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FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN
AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTIONS
Authors
Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU
Mehmet YEGİN
September 2014
This publication is sponsored by
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division
Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s
Contribution
Authors
Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU
Mehmet YEGİN
Contributors
Oğuz Kaan Pehlivan
Reyhan Güner
Emre Tunç Sakaoğlu
Mehmet Hecan
September 2014
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu (USAK)
International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) is a non-partisan, non-profit,
nongovernmental research organization dedicated to empirical research and analysis.
USAK aims to encourage greater public awareness and to influence the policymaking
process by sharing expert analysis and research findings through publications,
conferences, and policy recommendations.
USAK provides a forum for discussing the strategic implications of major national
and international developments as they affect Turkey and the world. The analyses,
views, and recommendations in this document are solely those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect the views of USAK.
Copyright © 2014
First Edition
Library Catalogue Reports
“Future of Afghanistan and Turkey‘s Contribution”
This report contains graphs and tables with supplementary text
USAK Publications
ISBN: 978-605-4030-96-5
Graphic Design: Karınca Ajans Yayıncılık Matbaacılık
Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak No: 56/1 Kızılay/ANKARA
Phone: (0312) 431 54 83 • Fax: (0312) 431 54 84 • www.karincayayinlari.net
International Strategic Research Organization (USAK)
Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu
Ayten Sokak No: 21 Tandoğan/Ankara
Phone: (0312) 212 28 86-87 • Fax: (0312) 212 25 84
www.usak.org.tr - www.turkishweekly.net
www.usakanalist.com - info@usak.org.tr
İçindekiler
CONTENTS
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations................................................................................7
I. DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF AFGHANISTAN........................................................................13
1) The Election Process and Risks................................................................................................13
2) Stability After NATO..............................................................................................................15
a) Ethnic and Social Cohesion.................................................................................................15
b) Security and Economy.........................................................................................................16
i) Taliban Problem...............................................................................................................16
ii) A Sustainable Afghan Army.............................................................................................18
iii) A Sustainable Economy..................................................................................................19
II. THE ROLE OF GLOBAL ACTORS AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES............................23
1) Pakistan...................................................................................................................................23
2) Iran..........................................................................................................................................24
3) Central Asian Countries..........................................................................................................25
4) India........................................................................................................................................25
5) Russia......................................................................................................................................26
6) China......................................................................................................................................26
7) United States...........................................................................................................................27
III. ROLE OF TURKEY AS A NATO MEMBER..............................................................................29
1) Strong Historical Ties..............................................................................................................29
2) Diplomatic Cooperation and Trilateral Mechanism Between Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Turkey.................................................................................................................29
3) Turkish-Afghan Security Cooperation......................................................................................30
4) Turkey’s Contribution to the Reconstruction of Afghanistan...................................................32
5) Economic and Commercial Relations......................................................................................33
Tables and Graphs
Table 1. Election Results Table.................................................................................................................................. 14
Table 2. Afghanistan’s GDP and Foreign Aid Indicator............................................................................................. 21
Table 3. Turkey’s Trade with Afghanistan................................................................................................................... 34
Graph 1. Perception on Actors Controlling the Region............................................................................................... 16
Graph 2. Support for Taliban Rule.............................................................................................................................. 18
Graph 3. GDP Growth of Afghanistan (Annual %).................................................................................................... 20
USAK CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN STUDIES
The USAK Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies (ODAM) is a leading
Turkish research center for promoting knowledge of the Middle East and Africa.
The Center is a source of sound information, recommendations, journals, and books,
and a platform for forums and conferences on the Middle East and Africa.
USAK-ODAM is regularly consulted by journalists, officials, politicians, diplomats,
and other NGOs on Middle Eastern security and politics. Center staff regularly
contribute to USAK publications and organize lectures and discussion forums on
Middle Eastern topics. ODAM arranges lectures, seminars, conferences and other
discussions, and sponsors research and publications. In addition, the Center has an
extensive, private library on Middle Eastern and African subjects. The library includes
Turkish, English, Arabic, and Persian publications and is available to USAK
researchers and visitors. The corresponding desks conduct research in English and
regional languages.
Selçuk ÇOLAKOĞLU: Professor of International Relations, Vice
President of USAK, and Director of USAK Center for Asia-Pacific
Studies in Ankara, Turkey.
MEHMET YEGİN: Head of USAK Center for American Studies.
His research areas include U.S. domestic and foreign policy, Turkey-
U.S. Relations, NATO and security issues.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Successful Democratic Transition of Power
• A transition period for Afghans to take control of their country and assume responsibility
will bring with it a series of arduous tests for Afghanistan.
• These tests may be summarized as: achieving the first democratic transition of power,
maintaining ethnic and social cohesion, resolving the Taliban problem, providing
security and rule of law, and building a working economy.
• The 2014 Presidential Elections commenced the country’s first transfer of power in
the post-9/11 period, one of the most crucial challenges facing Afghanistan. Nonetheless,
the process could not be concluded due to fraud allegations.
7
• The political crisis that stemmed from election fraud allegations may be resolved
with a “national unity government” that foresees power sharing between Ashraf
Ghani Ahmadzai and Abdullah Abdullah. Yet, presidential hopefuls failed to agree
on the technical details.
• The deadlock caused by the presidential hopefuls’ failure to agree on the formation
of the national unity government may result in President Karzai clinging to power
via an interim government. A third term for Karzai would constitute a major step
backward for Afghan democracy.
• About the two candidates, the next president should be free from fraud allegations
since legitimacy is very important for a strong executive with domestic and international
support.
• Besides, a government that embraces all ethnic groups and political fractions may
provide for ethnic and social cohesion.
• As a solution, both candidates should agree on forming a functioning national unity
government, regardless of who won the election.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
Stability, Security, and Economic Development
• Political networks based on interests that were formed in the post-2001 period may
provide the positive parameters for the maintaining stability.
• Certain side effects of these political networks such as nepotism and corruption
should be closely monitored. These problems require the implementation of a process
that aims for long-term solutions rather than short-term quick fixes.
• As one of the security matters, the Taliban has limited popularity and exerts influence
on only a small number of people in a narrow geography in Afghanistan.
• The Taliban does not have the ability to restore the power it wielded in the 1990s.
Nonetheless, it does have a certain level of influence that could disrupt the security
of the country.
• Solving the Taliban problem with the use of sheer military power would be unsustainable.
• Power sharing negotiations with the Taliban, especially as they relate to the national
government rather than the regional administrations, may lead the organization to
forsake violence and become a more moderate actor in Afghan politics.
8
• If the negotiations do not result in a comprehensive deal with the whole of the
Taliban, at least persuading some groups to put down their weapons would further
marginalize the more radical groups and buy time for the Afghan government.
• For a more effective and sustainable Afghan National Army, as another important
security matter, there is a need to increase in capabilities of the soldiers while also
decreasing them in number.
• The Afghan National Army needs an air force, and the country must also develop
the capacity to build up a defense industry that can at least produce light weaponry
for Afghan security forces.
• In Afghanistan, development without security cannot take place; security without
development cannot last either.
• Afghanistan has rich natural resource reserves, it has a growing number of educated
individuals who could contribute to the workforce, its geographic location is advantageous
in terms of transportation and trade, and it has the potential for agriculture.
Nonetheless, security is a precondition to activate the potential.
• To jump-start the economy of Afghanistan, an increase in the confidence at both
investors and consumers is a must. Otherwise, the aid-reliant nature of Afghanistan
may persist.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
Impact of Neighboring Countries
• Pakistan is the most important neighbor of Afghanistan and cooperation between
Kabul and Islamabad is crucial in attaining stability and security in Afghanistan.
• The Taliban regaining power and capturing Kabul is the most important redline for
Iran. Therefore Iran does not object to American security guarantees in Afghanistan
in the short-run. Regardless, Tehran and Kabul are likely to face a vital dispute regarding
water-sharing in the coming years.
• Afghanistan is of the utmost importance in the eyes of top leaders in Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan because it has the potential to serve as a transit corridor
through which oil and natural gas can flow into Pakistani and Indian markets.
• Central Asian states can easily gain access to the Indian Ocean and diversify their
trade partners if Afghanistan attains stability. Afghanistan plays a truly strategic role
for the rejuvenation of projects such as the Modern-Day Silk Road and the Modern-
Day Spice Road.
• Since 2001, Russia has successfully engaged with NATO countries in establishing
solid grounds for mutual dialogue and cooperation in Afghanistan. Thereby, extremists
and terrorist groups within Afghanistan have been jointly kept under control,
and mutual efforts have been undergone to prevent poppy harvest and cultivation,
and the illicit trade of narcotics.
9
• If the Ukrainian crisis gradually deepens and political dialogue between Western
countries and Russia grinds to a halt, NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan can
become a thing of the past.
• China is pursuing a low-profile foreign policy towards Afghanistan in terms of political
risk-taking and visibility. That is because Beijing does not wish to upset or
directly confront any parties involved.
• The “zero option” policy for the U.S. is not plausible. Besides, the two presidential
hopefuls, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, made a commitment to sign a bilateral
security agreement with the U.S.
The Role of Turkey
• Turkish-Afghan relations have always been amicable since the establishment of this
relationship.
