afghan report enson-16_9_2014

FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTIONS

Authors

Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU

Mehmet YEGİN

September 2014

This publication is sponsored by

NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division

Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s

Contribution

Authors

Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU

Mehmet YEGİN

Contributors

Oğuz Kaan Pehlivan

Reyhan Güner

Emre Tunç Sakaoğlu

Mehmet Hecan

September 2014

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)

Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK)

International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) is a non-partisan, non-profit,

nongovernmental research organization dedicated to empirical research and analysis.

USAK aims to encourage greater public awareness and to influence the policymaking

process by sharing expert analysis and research findings through publications,

conferences, and policy recommendations.

USAK provides a forum for discussing the strategic implications of major national

and international developments as they affect Turkey and the world. The analyses,

views, and recommendations in this document are solely those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the views of USAK.

Copyright © 2014

First Edition

Library Catalogue Reports

“Future of Afghanistan and Turkey‘s Contribution”

This report contains graphs and tables with supplementary text

USAK Publications

ISBN: 978-605-4030-96-5

Graphic Design: Karınca Ajans Yayıncılık Matbaacılık

Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak No: 56/1 Kızılay/ANKARA

Phone: (0312) 431 54 83 • Fax: (0312) 431 54 84 • www.karincayayinlari.net

International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)

Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu

Ayten Sokak No: 21 Tandoğan/Ankara

Phone: (0312) 212 28 86-87 • Fax: (0312) 212 25 84

www.usak.org.tr - www.turkishweekly.net

www.usakanalist.com - info@usak.org.tr

İçindekiler

CONTENTS

Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations................................................................................7

I. DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF AFGHANISTAN........................................................................13

1) The Election Process and Risks................................................................................................13

2) Stability After NATO..............................................................................................................15

a) Ethnic and Social Cohesion.................................................................................................15

b) Security and Economy.........................................................................................................16

i) Taliban Problem...............................................................................................................16

ii) A Sustainable Afghan Army.............................................................................................18

iii) A Sustainable Economy..................................................................................................19

II. THE ROLE OF GLOBAL ACTORS AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES............................23

1) Pakistan...................................................................................................................................23

2) Iran..........................................................................................................................................24

3) Central Asian Countries..........................................................................................................25

4) India........................................................................................................................................25

5) Russia......................................................................................................................................26

6) China......................................................................................................................................26

7) United States...........................................................................................................................27

III. ROLE OF TURKEY AS A NATO MEMBER..............................................................................29

1) Strong Historical Ties..............................................................................................................29

2) Diplomatic Cooperation and Trilateral Mechanism Between Afghanistan,

Pakistan and Turkey.................................................................................................................29

3) Turkish-Afghan Security Cooperation......................................................................................30

4) Turkey’s Contribution to the Reconstruction of Afghanistan...................................................32

5) Economic and Commercial Relations......................................................................................33

Tables and Graphs

Table 1. Election Results Table.................................................................................................................................. 14

Table 2. Afghanistan’s GDP and Foreign Aid Indicator............................................................................................. 21

Table 3. Turkey’s Trade with Afghanistan................................................................................................................... 34

Graph 1. Perception on Actors Controlling the Region............................................................................................... 16

Graph 2. Support for Taliban Rule.............................................................................................................................. 18

Graph 3. GDP Growth of Afghanistan (Annual %).................................................................................................... 20

USAK CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN STUDIES

The USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (ODAM) is a leading

Turkish research center for promoting knowledge of the Middle East and Africa.

The Center is a source of sound information, recommendations, journals, and books,

and a platform for forums and conferences on the Middle East and Africa.

USAK-ODAM is regularly consulted by journalists, officials, politicians, diplomats,

and other NGOs on Middle Eastern security and politics. Center staff regularly

contribute to USAK publications and organize lectures and discussion forums on

Middle Eastern topics. ODAM arranges lectures, seminars, conferences and other

discussions, and sponsors research and publications. In addition, the Center has an

extensive, private library on Middle Eastern and African subjects. The library includes

Turkish, English, Arabic, and Persian publications and is available to USAK

researchers and visitors. The corresponding desks conduct research in English and

regional languages.

Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU: Professor of International Relations, Vice

President of USAK, and Director of USAK Center for Asia-Pacific

Studies in Ankara, Turkey.

MEHMET YEGİN: Head of USAK Center for American Studies.

His research areas include U.S. domestic and foreign policy, Turkey-

U.S. Relations, NATO and security issues.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Successful Democratic Transition of Power

• A transition period for Afghans to take control of their country and assume responsibility

will bring with it a series of arduous tests for Afghanistan.

• These tests may be summarized as: achieving the first democratic transition of power,

maintaining ethnic and social cohesion, resolving the Taliban problem, providing

security and rule of law, and building a working economy.

• The 2014 Presidential Elections commenced the country’s first transfer of power in

the post-9/11 period, one of the most crucial challenges facing Afghanistan. Nonetheless,

the process could not be concluded due to fraud allegations.

7

• The political crisis that stemmed from election fraud allegations may be resolved

with a “national unity government” that foresees power sharing between Ashraf

Ghani Ahmadzai and Abdullah Abdullah. Yet, presidential hopefuls failed to agree

on the technical details.

• The deadlock caused by the presidential hopefuls’ failure to agree on the formation

of the national unity government may result in President Karzai clinging to power

via an interim government. A third term for Karzai would constitute a major step

backward for Afghan democracy.

• About the two candidates, the next president should be free from fraud allegations

since legitimacy is very important for a strong executive with domestic and international

support.

• Besides, a government that embraces all ethnic groups and political fractions may

provide for ethnic and social cohesion.

• As a solution, both candidates should agree on forming a functioning national unity

government, regardless of who won the election.

FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION

Stability, Security, and Economic Development

• Political networks based on interests that were formed in the post-2001 period may

provide the positive parameters for the maintaining stability.

• Certain side effects of these political networks such as nepotism and corruption

should be closely monitored. These problems require the implementation of a process

that aims for long-term solutions rather than short-term quick fixes.

• As one of the security matters, the Taliban has limited popularity and exerts influence

on only a small number of people in a narrow geography in Afghanistan.

• The Taliban does not have the ability to restore the power it wielded in the 1990s.

Nonetheless, it does have a certain level of influence that could disrupt the security

of the country.

• Solving the Taliban problem with the use of sheer military power would be unsustainable.

• Power sharing negotiations with the Taliban, especially as they relate to the national

government rather than the regional administrations, may lead the organization to

forsake violence and become a more moderate actor in Afghan politics.

8

• If the negotiations do not result in a comprehensive deal with the whole of the

Taliban, at least persuading some groups to put down their weapons would further

marginalize the more radical groups and buy time for the Afghan government.

• For a more effective and sustainable Afghan National Army, as another important

security matter, there is a need to increase in capabilities of the soldiers while also

decreasing them in number.

• The Afghan National Army needs an air force, and the country must also develop

the capacity to build up a defense industry that can at least produce light weaponry

for Afghan security forces.

• In Afghanistan, development without security cannot take place; security without

development cannot last either.

• Afghanistan has rich natural resource reserves, it has a growing number of educated

individuals who could contribute to the workforce, its geographic location is advantageous

in terms of transportation and trade, and it has the potential for agriculture.

Nonetheless, security is a precondition to activate the potential.

• To jump-start the economy of Afghanistan, an increase in the confidence at both

investors and consumers is a must. Otherwise, the aid-reliant nature of Afghanistan

may persist.


Impact of Neighboring Countries

• Pakistan is the most important neighbor of Afghanistan and cooperation between

Kabul and Islamabad is crucial in attaining stability and security in Afghanistan.

• The Taliban regaining power and capturing Kabul is the most important redline for

Iran. Therefore Iran does not object to American security guarantees in Afghanistan

in the short-run. Regardless, Tehran and Kabul are likely to face a vital dispute regarding

water-sharing in the coming years.

• Afghanistan is of the utmost importance in the eyes of top leaders in Kazakhstan,

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan because it has the potential to serve as a transit corridor

through which oil and natural gas can flow into Pakistani and Indian markets.

• Central Asian states can easily gain access to the Indian Ocean and diversify their

trade partners if Afghanistan attains stability. Afghanistan plays a truly strategic role

for the rejuvenation of projects such as the Modern-Day Silk Road and the Modern-

Day Spice Road.

• Since 2001, Russia has successfully engaged with NATO countries in establishing

solid grounds for mutual dialogue and cooperation in Afghanistan. Thereby, extremists

and terrorist groups within Afghanistan have been jointly kept under control,

and mutual efforts have been undergone to prevent poppy harvest and cultivation,

and the illicit trade of narcotics.

9

• If the Ukrainian crisis gradually deepens and political dialogue between Western

countries and Russia grinds to a halt, NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan can

become a thing of the past.

• China is pursuing a low-profile foreign policy towards Afghanistan in terms of political

risk-taking and visibility. That is because Beijing does not wish to upset or

directly confront any parties involved.

