting from<br />

<strong>the</strong> West where <strong>the</strong>y want to introduce order, security and authority, which would <strong>the</strong>n spread<br />

1<br />

Héritière (French) – heiress.<br />

2<br />

The author means <strong>the</strong>-so-called Locarno talks, as a result of which treaties that guaranteed <strong>the</strong> Western border<br />

of Germany were concluded.<br />

3<br />

Clause 10 of <strong>the</strong> Statutes of <strong>the</strong> League of <strong>the</strong> Nations obliged <strong>the</strong> member states to defend <strong>the</strong> territorial<br />

integrity and political independence of any member state of <strong>the</strong> League against external threats.


78 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r from this centre all over Europe. Views are being voiced in Romania that through such a<br />

pact Germany would be tied closer toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> West European democracies that would<br />

largely curb <strong>the</strong> former’s disposition to revenge and its aspirations to come to understanding<br />

with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Russia towards this purpose. Besides, Romania wants to see England through<br />

this step binding itself with <strong>the</strong> European continent and assuming also liability for <strong>the</strong> political<br />

and economic organization of this continent. Then from <strong>the</strong> Rhine <strong>the</strong> organisation of peace<br />

<strong>relations</strong> should gradually develop eastwards. But will it indeed happen, this is what everybody<br />

is asking in Romania. In <strong>the</strong> answers doubt can be discerned. The political opinion leans<br />

towards <strong>the</strong> belief that <strong>the</strong> pact of <strong>the</strong> five countries guarantees only <strong>the</strong> inviolability of <strong>the</strong><br />

western borders, if in principle, directly or indirectly, it [<strong>the</strong> pact] allows <strong>the</strong> possibility of <strong>the</strong><br />

revision of borders in <strong>the</strong> East, it will thus allow bringing forward all kinds of claims, will incite<br />

all kinds of aspirations and will rouse everyone who is dissatisfied with treaties concluded after<br />

<strong>the</strong> Great War [..]<br />

It must be admitted that Romania with great tenacity tries to organize and unite <strong>the</strong> Balkan<br />

states in a certain community of interests. The first attempts were mostly of a dynastic nature:<br />

in this way Romania communicated with Greece and Yugoslavia; it expected from it <strong>the</strong><br />

improving of <strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong>se countries. They say that after <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> dynasty in<br />

Greece <strong>the</strong> plan has not been altoge<strong>the</strong>r dropped yet [..]<br />

The centre of gravity of Romania’s <strong>relations</strong> with Soviet Russia lies on <strong>the</strong> issue of<br />

Bessarabia, <strong>the</strong> resolution of which has not moved forward at all. The Republic of Moldavia,<br />

established by Moscow on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong> Dniester, also causes concern for <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanians. Although this republic is said to have less than 300 000 – 400 000 inhabitants, it<br />

has importance as a centre of propaganda. There Moscow opens schools with <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />

language of instruction, organises courses in home economics, establishes agricultural schools<br />

for farmers and vocational schools for workers: it gives everything that Romania is unable to<br />

give on such a scale on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r side of <strong>the</strong> Dniester. Romanians have great concern that with<br />

<strong>the</strong> foundation of such a republic of Moldavia <strong>the</strong> Comintern 1 could launch even more intensive<br />

propaganda in Bessarabia; incidents might spring up from it, from incidents a conflict may<br />

grow; <strong>the</strong> Red Army might take positions along <strong>the</strong> border in even greater numbers. Romania is<br />

very much afraid of an armed conflict; <strong>the</strong> Soviet government knows it very well and for this<br />

reason it ventures to do whatever it pleases. By acting this way it reaches two goals apart from<br />

<strong>the</strong> direct issue of Bessarabia: firstly, it supports <strong>the</strong> Communist movement in Romania and <strong>the</strong><br />

Balkans [in general]; secondly, it makes it more difficult for Romania to receive ano<strong>the</strong>r loan [..]<br />

Of <strong>the</strong> great powers France is still <strong>the</strong> most influential in Romania. A certain role here is<br />

played by memories of <strong>the</strong> assistance received during <strong>the</strong> war when French General Ber<strong>the</strong>lot 2<br />

became especially popular; partly it is due to <strong>the</strong> deep influence of <strong>the</strong> French culture on <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian intellectuals. It seems to me that French books are much better read in Romania<br />

than <strong>the</strong> Romanian ones. Each newspaper vendor offers a ra<strong>the</strong>r rich choice of Paris<br />

newspapers. Romanians often communicate with each o<strong>the</strong>r in French, I would say same as we<br />

at home in Latvia – in German. Many Romanian statesmen and lawyers have studied in France.<br />

All this create natural ties that help <strong>the</strong> French influence to take root in Romania [..]<br />

1<br />

Comintern – abbreviation for <strong>the</strong> Communist International.<br />

2<br />

Henri Ber<strong>the</strong>lot (1861–1931), General of <strong>the</strong> Army of France. 1916–1919 head of <strong>the</strong> Military mission of France in<br />

Romania.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 79<br />

I went several times to <strong>the</strong> Parliament – to <strong>the</strong> Lower House, in order to get a general<br />

impression of its style of work. The Lower House sits in a building specially built for it with a<br />

meeting room in <strong>the</strong> style of an amphi<strong>the</strong>atre. What is striking is that <strong>the</strong>re are especially many<br />

rooms for <strong>the</strong> public, making a circle in three rows around <strong>the</strong> meeting room. There were few<br />

members of parliament <strong>the</strong>re; <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong>m are city dwellers – intellectuals; it was only<br />

rarely that I saw real farmers. The internal discipline is of a sou<strong>the</strong>rn style [..]<br />

From my discussions with members of parliament and politicians I got an impression that in<br />

Romania in general <strong>the</strong> physiognomy of parties is uncertain and <strong>the</strong>ir programmes have not<br />

been elaborated in detail. I would like to ascribe it <strong>the</strong> low educational level and political<br />

underdevelopment of <strong>the</strong> mass of electorate. When I started to make inquiries about this issue,<br />

an answer came from <strong>the</strong> Romanian side that a large step forward had been made in terms of<br />

parliamentarianism. Previously <strong>the</strong> opposition’s struggle with <strong>the</strong> position had taken place in a<br />

less parliamentary form [..]<br />

SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 398, s. 35–70; f. 2575, d. 15, file 18, s. 197–213.<br />

21. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Alexandru Iacovaky 1 nr. 2<br />

către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca, 2 martie 1925<br />

A se aduce la cunoștința Regelui Ferdinand I și Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri I.I.C.<br />

Brătianu 2<br />

Părerile Domnului Meierovics asupra chestiunilor de politică externă care interesează<br />

Letonia și România<br />

Știrea pe care am avut onoarea a o comunica Excelenței Voastre prin telegrama mea cifrată<br />

nr. 1 din 28 februarie anul curent mi-a fost adusă de Directorul Presei din Ministerul Afacerilor<br />

Străine, din partea Domnului Pusta 3 , în momentul plecării mele din Reval, unde am avut<br />

plăcerea de a fi întovărășit la gară de câteva persoane între care: subsecretarul de stat de la<br />

Ministerul Afacerilor Străine, Domnul Tofer 4 , și de toți directorii de servicii din acel minister.<br />

Știrea cum că Comitetul executiv al partidului comunist ar fi hotărât, sub îndemnul lui Frunză 5<br />

și al lui Zinoviev 6 , să decidă prin război soarta Basarabiei, reîncorporând-o la Rusia, cu<br />

precizarea că operațiunile militare de care depinde soarta acestei provincii se vor desfășura între<br />

lunile mai și august anul curent, mi s-a părut destul de importantă pentru a o controla prin<br />

mijloacele de care pot dispune aci. Ziariștii pe care i-am întâlnit mi-au spus lămurit că credința<br />

1<br />

Alexandru N. Iacovaky (1876-1949) a fost un diplomat român care s-a alăturat Ministerului Afacerilor Străine la<br />

începutul sec. al XX-lea și a lucrat în subordinea lui Alexandru Florescu căruia i-a succedat în calitate de ministru<br />

al României la Varșovia (1925-1927).<br />

2<br />

Ion I.C. Brătianu (1864-1927) a reprezentat personalitatea cea mai impozantă a Partidului Național Liberal din<br />

primul sfert al secolului al XX-lea. Președinte al acestui partid (1909-1927), a fost Președinte al Consiliului de<br />

Miniștri în mai multe rânduri (1914-1916, 1918-1919, 1922-1926, 1927). A jucat rolul determinant în intrarea României<br />

în Primul Război Mondial, realizarea Marii Uniri de la 1918 și reformele agrară și electorală elaborate după război.<br />

3<br />

Kaarel Robert Pusta (1883-1964) a fost un politician și diplomat estonian, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1920,<br />

1924-1925), ministru plenipotențiar în Franța, Polonia și România.<br />

4<br />

Karl Tofer (1885-1942) a fost un diplomat estonian, Ministru al Estoniei în Italia și Ungaria (cu sediul la Roma) –<br />

1927-1931, Polonia, Cehoslovacia și România (cu sediul la Varșovia) – 1930-1932, Uniunea Sovietică (1933-1936) și<br />

Germania (1936-1939). A murit într-un lagăr din Rusia.<br />

5<br />

Mihail Vasilievici Frunze (1885-1925), ortografiat și – sau Frunză, tatăl său fiind de origine română. A fost un<br />

politician comunist rus, lider al forțelor militare roșii care și-au înfrânt adversarii în timpul Războiului Civil.<br />

Președinte al Consiliului Militar Revoluționar.<br />

6<br />

Grigori Zinoviev (1883-1936) a fost un conducător politic comunist rus, membru al Politburo, lider al<br />

Kominternului și membru al troicăi care a preluat puterea în Uniunea Sovietică după moartea lui Lenin.


80 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

lor este că Rusia ne va ataca mai curând sau mai târziu, pentru a ne relua Basarabia. Verificând<br />

aceeași știre prin mijlocirea organelor Ministerului de Externe, am avut impresia unui pericol<br />

mai puțin iminent.<br />

Domnul Meierovics, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, căruia am avut onoarea a-i remite, în<br />

dimineața zilei de 28 februarie, copia scrisorilor de rechemare a Domnului Alexandru Florescu,<br />

copia propriilor mele scrisori de acreditare, precum și a discursului ce voi rosti în ziua de joi, 6<br />

martie, cu ocazia remiterii acelor scrisori Președintelui Republicii în audiență solemnă, mi-a<br />

spus că deocamdată nu vede niciun indiciu care să-l îndemne a crede la o asemenea<br />

eventualitate. Domnia sa a adăugat că, din informațiile pe care le-a primit de la reprezentantul<br />

său din Moscova, rezultă că în momentul de față politica Rusiei tinde la o apropiere de Franța,<br />

că în decursul acestor zile au avut loc la Moscova importante conferințe între ambasadorul<br />

Franței și dirigenții politicii sovietice, între care și Krasin 1 , care vor avea ca rezultat probabil o<br />

încercare de apropiere, mai ales economică, cu Franța. Domnul Meierovics nu cunoștea<br />

obiectul prim al acestor conferințe, dar mi-a spus că faptul în sine i-ar fi fost confirmat de<br />

Ministrul Germaniei, domnul Köster 2 , personaj asupra a cărui importanță domnul Meierovics a<br />

insistat, care i-ar fi spus că balanța politicii Rusiei se apleacă acum spre Franța, după cum<br />

oscilase odinioară spre Germania, sau spre Anglia, știut fiind că Rusia găsește întotdeauna<br />

argumente pentru a deștepta speranțele Guvernelor care cred că cu dânsa s-ar putea întemeia<br />

ceva durabil, după cum o crezuse și Ra<strong>the</strong>nau 3 , în momentul când semnase cu Rusia convenția<br />

de la Rapallo 4 . Din aceste încercări de apropiere economică cu Franța, fapt care mi-a fost<br />

confirmat de altfel și la Legația Franței, cu singura deosebire că domnul Barret, reprezentantul<br />

Franței, crede că Rusia încearcă să înșele pe toată lumea, primind totul și nedând nimic în<br />

schimb, Domnul Meierovics trage însă concluzia că politica sovietelor față de statele mărginașe<br />

Rusiei va avea în viitor un caracter mai puțin agresiv și aceasta din cauză că Franța va cere<br />

Rusiei să renunțe la politica ei de azi față de aceste state și că, prin urmare, evenimentele care se<br />

desfășoară la Moscova trebuie să ne bucure.<br />

Am avut grijă să insist pe lângă Secretarul General al Ministerului, rugându-l să controleze<br />

știrea ce aveam despre politica războinică pe care Rusia ar avea intenția să o desfășoare față de<br />

noi, și Domnia sa mi-a promis că o va face, adăugând că în ce privește Basarabia de câtva timp<br />

încoace nu mai aflase nimic de la informatorii săi, și a adăugat că până acum știrile acestea<br />

fuseseră confirmate de realitatea faptelor.<br />

Examinând interesele permanente care leagă Letonia de România, Domnul Meierovics a<br />

constat că aceste interese sunt în perfectă concordanță și mi-a mulțumit pentru expresia<br />

simpatiei sincere pe care i-o exprimasem din partea Guvernului Regal, și a adăugat că apreciază<br />

cu atât mai mult declarațiile mele cu cât Domnia sa era de părere că numai atunci când Rusia va<br />

ajunge la convingerea că în ziua când va ataca unul din statele ce alcătuiesc cordonul de apărare<br />

1<br />

Leonid Borisovici Krasin (1870-1926) a fost un membru al Comitetului Central al P.C.U.S. și diplomat sovietic.<br />

2<br />

Adolf Köster (1883-1930) a fost un politician social-democrat, Ministru de Externe (1920) și ulterior Ministru de<br />

Interne al Republicii de la Weimar (1921-1922). A fost Ministru al Germaniei în Letonia (1923-1928) și Iugoslavia<br />

(1928-1930).<br />

3<br />

Wal<strong>the</strong>r Ra<strong>the</strong>nau (1867-1922) a fost un politician german membru al Partidului Democrat German. În calitate de<br />

Ministru de Externe al Germaniei a semnat Tratatul de la Rapallo cu Rusia Sovietică (1922) prin care încerca să<br />

scoată Germania din izolarea internațională. A murit ucis de naționaliștii extremiști germani.<br />

4<br />

Tratatul de la Rapallo (16 aprilie 1922) a fost un tratat complex ce a vizat reluarea legăturilor <strong>diplomatic</strong>e dintre<br />

Germania și Rusia Sovietică, renunțarea la pretențiile financiare una față de celalaltă, precum și colaborarea în<br />

spirit de bună înțelegere între acestea.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 81<br />

antibolșevic războiul se va întinde pe tot frontul, atunci numai am putea spera la ceva liniște,<br />

știut fiind că forța este singurul argument de care Rusia ține seamă și că în situația prezentă nu<br />

vom putea în adevăr fi tari, decât numai dacă vom fi uniți.<br />

În această ordine de idei domnul Meierovics a emis părerea că participarea unui expert<br />

militar român la conferința pentru limitarea armamentelor care se va întruni la Riga la 24<br />

martie anul curent ar fi o măsură bine chibzuită. Domnia sa, ca și contele Skrzyński 1 , crede că<br />

participarea unui delegat al României la aceste dezbateri – care vor avea un caracter cu totul<br />

secret – ar fi utilă intereselor noastre comune; că departe de a conchide la putința micșorării<br />

armamentelor noastre, conferința experților militari va conchide din contră, după examinarea<br />

forțelor de care dispunem față de cele mereu crescânde ale Rusiei, care tinde la înarmarea<br />

întregii națiuni, că este nevoie să sporim armamentele noastre. Văzând dorința pe care<br />

Ministrul de Externe al Letoniei o avea de a cunoaște părerea Guvernului nostru în această<br />

privință, l-am sfătuit a se folosi de prezența actuală a domnului Nukša la București pentru a ști<br />

dacă Guvernul nostru este dispus a trimite un delegat la acea Conferință, pe care domnul<br />

Meierovics l-ar fi văzut în persoana însuși a șefului Marelui nostru Stat Major.<br />

În dorința de a stabili relații cât mai intime pentru apărarea noastră contra propagandei<br />

comuniste, pe care Domnul Meierovics mi-a spus că Letonia o combate prin mijloace cât se<br />

poate de energice, Ministrul de Externe m-a rugat să întreb pe Excelența Voastră dacă o<br />

asemenea colaborare nu ar fi potrivită, știut fiind că Letonia ar pune la dispoziția noastră toate<br />

informațiile de care dispune. Încheind această parte a conversației noastre, Ministrul de Externe<br />

al Letoniei a exprimat dorința de a stabili cu Polonia legături politice cât mai intime; această<br />

țară fiind astăzi legată de noi printr-o convenție militară, în modul acesta Republicile baltice<br />

sunt legate și de România și s-ar putea stabili astfel un front unic de la Marea Neagră până la<br />

Baltică. Realizarea acestui stăvilar menit să apere statele direct interesate ar asigura și Europei<br />

apusene un sprijin pe care din nenorocire aceasta din urmă nu-l apreciază îndestul. Domnul<br />

Meierovics a găsit astfel prilej de a se plânge de politica afară din cale de mercantilă a statelor<br />

Europei Occidentale care consimt chiar să înarmeze sovietele numai pentru a desface produsele<br />

propriei lor industrii.<br />

În ceea ce privește flota rusă de la Baltica, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al Letoniei a luat act<br />

cu mulțumire de declarația făcută de Domnul Herriot 2 în fața comisiei afacerilor străine a<br />

Senatului francez, conform căreia flota Wrangel va servi Franței ca garanție până când Rusia va<br />

da soluții satisfăcătoare cererilor pe care ea se crede în drept a le ridica contra fostei ei aliate.<br />

Această amânare „sine die” a liniștit deocamdată pe domnul Meierovics, care a adăugat că<br />

predarea flotei Wrangel nu s-ar putea face fără pericol decât numai în Marea Albă sau la<br />

Vladivostok. Aici, ca și la Reval și la Stockholm, apariția flotei de la Bizerte în Marea Baltică era<br />

considerată ca o catastrofă, cu toate că în trecerea sa prin Riga Domnul Herbette 3 o calificase de<br />

„pușcoci de ciocolată”, apreciere la care domnul Meierovics a răspuns că în acest caz ar fi fost<br />

mult mai logic ca Franța să păstreze la dânsa această indezirabilă jucărie.<br />

1<br />

Aleksander Józef Skrzyński (1882-1931) a fost Ministru al Poloniei în România (1919-1923), Prim-Ministru al țării<br />

sale (1925-1926) și Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1922-1923, 1924-1926).<br />

2<br />

Édouard Marie Herriot (1872-1957) a fost politician radical fracez, Președinte al Consiliului de Ministru al Franței<br />

(1924-1925, 1926, 1932), Președinte al Camerei Deputaților (1925-1926, 1936-1940) și Președinte al Adunării<br />

Naționale a Franței (1947-1954), cunoscut pentru simpatiile sale pentru Uniunea Sovietică.<br />

3<br />

Jean Herbette (1878-1960) era Ministrul Franței în Uniunea Sovietică (1924-1931).


82 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Încheind convorbirea sa, Domnul Meierovics m-a însărcinat să fiu pe lângă Excelența<br />

Voastră interpretul mulțumirilor sale sincere pentru simpatia și interesul pe care țara noastră îl<br />

arată Letoniei, care apreciază cu atât mai mult atitudinea noastră, cu cât ea rezultă din însăși<br />

firea lucrurilor și nu poate avea decât rezultatele cele mai favorabile pentru apărarea intereselor<br />

ambelor noastre țări.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />

Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 44-47.<br />

21. Diplomatic Report no. 2 of Alexandru Iacovaky 1 , Minister of Romania in Riga, to<br />

I.G. Duca, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 2 nd March 1925<br />

To be notified to King Ferdinand I and to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers I.I.C.<br />

Brătianu 2<br />

The opinions of Mr. Meierovics on foreign policy matters of interest for Latvia and<br />

Romania.<br />

The news that I had <strong>the</strong> honour to communicate to Your Excellency in my telegram no.<br />

1 dated February 28 th current year was brought to me by <strong>the</strong> Press Director of <strong>the</strong> Ministry<br />

of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pusta 3 , on my departure from Reval, where I had <strong>the</strong> pleasure to be<br />

accompanied to <strong>the</strong> railway station by a few persons among whom: Mr. Tofer 4 , <strong>the</strong><br />

Undersecretary of State of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by all services directors of<br />

that ministry. The news according to which <strong>the</strong> Executive Committee of <strong>the</strong> Communist<br />

Party, prompted by Frunză 5 and Zinoviev 6 , had decided to resolve <strong>the</strong> fate of Bessarabia by<br />

war, with <strong>the</strong> purpose of reattaching it to Russia, mentioning that military operations on<br />

which <strong>the</strong> fate of this province depends were to be carried out between May - August<br />

current year, seemed to be important enough to be controlled by those means that are<br />

available to me here. The journalists whom I met told me loud and clear that <strong>the</strong>y believed<br />

that sooner or later Russia would attack us as <strong>the</strong>y want to retake Bessarabia. When<br />

checking <strong>the</strong> same piece of news using <strong>the</strong> bodies of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I had<br />

<strong>the</strong> sense of a less imminent danger.<br />

Mr. Meierovics, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom I had <strong>the</strong> honour to relegate<br />

<strong>the</strong> copy of <strong>the</strong> recall letter of Mr. Alexandru Florescu, <strong>the</strong> copy of my own letters of<br />

accreditation, as well as <strong>the</strong> copy of <strong>the</strong> speech that I will deliver on Thursday, March 6 th ,<br />

1<br />

Alexandru N. Iacovaky (1876-1949) was a Romanian diplomat who joined <strong>the</strong> Foreign Ministry early in <strong>the</strong><br />

Twentieth Century and worked under <strong>the</strong> authority of Alexandru Florescu whom he succeeded as Minister of<br />

Romania in Warsaw (1925-1927).<br />

2<br />

Ion I.C. Bratianu (1864-1927) was a towering personality of <strong>the</strong> Liberal National Party in <strong>the</strong> first quarter of <strong>the</strong><br />

twentieth century. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> party (1909-1927), President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers on several occasions<br />

(1914-1916, 1918-1919, 1922-1926, 1927). He played <strong>the</strong> decisive role in Romania's entry into World War I, <strong>the</strong> Great<br />

Union of 1918 and agrarian and electoral reforms enacted after <strong>the</strong> war.<br />

3<br />

Kaarel Robert Pusta (1883-1964) was an Estonian politician and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1920, 1924-<br />

1925), Minister of Estonia in France and eventually in Poland and Romania.<br />

4<br />

Karl Tofer (1885-1942) was an Estonian diplomat, Minister of Estonia in Italy and Hungary (based in Rome) –<br />

1927-1931, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (based in Warsaw) – 1930-1932, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (1933-1936) and<br />

Germany (1936-1939). He died in a camp in Russia.<br />

5<br />

Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze (1885-1925), also spelled Frunză – because of his fa<strong>the</strong>r of Romanian origin. He was a<br />

Russian Communist politician, military leader who defeated Red Army opponents during <strong>the</strong> Civil War. Chairman<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Revolutionary Military Council.<br />

6<br />

Grigory Zinoviev (1883-1936) was a Russian communist political leader, member of <strong>the</strong> Politburo, <strong>the</strong> leader of<br />

Comintern and member of <strong>the</strong> troika that took power in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union following Lenin's death.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 83<br />

with <strong>the</strong> occasion of presenting of those letters to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic in solemn<br />

hearing, told me during <strong>the</strong> morning of February 28 th that, for now, he did not see any<br />

indication leading him to believe in such possibility. He added that information that he<br />

had received from his representative in Moscow showed that, currently, <strong>the</strong> Russian policy<br />

tends towards an approach to France, and that <strong>the</strong>se days important conferences are held<br />

in Moscow between <strong>the</strong> French ambassador and <strong>the</strong> leaders of Soviet policy, Krasin 1 among<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rs, conferences that might result in a rapprochement to France, especially of<br />

economical nature. Mr. Meierovics had no information on <strong>the</strong> main <strong>the</strong>me of <strong>the</strong>se<br />

conferences, but he told me that aforementioned fact was confirmed by Mr. Köster 2 , <strong>the</strong><br />

German Minister, a character thought by Mr. Meierovics to be of importance, who had told him<br />

that <strong>the</strong> balance of Russia’s policy is now leaning towards France, as it once did towards<br />

Germany or England, Russia being known to always find arguments to raise <strong>the</strong> hopes of<br />

Governments that think <strong>the</strong>y could build lasting <strong>relations</strong> with it, as Ra<strong>the</strong>nau 3 also used to<br />

think, when he signed <strong>the</strong> Rapallo convention 4 with Russia. Based on <strong>the</strong>se economical<br />

rapprochement attempts to France, which were also confirmed by <strong>the</strong> French Legation with <strong>the</strong><br />

only difference that Mr. Barret, <strong>the</strong> French representative, considers Russia to be misleading<br />

while getting what it wants and giving nothing in exchange, Mr. Meierovics concludes that in<br />

<strong>the</strong> future <strong>the</strong> policy of <strong>the</strong> Soviets will be less aggressive as France shall ask Russia to give up its<br />

current policy towards its neighbouring states and <strong>the</strong>refore events currently under way in<br />

Moscow should please us.<br />

I insisted on <strong>the</strong> General Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry asking him to control <strong>the</strong> news which<br />

I received on <strong>the</strong> war policy that Russia intends to pursue towards us, and His Excellency<br />

promised me to act consequently, adding that with regard to Bessarabia his informers had<br />

not been telling him anything for some time, and he added that until now this news was<br />

confirmed by actual facts.<br />

Assessing <strong>the</strong> permanent interests that connect Latvia and Romania, Mr. Meierovics<br />

remarked that <strong>the</strong>y were in perfect harmony and thanked me for conveying to him <strong>the</strong><br />

sincere sympathy of <strong>the</strong> Royal Government, adding that he was fond of my declarations<br />

even more as His Excellency thought that only when Russia would come to believe that <strong>the</strong><br />

day when it attacked one of <strong>the</strong> states in <strong>the</strong> anti-Bolshevik defence belt <strong>the</strong> war would<br />

extend on <strong>the</strong> entire front, only <strong>the</strong>n we can hope to find peace, knowing that force is <strong>the</strong><br />

only argument that Russia has in mind and also that presently we are not strong enough<br />

unless we are united.<br />

In this context, Mr. Meierovics issued <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> participation of a Romanian<br />

military expert to a conference of weapons restriction which is to be held in Riga on March<br />

24 th current year, would be a well inspired measure. His Excellency, toge<strong>the</strong>r with count<br />

1<br />

Leonid Borisovich Krasin (1870-1926) was a member of <strong>the</strong> Central Committee of <strong>the</strong> CPSU and Soviet diplomat.<br />

2<br />

Adolf Köster (1883-1930) was a Social-Democrat politician, Foreign Minister (1920) and later Minister of <strong>the</strong><br />

Interior of <strong>the</strong> Weimar Republic (1921-1922). He was <strong>the</strong> Minister of Germany in Latvia (1923-1928) and Yugoslavia<br />

(1928-1930).<br />

3<br />

Wal<strong>the</strong>r Ra<strong>the</strong>nau (1867-1922) was a German politician, member of <strong>the</strong> German Democratic Party. As Foreign<br />

Minister of Germany he signed <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Rapallo with Soviet Russia (1922) trying to pull Germany out of<br />

international isolation. He was murdered by German extremist nationalists.<br />

4<br />

The Treaty of Rapallo (April 16th, 1922) was a complex treaty aimed at resuming <strong>diplomatic</strong> ties between<br />

Germany and Soviet Russia, renouncing at financial claims against each o<strong>the</strong>r and working in a spirit of mutual<br />

understanding between <strong>the</strong>m.