• The Turkish Parliament authorized the government to assign the Turkish Armed
Forces to Afghanistan on October 10th, 2001. Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan will
continue with NATO as a framework nation of the resolute support mission, which
is going to take over from ISAF in 2015.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
• Turkey has done its best to help Afghanistan and Pakistan settle their differences.
However, despite all the good intentions, the mechanism put in place has not provided
substantial results. It has to be acknowledged that Turkey does not want to play
an assertive role vis-à-vis any of the parties involved.
• The Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits, despite all their shortcomings,
provide a forum of cooperation for the institutions of the three countries.
• The Turkish military programs and projects are very acceptable to Afghans because
they are sensitive and sympathetic to the Afghan traditional and cultural values.
• Until now, Turkey has trained 17,500 Afghan military officers and soldiers in Afghanistan
and an additional 3,500 in Turkey.
• Turkey has trained more than 1300 Afghan police. Sivas Police Academy in Turkey
has received 500 Afghan police every 6 months according to the agreement signed in
2011.
• Turkish military has been sponsoring the Afghan Military School as well. There are
more than 100 Turkish advisors in the Afghanistan Military Academy and Military
Schools and Turkey has more than 100 Afghan military students in Turkish military
academies and the military medical faculty.
10
• The Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Maidan Shahr, the capital of
the Wardak Province, was established in October 2006. The second Turkish PRT in
Afghanistan is in the Jawzjan Province, which was established in Shibirghan in July
2010. Despite the closure of two Turkish PRT’s, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination
Agency (TIKA) will continue being on the ground.
• To date, Turkey has realized about 800 projects in Afghanistan with the help of two
PRT’s. Turkish PRT’s have rebuilt or renovated 84 schools and 70 hospital clinics.
These projects have been implemented and executed by Turkish groups and TIKA.
• Until now, Turkey has donated around $600 million to provinces in Afghanistan.
Direct official aid coming from Turkey corresponds to $150-160 million annually.
The amount of Turkish humanitarian investment in Afghanistan reached $2 billion
as of 2014.
• In terms of numbers, in Afghanistan, Turkish companies rank first among foreign
investors in the contracting business, with approximately 60 construction companies
registered and active in the country.
• Another area of cooperation in the economic field is regional connectivity. Turkey is
a founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), of which
Afghanistan became a member in 1992. Through this organization, Turkey can help
Afghanistan to logistically reconnect with Iran, and from Iran it can link to Turkey,
and from Turkey to Europe.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
• Turkey has the potential to assist Afghanistan in the fields of agriculture, veterinary
medicine, human medicine, and textiles. There is also a need for more investment in
the education sector in Afghanistan.
• The Turkish government can encourage more Turkish investment in Afghanistan in
order to generate employment and income for Afghan citizens.
11
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
DOMESTIC DYNAMICS OF
AFGHANISTAN
1There will be a change in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan by
the end of 2014. The organization’s role in the country will
be limited to advisement and focus on training and counterterrorism.
In the post-2001 period until now, despite some setbacks, a period of peace and a time
to recover from constant warring and Taliban rule was provided to the Afghan people.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under leadership of NATO and donor
countries have contributed to the security and economy of the country. A transition
period for Afghans to take the control of their country and assume responsibility has
been put into place.
This brings with it a series of arduous tests for Afghanistan, including achieving the first
democratic transition of power, maintaining ethnic and social cohesion, resolving the
Taliban problem, providing security and rule of law, and building a working economy.
It would be an understatement to say that these obstacles placed on the path before
Afghanistan may pose a severe challenge. A failure of any of these tests in Afghanistan
would risk the loss of gains made in recent years and may even trigger another civil war.
On the other hand, there are reasons to be hopeful. The capacity of the Afghan people,
especially the educated Afghan youth, and the inherent potential of the country are of
crucial importance.
13
In the first part of the report, Afghanistan’s major challenges will be scrutinized within
domestic and international parameters. First, the elections will be examined and then
the issues of ethnic and social cohesion. Later, the Taliban problem and the maintenance
of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the building of an Afghan
economy will be discussed.
1) The Election Process and Risks
The 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan marked an important phase in the country’s
democratic history. This election was to commence the country’s first transfer of
power in the post-9/11 period, one of the most crucial challenges facing Afghanistan.
Before the elections, there were concerns that incumbent President Hamid Karzai would
push for a third term and change the constitution; yet, the political atmosphere, civil
society organizations, and political institutions prevented him from taking action in this
direction. 1
It was revealed
that Ashraf Ghani
received 56.44
percent of the vote
while Abdullah
Abdullah lagged
behind with only
43.56 percent.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
The second concern was related to the election process itself. Questions emerged regarding
the ability of the Afghans to run the elections by themselves and whether or not they
could secure the voting stations from the threats of the Taliban. 2 These possible problems
were handled by the Afghans. The voting process ran relatively smoothly and the
Afghan security forces were successful in providing security. In the first round of elections,
more than 60 percent of Afghans made their way to the ballot box despite Taliban
threats. What is more, 42 percent of women participated in the elections. 3
The first round of elections on April 5, 2014, ended up with two frontrunners: Abdullah
Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. Abdullah received 45 percent of the total
vote while Ashraf Ghani achieved 31.56 percent. The first round of the elections did not
spark any major disagreements between the candidates. Nonetheless, it is hard to say the
same for the second round of the elections.
Table 1. Election Results Table
14
Afghanistan Presidential Election First-Round Results Afghanistan Presidential Election Second-Round Results
Candidate Number of Votes Percentage (%) Number of Votes Percentage (%)
Abdullah Abdullah 2,972,141 45 3,461,639 43.56
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzi 2,084,547 31.56 4,485,888 56.44
Zalmay Rasool 750,997 11.37
Total Number of Votes 6,604,546 7,947,527
Source: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan
In the second round of the elections, held on June 14, 2014, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai
and Abdullah Abdullah competed for the presidential office. After the votes were counted,
it was revealed that Ashraf Ghani received 56.44 percent of the vote while Abdullah
Abdullah lagged behind with only 43.56 percent. In reaction to the outcome, Abdullah
refused to recognize the results and claimed to be the victim of electoral fraud. Indeed,
as seen in the table above, the nearly 1.4 million increase in votes for Ashraf Ghani is
hard to explain when compared to 0,4 million increase in Abdullah Abdullah’s votes.
Discussions have
emerged regarding
the Afghan security
forces’ threat to seize
power and form an
interim government if
the political situation
is not fixed soon.
Abdullah Abdullah’s threat to declare a “parallel government” alarmed the U.S. and the
UN. The U.S. played the “financial support card” to prevent possible political turmoil. 4
Secretary of State John Kerry visited Kabul and brokered a deal for an “internationally
monitored vote audit” and a “national unity government” that foresaw power sharing
between Ghani and Abdullah. This power share agreement would include the allocation
of important posts to the losing party, including the appropriation of the “chief executive”
post to the defeated candidate. 5
A few days after John Kerry’s visit to Kabul, the Independent Election Commission of
Afghanistan (IEC) began recounting and auditing the votes under the supervision of
United Nations observers. Nonetheless, the presidential hopefuls failed to agree on the
technical details of the auditing process and the formation of the national unity government,
even though the recounting process had already begun. John Kerry paid a second
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
visit to Kabul on August 8, 2014, to pressure both candidates to form the national unity
government before September so that the new president could attend the NATO Summit
in Wales on behalf of Afghanistan. The candidates still have not reached a final deal.
In the meantime, discussions have emerged regarding the Afghan security forces’ threat
to seize power and form an interim government if the political situation is not fixed
soon. 6 Thus, there are allegations that President Karzai is clinging to power by exploiting
the disagreement between the candidates. A third term for Karzai would constitute
a major step backward for Afghan democracy. However, the assumption of the presidency
of one of the candidates without clearing the fraud allegations would cause other
problems.
The legitimacy of
the next president
of Afghanistan is
quite important for
the country’s public
and international
support seeing that
fraud allegations in
the previous elections
limited President
Karzai’s ability to
govern.
The legitimacy of the next president of Afghanistan is quite important for the country’s
public and international support seeing that fraud allegations in the previous elections
limited President Karzai’s ability to govern. Additionally, a government that brings together
all ethnic groups and political fractions may help to provide stability as well.
In this way, it seems that the best option for both candidates is to agree on a national
unity government, which is functional and involves both Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf
Ghani Ahmadzai, regardless of who won the election.
2) Stability After NATO
a) Ethnic and Social Cohesion
When discussing social cohesion in Afghanistan the ethnic balances and centers of power
have to be taken into consideration. In terms of ethnic balances, different from other
countries that have ethnically diverse societies, Afghanistan hosts a relatively strong Afghan
identity, which has the potential to keep different ethnic groups together. The
historical experience of Afghanistan raises the chances for multiple ethnicities in the
country to live together under a single strong national identity. 7 For more than two
centuries, Afghanistan has not experienced territorial division based on ethnic identity,
rather, various ethnic groups have struggled to gain dominance over each other. 8 In recent
decades, there is a revival of ethnic awareness, but the mentioned balances are still
more or less applicable. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that ethnic struggle for domination
is not free of risks.
Looking at the recent picture, this ethnic struggle assumed a new structure in the post-
2001 period. Revolving primarily around powerful individuals that emerged from the
civil war, political networks based on interests were formed, sharing the resources of the
state structure in line with the Bonn Agreement. 9 These political networks provided
a structure in which different power centers could bargain and negotiate on disputed
matters. There are even claims that these structures push different competing groups
to work together to protect “their deeply entrenched and intertwined political and financial
interests.” 10 Thus, the current structure may help to keep the power balances
in harmony and offset the major changes that the country is experiencing along with
change in NATO role.