• The “zero option” policy for the U.S. is not plausible. Besides, the two presidential

hopefuls, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, made a commitment to sign a bilateral

security agreement with the U.S.

The Role of Turkey

• Turkish-Afghan relations have always been amicable since the establishment of this

relationship.

• The Turkish Parliament authorized the government to assign the Turkish Armed

Forces to Afghanistan on October 10th, 2001. Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan will

continue with NATO as a framework nation of the resolute support mission, which

is going to take over from ISAF in 2015.


• Turkey has done its best to help Afghanistan and Pakistan settle their differences.

However, despite all the good intentions, the mechanism put in place has not provided

substantial results. It has to be acknowledged that Turkey does not want to play

an assertive role vis-à-vis any of the parties involved.

• The Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits, despite all their shortcomings,

provide a forum of cooperation for the institutions of the three countries.

• The Turkish military programs and projects are very acceptable to Afghans because

they are sensitive and sympathetic to the Afghan traditional and cultural values.

• Until now, Turkey has trained 17,500 Afghan military officers and soldiers in Afghanistan

and an additional 3,500 in Turkey.

• Turkey has trained more than 1300 Afghan police. Sivas Police Academy in Turkey

has received 500 Afghan police every 6 months according to the agreement signed in

2011.

• Turkish military has been sponsoring the Afghan Military School as well. There are

more than 100 Turkish advisors in the Afghanistan Military Academy and Military

Schools and Turkey has more than 100 Afghan military students in Turkish military

academies and the military medical faculty.

10

• The Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Maidan Shahr, the capital of

the Wardak Province, was established in October 2006. The second Turkish PRT in

Afghanistan is in the Jawzjan Province, which was established in Shibirghan in July

2010. Despite the closure of two Turkish PRT’s, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination

Agency (TIKA) will continue being on the ground.

• To date, Turkey has realized about 800 projects in Afghanistan with the help of two

PRT’s. Turkish PRT’s have rebuilt or renovated 84 schools and 70 hospital clinics.

These projects have been implemented and executed by Turkish groups and TIKA.

• Until now, Turkey has donated around $600 million to provinces in Afghanistan.

Direct official aid coming from Turkey corresponds to $150-160 million annually.

The amount of Turkish humanitarian investment in Afghanistan reached $2 billion

as of 2014.

• In terms of numbers, in Afghanistan, Turkish companies rank first among foreign

investors in the contracting business, with approximately 60 construction companies

registered and active in the country.

• Another area of cooperation in the economic field is regional connectivity. Turkey is

a founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), of which

Afghanistan became a member in 1992. Through this organization, Turkey can help

Afghanistan to logistically reconnect with Iran, and from Iran it can link to Turkey,

and from Turkey to Europe.


• Turkey has the potential to assist Afghanistan in the fields of agriculture, veterinary

medicine, human medicine, and textiles. There is also a need for more investment in

the education sector in Afghanistan.

• The Turkish government can encourage more Turkish investment in Afghanistan in

order to generate employment and income for Afghan citizens.

11


DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF

AFGHANISTAN

1There will be a change in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan by

the end of 2014. The organization’s role in the country will

be limited to advisement and focus on training and counterterrorism.

In the post-2001 period until now, despite some setbacks, a period of peace and a time

to recover from constant warring and Taliban rule was provided to the Afghan people.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under leadership of NATO and donor

countries have contributed to the security and economy of the country. A transition

period for Afghans to take the control of their country and assume responsibility has

been put into place.

This brings with it a series of arduous tests for Afghanistan, including achieving the first

democratic transition of power, maintaining ethnic and social cohesion, resolving the

Taliban problem, providing security and rule of law, and building a working economy.

It would be an understatement to say that these obstacles placed on the path before

Afghanistan may pose a severe challenge. A failure of any of these tests in Afghanistan

would risk the loss of gains made in recent years and may even trigger another civil war.

On the other hand, there are reasons to be hopeful. The capacity of the Afghan people,

especially the educated Afghan youth, and the inherent potential of the country are of

crucial importance.

13

In the first part of the report, Afghanistan’s major challenges will be scrutinized within

domestic and international parameters. First, the elections will be examined and then

the issues of ethnic and social cohesion. Later, the Taliban problem and the maintenance

of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the building of an Afghan

economy will be discussed.

1) The Election Process and Risks

The 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan marked an important phase in the country’s

democratic history. This election was to commence the country’s first transfer of

power in the post-9/11 period, one of the most crucial challenges facing Afghanistan.

Before the elections, there were concerns that incumbent President Hamid Karzai would

push for a third term and change the constitution; yet, the political atmosphere, civil

society organizations, and political institutions prevented him from taking action in this

direction. 1

It was revealed

that Ashraf Ghani

received 56.44

percent of the vote

while Abdullah

Abdullah lagged

behind with only

43.56 percent.


The second concern was related to the election process itself. Questions emerged regarding

the ability of the Afghans to run the elections by themselves and whether or not they

could secure the voting stations from the threats of the Taliban. 2 These possible problems

were handled by the Afghans. The voting process ran relatively smoothly and the

Afghan security forces were successful in providing security. In the first round of elections,

more than 60 percent of Afghans made their way to the ballot box despite Taliban

threats. What is more, 42 percent of women participated in the elections. 3

The first round of elections on April 5, 2014, ended up with two frontrunners: Abdullah

Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. Abdullah received 45 percent of the total

vote while Ashraf Ghani achieved 31.56 percent. The first round of the elections did not

spark any major disagreements between the candidates. Nonetheless, it is hard to say the

same for the second round of the elections.

Table 1. Election Results Table

14

Afghanistan Presidential Election First-Round Results Afghanistan Presidential Election Second-Round Results

Candidate Number of Votes Percentage (%) Number of Votes Percentage (%)

Abdullah Abdullah 2,972,141 45 3,461,639 43.56

Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzi 2,084,547 31.56 4,485,888 56.44

Zalmay Rasool 750,997 11.37

Total Number of Votes 6,604,546 7,947,527

Source: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan

In the second round of the elections, held on June 14, 2014, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai

and Abdullah Abdullah competed for the presidential office. After the votes were counted,

it was revealed that Ashraf Ghani received 56.44 percent of the vote while Abdullah

Abdullah lagged behind with only 43.56 percent. In reaction to the outcome, Abdullah

refused to recognize the results and claimed to be the victim of electoral fraud. Indeed,

as seen in the table above, the nearly 1.4 million increase in votes for Ashraf Ghani is

hard to explain when compared to 0,4 million increase in Abdullah Abdullah’s votes.

Discussions have

emerged regarding

the Afghan security

forces’ threat to seize

power and form an

interim government if

the political situation

is not fixed soon.

Abdullah Abdullah’s threat to declare a “parallel government” alarmed the U.S. and the

UN. The U.S. played the “financial support card” to prevent possible political turmoil. 4

Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kabul and brokered a deal for an “internationally

monitored vote audit” and a “national unity government” that foresaw power sharing

between Ghani and Abdullah. This power share agreement would include the allocation

of important posts to the losing party, including the appropriation of the “chief executive”

post to the defeated candidate. 5

A few days after John Kerry’s visit to Kabul, the Independent Election Commission of

Afghanistan (IEC) began recounting and auditing the votes under the supervision of

United Nations observers. Nonetheless, the presidential hopefuls failed to agree on the

technical details of the auditing process and the formation of the national unity government,

even though the recounting process had already begun. John Kerry paid a second


visit to Kabul on August 8, 2014, to pressure both candidates to form the national unity

government before September so that the new president could attend the NATO Summit

in Wales on behalf of Afghanistan. The candidates still have not reached a final deal.

In the meantime, discussions have emerged regarding the Afghan security forces’ threat

to seize power and form an interim government if the political situation is not fixed

soon. 6 Thus, there are allegations that President Karzai is clinging to power by exploiting

the disagreement between the candidates. A third term for Karzai would constitute

a major step backward for Afghan democracy. However, the assumption of the presidency

of one of the candidates without clearing the fraud allegations would cause other

problems.

The legitimacy of

the next president

of Afghanistan is

quite important for

the country’s public

and international

support seeing that

fraud allegations in

the previous elections

limited President

Karzai’s ability to

govern.

The legitimacy of the next president of Afghanistan is quite important for the country’s

public and international support seeing that fraud allegations in the previous elections

limited President Karzai’s ability to govern. Additionally, a government that brings together

all ethnic groups and political fractions may help to provide stability as well.

In this way, it seems that the best option for both candidates is to agree on a national

unity government, which is functional and involves both Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf

Ghani Ahmadzai, regardless of who won the election.

2) Stability After NATO

a) Ethnic and Social Cohesion

When discussing social cohesion in Afghanistan the ethnic balances and centers of power

have to be taken into consideration. In terms of ethnic balances, different from other

countries that have ethnically diverse societies, Afghanistan hosts a relatively strong Afghan

identity, which has the potential to keep different ethnic groups together. The

historical experience of Afghanistan raises the chances for multiple ethnicities in the

country to live together under a single strong national identity. 7 For more than two

centuries, Afghanistan has not experienced territorial division based on ethnic identity,

rather, various ethnic groups have struggled to gain dominance over each other. 8 In recent

decades, there is a revival of ethnic awareness, but the mentioned balances are still

more or less applicable. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that ethnic struggle for domination

is not free of risks.