84 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Skrzyński 1 , think that <strong>the</strong> attendance of a Romanian delegate to in <strong>the</strong>se debates – which<br />

will have a completely confidential character – could be necessary for our common<br />

interests; that, far from deciding on possibility to cut down our weaponry, <strong>the</strong> conference<br />

of military experts will, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, conclude, after examination of our current forces<br />

against <strong>the</strong> increasing strength of Russia, which tends to arm <strong>the</strong> whole nation, that we<br />

need to supplement our weapons. Considering <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs’<br />

desire to be informed on our Government’s opinion, I advised him to make use of <strong>the</strong><br />

presence of Mister Nukša in Bucharest in order to find out whe<strong>the</strong>r our Government is<br />

willing to send to that Conference a delegate, whom Mr. Meierovics had considered in <strong>the</strong><br />

person of <strong>the</strong> Chief of our General Staff.<br />

Based on <strong>the</strong> desire to establish <strong>the</strong> most intimate possible <strong>relations</strong> for our defence<br />

against communist propaganda, on which Mr. Meierovics told me that Latvia was fighting<br />

against using very energetic methods, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs charged me with<br />

asking Your Excellency if such collaboration would not be appropriate, knowing that Latvia<br />

would provide us with all information it possesses. Ending this part of our conversation,<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his will to establish more intimate<br />

political connections with Poland; as this country is nowadays linked to us by a military<br />

convention, <strong>the</strong>refore Baltic Republics are also bounded to Romania and <strong>the</strong>refore a<br />

common front from <strong>the</strong> Black Sea to <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea could be established. The development<br />

of such barrier destined to protect interested states would also support Western Europe,<br />

which unfortunately fails to provide <strong>the</strong> appreciation such support deserves. Mr.<br />

Meierovics found <strong>the</strong> opportunity to complain on <strong>the</strong> trading activities of Western<br />

European states that have even agreed to arm <strong>the</strong> Soviets in order to sell <strong>the</strong> products of<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir own industry.<br />

In what <strong>the</strong> Russian fleet in <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea is concerned, <strong>the</strong> Latvian Minister of Foreign<br />

Affairs gladly noticed <strong>the</strong> declaration made by Mr. Herriot 2 before <strong>the</strong> French Senate’s<br />

Committee of Foreign Affairs , based on which <strong>the</strong> Wrangel fleet will serve France as a warranty<br />

until Russia gives course to <strong>the</strong> request that it thinks itself entitled to take against its former<br />

ally. This sine die delay has calmed Mr. Meierovics down for now, who added that surrender of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Wrangel fleet could not be done without any danger, unless carried out in <strong>the</strong> White Sea or<br />

Vladivostok. Here, just like in Reval and Stockholm, <strong>the</strong> apparition of Bizerte fleet into <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic Sea was considered to be a catastrophe, although when he passed through Riga Mr.<br />

Herbette 3 qualified it as a “big chocolate gun”, appreciation to which Mr. Meierovics responded<br />

that in this case it would have been logical for France to keep this undesirable toy.<br />

Closing his conversation, Mr. Meierovics instructed me to be, near Your Excellency, <strong>the</strong><br />

conveyor of his sincere thanks for <strong>the</strong> sympathy and interest that our country shows to Latvia,<br />

that he appreciates our position even more as it comes naturally and it can only reveal<br />

favourable results when defending <strong>the</strong> interest of both countries.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 44-47.<br />

1<br />

Aleksander Józef Skrzyński (1882-1931) was Minister of Poland in Romania (1919-1923), Prime Minister of his<br />

country (1925-1926) and Foreign Minister (1922-1923, 1924-1926).<br />

2<br />

Édouard Marie Herriot (1872-1957) was a French Radical politician, President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Minister of France<br />

(1924-1925, 1926, 1932), President of <strong>the</strong> Chamber of Deputies (1925-1926, 1936-1940) and Chairman of <strong>the</strong> National<br />

Assembly of France (1947-1954), known for his sympathies for <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union<br />

3<br />

Jean Herbette (1878-1960), journalist and diplomat, was Minister of France in <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union (1924-1931).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 85<br />

22. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Alexandru Iacovaky nr. 3<br />

către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca, 3 martie 1925<br />

Am onoarea a trimite Excelenței Voastre, alăturat, traducerea în română a interviului pe<br />

care l-am dat aici ziarului Rīgas Ziņas, al cărui redactor politic mi-a fost recomandat de<br />

Directorul Protocolului din Ministerul Afacerilor Străine.<br />

Ziarul Rīgas Ziņas, destul de răspândit în Riga, este un ziar de informație în felul ziarului Le<br />

Matin.<br />

Declarațiile pe care am crezut că este locul a le face au fost apreciate de Ministerul Afacerilor<br />

Străine, fiind considerate ca mărturia concretă a cordialității relațiilor româno-letone, pe care<br />

guvernul din Riga dorește să o aducă cât mai des la cunoștința vecinilor noștri de la est.<br />

Traducerea română a interviului dat de Ministrul României în Letonia ziarului independent<br />

Rīgas Ziņas:<br />

Un stat prieten în sudul Europei<br />

- O întrevedere cu ministrul României –<br />

Ministrul României de curând sosit aici, Domnul Iacovaky, a avut o convorbire cu unul<br />

dintre colaboratorii noștri în cursul căreia i-a spus:<br />

„Instrucțiunile mele tind la crearea unor relații de prietenie sinceră și cordială între România<br />

și poporul leton și guvernul său. La baza simpatiilor noastre se găsesc interesele comune care<br />

unesc România de Estonia și Letonia. România vede în colaborarea ei cu aceste două popoare o<br />

garanție a păcii dorită de toate națiunile Europei. România resimte nu numai o simpatie adâncă<br />

pentru Letonia, dar chiar un simțământ de respect, deoarece poporul leton vrea să trăiască liber<br />

și este hotărât, la nevoie, să își apere libertatea cu prețul sângelui său. Am fost martorul marilor<br />

manifestații de simpatie estono-letonă care s-au desfășurat la Reval 1 . Aceste manifestații sunt,<br />

după părerea mea, cea mai bună garanție nu numai pentru menținerea păcii, dar chiar și pentru<br />

libera dezvoltare a acestor două tinere țări.<br />

România dorește să apere alături de Dvs. civilizația și ordinea și de a face față alături de Dvs.<br />

la orice pericol care v-ar amenința. România nu are în politica ei alt scop, în Țările Baltice, decât<br />

o colaborare amicală la menținerea păcii pe care o dorește.”<br />

Este cunoscută Letonia în România?<br />

„Statele baltice sunt puțin cunoscute în România deoarece știrile despre Țările Baltice ne<br />

veneau înainte de război prin mijlocirea Rusiei. Acum suntem la curent în România cu situația<br />

Dvs. atât din punct de vedere geographic, cât și etnic; cunoaștem vechea Dvs. civilizație, marile<br />

progrese pe care le-ați realizat ne sunt de asemenea cunoscute și sperăm că în curând vom<br />

putea să înțelegem mai bine viața Dvs. politică și intelectuală. Din partea mea voi face tot ce-mi<br />

stă în putință pentru a apropia Letonia de România și sper că ne vom putea înțelege cu ușurință<br />

și în privința dezvoltării relațiilor noastre comerciale.”<br />

Care sunt mărfurile pe care România le poate exporta?<br />

„În genere vorbind: petrolul, grâul, lemnul, lâna, sarea și pieile brute. Mărfurile noastre pot fi<br />

exportate către Țările Baltice prin Polonia, ca țară de tranzit, sau pe mare.”<br />

Care vă sunt relațiile cu Rusia și cum stă azi chestiunea Basarabiei?<br />

1<br />

Denumirea germană, suedeză și daneză a capitalei Estoniei, Tallinn.


86 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

„Situația în Basarabia este cu totul liniștită. Reformele economice și sociale săvârșite de<br />

guvernul român au dovedit fraților noștri din Basarabia că vrem să întemeiem viitorul țării<br />

noastre nu pe fraze goale, dar pe reforme politice, economice și sociale matur cugetate.”<br />

Care sunt principiile politicii românești?<br />

„Înțelegându-și bine datoria, guvernul român dorește să întrețină relații corecte și normale<br />

cu toți vecinii săi. Programul său politic exclude ura față de orișice popor, singurul lucru pe care<br />

România îl cere este ca drepturile ce-i sunt recunoscute prin tratate, să fie respectate.”<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />

Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 51-52.<br />

22. Diplomatic report no. 3 of Alexandru Iacovaky, Minister of Romania, to I.G.Duca,<br />

Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 3 rd March 1925<br />

I have <strong>the</strong> honor to send Your Excellency, appended, <strong>the</strong> translation in Romanian of <strong>the</strong><br />

interview that I gave here to Rīgas Ziņas newspaper, <strong>the</strong> political editor of which <strong>the</strong><br />

Director of <strong>the</strong> Protocol from <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended to me.<br />

Fairly widespread in Riga, Rīgas Ziņas newspaper is an information newspaper of <strong>the</strong><br />

kind of Le Matin.<br />

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appreciated <strong>the</strong> statements that I appreciated worth<br />

delivering, considering <strong>the</strong>m a concrete testimony of <strong>the</strong> cordiality of <strong>the</strong> Romanian-<br />

Latvian <strong>relations</strong>, which <strong>the</strong> Riga government wishes to communicate to our Eastern<br />

neighbors as often as possible.<br />

The Romanian translation of <strong>the</strong> interview given by <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania in Latvia,<br />

Rīgas Ziņas newspaper.<br />

A friend state in <strong>the</strong> South of Europe<br />

- A meeting with <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania –<br />

Mr. Iacovaky, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania, who arrived here recently, entertained a<br />

conversation with one of our collaborators during which he told him:<br />

“My instructions tend to <strong>the</strong> establishment of genuine friendly <strong>relations</strong> between<br />

Romanian and <strong>the</strong> Latvian people and its government. At <strong>the</strong> heart of our sympathies lie<br />

<strong>the</strong> common interests that unite Romania with Estonia and Latvia. Romanian sees in this<br />

collaboration with <strong>the</strong>se two countries a warranty of <strong>the</strong> peace all of Europe’s nations<br />

desire. Romania experiences not only a deep sympathy for Latvia, but even a feeling of<br />

respect because <strong>the</strong> Latvian people want to live freely and <strong>the</strong>y are determined, if needed,<br />

to protect <strong>the</strong>ir freedom with <strong>the</strong> cost of <strong>the</strong>ir own blood. I was <strong>the</strong> witness of <strong>the</strong> great<br />

manifestations of Estonian-Latvian sympathy that took place in Reval 1 . These<br />

manifestations are, in my opinion, <strong>the</strong> best warranty not only for maintaining <strong>the</strong> peace,<br />

but even for <strong>the</strong> free development of <strong>the</strong>se two young countries.”<br />

Romania wishes to protect, as you also want, <strong>the</strong> civilization and order, and to face<br />

toge<strong>the</strong>r with you any danger that could threaten you. The policy of Romania does not<br />

have ano<strong>the</strong>r purpose, in <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries, but a friendly collaboration in order to<br />

maintain <strong>the</strong> peace that it genuinely seeks.<br />

Is Latvia known in Romania?<br />

1<br />

The German, Swedish and Danisg name for <strong>the</strong> capital of Estonia, Tallinn.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 87<br />

“The Baltic states are poorly known in Romania because <strong>the</strong> news about <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />

countries reached us before <strong>the</strong> war by mediation of Russia. Nowadays, in Romania we are<br />

aware of your situation both from a geographical point of view as well as from an ethnical<br />

point of view; we know your ancient civilization, <strong>the</strong> great progresses that you have<br />

accomplished are also known to us and we hope that soon we will understand your<br />

intellectual and political life better. As far as I am concerned, I will do my best to get Latvia<br />

closer to Romania, and I hope that we can easily understand each o<strong>the</strong>r concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

development of our commercial <strong>relations</strong>.”<br />

Which are <strong>the</strong> goods that Romania may export?<br />

“Generally speaking: oil, wheat, wood, wool, salt and raw lea<strong>the</strong>r. Our merchandise may<br />

be exported to <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries through Poland, as a transit country, or by sea.”<br />

Which are <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with Russia and what is new with respect to Bessarabia?”<br />

“The situation in Bessarabia is perfectly calm. The economic and social reforms<br />

performed by <strong>the</strong> Romanian government proved to our bro<strong>the</strong>rs from Bessarabia that we<br />

want to build <strong>the</strong> future of our country based not on empty words, but on well thought out<br />

politic, economic and social reforms.<br />

Which are <strong>the</strong> principles of <strong>the</strong> Romanian policy?<br />

“Understanding its mission very well, <strong>the</strong> Romanian Government wishes to maintain<br />

fair and normal <strong>relations</strong> with all of its neighbors. Its political program excludes hate<br />

towards any o<strong>the</strong>r people, <strong>the</strong> only thing that Romania asks for is that its rights recognized<br />

by treaties to be respected.”<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 51-52<br />

23. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1925. g. 4. apr. ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />

Meierovicam<br />

[..] Militārapspriede 1 uzbudinājusi šejienes Padomju sūtniecību. Politiskā departamenta<br />

direktors Dr. Baders 2 man Ārlietu ministrijā teica, ka pie viņa ieradies SSSR 3 sūtniecības<br />

padomnieks Besjadovskis 4 un oficiālā kārtā, svinīgā tonī prasījis, kas tā par kara apspriedi, kura<br />

patlaban notiekot Rīgā un kur ņemot dalību Polija, Rumānija un Baltijas valstis. Dr. Baders uz<br />

to atbildējis, ka šī apspriede notiek uz Tautu Savienības pamatiem un tur apskata vienīgi<br />

tehniskas dabas jautājumus, šī vārda šaurākā nozīmē. Tie attiecoties uz vispārīgo atbruņošanos<br />

un par tiem būšot drīzumā runa Ženēvā. Par apspriedes tīri tehnisko raksturu liecinot tas fakts,<br />

ka tur ņem dalību tikai pa vienam virsniekam un pie tam ar samērā zemu dienesta pakāpi [..].<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 18. l., 180. lp.<br />

1<br />

1925. g. 30. martā – 3. apr. Rīgā kā atbruņošanās ekspertu apspriede notika Igaunijas, Latvijas, Polijas un<br />

Rumānijas armiju izlūkdienestu pārstāvju apspriede (piedalījās arī Somijas armijas pārstāvis kā novērotājs). Cita<br />

starpā apspriedē tika nolemts informācijas apmaiņas uzlabošanai iecelt Latvijas militāro atašeju (kara aģentu)<br />

Rumānijā.<br />

2<br />

Karols Baders (1887–1957), Polijas diplomāts. 1924.–1931. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Politiskā departamenta direktors.<br />

3<br />

Domāta PSRS.<br />

4<br />

Grigorijs Besjadovskis – PSRS diplomāts, sūtniecības padomnieks Polijā.


88 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

23. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics,<br />

4 th April, 1925<br />

[..] The military conference 1 has alarmed <strong>the</strong> local Soviet Legation. In <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign<br />

Affairs Director of Political Department Dr. Bader 2 told me that Councillor of <strong>the</strong> SSSR 3<br />

Legation Besjadovsky 4 had visited him and in a solemn voice officially demanded what kind of<br />

war [military] meeting was that, which was taking place in Riga at that time with <strong>the</strong><br />

participation of Poland, Romania and <strong>the</strong> Baltic States. Dr. Bader had replied that <strong>the</strong> meeting<br />

was taking place on <strong>the</strong> foundations of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and that only issues of technical<br />

nature, in <strong>the</strong> narrowest sense of <strong>the</strong> word, were being addressed <strong>the</strong>re. They concerned general<br />

disarmament and would soon be addressed in Geneva. The purely technical nature of <strong>the</strong><br />

meeting was attested to by <strong>the</strong> fact that only one officer [per country], of a ra<strong>the</strong>r low rank at<br />

that, was taking part in it [...]<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 18, s. 180.<br />

24. Latvijas kara ministra R. Bangerska 5 1925. g. 24. apr. raksts ārlietu ministram Z.<br />

Meierovicam<br />

Sakarā ar to, ka kara resors nodomājis uzdot tagadējam kara aģentam Polijā pulkvedimleitnantam<br />

Grīnbergam 6 izpildīt tanī pašā laikā arī kara aģenta pienākumus Rumānijā, lūdzu<br />

neatteikt noskaidrot un paziņot, vai Rumānijas valdība neceltu iebildumus pret minētā<br />

virsnieka iecelšanu kara aģenta amatā Rumānijā. 7<br />

LVVA, 2570. f., 1. apr., 179. l., 2. lp.<br />

24. Note by Latvia’s Minister of War R. Bangerskis 8 to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z.<br />

Meierovics, 24 th April, 1925<br />

Due to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> war [military] department has decided to charge <strong>the</strong> acting war<br />

[military] agent in Poland Colonel-Lieutenant Grīnbergs 9 also with <strong>the</strong> duties of war [military]<br />

agent in Romania, please, do not refuse finding out and informing me whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> government<br />

1<br />

In Riga on 30 th March – 3 rd April, 1925 in <strong>the</strong> capacity of experts of disarmament met representatives of<br />

intelligence services of <strong>the</strong> armies of Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Romania (a representative of <strong>the</strong> Army of Finland<br />

also attended <strong>the</strong> meeting as an observer). Among o<strong>the</strong>r things <strong>the</strong> participants decided to send a military attaché<br />

(called war agent) of Latvia to Romania in order to improve exchange of information.<br />

2<br />

Carol Bader (1887–1957), Polish diplomat. 1924–1931 Director of <strong>the</strong> Political Department of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of<br />

Foreign Affairs.<br />

3<br />

Meaning <strong>the</strong> USSR.<br />

4<br />

Grigory Besjadovsky – USSR diplomat, Councillor of Legation in Poland.<br />

5<br />

Rūdolfs Bangerskis (1878–1958), Latvijas armijas ģenerālis (1925), valstsvīrs. 1924.–1925., 1926.–1928. g. kara<br />

ministrs.<br />

6<br />

Gustavs Jēkabs Grīnbergs (1884–1981), Latvijas armijas pulkvedis (1931). 1924.–1927. g. kara aģents Polijā, no 1925.<br />

g. arī Rumānijā.<br />

7<br />

1925. g. 3. nov. Rumānijas sūtniecība Varšavā informēja Latvijas sūtniecību, ka nav nekādu šķēršļu G. Grīnberga<br />

iecelšanai par militāro atašeju (kara aģentu) Rumānijā (LVVA, 2574. f., 1. apr., 179. l., 13. lp.).<br />

8<br />

Rūdolfs Bangerskis (1878–1958), General of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1925), statesman. 1924–1925, 1926–1928 Minister of<br />

War.<br />

9<br />

Gustavs Jēkabs Grīnbergs (1884–1981), Colonel of <strong>the</strong> Army of Latvia (1931). 1924–1927 war [military] agent in<br />

Poland, from 1925 also in Romania.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 89<br />

of Romania would not object to <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>the</strong> above-mentioned officer to <strong>the</strong> position of<br />

war [military] agent in Romania. 1<br />

SHAL, f. 2570, d. 1, file 179, s. l–2.<br />

25. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1925. g. 28. jūl. ziņojums ārlietu ministram Z.<br />

Meierovicam<br />

[..] Rumānijas sūtnis Jakovaki man stāstīja, ka Pad. Krievija esot pavasarī griezusies pie<br />

Polijas ar priekšlikumu noslēgt savstarpēju neuzbrukšanas līgumu. Nesastapusi pie Polijas<br />

gaidīto pretimnākšanu, SSSR esot tad taisījusi tādu pat priekšlikumu Baltijas valstīm, bet, viņš<br />

cerot, ka tā tur atradusi līdzīgu noraidījumu. Pēc tam SSSR esot savu priekšlikumu Polijai<br />

atkārtojusi, bet ar tikpat maz sekmēm, kā pirmo reiz; Polija esot prasījusi, lai SSSR formulē<br />

noteiktāk savu priekšlikumu; līdz ar to no poļu puses esot aizrādīts, ka bez Rumānijas viņi<br />

nekādas sarunas nevedīšot. Jakovaki bija laimīgs par tādu Polijas atbildi; neiespējama tā nav.<br />

Ārlietu ministrija no savas puses nenoliedza šādus SSSR soļus: taisni otrādi, aiz iemesliem, kuri<br />

ir visai saprotami, viņa pati labprāt šīs ziņas izplata. Pēc tiem pašiem avotiem, Padomju valdība,<br />

saņēmusi tādu Polijas atbildi, neesot pēc tā vairs ar līguma projektu nākusi; tā esot devusi<br />

saprast, ka ar Rumāniju nevēlas neuzbrukšanas līgumu slēgt Besarābijas jautājuma dēļ. Zināmas<br />

šaubas par visas šīs versijas pareizību ir vietā [..].<br />

LVVA, 2575. f., 15. apr., 18. l., 24.–25. lp.<br />

25. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Meierovics,<br />

28 th July, 1925<br />

[..] Envoy of Romania Iacovaky told me that in <strong>the</strong> spring Sov[iet] Russia had turned to<br />

Poland with a proposal to conclude a mutual non-aggression treaty. Not having been met with<br />

<strong>the</strong> expected responsiveness from Poland, <strong>the</strong> USSR had <strong>the</strong>n made <strong>the</strong> same proposal to <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic States, but he hopes that <strong>the</strong>re it was met with similar rejection. After that <strong>the</strong> USSR had<br />

repeated its proposal to Poland, but with as little success as <strong>the</strong> first time; Poland had required<br />

<strong>the</strong> USSR to formulate its proposal in more detail; simultaneously <strong>the</strong> Polish part had also<br />

pointed out that <strong>the</strong>y would not engage in any negotiations without Romania. Iacovaky was<br />

happy about such an answer from Poland; such an answer is not impossible. The Ministry of<br />

Foreign Affairs of Poland on its part did not deny that <strong>the</strong> USSR had taken such steps: on <strong>the</strong><br />

contrary, due to reasons that are well understandable it willingly spreads such information<br />

itself. According to <strong>the</strong> same sources, <strong>the</strong> Soviet government, having received such a reply from<br />

Poland, had not returned with a draft treaty; it had alluded that it did not want to conclude a<br />

non-aggression treaty with Romania due to <strong>the</strong> issue of Bessarabia. Certain doubt about <strong>the</strong><br />

accurateness of this entire version is in place. [..]<br />

SHAL, f. 2575, d. 15, file 18, s. 24–25.<br />

26. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al ministrului României la Riga Alexandru Iacovaky nr. 67<br />

către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României I.G. Duca, 21 noiembrie 1925<br />

A se aduce la cunoștința Regelui Ferdinand I și Președintelui Consiliului de Miniștri I.I.C.<br />

Brătianu<br />

1<br />

On 3 rd November, 1925 <strong>the</strong> Legation of Romania in Warsaw informed <strong>the</strong> Legation of Latvia that <strong>the</strong>re were no<br />

obstacles for G. Grīnbergs to be appointed military attaché (war agent) in Romania (SHAL, f. 2574, d. 1, file 179, s.<br />

13).