“It is not fair to
compare Afghanistan
with other
countries. Instead, a
comparison between
2004 Afghanistan
and 2014
Afghanistan is more
appropriate.”
Amanullah Jayhoon
Afghan Ambassador to
Ankara
15
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
“In Afghanistan
development without
security cannot
take place; security
without development
cannot last either.”
Hikmet Çetin
Former NATO Senior
Civilian Representative
in Afghanistan
(2003-2006)
Both the ethnic balance and political networks may provide for positive parameters that
maintain stability. The sturdiness of these structures will be challenged and tested when
it comes to certain issues such as election results mentioned above. Another problem
may emerge surrounding the debate on a new constitution, seeing that the current constitution
does not meet the needs of the Afghan people. 11 Here, an avoidance of discriminating
against any one ethnic group or political network, rather than demanding their
integration into the political system, may help to sidestep a revival of the major clashes
and civil wars that have been experienced in the country in the past. Additionally, there
are certain side effects of these structures such as nepotism and corruption that should
be closely monitored. These problems related to political networks require a process that
aims for long-term solutions rather than short-term, first-hand quick fixes.
b) Security and Economy
i) Taliban Problem
The Taliban problem is the foremost security problem in Afghanistan. Looking at the
structure of this phenomenon, there is not a monolithic Taliban organization, rather,
there are groups like Akhtar Mansur’s Alliance, Abdul Qayum Zakir’s Alliance, and the
Rahbari Shura under the Quetta Shura. 12 Quetta Shura and Peshawar Shura are the two
major groups within the Taliban. 13 Yet as the Taliban’s strength comes from the insurgency
network, these splinter groups have weakened Taliban’s influence. 14
16
Graph 1. Perception on Actors Controlling the Region
(Approx.)
100%
99.2 98.2
95
89.1
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0.1
5 0.3
61.8
Taliban
3
6.3 11.2
Other Insurgent
Groups
70.4
Goverment
0.2 5.3 0.2 5.1
Militas
20
44
People
22
Urban North
Rural North
Urban South
Rural South
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
The Taliban is not influential throughout the whole country. In fact, according to surveys
conducted by Assess, Transform and Reach Consulting (ATR) with people in Afghanistan,
it can be seen that Taliban maintains most of its influence in the rural South.
61.8 percent of those interviewed in the rural South assert that the Taliban shares power
in their area with the government, whereas in the North and Urban South, the surveys
show that the Taliban’s influence is more limited. 15
Graph 2. Support for Taliban Rule
(Approx.)
100%
80%
Urban North
60%
40%
20%
0%
59 59.5
11
31
No, neither my area nor
any parts of the country
38.7 37.1
57.8
39.2
I just want the Taliban to
work together within the
existing goverment
0.15 0.1
0.1
Yes, just in my area
2 2
32.6
25.6
Yes, my area and some
parts of the country/the
whole country
Rural North
Urban South
Rural South
Public support for the Taliban is limited as well, especially in the North. Here, the majority
of people look unfavorably on Taliban rule over their region and the country. Support
for the Taliban comes mostly from the ethnic Pashtun dominated regions. Taliban
governance is favored by 32.6 percent of people in the urban South and 25.6 percent in
the rural South. However, even in the South, people are more open to the Taliban working
with the government, rather than ruling their region unaccompanied. Thus, even in
the Pashtun dominated areas, 64.7 percent of people in urban South and 65.9 percent
of those in the rural South oppose unitary Taliban rule. 16
17
This data confirms the common claims that Taliban has limited popularity and exerts
influence on only a small number of people in a narrow geography in Afghanistan. The
Taliban’s limited influence is illustrated in its inability to hinder participation in recent
elections, where the Afghan people took to the polls paying no heed to the threats they
viewed as hollow. It is expected that the Taliban will further loose support and legitimacy
after the U.S. withdrawal. 17 In short, the Taliban does not have the ability to restore
the power it wielded in the 1990s. Nonetheless, it does have a certain level of influence
that could disrupt the security of the country.
In order to solve the problem there are two paths: to defeat the Taliban militarily and
force Taliban to submit to the Afghan government’s terms, or to negotiate with the Taliban
and accept a power sharing deal. Despite the relative weakness of the Taliban now
compared to its past, the Afghan government does not have enough military and economic
instruments to exercise the first option. First, the Afghan National Army does not
have the necessary capabilities to confront and defeat the Taliban in the field. Besides,
It is expected that the
Taliban will further
loose support and
legitimacy after the
U.S. withdrawal.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
Taliban issue is not
solely a military
problem, it has
economic and social
dimensions as well.
this path would be too costly for a country like Afghanistan with an economy reliant on
donor countries. To illustrate, in order to eliminate 5-10 militants, three Predator UAVs
and 12 missiles would be required, with a total cost of $200 million. 18 Thus, the use of
sheer military power would be unsustainable.
Additionally, the Taliban issue is not solely a military problem, it has economic and
social dimensions as well. Economic problems and lack of government services push the
Afghan people into the arms of the Taliban. 19 In this regard, if the issue is to be resolved,
a more comprehensive approach is needed. This comprehensive solution must include
promoting economic development, good governance, and improved government services.
If successfully implemented, this strategy could help to restrict the maneuverability
of the Taliban and further marginalize their presence in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, in the long run a political solution is needed to address the problem. Since
the Taliban is not a separatist group, power sharing negotiations with the Taliban, especially
as they relate to the national government rather than the regional administrations,
may lead it to forsake violence and become a more moderate actor in Afghan politics. 20
Taliban groups such as Akhtar Mansur’s Alliance are more open to negotiate with the
government due to their weak military capabilities. 21 If the negotiations do not result
in a comprehensive deal with the whole of the Taliban, at least persuading some groups
to put down their weapons would further marginalize the more radical groups and buy
time for the Afghan government.
18
ii) A Sustainable Afghan Army
Certain problems and
limitations linger in
the Afghan National
Army. One of the
major problems is
the lack of discipline
in the ANA. Illiteracy
among the Afghan
soldiers is another
major problem.
Experience with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is a mix bag of achievements
and failures. Indeed, it may be argued that there is a need for time and resources
in the establishment of a fully operational Afghan National Army (ANA). In this line,
the ANA has achieved a robust number of security personnel. Despite the security forces’
deficiencies, this high number still provides a strategic advantage against the Taliban.
Besides, according to surveys, the ANSF has managed to achieve a certain degree of
public support, with the divisions that fall under its umbrella, the ANA and the Afghan
National Police (ANP), receiving 67 percent and 64 percent public approval ratings respectively.
22 Nonetheless, the problems of sustainability and operational efficacy necessitate
a transformation in the long run. Thus, an increase in effectiveness and capabilities
of military personnel, and a decrease in the number of troops would ease financial
constraints with better combat units.
When it comes to the achievements, the ANA has 170,000 troops under its command.
When the Afghan National Police Forces are included, this number increases to
350,000. This high number of people constitutes a power block that enables the Afghan
government to resist insurgency. So far the ANSF has taken on the responsibility of
securing the entirety of Afghan territory and it has been successful in providing security
in the country, especially at crucial times such as during the elections. The ANSF’s high
numbers also restrains the target pool of militant recruits for the Taliban. It also provides
jobs for a huge number of people and facilitates the indoctrination of Afghan identity. 23
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
Nonetheless, this great number of soldiers does not automatically mean that these forces
are effective. The Afghan forces are not “well-motivated; they are under-financed, and
ill-equipped.” 24 There have been improvements made to the ANSF’s operations since
2012. At this time, within the body of ANSF, only 1 out of 23 brigades were fully operational.
By February 2014, however, this number increased to 19 out of 23. 25 Yet certain
problems and limitations linger in the Afghan National Army. One of the major problems
is the lack of discipline in the Army. 26 Illiteracy among the Afghan soldiers is another
major problem. Despite literacy programs having cost the government $200 million
over five years, there are still concerns about the effectiveness of these programs. 27
The ANA also
needs better special
operation forces.
This type of training
may be provided by
donor countries, and
primarily the U.S.
and Turkey as NATO
member countries.
There is a financial sustainability problem for the Afghan forces as well. At the Chicago
Summit, the estimated annual budget needed for the ANSF was set at $4.1 billion, yet
in 2013, $5.4 billion was used as 26 percent of the Afghanistan’s entire budget. 28 Regarding
the decrease in economic growth and decreasing foreign aid, it will be extremely
difficult for Afghanistan to fund such a large amount of security forces. 29
In order to deal with these problems, there is a need to increase the capabilities of the
Afghan soldiers while also decreasing them in number. In order to achieve this goal, a
political solution regarding the Taliban is necessary. This will decrease the need for a
high number of security forces. As another option, compulsory military service may be
one of the solutions to acquiring a cheaper military force. 30 Additionally, the ANA also
needs better special operation forces. This type of training may be provided by donor
countries, and primarily the U.S. and Turkey as NATO member countries. Putting aside
the land forces, the Afghan National Army needs an air force and must also develop the
capacity to build up a defense industry, at least to produce light weaponry for its security
forces. 31
19
iii) A Sustainable Economy
Afghanistan has the potential to build a running economy. It has rich natural resource
reserves, it has a growing number of educated individuals who could contribute to the
workforce, its geographic location has advantages in terms of transportation and trade,
and it has the potential for untapped agricultural potential. Nonetheless, security is a
precondition to activate this potential. Only after securing the country and employing
the rule of law can all of these advantages be used, otherwise all of these potentials could
just remain on paper. This would mean the continuation of Afghanistan’s dependency
on foreign aid.