Looking at the recent picture, this ethnic struggle assumed a new structure in the post-

2001 period. Revolving primarily around powerful individuals that emerged from the

civil war, political networks based on interests were formed, sharing the resources of the

state structure in line with the Bonn Agreement. 9 These political networks provided

a structure in which different power centers could bargain and negotiate on disputed

matters. There are even claims that these structures push different competing groups

to work together to protect “their deeply entrenched and intertwined political and financial

interests.” 10 Thus, the current structure may help to keep the power balances

in harmony and offset the major changes that the country is experiencing along with

change in NATO role.

“It is not fair to

compare Afghanistan

with other

countries. Instead, a

comparison between

2004 Afghanistan

and 2014

Afghanistan is more

appropriate.”

Amanullah Jayhoon

Afghan Ambassador to

Ankara

15


“In Afghanistan

development without

security cannot

take place; security

without development

cannot last either.”

Hikmet Çetin

Former NATO Senior

Civilian Representative

in Afghanistan

(2003-2006)

Both the ethnic balance and political networks may provide for positive parameters that

maintain stability. The sturdiness of these structures will be challenged and tested when

it comes to certain issues such as election results mentioned above. Another problem

may emerge surrounding the debate on a new constitution, seeing that the current constitution

does not meet the needs of the Afghan people. 11 Here, an avoidance of discriminating

against any one ethnic group or political network, rather than demanding their

integration into the political system, may help to sidestep a revival of the major clashes

and civil wars that have been experienced in the country in the past. Additionally, there

are certain side effects of these structures such as nepotism and corruption that should

be closely monitored. These problems related to political networks require a process that

aims for long-term solutions rather than short-term, first-hand quick fixes.

b) Security and Economy

i) Taliban Problem

The Taliban problem is the foremost security problem in Afghanistan. Looking at the

structure of this phenomenon, there is not a monolithic Taliban organization, rather,

there are groups like Akhtar Mansur’s Alliance, Abdul Qayum Zakir’s Alliance, and the

Rahbari Shura under the Quetta Shura. 12 Quetta Shura and Peshawar Shura are the two

major groups within the Taliban. 13 Yet as the Taliban’s strength comes from the insurgency

network, these splinter groups have weakened Taliban’s influence. 14

16

Graph 1. Perception on Actors Controlling the Region

(Approx.)

100%

99.2 98.2

95

89.1

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

0.1

5 0.3

61.8

Taliban

3

6.3 11.2

Other Insurgent

Groups

70.4

Goverment

0.2 5.3 0.2 5.1

Militas

20

44

People

22

Urban North

Rural North

Urban South

Rural South


The Taliban is not influential throughout the whole country. In fact, according to surveys

conducted by Assess, Transform and Reach Consulting (ATR) with people in Afghanistan,

it can be seen that Taliban maintains most of its influence in the rural South.

61.8 percent of those interviewed in the rural South assert that the Taliban shares power

in their area with the government, whereas in the North and Urban South, the surveys

show that the Taliban’s influence is more limited. 15

Graph 2. Support for Taliban Rule

(Approx.)

100%

80%

Urban North

60%

40%

20%

0%

59 59.5

11

31

No, neither my area nor

any parts of the country

38.7 37.1

57.8

39.2

I just want the Taliban to

work together within the

existing goverment

0.15 0.1

0.1

Yes, just in my area

2 2

32.6

25.6

Yes, my area and some

parts of the country/the

whole country

Rural North

Urban South

Rural South

Public support for the Taliban is limited as well, especially in the North. Here, the majority

of people look unfavorably on Taliban rule over their region and the country. Support

for the Taliban comes mostly from the ethnic Pashtun dominated regions. Taliban

governance is favored by 32.6 percent of people in the urban South and 25.6 percent in

the rural South. However, even in the South, people are more open to the Taliban working

with the government, rather than ruling their region unaccompanied. Thus, even in

the Pashtun dominated areas, 64.7 percent of people in urban South and 65.9 percent

of those in the rural South oppose unitary Taliban rule. 16

17

This data confirms the common claims that Taliban has limited popularity and exerts

influence on only a small number of people in a narrow geography in Afghanistan. The

Taliban’s limited influence is illustrated in its inability to hinder participation in recent

elections, where the Afghan people took to the polls paying no heed to the threats they

viewed as hollow. It is expected that the Taliban will further loose support and legitimacy

after the U.S. withdrawal. 17 In short, the Taliban does not have the ability to restore

the power it wielded in the 1990s. Nonetheless, it does have a certain level of influence

that could disrupt the security of the country.

In order to solve the problem there are two paths: to defeat the Taliban militarily and

force Taliban to submit to the Afghan government’s terms, or to negotiate with the Taliban

and accept a power sharing deal. Despite the relative weakness of the Taliban now

compared to its past, the Afghan government does not have enough military and economic

instruments to exercise the first option. First, the Afghan National Army does not

have the necessary capabilities to confront and defeat the Taliban in the field. Besides,

It is expected that the

Taliban will further

loose support and

legitimacy after the

U.S. withdrawal.


Taliban issue is not

solely a military

problem, it has

economic and social

dimensions as well.

this path would be too costly for a country like Afghanistan with an economy reliant on

donor countries. To illustrate, in order to eliminate 5-10 militants, three Predator UAVs

and 12 missiles would be required, with a total cost of $200 million. 18 Thus, the use of

sheer military power would be unsustainable.

Additionally, the Taliban issue is not solely a military problem, it has economic and

social dimensions as well. Economic problems and lack of government services push the

Afghan people into the arms of the Taliban. 19 In this regard, if the issue is to be resolved,

a more comprehensive approach is needed. This comprehensive solution must include

promoting economic development, good governance, and improved government services.

If successfully implemented, this strategy could help to restrict the maneuverability

of the Taliban and further marginalize their presence in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, in the long run a political solution is needed to address the problem. Since

the Taliban is not a separatist group, power sharing negotiations with the Taliban, especially

as they relate to the national government rather than the regional administrations,

may lead it to forsake violence and become a more moderate actor in Afghan politics. 20

Taliban groups such as Akhtar Mansur’s Alliance are more open to negotiate with the

government due to their weak military capabilities. 21 If the negotiations do not result

in a comprehensive deal with the whole of the Taliban, at least persuading some groups

to put down their weapons would further marginalize the more radical groups and buy

time for the Afghan government.

18

ii) A Sustainable Afghan Army

Certain problems and

limitations linger in

the Afghan National

Army. One of the

major problems is

the lack of discipline

in the ANA. Illiteracy

among the Afghan

soldiers is another

major problem.

Experience with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is a mix bag of achievements

and failures. Indeed, it may be argued that there is a need for time and resources

in the establishment of a fully operational Afghan National Army (ANA). In this line,

the ANA has achieved a robust number of security personnel. Despite the security forces’

deficiencies, this high number still provides a strategic advantage against the Taliban.

Besides, according to surveys, the ANSF has managed to achieve a certain degree of

public support, with the divisions that fall under its umbrella, the ANA and the Afghan

National Police (ANP), receiving 67 percent and 64 percent public approval ratings respectively.

22 Nonetheless, the problems of sustainability and operational efficacy necessitate

a transformation in the long run. Thus, an increase in effectiveness and capabilities

of military personnel, and a decrease in the number of troops would ease financial

constraints with better combat units.

When it comes to the achievements, the ANA has 170,000 troops under its command.

When the Afghan National Police Forces are included, this number increases to

350,000. This high number of people constitutes a power block that enables the Afghan

government to resist insurgency. So far the ANSF has taken on the responsibility of

securing the entirety of Afghan territory and it has been successful in providing security

in the country, especially at crucial times such as during the elections. The ANSF’s high

numbers also restrains the target pool of militant recruits for the Taliban. It also provides

jobs for a huge number of people and facilitates the indoctrination of Afghan identity. 23


Nonetheless, this great number of soldiers does not automatically mean that these forces

are effective. The Afghan forces are not “well-motivated; they are under-financed, and

ill-equipped.” 24 There have been improvements made to the ANSF’s operations since

2012. At this time, within the body of ANSF, only 1 out of 23 brigades were fully operational.

By February 2014, however, this number increased to 19 out of 23. 25 Yet certain

problems and limitations linger in the Afghan National Army. One of the major problems

is the lack of discipline in the Army. 26 Illiteracy among the Afghan soldiers is another

major problem. Despite literacy programs having cost the government $200 million

over five years, there are still concerns about the effectiveness of these programs. 27

The ANA also

needs better special

operation forces.

This type of training

may be provided by

donor countries, and

primarily the U.S.

and Turkey as NATO

member countries.