90 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Audiența ministrului României la Riga la Președintele Republicii Letone<br />

Am avut onoarea de a fi primit astăzi în audiență de Excelența Sa Domnul Čakste 1 ,<br />

Președintele Republicii Letone.<br />

La începutul convorbirii Președintele Republicii și-a exprimat regretul de a vedea că<br />

părăsesc așa de curând Letonia; am răspuns Șefului Statului că întoarcerea mea la Varșovia era<br />

motivată de faptul că eram dator să mă întorc acolo, pentru a lua contact cu noul Guvern, care<br />

se va forma după limpezirea actualei crize ministeriale.<br />

Conversația s-a legat atunci de situația în Polonia care după părerea Președintelui Republicii<br />

lasă mult de dorit căci – zicea Domnul Čakste – „în Polonia se muncește prea puțin și se<br />

cheltuiește prea mult. Polonia, a adăugat domnul Čakste, este o țară mare, dar nu este<br />

puternică, ea este în genere prost administrată. Mă mir cum polonezii nu au învățat mai mult<br />

din timpul cât au stat sub dominație rusă. Se cheltuiește prea mult pentru armată, și armata<br />

polonă a fugit în fața rușilor, pe când armata letonă a ținut piept trupelor de elită germane și a<br />

învins cu ușurință pe bolșevici în războiul pentru independența țării noastre.”<br />

Am considerat că aceste păreri severe erau defavorabile scopului ce-mi propusesem, adică<br />

de a arăta că Polonia este singurul factor pe care Letonia poate conta în eventualitatea unui<br />

război cu Rusia. Președintele m-a întrebat apoi care erau legăturile care ne unesc cu Polonia; i-<br />

am spus că se semnase acum cinci ani un tratat de alianță care era completat printr-o convenție<br />

militară ale căror detalii erau ținute la curent de Statele majore ale ambelor țări, că situația în<br />

ceea ce privește frontul polono-român mi se părea asigurată și că ar fi de dorit ca o situație<br />

identică să se înfăptuiască până la Golful Finlandei. Președintele mi-a spus apoi: „valoarea<br />

politicii scandinave este slăbită din cauza îngustimii de vedere care caracterizează politica<br />

Suediei și a Norvegiei și prin abținerea Finlandei de la ideea realizării „Uniunii Baltice”, care, la<br />

rândul ei, este slăbită prin atitudinea Lituaniei și de diferendul care desparte această țară de<br />

Polonia. Lituania duce – mi-a spus Domnul Čakste – o politică de neînduplecată rezistență; dar<br />

și Polonia a greșit atunci când și-a apropiat Vilna prin forța armelor (acțiunea întreprinsă în<br />

februarie 1921 de generalul Želigovskį 2 ). Am căutat întotdeauna să mijlocim o apropiere între<br />

Polonia și Lituania; la chemările noastre, Polonia a răspuns întotdeauna, Lituania s-a abținut<br />

sistematic de la orice împăcare, ba chiar ne-a acuzat că lucrând pentru rezolvarea diferendului<br />

polono-lituanian, urmărim o hegemonie asupra poporului lituanian înrudit nouă, care este mai<br />

puțin dezvoltat pe teren cultural. Acuzația este neîntemeiată și am impresia că „degetul<br />

Germaniei nu este străin acestei politici”. Totuși, mi-a zis domnul Čakste, „nimeni nu pune la<br />

îndoială la noi că pivotul situației Europei Orientale este Polonia și înțelegem că trebuie să ne<br />

apropiem de această țară pentru a consolida linia de apărare care eventual urmează a fi opusă<br />

Rusiei.”<br />

„Situația în Rusia, mi-a spus Domnul Čakste, este caracterizată prin slăbiciunea actualului<br />

Guvern care prezintă pentru vecinii Rusiei mai puțin pericol decât oricare altul, fie bolșevic,<br />

dacă acest regim s-ar consolida, fie țarist, dacă vechiul regim ar putea să revină la cârma<br />

Statului.”<br />

1<br />

Jānis Čakste (1859-1927) a fost un avocat și politician leton, Președinte al Consiliului Național (sau Popular) –<br />

Tautas Padome care a declarat independența Letoniei, Președinte al Adunării Constituante (1920-1922) și primul<br />

Președinte al Letoniei (1922–1927).<br />

2<br />

La 7 octombrie 1920 s-au semnat acordurile polono-lituaniene de la Suwałki. În aceeaşi noapte, generalul Lucjan<br />

Żeligowski, la ordinele Varșoviei, a început operațiunea de ocuparea a Vilniusului și a proclamat Republica<br />

Lituania Centrală (teritoriu de 13.500 km 2 şi populaţie de 500.000 locuitori).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 91<br />

Oricare ar fi situația de astăzi, trebuie să ne gândim la cea care va fi peste câțiva ani, când se<br />

vor ivi partidul, oamenii sau omul „care va aduna sub o conducere energică poporul rus, incult<br />

și răbdător”. Zic că regimul Sovietic, ca și cel țarist, este un regim slab pentru că el nu este în<br />

stare să ducă un război ofensiv.<br />

Sunt convins – mi-a spus Președintele – că un asemenea război ar aduce cu sine prăbușirea<br />

regimului sovietic. Ca și armata țaristă, armata sovietică poate înăbuși numai răscoale sporadice<br />

și să stăpânească prin teroare masele amorfe ale unui popor care nu se gândește mai departe<br />

decât să-și asigure traiul, și dacă e vorba de o preocupare politică, aceasta se limitează numai<br />

strict la interesele comunei (Mir), sau cel mult ale provinciei.<br />

Dar în ziua când Rusia va fi guvernată de un dictator sau de un țar, prima grijă a noului<br />

regim va fi de a-și mări prestigiul printr-un război de cucerire. De aceea Statele mărginașe<br />

amenințate toate de un pericol identic trebuie să se pregătească pentru ziua când Rusia va fi din<br />

nou supusă unui om sau unui grup de oameni care vor tinde spre cuceriri. Dacă examinez<br />

fruntaria care desparte astăzi Statele mărginașe de Rusia sovietică trebuie să mărturisesc că<br />

aceste hotare nu mi se par cu totul stabile și trebuie să ne pregătim pentru ziua când<br />

independența țărilor noastre va fi amenințată. Privesc, ca și toți concetățenii mei, politica<br />

României față de Rusia cu cel mai viu interes, urmărind neîncetat dezvoltarea chestiunii<br />

Basarabiei și suntem perfect conștienți că un război pentru cucerirea acestei provincii ar<br />

influența foarte mult propria noastră situație.<br />

S-a urmărit la noi cu mult interes războiul dus de georgieni pentru independența lor. Nu am<br />

putut să-i ajutăm deoarece Caucazul este o regiune care iese cu totul din cadrul posibilităților<br />

noastre. Pentru România însă interesul este mult mai viu: avem puțină știință despre țara<br />

Dumneavoastră și despre trecutul ei, dar ne dăm seama de forța ce reprezintă, de continuitatea<br />

politicii sale, al cărui singur scop este consolidarea păcii.<br />

Președintele Čakste s-a interesat apoi despre sistemul nostru de alianțe care constituie Mica<br />

Înțelegere, despre rostul și însemnătatea ei. Chestiunile balcanice fiindu-i străine, m-a rugat să i<br />

le lămuresc. Când eram la Paris – mi-a zis Domnia Sa – pentru a apăra interesele țării mele<br />

renăscute, ni se arunca adeseori învinuirea că vroim să balcanizăm Nordul Europei; nu<br />

înțelegeam atunci ce însemna această comparație, de atunci însă i-am înțeles sensul. La<br />

rugămintea Domnului Čakste, i-am explicat politica urmărită de România în Balcani, politică<br />

care tinde la menținerea păcii și a echilibrului politic stabilit de tratate. Președintele a ascultat<br />

cu mult interes expunerea ce i-am făcut, cu atât mai mult cu cât mi-am permis a-i face o scurtă<br />

descriere a istoriei contemporane a țării noastre, de la Tratatul de la Paris (1856) până în zilele<br />

noastre, punând în legătură dezvoltarea noastră politică cu dezvoltarea noastră economică,<br />

pentru deplina lămurire a căreia am luat ca subiect chestiunea Dunării și a strâmtorilor,<br />

arătându-i că dacă sforțările noastre au fost câteodată încoronate cu succes, datorăm această<br />

izbândă faptului că am făcut întotdeauna o politică europeană, al cărei scop tindea la<br />

armonizarea propriilor noastre interese cu interesele Marilor Puteri.<br />

Interesat de expunerea mea, Președintele Čakste a spus:<br />

„Mă ocup mult cu studiul istoriei, îmi lipsesc însă cărți despre viața și istoria poporului<br />

român.” Cum este firesc m-am grăbit a spune Președintelui că-mi voi face o plăcere din a-i oferi<br />

câteva cărți care ar putea să formeze miezul informațiilor sale despre România. Îmi permit deci<br />

a ruga pe Excelența Voastră să binevoiască a dispune ca Direcția Presei și Propagandei să-mi


92 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

pună la dispoziție materialul de cărți care ar putea interesa pe Domnul Čakste și pe care îmi voi<br />

face o plăcere a i le oferi din partea Excelenței Voastre cu ocazia viitoarei mele vizite la Riga.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />

Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, filele 67-69.<br />

26. Diplomatic report no. 67 of Alexandru Iacovaky, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Romania in Riga,<br />

to I.G.Duca, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs in Romania, 21 st November 1925<br />

To be notified to King Ferdinand I and to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers I.I.C.<br />

Brătianu<br />

The audience of <strong>the</strong> minister of Romania in Riga to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic of Latvia.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> start of conversation, <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic expressed his regret in seeing<br />

that I had to leave Latvia so soon; I answered <strong>the</strong> Chief of State that my return to Warsaw<br />

was motivated by <strong>the</strong> fact that it was my duty to go back <strong>the</strong>re, in order to contact <strong>the</strong> new<br />

Government that would be established after <strong>the</strong> settlement of current ministerial crisis.<br />

We discussed <strong>the</strong> situation in Poland which, according to <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Republic,<br />

is disappointing as – based on Mr. Čakste 1 ’s words – Poland works less and spends too<br />

much. Poland, Mr. Čakste added, is a large but weak country, and it is generally poorly<br />

administered. I am surprised that <strong>the</strong> Polish did not learn more while <strong>the</strong>y were under<br />

Russian control. Too much money is spent on army, and <strong>the</strong> Polish army fled when faced<br />

with <strong>the</strong> Russians, while <strong>the</strong> Latvian army fought against <strong>the</strong> elitist German troops and<br />

easily defeated <strong>the</strong> Bolsheviks in our country’s war for independence.<br />

I have considered that <strong>the</strong>se severe opinions were not favourable to my goals, meaning<br />

that I intended to show that Poland was <strong>the</strong> only factor which Latvia may counted on in<br />

case of a war against Russia. The president asked me what were <strong>the</strong> links connecting us to<br />

Poland; I told him that five years ago, an alliance treaty had been signed, that was<br />

supplemented by a military convention whose details were kept up to date by <strong>the</strong> general<br />

staffs of both countries, that <strong>the</strong> situation of Polish-Romanian front seemed to be secured<br />

and it would be desirable for an identical situation to be developed up to <strong>the</strong> Gulf of<br />

Finland. The president <strong>the</strong>n told me that: <strong>the</strong> quality of Scandinavian policy was reduced<br />

by <strong>the</strong>ir narrow perception that characterized <strong>the</strong> policy of Sweden and Norway and<br />

because Finland held itself against <strong>the</strong> idea of developing <strong>the</strong> “Baltic Union”, which was in<br />

turn weakened by <strong>the</strong> attitude of Latvia and <strong>the</strong> disagreement that separated this country<br />

from Poland. Latvia carries – I was told by Mr. Čakste – a policy of strong resistance, but<br />

Poland also made a mistake when it got close to Vilna through <strong>the</strong> force of weapons (an<br />

action that was carried out in February 1921 by general Želigovskį 2 ). We have always wanted<br />

to mediate a relation between Poland and Lithuania; Poland always answered our calls,<br />

Lithuania refrained systematically from any reconciliation, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore it even accused us<br />

that working for settlement of Polish – Lithuania differences, our intention would be to<br />

achieve a hegemony on Lithuania people which is related to our people, yet less developed<br />

1<br />

Jānis Čakste (1859-1927) was a Latvian lawyer and politician, President of <strong>the</strong> National (or People’s) Council –<br />

Tautas Padome who declared independence of Latvia, Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Constituent Assembly (1920-1922) and first<br />

President of Latvia (1922-1927).<br />

2<br />

On 7 October 1920, Polish-Lithuanian agreements were signed in Suwalki. That night, General Lucjan Želigovskį,<br />

ordered by Warsaw, began <strong>the</strong> occupying of Vilnius and proclaimed <strong>the</strong> Republic of Central Lithuania (territory of<br />

13,500 km 2 and population of 500,000 inhabitants).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 93<br />

on a cultural level. This accusation is ill-founded and I sense that “<strong>the</strong> finger of Germany is<br />

not unacquainted with this policy”. Even though, Mr. Čakste said, nobody doubts that<br />

Poland is pivotal for <strong>the</strong> situation in Eastern Europe and we understand that we need to get<br />

closer to this country in order to consolidate <strong>the</strong> defence line that is to be raised against<br />

Russia.<br />

“The situation in Russia, Mr. Čakste said, is characterized by <strong>the</strong> weakness of <strong>the</strong><br />

current Government, who poses, to its neighbours, less danger than any o<strong>the</strong>r, whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

Bolshevik, if this regime consolidates, or tsarist, if <strong>the</strong> old regime would be reinforced in<br />

<strong>the</strong> State.”<br />

Regardless of today’s situation, we have to think what would be like in a few years, when<br />

<strong>the</strong> party, <strong>the</strong> people or <strong>the</strong> man shall rise “to ga<strong>the</strong>r illiterate and patient Russian people<br />

under a dynamic command”. I say that <strong>the</strong> Soviet regime, as well as <strong>the</strong> Tsarist one, is a<br />

weak regime because it cannot carry on an offensive war.<br />

I am convinced – <strong>the</strong> President told me – that such war would bring along <strong>the</strong> fall of <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet regime. Like <strong>the</strong> case of <strong>the</strong> Tsarist army, <strong>the</strong> Soviet army may only suppress<br />

sporadic riots and command, through terror, armed masses of people that are only<br />

concerned with securing <strong>the</strong>ir own living, and as for <strong>the</strong> political concern, this is limited<br />

strictly to <strong>the</strong> interests of <strong>the</strong> commune (Mir), or at best to <strong>the</strong> province’s.<br />

But on <strong>the</strong> day when Russia will be governed by a dictator or tsar, <strong>the</strong> first concern of<br />

<strong>the</strong> new regime will be to increase its prestige through a war of conquest. That is why <strong>the</strong><br />

Border States that are threatened by a similar danger have to prepare for <strong>the</strong> day when<br />

Russia will be again submitted to a man or a group of men who want to conquest<br />

territories. If I examine <strong>the</strong> border that separates today <strong>the</strong> Border States from Soviet<br />

Russia, I would have to say that <strong>the</strong>se areas do not seem entirely solid and we have to<br />

prepare ourselves for <strong>the</strong> day when independence of our country will be threatened. I<br />

watch Romania’s policy concerning Russia with <strong>the</strong> liveliest interest, just like my fellow<br />

countrymen, continuously checking <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian issue, and we are<br />

perfectly aware that a war for <strong>the</strong> conquest of this province would be of high influence on<br />

our own situation.<br />

We watched closely <strong>the</strong> war carried out by <strong>the</strong> Georgians for <strong>the</strong>ir independence. We<br />

could not help <strong>the</strong>m as Caucasus is a region that is completely out of our reach. For<br />

Romania, this concern is more lively: we know little about your country and about its past,<br />

but we are aware of <strong>the</strong> force that it represents, of <strong>the</strong> continuity of its policy, which has<br />

<strong>the</strong> only purpose to consolidate peace.<br />

President Čakste fur<strong>the</strong>r asked about our alliance system that constitutes <strong>the</strong> Little<br />

Entente, about its purpose and its meaning. As <strong>the</strong> Balkan matters were unknown to him,<br />

he asked me to explain it. When I was in Paris –His Excellency said – to defend <strong>the</strong><br />

interests of my reborn country, we were always accused to be pursuing Balkanization of <strong>the</strong><br />

Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Europe; back <strong>the</strong>n, I did not understand this comparison, but since <strong>the</strong>n I came<br />

to apprehend its meaning. Upon Mr. Čakste’s demand, I explained <strong>the</strong> Romanian policy’s<br />

goals in <strong>the</strong> Balkans, policy that aims maintaining <strong>the</strong> peace and <strong>the</strong> political balance as set<br />

forth in treaties. The President heard my speech with great interest, all <strong>the</strong> more so as I<br />

took <strong>the</strong> permission of providing a short description of our country’s modern history,<br />

between <strong>the</strong> Paris Treaty (1856) and current time, linking <strong>the</strong> political development of our


94 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

country with our economic development, for whose full description I approached <strong>the</strong><br />

matter of Danube and of <strong>the</strong> Straits, showing that if our endeavours were sometimes<br />

successful, we owe this to always making European-wide politics, pursuing harmonization<br />

of our own interests with <strong>the</strong> interest of <strong>the</strong> Great Powers.<br />

Interested in my speech, President Čakste said:<br />

“I dedicate a lot of time to <strong>the</strong> study of history, but I need books on <strong>the</strong> history and life<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Romanian people.” Naturally, I hurried to tell <strong>the</strong> President that it will be my<br />

pleasure to offer him some books that could form <strong>the</strong> core of his information about<br />

Romania. I <strong>the</strong>refore took <strong>the</strong> liberty of asking Your Excellency to request that <strong>the</strong> Media<br />

and Propaganda Direction shall offer books that could prove of interest to Mr. Čakste and<br />

that I will be glad to offer <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> name of Your Excellency upon my next visit in Riga.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, vol. 8, s. 67-69.<br />

27. Sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1926. g. 19. aug. ziņojums ārlietu ministram K. Ulmanim<br />

Atļaujos Jūs informēt par to stāvokli, kādā atrodas iekustinātie jautājumi par tirdzniecības<br />

līgumiem ar Balkānu valstīm un par konsulāro pārstāvību tīkla izveidošanu šinīs zemēs.<br />

Sarunās ar sūtni Jakovaki pilnīgi apstiprinājās no jauna, ka Rumānijas viedoklis nav grozījies.<br />

Rumānija joprojām neslēdz tirdzniecības līgumus parastā kārtā, bet veido savas ekonomiskās<br />

attiecības ar citām valstīm vienīgi notu apmaiņas ceļā, pie kam abas puses garantē viena otrai<br />

vislielāko labvēlību. Šo pašu atbildi biju dabūjis jau agrāk Bukarestē. Esmu pārliecināts, ka<br />

tālākas sarunas šimbrīžam nav iespējamas, ja negribam apmierināties ar notu apmaiņu. Vēl<br />

vairāk, – ja sarunas notiktu ar sūtni Jakovaki Varšavā vai Rīgā, tad paredzu pat, ka grūtības<br />

rastos pie klauzulu ievietošanas notu tekstā. Jakovaki jau agrāk man izteicās, ka trūkst līdzsvara<br />

starp Rumānijas vislielāko labvēlību un Latvijas ierobežoto labvēlību. Jakovaki pēc dabas ir<br />

bailīgs, ietiepīgs un sīks; ar tādu sarunas neveiktos. Bukarestē, Dukas laikos, bija daudz vieglāk<br />

tikt pie rezultāta, jo ministrs pats mīlēja izlemt jautājumus ātri un noteikti. Tagad, sakarā ar<br />

kabineta maiņu, Bukarestē Ārlietu ministrijā ir nākuši jauni ļaudis, kurus tuvāk nepazīstu. Esmu<br />

pārliecināts, ka Rumānijas principiālais uzskats – neslēgt tirdzniecības līgumus parastā veidā,<br />

bet apmierināties, pagaidām, ar notu apmaiņu – paliek joprojām spēkā; to prasa nenokārtotais<br />

ekonomiskais stāvoklis valstī un iekšējo saimniecisko attiecību neskaidrība, kas cēlusies,<br />

pievienojot Rumānijai lielās provinces: Besarābiju, Bukovinu, Transilvāniju.<br />

Jakovaki aizbraucis atvaļinājumā; nesagaidu no viņa pēc atgriešanās citas atbildes.<br />

Rumānijas tirgus līdz šim interesējis mūsu gumijas un linoleuma rūpniecību. Šīm nozarēm<br />

tagad nebūs iespējams konkurēt ar citām valstīm, jo, kā dzirdu, tad, uz šī gada jūnija dekrēta<br />

pamata, pastāvošā muitas tarifa likmes tām valstīm, kuras nav nokārtojušas savas ekonomiskās<br />

attiecības ar Rumāniju ar notām, tiek dubultotas.<br />

Paceļas jautājums, vai mums ir no svara pieturēties tik neatlaidīgi pie uzskata, ka notu<br />

apmaiņas ceļā mēs savas ekonomiskās attiecības ar citām valstīm nekārtojam. Austrumu zemēs<br />

tāda neatlaidība novedīs pie tādiem ieilgumiem, pie kādiem neesam pieraduši. Zīmējoties uz<br />

Rumāniju, ir grūti paredzēt, kad viņa būs gatava slēgt tirdzniecības līgumu parastā kārtībā [..].<br />

LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 505. l., 3.–5. lp.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 95<br />

27. Report by Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Ulmanis,<br />

19 th August, 1926<br />

I take <strong>the</strong> liberty to inform you about <strong>the</strong> current status of <strong>the</strong> raised issues regarding trade<br />

agreements with <strong>the</strong> Balkan states and about <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong> network of consular<br />

representation in <strong>the</strong>se states.<br />

In discussions with Envoy Iacovaky it was reaffirmed that Romania’s position had not<br />

changed. Romania still does not conclude any trade agreements in <strong>the</strong> customary form, but<br />

instead develops its economic <strong>relations</strong> with o<strong>the</strong>r countries only by way of exchanging notes,<br />

both parties, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, guaranteeing each o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> most-favoured-nation treatment. I had<br />

received <strong>the</strong> same reply in Bucharest earlier. I am sure that fur<strong>the</strong>r negotiations are not possible<br />

at <strong>the</strong> moment, if we do not agree to make a shift with an exchange of notes. Even more – if<br />

negotiations took place through Envoy Iacovaky ei<strong>the</strong>r in Warsaw or in Riga, I expect<br />

difficulties to arise even with inserting clauses in <strong>the</strong> text of <strong>the</strong> notes. Iacovaky mentioned to<br />

me earlier that <strong>the</strong>re was a lack of balance between most-favoured-nation treatment from<br />

Romania’s side and limited favour Latvia’s side. Iacovaky is by nature timid, stubborn and petty;<br />

with such a man negotiations would not get on well. In Bucharest, in Duca’s time, it was much<br />

easier to achieve a result, because <strong>the</strong> Minister liked to make decisions himself quickly and<br />

firmly. Now, due to <strong>the</strong> change of Cabinet, new people whom I do not know have joined <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest. I am sure that Romania’s principal position – not to<br />

conclude trade agreements in <strong>the</strong> customary form but, for <strong>the</strong> time being, to make shift with an<br />

exchange of notes – is still in force; it is dictated by <strong>the</strong> unsettled economic situation in <strong>the</strong><br />

country and <strong>the</strong> uncertainty of <strong>the</strong> domestic economic <strong>relations</strong> that arouse when Romania<br />

annexed <strong>the</strong> large provinces: Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania.<br />

Iacovaky has left on a vacation; I do not expect a different answer from him when he comes<br />

back.<br />

So far Romania’s market has attracted our rubber and linoleum industries. Now <strong>the</strong>se<br />

branches will not be able to compete with [those of] o<strong>the</strong>r countries because, as I hear,<br />

pursuant to a decree of this June, <strong>the</strong> existing rate of customs tariff is doubled for those<br />

countries, which had not regularized <strong>the</strong>ir economic <strong>relations</strong> with Romania by way of notes.<br />

A question arises whe<strong>the</strong>r it is important for us to keep that consistently to <strong>the</strong> position that<br />

we do not settle our economic <strong>relations</strong> with o<strong>the</strong>r countries by way of exchanging notes. In<br />

oriental countries such persistence will lead to delays that we are not accustomed to. As<br />

concerns Romania, it is difficult to predict, when it will be ready to conclude a trade agreement<br />

in <strong>the</strong> customary form […]<br />

SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 505, s. 3–5.<br />

28. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1927. g. 9. maija ziņojums ārlietu ministram F.<br />

Cielēnam 1<br />

Saņēmu Jūsu telegrammu, kurā Jūs piekrītat 5 dienu komandējumam uz Rumānijas valsts<br />

svētkiem. Tik īsā laikā šis brauciens nav izdarāms. Tiešas satiksmes vilcieni starp Varšavu un<br />

Bukaresti neiet ik dienas. Jau aiz tā tehniskā iemesla man būtu vajadzīgas vismaz 9 dienas. Bet<br />

patiesībā ar tām vēl nepietiek. Neesmu pēdējos divi gados, darba apstākļu dēļ, bijis Rumānijā.<br />

1<br />

Fēlikss Cielēns (1888–1964), Latvijas kreisais politiķis, valstsvīrs, diplomāts. 1923. g. bijis ārlietu ministra biedrs,<br />

1926.–1928. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1933.–1934. g. sūtnis Francijā, Spānijā un Portugālē ar sēdekli Parīzē. Miris Zviedrijā.