One of the latent economic capacities of Afghanistan is the country’s rich natural resources
of natural gas, iron ore, and copper. According to the World Bank, the oil and
gas reserves at Amu Derija, iron ore reserves in Hajigak, and copper reserves in Anyak
have the potential to be turned into economic catalysts for Afghanistan’s development. 32
Activating this potential may not only change the dynamics of the Afghan economy and
its dependency on foreign aid, but also may effect the people. According to the Ministry
of Mines and Petroleum of Afghanistan, the Aynak and Hajigak projects have the potential
to create nearly 100,000 jobs. 33
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
According to the
World Bank, the oil
and gas reserves
at Amu Derija, iron
ore reserves in
Hajigak, and copper
reserves in Anyak
have the potential
to be turned into
economic catalysts
for Afghanistan’s
development.
Other promising aspects of Afghanistan are related to the country’s cheap workforce
and its strategic location. There is an increasing number of college-educated individuals
in the country that could greatly contribute to the economy. Additionally, Afghanistan
occupies a strategic location that may be utilized as a hub for transportation and trade in
the region. This is especially true for Central Asia as Afghanistan represents the cheapest
path to the global market via the Indian Ocean. It may be a route for trade and even
energy transport. This potential will be elaborated upon in the next section on Afghanistan’s
relations with neighbors.
Lastly, currently agriculture is one of the dominant sectors of the Afghan economy. The
agriculture potential may be improved upon to stimulate more effective production. Yet
there are problems related to land and water ownership and usage rights. Domestic conflicts
over who has the right to use the land and water should be addressed by “improved
resource governance [and] stronger mechanisms for dispute resolution.” 34 In general, for
better land and water governance, the rule of law needs to be established and enforced.
Graph 3. GDP Growth of Afghanistan (Annual %)
14.4%
20
8.4%
Despite the increase
in agricultural
production by
2.7 percent,
Afghanistan’s
growth rate in 2013
decreased from
14.4 percent to 3.6
percent and the
forecast for 2014
is 3.2 percent due
to speculation of
a deterioration of
security and stability.
2010
6.1%
3.4%
3.2%
4.2%
2011 2012 2013 (expected) 2014 (forecasted) 2014 (forecasted)
All these capacities can turn into active economic assets only after the provision of security
and rule of law in the country. The mentioned natural resource projects need foreign
investment in order to be realized. If not taken advantage of, the cheap workforce may
turn into a curse as the growing number of college graduates could come to constitute
the basis of the unemployed masses. Lastly, agriculture may not bring economic growth
by itself. Despite the increase in agricultural production by 2.7 percent, Afghanistan’s
growth rate in 2013 decreased from 14.4 percent to 3.6 percent and the forecast for
2014 is 3.2 percent due to speculation of a deterioration of security and stability. 35
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
Table 2. Afghanistan’s GDP and Foreign Aid Indicator
2010 2011 2012 2013
GDP (US $) 15,936,784,436 17,870,159,082 20,506,795,254 20,724,663,537
Aid received (US $) 6,426,380,000 6,884,700,000 6,725,030,000 Undeclared
Percentage (%) 40.3 38.5 32.8
Source: The World Bank
In short, Afghanistan has great potential to build a sustainable economy. Nonetheless,
in order to achieve this, it has to first provide security and establish rule of law in order
to increase foreign investment and consumer confidence. To jump-start the economy
of Afghanistan an increase in the confidence at both investors and consumers is a must.
Otherwise, the aid reliant nature of Afghanistan may linger. It is projected that within
the next ten years, foreign aid to Afghanistan will decrease and economic development
indexes will increase. Looking at the data, over the past three years, nearly 30 percent of
Afghanistan’s GDP has come from foreign aid.
21
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
THE ROLE OF GLOBAL
ACTORS AND NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES
2Afghanistan has six neighbors with which it has a land border.
Moreover, countries that have strong historical ties with
Afghanistan and that are located in its close neighborhood,
i.e. countries like Turkey, Russia, and India, should also be
mentioned in order to have a deeper insight on Afghanistan’s
geographical location as a political entity.
The U.S. is another important country today, with respect to Afghanistan’s political and
economic relations with the rest of the world. In this chapter, the countries listed above,
excluding Turkey, will be our priority subject. On the other hand, elaborations on Turkey
will be given a larger space in the next chapter.
1) Pakistan
23
Pakistan is the most important neighbor of Afghanistan because of the fact that Pashtuns
live in regions which are lined along both sides of the border. Pakistan gives utmost
importance to the subjects of attaining stability and security in Afghanistan, the institution
of an Afghan regime which would maintain close contact between Kabul and
Islamabad, and that Afghanistan becomes fit to serve as a gateway and transit route for
Central Asian energy resources and markets. 36 Pakistan, on the other hand, claims that
India tries to encircle herself through Afghanistan and that India has a large number
of activities of politics and intelligence in nature in Afghanistan. It believes that Indian
intelligence trains and equips Baloch separatists, who are actively struggling against the
government in Islamabad, in Afghan camps. 37 Without a full normalization in the relations
between Islamabad and New Delhi, it seems hard for the two countries to reach a
consensus, and cooperate in Afghanistan. Pakistan is further concerned that Afghanistan
may turn into a front for proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Therefore Islamabad
tries to stick to a policy of balancing between Riyadh and Tehran.
The Pakistanis also think that Pakistan is the country which suffers about Afghanistan
the most. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is not a commercial or political issue; it is an agenda
of existential importance. The destabilization process of Pakistan began in 1980, when
the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Salafi groups coming from Saudi Arabia
in support of the Mujahedeen in that time are said to have created instability. Saudifunded
madrassas in Pakistan are said to break poor family children off their families
Pakistan claims that
India tries to encircle
herself through
Afghanistan and that
India has a large
number of activities
of politics and
intelligence in nature
in Afghanistan.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
Pakistan is further
concerned that
Afghanistan may turn
into a front for proxy
warfare between
Saudi Arabia and
Iran. Therefore
Islamabad tries to
stick to a policy of
balancing between
Riyadh and Tehran.
and subject them to brainwashing with the promise to aid the families and meet all the
costs of training. Especially poor families with many children in rural areas of Pakistan
relieve themselves financially by giving some of the children to madrassas and they think
they save children’s lives as well. Suicide bombers and armed militants come from the
children taken from families. 38
Before September 11, Pakistan was trying to convince the Taliban regime to break the
link with al-Qaeda but did not succeed. The Pakistanis say Pakistan has no common
interest with the Taliban regime. Pakistanis claim that they try to make as much contact
as possible with the Afghan officials, but their efforts are not met by the Afghanis. They
say that Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups target the Pakistani state
and society, and even organize attacks on the largest land, air and sea bases. They also
say Pashtunistan ideas spread mostly from Afghanistan. The Pakistanis believe that civil
war in Afghanistan seems inevitable after 2014 if the Taliban is not included in the system.
Pakistan, together with Iran, is also a country that carries the burden of the Afghan
refugees. More than one million refugees have been living in Pakistan since the 1980s. 39
Exactly how many Afghan refugees live in Pakistan is not known as the country cannot
carry out border controls effectively.
2) Iran
24
Iran is also one of the countries having impact on the future of Afghanistan. In Iran,
there are over a million Afghan refugees, many of whom entered the country illegally.
From the point of Iranians, terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking originating from
Afghanistan are a major threat. Another important issue for Iran is ending the occupation
in Afghanistan. The Iranians see post-2001 NATO intervention as a foreign occupation,
as the 1980 Soviet invasion and demand the immediate ending of the American
occupation under the name of NATO. However, the Iranians say they can negotiate and
cooperate with the Americans for Afghanistan as they did it for Iraq. 40
The Iranians see
post-2001 NATO
intervention as a
foreign occupation,
as the 1980
Soviet invasion,
and demand the
immediate ending
of the American
occupation under the
name of NATO.
Grounds for cooperation between Tehran and Washington have been consolidated in recent
months depending upon the progress made in P5+1 negotiations with Iran. While
Tehran used to object strongly to the U.S. retaining any military bases in Afghanistan,
it has lately been expressing consent for the U.S. retaining a limited number of temporary
military bases in the country. In this respect, Tehran no longer objects President
Obama’s plans to deploy 10,000 American troops until 2016 in Afghanistan, which
Washington announced in May 2014. 41
Under current circumstances, continued existence and stability of the Afghan state bears
utmost importance for countering extremist groups, combating illicit trade of narcotics,
and maintaining border security. The Taliban, regaining power and capturing Kabul, is
the most important red line for Iran. Therefore Iran does not object American security
guarantees in Afghanistan in the short-run. 42
In terms of language and culture, Iran has an advantageous position for influence over
Afghanistan. But because of Shia solidarity carried out over Hazaras, Tehran seems to
have not used the chance to establish good relations with all groups in Afghanistan. Af-
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
ghanistan has a reaction in particular against Iran and Pakistan. Iran is claimed to have
tried to put pressure on Afghanistan and politicize the Shiite Hazaras. 43
Tehran and Kabul are likely to face a vital dispute regarding water-sharing in the coming
years. Iran is highly dependent on rivers originating in Afghanistan to supply its
unsustainable need for water. Due to the increase in population and the expansion of
arable land both in Afghanistan and Iran, a crisis over sharing scarce water resources is
inevitable. 44
3) Central Asian Countries
Afghanistan has a
reaction in particular
against Iran and
Pakistan. Iran is
claimed to have
tried to put pressure
on Afghanistan and
politicize the Shiite
Hazaras.