There is a financial sustainability problem for the Afghan forces as well. At the Chicago

Summit, the estimated annual budget needed for the ANSF was set at $4.1 billion, yet

in 2013, $5.4 billion was used as 26 percent of the Afghanistan’s entire budget. 28 Regarding

the decrease in economic growth and decreasing foreign aid, it will be extremely

difficult for Afghanistan to fund such a large amount of security forces. 29

In order to deal with these problems, there is a need to increase the capabilities of the

Afghan soldiers while also decreasing them in number. In order to achieve this goal, a

political solution regarding the Taliban is necessary. This will decrease the need for a

high number of security forces. As another option, compulsory military service may be

one of the solutions to acquiring a cheaper military force. 30 Additionally, the ANA also

needs better special operation forces. This type of training may be provided by donor

countries, and primarily the U.S. and Turkey as NATO member countries. Putting aside

the land forces, the Afghan National Army needs an air force and must also develop the

capacity to build up a defense industry, at least to produce light weaponry for its security

forces. 31

19

iii) A Sustainable Economy

Afghanistan has the potential to build a running economy. It has rich natural resource

reserves, it has a growing number of educated individuals who could contribute to the

workforce, its geographic location has advantages in terms of transportation and trade,

and it has the potential for untapped agricultural potential. Nonetheless, security is a

precondition to activate this potential. Only after securing the country and employing

the rule of law can all of these advantages be used, otherwise all of these potentials could

just remain on paper. This would mean the continuation of Afghanistan’s dependency

on foreign aid.

One of the latent economic capacities of Afghanistan is the country’s rich natural resources

of natural gas, iron ore, and copper. According to the World Bank, the oil and

gas reserves at Amu Derija, iron ore reserves in Hajigak, and copper reserves in Anyak

have the potential to be turned into economic catalysts for Afghanistan’s development. 32

Activating this potential may not only change the dynamics of the Afghan economy and

its dependency on foreign aid, but also may effect the people. According to the Ministry

of Mines and Petroleum of Afghanistan, the Aynak and Hajigak projects have the potential

to create nearly 100,000 jobs. 33


According to the

World Bank, the oil

and gas reserves

at Amu Derija, iron

ore reserves in

Hajigak, and copper

reserves in Anyak

have the potential

to be turned into

economic catalysts

for Afghanistan’s

development.

Other promising aspects of Afghanistan are related to the country’s cheap workforce

and its strategic location. There is an increasing number of college-educated individuals

in the country that could greatly contribute to the economy. Additionally, Afghanistan

occupies a strategic location that may be utilized as a hub for transportation and trade in

the region. This is especially true for Central Asia as Afghanistan represents the cheapest

path to the global market via the Indian Ocean. It may be a route for trade and even

energy transport. This potential will be elaborated upon in the next section on Afghanistan’s

relations with neighbors.

Lastly, currently agriculture is one of the dominant sectors of the Afghan economy. The

agriculture potential may be improved upon to stimulate more effective production. Yet

there are problems related to land and water ownership and usage rights. Domestic conflicts

over who has the right to use the land and water should be addressed by “improved

resource governance [and] stronger mechanisms for dispute resolution.” 34 In general, for

better land and water governance, the rule of law needs to be established and enforced.

Graph 3. GDP Growth of Afghanistan (Annual %)

14.4%

20

8.4%

Despite the increase

in agricultural

production by

2.7 percent,

Afghanistan’s

growth rate in 2013

decreased from

14.4 percent to 3.6

percent and the

forecast for 2014

is 3.2 percent due

to speculation of

a deterioration of

security and stability.

2010

6.1%

3.4%

3.2%

4.2%

2011 2012 2013 (expected) 2014 (forecasted) 2014 (forecasted)

All these capacities can turn into active economic assets only after the provision of security

and rule of law in the country. The mentioned natural resource projects need foreign

investment in order to be realized. If not taken advantage of, the cheap workforce may

turn into a curse as the growing number of college graduates could come to constitute

the basis of the unemployed masses. Lastly, agriculture may not bring economic growth

by itself. Despite the increase in agricultural production by 2.7 percent, Afghanistan’s

growth rate in 2013 decreased from 14.4 percent to 3.6 percent and the forecast for

2014 is 3.2 percent due to speculation of a deterioration of security and stability. 35


Table 2. Afghanistan’s GDP and Foreign Aid Indicator

2010 2011 2012 2013

GDP (US $) 15,936,784,436 17,870,159,082 20,506,795,254 20,724,663,537

Aid received (US $) 6,426,380,000 6,884,700,000 6,725,030,000 Undeclared

Percentage (%) 40.3 38.5 32.8

Source: The World Bank

In short, Afghanistan has great potential to build a sustainable economy. Nonetheless,

in order to achieve this, it has to first provide security and establish rule of law in order

to increase foreign investment and consumer confidence. To jump-start the economy

of Afghanistan an increase in the confidence at both investors and consumers is a must.

Otherwise, the aid reliant nature of Afghanistan may linger. It is projected that within

the next ten years, foreign aid to Afghanistan will decrease and economic development

indexes will increase. Looking at the data, over the past three years, nearly 30 percent of

Afghanistan’s GDP has come from foreign aid.

21


THE ROLE OF GLOBAL

ACTORS AND NEIGHBORING

COUNTRIES

2Afghanistan has six neighbors with which it has a land border.

Moreover, countries that have strong historical ties with

Afghanistan and that are located in its close neighborhood,

i.e. countries like Turkey, Russia, and India, should also be

mentioned in order to have a deeper insight on Afghanistan’s

geographical location as a political entity.

The U.S. is another important country today, with respect to Afghanistan’s political and

economic relations with the rest of the world. In this chapter, the countries listed above,

excluding Turkey, will be our priority subject. On the other hand, elaborations on Turkey

will be given a larger space in the next chapter.

1) Pakistan

23

Pakistan is the most important neighbor of Afghanistan because of the fact that Pashtuns

live in regions which are lined along both sides of the border. Pakistan gives utmost

importance to the subjects of attaining stability and security in Afghanistan, the institution

of an Afghan regime which would maintain close contact between Kabul and

Islamabad, and that Afghanistan becomes fit to serve as a gateway and transit route for

Central Asian energy resources and markets. 36 Pakistan, on the other hand, claims that

India tries to encircle herself through Afghanistan and that India has a large number

of activities of politics and intelligence in nature in Afghanistan. It believes that Indian

intelligence trains and equips Baloch separatists, who are actively struggling against the

government in Islamabad, in Afghan camps. 37 Without a full normalization in the relations

between Islamabad and New Delhi, it seems hard for the two countries to reach a

consensus, and cooperate in Afghanistan. Pakistan is further concerned that Afghanistan

may turn into a front for proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Therefore Islamabad

tries to stick to a policy of balancing between Riyadh and Tehran.

The Pakistanis also think that Pakistan is the country which suffers about Afghanistan

the most. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is not a commercial or political issue; it is an agenda

of existential importance. The destabilization process of Pakistan began in 1980, when

the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Salafi groups coming from Saudi Arabia

in support of the Mujahedeen in that time are said to have created instability. Saudifunded

madrassas in Pakistan are said to break poor family children off their families

Pakistan claims that

India tries to encircle

herself through

Afghanistan and that

India has a large

number of activities

of politics and

intelligence in nature

in Afghanistan.


Pakistan is further

concerned that

Afghanistan may turn

into a front for proxy

warfare between

Saudi Arabia and

Iran. Therefore

Islamabad tries to

stick to a policy of

balancing between

Riyadh and Tehran.

and subject them to brainwashing with the promise to aid the families and meet all the

costs of training. Especially poor families with many children in rural areas of Pakistan

relieve themselves financially by giving some of the children to madrassas and they think

they save children’s lives as well. Suicide bombers and armed militants come from the

children taken from families. 38

Before September 11, Pakistan was trying to convince the Taliban regime to break the

link with al-Qaeda but did not succeed. The Pakistanis say Pakistan has no common

interest with the Taliban regime. Pakistanis claim that they try to make as much contact

as possible with the Afghan officials, but their efforts are not met by the Afghanis. They

say that Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups target the Pakistani state

and society, and even organize attacks on the largest land, air and sea bases. They also

say Pashtunistan ideas spread mostly from Afghanistan. The Pakistanis believe that civil

war in Afghanistan seems inevitable after 2014 if the Taliban is not included in the system.

Pakistan, together with Iran, is also a country that carries the burden of the Afghan

refugees. More than one million refugees have been living in Pakistan since the 1980s. 39

Exactly how many Afghan refugees live in Pakistan is not known as the country cannot

carry out border controls effectively.

2) Iran

24

Iran is also one of the countries having impact on the future of Afghanistan. In Iran,

there are over a million Afghan refugees, many of whom entered the country illegally.