96 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Tagad es būtu spiests palikt tur vismaz pāris nedēļas, ņemot vērā īpatnējos vietējos apstākļus,<br />

galma formālismu un gausību. Beidzot atradu par labāku uz Bukaresti nebraukt, jo dabūju<br />

zināt, ka ārlietu ministram Mitilineu jābūt jau 12. maijā Čehoslovākijā uz Mazās Antantes<br />

konferenci. Tādā gadījumā man nebūtu bijis iespējams runāt ar viņu par tirdzniecības līgumu.<br />

LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 573. l., 137. lp.<br />

28. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs F.<br />

Cielēns 1 , 9 th May, 1927<br />

I received your telegram whereby you approve a 5-day official trip to Romania’s National<br />

Day celebrations. This trip cannot be made in such a short time. It is not every day that <strong>the</strong>re<br />

are direct trains between Warsaw and Bucharest. For this reason alone I would need at least 9<br />

days. But in fact that, too, would be insufficient. I have not been to Romania in <strong>the</strong> last two<br />

years, due to work. Now I would have to stay <strong>the</strong>re at least a couple of weeks, considering <strong>the</strong><br />

specific local conditions, <strong>the</strong> formalism and slowness of <strong>the</strong> court. Finally I came to <strong>the</strong><br />

conclusion that it would be better not to go to Bucharest because I heard that already on 12 th<br />

May Minister of Foreign Affairs Mitilineu had to be in Czechoslovakia to attend <strong>the</strong> conference<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Little Entente. In such case I would not have had <strong>the</strong> chance to talk to him about <strong>the</strong><br />

trade agreement.<br />

SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 573, s. 137.<br />

29. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1928. g. 11. jūn. ziņojums ārlietu ministram A.<br />

Balodim 2<br />

Bukarestē uzstādīju jautājumu, kad tiks iecelts Rumānijas sūtnis Latvijā. Ministrs Duka man<br />

atbildēja, ka viņš tikai atvieto savu kolēģi Titulesku un tādēļ jautājuma izšķiršanu atstāj<br />

ministram pašam. Duka domā, ka Titulesku varēšot atgriezties Bukarestē ap jūnija vidu. Pēc<br />

tam jautājums par sūtņa iecelšanu Rīgā tikšot visā drīzumā nokārtots. Kandidāti šinī sarunā<br />

netika minēti; no citas puses dabūju zināt, ka to esot vairāk un tādēļ grūtāk esot noteikt, uz<br />

kuru kritīs izvēle. Starp citiem turpina minēt Grigorkea. To pabalsta sūtnis Varšavā Davila, kurš<br />

pats savu tagadējo posteni dabūjis, pateicoties Titulesku labvēlībai. Tā Grigorkea, kuru jau reiz<br />

minēju kā kandidātu, ir zināmas izredzes tikt uz Rīgu.<br />

LVVA, 2570. f., 1. apr., 209. l., 25. lp.<br />

29. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs A.<br />

Balodis 3 , 11 th June, 1928<br />

In Bucharest I asked when an Envoy of Romania to Latvia would be appointed. Minister<br />

Duca replied to me that he was only replacing his colleague Titulescu and for that reason would<br />

leave <strong>the</strong> making of <strong>the</strong> decision to <strong>the</strong> Minister himself. Duca thinks that Titulescu will be able<br />

1<br />

Fēlikss Cielēns (1888–1964), left-wing Latvian politician, statesman, diplomat. 1923 deputy Minister of Foreign<br />

Affairs, 1926–1928 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1933–1934 Envoy to France, Spain and Portugal with seat in Paris.<br />

Died in Sweden.<br />

2<br />

Antons Balodis (1880–1942), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1920.–1924. g. Ārlietu ministrijas Baltijas valstu nodaļas<br />

vadītājs, no 1924. g. sūtnis Lietuvā, 1928.–1930. g. ārlietu ministrs, 1930.–1933. g. sūtnis Somijā. Gājis bojā padomju<br />

ieslodzījumā.<br />

3<br />

Antons Balodis (1880–1942), Latvian diplomat, statesman. 1920–1924 Head of <strong>the</strong> Baltic States Department of <strong>the</strong><br />

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 1924 Envoy to Lithuania, 1928–1930 Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1930–1933 Envoy<br />

to Finland. Perished in Soviet imprisonment.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 97<br />

to return to Bucharest around mid-June. After that <strong>the</strong> issue of appointing an Envoy in Riga will<br />

be settled soon. Candidates were not mentioned in this discussion; from a different source I<br />

learned that <strong>the</strong>re were several of <strong>the</strong>m and thus it was difficult to know who would be chosen.<br />

Grigorcea is still mentioned among <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs. He is supported by Envoy in Warsaw Davila who<br />

had got his present position thanks to Titulescu’s benevolence. Thus Grigorcea, whom I once<br />

already mentioned as a candidate, has a certain chance to get to Riga.<br />

SHAL, f. 2570, d. 1, file 209, s. 25.<br />

30. Telegrama lui Gheorghe Filality de la Ministerul Afacerilor Străine al României<br />

nr. 11528 către Legația României la Riga, 22 februarie 1929<br />

Fiind informați că numeroși basarabeni neștiutori [ai] limbii noastre și plecați din țară de<br />

mult timp încearcă a se reîntoarce în țară prezentând pașapoarte române de emigrare sau tot<br />

felul de certificate sau recomandări oficiale (?) de la prietenii din România, dintre care unele<br />

false emanând [de la] funcționari, parlamentari sau persoane influente din Basarabia, binevoiți<br />

vă rog a nu le acorda [în] niciun caz pașapoarte sau acte de călătorie dacă aveți cea mai mică<br />

bănuială că ar fi suspecte. Vă rog să transmiteți aceste instrucțiuni consulatelor dependente.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 45<br />

30. Telegram by Gheorghe Filality of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania no.<br />

11528 to <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga, 22 nd February 1929<br />

Being informed that numerous Bessarabians who do not speak our language and who<br />

left <strong>the</strong> country a long time ago, are trying to come back, making use of Romanian<br />

emigration passports or all sorts of certificates or official petitions from Romanian friends<br />

such as officials, members of <strong>the</strong> Parliament or influential persons from Bessarabia, some of<br />

which are false, I kindly ask you not to grant <strong>the</strong>m by any means passports or travel<br />

<strong>documents</strong>, if you have <strong>the</strong> slightest suspicion that <strong>the</strong>y are doubtful.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 45.<br />

31. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā M. Nukšas 1929. g. 2. marta ziņojums ārlietu ministram A.<br />

Balodim<br />

Rumānijas ārlietu ministrs Mironesku viesojās Varšavā 25. un 26. februārī. Kā parasts tādos<br />

gadījumos, viņa atbraukšana un uzturēšanās Polijā bija savienota ar daudzām svinībām,<br />

mielastiem, rautiem un runām, kuras tomēr maz apgaismoja vizītes nolūkus un nozīmi.<br />

Pirmā kārtā šo vizīti jāuzskata kā draudzības aktu no Rumānijas puses savai sabiedrotai<br />

Polijai; tai vajadzēja rādīt, ka abu valstu attiecībās nekas nav mainījies [..].<br />

Nevar gan apgalvot, ka politiskā konstelācija austrumos būtu palikusi tāda pati, kāda viņa<br />

bija tolaik, kad Polijas–Rumānijas sabiedrība radās. Toreiz abas valstis raudzījās ar neuzticību<br />

uz PSRS un baidījās no tās. Rumānija šo uzskatu nav mainījusi; citādi tas Polijā. Polija no PSRS<br />

vairs nebaidās; vēl vairāk, viņas ārējo attiecību vārīgākais punkts meklējams tagad vakaros. Uz<br />

turieni, galvenā kārtā, vērsta Polijas nacionālā enerģija un šinī virzienā Rumānija Polijai var dot<br />

ļoti maz. Bez tam, Polija vispārīgi nestāda ļoti augstu Rumāniju, kā sabiedroto, militārā ziņā.<br />

Polijai pat nebūtu nekas pretim uzlabot savas attiecības ar PSRS un izkopt tās, sevišķi<br />

saimnieciskā nozarē. Te sabiedrība ar Rumāniju viņai drīzāk ir par traucējumu [..].<br />

LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 688. l., 19.–20. lp.


98 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

31. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw M. Nukša to Minister of Foreign Affairs A.<br />

Balodis, 2 nd March, 1929<br />

Romania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mironescu visited Warsaw on 25 th and 26 th February.<br />

As is usual on such occasions, his arrival and stay in Poland were accompanied with many<br />

celebrations, feasts, routs [receptions] and speeches, which however shed little light on <strong>the</strong><br />

goals and importance of <strong>the</strong> visit.<br />

This visit should be regarded first and foremost as an act of friendship from <strong>the</strong> part of<br />

Romania towards its ally Poland; it was supposed to signalize that nothing had changed in <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>relations</strong> between <strong>the</strong> two countries [...]<br />

One however cannot assure that <strong>the</strong> political constellation in <strong>the</strong> East has stayed <strong>the</strong> way it<br />

was when Poland–Romania alliance was born. Then both countries regarded <strong>the</strong> USSR with<br />

distrust and were afraid of it. Romania has not changed its position in this regard; but <strong>the</strong><br />

situation in Poland is different. Poland is no longer afraid of <strong>the</strong> USSR; even more so, now <strong>the</strong><br />

tender spot of its external <strong>relations</strong> is in <strong>the</strong> West. It is this direction that Poland’s national<br />

energy is oriented in <strong>the</strong> first instance and in this regard Romania can give Poland very little.<br />

Besides, Poland does not value Romania very high in general, in <strong>the</strong> military sense as an ally.<br />

Poland would not even mind to improve its <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> USSR and to cultivate <strong>the</strong>m,<br />

especially in <strong>the</strong> field of economy. In this regard its alliance with Romania is ra<strong>the</strong>r an obstacle<br />

on its path [...]<br />

SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 688, s. 19–20.<br />

32. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza 1 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu 2 , iunie<br />

1929<br />

Unele evenimente petrecute în ajunul sau după sosirea mea în Riga – atentatul din Kowno 3 ,<br />

schimbul vizitelor baltice – au animat opinia și presa acestei capitale punând personalitățile<br />

politice, cu care am avut ocazia să mă întrețin, într-o stare mai comunicativă decât cea<br />

obișnuită; ele mi-au dat de asemenea prilejul unor conversații interesante cu colegii mei dintre<br />

care cei mai mulți, acreditați și în una sau două din țările vecine, au putut completa în Kowno și<br />

Reval informațiile și impresiile lor.<br />

Atentatul împotriva domnului Voldemaras 4 a pus încă o dată în mod cu totul indirect, dar<br />

dramatic, în evidență ireductibilitatea conflictului dintre Polonia și Lituania, iar seria de vizite<br />

între Riga, Reval și capitalele nord-baltice ar putea indica noua îndrumare ce Estonia și Letonia,<br />

definitiv descurajate de acest conflict, înțeleg să o dea politicii lor în căutarea unei completări<br />

morale dacă nu formale a alianței ce le leagă.<br />

1<br />

Mihail R. Sturdza (1886-1980) a fost un om politic cu vederi de extremă dreapta și diplomat român. A intrat în<br />

diplomație în 1913 și a îndeplinit misiuni <strong>diplomatic</strong>e la Durazzo, Berna, Budapesta, Viena, Washington, Riga,<br />

Helsinki și Copenhaga. Însărcinat cu afaceri și apoi Ministru al României în Letonia și Estonia (1929-1932, 1932-<br />

1935), Ministru al României la Copenhaga (1938-1939), Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1940).<br />

2<br />

Gheorghe G. Mironescu (1874-1949) a fost un politician român, membru al Partidului Conservator-Democrat și al<br />

Partidului Național-Țărănesc. Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri (1930, 1930-1931), Ministru al Afacerilor Străine<br />

(1928-1930, 1930-1931, 1932).<br />

3<br />

Denumirea lituaniană a localității este Kaunas (apare și sub forma de Kovno).<br />

4<br />

Încercarea de asasinat a avut loc la 6 mai 1929.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 99<br />

Nu rămâne cea mai mică îndoială că Acordul Politic din Varșovia din 17 martie 1922 între<br />

Polonia, Finlanda, Estonia și Letonia, care prin art. 6 al său conținea germenii unei atât de<br />

puternice grupări politice și militare, nu era, în spiritul guvernelor din Riga, Reval și Helsingfors,<br />

destinat să fie pus în vigoare decât în ziua când, potolindu-se învrăjbirile dezlănțuite odată cu<br />

legiunile lui Želigovskį, Lituania s-ar fi decis să adere și ea pactului de apărare al celor patru<br />

republici. Oameni de stat letoni și estonieni au judecat cu drept cuvânt că perfectarea unei<br />

asemenea alianțe în orișice alte împrejurări decât cele implicând maximul posibil de eficacitate<br />

și prestigiu ar fi fost mai mult vătămătoare decât folositoare siguranței lor, o imprudentă<br />

provocare față de Rusia sovietică, fără de nicio reală garanție față de reacția posibilă a ei.<br />

Tratatul Skirmunt 1 , de altfel dezavuat în urmă de Finlanda, a rămas de aceea neratificat de Riga<br />

și Reval, care în așteptarea unor posibilități de realizări mai largi au înjghebat alianța militară<br />

din 1 noiembrie 1923 redusă geografic, dar tehnic completă.<br />

Domnul Balodis, care a fost lung timp Ministru al Letoniei în Kowno, mi-a istorisit<br />

zadarnicele sale sforțări pentru a reduce resentimentul lituanian până la posibilitatea unei<br />

reconcilieri cât de teoretică cu Polonia, reconciliere ce ar fi lăsat deschisă calea unei grupări de<br />

forțe, pe care cred că atât Dl Balodis cât și elementele politice cele mai numeroase în Letonia și<br />

Estonia o considerau în mod foarte sincer ca soluția optimă a problemei veșnic deschise a<br />

menținerii independenței naționale a micilor republici vecine.<br />

S-ar părea că astăzi aceleași elemente au renunțat la această soluție și că printr-un<br />

reviriment, probabil numai momentan, ce nu a mirat pe cei ce cunosc pretențiile de<br />

scandinavism crescând în Țările Baltice de la sud spre nord, Estonia și Letonia se întreabă dacă<br />

nu le-ar fi posibilă retragerea de pe un câmp politic atât de puțin atrăgător, retragere pe care<br />

Finlanda a efectuat-o, probabil, când în 1922 a dezavuat atât de repede pe Dl. Holsti 2 , ministrul<br />

său al Afacerilor Străine.<br />

Schimbul de vizite între capii de stat și oamenii politici ai țărilor baltice ar fi astfel<br />

preliminariile unei noi orientări a politicii Estoniei și Letoniei, în cadrul bineînțeles al<br />

principalului lor interes comun, cel al menținerii independenței lor naționale.<br />

În asemenea împrejurări o întrebare firească este cred următoarea. O dată exclusă<br />

posibilitatea unei alianțe baltice integrale, adică una din care Polonia și Lituania ar face<br />

împreună parte (alianța optimă pentru noi și prietenii noștri deoarece prin trăsătura de uniune<br />

polonă s-ar completa rețeaua neîntreruptă de legături militare și politice împotriva estului de la<br />

Baltica la Marea Neagră), nu este soluția actuală a unei alianțe militare formale, redusă [la]<br />

Letonia și Estonia, dar menținută prin forța lucrurilor în câmpul de gravitație politică a<br />

Poloniei, cea mai avantajoasă pentru noi? Cu alte cuvine cum trebuie să considerăm extinderea<br />

acestei alianțe până la Finlanda și eventual, într-un mod teoretic, chiar cu Suedia?<br />

Întrebarea nu este zadarnică și las Domnului Balodis cuvântul pentru a ne spune dacă ideea<br />

unei apropieri balto-scandinave ocupă astăzi un colț al imaginației unora din oamenii de stat ai<br />

acestor țări.<br />

1<br />

Constantin Skirmunt (1866–1949) a fost un politician și diplomat polonez, membru al Comitetului Național<br />

Polonez de la Paris (1917-1918), Ministru în Italia (1919-1921), Ministru al Afacerilor Externe (1921-1922) și Ministru<br />

în Marea Britanie (1919-1934).<br />

2<br />

Eino Rudolf Woldemar Holsti (1881-1945) a fost un om politic, jurnalist, diplomat și profesor finlandez. Membru<br />

al Partidului Național-Progresist. Ministru al Afacerilor Externe al Finlandei (1919-1922 și 1936-1938), delegat al<br />

Finlandei la Societatea Națiunilor. Profesor la Stanford University.


100 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

„Relațiile între Finlanda și Letonia erau în ultimii ani atât de răcite că o reapropiere apărea<br />

extrem de importantă. Ținând cont că relațiile dintre cele două state în primii ani ai<br />

independenței lor erau excepțional de calde și animate, aveam ferma speranță că voi reuși să<br />

aduc și astăzi între ele o apropiere amicală și vie... În discursurile mele am exprimat în principal<br />

gândul unei conlucrări necesare între statele Ost 1 -baltice. Și dacă [este] posibil trebuie atrasă în<br />

această strânsă grupare prietenească și Scandinavia (so sollte auch Skandinavien in diesen<br />

engen Freundschaftsbund mit hineingezogen werden)....<br />

Înainte de toate am fost de acord cu colegul meu finlandez că datoria principală a Finlandei<br />

și a Letoniei era necesitatea de a menține și întări independența lor... O altă îndatorire a politicii<br />

noastre externe este de întări mai departe legăturile și cu celelalte state nordice, în special cu<br />

Suedia... Trebuie să spun că în această călătorie în Finlanda am ajuns la convingerea că putem<br />

aștepta cu siguranță o nouă dezvoltare a legăturilor prietenești între Finlanda și Letonia...”<br />

Colegul meu [neclar] direct interesate consideră cu drept cuvânt că o politică externă<br />

letono-estoniană bazată pe aspirațiile platonice exprimate de Dl. Balodis la Helsingfors sau de<br />

Dl Zemgals 2 la Stockholm ar fi prea fantezistă ca asemenea eventualitate să fie luată serios în<br />

considerație de către noi. Nimeni nu își poate închipui că cele două republici baltice ar căuta în<br />

Suedia și chiar în Finlanda un echivalent pentru garanția ce la un moment dat le-o poate oferi<br />

Polonia sau că aceste două din urmă țări ar fi gata să dea această garanție.<br />

Totuși, după cum convenea atașatul militar al unei alte țări aliate, privită sub un alt unghi o<br />

asemenea acțiune din partea Letoniei și Estoniei ar putea părea mai puțin absurdă. Ea ar putea<br />

să privească nu atât o înțelegere relativă la o rezistență comună împotriva unui atac dinspre est<br />

pe cât căutarea unor noi legături cu caracter mult mai puțin provocator care să pună și pe cele<br />

două mici republici în afară de axa probabilă a unui asemenea atac, situație de care beneficiază<br />

astăzi și Suedia și foarte probabil și Finlanda. Nicio îndoială nu pare într-adevăr a exista aici că<br />

în situația actuală Letonia și Estonia ar participa fără ezitare la respingerea unui atac bolșevic<br />

chiar dacă el ar fi la început îndreptat numai împotriva Poloniei. În ceea ce privește Finlanda<br />

însă, atașatul militar în chestiune (care este considerat aici persoana cea mai bine informată în<br />

chestiunile politice și militare ale Balticii și a cărui sferă de competență se întinde de la Kowno<br />

la Helsingfors) îmi afirma convingerea sa că Finlanda nu se va solidariza cu vecinele sale de la<br />

sud decât în cazul când va fi ea însăși victima unei agresiuni moscovite si că o asemenea<br />

agresiune îi pare din punct de vedere politic improbabilă, iar din punct de vedere militar<br />

geografic imposibilă. O înțelegere între cele trei state baltice în chestiune, înțelegere ce ar<br />

cuprinde și eventualitatea unei acțiuni militare sovietice, nu ar fi realizabilă decât dacă ar avea<br />

ca bază un angajament de dezinteresare în cazul unui conflict polono-rus, angajament ce<br />

Letonia și Estonia nu l-ar putea lua decât ispitite de o garanție de altă valoare decât cea pe care<br />

le-o poate da Suedia.<br />

Expunând cele ce preced Excelenței Voastre cu restricțiile la care sunt încă îndreptățit de<br />

prea scurta mea ședere aici aș greși dacă aș da impresia că în cercurile prietene nouă, cu care m-<br />

am întreținut de la sosirea mea în Riga, ar exista vreo îngrijorare privitoare la semnificația<br />

conversațiilor și vizitelor ai căror martori suntem astăzi în Baltica. Impresia în aceste cercuri<br />

1<br />

Est-baltice, de la cuvântul german Ost, est.<br />

2<br />

Gustavs Zemgals (1871-1939) a fost om de stat și jurnalist leton, al doilea șef de stat al Letoniei. A fost implicat în<br />

lupta pentru obținerea independenței (vicepreședinte al Tautas Padome) și a deținut mai multe funcții<br />

guvernamentale și în administrația locală.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 101<br />

este dimpotrivă mai mult una de optimism și de încredere că atât în Letonia cât și în Estonia<br />

cercurile competente civile și militare realizează complet solidaritatea intereselor țărilor<br />

amenințate de primejdia rusească. Totuși sunt indicii că, în cadrul acestor [neclar], unele<br />

grupuri descurajate de nesfârșitul conflict polono-lituanian caută să asigure țărilor lor noi soluții<br />

eventuale problemelor ce le sunt particulare. Convingerea rămâne însă că în împrejurările grave<br />

la care este natural să ne gândim bunul simț va triumfa asupra unor tendințe de caracter mai<br />

mult speculativ și fără sau aproape fără nicio contraparte materială. Îmi permit a adăuga că<br />

posibilitatea de a completa sau controla eu însumi în Reval impresiile mele sau opiniile<br />

interlocutorilor mei mi-ar fi în asemenea împrejurare foarte folositoare.<br />

În ceea ce privește probabilitatea sau proximitatea acestor împrejurări grave, cuvintele<br />

colegului meu american 1 (un veteran al terenului politic baltic, decanul corpului <strong>diplomatic</strong> aici<br />

și în cele două țări vecine, cu un personal de treizeci de persoane sub ordinele sale) rezumă,<br />

cred, opinia generală răspândită: „două lucruri sunt tot atât de sigure: întâi că niciodată<br />

Sovietele nu au fost mai îndepărtate decât astăzi de posibilitatea militară și economică de a<br />

ataca, al doilea că vor ataca odată vecinii lor vestici determinați sau de dezvoltarea până la<br />

explozie a stărilor lor economice sau dimpotrivă ca ultimă carte înainte de sinucidere, de<br />

dărâmarea completă a acestor stări. În acest ultim caz, adaugă atașatul militar, la care mă<br />

refeream mai sus, atacul va fi foarte probabil dirijat înspre micile puteri baltice în căutarea unui<br />

succes ușor, succes de care Sovietele ar avea imediat nevoie din punct de vedere intern.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 102-<br />

106.<br />

32. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza 2 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu 3 , June 1929<br />

Some of <strong>the</strong> events that happened in <strong>the</strong> eve or after my arrival in Riga – such as <strong>the</strong><br />

Kowno attempt 4 , <strong>the</strong> Baltic visits exchange, have animated <strong>the</strong> public and <strong>the</strong> media of this<br />

capital, making <strong>the</strong> political figures with whom I had <strong>the</strong> chance to deal more<br />

communicative than usually; <strong>the</strong>y also gave me <strong>the</strong> privilege to have interesting<br />

conversations with my colleagues, and as most of <strong>the</strong>m were accredited in one or two<br />

neighboring countries <strong>the</strong>y could complete <strong>the</strong>ir information and impressions in Kowno<br />

and Reval.<br />

The attempt on Mr. Voldemaras 5 has once again stressed, in a totally indirect, yet<br />

dramatic manner, <strong>the</strong> irreducibility of <strong>the</strong> conflict between Poland and Lithuania, while <strong>the</strong><br />

series of visits between Riga, Reval and <strong>the</strong> North-Baltic capitals could indicate <strong>the</strong> new<br />

direction that Estonia and Latvia, hopelessly discouraged by this conflict, want to give to<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir policy, in <strong>the</strong> search of a moral, if not formal, completion of <strong>the</strong>ir alliance.<br />

1<br />

Frederick W.B. Coleman (1874-1947) a fost ministru al S.U.A. în Letonia în perioada 1922-1932.<br />

2<br />

Mihail R. Sturdza (1886-1980) was a Romanian politician with right-wing views and diplomat. He entered in<br />

diplomacy in 1913 and accomplished <strong>diplomatic</strong> missions in Durazzo, Bern, Budapest, Vienna, Washington, Riga,<br />

Helsinki and Copenhagen. Chargé d'Affaires and <strong>the</strong>n Minister of Romania in Latvia and Estonia (1929-1932, 1932-<br />

1935), Minister of Romania in Copenhagen (1938-1939), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1940).<br />

3<br />

Gheorghe G. Mironescu (1874-1949) was a Romanian politician, member of <strong>the</strong> Democratic Conservative and <strong>the</strong><br />

National Peasant parties. Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers (1930, 1930-1931), Minister for Foreign Affairs (1928-<br />

1930, 1930-1931, 1932).<br />

4<br />

Or Kovno. The Lithuanian name of <strong>the</strong> locality is Kaunas.<br />

5<br />

May 6 th , 1929


102 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

We do not have <strong>the</strong> slightest doubt that <strong>the</strong> Political Agreement of Warsaw of March<br />

17 th , 1922 between Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, which, according to its 6 th article,<br />

contained <strong>the</strong> germs of such a powerful political and military group, was not, in <strong>the</strong> spirit<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Riga, Reval and Helsingfors governments, to be put into effect until <strong>the</strong> day when,<br />

<strong>the</strong> quarrels unleashed along with Želigovskį’s legion having been tempered, Lithuania<br />

would have decided to adhere to <strong>the</strong> defense pact of <strong>the</strong> four republics. Latvian and<br />

Estonian statesmen rightfully judged that <strong>the</strong> perfection of such an alliance in any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

circumstances, except for those involving <strong>the</strong> maximum possible efficiency and prestige,<br />

would have been ra<strong>the</strong>r troublesome than useful to <strong>the</strong>ir safety, an imprudent provocation<br />

to Soviet Russia, with no real guarantee against its reaction. The Treaty of Skirmunt 1 ,<br />

o<strong>the</strong>rwise disavowed by Finland, has consequently remained unapproved by Riga and Reval<br />

which, while leaving <strong>the</strong> possibilities of larger achievements open, had built up <strong>the</strong><br />

geographically reduced but technically complete military alliance of November 1 st 1929.<br />

Mr. Balodis, who has been <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Kowno for a long time, recounted<br />

me his futile efforts of reducing <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian resentfulness up to <strong>the</strong> possibility of a<br />

<strong>the</strong>oretical reconciliation with Poland, a reconciliation that would have left open <strong>the</strong> way<br />

to a group of forces, which I think that Mr. Balodis, as well as most numerous political<br />

elements from Latvia and Estonia, honestly considered as being <strong>the</strong> optimal solution of <strong>the</strong><br />

everlasting problem of maintaining <strong>the</strong> national independence of <strong>the</strong> small border<br />

republics.<br />

Today, it seems that <strong>the</strong> same elements have given up this solution and that through a<br />

temporary recommencement, which did not surprise those who were aware of <strong>the</strong><br />

increasing Scandinavianist claims of <strong>the</strong> Baltic states from South to North, Estonia and<br />

Latvia wonder whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y could retreat from such an unattractive political field, a retreat<br />

that Finland probably achieved in 1922 when <strong>the</strong>y promptly disavowed Mr. Holsti 2 , <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

Minister of Foreign Affairs.<br />

The visit exchange between <strong>the</strong> heads of state and <strong>the</strong> politicians from <strong>the</strong> Baltic<br />

countries would thus constitute <strong>the</strong> preliminaries of a new political orientation of Estonia<br />

and Latvia, within, of course, <strong>the</strong>ir main common interest, that of maintaining <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

national independence.<br />

In such circumstances, I believe that a fair question would be <strong>the</strong> one that follows. Once<br />

<strong>the</strong> possibility of a general Baltic alliance, in which Poland and Lithuania would take part<br />

toge<strong>the</strong>r, is excluded (<strong>the</strong> optimal alliance for us and for our friends since, through <strong>the</strong><br />

feature of Polish union, <strong>the</strong> network of military and political links against <strong>the</strong> East from <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic Sea to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea would be complete), isn’t <strong>the</strong> actual solution of a formal military<br />

alliance, reduced to Latvia and Estonia, however inevitably maintained under <strong>the</strong> political<br />

influence of Poland, <strong>the</strong> most convenient for us? In o<strong>the</strong>r words, how should we consider<br />

<strong>the</strong> expansion of this alliance up to Finland and, <strong>the</strong>oretically, even up to Sweden?<br />

1<br />

Constantin Skirmunt (1866–1949) was a Polish politician and diplomat, member of <strong>the</strong> Polish National<br />

Committee in Paris (1917-1918), Minister in Italy (1919-1921), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1921-1922) and Minister in<br />

<strong>the</strong> United Kingdom (1919-1934).<br />

2<br />

Eino Rudolf Woldemar Holsti (1881-1945) was a Finnish politician, journalist, diplomat and professor. Member of<br />

<strong>the</strong> National Progressive Party. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland (1919-1922 and 1936-1938), Finland’s delegate<br />

to <strong>the</strong> League of Nations. Professor at Stanford University.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 103<br />

The question is not useless, and I give <strong>the</strong> floor to Mr. Balodis, in order for him to tell us<br />

if <strong>the</strong> idea of a Baltic-Scandinavian contiguity finds a place in <strong>the</strong> imagination of some of<br />

<strong>the</strong> statesmen of those countries.<br />

“The <strong>relations</strong> between Finland and Latvia were freezing in <strong>the</strong> last years, so that a new<br />

approach seemed to be extremely important. Bearing in mind that <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> between<br />

<strong>the</strong> two states in <strong>the</strong> first years of <strong>the</strong>ir independence were exceptionally friendly and<br />

animated, I cherish <strong>the</strong> steady hope that I will succeed in establishing a friendly, vivid<br />

approach between <strong>the</strong>m even <strong>the</strong>se days…. In my speeches, I mainly expressed <strong>the</strong> thought<br />

of a necessary cooperation among <strong>the</strong> Ost 1 -Baltic states. And, if possible, Scandinavia<br />

should be attracted in this tight group (Scandinavia should also be involved in this close<br />

friendship alliance).<br />

First of all I agreed with my Finnish colleague that <strong>the</strong> main duty of Finland and Latvia<br />

was <strong>the</strong> necessity to maintain and consolidate <strong>the</strong>ir independence… Ano<strong>the</strong>r duty of our<br />

policy is to fur<strong>the</strong>r streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Nordic countries, especially with<br />

Sweden… I must say that during this journey to Finland, I came to <strong>the</strong> conclusion that we<br />

can certainly expect a new development of <strong>the</strong> friendly ties between Finland and Latvia…”<br />

My colleague [unclear] directly concerned rightfully believes that a Latvian – Estonian<br />

foreign policy based on <strong>the</strong> platonic aspirations expressed by Mr. Balodis at Helsingfors or<br />

by Mr. Zemgals 2 at Stockholm would be too fanciful to be taken into consideration by us.<br />

Nobody can imagine that <strong>the</strong> two Baltic republics would seek in Sweden and even in<br />

Finland an equivalent for <strong>the</strong> assurance that Poland could give <strong>the</strong>m at some point, or that<br />

<strong>the</strong> latter ones would be ready to offer this assurance.<br />

However, as <strong>the</strong> military attaché of an allied country agreed, regarded from a different<br />

viewpoint, such an action may seem absurd. It could concern not an agreement regarding a<br />

common resistance against an attack from <strong>the</strong> East, but <strong>the</strong> search of new <strong>relations</strong> with a<br />

far less challenging feature, which would set <strong>the</strong> two small republics outside <strong>the</strong> probable<br />

axis of such an attack, a position enjoyed <strong>the</strong>se days by Sweden and most likely even by<br />

Finland. There seems to be no doubt here that in <strong>the</strong> given situation, Latvia and Estonia<br />

would participate without hesitation to <strong>the</strong> driving back of a Bolshevik attack even if it<br />

would only aim at Poland, at first. As for Finland, however, <strong>the</strong> military attaché in question<br />

(who is considered to be, in this case, <strong>the</strong> most well informed person in what concerns <strong>the</strong><br />

political and military issues of <strong>the</strong> Baltic zone and whose area of competence extends from<br />

Kowno to Helsingfors) told me about his conviction that Finland would not sympathize<br />

with its Sou<strong>the</strong>rn neighbors unless it would be itself <strong>the</strong> victim of a Russian aggression, and<br />

that such an aggression seems to be politically improbable and impossible from a militarygeographical<br />

viewpoint. An agreement between <strong>the</strong> three Baltic states in question,<br />

agreement that would include <strong>the</strong> likeliness of a Soviet military action, would not be<br />

achievable unless it was based on a commitment of neutrality in <strong>the</strong> case of a Polish –<br />

Russian conflict, commitment that <strong>the</strong>y would only agree upon if <strong>the</strong>y were tempted by a<br />

guarantee of a different value than <strong>the</strong> one that can be offered by Sweden.<br />

1<br />

East Baltic, from <strong>the</strong> German term Ost, East<br />

2<br />

Gustavs Zemgals (1871-1939) was a Latvia statesman and journalist, <strong>the</strong> second President of Latvia. He was<br />

involved in <strong>the</strong> struggle for independence (Vice-President of Tautas Padome) and held several positions in<br />

government and local administration.