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have almost identical
policies on Afghanistan. Central Asian countries want Afghanistan to restore its political
stability as soon as possible and be a center of attraction by trade routes and pipelines.
Afghanistan-based drug trafficking and radical organizations deeply affect the stability
of the Central Asian countries. Salafi groups open to Central Asia through Afghanistan.
Even Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which do not have a direct border with Afghanistan,
are uncomfortable with extremist religious movements. 45
Afghanistan bears utmost importance in the eyes of top leaders in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan; because it has the potential to serve as a transit corridor
through which oil and natural gas can flow into Pakistani and Indian markets. TAPI
(Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) and similar projects can be realized
only when Afghanistan qualifies as a safe route.
25
Because the southern trade corridor which links Central Asian countries to the Indian
subcontinent passes through its borderlands, Afghanistan is indispensable in terms of
regional logistics. Central Asian states will easily reach out to the Indian Ocean and
diversify their trade partners if Afghanistan attains stability. Afghanistan plays a truly
strategic role for the rejuvenation of projects such as the Modern-Day Silk Road and the
Modern-Day Spice Road. 46
Central Asian countries wish that the U.S., Russia, and China can maintain good relations
overall, and reach some level of consensus over Afghanistan as well as other
regional issues. They are worried though, because in case relations between these great
powers suffer a setback due to increased competition and conflicts of interest, Central
Asian countries will be compelled to take a side. 47
4) India
India is both a regional and global actor seeking influence over Afghanistan. India wants
to provide support especially for the development of Afghan economy. New Delhi proposes
Kabul to be a trade bridge between Central Asia and South Asia, thus revitalization
of historical Silk Road and Spice Road. India also wishes the Caspian energy resources to
reach South Asia through Afghanistan. New Delhi also intends to support the process of
national understanding in Afghanistan. The Indians think their own multiculturalism
and democracy can be a model for the future of Afghanistan. 48
Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Kazakhstan
have almost
identical policies on
Afghanistan.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
New Delhi is trying to
improve its relations
and cooperate with
Iran as well, in a
bid to overcome its
strategic reliance
upon Pakistan in
reaching out to
Central Asia and
Afghanistan.
The biggest handicap of India, which has no direct border with Afghanistan, is that she
has to agree with Pakistan in this regard. The fate of New Delhi’s economic and trade
relations to be developed with Kabul depends on the logistical support to be provided by
Islamabad. In this respect, Pakistan is India’s only door opening to Central Asia. Being
aware of this situation, India is trying to take into account sensitivities of Pakistan while
improving relations with Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan’s cooperation is essential to
the success of pipeline projects such as TAPI. 49
New Delhi is trying to improve its relations and cooperate with Iran as well, in a bid
to overcome its strategic reliance upon Pakistan in reaching out to Central Asia and
Afghanistan. In this respect, assisting Iran in developing the Chabahar Port is among
India’s priorities. 50
26
If the Ukrainian
crisis gradually
deepens and political
dialogue between
Western countries
and Russia grinds
to a halt, NATO-
Russia cooperation
in Afghanistan can
become a thing of
the past.
5) Russia
Russia is one of the biggest victims of the narcotic produced in Afghanistan. The country
immediately wants to put an end to the drug traffic directly affecting the Russian
youth. Moscow is also concerned about the Salafi groups supported by the Taliban gaining
influence among Muslim peoples of the Russian Federation. The Russians state that
they want to come to terms with all the actors on Afghanistan, but that they will not
accept the impositions of especially Western countries. Therefore, it can be assumed that
Russia will support all kinds of roles the international community play in Afghanistan,
subject to take her prior consent. 51
So far, Russia has successfully engaged with NATO countries while establishing solid
grounds for mutual dialogue and cooperation in Afghanistan since 2001. Thereby, extremists
and terrorist groups within Afghanistan were jointly kept under control, and
mutual efforts in preventing poppy harvest, cultivation, and the illicit trade of narcotics
were underwent. Russia was supporting NATO’s state-building endeavor in Afghanistan
under the condition that NATO does not expand militarily into former Soviet countries.
However, the NATO-Russia Council reached an abrupt end with the Ukrainian
crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Indeed, Russia began perceiving Afghanistan
not as a zone of cooperation but as a country in which NATO’s intervention caused
destabilization since May 2014. Whether such an attitude only reflects Russia’s immediate
reaction against the NATO will be revealed in time. If the Ukrainian crisis gradually
deepens and political dialogue between Western countries and Russia grinds to a halt,
NATO-Russia cooperation in Afghanistan can become a thing of the past. 52
6) China
China has a narrow land border with Afghanistan. In this respect, Afghanistan matters
for China in terms of security, rather than for its logistic or strategic value. Beijing’s first
priority with respect to Afghanistan is preserving border security in Xinjiang and Tibet,
two minority regions in Afghanistan’s close neighborhood. Beijing is especially concerned
with Uighur separatists, exiting and entering Chinese borders at will in order to
receive training in Afghanistan and then organizing armed opposition back in Xinjiang.
Therefore Beijing supports the moderate government in Kabul and hopes it endures.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
The worst case scenario for Beijing would be Afghanistan turning into a safe haven for
separatist groups threatening border security. 53
Nonetheless, China is pursuing a low-profile foreign policy towards Afghanistan in
terms of political risk-taking and visibility. That is because Beijing does not wish to
upset or directly confront any parties involved. Beijing does not wish to risk its relations
with Islamabad while improving its relations with Kabul. Likewise, China refrains from
interfering actively in the politics of Afghanistan, because it wishes to antagonize neither
the U.S., nor Russia, nor India under any circumstances. While China puts support
behind multilateral initiatives on Afghanistan, it does not wish to confront any country
over Afghanistan. 54 It is expected that China is preparing a more active role in Afghanistan
in the post-2014 period. The fourth ministerial meeting of the Istanbul Process
on Afghanistan in Tianjin at the end of August 2014 might be turning point for China’s
more active engagement role in Afghanistan. 55 On the other hand, China adopted a
proactive policy of economic involvement in Afghanistan. That said, China became the
largest economic partner of Afghanistan, in various sectors with mining at the outset.
Beijing does not wish
to risk its relations
with Islamabad
while improving
its relations with
Kabul. Likewise,
China refrains from
interfering actively
in the politics
of Afghanistan,
because it wishes to
antagonize neither
the U.S., nor Russia,
nor India under any
circumstances.
7) United States
The basic priority for the U.S. in Afghanistan is the survival and success of the administrative
structure and state authority, that were established post-2001, after NATO
troops withdraw from the country. On the other hand, there is a possibility that U.S.
forces will completely withdraw from Afghanistan together with NATO forces in 2014
without leaving a permanent military base in the country. In fact, not only the Afghans
but also many global and regional actors are concerned about the fact that the American
troops providing security in Afghanistan since 2001 will withdraw from the country.
Whether the Afghan army is capable of maintaining its integrity to fight the Taliban is
a matter of discussion. 56
27
In addition, there are other important considerations relating to the extent of national
consolidation in Afghanistan and how to avoid the breakout of a civil war between the
groups in the country. Americans are hopeful about the future of Afghanistan in general,
and think that the Afghan government and the ANA have the capacity to protect the
integrity and stability of the country.
In his public speech at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York,
in May 2014, President Barrack Obama stated that 9,800 American troops can be left
in Afghanistan until the end of 2016 renouncing the “zero option” policy. 57 Moreover,
both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the two presidential candidates who qualified
for the second round of the ongoing presidential elections in Afghanistan, made a
commitment to sign a bilateral security agreement with the U.S.; despite the fact that
current President Hamid Karzai refused to sign one. In this respect, the United States’
promise to retain troops in Afghanistan for at least two years more helped alleviate anxieties
concerning the future of the country.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
3
1920s
1) Strong Historical Ties
ROLE OF TURKEY
AS A NATO MEMBER
The Turkish-Afghan relations have always been amicable since the establishment of this
relationship. Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Afghanistan, which gained its
independence in 1919, first began in 1921. Delegations from the two countries signed
the first Turkey-Afghanistan Alliance Agreement on 1 March 1921 in Moscow. 58
1920s and 1930s are significant periods in the history of Turkish-Afghan relations when
Afghanistan was under the rule of Amanullah Khan and Turkey was led by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk. In the first anniversary of the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1924,
only representative from the foreign countries was the Afghan ambassador. Ataturk was
also present in the opening of the Afghan Embassy in the new Turkish capitol, Ankara.