From the point of Iranians, terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking originating from

Afghanistan are a major threat. Another important issue for Iran is ending the occupation

in Afghanistan. The Iranians see post-2001 NATO intervention as a foreign occupation,

as the 1980 Soviet invasion and demand the immediate ending of the American

occupation under the name of NATO. However, the Iranians say they can negotiate and

cooperate with the Americans for Afghanistan as they did it for Iraq. 40

The Iranians see

post-2001 NATO

intervention as a

foreign occupation,

as the 1980

Soviet invasion,

and demand the

immediate ending

of the American

occupation under the

name of NATO.

Grounds for cooperation between Tehran and Washington have been consolidated in recent

months depending upon the progress made in P5+1 negotiations with Iran. While

Tehran used to object strongly to the U.S. retaining any military bases in Afghanistan,

it has lately been expressing consent for the U.S. retaining a limited number of temporary

military bases in the country. In this respect, Tehran no longer objects President

Obama’s plans to deploy 10,000 American troops until 2016 in Afghanistan, which

Washington announced in May 2014. 41

Under current circumstances, continued existence and stability of the Afghan state bears

utmost importance for countering extremist groups, combating illicit trade of narcotics,

and maintaining border security. The Taliban, regaining power and capturing Kabul, is

the most important red line for Iran. Therefore Iran does not object American security

guarantees in Afghanistan in the short-run. 42

In terms of language and culture, Iran has an advantageous position for influence over

Afghanistan. But because of Shia solidarity carried out over Hazaras, Tehran seems to

have not used the chance to establish good relations with all groups in Afghanistan. Af-


ghanistan has a reaction in particular against Iran and Pakistan. Iran is claimed to have

tried to put pressure on Afghanistan and politicize the Shiite Hazaras. 43

Tehran and Kabul are likely to face a vital dispute regarding water-sharing in the coming

years. Iran is highly dependent on rivers originating in Afghanistan to supply its

unsustainable need for water. Due to the increase in population and the expansion of

arable land both in Afghanistan and Iran, a crisis over sharing scarce water resources is

inevitable. 44

3) Central Asian Countries

Afghanistan has a

reaction in particular

against Iran and

Pakistan. Iran is

claimed to have

tried to put pressure

on Afghanistan and

politicize the Shiite

Hazaras.

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have almost identical

policies on Afghanistan. Central Asian countries want Afghanistan to restore its political

stability as soon as possible and be a center of attraction by trade routes and pipelines.

Afghanistan-based drug trafficking and radical organizations deeply affect the stability

of the Central Asian countries. Salafi groups open to Central Asia through Afghanistan.

Even Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which do not have a direct border with Afghanistan,

are uncomfortable with extremist religious movements. 45

Afghanistan bears utmost importance in the eyes of top leaders in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,

and Uzbekistan; because it has the potential to serve as a transit corridor

through which oil and natural gas can flow into Pakistani and Indian markets. TAPI

(Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) and similar projects can be realized

only when Afghanistan qualifies as a safe route.

25

Because the southern trade corridor which links Central Asian countries to the Indian

subcontinent passes through its borderlands, Afghanistan is indispensable in terms of

regional logistics. Central Asian states will easily reach out to the Indian Ocean and

diversify their trade partners if Afghanistan attains stability. Afghanistan plays a truly

strategic role for the rejuvenation of projects such as the Modern-Day Silk Road and the

Modern-Day Spice Road. 46

Central Asian countries wish that the U.S., Russia, and China can maintain good relations

overall, and reach some level of consensus over Afghanistan as well as other

regional issues. They are worried though, because in case relations between these great

powers suffer a setback due to increased competition and conflicts of interest, Central

Asian countries will be compelled to take a side. 47

4) India

India is both a regional and global actor seeking influence over Afghanistan. India wants

to provide support especially for the development of Afghan economy. New Delhi proposes

Kabul to be a trade bridge between Central Asia and South Asia, thus revitalization

of historical Silk Road and Spice Road. India also wishes the Caspian energy resources to

reach South Asia through Afghanistan. New Delhi also intends to support the process of

national understanding in Afghanistan. The Indians think their own multiculturalism

and democracy can be a model for the future of Afghanistan. 48

Turkmenistan,

Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan

and Kazakhstan

have almost

identical policies on

Afghanistan.


New Delhi is trying to

improve its relations

and cooperate with

Iran as well, in a

bid to overcome its

strategic reliance

upon Pakistan in

reaching out to

Central Asia and

Afghanistan.

The biggest handicap of India, which has no direct border with Afghanistan, is that she

has to agree with Pakistan in this regard. The fate of New Delhi’s economic and trade

relations to be developed with Kabul depends on the logistical support to be provided by

Islamabad. In this respect, Pakistan is India’s only door opening to Central Asia. Being

aware of this situation, India is trying to take into account sensitivities of Pakistan while

improving relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan’s cooperation is essential to

the success of pipeline projects such as TAPI. 49

New Delhi is trying to improve its relations and cooperate with Iran as well, in a bid

to overcome its strategic reliance upon Pakistan in reaching out to Central Asia and

Afghanistan. In this respect, assisting Iran in developing the Chabahar Port is among

India’s priorities. 50

26

If the Ukrainian

crisis gradually

deepens and political

dialogue between

Western countries

and Russia grinds

to a halt, NATO-

Russia cooperation

in Afghanistan can

become a thing of

the past.

5) Russia

Russia is one of the biggest victims of the narcotic produced in Afghanistan. The country

immediately wants to put an end to the drug traffic directly affecting the Russian

youth. Moscow is also concerned about the Salafi groups supported by the Taliban gaining

influence among Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation. The Russians state that

they want to come to terms with all the actors on Afghanistan, but that they will not

accept the impositions of especially Western countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that

Russia will support all kinds of roles the international community play in Afghanistan,

subject to take her prior consent. 51

So far, Russia has successfully engaged with NATO countries while establishing solid

grounds for mutual dialogue and cooperation in Afghanistan since 2001. Thereby, extremists

and terrorist groups within Afghanistan were jointly kept under control, and

mutual efforts in preventing poppy harvest, cultivation, and the illicit trade of narcotics

were underwent. Russia was supporting NATO’s state-building endeavor in Afghanistan

under the condition that NATO does not expand militarily into former Soviet countries.

However, the NATO-Russia Council reached an abrupt end with the Ukrainian

crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Indeed, Russia began perceiving Afghanistan

not as a zone of cooperation but as a country in which NATO’s intervention caused

destabilization since May 2014. Whether such an attitude only reflects Russia’s immediate

reaction against the NATO will be revealed in time. If the Ukrainian crisis gradually

deepens and political dialogue between Western countries and Russia grinds to a halt,

NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan can become a thing of the past. 52

6) China

China has a narrow land border with Afghanistan. In this respect, Afghanistan matters

for China in terms of security, rather than for its logistic or strategic value. Beijing’s first

priority with respect to Afghanistan is preserving border security in Xinjiang and Tibet,

two minority regions in Afghanistan’s close neighborhood. Beijing is especially concerned

with Uighur separatists, exiting and entering Chinese borders at will in order to

receive training in Afghanistan and then organizing armed opposition back in Xinjiang.

Therefore Beijing supports the moderate government in Kabul and hopes it endures.


The worst case scenario for Beijing would be Afghanistan turning into a safe haven for

separatist groups threatening border security. 53

Nonetheless, China is pursuing a low-profile foreign policy towards Afghanistan in

terms of political risk-taking and visibility. That is because Beijing does not wish to

upset or directly confront any parties involved. Beijing does not wish to risk its relations

with Islamabad while improving its relations with Kabul. Likewise, China refrains from

interfering actively in the politics of Afghanistan, because it wishes to antagonize neither

the U.S., nor Russia, nor India under any circumstances. While China puts support

behind multilateral initiatives on Afghanistan, it does not wish to confront any country

over Afghanistan. 54 It is expected that China is preparing a more active role in Afghanistan

in the post-2014 period. The fourth ministerial meeting of the Istanbul Process

on Afghanistan in Tianjin at the end of August 2014 might be turning point for China’s

more active engagement role in Afghanistan. 55 On the other hand, China adopted a

proactive policy of economic involvement in Afghanistan. That said, China became the

largest economic partner of Afghanistan, in various sectors with mining at the outset.

Beijing does not wish

to risk its relations

with Islamabad

while improving

its relations with

Kabul. Likewise,

China refrains from

interfering actively

in the politics

of Afghanistan,

because it wishes to

antagonize neither

the U.S., nor Russia,

nor India under any

circumstances.

7) United States

The basic priority for the U.S. in Afghanistan is the survival and success of the administrative

structure and state authority, that were established post-2001, after NATO

troops withdraw from the country. On the other hand, there is a possibility that U.S.

forces will completely withdraw from Afghanistan together with NATO forces in 2014

without leaving a permanent military base in the country. In fact, not only the Afghans

but also many global and regional actors are concerned about the fact that the American

troops providing security in Afghanistan since 2001 will withdraw from the country.

Whether the Afghan army is capable of maintaining its integrity to fight the Taliban is

a matter of discussion. 56

27

In addition, there are other important considerations relating to the extent of national

consolidation in Afghanistan and how to avoid the breakout of a civil war between the

groups in the country. Americans are hopeful about the future of Afghanistan in general,

and think that the Afghan government and the ANA have the capacity to protect the

integrity and stability of the country.