104 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

By relating <strong>the</strong> foregoing to Your Excellency with <strong>the</strong> restrictions to which I am entitled<br />

by my too short stay here, it would be wrong to give <strong>the</strong> impression that in our friendly<br />

circles, in which I have stayed since my arrival in Riga, <strong>the</strong>re are worries concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

meaning of <strong>the</strong> conversations and visits whose witnesses we are today in <strong>the</strong> Baltic region.<br />

The general impression in those circles is actually one of optimism and trust that in Latvia,<br />

as well as in Estonia, <strong>the</strong> competent civil and military circles are fully aware of <strong>the</strong><br />

solidarity of <strong>the</strong> interests that <strong>the</strong> countries threatened by Russia menace. However, <strong>the</strong>re<br />

is evidence showing that, under <strong>the</strong>se [unclear], some groups that are discouraged by <strong>the</strong><br />

never-ending Polish – Lithuanian conflict are searching for new potential solutions to<br />

peculiar problems for <strong>the</strong>ir countries. My belief remains, never<strong>the</strong>less, that in <strong>the</strong>se serious<br />

circumstances, which it is natural to contemplate, <strong>the</strong> common sense will triumph against<br />

certain tendencies that are ra<strong>the</strong>r speculative, without having any or much material<br />

substance. I dare adding that <strong>the</strong> possibility of completing or controlling myself, in Reval,<br />

my impressions or <strong>the</strong> opinions of my interlocutors, would be, in such circumstances, very<br />

useful.<br />

In what concerns <strong>the</strong> possibility or likeliness of those severe circumstances, <strong>the</strong> words of<br />

my American colleague 1 (a veteran of <strong>the</strong> Baltic political field, <strong>the</strong> dean of <strong>the</strong> Diplomatic<br />

Corps here and in <strong>the</strong> two neighboring countries, with a staff of over thirty subordinates)<br />

summarize, in my opinion, <strong>the</strong> general widespread belief: “two things are certain; first,<br />

never have <strong>the</strong> Soviets been so far from <strong>the</strong> military and economic potential of attacking as<br />

<strong>the</strong>y are today. The second aspect is that <strong>the</strong>y will attack <strong>the</strong>ir Western neighbors,<br />

determined ei<strong>the</strong>r by <strong>the</strong> development to <strong>the</strong> point of explosion of <strong>the</strong>ir economic situation<br />

or, on <strong>the</strong> contrary, as <strong>the</strong>ir last card, before suicide, before <strong>the</strong> demolishment of this<br />

status.” In this later case, <strong>the</strong> military attaché to whom I previously referred adds that <strong>the</strong><br />

attack would most probably be directed towards <strong>the</strong> small Baltic powers in <strong>the</strong> search of an<br />

effortless victory, a victory that <strong>the</strong> Soviets would immediately need from a domestic<br />

viewpoint.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 102-106.<br />

33. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza nr. 45 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 30<br />

iunie 1929<br />

Dacă extrem de scurtul timp pe care l-am petrecut până acum în Riga și în parte grijile<br />

instalării unei legații nu mi-au dat încă prilejul să beneficiez decât în mod cu totul superficial și<br />

indirect de terenul de informație constituit de Țările Baltice și în special de Letonia, am putut<br />

grație indicațiilor colegilor mei din legațiile aliate sau amice să-mi formez ușor o opinie despre<br />

deosebita bogăție a acestui teren.<br />

Dau Excelenței Voastre câteva amănunte, obligatoriu limitate, suficiente cred pentru a arăta<br />

importanța atribuită de alții acestui punct de observație și contraobservație. În afară de<br />

publicațiile și agențiile mai puțin importante, următoarele au agentul lor special aici: Reuters,<br />

Telegraph Union, Exchange Telegraph, Tass, Le Temps, Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily<br />

News, Chicago Tribune, Vossische Zeitung, Havas, Izvestia etc. Legația americană are un<br />

personal de 11 persoane înscrise în lista corpului <strong>diplomatic</strong> sau consular de carieră și în total<br />

1<br />

Frederick W.B. Coleman (1874-1947) was minister of <strong>the</strong> U.S. in Latvia during <strong>the</strong> period 1922-1932.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 105<br />

peste 20 de amploiați, Anglia 12 înscriși în liste și numeroși auxiliari. Sovietele au nouă persoane<br />

înscrise, dar un număr indefinit și veșnic reînnoit de personal auxiliar. Legația Sovietică este<br />

instalată în două mari imobile din care unul îndeosebi este un stabiliment de mărimea unei<br />

adevărate clădiri publice comparându-se cu orișicare minister [de] aici.<br />

Nu este numai experiența mea din activitatea mai ales a două legații din care am făcut parte,<br />

că chiar în ceea ce privește informația specială nu agenții profesionali și retribuiți sunt cei care<br />

aduc cele mai multe informații utile, ci cei de ocazie a căror întâlnire trebuie căutată în cercurile<br />

cele mai variate. Aici, pe lângă cele ce intră în programul obișnuit al unei activități<br />

bineînțeleasă: colegii, personalul inferior al legațiilor și consulatelor, cercurile politice locale,<br />

presa locală, reprezentanții presei străine, vizitatorii străini în reîntoarcere din călătoriile estice,<br />

cercurile financiare etc..., este și categoria deosebit de interesantă a marilor și micilor<br />

comercianți, care mai mult decât orișicare alții au numeroase ocazii și speciale ușurințe de a<br />

străbate granițele rusești.<br />

Dacă întâmplarea poate fi câteodată suficientă pentru a aduce chiar informațiile cele mai<br />

prețioase, o misiune de natura celei de care mai toate legațiile par a fi însărcinate, misiune care,<br />

trebuie observat, implică în anumite cazuri o răspundere specială, nu poate fi conștiincios<br />

bazată decât pe relațiile cele mai diverse și pe contacte continue. Zic continue fiindcă o vizită<br />

sau o întâlnire unică și ad-hoc cu persoana apropiată de cele mai multe ori nu aduce informația<br />

specială căutată care ar fi dată împreună cu altele în cursul unor raporturi mai lungi creatoare<br />

de încredere, de simpatie și de ocazii propice.<br />

Pe cât îmi este de neplăcut de a reveni cu această ocazie asupra unei chestiuni care pare de<br />

caracter mai personal, sunt obligat a semnala cât de greu mi-ar fi îndeplinirea obligațiilor<br />

inerente misiunii mele dacă s-ar reduce chiar în cea mai mică proporție apuntamentele ce din<br />

ordinele Excelenței Voastre mi-au fost atribuite la plecarea mea din București, apuntamente ce<br />

nu cuprindeau decât jumătate din cheltuielile de reprezentare prevăzute de lege (printr-un<br />

calcul făcut cu coeficienți inadecvați) pentru îndeplinirea unei misiuni ce nu este defel una de<br />

simplă prezență (ca de pildă ce a Ministrului Spaniei sau Reprezentantului Argentinei în<br />

localitate), ci una prin excelență de contact permanent cu toate cercurile locale.<br />

Suma lunară de care dispun în momentul de față îmi permite de abia cu sacrificii personale<br />

istovitoare de a monta și întreține în urmă o casă ce este o legație de la care se așteaptă toată<br />

ospitalitatea unei legații, ospitalitate la care sunt de altfel obligat, după cum exprimam mai sus,<br />

sub primejdia de a zădărnici rezultatele primei misiuni ce îmi este încredințată în mod<br />

permanent.<br />

În aceeași ordine de idei, îmi permit a semnala Excelenței Voastre că scrisorile mele de<br />

acreditare în Estonia pentru redactarea cărora se dăduseră instrucțiuni înainte de plecarea mea<br />

nu mi-au parvenit încă. Colegii mei trag cel mai mare folos din posibilitatea de a completa și<br />

controla informațiile lor din Reval. Toate puterile ce au interes cât de mic în supravegherea<br />

împrejurărilor în Baltica când nu sunt reprezentate efectiv în ambele sau chiar cele trei capitale,<br />

întind în schimb competența reprezentantului lor.<br />

Din citirea raportului meu nr. 15 Excelența Voastră va înțelege a atribui un interes particular<br />

posibilității de a fi în Reval cu ocazia sosirii Majestății Sale Regele Suediei 1 . Acest eveniment se<br />

va repeta într-adevăr și aici, dar caracterul mult mai comunicativ al oamenilor politici estonieni<br />

îmi va permite a trage mai multe beneficii din aceste împrejurări speciale. De aceea aș fi fericit<br />

1<br />

Gustaf V, rege al Suediei (1907-1950).


106 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

dacă aș putea prezenta cât mai degrabă scrisorile mele de acreditare în Reval unde de altfel miam<br />

dat în principiu întâlnire cu atașatul nostru militar; competența colonelului Nicolaescu se<br />

întinde de la Varșovia prin Riga la Reval.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 107-110.<br />

33. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 45 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 30 th June 1929<br />

Although <strong>the</strong> short time I have spent in Riga so far and, partially, <strong>the</strong> concerns of<br />

establishing a legation, have given me <strong>the</strong> privilege of benefiting only superficially and<br />

indirectly from <strong>the</strong> field of information constituted by <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries and especially by<br />

Latvia, thanks to <strong>the</strong> indications of my colleagues from <strong>the</strong> allied or friendly legations, I<br />

had <strong>the</strong> possibility to easily elaborate an opinion about <strong>the</strong> distinctive richness of this field.<br />

I shall give to Your Excellency some details, unavoidably limited but sufficient, I think,<br />

in order to illustrate <strong>the</strong> importance attributed by o<strong>the</strong>rs to this point of observation and<br />

counter-observation. Except for <strong>the</strong> less important publications and agencies, <strong>the</strong> following<br />

have <strong>the</strong>ir own special agent here: Reuters, Telegraph Union, Exchange Telegraph, Tass, Le<br />

Temps, Times, Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily News, Chicago Tribune, Vossiche Zeitung,<br />

Havas, Izvestia etc. The American legation has a staff of 11 persons enlisted in <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> or consular corps and a total of over 20 employees; England has 12 persons<br />

enlisted and numerous auxiliaries. The Soviets have nine persons enlisted, but also an<br />

indefinite and constantly renewed number of auxiliary staff. The Soviet legation is installed<br />

in two big buildings, one of which has <strong>the</strong> size of a public building, comparable to any<br />

ministry here.<br />

It is not only my belief resulting especially from <strong>the</strong> activity of two legations in which I<br />

was posted, that even in what concerns <strong>the</strong> special information, it is not <strong>the</strong> professional<br />

paid agents that bring <strong>the</strong> most useful information, but those occasional agents whose<br />

presence must be sought in <strong>the</strong> most varied circles. Here, in addition to <strong>the</strong> habitual<br />

schedule of a self-understood activity: <strong>the</strong> colleagues, <strong>the</strong> inferior staff of legations and<br />

consulates, <strong>the</strong> local political circles, <strong>the</strong> local press, <strong>the</strong> representatives of foreign press,<br />

foreign visitors or those returning from Eastern journeys, financial circles etc…, <strong>the</strong>re is also<br />

<strong>the</strong> particularly interesting category of small and big merchants who, more than everyone<br />

else, enjoy numerous occasions and special facilities of going abroad.<br />

If chance can sometimes be sufficient in order to bring even <strong>the</strong> most precious<br />

information, a mission <strong>the</strong> kind of which almost all legations seem to be involved, a<br />

mission that must be observed involves in some cases a special responsibility can only be<br />

thoroughly based on <strong>the</strong> most different <strong>relations</strong> and continuous contacts. I say continuous<br />

because a visit or a single and ad-hoc meeting with <strong>the</strong> close person usually does not bring<br />

<strong>the</strong> special information that is sought and that would be given toge<strong>the</strong>r with o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

information in <strong>the</strong> course of longer <strong>relations</strong>, <strong>relations</strong> that would result in trust, sympathy<br />

and proper occasions.<br />

As unpleasant as it is for me to return on this occasion to a seemingly personal issue, I<br />

have to signal how hard it would be for me to fulfill <strong>the</strong> obligations of my mission if <strong>the</strong><br />

remuneration that, as an effect of Your Excellency’s order, has been given to me at my<br />

departure from Bucharest, would suffer even <strong>the</strong> slightest reduction; a remuneration which


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 107<br />

only comprised half of <strong>the</strong> statutory representation expenses (through a calculation made<br />

using inappropriate coefficients) for <strong>the</strong> fulfillment of a mission that is not one of mere<br />

presence (as, for example, that of <strong>the</strong> Envoy of Spain or <strong>the</strong> Representative of Argentina in<br />

<strong>the</strong> city), but one of permanent contact with <strong>the</strong> local circles par excellence.<br />

The monthly sum that I receive at <strong>the</strong> moment is hardly allowing me to assemble and<br />

maintain a house, that is a legation from which great hospitality is expected, hospitality to<br />

which I am actually obliged, as I previously said, in order to avoid compromising <strong>the</strong> results<br />

of my first permanent mission.<br />

I take <strong>the</strong> permission to signal Your Excellency that my credentials for Estonia, which<br />

were ordered before my departure, have not reached me so far. My colleagues take <strong>the</strong><br />

greatest benefit from <strong>the</strong> possibility of completing and controlling <strong>the</strong>ir information from<br />

Reval. All <strong>the</strong> powers that have <strong>the</strong> slightest interest in supervising <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea<br />

surroundings, when <strong>the</strong>y are not effectively represented in both or all three of <strong>the</strong> capitals,<br />

extend this competence to <strong>the</strong>ir representative.<br />

After reading my report no. 15, Your Excellency will understand <strong>the</strong> need to attribute a<br />

particular interest in <strong>the</strong> possibility of being in Reval on <strong>the</strong> occasion of <strong>the</strong> arrival of His<br />

Majesty, <strong>the</strong> King of Sweden 1 . This event will probably continue here, but <strong>the</strong> more<br />

communicative nature of <strong>the</strong> Estonian politicians will allow me to gain more benefits from<br />

<strong>the</strong>se special circumstances. That is why I would be happy if I was able to present my<br />

credentials as soon as possible in Reval, where I actually arranged, in principle, a meeting<br />

with our military attaché; Colonel Nicolaescu’s area of competence ranges from Warsaw via<br />

Riga to Reval.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 107-110.<br />

34. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al secretarului de legație al României la Riga Eugeniu<br />

Lukasiewicz nr. 38p. către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G.<br />

Mironescu, 28 septembrie 1929<br />

Azi dimineață am fost primit de Domnul Balodis, Ministrul Afacerilor Străine, întors zilele<br />

acestea de la Geneva. Felicitându-l pentru succesul înregistrat de Letonia prin alegerea Domniei<br />

sale cu un mare număr de voturi pentru unul din locurile de vicepreședinți ai Adunării 2 ,<br />

Domnia sa s-a arătat încântat de ultima sesiune a Ligii. Mi-a vorbit apoi cu multă satisfacție<br />

despre Excelența Sa Dl. Ministru Mironescu ale cărui curtoazie și afabilitate l-au impresionat<br />

plăcut.<br />

Acordurile feroviare încheiate de noi cu Polonia în anul acesta, precum și acordul deja<br />

existent între Polonia și Letonia ar ușura mult traficul între ambele țări.<br />

Îmi permit a atrage atenția Excelenței Voastre că în raportul meu nr. 179 din 23 august,<br />

referitor la publicarea unui număr consacrat României de către ziarul local „Latvijas Tirgotājs”,<br />

raport asupra căruia nu am avut până în prezent vreun răspuns, am semnalat deja<br />

oportunitatea stabilirii unor legături comerciale mai strânse între ambele țări.<br />

În această ordine de idei cred că o primă necesitate ar fi ca Banca Națională și Banca<br />

Letoniei să intre în contact pentru a se putea ajunge la ușurarea operațiunilor bancare. Întradevăr,<br />

până în momentul de față nici leul nu este cotat la Riga, nici latul la București. Adesea<br />

1<br />

Gustaf V, King of Sweden (1907-1950).<br />

2<br />

Adunarea Societății Națiunilor.


108 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

am primit plângeri la Legație și cereri de a schimba lei; băncile din localitate nu au aproape<br />

nicio legătură cu cele din București și chiar pentru trimiterea unui cec sunt greutăți aproape<br />

insurmontabile. Amintesc în treacăt că fondurile expediate de Minister acestui oficiu sosesc cu<br />

întârzieri adesea extrem de neplăcute, operațiunile urmând a fi efectuate prin intermediul<br />

diferitelor bănci engleze, germane, suedeze etc.<br />

Revenind la conversația mea cu Domnul Balodis, la întrebarea ce i-am pus asupra părerii<br />

Domniei sale cu privire la schimbarea de guvern din Lituania, Domnia sa nu s-a putut lipsi de a-<br />

și manifesta satisfacția pentru căderea lui Voldemaras 1 : „Voilà un bon débarras pour tout le<br />

monde” a fost exclamația cu care Dl Balodis a răspuns întrebării mele. (În treacăt fie amintit că<br />

Domnia sa a fost acum câțiva ani reprezentant al Letoniei la Kowno și nu a avut a se lăuda de<br />

raporturile Domniei Sale cu Voldemaras).<br />

„Tūbelis est un homme plus conciliant et avec lequel on pourra causer plus facilement” este<br />

părerea Domnului Balodis asupra noului președinte al Consiliului lituanian. Chestiunea cea mai<br />

delicată între ambele țări, adică a imigranților lituanieni refugiați în Letonia (aderenți ai lui<br />

Pletkchaitis 2 și alți conspiratori ejusdem farinae 3 ), asupra cărora Voldemaras se arăta de o<br />

intransigență violentă, cerând expulzarea lor, va putea de acum încolo intra într-o fază mai<br />

calmă. Domnul Balodis crede că noul guvern din Kowno se va ocupa în special de ameliorarea<br />

situației economice și financiare, Dl. Tūbelis 4 – care, între paranteze fie zis, e foarte bolnăvicios<br />

– fiind un specialist în materie agrară și cooperativă.<br />

E de așteptat, crede Domnul Balodis, ca regimul de teroare, stare de asediu, cenzură etc.<br />

care domnește în țara vecină să fie puțin atenuat de noul Guvern; în ceea ce privește însă<br />

politica externă a Lituaniei și în special raporturile cu Polonia, nu trebuie să ne facem nicio<br />

iluzie, directivele noului cabinet fiind identice cu cele urmate până acum de Voldemaras.<br />

În fond, căderea acestuia se datorează, după părerea Domnului Balodis, în cea mai mare<br />

parte aroganței sale și modului brutal 5 cu care se obișnuise a trata pe colegii săi de cabinet și<br />

chiar pe președintele Republicii, Smetona 6 , căruia voia să-i impună toate concepțiile sale.<br />

Maniera Domnului Voldemaras a avut de altfel darul de a-i aliena multe simpatii europene și de<br />

a șoca adesea membrii Adunării de la Geneva.<br />

În fine, Dl. Balodis a exprimat regretul pentru eșecul propunerii susținute de Finlanda de<br />

ajutorare cel puțin financiară a Statelor atacate, și venind a vorbi de chestiunile financiare și de<br />

atotputernicia americană, Dl. Balodis a terminat conversația cu o butadă, făcând comparația<br />

între „Golf Stream-ul” care ne vine din America și „Gold Stream-ul” care se revarsă din Europa<br />

spre America.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 140-<br />

142.<br />

1<br />

Augustinas Voldemaras (1883-1942) a fost un politician nationalist lituanian, Prim Ministru (1918, 1926-1929), a<br />

susținut lovitura de stat din 1926 și s-a apropiat ulterior de forțele de extrema dreaptă.<br />

2<br />

Autorul se referă probabil la liderul social-democrat lituanian J. Plečkaitis.<br />

3<br />

De aceeași natură, expresie latinească.<br />

4<br />

Juozas Tūbelis (1882-1939) a fost un politician lituanian, Prim Ministru (1929-1934) și ministru în mai multe<br />

rânduri.<br />

5<br />

În original, brusc.<br />

6<br />

Antanas Smetona (1874-1944) a fost un politician naționalist lituanian care și-a adus o contribuție esențială la<br />

independența acestei țări, a fost primul său președinte democrat (1919-1920) și apoi președinte autoritar al acestei<br />

țări (1926-1940).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 109<br />

34. Diplomatic report by Romanian Legation Secretary in Riga Eugeniu Lukasiewicz<br />

no. 38p. to Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 28 th September 1929<br />

This morning Mr. Balodis, <strong>the</strong> Minister of Foreign Affairs, who just came from Geneva,<br />

received me. As I congratulated him for <strong>the</strong> success that Latvia had through his election,<br />

with a large number of votes, as a vice-president of <strong>the</strong> Assembly 1 , he expressed his delight<br />

with <strong>the</strong> results of <strong>the</strong> latest League session. Then, he showed much satisfaction when<br />

talking about His Excellency, Minister Mironescu, whose courtesy and affability pleasantly<br />

impressed him.<br />

The railway agreements that we completed with Poland this year, as well as <strong>the</strong> already<br />

existing agreement between Poland and Latvia would considerably facilitate <strong>the</strong> traffic<br />

between <strong>the</strong> two countries.<br />

I take <strong>the</strong> permission to bring into Your Excellency’s attention that in my report no. 179<br />

of August 23 rd , referring to <strong>the</strong> publication of an issue dedicated to Romania of <strong>the</strong> local<br />

newspaper “Latvija Tirgotajs”, report to which I have not receive any answer so far, I have<br />

already announced <strong>the</strong> opportunity of establishing stronger commercial ties between <strong>the</strong><br />

two countries.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, I believe that one of <strong>the</strong> main necessities would be for <strong>the</strong> National<br />

Bank and <strong>the</strong> Bank of Latvia establish a contact in order to facilitate <strong>the</strong> banking<br />

operations. It is true that up to now, nei<strong>the</strong>r is <strong>the</strong> leu marketable in Riga, nor <strong>the</strong> lat in<br />

Bucharest. I have frequently received complaints at <strong>the</strong> Legation and requests of<br />

exchanging lei; <strong>the</strong> local banks have almost no connections to those from Bucharest and<br />

one is confronted with almost insurmountable difficulties even for sending a cheque. I<br />

briefly remind you that <strong>the</strong> funds sent by <strong>the</strong> Ministry to this office arrive with delays that<br />

are often extremely unpleasant, <strong>the</strong> operations being made by <strong>the</strong> means of different<br />

English, German, Swedish, etc. banks.<br />

As for my conversation with Mr. Balodis, when I asked for his opinion concerning <strong>the</strong><br />

change of government in Lithuania, he could not refrain from expressing his satisfaction<br />

caused by Voldemaras 2 ’s fall. “Here’s a good riddance for everyone” he exclaimed, as an<br />

answer to my question. (I briefly remind you that he used to be, some years ago, <strong>the</strong><br />

representative of Latvia in Kowno and he could not have said anything good about his<br />

<strong>relations</strong> with Voldemaras).<br />

“Tūbelis 3 is a more conciliatory person and with whom we can speak more easily” is Mr.<br />

Balodis’ opinion concerning <strong>the</strong> new president of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian Council. The most<br />

delicate issue in both countries, that of <strong>the</strong> Lithuanian refugees in Latvia (adherents of<br />

Pletkachaitis 4 and o<strong>the</strong>r conspirators ejusdem farinae 5 ) to whom Voldemaras showed a<br />

violent intransigency, asking for <strong>the</strong>ir expulsion, will henceforth enter a calmer phase. Mr.<br />

