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<strong>LONERGAN</strong> <strong>WORDBOOK</strong><br />

A <strong>Primer</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong> <strong>Terminology</strong><br />

Introduction<br />

The idea for a <strong>Primer</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong> <strong>Terminology</strong> was given impetus by Frederick E. Crowe, SJ in the early<br />

1980's. I suggested the need for such a wordbook, and in his own inimitable style, Fred said, “Go and do<br />

it!” Approximately 300 terms were chosen and after a number were marked for priority with Fred’s red<br />

pen, the project slowly began.<br />

Scholars who had done doctoral work in <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought were approached and invited to be<br />

collaborators in the effort. I have done the initial work and then sent various terms to a group <strong>of</strong> seven<br />

Critic Readers to read, check for references, and <strong>of</strong>fer suggestions or modifications. An editing took place<br />

upon the return <strong>of</strong> their suggestions. The edited text was then sent to six Final Readers, who read over the<br />

work knowing that the references had been checked and an earlier editing done. They too <strong>of</strong>fered<br />

suggestions and modifications, and a final editing was done.<br />

I regard this as a work in progress. Those working in <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought are invited to send me<br />

comments, suggestions, and corrections as they use the <strong>Primer</strong>. Each <strong>of</strong> these communications will be<br />

gratefully received and the entries expanded and/or corrected if this seems feasible. It is understood that<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought itself developed, and thus a term used in his early writings may have a fuller meaning<br />

in his later works. The limited scope <strong>of</strong> this project has not allowed this development to be taken into full<br />

account in the treatment <strong>of</strong> each term. In some an attempt has been made to show this development, in<br />

others this more complete treatment remains to be done.<br />

I am most grateful to all <strong>of</strong> those listed below for staying with me as the work progressed. Hopefully we<br />

have answered in some small way, <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s call for a collaborative effort and will continue to do so as<br />

the terms continue to appear and terms already in the <strong>Primer</strong> are expanded or more clearly focused. I am<br />

indebted to these colleagues who have helped me make but a beginning.<br />

Critic Readers<br />

Cathleen Going, OP: Now Sister Mary <strong>of</strong> the Savior, member <strong>of</strong> the cloistered Dominicans <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Monastery <strong>of</strong> the Blessed Sacrament in Farmington Hills, Michigan, Cathleen received her doctorate from<br />

St. Mary’s School <strong>of</strong> Theology, Notre Dame, Indiana, in 1956. She is known as the co-editor and cointerviewer<br />

for “Caring about Meaning: Patterns in the Life <strong>of</strong> Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>,” <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s<br />

intellectual autobiography by interview, published by The Thomas More Institute, Montreal, in 1982. Prior<br />

to her entrance into the monastery, Cathleen also served as an assessor for grants to be awarded by the<br />

Humanities Research Council <strong>of</strong> the Canadian Government for about fifteen years.<br />

Eileen De Neeve: Eileen is currently President <strong>of</strong> the Thomas More Institute, and on the board <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Research Institute in Adult Liberal Studies in Montreal. She completed her doctoral work in economics


at McGill University in 1990, with a thesis on Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s “Circulation Analysis” and<br />

Macrodynamics.” Eileen continues to pursue her interest in broadening current research on <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s<br />

economics, especially as <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought might address institutional and ethical questions. Eileen served<br />

as both Critic Reader <strong>of</strong> select terms and Final Reader.<br />

Nancy Ring: Nancy is presently Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Religious Studies at Le Moyne Collage in Syracuse, New<br />

York. She completed her doctoral work at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1980 with<br />

the thesis, “Doctrine Within the Dialectic <strong>of</strong> Subjectivity and Objectivity: A Critical Study <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Positions <strong>of</strong> Paul Tillich and Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>.” Nancy’s interest has been teaching Christianity within<br />

a <strong>Lonergan</strong> context, and addressing women’s and feminist issues from a <strong>Lonergan</strong> perspective. In the<br />

future she hopes to focus on <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s notion <strong>of</strong> desire as manifested in western Christian spirituality.<br />

Mary Frohlich: Mary is presently Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Spirituality at the Catholic Theological Union in<br />

Chicago. She completed her doctoral work at the Catholic University <strong>of</strong> America in 1990, with the thesis,<br />

“Mystical Transformation, Intersubjectivity, and Foundations: A Study <strong>of</strong> Teresa <strong>of</strong> Avila’s Interior<br />

Castle.” Mary immersed herself in <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought to employ it as the major philosophical/theological<br />

framework for her dissertation research on mystical transformation. Well published, Mary has been<br />

pursuing the relationship between praxis and theory in the developing discipline <strong>of</strong> spirituality.<br />

Cora Twohig-Moengangongo: Cora is currently teaching theology as visiting pr<strong>of</strong>essor in British<br />

Columbia. She has taught in the Northwest Territories and Tonga, and spent a year teaching seminarians<br />

in Nigeria at the Spiritan International school <strong>of</strong> Theology. Cora completed her doctoral work at Regis<br />

