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Nimrod MRA4 - Association for Project Management

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<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong><br />

“Re<strong>for</strong>ming A <strong>Project</strong>”<br />

EVA10 : 19 May 2005<br />

Mr Russell Brown, <strong>Nimrod</strong> RP


PROJECT SCOPE & SIZE<br />

What is a <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> ?


<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> is a New Aircraft<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> MR2<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong><br />

- 94% New Parts<br />

New Design & Build<br />

Modified Design/ Upgrade<br />

Re-lifed<br />

lifed, , Upgraded<br />

3


Providing Military Capability<br />

Force Structure<br />

Concepts/Doctrine<br />

Training<br />

Equipment<br />

Decision Support<br />

Infrastructure<br />

People<br />

4<br />

Sustainment


Search & Rescue<br />

Anti-Submarine Warfare<br />

Support to<br />

Special Forces<br />

What will an<br />

<strong>MRA4</strong> do ?<br />

Assured Access /<br />

Force Protection<br />

Homeland Defence<br />

5


Key <strong>Project</strong> Data<br />

• Schedule<br />

– Design and Development > 2007<br />

– Production > 2012<br />

– Support > 2036<br />

• Overall <strong>Project</strong> Costs<br />

– Design and Development > £2Bn<br />

– Production > £1Bn<br />

– Support > £20Bn<br />

6


THE DRIVERS FOR CHANGE<br />

Why is <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> a suitable Case Study ?


The <strong>Project</strong> : Prior to February 2003<br />

• Insufficient risk reduction<br />

• ‘Must win’ business<br />

• Fixed price / underfunded / under-resourced<br />

• No Company / MOD common objectives<br />

• Ineffective use of <strong>Project</strong> Control System<br />

8


Strategic Encouragement<br />

“The Defence Procurement Agency will look at the<br />

complexity of the contract and three key features:<br />

Control<br />

Assurance of control<br />

& Senior Employee incentives<br />

We will wish to agree with the contractor how control<br />

and assurance will be managed and reported”<br />

Chief Defence Procurement : 2003<br />

9


PROJECT REFORM<br />

What did the <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong> project actually do ?


Strategic Change - Post Feb 2003<br />

• Commercial restructuring - “The Agreement”<br />

– Target Cost Incentive Fee<br />

• Industry organisational structure<br />

– Budgetary accountability aligned with deliverables<br />

• Joint Behaviour and Culture<br />

– Open Book<br />

– Trading Per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />

11


Tactical Change - Post Feb 2003<br />

• Established a “REFORM” <strong>Project</strong><br />

– Objectives to:<br />

• Regain & demonstrate project control<br />

• Regain the <strong>Project</strong>’s credibility with stakeholders<br />

– Managed and driven by Joint Steering Committee<br />

• MOD & Industry Champions<br />

• Central <strong>Project</strong>s<br />

• Delivery Stream Directors<br />

• Specialist Support<br />

– Funded and incentivised by MOD<br />

• removed any potential blockers<br />

12


Making the “Re<strong>for</strong>m” happen<br />

• Senior <strong>Management</strong> ‘BUY IN’<br />

– BAES and MOD Senior <strong>Management</strong> Teams actively<br />

advertised the importance of this re<strong>for</strong>m<br />

• Implementation, IT and Change <strong>Management</strong><br />

experts brought in from the start.<br />

– Minimised the learning curve<br />

• Training/Coaching plan created<br />

– Toolset and Process training<br />

– Coaching plan (1 to 1 <strong>for</strong> IPTLs, CAMs & Buddies)<br />

– Leadership training<br />

• Regular, <strong>for</strong>mal system reviews<br />

– Incentivised, success rewarded<br />

13


Setting & Maintaining the Pace<br />

Feb 03 Jun 03 Nov 03 Mar 04 Jul 04 Nov 04<br />

“IBR”<br />

Readiness<br />

Review<br />

“DR”<br />

Readiness<br />

Review<br />

IBR<br />

• Payment by EVM<br />

DR<br />

‣ Reviewing Documents<br />

& Processes<br />

‣ Identifying shortfalls<br />

affecting system<br />

integrity<br />

‣ Maturity Check<br />

‣ Meaningful per<strong>for</strong>mance/<br />

trend data & <strong>for</strong>ecasts;<br />

‣ Effective data analysis<br />

and reporting;<br />

‣ In<strong>for</strong>med decision making;<br />

‣ Robust & integrated baseline<br />

schedules;<br />

‣ Realistic & defined baseline budgets;<br />

‣ Integration of the schedules & budgets;<br />

‣ Key areas of risk/uncertainty identified;<br />

14


Independent confirmation (MOD)<br />

• Demonstrate that a robust programme<br />

has been developed<br />

June 03 Nov 03 Jul 04<br />

+<br />

Now ??<br />

• That project control processes have been<br />

embedded<br />

• Schedule adherence is being achieved<br />

-<br />

-<br />

-<br />

• Used Reviews to set the ‘drum beat’<br />

– Avoided lulls in progress<br />

– Measured both Industry & Buddy per<strong>for</strong>mance<br />

– Worked corrective actions/improvements jointly<br />

– Formal action closure reviews<br />

– Incentivised the reviews and rewarded progress<br />

15


Independent confirmation (BAES)<br />

July 2004<br />

16


CURRENT PROJECT STATUS<br />

What evidence of success is there ?