Balodis believes that <strong>the</strong> new government from Kowno will especially try to improve <strong>the</strong><br />

1<br />

Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations.<br />

2<br />

Augustinas Voldemaras (1883-1942), Lithuanian nationalist, Prime-Minister in 1918 and 1926-1929, supported <strong>the</strong><br />

1926 coup and eventually drew closer to <strong>the</strong> extreme right forces.<br />

3<br />

Juozas Tūbelis (1882-1939) was a Lithuanian politician, Prime Minister (1929-1934) and minister on several<br />

occasions.<br />

4<br />

The author perhaps refers to Social-Democrat leader J. Plečkaitis.<br />

5<br />

For <strong>the</strong> same fear (Latin)


110 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

economic and financial situation, Mr. Tūbelis – who, by <strong>the</strong> way, is very sickly – being a<br />

specialist in agrarian and co-operative matters.<br />

It is likely, as Mr. Balodis believes, that <strong>the</strong> terror regime, <strong>the</strong> curfew, censorship etc,<br />

that governs <strong>the</strong> neighboring country, will be slightly diminished by <strong>the</strong> new Government;<br />

however, in what concerns Lithuania’s foreign policy and especially <strong>the</strong> <strong>relations</strong> with<br />

Poland, we should not make any illusions, <strong>the</strong> new government’s directives being identical<br />

to those followed until now by Voldemaras.<br />

Ultimately, his fall is due, according to Mr. Balodis, mostly to his arrogance and his rude<br />

manner of treating his cabinet colleagues and even <strong>the</strong> president of <strong>the</strong> Republic, Smetona 1 ,<br />

upon whom he wanted to impose his ideas. Mr. Voldemaras’ manner alienated many of his<br />

European sympathies and frequently shocked <strong>the</strong> members of <strong>the</strong> Assembly of Geneva.<br />

Finally, Mr. Balodis expressed his regret for <strong>the</strong> failure of <strong>the</strong> proposition sustained by<br />

Finland to help, at least financially, <strong>the</strong> attacked states and, by speaking of <strong>the</strong> financial<br />

issues and of <strong>the</strong> American almightiness, Mr. Balodis ended <strong>the</strong> conversation with an irony,<br />

comparing <strong>the</strong> “Golf Stream” that comes from America and <strong>the</strong> “Gold Stream” that effuses<br />

from Europe to America.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 140-142.<br />

35. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 42<br />

către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, octombrie 1929<br />

Într-o întrevedere ce am avut-o astăzi cu Domnul Celmiņš, Președintele Consiliului,<br />

Domnia sa a găsit ocazia a exprima încrederea în solidaritatea spontană ce ar reuni țările din<br />

Estul Europei egal interesate în apărarea independenței lor naționale, dacă această<br />

independență ar fi vreodată amenințată de un vecin comun. Domnia sa a adăugat că o<br />

asemenea amenințare nu i s-a părut niciodată mai îndepărtată decât astăzi.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 111<br />

35. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 42 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, October 1929<br />

In a meeting I had today with Mr. Celminš, <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Council, he found <strong>the</strong><br />

occasion to express his trust in <strong>the</strong> spontaneous solidarity that would reunite <strong>the</strong> countries<br />

of Eastern Europe equally interested in defending <strong>the</strong>ir national independence, if this<br />

independence had ever been threatened by a common neighbor. He added that such a<br />

threat never seemed more unlikely than today.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 111.<br />

36. Telegrama însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr. 50<br />

către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, noiembrie 1929<br />

Dl. Balodis mi-a reînnoit astăzi propunerile făcute Excelenței Voastre la Geneva relative la<br />

Tratatul de Comerț. Domnia sa m-a rugat a-l informa dacă aceste propuneri sunt primite în<br />

principiu spre a aviza de comun acord începerea negocierilor. Dl. Balodis ar dori ca pe bază de<br />

1<br />

Antanas Smetona (1874-1944), Lithuanian nationalist playing an important role in <strong>the</strong> proclamation of<br />

Lithuania’s independence in 1918, <strong>the</strong> first President of democratic Lithuania (1919-1920) and its authoritarian<br />

President (1926-1940).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 111<br />

reciprocitate să fie stabilite liste de mărfuri beneficiind de tarif minimal; tariful leton este ca și al<br />

nostru pe două coloane. Letonia luptând pentru dezvoltarea [unui] bilanț comercial activ și<br />

suferind [în] unele privințe supraproducție industrială, este de așteptat ca de partea sa lista să<br />

cuprindă toate mărfurile prezentând interes oarecare.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 118<br />

36. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 50 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, November 1929<br />

Today, Mr. Balodis renewed <strong>the</strong> propositions he made to Your Excellency at Geneva<br />

with regard to <strong>the</strong> Treaty of Commerce. He asked me to inform him if <strong>the</strong>se propositions<br />

are received in principle in order to commonly approve <strong>the</strong> commencement of<br />

negotiations. Mr. Balodis would like, on <strong>the</strong> basis of mutuality, to establish lists of<br />

merchandises that would benefit from minimal tariffs; <strong>the</strong> Latvian tariff lies, <strong>the</strong> same as<br />

ours, on two columns. As Latvia is struggling to develop an active balance sheet and suffers,<br />

in some respects, from industrial overproduction, as far as <strong>the</strong>y are concerned, <strong>the</strong>ir list<br />

would contain all <strong>the</strong> potentially interesting merchandise.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 118.<br />

37. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza nr. 90 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 4<br />

martie 1930<br />

Presa baltică a înregistrat zilele acestea zvonurile unei posibile vizite a Domnului<br />

Strandman 1 , Președintele de Stat Estonian, la Kowno. Informându-mă în locul competent, am<br />

aflat că de o asemenea vizită nu este într-adevăr vorba. Am câștigat impresia totuși că aceste<br />

zvonuri ar putea să aibă foarte bine Revalul ca origine, constituind o parte din manopera de<br />

învăluire prin care se încearcă a se hotărî Guvernul leton de organizare a vizitei Președintelui<br />

Zemgals la Varșovia în timpul cuvenit pentru ca Președintele Republicii Polone să poată înapoia<br />

în aceeași călătorie vizitele la Riga și Reval.<br />

Curentele de opinie favorabile unei apropieri mai strânse între Letonia și Estonia, pe de o<br />

parte, și Lituania, pe de alta, câștigaseră mai ales în Riga, în ultimele vremuri, o deosebită<br />

consistență. Partizanii acestei „Mici Antante Baltice” care se recrutează nu numai din cercurile<br />

social-democrate, dar chiar din cele mai puțin susceptibile de a fi acuzate de sentimente<br />

favorabile Sovietelor, propovăduiesc acest nou curs al politicii externe letone, combinându-l cu<br />

un proces de apropiere economică de Rusia și Germania. Afară de cercurile și presa germană<br />

acest curent nu pare a fi găsit mulți adepți în Estonia, dar dacă el ar triumfa sau chiar dacă ar<br />

mai lua oarecare dezvoltare în Letonia ar constitui pentru politica polonă în Țările Baltice o<br />

adevărată primejdie.<br />

Față de această stare de fapt guvernul din Varșovia, perfect informat de reprezentanții săi, s-<br />

ar hotărî a lua taurul de coarne și a provoca în Letonia, prin surpriza creată de vizita Domnului<br />

1<br />

Otto August Strandman (1875-1941) a fost politician și diplomat estonian cu vederi de centru stânga, unul dintre<br />

realizatorii reformei agrare de după cucerirea independenței și a Constituției din 1920. Șef de stat (1929-1931), Prim<br />

Ministru (1919), Ministru de Externe (1918, 1920-1921, 1924), președinte al adunării legislative (1917-1918, 1921),<br />

Ministru al Estoniei la Varșovia (1927-1929). S-a sinucis pentru a nu fi arestat de autoritățile de ocupație sovietice.


112 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Strandman în Varșovia, o criză de opinie al cărei deznodământ acești reprezentanți optimiști îl<br />

prevăd favorabil reafirmării autorității Poloniei în Țările Baltice.<br />

Pentru a ușura situația guvernului leton față de grupurile majorității parlamentare ostile<br />

ideii vizitei Domnului Zemgals în Varșovia, guvernul polon a remis 1 până în august călătoria<br />

Domnului Mościcki 2 la Reval, și dând dovadă de mult tact politic a declarat că nu numai [că] nu<br />

ar vedea cu ochi răi o vizită prealabilă a Domnului Zemgals la Kowno, dar chiar s-ar ferici de un<br />

asemenea eveniment. Situația guvernului Domnului Celmiņš, care beneficiază în Parlament de<br />

o majoritate numai de cinci voturi, este așa de șubredă însă că chiar (sic!) în asemenea condiții<br />

ezită a înfrunta curentele ostile vizitei polone. Anunțarea călătoriei Domnului Strandman la<br />

Kowno ar fi destinată a folosi de imbold opiniei publice letone care s-ar putea crede în<br />

primejdie de a vedea țara ei luată înainte și pe această cale de vecina ei, vecină ce până acum a<br />

avut monopolul inițiativelor în politica baltică.<br />

Este evident că dacă programul schimburilor de vizite în Baltica și între Baltica și Polonia s-<br />

ar îndeplini exact după dorințele guvernului din Varșovia, aceasta ar însemna un deplin succes<br />

pentru politica sa, care este una de preponderență în Estonia și Letonia FĂRĂ A DISTRUGE<br />

LEGĂTURILE DE PRIETENIE ÎNTRE ACESTE DOUĂ ȚĂRI ȘI LITUANIA. Aflu însă că guvernul<br />

din Kowno, cu intransigența sa obișnuită, pune vizitei Domnului Zemgals unele condiții de<br />

natură a anula tot avantajul ce această vizită l-ar prezenta din punct de vedere al pacificării<br />

spiritelor în această parte a Europei. Minimul ce s-ar cere Domnului Zemgals este de a asculta<br />

fără a reacționa declarații virulente ale colegului său lituanian în chestiunea Vilnei. Este sigur că<br />

Polonia nu ar admite aceasta și tot atât de sigur, după declarațiile colegului meu lituanian, că<br />

Kowno nu va primi pe domnul Zemgals cât timp Domnia sa nu se va declara gata a admite că<br />

aceasta nu este capitala țării pe care o vizitează.<br />

Din conversațiile pe care le-am avut în locurile cuvenite m-am putut convinge că Dl.<br />

Celmiņš este personal cu totul favorabil vizitei Președintelui Zemgals în Varșovia; înainte de a<br />

căuta o hotărâre însă el va aștepta realegerea acestuia ce va avea loc în mai. Am cules însă<br />

totodată impresia că opoziția în Parlament și opinia publică pe care Dl. Celmiņš sau alt<br />

Președinte de Consiliu le-ar întâlni sunt atât de importante încât Letonia ar putea să fie silită să<br />

renunțe la această manifestație de solidaritate politică cu aliata și vecina ei Estonia.<br />

Dacă un asemenea lucru se va întâmpla, dacă contrariul celor ce am văzut cu ocazia<br />

schimbului de vizite cu Suedia Guvernul leton de astă dată va desolidariza politica sa externă de<br />

cea a Estoniei și se va hotărî definitiv a nu urma față de Varșovia politica de apropiere, de alianță<br />

de fapt, urmată de vecina sa, mă întreb dacă nu va trebui să considerăm că un nou curs politic a<br />

fost inaugurat în Baltica, un curs politic ce ne interesează în primul grad deoarece ar<br />

compromite opera de solidificare a zidului statelor burgheze în buna cale de alcătuire de la<br />

Marea Neagră la cea Baltică. Mă întreb de asemenea dacă nu s-ar indica ca, în limita foarte<br />

redusă într-adevăr a posibilităților noastre, să participăm la încercarea de a evita sau de a<br />

controla o atât de importantă preschimbare. Cred că în această privință prezența intermitentă a<br />

unui reprezentant român în Kowno ar putea prezenta sensibile avantaje.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 211-214.<br />

1<br />

A amânat.<br />

2<br />

Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946) a fost un profesor, cercetător și om de stat polonez, Președinte al Poloniei (1926-<br />

1939). Retras în România din fața trupelor germane, ulterior s-a stabilit lângă Geneva unde s-a stins din viață.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 113<br />

37. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 90 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 4 th March 1930<br />

The Baltic press noted <strong>the</strong>se days <strong>the</strong> rumors of a potential visit of Mr. Strandman 1 , <strong>the</strong><br />

Estonian Chief of State, to Kowno. As I ga<strong>the</strong>red my information from reliable sources, I<br />

learned that such a visit was not actually possible. I got, however, <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong>se<br />

rumors could well stem from Reval, constituting a part of <strong>the</strong> flanking maneuver by which<br />

<strong>the</strong> Latvian Government was trying to organize President Zemgals’s visit to Warsaw in due<br />

time so that <strong>the</strong> President of <strong>the</strong> Polish Republic would be able to return <strong>the</strong> visit within<br />

<strong>the</strong> same trip to Riga and Reval.<br />

The groundswells in favor of a closer <strong>relations</strong>hip between Latvia and Estonia, on <strong>the</strong><br />

one hand, and Romania, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, have gained lately, especially in Riga, a distinct<br />

consistency. The partisans of this “Little Baltic Entente” who are recruited not only from<br />

<strong>the</strong> social-democratic circles, but also from <strong>the</strong> ones less susceptible of being accused of<br />

maintaining favorable connections with <strong>the</strong> Soviets, militate for this new course of Latvian<br />

foreign policy and integrate it with a friendly economic process in <strong>relations</strong> with Russia and<br />

Germany. Except for <strong>the</strong> German circles and press, this movement does not seem to have<br />

ga<strong>the</strong>red many followers in Estonia, but if this movement gained <strong>the</strong> upper hand or if it<br />

were to be fur<strong>the</strong>r developed in Latvia, it could be considered a real danger for <strong>the</strong> Polish<br />

politics throughout <strong>the</strong> Baltic countries.<br />

With regard to this state of affairs, <strong>the</strong> government of Warsaw, which is thoroughly<br />

informed by its representatives, could decide to take <strong>the</strong> bull by its horns and cause an<br />

opinion crisis in Latvia by means of <strong>the</strong> surprise created by <strong>the</strong> Mr. Strandman’s visit in<br />

Warsaw. These optimistic representatives consider <strong>the</strong> resolution of this opinion crisis to<br />

be favorable as regards <strong>the</strong> Polish authority within <strong>the</strong> Baltic States.<br />

In order to make things easier for <strong>the</strong> Latvian government in respect to <strong>the</strong> groups of<br />

<strong>the</strong> parliamentary majority which are hostile to <strong>the</strong> idea of Mr. Zemgals visiting Warsaw,<br />

<strong>the</strong> Polish government have delayed until August Mr. Mościcki 2 ’s voyage to Reval and by<br />

proving great political abilities, <strong>the</strong>y have declared that <strong>the</strong>y would not see Mr. Zemgals’<br />

visit to Kowno with woeful eyes, but on <strong>the</strong> contrary, <strong>the</strong>y would be happy to see this<br />

happening. The situation of Mr. Celmiņš’ government, which benefits from a majority of<br />

only five votes inside <strong>the</strong> Parliament, has become so weakened, that, under <strong>the</strong>se<br />

circumstances, it hesitates to confront <strong>the</strong> hostile currents of <strong>the</strong> Polish visit. The<br />

announcement of Mr. Strandman’s trip to Kowno should be used as an impulse for <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian public opinion which might think <strong>the</strong>y are in jeopardy of seeing <strong>the</strong>ir country be<br />

outdone by <strong>the</strong>ir neighbor who has had so far <strong>the</strong> upper hand of <strong>the</strong> initiatives regarding<br />

<strong>the</strong> Baltic politics.<br />

It is obvious that if <strong>the</strong> visit exchange programme within <strong>the</strong> Baltic States and between<br />

<strong>the</strong> Baltic States and Poland was fulfilled according to <strong>the</strong> wishes of <strong>the</strong> Warsaw<br />

1<br />

Otto August Strandman (1875-1941) was a center-left Estonian politician and diplomat, one of <strong>the</strong> creators of <strong>the</strong><br />

land reform after independence and <strong>the</strong> Constitution of 1920. Head of State (1929-1931), Prime Minister (1919),<br />

Foreign Minister (1918, 1920-1921, 1924), President of <strong>the</strong> Legislative Assembly (1917-1918, 1921), Minister of Estonia<br />

in Warsaw (1927-1929) . He committed suicide to avoid being arrested by Soviet occupation authorities.<br />

2<br />

Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946) was a Polish professor, renown scholar and statesman. President of Poland (1926-<br />

1939). He withdrew to Romania to avoind being captured by German troops and subsequently settled near Geneva<br />

where he died.


114 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

government, it would be considered a great success for its policy of seeking preponderance<br />

in Estonia and Latvia, WITHOUT DESTROYING THE FRIENDSHIP RELATIONS<br />

BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES AND LITHUANIA. I learn that <strong>the</strong> Kowno<br />

government, known for its intransigency, lays down certain conditions to Mr. Zemgals’<br />

visit, conditions that might quash <strong>the</strong> advantage that this visit brings regarding <strong>the</strong><br />

pacification of <strong>the</strong> spirits in this part of Europe. The only thing that Mr. Zemgals is required<br />

to do is to listen without giving virulent statements to his Lithuanian colleague with regard<br />

to <strong>the</strong> matter of Vilnius. It is certain that Poland would not admit it, and it is almost certain<br />

that, according to my Lithuanian colleague, Kowno would not receive Mr. Zemgals as long<br />

as he does not acknowledge that this city is not <strong>the</strong> capital of <strong>the</strong> country he is about to<br />

visit.<br />

Taking into account <strong>the</strong> conversations that I had in appropriate places, I became<br />

convinced that Mr. Celmiņš was in complete agreement with President Zemgal’s visit to<br />

Warsaw; before taking a decision, he will wait for his reelection in May. I have got <strong>the</strong><br />

impression that <strong>the</strong> opposition inside <strong>the</strong> Parliament and <strong>the</strong> public opinion that Mr.<br />

Celmiņš and any o<strong>the</strong>r President of <strong>the</strong> Council of Ministers would encounter is so weighty<br />

that Latvia could be forced to give up this manifestation of political solidarity with its ally<br />

and its neighbor, Estonia.<br />

Should such a thing happen, should, contrary to what I have seen on <strong>the</strong> occasion of<br />

visit exchange with Sweden, <strong>the</strong> Latvian government dissociate its external politics from its<br />

Estonian mate and decide not to accept <strong>the</strong> intimate, in fact alliance policy with Warsaw<br />

followed by its neighbor, I wonder if we should not state that a new political course has<br />

been inaugurated in <strong>the</strong> Baltic States, a fresh political course that we are interested in<br />

mainly because it would compromise <strong>the</strong> solidification work of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois states’ wall. I<br />

also wonder, whe<strong>the</strong>r, in spite of our possibilities reduced in this respect, we should try to<br />

avoid or control such an important conversion. I think that <strong>the</strong> intermittent presence of a<br />

Romanian representative in Kowno would bring sensitive advantages in this respect.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 211-214.<br />

38. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza nr. 105 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />

14 martie 1930<br />

Strict confidențial<br />

Colegul meu polon, dl Arciszewski 1 , mi-a făcut, cu toate menajamentele cuvenite,<br />

următoarea comunicare.<br />

Colonelul Pełczyński 2 , șeful Biroului 2 al Statului Major din Varșovia, a părăsit zilele acestea<br />

Riga după o călătorie de contact și inspecție în capitalele celor două țări baltice și de-a lungul<br />

granițelor estice ale Letoniei și Estoniei. Domnia sa s-a arătat foarte satisfăcut de soliditatea<br />

acestor granițe atât din punctul de vedere al spiritului populației (după planul defensiv al<br />

Statelor Majore baltice acoperirea granițelor este încredințată elementelor de recrutare locale,<br />

1<br />

Mirosław Arciszewski (1892–1963) a fost diplomat polonez, Ministru al Poloniei la Riga (1929-1932) și București<br />

(1932-1938), adjunct al Ministrului de Externe (1938-1939).<br />

2<br />

Tadeusz Pełczyński (1892-1985) a fost general maior polonez, șef al Secției a II-a a Marelui Stat Major (informații<br />

militare), șef de Stat Major și apoi Comandant adjunct al armatei de rezistență din Polonia – Armia Krajowa (1941-<br />

1944).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 115<br />

mobilizate și concentrate în aceeași operațiune) cât și din punctul de vedere al dispozițiilor<br />

adoptate și al înzestrării tehnice (întărituri și drumuri în special).<br />

Fiind adus a se exprima asupra valorii comparative de rezistență a porțiunilor graniței<br />

Europei burgheze de la Marea Baltică la Marea Neagră, colonelul Pełczyński a informat pe dl.<br />

Arciszewski că după părerea Statului Major polon porțiunea cea mai fragilă este granița<br />

Basarabiei – aceasta din cauza neîndestulării mijloacelor de comunicație și din cauza spiritului<br />

populației, spirit pe care îl atribuie mai ales insuficienței din punctul de vedere moral și național<br />

al administrației locale – Nota Bene: Observația colonelului Pełczyński nu se referea la valoarea<br />

comparativă a armatelor respective, ci numai la elementul precis al rezistenței granițelor.<br />

Am făcut observația Domnului Arciszewski că opinia Biroului 2 era probabil în mare parte<br />

bazată pe informațiile exagerate ale ziarelor noastre; nu m-am crezut însă autorizat a o păstra<br />

fără a transmite mai departe comunicarea domniei sale.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 219-<br />

220.<br />

38. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 105 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 14 th March 1930<br />

Strictly confidential<br />

My Polish colleague, Mr. Arciszewski, has informed me of <strong>the</strong> following matters, with all <strong>the</strong><br />

appropriate respect.<br />

Colonel Pełczyński 1 , <strong>the</strong> Head of <strong>the</strong> Second Bureau of <strong>the</strong> General Staff in Warsaw, has<br />

recently left Riga after taking a trip to inspect <strong>the</strong> capitals of <strong>the</strong> two Baltic States and<br />

across <strong>the</strong> Eastern borders of Latvia and Estonia. He was pleased by <strong>the</strong> strength of <strong>the</strong>se<br />

borders, both in terms of <strong>the</strong> spirit of <strong>the</strong> population (according to <strong>the</strong> defensive plan of <strong>the</strong><br />

Baltic General Staffs, <strong>the</strong> boundary protection is assigned to <strong>the</strong> elements of local<br />

recruitment which are mobilized and centralized within <strong>the</strong> same operation) and of <strong>the</strong><br />

adopted dispositions and <strong>the</strong> technical endowment (fortifications and roads, especially).<br />

Being asked to comment on <strong>the</strong> comparative value of resistance, regarding <strong>the</strong> borders<br />

of <strong>the</strong> bourgeois Europe from <strong>the</strong> Baltic Sea to <strong>the</strong> Black Sea, Colonel Pełczyński has<br />

informed Mr. Arciszewski that, according to <strong>the</strong> Polish General Staff, <strong>the</strong> most vulnerable<br />

section is <strong>the</strong> Bessarabian border – because of <strong>the</strong> inexistence of means of communication<br />

and because of <strong>the</strong> population spirit, an attitude he morally and nationally associated to<br />

<strong>the</strong> local administration. Nota Bene: Colonel Pełczyński’s remark did not concern <strong>the</strong><br />

comparative value of <strong>the</strong> respective armies, but only <strong>the</strong> precise element of border<br />

resistance.<br />

I mentioned to Mr. Arciszewski’s that <strong>the</strong> opinion of <strong>the</strong> Second Bureau was probably<br />

based on <strong>the</strong> exaggerated information released by our newspapers; I did not think of me as<br />

an authorized person to keep his message just for myself and not share it.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 219-220.<br />

1<br />

Tadeusz Pełczyński (1892-1985) was a Polish Major General, Chief of Second Section of <strong>the</strong> General Staff (military<br />

intelligence), Chief of Staff and <strong>the</strong>n Deputy Commander of <strong>the</strong> Polish Home Army - <strong>the</strong> Armia Krajowa (1941-<br />

1944 )


116 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

39. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza nr. 130 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />

20 martie 1930<br />

Răspuns la telegrama nr. 17989 din martie curent.<br />

Am comunicat domnului secretar Lukasiewicz 1 ordinul de transferare la Budapesta pe ziua<br />

de 15 aprilie. Voi regreta mult plecarea domnului Lukasiewicz, a cărui colaborare învățasem a o<br />

aprecia.<br />

În cazul mai ales când voi urma să fiu succedat în această legație de o persoană în afară de<br />

carieră 2 , după cum mi-o anunțaseră telegramele Excelenței Voastre, aș crede foarte util ca<br />

înlocuitorul domnului Lukasiewicz să vină cât mai curând posibil la Riga, aceasta pentru a-mi<br />

da timpul a-l pune cât mai complet la curent cu serviciul Domniei sale și împrejurările locale.<br />

Într-un mod general îmi permit a face următoarele sugestii în ceea ce privește completarea<br />

personalului Legației din Riga. Aceasta, în afară de personalul actual (șeful misiunii, un secretar,<br />

o interpretă-dactilografă) ar trebui, cred, să cuprindă: un cancelar dactilograf român și un atașat<br />

de presă. Amintesc că, după ultimele liste ale Ministerului Afacerilor leton, Legația Statelor<br />

Unite întrebuințează 34 funcționari, cea a Marii Britanii 17, cea a Sovietelor 87 etc. Acestea și<br />

alte legații dispun în plus de serviciile reprezentanților ziarelor și agențiilor de presă ale țării lor.<br />

Completarea personalului său ar permite acestei legații regale a face pentru propriul său<br />

cont ceea ce Legațiile Statelor Unite și a Marii Britanii fac cu atâta atenție: urmărirea presei<br />

rusești și în special a revistelor și publicațiilor tehnice pentru culegerea, confruntarea și<br />

controlul cifrelor și indicațiilor de natură economică, financiară, comercială, agrară etc, cifre și<br />

indicații care prezintă mai mult interes și mai multă temeinicie decât orișice alt izvor de<br />

informație.<br />

Într-adevăr, în afară de cazul problematic al unei revoluții de palat sau al altor evenimente<br />

dramatice în Kremlin, evoluția evenimentelor în Rusia va fi după toate probabilitățile guvernată<br />

exclusiv de o chestiune de cifre. S-a observat că nu de puține ori cele date de înseși serviciile<br />

statistice ale Sovietelor permiteau a rectifica informațiile răspândite de ele pe altă cale, aceasta<br />

explicându-se prin dificultatea, imposibilitatea chiar de a coordona falsificarea sau alterarea<br />