In his public speech at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York,

in May 2014, President Barrack Obama stated that 9,800 American troops can be left

in Afghanistan until the end of 2016 renouncing the “zero option” policy. 57 Moreover,

both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the two presidential candidates who qualified

for the second round of the ongoing presidential elections in Afghanistan, made a

commitment to sign a bilateral security agreement with the U.S.; despite the fact that

current President Hamid Karzai refused to sign one. In this respect, the United States’

promise to retain troops in Afghanistan for at least two years more helped alleviate anxieties

concerning the future of the country.


3

1920s

1) Strong Historical Ties

ROLE OF TURKEY

AS A NATO MEMBER

The Turkish-Afghan relations have always been amicable since the establishment of this

relationship. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Afghanistan, which gained its

independence in 1919, first began in 1921. Delegations from the two countries signed

the first Turkey-Afghanistan Alliance Agreement on 1 March 1921 in Moscow. 58

1920s and 1930s are significant periods in the history of Turkish-Afghan relations when

Afghanistan was under the rule of Amanullah Khan and Turkey was led by Mustafa

Kemal Ataturk. In the first anniversary of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1924,

only representative from the foreign countries was the Afghan ambassador. Ataturk was

also present in the opening of the Afghan Embassy in the new Turkish capitol, Ankara.

King Amanullah Khan finally paid a visit to Turkey in 1927. Turkey endeavored to

provide all manner of political and economic support to ensure the development and

stability of Afghanistan. Ali Abat University in Afghanistan was founded in 1932 by

Turkey and law and medical schools at the Kabul University were opened by Turkey in

1935. The first staff of defense ministry at that time and all the troops were trained by

Turkey. 59

and 1930s are

significant periods in

the history of Turkish-

Afghan relations

when Afghanistan

was under the rule

of Amanullah Khan

and Turkey was led

by Mustafa Kemal

Ataturk.

29

2) Diplomatic Cooperation and Trilateral Mechanism Between

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey

Turkey has played an important role in different areas, including Af-Pak relations in

the post-2001 period. The Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits convened

eight times from 2007 to 2014. Turkey accepted to take a part in this mechanism due

to its historical ties with those countries. Firstly, Afghan and Pakistani leaders, who were

in disagreement on the methods for fighting terrorism against the increasing capacity

of Taliban forces after 2005, were brought together by Turkey in Ankara on April 29,

2007. At the end of the meeting hosted by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and

performed with the participation of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani

President Pervez Musharraf, the Ankara Declaration was issued in order to increase the

cooperation between the three countries. In the Ankara Declaration, it was emphasized

that the bilateral relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan would be strengthened on the

basis of good neighborhood relations, mutual respect for territorial integrity and noninterference

in domestic affairs. 60


This trilateral cooperation was continued in the following years. At the time of second

trilateral summit held on December 5, 2008, two of the presidents who participated in

the initial meeting had changed. In Turkey, the new parliament convened on August

2007 to elect Abdullah Gül as president in Sezer’s place, whose term had ended. On the

other hand in Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, the spouse of Benazir Bhutto, took over the

presidency from Musharraf, who had been obliged to resign from office on August 18,

2008. 61

The second Trilateral Summit held in Istanbul on December 5, 2008 with the

participation of the Turkish President Gül, the Afghan President Karzai and the Pakistani

President Zardari focused on the means for enhancing the trilateral cooperation. During

the fourth trilateral summit held in Istanbul on December 24, 2010, it was decided that

the railway network between Pakistan and Turkey would be extended to Afghanistan,

and that the communication, airways, trade and energy connections between these

countries would be strengthened. 62

30

The 6 th Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit was held in Istanbul on October

31, 2011, with the participation of the same presidents. 63 The 7 th Turkey-Afghanistan-

Pakistan Trilateral Summit was held in Ankara on December 12, 2012. 64 The 8 th Turkey-

Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit was held in Ankara on February 13, 2014 under

the theme of “Sustainable Peace in the Heart of Asia”. President Gül, President Karzai

and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif discussed the steps that should be taken toward the

establishment of sustainable peace and stability in the region. 65 Initiatives have been

launched during these trilateral summits, for cooperation on counter-terrorism, and

also for enhancing the political, economic and cultural ties between the three countries.

Turkey did its best to help both Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their differences.

However, despite all the good intentions, this mechanism did not give substantial results.

It is not sure whether this number indicates to the institutionalization of the platform,

or the persistence of unresolved problems. According to Afghan experts, it is time for

Turkey to decide either to become more assertive in mediation between Afghanistan and

Pakistan. Ankara should confront Islamabad, when it is necessary in order to protect

peace in Afghanistan. If Turkey cannot be assertive, the Afghans would have to leave

that process, because if Turkey remains a passive mediator, then it would damage its

relationship with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 66 However, Turkey does not want to

play an assertive role against any of side.

The 8 th Turkey-

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Trilateral Summit was

held in Ankara on

February 13, 2014

under the theme of

“Sustainable Peace in

the Heart of Asia”.

Despite all of its shortcomings Afghan, Pakistani and Turkish leaders find the process

useful and they want to continue with it, because this not only provides a forum for

dialogue for the Afghani and Pakistani authorities, but with the recent developments, it

also provides a forum cooperation for the institutions of three countries. 67

Turkey also initiated another diplomatic attempt to integrate Afghanistan to the regional

and international system. Turkey invited neighbors of Afghanistan to attend the Istanbul

Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan in

November 2014. The Istanbul Process has become a regional platform to encourage

cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors on security, economic, and political

issues. The process includes 14 regional countries and 28 supporting partners, including


extra-regional countries, like the U.S. and the U.K. and international organizations

like the UN. The Istanbul Process itself focuses on various issues such as educational

exchanges, cooperation on disaster management and prevention, and anti-drug

trafficking operations. The ultimate goal of the Istanbul process is ensuring a stability

for Afghanistan. 68

3) Turkish-Afghan Security Cooperation

Turkish military

has not engaged

in a conflict in

Afghanistan for now

and has no conflictrelated

casualty up

until now.

In the field of security, Turkey provides support to Afghanistan both through the ISAF

and within the framework of training and equipment provided to the Afghan army

and police. The Turkish Parliament authorized the government to assign the Turkish

Armed Forces to Afghanistan on October 10, 2001. During the first period of the ISAF

operation under the command of the United Kingdom, Turkey participated with a force

of 267 personnel in total, including army staff, a squad team and training personnel.

Turkey assumed the command of ISAF from the United Kingdom during the second

ISAF period between June 2002 and February 2003. During this period, Turkey’s

contribution in troops was raised to the level of a battalion, and the number of personnel

increased to 1350. In addition, Turkey assumed responsibility for the operation of the

Kabul Airport. Turkey’s experiences with counter-terrorism played a major role in its

assignment for this task. 69

Turkish military led the second ISAF mission in 2003 with 1400 troops and the 7 th

mission in 2005 with 1600 troops. In 2009, the number of Turkish soldiers reached its

peak level with 1800 personnel under the Kabul Regional Command. Turkey had the

third largest contingent within the ISAF among 50 contributive countries at the time. 70

31

The Kabul Regional Command, which is in charge of the Kabul province, began

its duty on 6 th of August 2006 under the leadership of Turkey, Italy and France. Its

command rotated respectively between Turkey, France and Italy for 8-month periods. 71

As of June 2014, Turkey has 457 troops on ground. 72 Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan

will continue with NATO as a framework nation of the resolute support mission, which

is going to take over from ISAF in 2015.

The former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin was appointed on 19 November

2003 as the NATO Secretary General’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan,

which is the highest-level political representative of NATO in the country. Çetin held

command of the ISAF starting from 11 th of August 2003, taking office in Kabul on 26

January 2004, and serving two consecutive terms until 24 th of August 2006. 73

Turkish troops are not engaged in combat operations, and Ankara has long resisted

pressure from Washington to provide more combat troops. Turkish military has not

engaged in a conflict in Afghanistan and has no conflict-related casualty up until now.

Turkey has 14 fallen soldiers, two personnel in car accident, one of whom was a colonel

and 12 personnel in the helicopter crush in Kabul in 2012. Turkish military has been in

Afghanistan for 12 years and up to now 30,000 Turkish soldiers served in Afghanistan.

There is no single criminal record towards Afghanis in which Turkish soldiers involved. 74

The circumcision

ceremonies for

boys, and medical

examination

programs for women

has become very

popular.


Turkey has 187

military personals

within NATO training

mission, doing

business within

NATO.