King Amanullah Khan finally paid a visit to Turkey in 1927. Turkey endeavored to
provide all manner of political and economic support to ensure the development and
stability of Afghanistan. Ali Abat University in Afghanistan was founded in 1932 by
Turkey and law and medical schools at the Kabul University were opened by Turkey in
1935. The first staff of defense ministry at that time and all the troops were trained by
Turkey. 59
and 1930s are
significant periods in
the history of Turkish-
Afghan relations
when Afghanistan
was under the rule
of Amanullah Khan
and Turkey was led
by Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk.
29
2) Diplomatic Cooperation and Trilateral Mechanism Between
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey
Turkey has played an important role in different areas, including Af-Pak relations in
the post-2001 period. The Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits convened
eight times from 2007 to 2014. Turkey accepted to take a part in this mechanism due
to its historical ties with those countries. Firstly, Afghan and Pakistani leaders, who were
in disagreement on the methods for fighting terrorism against the increasing capacity
of Taliban forces after 2005, were brought together by Turkey in Ankara on April 29,
2007. At the end of the meeting hosted by Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and
performed with the participation of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf, the Ankara Declaration was issued in order to increase the
cooperation between the three countries. In the Ankara Declaration, it was emphasized
that the bilateral relations of Afghanistan and Pakistan would be strengthened on the
basis of good neighborhood relations, mutual respect for territorial integrity and noninterference
in domestic affairs. 60
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
This trilateral cooperation was continued in the following years. At the time of second
trilateral summit held on December 5, 2008, two of the presidents who participated in
the initial meeting had changed. In Turkey, the new parliament convened on August
2007 to elect Abdullah Gül as president in Sezer’s place, whose term had ended. On the
other hand in Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, the spouse of Benazir Bhutto, took over the
presidency from Musharraf, who had been obliged to resign from office on August 18,
2008. 61
The second Trilateral Summit held in Istanbul on December 5, 2008 with the
participation of the Turkish President Gül, the Afghan President Karzai and the Pakistani
President Zardari focused on the means for enhancing the trilateral cooperation. During
the fourth trilateral summit held in Istanbul on December 24, 2010, it was decided that
the railway network between Pakistan and Turkey would be extended to Afghanistan,
and that the communication, airways, trade and energy connections between these
countries would be strengthened. 62
30
The 6 th Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit was held in Istanbul on October
31, 2011, with the participation of the same presidents. 63 The 7 th Turkey-Afghanistan-
Pakistan Trilateral Summit was held in Ankara on December 12, 2012. 64 The 8 th Turkey-
Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit was held in Ankara on February 13, 2014 under
the theme of “Sustainable Peace in the Heart of Asia”. President Gül, President Karzai
and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif discussed the steps that should be taken toward the
establishment of sustainable peace and stability in the region. 65 Initiatives have been
launched during these trilateral summits, for cooperation on counter-terrorism, and
also for enhancing the political, economic and cultural ties between the three countries.
Turkey did its best to help both Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their differences.
However, despite all the good intentions, this mechanism did not give substantial results.
It is not sure whether this number indicates to the institutionalization of the platform,
or the persistence of unresolved problems. According to Afghan experts, it is time for
Turkey to decide either to become more assertive in mediation between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Ankara should confront Islamabad, when it is necessary in order to protect
peace in Afghanistan. If Turkey cannot be assertive, the Afghans would have to leave
that process, because if Turkey remains a passive mediator, then it would damage its
relationship with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 66 However, Turkey does not want to
play an assertive role against any of side.
The 8 th Turkey-
Afghanistan-Pakistan
Trilateral Summit was
held in Ankara on
February 13, 2014
under the theme of
“Sustainable Peace in
the Heart of Asia”.
Despite all of its shortcomings Afghan, Pakistani and Turkish leaders find the process
useful and they want to continue with it, because this not only provides a forum for
dialogue for the Afghani and Pakistani authorities, but with the recent developments, it
also provides a forum cooperation for the institutions of three countries. 67
Turkey also initiated another diplomatic attempt to integrate Afghanistan to the regional
and international system. Turkey invited neighbors of Afghanistan to attend the Istanbul
Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan in
November 2014. The Istanbul Process has become a regional platform to encourage
cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors on security, economic, and political
issues. The process includes 14 regional countries and 28 supporting partners, including
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
extra-regional countries, like the U.S. and the U.K. and international organizations
like the UN. The Istanbul Process itself focuses on various issues such as educational
exchanges, cooperation on disaster management and prevention, and anti-drug
trafficking operations. The ultimate goal of the Istanbul process is ensuring a stability
for Afghanistan. 68
3) Turkish-Afghan Security Cooperation
Turkish military
has not engaged
in a conflict in
Afghanistan for now
and has no conflictrelated
casualty up
until now.
In the field of security, Turkey provides support to Afghanistan both through the ISAF
and within the framework of training and equipment provided to the Afghan army
and police. The Turkish Parliament authorized the government to assign the Turkish
Armed Forces to Afghanistan on October 10, 2001. During the first period of the ISAF
operation under the command of the United Kingdom, Turkey participated with a force
of 267 personnel in total, including army staff, a squad team and training personnel.
Turkey assumed the command of ISAF from the United Kingdom during the second
ISAF period between June 2002 and February 2003. During this period, Turkey’s
contribution in troops was raised to the level of a battalion, and the number of personnel
increased to 1350. In addition, Turkey assumed responsibility for the operation of the
Kabul Airport. Turkey’s experiences with counter-terrorism played a major role in its
assignment for this task. 69
Turkish military led the second ISAF mission in 2003 with 1400 troops and the 7 th
mission in 2005 with 1600 troops. In 2009, the number of Turkish soldiers reached its
peak level with 1800 personnel under the Kabul Regional Command. Turkey had the
third largest contingent within the ISAF among 50 contributive countries at the time. 70
31
The Kabul Regional Command, which is in charge of the Kabul province, began
its duty on 6 th of August 2006 under the leadership of Turkey, Italy and France. Its
command rotated respectively between Turkey, France and Italy for 8-month periods. 71
As of June 2014, Turkey has 457 troops on ground. 72 Turkey’s presence in Afghanistan
will continue with NATO as a framework nation of the resolute support mission, which
is going to take over from ISAF in 2015.
The former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin was appointed on 19 November
2003 as the NATO Secretary General’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan,
which is the highest-level political representative of NATO in the country. Çetin held
command of the ISAF starting from 11 th of August 2003, taking office in Kabul on 26
January 2004, and serving two consecutive terms until 24 th of August 2006. 73
Turkish troops are not engaged in combat operations, and Ankara has long resisted
pressure from Washington to provide more combat troops. Turkish military has not
engaged in a conflict in Afghanistan and has no conflict-related casualty up until now.
Turkey has 14 fallen soldiers, two personnel in car accident, one of whom was a colonel
and 12 personnel in the helicopter crush in Kabul in 2012. Turkish military has been in
Afghanistan for 12 years and up to now 30,000 Turkish soldiers served in Afghanistan.
There is no single criminal record towards Afghanis in which Turkish soldiers involved. 74
The circumcision
ceremonies for
boys, and medical
examination
programs for women
has become very
popular.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
Turkey has 187
military personals
within NATO training
mission, doing
business within
NATO.
Unlike other soldiers of the ISAF, Turkish military personnel, who serves by building
close relations with the public, has gained considerable respect among the Afghan
people. The main reason of success of Turkish troops is that the probability of the use
of force is quite low. 75 Turkish military programs and projects are very sympathetic and
acceptable to Afghans because they are sensitive to the Afghan traditional and cultural
values. These are small success stories but very effective. Firstly, circumcision is for the
ones who doesn’t know this term. These circumcision ceremonies, for instance, more
than 8000 boys, this is a policy, which is directly related to hearts and minds of the
local Afghans in economic, socio-cultural, religious and medical domains. It’s a policy
with deep strategic impact on Afghans. Secondly, the medical examination programs
for women. This program has become very popular and currently 15 female military
doctors are serving in military hospitals in Kabul and also Turkish medical examinations,
these teams extend their medical services to the civilians “since 2002 more than 3000
Afghans were offered free medical treatment in Turkey and more than 30,000 Afghans
in Kabul.” 76
The Turkish Armed Forces granted 7.1 million U.S. dollars of military materials to the
Afghan Armed Forces between 2003 and 2007. 77 Turkey has donated approximately 6
million US Dollars of military material, and provided minimum material requirements
including ammunition within the scope of a project for the establishment of three
155mm towed howitzer batteries that will independently serve the Afghan National
Army.
32
Within the context of the cooperation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the
Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), buildings and
facilities were constructed within the framework of the project for the modernization of
the Afghan Military High School into a modern educational institution, with nearly 8
million US Dollars of aid materials being provided in the process. As of April 2008, the
total sum of the aid and materials provided for the Afghan National Army has reached
almost 52 million US Dollars. The logistic assistance as part of the Foreign Military
Assistance Program carried out between 2004 and 2007, 3.5 million US Dollars of aid
was provided. 78
Turkey has trained
more than 1300
Afghan police. Sivas
police academy in
Turkey has got 500
Afghan police every
6 months according
to the agreement
signed in 2011.