Then (2002)……<br />

.….and Now (2005)<br />

• Denial of Metrics<br />

• Joint use of data to support decision making<br />

• Ineffective Variance Reporting<br />

• Structured estimating & <strong>for</strong>ecasting monthly<br />

• Separate Industry & MOD Risk Processes & Views<br />

• Joint view of exposure & mitigation actions<br />

• Functional stovepipes<br />

• Agreed integrated baseline & change process<br />

“JOINT MANAGEMENT &<br />

DECISION MAKING”<br />

18


D&D <strong>Project</strong> Control Data - Jan 05<br />

Element: 81<br />

40<br />

30<br />

CV % CUM Percent of Pounds<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

(Default) CB/MAR/21a/100 OTHER PROD<br />

Bull's-eye Chart - As of: JAN 05<br />

BEHIND SCHEDULE, UNDER AHEAD COST OF SCHEDULE, UNDER COST<br />

7 654 32 1 0<br />

Name: <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Project</strong><br />

Element: 81<br />

Index of Pounds<br />

1.30<br />

1.20<br />

1.10<br />

1.00<br />

(Default) CB/MAR/21a/100 OTHER PROD<br />

SPI/CPI Chart<br />

Name: <strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>Project</strong><br />

2004<br />

FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC<br />

2005<br />

JAN<br />

-10<br />

-20<br />

10 9 8<br />

0.90<br />

0.80<br />

-30<br />

11<br />

BEHIND SCHEDULE, OVER COST AHEAD OF SCHEDULE, OVER COST<br />

-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40<br />

SV % CUM Percent of Pounds<br />

0.70<br />

SPI CUM 0.722 0.744 0.748 0.814 0.896 0.906 0.909 0.915 0.932 0.938 0.958 0.962<br />

CPI CUM 0.775 0.815 0.820 0.887 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.988 0.993 0.999 1.021 1.014<br />

TCPI BAC1.046<br />

1.044 1.048 1.034 1.010 1.009 1.007 1.004 1.002 1.000 0.988 0.994<br />

TCPIEAC 1.302 1.266 1.242 1.194 1.128 1.097 1.093 1.016 1.033 1.016 1.030 0.996<br />

• Overall project trends<br />

continuing to improve<br />

• Overall project indicators<br />

Schedule (SPI) and Cost<br />

(CPI) ‘GREEN’<br />

Total Cost (£M)<br />

TCIF Tracking<br />

PTA<br />

Max<br />

EAC<br />

Min<br />

19<br />

Target Cost<br />

Excluding Risk & Opportunities


Key <strong>Project</strong> Successes<br />

• Last years Anchor Milestone dates<br />

– First Flight of Aircraft 1 - Aug 04 (50%)<br />

– First Flight of Aircraft 2 - Dec 04 (50%)<br />

• PCS data indicated severe<br />

challenge to achieve them<br />

– but difficulties overcome<br />

by new culture<br />

PA1 - 26 Aug 04<br />

PA2 - 15 Dec 04<br />

20


THE FUTURE<br />

What are we going to do next ?


Embed principles in all Future Work<br />

• Continue to improve Design & Development PCS<br />

implementation and use<br />

– IBR in Autumn following Jan 05 ‘reset’<br />

• Already conducted a successful “Readiness Review”<br />

<strong>for</strong> the Partnered Support Contract<br />

• For the future Production Contract<br />

– Intention <strong>for</strong> a PCS to support payment by EVM<br />

• Ensure robust ‘whole programme’ PCS<br />

22


KEY LESSONS/LEARNING<br />

Could we have done it better ?


Key Success Factors<br />

• Established strong “Pull” from above<br />

– Set challenging but realistic targets<br />

– Didn’t underestimate the ef<strong>for</strong>t or the time needed, but<br />

pushed it to the limit<br />

• Measured the cultural change<br />

– Coaching & mentoring (vs Training)<br />

• acted as a catalyst, and provided real time feedback<br />

– Regular, <strong>for</strong>mal system reviews<br />

• Incentivised, success rewarded<br />

24


Aspects we could have improved<br />

• Initial change focused solely on Planning /<br />

Scheduling and EVM metrics / data<br />

– Risk & Opportunity improvement programme started 6<br />

months late and initially under-resourced<br />

• Focussed most investment and all incentives on<br />

Industry<br />

– Training open to both Industry and MOD, but MOD “Buddy”<br />

role not initially perceived as real<br />

– “Buddy” role enhanced by Validation of Payments by<br />

Earned Value<br />

25


The Buddy Relationship Continuum<br />

Highly<br />

Invasive<br />

Selective and appropriate challenges<br />

Shared data<br />

Mutually<br />

supportive<br />

Invasive<br />

Inconsistent<br />

Difficult<br />

Challenging<br />

Knowledgeable<br />

Lack of trust<br />

Demotivator<br />

Visible<br />

Involved<br />

Consistent<br />

Trusting/trusted<br />

Knowledgeable<br />

EV literate<br />

Motivator<br />

26


Will the <strong>Project</strong> be a Success ?<br />

• A robust PCS (People, Processes & Tools) only<br />

gives you “Control”<br />

– It gives early warning, but will not stop problems from<br />

happening<br />

– It allows the effects of problems and their corrective<br />

actions to be understood<br />

• Without “REFORM” the project would have failed<br />

27


Questions ?<br />

<strong>Nimrod</strong> <strong>MRA4</strong><br />

“Re<strong>for</strong>ming A <strong>Project</strong>”<br />

EVA10 : 19 May 2005<br />

Mr Russell Brown, <strong>Nimrod</strong> RP

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