Unlike other soldiers of the ISAF, Turkish military personnel, who serves by building

close relations with the public, has gained considerable respect among the Afghan

people. The main reason of success of Turkish troops is that the probability of the use

of force is quite low. 75 Turkish military programs and projects are very sympathetic and

acceptable to Afghans because they are sensitive to the Afghan traditional and cultural

values. These are small success stories but very effective. Firstly, circumcision is for the

ones who doesn’t know this term. These circumcision ceremonies, for instance, more

than 8000 boys, this is a policy, which is directly related to hearts and minds of the

local Afghans in economic, socio-cultural, religious and medical domains. It’s a policy

with deep strategic impact on Afghans. Secondly, the medical examination programs

for women. This program has become very popular and currently 15 female military

doctors are serving in military hospitals in Kabul and also Turkish medical examinations,

these teams extend their medical services to the civilians “since 2002 more than 3000

Afghans were offered free medical treatment in Turkey and more than 30,000 Afghans

in Kabul.” 76

The Turkish Armed Forces granted 7.1 million U.S. dollars of military materials to the

Afghan Armed Forces between 2003 and 2007. 77 Turkey has donated approximately 6

million US Dollars of military material, and provided minimum material requirements

including ammunition within the scope of a project for the establishment of three

155mm towed howitzer batteries that will independently serve the Afghan National

Army.

32

Within the context of the cooperation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the

Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), buildings and

facilities were constructed within the framework of the project for the modernization of

the Afghan Military High School into a modern educational institution, with nearly 8

million US Dollars of aid materials being provided in the process. As of April 2008, the

total sum of the aid and materials provided for the Afghan National Army has reached

almost 52 million US Dollars. The logistic assistance as part of the Foreign Military

Assistance Program carried out between 2004 and 2007, 3.5 million US Dollars of aid

was provided. 78

Turkey has trained

more than 1300

Afghan police. Sivas

police academy in

Turkey has got 500

Afghan police every

6 months according

to the agreement

signed in 2011.

In the area of security cooperation is on given a partnership direction to the Afghan

security forces. Turkey has 187 military personals within NATO training mission, doing

business within NATO. Until now Turkey have trained 17,500 military officers and

soldiers in Afghanistan and in addition 3500 in Turkey. Turkish army invited them to

Turkey, to train them and send them back. . This number includes 2000 commando

units, 100 military advisers, and 100 military students who became officers by now. The

Ghazi Military Training Center was established for the training of Afghan soldiers in

Turkey. Turkish military has been sponsoring the Afghan Military School as well. There

are more than 100 Turkish advisors in Afghanistan Military Academy and Military

Schools and Turkey has more than 100 Afghan military students in Turkish military

academies and military medical faculty. Turkish military has spent 1 million dollars

for 11 years. Turkey has trained more than 1300 Afghan police. Sivas police academy

in Turkey has received 500 Afghan police every 6 months according to the agreement

signed in 2011. 79


4) Turkey’s Contribution to the Reconstruction of Afghanistan

Following the NATO Secretary General’s visit to Turkey in December 2005 and President

Karzai’s visit in January 2006, the decision was taken for the establishment of a Turkish

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak. The Turkish PRT in Maidan Shahr,

the capital of the Wardak Province, was established in October 2006. The Wardak PRT

was composed of two administrative structures, one being the Civilian Coordinatorship,

and the other being the Military Unit Command. Military Unit Command was carrying

out its duties with 29 civilian and 79 military personnel. 80

The objective of the Turkish PRT in Wardak was to support the development of the

Afghan society and of the infrastructure in Wardak Province, and also to strengthen the

provincial administration and to increase their effectiveness and capability in securityrelated

areas. The civilian component of the PRT included advisors from the Turkish

Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education and TIKA,

who assisted in the planning and implementation of reconstruction and development

projects. 81

The Turkish PRT in Maidan Shahr covered the Wardak Province in its Area of Operation.

In close coordination with the Afghan authorities, the Turkish PRT contributed

significant additional capabilities and resources to a region that would supplement

and augment the current development, reconstruction and capacity building efforts in

Wardak province. Furthermore, the PRT also contributed in the area of security through

the training of the Afghan National Police, by contributing experienced Police Trainers

to the educational program of the Turkish-Afghan Police Training Center founded by

Turkey in 2008. As of 2014 Wardak PRT has closed down but Turkey did not just pack

up and leave. Turkey has transformed Wardak PRT facilities into a boarding school

which is going to serve the Afghan youth and society for many years. 82

33

The second Turkish PRT in Afghanistan is in the Jawizcan Province, which was

established in Shibirghan in July 2010 in close consultation with ISAF Nations following

the invitation of the Afghan Government. PRT Jawizcan was one of the 27 PRTs

operating in Afghanistan, and one of the 6 PRTs under Regional Command-North.

PRT Jawizcan operates in the Jawizcan and the Sar-i Pul Provinces. On 15 April 2010,

Turkey and Sweden agreed that the Swedish-led PRT Mazar-e Sharif (MeS) and PRT

Jawizcan would have “concurrent responsibilities” for the development and capacity

building efforts in both the Jawizcan and Sar-i Pul Provinces. 83 Turkey is making a

calendar to phase Jawizcan PRT out and close it down but not terminate projects there

by the end of 2014.

Up till now Turkey realized about 800 projects in Afghanistan with the help of two

PRTs. Turkish PRTs rebuilt or just renovated 84 schools, 70 hospital Clinique. These

projects have been done by Turkish groups and TIKA. 84 Despite the close down of

two Turkish PRT’s, TIKA will continue being on the ground. To date, Turkey donated

around $600 million to provinces in Afghanistan. Direct official aid coming from

Turkey corresponds to $150-160 million annually. The stock of Turkish humanitarian

investment in Afghanistan reached the level of $2 billion by 2014. These expenses are

mostly covered by Turkey’s public budget. 85

Trade volume

increased from 8

million dollars in

2000 to 296 million

dollars in 2012 at the

highest level.


5) Economic and Commercial Relations

The commercial relations between Turkey and Afghanistan have begun to develop over

the course of the last decade. Trade volume increased from 8 million dollars in 2000 to

296 million dollars in 2012 at the highest level (see Table-3). However, it would not be

accurate to claim that the current trade figures represent the actual commercial potential

of these two countries.

Table 3. Turkey’s Trade with Afghanistan

Year Exports (Million $) Imports (Million $) Total (Million $)

1990 1 1 2

2000 8 0 8

2005 113 8 121

2010 260 5 265

2012 290 6 296

2013 228 11 239

Source: Turkish Ministry of Economy

34

Of the Turkish companies operating in Afghanistan, 95% are active in the construction

industry. The total value of the undertakings assumed and currently performed by

Turkish medium and large-scale companies from 2002 until the end of 2009 has

exceeded 2 billion and 555 million dollars. In terms of numbers, Turkish companies

rank first among foreign investors in the contracting business, with approximately 60

construction companies registered and active in Afghanistan. The number of Turkish

personnel working in Afghanistan currently exceeds 3000. 86

One of the major problems faced by contractors working in Afghanistan is in transit

transportation. To this day, the transportation by Afghan trucks of goods and construction

equipment delivered from Turkey after they are unloaded at the borders has led to a

considerable loss of both time and materials, with up to 20% of the materials being

lost during transportation. At the same time, the fact that some routes such as the Iran-

Afghanistan/Islam Qala and Iran-Turkmenistan/Torghundi border gates are unsafe, and

the fact that routes such as the Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan route to Afghanistan

covers difficult terrain connected with rough roads, lead to problems in transportation,

and thus adversely affects the competitiveness of Turkish goods. 87

One of the major

problems faced by

contractors working

in Afghanistan is in

transit transportation.

Up to 20% of

the materials

being lost during

transportation.

Another area of cooperation in the economic field is again regional connectivity. Turkey is

a founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Afghanistan

is a new member of the ECO since 1992. 88 Regional infrastructure connectivity raises the

level of interaction. Therefore, Turkey can help Afghanistan to reconnect with Iran and

through Iran to Turkey and from Turkey to Europe. Transportation and communication

infrastructure in Central Asia is insufficiently linked with Afghanistan. Therefore Turkey

can help the integration of the whole region including Afghanistan. So, Turkey can also

increase its economic investment in regional connectivity. 89

Turkey has the potential to assist Afghanistan in the fields of agriculture, veterinary,

medicine, and textile industry. There is also a need for more investment in the education


sector in Afghanistan. Half million Afghan people is eligible for university education

and millions of youngsters are looking for primary, secondary, and higher education. 90

Finally, Turkish public sector, as well as the private sector, needs to invest more in urban

infrastructure for the best interest of Afghanistan. Turkish government can encourage

more Turkish investment in Afghanistan in order to generate employment and income

for Afghan estates. Moreover, Turkish firms come for reconstruction but no long-term

investment.

35


FOOTNOTES

1 Interview with Timor Sharan, May 9, 2014.

2 Paul D. Miller, “Democracy in Afghanistan: The 2014 Election and Beyond”, Perspective Series,

RAND Corporation, 2014, pp.4,7.

3 Khorshied Samad, “Afghanistan Elections: The Irreversible Journey of Afghan Women”, Foreign

Policy, April 9, 2014.