întregului aparat de cifre reprezentând activitatea economică a unei țări. Pentru a trage însă din<br />

controlul acestui aparat prețioasele indicații ce le ține sau le-ar putea ține la dispoziția noastră,<br />

mărirea indicată aici la personalul Legației Române din Riga, ar fi, cred, un minim<br />

indispensabil.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, filele 228-<br />

229.<br />

39. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 130 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 20 th March 1930<br />

Response to <strong>the</strong> telegram no. 17989 from March, this year:<br />

I communicated to <strong>the</strong> Secretary, Mr. Lukasiewicz 3 , <strong>the</strong> order of transfer to Budapest on<br />

April 15 th . I will greatly regret Mr. Lukasiewicz’s leaving, especially now that I learned to<br />

appreciate his collaboration.<br />

1<br />

Sau Lucasiewicz.<br />

2<br />

Referire la fruntașul basarabean Ion Pelivan.<br />

3<br />

Or, else, Lucasiewicz.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 117<br />

In case I am to be succeeded at <strong>the</strong> head of this legation by a person from outside <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>diplomatic</strong> corps 1 as I learned from <strong>the</strong> telegrams of Your Excellency, I think that it would<br />

be useful for Mr. Lukasiewicz’s replacement to come as soon as possible to Riga, so that I<br />

can accustom him with his duties and <strong>the</strong> local circumstances.<br />

Generally speaking, I dare make <strong>the</strong> following suggestions regarding <strong>the</strong> completion of<br />

<strong>the</strong> Riga Legation staff. This legation, apart from <strong>the</strong> existing staff (<strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong> mission,<br />

a secretary, an interpreter – typist) should consist, I think, of: Romanian chancellor – typist<br />

and press members. I remind you that, according to <strong>the</strong> latest lists of <strong>the</strong> Latvian Ministry<br />

of Affairs, <strong>the</strong> Legation of <strong>the</strong> United States uses 34 employees, Great Britain uses 17<br />

employees, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union uses 87 employees etc. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>se legations dispose<br />

of <strong>the</strong> services of <strong>the</strong> representative of newspaper and press agencies from <strong>the</strong>ir country.<br />

The supplement of its staff would allow this royal legation to achieve <strong>the</strong> same results as<br />

<strong>the</strong> United States and Great Britain accomplish so thoroughly: monitoring <strong>the</strong> Russian<br />

press, especially <strong>the</strong> technical magazines and publications for ga<strong>the</strong>ring, confronting and<br />

controlling <strong>the</strong> figures and indications within <strong>the</strong> economic, financial, commercial, and<br />

agrarian fields, figures and indications which present more interest and reliability than any<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r information source.<br />

It is true that, apart from <strong>the</strong> problematic case of a palace revolution or any o<strong>the</strong>r<br />

dramatic events occurring in Kremlin, <strong>the</strong> evolution of events in Russia will be probably<br />

exclusively governed by figures. It has been observed that <strong>the</strong> Soviet statistical services<br />

allow for a rectification of <strong>the</strong> information spread by <strong>the</strong>m by o<strong>the</strong>r means. That can be<br />

explained by taking into account <strong>the</strong> difficulty and even <strong>the</strong> impossibility to coordinate <strong>the</strong><br />

falsification and alteration of <strong>the</strong> whole figure system that represents <strong>the</strong> economic activity<br />

of a country. In order to draw from <strong>the</strong> control of this system <strong>the</strong> precious indications<br />

which are placed or can be placed at our disposal, <strong>the</strong> increase of <strong>the</strong> personnel of <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian Legation in Riga would be <strong>the</strong> minimum essential thing to be done.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 228-229.<br />

40. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza nr. 150 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />

24 martie 1930<br />

Domnul Grosvalds, al cărui agrement ca Ministru în București și Varșovia este cerut de<br />

guvernul leton, a fost Ministru al Letoniei în Paris și Helsingfors.<br />

Domnia sa și soția Domniei sale sunt de raporturi sociale extrem de agreabile. Tatăl<br />

domnului Grosvalds fusese el însuși ministru al Letoniei în Stockholm. Domnia sa precum și<br />

familia Domniei sale sunt de obârșie și simțăminte sănătoase burgheze.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 234.<br />

40. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 150 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 24 th March 1930<br />

Mr. Grosvalds, whose presence as Minister in Bucharest and Warsaw is asked by <strong>the</strong><br />

Latvian government, was Minister of Latvia in Paris and Helsingfors.<br />

1<br />

He refers at Ion Pelivan, a leader from Bessarabia.


118 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

He and His Excellency’s wife are in <strong>the</strong> finest social <strong>relations</strong>hip. Mr. Grosvald’s fa<strong>the</strong>r<br />

was <strong>the</strong> Minister of Latvia in Stockholm. His Excellency and His family come from healthy<br />

bourgeois families.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 234.<br />

41. Instrucțiuni ale ministrului afacerilor străine al României Gheorghe G.<br />

Mironescu adresate însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R. Sturdza nr.<br />

35856, 5 iunie 1930<br />

În septembrie viitor vor avea loc alegerile pentru cele 15 locuri de judecători la Curtea<br />

Permanentă de Justiție Internațională, Adunarea și Consiliul Societății Națiunilor fiind organele<br />

care vor proceda la aceste alegeri.<br />

În urma invitației oficiale a Secretariatului General al Societății Națiunilor și pe baza art. 5 și<br />

6 din Statutul Curții Permanente de Justiție Internațională, grupul național român al Curții de<br />

Arbitraj s-a întrunit în ziua de 20 mai a.c. și a recomandat pe Dl. Demetru Negulescu, profesor<br />

universitar, judecător supleant la Curtea Permanentă de Justiție Internațională în calitate de<br />

candidat național pentru viitoarele alegeri.<br />

Rugându-vă să aduceți cele ce preced la cunoștință guvernului leton și celui estonian, veți<br />

binevoi totodată a face cu tot tactul potrivit demersurile verbale ce veți socoti utile spre a căuta<br />

să obțineți votul delegației sale în favoarea candidatului nostru.<br />

Un argument puternic în favoarea candidaturii Domnului Demetru Negulescu este acela că<br />

dânsul, pe lângă cunoașterea teoretică a dreptului internațional, a îndeplinit timp de 9 ani<br />

funcția de judecător la Curtea Permanentă de Justiție Internațională, satisfăcând astfel dorința<br />

exprimată de a X-a Adunare a Societății Națiunilor care cere candidaților nu numai o<br />

competență testată, dar și o competență practică în materie de drept internațional, tocmai<br />

pentru a permite foștilor judecători ai Curții de a avea ascendență asupra celorlalți și a contribui<br />

astfel la continuarea judecăților Curții, conservându-se pe cât va fi posibil foștii magistrați.<br />

Iată rezoluția votată la 14 Septembrie 1929 de a X-a Adunare a Societății Națiunilor:<br />

„L`Assemblée fait sien le voeu ci-après qui a été adopté par la Conférence:<br />

La Conférence exprime le vœu que, conformément à l'esprit des articles 2 et 39 du Statut de<br />

la Cour, les carndidats présentés par les groupes nationaux possèdent une experiénce practique<br />

notoire de droit international et qu`ils soient en mesure de pouvoir au moins lire les deux<br />

langues officielles de la Cour et de parler l`une ou l’autre: elle estime également souhaitable<br />

qu`à la présentation des candidats soit joint un état de leurs services justifiant leur<br />

candidatures.”<br />

Cum dintre numeroșii candidați la viitoarele alegeri (aproximativ 100, unul sau doi de fiecare<br />

stat din cele 54 care compun Societatea Națiunilor) sunt puțini care au funcționat ca judecători<br />

la Curtea Permanentă, vă rog a insista asupra acestei condiții împlinită de candidatul nostru,<br />

condiție care corespunde cerințelor unei Curți permanente, pentru perpetuarea jurisprudenței<br />

sale.<br />

Aici alăturat în copie veți găsi o notiță privitoare la meritele și lucrările care justifică<br />

candidatura Domnului Demetru Negulescu 1 .<br />

Vă rog binevoiți a-mi comunica rezultatul intervenției Dumneavoastră.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 247.<br />

1<br />

CV-ul în limba franceză nu a fost inclus în cadrul acestui volum.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 119<br />

41. Instructions of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu to <strong>the</strong><br />

Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R. Sturdza no. 35856, 5 th June 1930<br />

The elections for filling <strong>the</strong> 15 judge positions of <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court of International<br />

Justice will be carried out next September. The Assembly and <strong>the</strong> Council of <strong>the</strong> League of<br />

Nations are <strong>the</strong> institutions that will deal with <strong>the</strong>se elections.<br />

Following <strong>the</strong> official invitation of <strong>the</strong> General Secretariat of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations and<br />

according to articles 5 and 6 of <strong>the</strong> Statute of <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court of International Justice,<br />

<strong>the</strong> Romanian national group of <strong>the</strong> Arbitration Court has ga<strong>the</strong>red on May 20 th this year<br />

and recommended Mr. Demetru Negulescu, university professor, alternate judge at <strong>the</strong><br />

Permanent Court of International Justice, as national candidate for future elections.<br />

By kindly asking you to inform <strong>the</strong> Latvian and Estonian governments on <strong>the</strong> above<br />

mentioned matter, I am also asking you to be kind enough to make <strong>the</strong> verbal demarches<br />

in order to obtain <strong>the</strong> vote of <strong>the</strong>ir delegations in favor of our candidate.<br />

A strong argument in favor of Mr. Demetru Negulescu’s candidacy is that apart from<br />

knowing <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical part of <strong>the</strong> international law, he was also employed as judge at <strong>the</strong><br />

Permanent Court of International Justice for 9 years thus fulfilling <strong>the</strong> request of <strong>the</strong> 10 th<br />

Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League of Nations asking candidates not only a tested competence but also<br />

a practical competence regarding <strong>the</strong> international law, precisely to enable <strong>the</strong> former<br />

judges of <strong>the</strong> Court to have ascendancy over <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs and to carry on <strong>the</strong> cases of <strong>the</strong><br />

Court.<br />

Here is <strong>the</strong> resolution voted on September 14 th , 1929 by <strong>the</strong> 10 th Assembly of <strong>the</strong> League<br />

of Nations:<br />

„The Assembly endorses <strong>the</strong> following vow which has been adopted by <strong>the</strong> Conference:<br />

The Conference expresses <strong>the</strong> hope that, according to <strong>the</strong> meaning of articles 2 and 39<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Statute of <strong>the</strong> Court, <strong>the</strong> candidates presented by <strong>the</strong> national groups have a widelyknown<br />

practical experience in international law and that <strong>the</strong>y are able to read at least <strong>the</strong><br />

two official languages of <strong>the</strong> Court and to speak one or <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r; it also agrees that it<br />

would be desirable for a service record of <strong>the</strong> candidates, which justifies <strong>the</strong>ir candidatures,<br />

to be attached to <strong>the</strong>ir presentation.”<br />

As among <strong>the</strong> numerous candidates for <strong>the</strong> future elections (almost 100, one or two for<br />

each of <strong>the</strong> 54 states that make <strong>the</strong> League of Nations) <strong>the</strong>re are few who have worked as<br />

judges at <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court, I ask you to insist on this condition met by our candidate, a<br />

condition which corresponds to <strong>the</strong> requirements of a Permanent Court, in order to<br />

perpetuate its jurisprudence.<br />

Enclosed in copy you will find a notice regarding <strong>the</strong> merits and <strong>the</strong> <strong>documents</strong> that<br />

justify Mr. Demetru Negulescu’s candidacy 1 .<br />

I kindly ask you to inform me about <strong>the</strong> results of your intervention.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 247.<br />

1<br />

The CV in French is not included in this volume.


120 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

42. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri al României la Riga Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza nr. 339 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 9<br />

iulie 1930<br />

Răspunzând adresei ministeriale nr. 35856 din 5 iunie curent, am onoarea a informa<br />

Excelența Voastră că Guvernul leton, care este hotărât să nu propună candidat național pentru<br />

locurile de judecători la Curtea Permanentă, mi-a făgăduit formal sprijinul pentru candidatul<br />

României și chiar pentru cei doi candidați ai Micii Înțelegeri, în cazul când s-ar hotărî<br />

prezentarea a două candidaturi din partea acestei grupări politice.<br />

Această făgăduință, bineînțeles, nu prevede cazul, fără nicio probabilitate de altfel, în care<br />

Letonia ar prezenta candidatul ei.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame și rapoarte Riga 1929-1940, vol. 2, fila 257.<br />

42. Diplomatic Report by Romanian Romanian Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia Mihail R.<br />

Sturdza no. 339 to <strong>the</strong> Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu, 9 th July 1930<br />

As a response to <strong>the</strong> Ministerial address no. 35856 of June 5 th of <strong>the</strong> current year, I’m<br />

honored to inform Your Excellency that <strong>the</strong> Latvian Government, which has decided not to<br />

support a national candidate for a judge position at <strong>the</strong> Permanent Court, has formally<br />

promised me to support <strong>the</strong> Romanian candidate and even <strong>the</strong> two candidates of <strong>the</strong> Little<br />

Entente, in case two candidacies from this political group would be decided.<br />

Of course, this promise does not mention <strong>the</strong> case in which Latvia were to present its<br />

candidate.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams and reports, Riga, 1929-1940, vol. 2, s. 257.<br />

43. Latvijas sūtņa Varšavā O. Grosvalda 1 1930. g. 15. jūl. ziņojums Ministru<br />

prezidentam un ārlietu ministram H. Celmiņam 2<br />

Pagodinos ziņot par savu komandējuma braucienu uz Rumāniju.<br />

Izbraucu no Varšavas 6. jūnijā un ierados Bukarestē 8. jūnijā, saziņā ar Rumānijas valdību,<br />

kura bija nolikusi manu audienci pie Pavaldonības uz 10. jūniju. Šis apstāklis jau pierāda, ka<br />

prinča Karola atgriešanās diena (6. jūnija vakars) bijusi zināma tikai nedaudzām personām<br />

Rumānijā. Prinča nodomi valdībai bez šaubām bija zināmi, bet atgriešanās datums nolikts<br />

saziņā tikai ar dažiem prinča tuvākiem draugiem un militāriem palīgiem.<br />

8. jūnijā Bukareste atradās entuziasma varā un vienā dienā ar lielu sajūsmu izveda visas<br />

režīma maiņas valststiesiskās formalitātes. Abas likumdevējas iestādes anulēja nelaiķa karaļa<br />

Ferdinanda 1926. g. 4. janvāra aktu un iecēla princi Karolu par valdnieku. Būtu lieki atkārtot no<br />

preses pazīstamos faktus, gribu tikai īsumā attēlot iespaidus, kādus guvu kā šo notikumu<br />

aculiecinieks.<br />

Karola iecelšanu par valdnieku galvaspilsēta un visa zeme apsveica ar lielu sajūsmu.<br />

Rumānijas sliktais saimnieciskais stāvoklis pēdējā laikā bija palicis sevišķi akūts un pavaldonība<br />

1<br />

Oļģerds Grosvalds (1884–1962), Latvijas diplomāts. 1919.–1924. g. diplomātiskais pārstāvis, sūtnis Francijā, no 1921.<br />

g. – arī Beļģijā un Nīderlandē ar sēdekli Parīzē, 1925.–1930. g. sūtnis Somijā, 1930.–1934. g. sūtnis Polijā un<br />

Rumānijā ar sēdekli Varšavā (1930.–1931. g. arī Austrijā, 1932.–1934. g. arī Ungārijā), no 1934. g. sūtnis Francijā.<br />

Miris Parīzē.<br />

2<br />

Hugo Eduards Celmiņš (1877–1941), Latvijas diplomāts, valstsvīrs. 1920.–1921. g. zemkopības ministrs, 1923.–1924.<br />

g. izglītības ministrs, 1924.–1925. un 1928.–1931. g. Ministru prezidents (1930.–1931. g. arī ārlietu ministrs), 1931.–<br />

1935. g. Rīgas pilsētas galva, 1935.–1938. g. sūtnis Vācijā, Austrijā un Nīderlandē ar sēdekli Berlīnē. Nogalināts<br />

padomju apcietinājumā.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 121<br />

nebija pratusi tikt ar grūtībām galā. Šis orgāns, kā zināms, sastādījās no prinča Nikolaja, nelaiķa<br />

karaļa Ferdinanda otra dēla, Kasācijas tiesas priekšsēdētāja un Metropolīta. Princis Nikolajs,<br />

kuram Pavaldonībā pienācās pirmā vieta, maz interesējās par valsts darīšanām un vēlējās pat<br />

atstāt Rumāniju, lai dzīvotu ārzemēs ar kādu dāmu. Karaliene – māte, Marija, zem kuras<br />

iespaida princis Karols savā laikā tika izraidīts un tika nodibināta Pavaldonība, sanāca konfliktā<br />

arī ar otro dēlu – princi Nikolaju un nepretojās vairs aktīvi prinča Karola atnākšanai. Tādā veidā<br />

Pavaldonība izvērtās par nespēcīgu un bālu institūtu, un valdošā agrāriešu partija, kurai<br />

parlamentā pieder nospiedošais vairākums, sāka gatavot ceļu prinča Karola atbraukšanai.<br />

Opozīcijā palika tikai liberāļu partija, kurai mazs biedru skaits, bet kura rekrutējas galvenā kārtā<br />

no lielo finansistu aprindām. Atsaucot atpakaļ princi Karolu un nosēdinot to uz troņa, agrārieši<br />

cerēja atspiest pie malas liberāļus un nostiprināt savu stāvokli. Šis manevrs agrāriešiem spīdoši<br />

izdevies, jo 8. jūnija apvērsums visā valstī noritēja mierīgi, bez mazākās nekārtības.<br />

Galvaspilsētā notika sajūsmas pilnas manifestācijas, un no sarunām ar dažādu aprindu<br />

pārstāvjiem guvu iespaidu, ka sabiedrība apmierināta ar jauno režīmu un sagaida no tā apstākļu<br />

uzlabošanos.<br />

[..] No ārienes skatoties, Rumānijas tagadējais režīms izliekas pietiekoši stabilizēts. Lielā<br />

agrāriešu partija, kas parlamentā sastāda 4/5 vairākumu, pārvalda situāciju. Liberāļu partija, kā<br />

dzirdēju Bukarestē no diplomātu aprindām, rudenī, parlamenta sanākšanas laikā, pilnīgi<br />

piesliešoties jaunajam režīmam.<br />

Bet grūtības meklējamas iekšējos apstākļos. „Īsta karaļa” nostāšanās valsts priekšgalā, „stipra<br />

vara” un partiju samierināšanās tagadējā brīdī var apžilbināt tautas acis, bet grūtības, kuru<br />

priekšā atrodas Rumānija, paliek tās pašas. Ja tās grib uzskaitīt, tad jāmin vispirms karaliskās<br />

ģimenes nesaskaņas un dēkas, jaunā karaļa vieglais raksturs un valdnieka amatam nesagatavotā<br />

personība. Te var slēpties monarhistiskā režīma krišanas pazīmes. Tad – ārkārtīgi grūtais<br />

apvienošanas darbs, kas vēl „Lielajā Rumānijā” („Romania Mare”) nav nobeigts. Rumānija no<br />

mazas valsts (7 milj. pirms kara) pārvērtusies par lielu valsti (17 milj.), un agrākās<br />

Austroungārijas Transilvānija, Banats un Bukovina, kā arī agrākās Krievijas Besarābija<br />

saimnieciski, administratīvi un juridiski vēl dzīvo savu īpatnējo dzīvi. Rumānija, kurai šie gardie<br />

kumosi iekrita mutē pēc pasaules kara, nav vēl pratusi asimilēt šos lielos apgabalus (kuros dzīvo<br />

ļoti stipras minoritātes). Ja Besarābijā Rumānijai darīšana ar zemāku – krievu – kultūru, tad<br />

Transilvānijā jaunais Rumānijas režīms nav spējis atvietot ungāru civilizatorisko darbību un<br />

labo administrāciju. Pēdīgi, jāmin rumāņu tautas vājības – korupcija, nekārtība, slinkums, kā arī<br />

visas Eiropas agrārās valstis aptverošā smagā lauksaimniecības krīze.<br />

Ārējā politika. Rumānijā visvairāk atbalstās uz Franciju un abām Mazās Antantes valstīm –<br />

Čehoslovākiju un Jugoslāviju. Tomēr ar šo pēdējo valsti attiecības nav vislabākās, jo<br />

Dienvidslāvija nav īsti apmierināta ar robežas novilkšanu. Vispārīgi jāsaka, ka visu valstu starpā,<br />

kuru teritorija pieaugusi pēc pasaules kara, Rumānija saņēmusi no Sabiedrotajiem ar<br />

visdevīgāko roku kaisītas dāvanas. Ienaidnieki saka, ka Rumānija dabūjusi tik treknus kumosus,<br />

ka nu nezinot, kā tos sagremot. No šejienes izriet viņas nesamierināmais konflikts ar Ungāriju,<br />

kura nekad neaizmirsīs bagāto Transilvāniju un dažus miljonus ungāru tautas brāļus, kā arī<br />

vienmēr vēl draudošais Besarābijas jautājums.<br />

Iekšējā politikā jāatzīmē, ka Rumānijā, kā agrārvalstī, nav asu šķiru pretišķību; nerunājot<br />

nemaz par komunismu, pat sociāldemokrātijai te tikai pavisam niecīgs skaits piekritēju. Nav te<br />

arī sadrumstaloto politisko partiju cīņas, jo patiesībā jārēķinās tikai ar divām lielām partijām –


122 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

agrāriešiem un liberāļiem, kura viena pēc otras valdījušas pēc angļu sistēmas (ja tāds<br />

salīdzinājums būtu iespējams). Ja nu vēl ņem vērā šīs zemes lielās dabas bagātības (petroleja,<br />

labība, sāls, dārgmetāli u. t. t.), tad „Lielai Rumānijai”, šķiet, varētu pareģot spīdošu nākotni. Bet<br />

tomēr šī valsts pārdzīvo smagu krīzi, uz kuras cēloņiem esmu jau agrāk aizrādījis. Dinastiskā<br />

iekārtā, administrācijā, saimnieciskā organizācijā un tautas morālē saskatāmi tik lieli trūkumi,<br />

ka Rumānijas stabilitāte nebūt neliekas pilnīgi nodrošināta, un ka politiski un saimnieciski<br />

satricinājumi ļoti iespējami.<br />

Ierados Bukarestē 8. jūnijā, ar „lettres de créance” 1 uz karaļa Mihaja vārdu. Kaut gan sākumā<br />

man deva cerību, ka varēšot iesniegt šo dokumentu (ar Mūsu Valsts Prezidenta telegrāfisku<br />

papildinājumu), tad tomēr pēc dažām dienām man paziņoja, ka vajagot jaunas pilnvaras<br />

(acīmredzot, jaunais karalis uz to bija pastāvējis). Biju tās jau tūliņ 8. jūnijā izlūdzies telegrāfiski<br />

no Rīgas; tās ar lielu precizitāti tika Rīgā izgatavotas un izsūtītas, tā kā jau 16. jūnijā jaunās<br />

lettres de créance bija man rokā. Tomēr mana audience pie karaļa tika nolikta tikai uz 20. jūniju!<br />

Te jāpiezīmē, ka Rumānijā viss iet ļoti lēni, laiks te nespēlē nekādu lomu, un uz doto vārdu grūti<br />

paļauties. Biju atbraucis Rumānijā ļoti neizdevīgā brīdī, jo visi prāti bija aizņemti ar režīma<br />

maiņu un iekšējiem jautājumiem. Bet šos notikumus, kā jau teicu, neviens nevarēja iepriekš<br />

paredzēt un Rumānijas valdība man bija noteikti solījusi audienci uz 10. jūniju.<br />

Kaut gan nevarēju vēl taisīt oficiālas vizītes, tad tomēr izlietoju laiku, lai apmeklētu ārlietu<br />

ministru Mironesku, Ārlietu ministrijas augstākos ierēdņus un kolēģus, kā arī, lai iepazītos ar<br />

Rumānijas politiku un saimniecību. Iepazinos arī ar tirdzniecības un rūpniecības ministru V.<br />

Madgearu, spējīgu un ievērojamu valstsvīru. Jākonstatē, ka Latvija un vispārīgi Ziemeļu valstis<br />

Rumānijā tikpat kā nepazīstamas, un ka sabiedrībai par šo Eiropas daļu nav nekādas intereses.<br />

Latvijas labā ļoti daudz darījis mūsu enerģiskais un rosīgais ģenerālkonsuls T. Orgidans,<br />

Bukarestes Tirdzniecības kameras priekšsēdētājs un sabiedrībā vispār ļoti iecienīta persona.<br />

Rumāņu preses apstākļus labi raksturo tas fakts, ka ārzemju sūtņiem, ja tie vēlas laikrakstos<br />

ievietot kādu interview, 2 vienkārši par to – jāmaksā redakcijai, un pie tam vēl diezgan sālīta<br />

cena... Man tomēr izdevās vairākās avīzēs ievietot sarunas, pateicoties ģenerālkonsula Orgidana<br />

palīdzībai, kurš šim nolūkam izlietoja žurnālistus, kas stāv viņa vadītās Tirdzniecības kameras<br />

dienestā.<br />

Tirdzniecības līguma lietā man bija garāka saruna ar tirdzniecības un rūpniecības ministru<br />

Madgearu, kurš izsacījās, ka Rumānija vispirms vēloties nobeigt iesāktās līguma sarunas ar<br />

Angliju, Franciju, Vāciju, Čehoslovākiju un Poliju, un tad iesākt sarunas ar mums. Kā Ārlietu<br />

ministrijā noskaidroju, tad princis Sturdza nebija pilnvarots vest sarunas (vismaz līdz tam<br />

laikam nē). Jau pēc manas aizbraukšanas no Bukarestes nāca paziņojums par minimālo likmju<br />

piemērošanas termiņa pagarināšanu līdz 1. septembrim un uzaicinājums slēgt pagaidu<br />

tirdzniecības nolīgumu.<br />

20. jūnijā mani aizveda vecmodīgā galma karietē uz pili, kur mani pieņēma karalis Karols II.<br />

Pasniedzu viņam savas pilnvaras un sūtņa M. Nukšas kunga atsaukšanas grāmatas, ar runu,<br />

kuras tekstu te pielieku klāt. Audiencē piedalījās karaļa brālis princis Nikolajs un ārlietu<br />

ministrs Mironesku. Karalis atbildēja man ar sirsnīgu runu, kuras tekstu tas nolasīja no papīra.<br />

(Tekstu man neizsniedza, jo tas neesot parasts, pēc turienes etiķetes). Runā atkārtots apmēram<br />

