Nimrod MRA4 - Association for Project Management
Nimrod MRA4 - Association for Project Management
Nimrod MRA4 - Association for Project Management
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<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong><br />
“Re<strong>for</strong>ming A <strong>Project</strong>”<br />
EVA10 : 19 May 2005<br />
Mr Russell Brown, <strong>Nimrod</strong> RP
PROJECT SCOPE & SIZE<br />
What is a <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> ?
<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> is a New Aircraft<br />
<strong>Nimrod</strong> MR2<br />
<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong><br />
- 94% New Parts<br />
New Design & Build<br />
Modified Design/ Upgrade<br />
Re-lifed<br />
lifed, , Upgraded<br />
3
Providing Military Capability<br />
Force Structure<br />
Concepts/Doctrine<br />
Training<br />
Equipment<br />
Decision Support<br />
Infrastructure<br />
People<br />
4<br />
Sustainment
Search & Rescue<br />
Anti-Submarine Warfare<br />
Support to<br />
Special Forces<br />
What will an<br />
<strong>MRA4</strong> do ?<br />
Assured Access /<br />
Force Protection<br />
Homeland Defence<br />
5
Key <strong>Project</strong> Data<br />
• Schedule<br />
– Design and Development > 2007<br />
– Production > 2012<br />
– Support > 2036<br />
• Overall <strong>Project</strong> Costs<br />
– Design and Development > £2Bn<br />
– Production > £1Bn<br />
– Support > £20Bn<br />
6
THE DRIVERS FOR CHANGE<br />
Why is <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> a suitable Case Study ?
The <strong>Project</strong> : Prior to February 2003<br />
• Insufficient risk reduction<br />
• ‘Must win’ business<br />
• Fixed price / underfunded / under-resourced<br />
• No Company / MOD common objectives<br />
• Ineffective use of <strong>Project</strong> Control System<br />
8
Strategic Encouragement<br />
“The Defence Procurement Agency will look at the<br />
complexity of the contract and three key features:<br />
Control<br />
Assurance of control<br />
& Senior Employee incentives<br />
We will wish to agree with the contractor how control<br />
and assurance will be managed and reported”<br />
Chief Defence Procurement : 2003<br />
9
PROJECT REFORM<br />
What did the <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> project actually do ?
Strategic Change - Post Feb 2003<br />
• Commercial restructuring - “The Agreement”<br />
– Target Cost Incentive Fee<br />
• Industry organisational structure<br />
– Budgetary accountability aligned with deliverables<br />
• Joint Behaviour and Culture<br />
– Open Book<br />
– Trading Per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
11
Tactical Change - Post Feb 2003<br />
• Established a “REFORM” <strong>Project</strong><br />
– Objectives to:<br />
• Regain & demonstrate project control<br />
• Regain the <strong>Project</strong>’s credibility with stakeholders<br />
– Managed and driven by Joint Steering Committee<br />
• MOD & Industry Champions<br />
• Central <strong>Project</strong>s<br />
• Delivery Stream Directors<br />
• Specialist Support<br />
– Funded and incentivised by MOD<br />
• removed any potential blockers<br />
12
Making the “Re<strong>for</strong>m” happen<br />
• Senior <strong>Management</strong> ‘BUY IN’<br />
– BAES and MOD Senior <strong>Management</strong> Teams actively<br />
advertised the importance of this re<strong>for</strong>m<br />
• Implementation, IT and Change <strong>Management</strong><br />
experts brought in from the start.<br />
– Minimised the learning curve<br />
• Training/Coaching plan created<br />
– Toolset and Process training<br />
– Coaching plan (1 to 1 <strong>for</strong> IPTLs, CAMs & Buddies)<br />
– Leadership training<br />
• Regular, <strong>for</strong>mal system reviews<br />
– Incentivised, success rewarded<br />
13
Setting & Maintaining the Pace<br />
Feb 03 Jun 03 Nov 03 Mar 04 Jul 04 Nov 04<br />
“IBR”<br />
Readiness<br />
Review<br />
“DR”<br />
Readiness<br />
Review<br />
IBR<br />
• Payment by EVM<br />
DR<br />
‣ Reviewing Documents<br />
& Processes<br />
‣ Identifying shortfalls<br />
affecting system<br />
integrity<br />
‣ Maturity Check<br />
‣ Meaningful per<strong>for</strong>mance/<br />
trend data & <strong>for</strong>ecasts;<br />
‣ Effective data analysis<br />
and reporting;<br />
‣ In<strong>for</strong>med decision making;<br />
‣ Robust & integrated baseline<br />
schedules;<br />
‣ Realistic & defined baseline budgets;<br />
‣ Integration of the schedules & budgets;<br />
‣ Key areas of risk/uncertainty identified;<br />
14
Independent confirmation (MOD)<br />
• Demonstrate that a robust programme<br />
has been developed<br />
June 03 Nov 03 Jul 04<br />
+<br />
Now ??<br />
• That project control processes have been<br />
embedded<br />
• Schedule adherence is being achieved<br />
-<br />
-<br />
-<br />
• Used Reviews to set the ‘drum beat’<br />
– Avoided lulls in progress<br />
– Measured both Industry & Buddy per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />
– Worked corrective actions/improvements jointly<br />
– Formal action closure reviews<br />
– Incentivised the reviews and rewarded progress<br />
15
Independent confirmation (BAES)<br />
July 2004<br />
16
CURRENT PROJECT STATUS<br />
What evidence of success is there ?