In the area of security cooperation is on given a partnership direction to the Afghan
security forces. Turkey has 187 military personals within NATO training mission, doing
business within NATO. Until now Turkey have trained 17,500 military officers and
soldiers in Afghanistan and in addition 3500 in Turkey. Turkish army invited them to
Turkey, to train them and send them back. . This number includes 2000 commando
units, 100 military advisers, and 100 military students who became officers by now. The
Ghazi Military Training Center was established for the training of Afghan soldiers in
Turkey. Turkish military has been sponsoring the Afghan Military School as well. There
are more than 100 Turkish advisors in Afghanistan Military Academy and Military
Schools and Turkey has more than 100 Afghan military students in Turkish military
academies and military medical faculty. Turkish military has spent 1 million dollars
for 11 years. Turkey has trained more than 1300 Afghan police. Sivas police academy
in Turkey has received 500 Afghan police every 6 months according to the agreement
signed in 2011. 79
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
4) Turkey’s Contribution to the Reconstruction of Afghanistan
Following the NATO Secretary General’s visit to Turkey in December 2005 and President
Karzai’s visit in January 2006, the decision was taken for the establishment of a Turkish
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak. The Turkish PRT in Maidan Shahr,
the capital of the Wardak Province, was established in October 2006. The Wardak PRT
was composed of two administrative structures, one being the Civilian Coordinatorship,
and the other being the Military Unit Command. Military Unit Command was carrying
out its duties with 29 civilian and 79 military personnel. 80
The objective of the Turkish PRT in Wardak was to support the development of the
Afghan society and of the infrastructure in Wardak Province, and also to strengthen the
provincial administration and to increase their effectiveness and capability in securityrelated
areas. The civilian component of the PRT included advisors from the Turkish
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Education and TIKA,
who assisted in the planning and implementation of reconstruction and development
projects. 81
The Turkish PRT in Maidan Shahr covered the Wardak Province in its Area of Operation.
In close coordination with the Afghan authorities, the Turkish PRT contributed
significant additional capabilities and resources to a region that would supplement
and augment the current development, reconstruction and capacity building efforts in
Wardak province. Furthermore, the PRT also contributed in the area of security through
the training of the Afghan National Police, by contributing experienced Police Trainers
to the educational program of the Turkish-Afghan Police Training Center founded by
Turkey in 2008. As of 2014 Wardak PRT has closed down but Turkey did not just pack
up and leave. Turkey has transformed Wardak PRT facilities into a boarding school
which is going to serve the Afghan youth and society for many years. 82
33
The second Turkish PRT in Afghanistan is in the Jawizcan Province, which was
established in Shibirghan in July 2010 in close consultation with ISAF Nations following
the invitation of the Afghan Government. PRT Jawizcan was one of the 27 PRTs
operating in Afghanistan, and one of the 6 PRTs under Regional Command-North.
PRT Jawizcan operates in the Jawizcan and the Sar-i Pul Provinces. On 15 April 2010,
Turkey and Sweden agreed that the Swedish-led PRT Mazar-e Sharif (MeS) and PRT
Jawizcan would have “concurrent responsibilities” for the development and capacity
building efforts in both the Jawizcan and Sar-i Pul Provinces. 83 Turkey is making a
calendar to phase Jawizcan PRT out and close it down but not terminate projects there
by the end of 2014.
Up till now Turkey realized about 800 projects in Afghanistan with the help of two
PRTs. Turkish PRTs rebuilt or just renovated 84 schools, 70 hospital Clinique. These
projects have been done by Turkish groups and TIKA. 84 Despite the close down of
two Turkish PRT’s, TIKA will continue being on the ground. To date, Turkey donated
around $600 million to provinces in Afghanistan. Direct official aid coming from
Turkey corresponds to $150-160 million annually. The stock of Turkish humanitarian
investment in Afghanistan reached the level of $2 billion by 2014. These expenses are
mostly covered by Turkey’s public budget. 85
Trade volume
increased from 8
million dollars in
2000 to 296 million
dollars in 2012 at the
highest level.
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
5) Economic and Commercial Relations
The commercial relations between Turkey and Afghanistan have begun to develop over
the course of the last decade. Trade volume increased from 8 million dollars in 2000 to
296 million dollars in 2012 at the highest level (see Table-3). However, it would not be
accurate to claim that the current trade figures represent the actual commercial potential
of these two countries.
Table 3. Turkey’s Trade with Afghanistan
Year Exports (Million $) Imports (Million $) Total (Million $)
1990 1 1 2
2000 8 0 8
2005 113 8 121
2010 260 5 265
2012 290 6 296
2013 228 11 239
Source: Turkish Ministry of Economy
34
Of the Turkish companies operating in Afghanistan, 95% are active in the construction
industry. The total value of the undertakings assumed and currently performed by
Turkish medium and large-scale companies from 2002 until the end of 2009 has
exceeded 2 billion and 555 million dollars. In terms of numbers, Turkish companies
rank first among foreign investors in the contracting business, with approximately 60
construction companies registered and active in Afghanistan. The number of Turkish
personnel working in Afghanistan currently exceeds 3000. 86
One of the major problems faced by contractors working in Afghanistan is in transit
transportation. To this day, the transportation by Afghan trucks of goods and construction
equipment delivered from Turkey after they are unloaded at the borders has led to a
considerable loss of both time and materials, with up to 20% of the materials being
lost during transportation. At the same time, the fact that some routes such as the Iran-
Afghanistan/Islam Qala and Iran-Turkmenistan/Torghundi border gates are unsafe, and
the fact that routes such as the Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan route to Afghanistan
covers difficult terrain connected with rough roads, lead to problems in transportation,
and thus adversely affects the competitiveness of Turkish goods. 87
One of the major
problems faced by
contractors working
in Afghanistan is in
transit transportation.
Up to 20% of
the materials
being lost during
transportation.
Another area of cooperation in the economic field is again regional connectivity. Turkey is
a founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and Afghanistan
is a new member of the ECO since 1992. 88 Regional infrastructure connectivity raises the
level of interaction. Therefore, Turkey can help Afghanistan to reconnect with Iran and
through Iran to Turkey and from Turkey to Europe. Transportation and communication
infrastructure in Central Asia is insufficiently linked with Afghanistan. Therefore Turkey
can help the integration of the whole region including Afghanistan. So, Turkey can also
increase its economic investment in regional connectivity. 89
Turkey has the potential to assist Afghanistan in the fields of agriculture, veterinary,
medicine, and textile industry. There is also a need for more investment in the education
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
sector in Afghanistan. Half million Afghan people is eligible for university education
and millions of youngsters are looking for primary, secondary, and higher education. 90
Finally, Turkish public sector, as well as the private sector, needs to invest more in urban
infrastructure for the best interest of Afghanistan. Turkish government can encourage
more Turkish investment in Afghanistan in order to generate employment and income
for Afghan estates. Moreover, Turkish firms come for reconstruction but no long-term
investment.
35
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
FOOTNOTES
1 Interview with Timor Sharan, May 9, 2014.
2 Paul D. Miller, “Democracy in Afghanistan: The 2014 Election and Beyond”, Perspective Series,
RAND Corporation, 2014, pp.4,7.
3 Khorshied Samad, “Afghanistan Elections: The Irreversible Journey of Afghan Women”, Foreign
Policy, April 9, 2014.
4 Salih Doğan, “If Politics Go Wrong in Afghanistan, What Happens to the Economy,” Today’s Zaman,
July 27-30, 2014.
5 Michael R. Gordon and Matthew Rosenberg, “Kerry Visits Afghanistan to Urge Deal on the
Election”, The New York Times, August 7, 2014.
6 Matthew Rosenberg, “Amid Election Impasse, Calls in Afghanistan for an Interim Government” The
New York Times, August 18, 2014.
7 Hikmet Çetin’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
8 Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan Ethnic Puzzle: Decentralizing Power before U.S. Withdrawal”,
Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011.
9 Timor Sharan, “The Dynamics of Informal Political Networks and Statehood in post-2001
Afghanistan: A Case Study of the 2010–2011 Special Election Court Crisis”, Central Asian Survey,
Vol. 32, No.3, pp. 337-338.
10 Sharan, “The Dynamics of Informal Political Networks and Statehood in post-2001 Afghanistan: A
Case Study of the 2010–2011 Special Election Court Crisis”, p.349.
11 Interview with Head of Afghan International Strategic Studies (AISS) Davood Moradien, May 9,
2014.
12 Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in Afghanistan”, United States Institute of
Peace Report, February 2014, p. 5.
13 Ibid.
14 Interview with Timor Sharan, May 9, 2014.
15 Afghan Citizen Perception Survey, Assess, Transform & Reach (ATR) Consulting, February 2014,
pp.16-17.
16 Afghan Citizen Perception Survey, p.31.
17 Interview with Timor Sharan, May 9, 2014.
18 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
19 Hikmet Çetin’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
20 Interview with USAK, Head of Academic Council Ihsan Bal, June 15, 2014
21 Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in Afghanistan”, p.7.
22 ISAF ANQAR Survey, March 2014.
23 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
24 Ibid.
25 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, U.S. Department of Defense, April 2014,
p.39.
26 “Afghan Armed Forces Have Serious Problem with Discipline”, Russia Today, August 6, 2014. <
http://rt.com/op-edge/178404-afghanistan-shooting-security-soldiers/>
37
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
38
27 Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy
Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment, SIGAR 14-30 Audit Report,
January 2014.
28 Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, U.S. Department of Defense Report, April
2014, p.74.
29 Salih Doğan, “International Aid to Afghanistan and Its Importance in the Post-2014 Era”, Caucasus
International, Vol. 3, No. 3, Autumn 2013.