1<br />

Lettres de créance (franču val.) – akreditācijas raksts.<br />

2<br />

Interview (angļu val.) – intervija.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 123<br />

tas pats domu gājiens, kā manā uzrunā. Pēc tam apmainījāmies ar karali parastām laipnības<br />

frāzēm. Pilī man stādīja priekšā karaļa civilo un militāro namu.<br />

Pie pils bija uzstādīta goda sardze ar karogu, pie kam orķestris nospēlēja Latvijas valsts<br />

himnu.<br />

Pēc tam mani ar to pašu ceremoniālu aizvadīja uz viesnīcu.<br />

Caur Ārlietu ministriju nodevu arī mūsu Valsts Prezidenta A. Kvieša 1 kunga paziņojumu par<br />

stāšanos amatā un sūtņa M. Nukšas kunga lettres de créance uz karaļa Mihaja vārda, kas man<br />

bija uzdots.<br />

21. jūnijā izbraucu uz Austriju.<br />

LVVA, 2574. f., 3. apr., 750. l., 169.–177. lp.<br />

43. Report by Latvia’s Envoy in Warsaw O. Grosvalds 2 to Prime Minister and Minister<br />

of Foreign Affairs H. Celmiņš 3 , 15 th July 1930<br />

I have <strong>the</strong> honour to report to you about my official trip to Romania.<br />

I left Warsaw on 6 th June and arrived in Bucharest on 8 th June as had been agreed on with<br />

Romania’s government, which had made an appointment for me with <strong>the</strong> Regency on 10 th June.<br />

This fact alone shows that only a few persons in Romania knew <strong>the</strong> date of Prince Carol’s return<br />

(evening of 6 th June). The Prince’s intentions were, no doubt, known to <strong>the</strong> government, but <strong>the</strong><br />

date of his return had been planned in communication with only a few closest friends and<br />

military allies of <strong>the</strong> Prince.<br />

On 8 th June Bucharest was overwhelmed with enthusiasm and with great delight performed<br />

all <strong>the</strong> judicial formalities of <strong>the</strong> change of regime. The both legislative authorities annulled late<br />

King Ferdinand’s act of 4 th January, 1926 and appointed Prince Carol 4 as <strong>the</strong> monarch. It would<br />

be redundant to repeat <strong>the</strong> facts, which are well-known from <strong>the</strong> press, I would like only briefly<br />

to describe <strong>the</strong> impressions that I got as an eyewitness of <strong>the</strong> respective events.<br />

Carol’s appointment as <strong>the</strong> monarch was welcomed by <strong>the</strong> capital and entire country with<br />

great enthusiasm. Of late <strong>the</strong> poor economic situation of Romania has become particularly<br />

acute and <strong>the</strong> Regency has been unable to cope with <strong>the</strong> difficulties. This body, as we know,<br />

consisted of Prince Nicolae 5 , late King Ferdinand’s second son, <strong>the</strong> chairman of <strong>the</strong> Supreme<br />

Court of Appeal and <strong>the</strong> Metropolitan. Prince Nicolae, who was due to be number one in <strong>the</strong><br />

regency, took little interest in state affairs and even wanted to leave Romania in order to live<br />

abroad with a lady. The queen-mo<strong>the</strong>r Marie, under <strong>the</strong> impact of whom Prince Carol had been<br />

exiled and <strong>the</strong> board of regents was founded, came into conflict also with her second son –<br />

1<br />

Alberts Kviesis (1881–1944), Latvijas valstsvīrs. 1921.–1923. g. iekšlietu ministrs, 1926.–1930. g. Saeimas<br />

priekšsēdētāja biedrs, 1930.–1936. g. Valsts prezidents.<br />

2<br />

Oļģerds Grosvalds (1884–1962), Latvian diplomat. 1919–1924 <strong>diplomatic</strong> representative, Envoy of Latvia to France,<br />

from 1921 – also to Belgium and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands with seat in Paris, 1925–1930 Envoy to Finland, 1930–1934 Envoy to<br />

Poland and Romania with seat in Warsaw (1930–1931 also to Austria and 1932–1934 – also to Hungary), from 1934<br />

Envoy to France. Died in Paris.<br />

3<br />

Hugo Eduards Celmiņš (1877–1941), Latvian diplomat, statesman. 1920–1921 Minister of Agriculture, 1923–1924<br />

Minister of Education, 1924–1925 and 1928–1931 Prime Minister (1930–1931 also Minister of Foreign Affairs), 1931–<br />

1935 May or of Riga City, 1935–1938 Envoy to Germany, Austria and Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands with seat in Berlin. Executed in<br />

Soviet imprisonment.<br />

4<br />

Carol II of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (1893-1953) was King of Romania (1930-1940). Famous by his amorous<br />

escapades, nicknamed <strong>the</strong> Playboy King.<br />

5<br />

Prince Nicolae of Romania, Prince of Hohenzollern (1903-1978), was <strong>the</strong> second son of King Ferdinand I.<br />

Memeber of <strong>the</strong> Regency Council between 1927-1930.


124 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

Prince Nicolae – and no longer actively resisted <strong>the</strong> return of Prince Carol. In this way <strong>the</strong> board<br />

of regents turned into a feeble and colourless institution and <strong>the</strong> leading Farmers’ Party, which<br />

has overwhelming majority in <strong>the</strong> parliament, began to pave <strong>the</strong> way for Prince Carol’s return.<br />

In opposition <strong>the</strong>re remained only <strong>the</strong> Liberal Party, which has a small number of members,<br />

who, however, are recruited mainly from <strong>the</strong> circles of large financiers. By calling Prince Carol<br />

back and placing him on <strong>the</strong> throne, <strong>the</strong> Farmers hoped to push <strong>the</strong> Liberals aside and to secure<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir own positions. The Farmers have performed this manoeuvre with signal success, because<br />

<strong>the</strong> coup of 8 th June took place peacefully, without <strong>the</strong> least disorder in <strong>the</strong> entire country.<br />

Enthusiastic manifestations took place in <strong>the</strong> capital and from discussions with representatives<br />

of various circles I gained <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> society is satisfied with <strong>the</strong> new regime and<br />

expects from it improvement of <strong>the</strong> situation.<br />

[...] Looking from outside, <strong>the</strong> present regime in Romania seems to be sufficiently stabilised.<br />

The large Farmers’ Party, which has <strong>the</strong> majority of 4/5 in <strong>the</strong> parliament, is in control of <strong>the</strong><br />

situation. In <strong>the</strong> autumn as <strong>the</strong> parliament convenes <strong>the</strong> Liberal Party, as I heard in <strong>the</strong><br />

diplomats’ circle in Bucharest, will fully side with <strong>the</strong> new regime.<br />

The difficulties, however, hide in <strong>the</strong> preceding conditions. At <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong> coming of “a<br />

real king” at <strong>the</strong> helm of <strong>the</strong> nation, “strong rule” and reconciliation of parties may dazzle <strong>the</strong><br />

people, but difficulties that Romania is facing, remain <strong>the</strong> same. If one wants to list it, one<br />

should start with <strong>the</strong> discords and affairs in <strong>the</strong> Royal family, <strong>the</strong> new King’s flippant character<br />

and his personality, which is unprepared for <strong>the</strong> position of a monarch. This aspect may hide<br />

signals of <strong>the</strong> fall of <strong>the</strong> monarchist regime. Then – <strong>the</strong> extremely difficult task of unification in<br />

“Great Romania” („Romania Mare”) that has not been completed yet. From a small country<br />

(population of 7 million before <strong>the</strong> war) Romania has turned into a large country (population of<br />

17 million) and previously Austro-Hungary’s Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina as well as<br />

previously Russia’s Bessarabia in economic, administrative and juridical terms still live <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

own specific lives. Having <strong>the</strong>se tasty morsels fall into its mouth after <strong>the</strong> World War, Romania<br />

still has not been able to assimilate <strong>the</strong>se large regions (inhabited by very strong ethnic<br />

minorities). While in Bessarabia Romania has to deal with a lower – Russian – culture, in<br />

Transylvania <strong>the</strong> new Romanian regime has not been able to replace <strong>the</strong> civilizing work and<br />

good administration of <strong>the</strong> Hungarians. Finally, one must mention <strong>the</strong> weak points of <strong>the</strong><br />

Romanian people: corruption, lack of order and laziness as well as <strong>the</strong> grave agricultural crisis,<br />

which encompasses all <strong>the</strong> agrarian countries in Europe.<br />

Foreign policy. Romania most of all relies on France and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r two members of <strong>the</strong> Little<br />

Entente: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. However, its <strong>relations</strong> with <strong>the</strong> latter are not <strong>the</strong> best,<br />

because Yugoslavia is not quite satisfied with <strong>the</strong> delineation of <strong>the</strong> border. In general, one<br />

should say that of <strong>the</strong> two countries, whose territory has grown after <strong>the</strong> war, Romania has<br />

received <strong>the</strong> most generous gifts from <strong>the</strong> Allies. Enemies say that Romania has got morsels so<br />

fat that now it is not able to digest <strong>the</strong>m. From this follows its irreconcilable conflict with<br />

Hungary, which will never forget <strong>the</strong> wealthy Transylvania and a few millions of its Hungarian<br />

bro<strong>the</strong>rs, and <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> constantly threatening issue of Bessarabia.<br />

Domestic policy: In this regard it should be noted that, Romania being an agrarian country,<br />

<strong>the</strong>re are no sharp class differences <strong>the</strong>re; let alone Communism, even Social Democracy has<br />

only a very small number of supporters. A struggle among fragmented political parties is also<br />

missing, because in fact <strong>the</strong>re are only two large parties – <strong>the</strong> Farmers and <strong>the</strong> Liberals – which


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 125<br />

have taken turns to govern following <strong>the</strong> English system (if such a comparison was possible). If<br />

we also consider <strong>the</strong> rich natural resources of this country (kerosene [oil], grain, salt, precious<br />

metals etc.), it seems that a bright future can be predicted for “Great Romania”. Yet this country<br />

is going through a difficult crisis, <strong>the</strong> causes of which I have mentioned earlier. Faults so great<br />

can be seen in <strong>the</strong> dynastic system, administration, organization of economy and <strong>the</strong> people’s<br />

morals that Romania’s stability does not seem fully secured at all and political and economic<br />

shocks are very likely.<br />

I arrived in Romania on 8 th June with „lettres de créance” 1 addressed to King Mihai 2 .<br />

Although at first I was given hope that I would be allowed to hand in this document (with a<br />

supplement by our President received by telegraph), a few days later I was told that I needed<br />

new credentials (apparently <strong>the</strong> new King had insisted on that). Right away on 8 th June I had<br />

requested <strong>the</strong>m by telegraph; <strong>the</strong>y were drawn up in Riga and dispatched with great precision<br />

so that already on 16 th June I had <strong>the</strong> new lettres de créance. However, my audience with <strong>the</strong><br />

King was scheduled only for 20 th June! It should be remarked here that in Romania everything<br />

happens very slowly, time plays no role here and one can hardly rely on <strong>the</strong> given word. I had<br />

arrived in Romania at a very inconvenient time because all minds were busy with <strong>the</strong> change of<br />

regime and with domestic issues. But nobody could have predicted <strong>the</strong>se events, as I said<br />

earlier, and Romania’s government had firmly promised me an audience on 10 th June.<br />

Although I could not pay official visits, I used <strong>the</strong> time to visit Minister of Foreign Affairs<br />

Mironescu, <strong>the</strong> highest-ranking civil servants at <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and my<br />

colleagues as well as to become acquainted with Romania’s politics and economy. I also made<br />

acquaintance with Minister of Commerce and Industry V. Madgearu 3 , an able and prominent<br />

statesman. One has to draw <strong>the</strong> conclusion that Latvia and <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn countries in general<br />

are almost unknown in Romania and <strong>the</strong> public shows no interest at all in this part of Europe.<br />

For Latvia very much has been done by our energetic and active General Consul T. Orghidan,<br />

Chairman of <strong>the</strong> Bucharest Chamber of Commerce and in general a very popular person in<br />

society.<br />

The condition of <strong>the</strong> Romanian press is well characterized by <strong>the</strong> fact that foreign envoys, if<br />

<strong>the</strong>y wish to have an interview with a newspaper, simply have to pay for it – and a ra<strong>the</strong>r stiff<br />

price at that... Never<strong>the</strong>less I managed to place discussions [interviews] in several newspapers,<br />

thanks to General Consul Orghidan, who for this purpose used journalists who are in <strong>the</strong><br />

service of <strong>the</strong> Chamber of Commerce that he administrates.<br />

On <strong>the</strong> issue of trade agreement I had a lengthy discussion with Minister of Commerce and<br />

Industry Madgearu, who said that Romania first wanted to finalize <strong>the</strong> commenced<br />

negotiations on <strong>the</strong> agreement with England, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland and<br />

<strong>the</strong>n to begin negotiations with us. In <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs I found out that Prince<br />

Sturdza had not been authorised to conduct negotiations (at least not by that time). After I had<br />

1<br />

Lettres de créance (French) – letters of credence.<br />

2<br />

Mihai I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (born 1921), King of Romania (1927-1930 – under regency and 1940-1947),<br />

dethroned by <strong>the</strong> Communist regime. Awarded with <strong>the</strong> Soviet Order of Victory by Stalin. Lives in Romania.<br />

3<br />

Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940) was a Romanian politician, economist and sociologist, ideologist of <strong>the</strong> doctrine of<br />

Țărănism. Murdered by <strong>the</strong> Iron Guard.<br />

irgil Traian N. Madgearu (n. 14 decembrie 1887, Galați — d. 27 noiembrie 1940, pădurea Snagov) a fost un<br />

economist român, sociolog, și politician de stânga, membru prominent și principal teoretician al Partidului<br />

Țărănesc și al succesorului său, Partidul Național Țărănesc (PNȚ).


126 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

already left Bucharest I received a notification on <strong>the</strong> extension of <strong>the</strong> term of application of<br />

minimal rates until 1 st September and an invitation to conclude a temporary Trade Agreement.<br />

On 20 th June in an old-fashioned royal carriage I was taken to <strong>the</strong> palace, where I was<br />

received by King Carol II. I handed him my credentials and <strong>the</strong> letter of recall of Envoy Mr. M.<br />

Nukša with a speech, <strong>the</strong> text of which I hereby attach. King’s bro<strong>the</strong>r Prince Nicolae and<br />

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mironescu also were present at <strong>the</strong> audience. The King replied with<br />

a cordial speech, which he read out from a paper (I was not given <strong>the</strong> text of it, because, as I was<br />

told, it is not customary to do so, according to <strong>the</strong>ir etiquette). His speech contained<br />

approximately <strong>the</strong> same stream of thought as mine. Then <strong>the</strong> King and I exchanged <strong>the</strong><br />

customary phrases of courtesy. In <strong>the</strong> Palace I was presented <strong>the</strong> King’s civilian and military<br />

courts.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> Palace <strong>the</strong>re stood a guard of honour with a flag and an orchestra played <strong>the</strong> National<br />

An<strong>the</strong>m of Latvia.<br />

After that I was taken back to hotel with <strong>the</strong> same ceremonial.<br />

Through <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs I submitted also our President M. A. Kviesis’ 1<br />

statement of [my] coming to office and Envoy Mr. M. Nukša’s lettres de créance addressed to<br />

King Mihai as I was instructed to do.<br />

On 21 st June I departed for Austria.<br />

SHAL, f. 2574, d. 3, file 750, s. 169–177.<br />

44. Telegrama Legației României la Riga nr. 550 semnată de secretarul de legație<br />

Ioachim Dăianu către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />

9 septembrie 1930<br />

Presa locală letonă, rusă și germană se ocupă de primirea nepoliticoasă a aviatorilor letoni la<br />

București afirmând că au fost alungați de la aerodromul militar de către soldați. Ofițerii nu au<br />

salutat, autoritățile militare și civile nu au întâmpinat, numai Consulul General al Letoniei [a<br />

făcut oficiile de gazdă]. Colonelul Indans 2 , șeful aviației militare, a declarat presei [că]<br />

pretutindeni a fost primit foarte bine afară de București. Din această cauză, neodihniți, a doua<br />

zi dimineață [au] părăsit București. Presa socialistă se miră că reprezentantul României aici<br />

Domnul Sturdza se bucură de ospitalitatea Letoniei. Au apărut articole de presă în termeni<br />

foarte răi ca: nemaipomenită inospitalitate și primire foarte necorectă. Rog binevoiți a-mi<br />

comunica de urgență motivul întemeiat, scuza [pe care o] vom putea invoca sau binevoiți a da<br />

dezmințire.<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 66<br />

1<br />

Alberts Kviesis (1881–1944), Latvian statesman. 1921–1923 Minister of Interior, 1926–1930 Deputy Chairman of <strong>the</strong><br />

Saeima (parliament), 1930–1936 President of Latvia.<br />

2<br />

Janis Indans (1895-1941) a fost un renumit general leton de aviație, participant la numeroase festivaluri aviatice. A<br />

întreprins zboruri de bunăvoință în Letonia, Lituania, Scandinavia și Europa. Atașat militar al țării sale în Lituania.<br />

În septembrie 1930 a condus un zbor al bunăvoinței în Europa. A fost arestat, deportat și executat de autoritățile<br />

sovietice la Moscova.


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 127<br />

44. Telegram of <strong>the</strong> Romanian Legation in Riga no. 550 signed by <strong>the</strong> Legation<br />

secretary Ioachim Dăianu to <strong>the</strong> Romanian Foreign Minister Gheorghe G. Mironescu,<br />

9 th September 1930<br />

The Latvian, Russian and German local press is dealing with <strong>the</strong> discourteous welcome<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Latvian aviators in Bucharest, saying that <strong>the</strong>y were expelled by <strong>the</strong> soldiers from <strong>the</strong><br />

military aerodrome. The officers did not salute, <strong>the</strong> military and civil authorities did not<br />

welcome <strong>the</strong>m, with <strong>the</strong> exception of <strong>the</strong> General Consul of Latvia. Colonel Indans 1 , <strong>the</strong><br />

head of <strong>the</strong> air force, told <strong>the</strong> press that he had been warmly welcomed everywhere except<br />

for Bucharest. That is why, in spite of being tired, <strong>the</strong>y left Bucharest <strong>the</strong> next morning.<br />

The socialist press is intrigued that <strong>the</strong> representative of Romania here, Mr. Sturdza, is<br />

enjoying Latvia’s hospitality. There are press articles that speak about: extraordinary<br />

inhospitality and improper welcoming. I kindly ask you to immediately give me a<br />

consistent reason, <strong>the</strong> excuse that we shall invoke, or be kind enough to refute <strong>the</strong><br />

accusations.<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 66.<br />

45. Telegrama semnată de secretarul de stat al Ministerului Afacerilor Străine al<br />

României Grigore Gafencu 2 și de Dimitrie C. Pennescu 3 nr. 56661 adresată Legației<br />

României la Riga, 22 septembrie 1930<br />

Drept răspuns la telegrama Dvs. nr. 550 controlând împrejurările în care a avut loc vizita<br />

ofițerilor letoni la București am constatat că Consulul General leton, Dl. Orghidan, a înștiințat<br />

inspectoratul aeronauticii prin scrisoarea din 4 septembrie numărul 102 că trei avioane militare<br />

letone vor sosi la ora șaptesprezece jumătate [la] aerodromul Băneasa, aviația militară<br />

convenind să facă primire oficială la aerodromul sus-zis ales pentru aterizare; deși aerodromul<br />

era civil autoritățile militare [au] așteptat la această oră avioanele letone. Acestea [au] aterizat<br />

însă [la] aerodromul militar Pipera unde nu aștepta nimeni. De acolo au fost îndrumate la<br />

Băneasa. Aviatorii și-au exprimat mirarea că nu au fost primiți pe aerodromul militar. Faptul se<br />

datorează, după cum am spus, consulului Letoniei. Aviatorii au fost așteptați în locul pe care<br />

[ei] înșiși l-au anunțat. De altfel, aerodromul Băneasa, cel mai mare din București, [este]<br />

aerodromul [ce găzduiește] deseori recepții oficiale. Ofițerii au părăsit capitala a doua zi, deși ei<br />

fuseseră invitați în mod oficial [la] recepția aeroclubului regal în onoarea lor.<br />

Binevoiți a da aceste explicații [indescifrabil] și presei. Nimeni nu a avut intenția de a jigni<br />

reprezentanții unui stat amic. Dimpotrivă, s-au făcut pregătiri pentru primire oficială, serbare<br />

oficială în cinstea lor. Dacă nu au profitat de aceste pregătiri, [a fost] din cauza [unei]<br />

regretabile neînțelegeri. Semnat [Grigore] Gafencu.<br />

A se vedea nr. 561 la dosarul presei /IV/6)<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, Telegrame Riga 1929-1939, vol. 1, fila 68<br />

1<br />

Janis Indans (1895-1941) was a famous Latvian general of aviation, participated in numerous flight festivals. He<br />

undertook goodwill flights to Latvia, Lithuania, Scandinavia and Europe. He was his country's military attaché in<br />

Lithuania. In September 1930 he led a goodwill flight to Europe. He was arrested, deported and executed by <strong>the</strong><br />

Soviet authorities in Moscow.<br />

2<br />

Grigore Gafencu (1892-1957) a fost diplomat, om politic și jurnalist român, fondator al agenției de presă Rador,<br />

Ministru al Afacerilor Străine (1938-1940), Ministru al României în U.R.S.S. (1940-1941), membru proeminent al<br />

exilului românesc și al mișcării paneuropene.<br />

3<br />

Dimitrie C. Pennescu (1874-1938) a fost diplomat român de carieră, primul ministru plenipotențiar al României<br />

pe lângă Sfântul Scaun (1920-1928), ulterior fiind desemnat în acceași calitate la Stockholm (1928-1929).


128 | THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958)<br />

45. Telegram signed by <strong>the</strong> State Secretary of <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of<br />

Romania Grigore Gafencu 1 and Dimitrie C. Pennescu 2 no. 56661 to <strong>the</strong> Romanian<br />

Legation in Riga, 22 nd September 1930<br />

As an answer to your telegram no. 550 controlling <strong>the</strong> circumstances in which <strong>the</strong> visit<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Latvian officers in Bucharest took place, I found that <strong>the</strong> General Consul of Latvia,<br />

Mr. Orghidan, informed <strong>the</strong> Inspectorate of Aerial Navigation through letter no. 102 of<br />

September 4 th that three Latvian military aircrafts would lend at 5 PM on Băneasa airport,<br />

<strong>the</strong> air force agreeing to give an official welcome at <strong>the</strong> above mentioned aerodrome which<br />

has been chosen for landing; although <strong>the</strong> aerodrome was civilian, <strong>the</strong> military authorities<br />

awaited <strong>the</strong> Latvian aircrafts at <strong>the</strong> mentioned hour. However, <strong>the</strong>y landed on <strong>the</strong> Pipera<br />

military aerodrome where nobody was expecting <strong>the</strong>m. From <strong>the</strong>re, <strong>the</strong>y were guided to<br />

Băneasa. The aviators seemed surprised that <strong>the</strong>y were not welcomed on <strong>the</strong> military<br />

aerodrome. This happened, as I said, because of <strong>the</strong> consul of Latvia. The aviators were<br />

awaited in <strong>the</strong> place that <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>mselves announced. Actually, <strong>the</strong> Băneasa aerodrome, <strong>the</strong><br />

biggest from Bucharest, often hosts official receptions. The officers left <strong>the</strong> capital <strong>the</strong> next<br />

day although <strong>the</strong>y had been officially invited to <strong>the</strong> reception given by <strong>the</strong> Royal Airclub in<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir honor.<br />

Please be kind enough to give <strong>the</strong>se explanations to [indecipherable] to <strong>the</strong> press too.<br />

Nobody had <strong>the</strong> intention of insulting <strong>the</strong> representatives of a friendly country. On <strong>the</strong><br />

contrary, preparations for <strong>the</strong>ir official reception have been made, with an official festivity<br />

in <strong>the</strong>ir honor. The fact that <strong>the</strong>y did not benefit from those preparations was because of a<br />

regrettable misunderstanding.<br />

Signed [Grigore] Gafencu.<br />

See no. 561 in <strong>the</strong> press record /IV/6)<br />

DARMFA, f. 71/1920-1944, Latvia, Telegrams, Riga, 1929-1939, vol. 1, s. 68.<br />

46. Raportul <strong>diplomatic</strong> al însărcinatului cu afaceri ad interim al României la Riga<br />

Ioachim Dăianu nr. 566 către Ministrul Afacerilor Străine al României Gheorghe G.<br />

Mironescu, 24 septembrie 1930<br />

Ca urmare la raportul meu nr. 561 din 18 septembrie curent am onoarea a vă face cunoscut<br />

că în lipsa titularului Ministerului Afacerilor Străine leton, m-am prezentat la Secretarul<br />

General, Domnul Albats 3 , căruia i-am dat lămuririle necesare cu privire la împrejurările în care a<br />

avut loc vizita ofițerilor aviatori letoni la București.<br />

Domnia sa ascultând cu interes explicațiile date, mi-a declarat că a fost de la început de<br />

convingerea că în jurul acestei vizite a fost numai o mică neînțelegere și că va comunica<br />

Ministrului de Război cele ce i-am împărtășit cu această ocazie.<br />

1<br />

Grigore Gafencu (1892-1957) was a Romanian diplomat, politician and journalist, founder of <strong>the</strong> news agency<br />

Rador, Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938-1940), Minister of Romania in <strong>the</strong> USSR (1940-1941), prominent member<br />

of <strong>the</strong> Romanian exile and pan-European movement.<br />

2<br />

Dimitrie C. Pennescu (1874-1938) was a career diplomat Romanian, first minister plenipotentiary to <strong>the</strong> Holy See<br />

(1920-1928), eventually being nominated in same quality in Stockholm (1928-1929).<br />

3<br />

Hermanis Albats (1879-1942) a fost profesor, jurnalist și diplomat de carieră leton. Director al Departamentului<br />

Juridic (1919-1920), Secretar General al Ministerului de Externe (1923-1933), Ministru la Sfântul Scaun (1925-1940).


THE ROMANIAN-LATVIAN RELATIONS. DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS (1918-1958) | 129<br />

Adnotare, semnat indescifrabil: Incident foarte regretabil care desigur nu a lăsat bună<br />

amintire despre țara noastră aviatorilor letoni<br />

AMAE, fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, 1921-1940. Relații cu Lituania, Polonia, România, Suedia,<br />

Turcia, Ungaria, Vatican, vol. 8, fila 90.<br />

46. Diplomatic report no. 566 of Ioachim Dăianu, <strong>the</strong> Chargé d’Affai