4 Salih Doğan, “If Politics Go Wrong in Afghanistan, What Happens to the Economy,” Today’s Zaman,

July 27-30, 2014.

5 Michael R. Gordon and Matthew Rosenberg, “Kerry Visits Afghanistan to Urge Deal on the

Election”, The New York Times, August 7, 2014.

6 Matthew Rosenberg, “Amid Election Impasse, Calls in Afghanistan for an Interim Government” The

New York Times, August 18, 2014.

7 Hikmet Çetin’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic

Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.

8 Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power before U.S. Withdrawal”,

Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011.

9 Timor Sharan, “The Dynamics of Informal Political Networks and Statehood in post-2001

Afghanistan: A Case Study of the 2010–2011 Special Election Court Crisis”, Central Asian Survey,

Vol. 32, No.3, pp. 337-338.

10 Sharan, “The Dynamics of Informal Political Networks and Statehood in post-2001 Afghanistan: A

Case Study of the 2010–2011 Special Election Court Crisis”, p.349.

11 Interview with Head of Afghan International Strategic Studies (AISS) Davood Moradien, May 9,

2014.

12 Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in Afghanistan”, United States Institute of

Peace Report, February 2014, p. 5.

13 Ibid.


15 Afghan Citizen Perception Survey, Assess, Transform & Reach (ATR) Consulting, February 2014,

pp.16-17.

16 Afghan Citizen Perception Survey, p.31.


18 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic




20 Interview with USAK, Head of Academic Council Ihsan Bal, June 15, 2014

21 Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in Afghanistan”, p.7.

22 ISAF ANQAR Survey, March 2014.



24 Ibid.

25 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, U.S. Department of Defense, April 2014,

p.39.

26 “Afghan Armed Forces Have Serious Problem with Discipline”, Russia Today, August 6, 2014. <

http://rt.com/op-edge/178404-afghanistan-shooting-security-soldiers/>

37


38

27 Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy

Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment, SIGAR 14-30 Audit Report,

January 2014.

28 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, U.S. Department of Defense Report, April

2014, p.74.

29 Salih Doğan, “International Aid to Afghanistan and Its Importance in the Post-2014 Era”, Caucasus

International, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 2013.

30 Salih Doğan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic




32 World Bank Data on Energy & Mining,

33 Website of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum

34 Natural resources management and Peace Building in Afghanistan, UNEP Report, May-2013, p.7.

35 World Bank Afghanistan Economy Overview, Last Updated: April 8, 2014. < http://www.worldbank.

org/en/country/afghanistan/overview>

36 Asraf Jehangir Qazi, “A Pakistani Analysis of the Present and Future Situation”, Afghanistan and Its

Neighbors: Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group

Publication, 2014, pp.36-37.

37 Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “How Balochistan gained independence”, Pakistan Today, December 21,

2013.

38 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Stability of Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly,

7 November 2012.

39 UNHCR, “2014 UNHCR country operations profile – Pakistan”, http://www.unhcr.org/

pages/49e487016.html (30.6.2014)

40 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Stability of Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation”, The Journal of Turkish

Weekly, November 7, 2012.

41 Ramin Nadimi, “Afghan Presidential Election and Possible Impact on Tehran-Kabul Ties”, Iran

Review, June 14, 2014.

42 Ellen Laipson, Engaging Iran on Afghanistan, Washington, DC, Stimson Center Publication, pp.3-4.

43 Richard Ghiasy and Maihan Saeedi, The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments

to Further Progress, Afghan Institute For Strategic Studıes, June 2014, p.28

44 Ellen Laipson, Engaging Iran on Afghanistan, Washington, DC, Stimson Center Publication, p.3.

45 Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “Uzbekistan’s Relationship with Afghanistan”, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors:

Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group Publication,

2014, pp.46-47.

46 Hakim Abdullohi Rahnamo, Fundamental Principles of Tajikistan’s Afghan Policy”, Afghanistan and

Its Neighbors: Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy

Group Publication, 2014, pp.44-45.


to Further Progress, Afghan Institute For Strategic Studıes, June 2014, p.29.

48 Punchok Stobdan’s Presentation at the Panel on Afghanistan And Regional Security, III Moscow

Conference on International Security, May 24, 2014, Moscow.

49 Radha Kumar, “India’s Strategic Interest: a Sovereign Afghanistan”, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors:

Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group Publication,

2014, pp.8-9.

50 Rahul Wadke, “Chabahar port in Iran holds key to boost Indo-Afghan trade ties”, The Hindu, 26

June 2014.

51 Vladimir Boyko, “Russia’s Approach to Afghanistan: Current Politics and Post-2014 Scenarios”,

Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi,

Delhi Policy Group Publication, 2014, pp.28-29.

52 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Russian understanding of color revolutions and the Arab Spring”, The Journal of

Turkish Weekly, 30 May 2014.

53 Wang Xu, “A Chinese Perspective on Afghanistan Post-2014”, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: Regional

Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group Publication, 2014,

pp.19-20.


to Further Progress, Afghan Institute For Strategic Studıes, June 2014, p.24.


55 Shanon Tiezzi, “Can China Lead the Push for Afghan Stability?”, The Diplomat, July 9, 2014.

56 Stephen Biddle, “Ending the War in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2013, pp.49-

51.

57 Mark Landler, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016”, The New York Times, May 27,

2014.

58 Mehmet Saray, Afghanistan and Turks, Printing House of Faculty of Letters, İstanbul, 1987, pp.96-

97.

59 Hikmet Çetin, “2014: Afganistan’ın Kritik Yılı”, Analist, June 2014, p.59.

60 “Declaration from Karzai and Musharraf”, BBC Turkish, 30 April 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/

turkish/europe/story/2007/04/070430_turkey_pakistan_afghan.shtml. (30.06.2014)

61 Muhammad Riaz Raza and Muhammad Wasim Akbar, “Image of President Asif Ali Zardari as

Portrayed by Daily Dawn and News: A Discourse Analysis of Editorials”, Mass Communication and

Journalism, Vol.2, No. 4, 2012, p.1.

62 “Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit in Istanbul”, Presidency of Republic of Turkey,

December 24, 2010. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/78467/istanbulda-turkiyeafganistanpakista

n-uclu-zirve-toplantisi.html (15.09.2012)

63 “6th Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit”, Akşam, November 1, 2011.

64 Presidency of Republic of Turkey, “7 th Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit Kicks Off”,

December 12, 2012, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/84675/7th-turkeyafghanistanpakistan-trilate

ral-summit-kicks-off.html (14.01.2013)

65 “PM, COAS in Turkey to Attend Trilateral Summit”, Daily Times, July 02, 2014.

66 Davood Moradian’s presentation at “the IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Beyond Common Debates:

Turkey’s Future Role in Afghanistan”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.

67 “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan

and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.

68 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation

for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, 2 November 2011”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/istanbul-process-onregional-security-and-cooperation-for-a-secure-and-stable-afghanistan.en.mfa

(30.6.2014)

69 Nadir Devlet, “Turkey withdraws from Afghanistan”, Geopolitics, 2002, p. 41.



71 Turkish-Afghan Relations from Past to Present, The publications of the Department of War History

and Strategic Studies, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 2009, pp.95-97.

72 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures, http://www.isaf.nato.int/

images/media/20140603_isaf-placemat-final.pdf (30.06.2014)

73 NATO, “Biographies. Hikmet Çetin”, http://www.nato.int/cv/scr/cetin-e.htm (18.01.2014)



75 Sertif Demir and Ali Bilgin Varlık, “Winning Peace: A Mere Dream of An Achievable Objective?

Inferences from Turkish Peacekeeping Experience in Afghanistan”, Journal of Central Asian &

Caucasian Studies, Vol.7, No.14, 2012, p.199.


Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara..

77 Turkish-Afghan Relations from Past to Present, The publications of the Department of War History

and Strategic Studies, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 2009, pp.95-97.

78 Ibid.

79 Hikmet Çetin, “2014: Afganistan’ın Kritik Yılı”, Analist, June 2014, p.59.

80 Turkish-Afghan Relations from Past to Present, pp. 103-104.

81 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Provincial Reconstruction Team – Wardak, http://vardakprt.org/

icerik.php?no=5 (15.01.2013)

82 “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan

and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.

83 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Provincial Reconstruction Team – Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul, http://

cevizcanprt.org/icerik.php?no=9 (15.01.2013)



85 Reşat Bayer’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic


86 Office of the Commercial Counselor in Kabul, http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/detay.cfm?AlanID=17

&dil=EN&ulke=AFG (17.06.2014)

USA

39


87 Ibid.

88 “About ECO”, Economic Cooperation Organization, http://www.ecosecretariat.org/in2.htm

(20.6.2014)

89 Davood Moradian’s Presentation at “the IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Beyond Common Debates:


90 Reşat Bayer’s Presentation at “the IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Beyond Common Debates:


40


USAK

INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC

RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Established in 2004, the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) has

gained wide recognition as Turkey’s foremost source of independent and balanced

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and the world’s leading organizations for the analysis of global issues, satisfying a

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