30 Salih Doğan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
31 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
32 World Bank Data on Energy & Mining,
33 Website of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Mines and Petroleum
34 Natural resources management and Peace Building in Afghanistan, UNEP Report, May-2013, p.7.
35 World Bank Afghanistan Economy Overview, Last Updated: April 8, 2014. < http://www.worldbank.
org/en/country/afghanistan/overview>
36 Asraf Jehangir Qazi, “A Pakistani Analysis of the Present and Future Situation”, Afghanistan and Its
Neighbors: Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group
Publication, 2014, pp.36-37.
37 Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “How Balochistan gained independence”, Pakistan Today, December 21,
2013.
38 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Stability of Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly,
7 November 2012.
39 UNHCR, “2014 UNHCR country operations profile – Pakistan”, http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49e487016.html (30.6.2014)
40 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Stability of Afghanistan and Regional Cooperation”, The Journal of Turkish
Weekly, November 7, 2012.
41 Ramin Nadimi, “Afghan Presidential Election and Possible Impact on Tehran-Kabul Ties”, Iran
Review, June 14, 2014.
42 Ellen Laipson, Engaging Iran on Afghanistan, Washington, DC, Stimson Center Publication, pp.3-4.
43 Richard Ghiasy and Maihan Saeedi, The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments
to Further Progress, Afghan Institute For Strategic Studıes, June 2014, p.28
44 Ellen Laipson, Engaging Iran on Afghanistan, Washington, DC, Stimson Center Publication, p.3.
45 Mirzokhid Rakhimov, “Uzbekistan’s Relationship with Afghanistan”, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors:
Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group Publication,
2014, pp.46-47.
46 Hakim Abdullohi Rahnamo, Fundamental Principles of Tajikistan’s Afghan Policy”, Afghanistan and
Its Neighbors: Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy
Group Publication, 2014, pp.44-45.
47 Richard Ghiasy and Maihan Saeedi, The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments
to Further Progress, Afghan Institute For Strategic Studıes, June 2014, p.29.
48 Punchok Stobdan’s Presentation at the Panel on Afghanistan And Regional Security, III Moscow
Conference on International Security, May 24, 2014, Moscow.
49 Radha Kumar, “India’s Strategic Interest: a Sovereign Afghanistan”, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors:
Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group Publication,
2014, pp.8-9.
50 Rahul Wadke, “Chabahar port in Iran holds key to boost Indo-Afghan trade ties”, The Hindu, 26
June 2014.
51 Vladimir Boyko, “Russia’s Approach to Afghanistan: Current Politics and Post-2014 Scenarios”,
Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: Regional Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi,
Delhi Policy Group Publication, 2014, pp.28-29.
52 Selçuk Çolakoğlu, “Russian understanding of color revolutions and the Arab Spring”, The Journal of
Turkish Weekly, 30 May 2014.
53 Wang Xu, “A Chinese Perspective on Afghanistan Post-2014”, Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: Regional
Views, Radha Kumar & Dnyanada Palkar (eds.), New Delhi, Delhi Policy Group Publication, 2014,
pp.19-20.
54 Richard Ghiasy and Maihan Saeedi, The Heart of Asia Process at a Juncture: An Analysis of Impediments
to Further Progress, Afghan Institute For Strategic Studıes, June 2014, p.24.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
55 Shanon Tiezzi, “Can China Lead the Push for Afghan Stability?”, The Diplomat, July 9, 2014.
56 Stephen Biddle, “Ending the War in Afghanistan”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2013, pp.49-
51.
57 Mark Landler, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016”, The New York Times, May 27,
2014.
58 Mehmet Saray, Afghanistan and Turks, Printing House of Faculty of Letters, İstanbul, 1987, pp.96-
97.
59 Hikmet Çetin, “2014: Afganistan’ın Kritik Yılı”, Analist, June 2014, p.59.
60 “Declaration from Karzai and Musharraf”, BBC Turkish, 30 April 2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
turkish/europe/story/2007/04/070430_turkey_pakistan_afghan.shtml. (30.06.2014)
61 Muhammad Riaz Raza and Muhammad Wasim Akbar, “Image of President Asif Ali Zardari as
Portrayed by Daily Dawn and News: A Discourse Analysis of Editorials”, Mass Communication and
Journalism, Vol.2, No. 4, 2012, p.1.
62 “Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit in Istanbul”, Presidency of Republic of Turkey,
December 24, 2010. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/78467/istanbulda-turkiyeafganistanpakista
n-uclu-zirve-toplantisi.html (15.09.2012)
63 “6th Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit”, Akşam, November 1, 2011.
64 Presidency of Republic of Turkey, “7 th Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit Kicks Off”,
December 12, 2012, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/84675/7th-turkeyafghanistanpakistan-trilate
ral-summit-kicks-off.html (14.01.2013)
65 “PM, COAS in Turkey to Attend Trilateral Summit”, Daily Times, July 02, 2014.
66 Davood Moradian’s presentation at “the IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Beyond Common Debates:
Turkey’s Future Role in Afghanistan”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
67 “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan
and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
68 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation
for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, 2 November 2011”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/istanbul-process-onregional-security-and-cooperation-for-a-secure-and-stable-afghanistan.en.mfa
(30.6.2014)
69 Nadir Devlet, “Turkey withdraws from Afghanistan”, Geopolitics, 2002, p. 41.
70 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
71 Turkish-Afghan Relations from Past to Present, The publications of the Department of War History
and Strategic Studies, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 2009, pp.95-97.
72 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures, http://www.isaf.nato.int/
images/media/20140603_isaf-placemat-final.pdf (30.06.2014)
73 NATO, “Biographies. Hikmet Çetin”, http://www.nato.int/cv/scr/cetin-e.htm (18.01.2014)
74 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
75 Sertif Demir and Ali Bilgin Varlık, “Winning Peace: A Mere Dream of An Achievable Objective?
Inferences from Turkish Peacekeeping Experience in Afghanistan”, Journal of Central Asian &
Caucasian Studies, Vol.7, No.14, 2012, p.199.
76 Metin Gürcan’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara..
77 Turkish-Afghan Relations from Past to Present, The publications of the Department of War History
and Strategic Studies, Turkish General Staff, Ankara, 2009, pp.95-97.
78 Ibid.
79 Hikmet Çetin, “2014: Afganistan’ın Kritik Yılı”, Analist, June 2014, p.59.
80 Turkish-Afghan Relations from Past to Present, pp. 103-104.
81 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Provincial Reconstruction Team – Wardak, http://vardakprt.org/
icerik.php?no=5 (15.01.2013)
82 “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan
and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
83 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Provincial Reconstruction Team – Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul, http://
cevizcanprt.org/icerik.php?no=9 (15.01.2013)
84 Hikmet Çetin’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
85 Reşat Bayer’s Presentation at “IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Security, State-Building and Ethnic
Cohesion: Future of Afghanistan and Turkey’s Contributions”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
86 Office of the Commercial Counselor in Kabul, http://www.musavirlikler.gov.tr/detay.cfm?AlanID=17
&dil=EN&ulke=AFG (17.06.2014)
USA
39
FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN AND TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION
87 Ibid.
88 “About ECO”, Economic Cooperation Organization, http://www.ecosecretariat.org/in2.htm
(20.6.2014)
89 Davood Moradian’s Presentation at “the IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Beyond Common Debates:
Turkey’s Future Role in Afghanistan”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
90 Reşat Bayer’s Presentation at “the IPC-USAK-NATO Talk Series: Beyond Common Debates:
Turkey’s Future Role in Afghanistan”, May 9, 2014, Ankara.
40
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (USAK)
USAK
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION
Established in 2004, the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) has
gained wide recognition as Turkey’s foremost source of independent and balanced
information and research on a broad range of issues affecting Turkey and its region.
Focusing particularly on issues of security and cooperation, USAK is one of Turkey
and the world’s leading organizations for the analysis of global issues, satisfying a
need in Turkey, its region and the world for a body of informed opinion on these
issues.
USAK works to stimulate debate and research on international relations and
security issues through a dynamic program of seminars, conferences, workshops,
publications, educational activities and media relations. The organization aims to
encourage greater public awareness of national and international developments
and to help individuals and organizations to understand an ever-changing and
increasingly complex world. USAK enhances the basis for informed choice by the
Turkish public and its leaders and serves as one of the focal points for research in
Turkey. The organization welcomes visitor applications from academics at other
national or international institutions, advanced doctoral research students, and
those with a professional or academic interest in international relations. A nonpartisan,
non-profit and non-governmental research organization (NGO), USAK is
not intended to be a forum for single-issue advocacy or lobbying.
The Director of USAK is Ambassador (R) Özdem Sanberk.
Core Research Areas
* Area Studies (Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus, Balkans, Asia-Pacific, etc.)
* Ethnic Studies
* European Studies
* Integration Studies
* International Law
* International Politics
* Political Economy
* Religion and Politics
* Security Studies (Domestic and International)
* Sociology
* Terrorism
* Turkish Studies (Domestic and International)
International Strategic Research Organization
Mebusevleri Mahallesi, Ayten Sokak, No: 21 06570, Tandoğan, Ankara
Phone: 0090 312 212 28 86 Fax: 0090 312 212 25 84
www.usak.org.tr, www.turkishweekly.net, www.usakanalist.com