Then (2002)……<br />
.….and Now (2005)<br />
• Denial of Metrics<br />
• Joint use of data to support decision making<br />
• Ineffective Variance Reporting<br />
• Structured estimating & <strong>for</strong>ecasting monthly<br />
• Separate Industry & MOD Risk Processes & Views<br />
• Joint view of exposure & mitigation actions<br />
• Functional stovepipes<br />
• Agreed integrated baseline & change process<br />
“JOINT MANAGEMENT &<br />
DECISION MAKING”<br />
18
D&D <strong>Project</strong> Control Data - Jan 05<br />
Element: 81<br />
40<br />
30<br />
CV % CUM Percent of Pounds<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
(Default) CB/MAR/21a/100 OTHER PROD<br />
Bull's-eye Chart - As of: JAN 05<br />
BEHIND SCHEDULE, UNDER AHEAD COST OF SCHEDULE, UNDER COST<br />
7 654 32 1 0<br />
Name: <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Project</strong><br />
Element: 81<br />
Index of Pounds<br />
1.30<br />
1.20<br />
1.10<br />
1.00<br />
(Default) CB/MAR/21a/100 OTHER PROD<br />
SPI/CPI Chart<br />
Name: <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Project</strong><br />
2004<br />
FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC<br />
2005<br />
JAN<br />
-10<br />
-20<br />
10 9 8<br />
0.90<br />
0.80<br />
-30<br />
11<br />
BEHIND SCHEDULE, OVER COST AHEAD OF SCHEDULE, OVER COST<br />
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40<br />
SV % CUM Percent of Pounds<br />
0.70<br />
SPI CUM 0.722 0.744 0.748 0.814 0.896 0.906 0.909 0.915 0.932 0.938 0.958 0.962<br />
CPI CUM 0.775 0.815 0.820 0.887 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.988 0.993 0.999 1.021 1.014<br />
TCPI BAC1.046<br />
1.044 1.048 1.034 1.010 1.009 1.007 1.004 1.002 1.000 0.988 0.994<br />
TCPIEAC 1.302 1.266 1.242 1.194 1.128 1.097 1.093 1.016 1.033 1.016 1.030 0.996<br />
• Overall project trends<br />
continuing to improve<br />
• Overall project indicators<br />
Schedule (SPI) and Cost<br />
(CPI) ‘GREEN’<br />
Total Cost (£M)<br />
TCIF Tracking<br />
PTA<br />
Max<br />
EAC<br />
Min<br />
19<br />
Target Cost<br />
Excluding Risk & Opportunities
Key <strong>Project</strong> Successes<br />
• Last years Anchor Milestone dates<br />
– First Flight of Aircraft 1 - Aug 04 (50%)<br />
– First Flight of Aircraft 2 - Dec 04 (50%)<br />
• PCS data indicated severe<br />
challenge to achieve them<br />
– but difficulties overcome<br />
by new culture<br />
PA1 - 26 Aug 04<br />
PA2 - 15 Dec 04<br />
20
THE FUTURE<br />
What are we going to do next ?
Embed principles in all Future Work<br />
• Continue to improve Design & Development PCS<br />
implementation and use<br />
– IBR in Autumn following Jan 05 ‘reset’<br />
• Already conducted a successful “Readiness Review”<br />
<strong>for</strong> the Partnered Support Contract<br />
• For the future Production Contract<br />
– Intention <strong>for</strong> a PCS to support payment by EVM<br />
• Ensure robust ‘whole programme’ PCS<br />
22
KEY LESSONS/LEARNING<br />
Could we have done it better ?
Key Success Factors<br />
• Established strong “Pull” from above<br />
– Set challenging but realistic targets<br />
– Didn’t underestimate the ef<strong>for</strong>t or the time needed, but<br />
pushed it to the limit<br />
• Measured the cultural change<br />
– Coaching & mentoring (vs Training)<br />
• acted as a catalyst, and provided real time feedback<br />
– Regular, <strong>for</strong>mal system reviews<br />
• Incentivised, success rewarded<br />
24
Aspects we could have improved<br />
• Initial change focused solely on Planning /<br />
Scheduling and EVM metrics / data<br />
– Risk & Opportunity improvement programme started 6<br />
months late and initially under-resourced<br />
• Focussed most investment and all incentives on<br />
Industry<br />
– Training open to both Industry and MOD, but MOD “Buddy”<br />
role not initially perceived as real<br />
– “Buddy” role enhanced by Validation of Payments by<br />
Earned Value<br />
25
The Buddy Relationship Continuum<br />
Highly<br />
Invasive<br />
Selective and appropriate challenges<br />
Shared data<br />
Mutually<br />
supportive<br />
Invasive<br />
Inconsistent<br />
Difficult<br />
Challenging<br />
Knowledgeable<br />
Lack of trust<br />
Demotivator<br />
Visible<br />
Involved<br />
Consistent<br />
Trusting/trusted<br />
Knowledgeable<br />
EV literate<br />
Motivator<br />
26
Will the <strong>Project</strong> be a Success ?<br />
• A robust PCS (People, Processes & Tools) only<br />
gives you “Control”<br />
– It gives early warning, but will not stop problems from<br />
happening<br />
– It allows the effects of problems and their corrective<br />
actions to be understood<br />
• Without “REFORM” the project would have failed<br />
27
Questions ?<br />
<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong><br />
“Re<strong>for</strong>ming A <strong>Project</strong>”<br />
EVA10 : 19 May 2005<br />
Mr Russell Brown, <strong>Nimrod</strong> RP