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Improving Security and Performance in Low Latency Anonymity ...

Improving Security and Performance in Low Latency Anonymity ...

Improving Security and Performance in Low Latency Anonymity

Improving Security and Performance in Low Latency Anonymity Networks by Kevin Scott Bauer B.S., University of Denver, 2005 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Computer Science 2011

  • Page 2 and 3: This thesis entitled: Improving Sec
  • Page 4 and 5: To my parents. Dedication
  • Page 6 and 7: vi research possible. In addition,
  • Page 8 and 9: viii 2.3.7 HerbivoreFS . . . . . .
  • Page 10 and 11: x 4.3 Experiments . . . . . . . . .
  • Page 12 and 13: xii 6.7 Performance Analysis . . .
  • Page 14 and 15: xiv Tables Table 2.1 A taxonomy of
  • Page 16 and 17: xvi Figures Figure 2.1 An example o
  • Page 18 and 19: xviii 5.6 Circuit building messages
  • Page 20 and 21: Chapter 1 Introduction “If you ha
  • Page 22 and 23: 3 the anonymization infrastructure
  • Page 24 and 25: 5 potential for abuse. Among other
  • Page 26 and 27: Chapter 2 Background and Related Wo
  • Page 28 and 29: 9 Being identifiable within the ano
  • Page 30 and 31: 11 Figure 2.1: An example of how a
  • Page 32 and 33: 13 2.2.1 High Latency Anonymity Hig
  • Page 34 and 35: 15 We now discuss a sample of high
  • Page 36 and 37: 17 When a message is received by mi
  • Page 38 and 39: 19 not strictly specified — it co
  • Page 40 and 41: 21 only two of the cryptographers k
  • Page 42 and 43: 23 with high latency or low latency
  • Page 44 and 45: 25 client sends its data through th
  • Page 46 and 47: 27 2.3.3.1 Tor’s Design Tor is th
  • Page 48 and 49: 29 2.3.3.3 Tor’s Path Selection A
  • Page 50 and 51: 31 falsely reporting high bandwidth
  • Page 52 and 53:

    33 By tunneling end-to-end TCP conn

  • Page 54 and 55:

    35 Chaum’s original design, they

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    37 2.3.10 Nonesuch Nonesuch is a hi

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    39 2.3.16 Privacy-preserving File S

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    41 While expressing degrees of anon

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    43 routing design that assumed unif

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    45 a receiver, an adversary notes t

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    47 each round reduces the size of t

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    49 where s is the tunable selection

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    51 this threat, we develop a method

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    Table 3.1: Exit traffic protocol di

  • Page 74 and 75:

    55 3.2.3 Insecure Protocols Another

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    57 Tor Client SYN 1.1.1.1 Circuit T

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    59 3.4 Misbehaving Clients While To

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    Client geo-political distribution.

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    63 PDF 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 PDF

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    65 Unique Circuits 0 5000 10000 150

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    67 Cumulative Distribution 0.0 0.2

  • Page 88 and 89:

    69 Cumulative Distribution 0.0 0.2

  • Page 90 and 91:

    71 Cumulative Distribution 0.2 0.4

  • Page 92 and 93:

    73 Cumulative Distribution 0.0 0.2

  • Page 94 and 95:

    in the circuit building process suc

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    77 to balance the potential benefit

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    79 The observed demand for anonymou

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    81 When the Tor network was launche

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    83 Context. Following the initial d

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    Algorithm 1: Non-Entry Router Selec

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    87 advertisements are not verified

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    E_K1[extend_2] E_K2[extend_3] Tor P

  • Page 110 and 111:

    Table 4.1: Bandwidth distributions

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    93 generate a sufficient amount of

  • Page 114 and 115:

    Table 4.3: The number of predicted

  • Page 116 and 117:

    97 Router selection probability 0.0

  • Page 118 and 119:

    99 Probability density function 0.0

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    101 smaller experiments. This is be

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    103 The path selection simulator ge

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    Table 4.6: Tor’s distribution of

  • Page 126 and 127:

    107 4.4.3 Mitigating Circuit Compro

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    109 circuits with the adversary’s

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    111 we ignore traffic at the entry

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    113 Distributed reputation system.

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    115 correlation. While is it well-k

  • Page 136 and 137:

    Chapter 5 Improving Performance (an

  • Page 138 and 139:

    Number of Nodes 119 0 500 1000 1500

  • Page 140 and 141:

    121 Fraction of circuits compromise

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    Table 5.1: Daily statistics for cli

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    125 the same entry guard and exit r

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    127 5.3 Blending Different Paths Le

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    129 would establish a shared key be

  • Page 150 and 151:

    131 5.4.3 Secure Bandwidth Estimati

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    133 user’s privacy and performanc

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    135 strong anonymizing networks lik

  • Page 156 and 157:

    137 6.1.1 Background Before we desc

  • Page 158 and 159:

    139 right protected files [180]. Th

  • Page 160 and 161:

    141 sharing. Practical consideratio

  • Page 162 and 163:

    143 The experiments were conducted

  • Page 164 and 165:

    Fraction of peers 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

  • Page 166 and 167:

    147 active probing does not provide

  • Page 168 and 169:

    Kilobytes 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,0

  • Page 170 and 171:

    151 node from which it received the

  • Page 172 and 173:

    153 6.4 Design Principles In order

  • Page 174 and 175:

    155 Normal Peer Relay Peer (n,t) Fi

  • Page 176 and 177:

    157 It is important that relay peer

  • Page 178 and 179:

    159 Expected path length (l) 0 2 4

  • Page 180 and 181:

    161 Additionally, relay peers could

  • Page 182 and 183:

    163 6.7.2 Experimental Results We f

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    encourage future work aimed at addr

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    167 a design offers increased perfo

  • Page 188 and 189:

    169 Improving congestion and flow c

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    171 the circuit queue has no explic

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    173 poor performance. While this ap

  • Page 194 and 195:

    175 ⎧ ⎪⎨ old window + 100 new

  • Page 196 and 197:

    177 On receiving a flow control cel

  • Page 198 and 199:

    179 Cumulative Distribution 0.0 0.2

  • Page 200 and 201:

    181 restrict the amount of data in

  • Page 202 and 203:

    183 Cumulative Distribution 0.0 0.2

  • Page 204 and 205:

    185 windows are roughly the same. H

  • Page 206 and 207:

    187 Cumulative Distribution 0.0 0.2

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    189 per circuit), the cost of N23 i

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    191 end-systems’ TCP congestion a

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    193 effectively restrict the amount

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    195 have been shown to be highly ac

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    197 delays, they tend to suffer fro

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    199 user names or login credentials

  • Page 220 and 221:

    201 large and static windows. We fi

  • Page 222 and 223:

    Bibliography [1] 17 United States C

  • Page 224 and 225:

    [45] China blocking Tor: Round Two.

  • Page 226 and 227:

    [71] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H.

  • Page 228 and 229:

    [99] Roger Dingledine. Research pro

  • Page 230 and 231:

    [130] Tomas Isdal, Michael Piatek,

  • Page 232 and 233:

    [157] Nick Matthewson. Base “stab

  • Page 234 and 235:

    [188] Joel Reardon and Ian Goldberg

  • Page 236 and 237:

    [218] L. Sweeney. k-Anonymity: A mo

  • Page 238 and 239:

    Appendix A Extended Circuit Comprom

  • Page 240:

    Table A.2: Tor’s distribution of

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