College <strong>of</strong> the Toronto School <strong>of</strong> Theology in 1992 with the thesis, “Feminist Consciousness and<br />

Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s Notion <strong>of</strong> Dialectic.” Cora continues to pursue her particular interest in women’s<br />

self-appropriation as it is articulated in conversion terms, using the writings <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong> and Robert Doran.<br />

Catherine Siejk: Catherine is Assistant Pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> Religious Studies at Gonzaga University in Spokane,<br />

Washington. She completed her doctoral work at Boston College in 1992 with the thesis, “Toward a<br />

Religious Education Practice that Promotes Authentically Lived Christian Faith Within a Christian<br />

Faith Community: A Religious Education Interpretation <strong>of</strong> Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s Understanding <strong>of</strong><br />

Christian Authenticity.” Catherine continues to pursue her interest in making <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought<br />

accessible to Christian Religious Educators. She is also interested in the connection between <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s<br />

thought and contemporary feminist theory.<br />

Christine Partisano, CSJ: Christine is presently a consultant for church and education-related projects<br />

in Latham, New York. She completed a Doctor <strong>of</strong> Ministry degree at The Catholic University <strong>of</strong> America<br />

in 1983 with the thesis project, “Development and Implementation <strong>of</strong> a Reflection Process for<br />

Ministerial Education/Formation Based on <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s Method and Erikson’s Life Cycle.” Christine<br />

finds that her work in spiritual direction, retreats, and process facilitation, especially with religious<br />

communities, parish, and diocesan groups, continually calls forth the insights she gleaned from her research<br />

in <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought.


Final Readers<br />

Eileen De Neeve: Eileen is currently President <strong>of</strong> the Thomas More Institute, and on the board <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Research Institute in Adult Liberal Studies in Montreal. She completed her doctoral work in economics<br />

at McGill University in 1990, with a thesis on Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s “Circulation Analysis” and<br />

Macrodynamics.” Eileen continues to pursue her interest in broadening current research on <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s<br />

economics, especially as <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s thought might address institutional and ethical questions. Eileen served<br />

as both Critic Reader <strong>of</strong> select terms and Final Reader.<br />

Mary E Hunt, PhD: Mary is presently co-director <strong>of</strong> The Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics and<br />

Ritual in Silver Spring, Maryland. She completed her doctoral work with a thesis in “Feminist Liberation<br />

Theology: The Development <strong>of</strong> Method in Construction,” at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley<br />

in 1980. Mary published Fierce Tenderness: A Feminist Theology <strong>of</strong> Friendship, in 1991.<br />

Dedication<br />

The <strong>Primer</strong> is dedicated to Frederick E. Crowe, SJ<br />

who one day in his <strong>of</strong>fice simply said, “Go and do it!”<br />

Permissions<br />

Several terms in the <strong>Primer</strong> were published previously in Communication and <strong>Lonergan</strong>: Common<br />

Ground for Forging the New Age, a volume in the Communication, Culture & Theology Series published<br />

by Sheed and Ward, Kansas City, in 1993. The editors <strong>of</strong> the volume were Thomas J. Farrell and Paul<br />

A. Soukup, with a forward by Robert M. Doran. Jeremy W. Langford, Editor-in-Chief <strong>of</strong> Sheed and<br />

Ward, has graciously granted permission for the wider use <strong>of</strong> those terms. Sheed and Ward can be<br />

contacted at 7373 S. Lovers Lane Road, Franklin, WI 53132, or by calling 1-800-266-5564. Our<br />

gratitude to Jeremy for his assistance in making the <strong>Primer</strong> available to internet users.<br />

The research provided on these terms is free to be used by scholars in any location. Reference to the<br />

source <strong>of</strong> the terms is assumed as part <strong>of</strong> the scholarly integrity expected among colleagues worldwide.<br />

Comments and suggestions on the <strong>Primer</strong> itself and its content can be sent to the author at the contacts<br />

given below under Key. Matters concerning the web page can be referred directly to webmaster Paul<br />

Allen at the University <strong>of</strong> St. Paul in Ottawa, Canada.<br />

Future Entries<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> scholars working on specific topics may want to research a term particular to their area <strong>of</strong><br />

interest. I invite and encourage any additional entries. Please send them, complete with in-text references<br />

to Carla Mae Streeter, OP at the address below. All entries will be juried by at least one other person


other than the editor before being included in the <strong>Primer</strong> online.<br />

Key<br />

The following key indicates works by Bernard <strong>Lonergan</strong>. The reader is encouraged to refer to these works<br />

for a fuller understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s thought in the context <strong>of</strong> his own writings. The key used here is<br />

similar to that used in the Combined <strong>Lonergan</strong> Indices compiled by Timothy P. Fallon, S.J. and Dennis<br />

Rosselli at Santa Clara University in Santa Clara, California. I acknowledge gratefully the assistance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Indices in the creation <strong>of</strong> this Wordbook. Insight references refer to the 1992 Collected Works edition<br />

with the 1957, 1958 edition included in parentheses. The same applies to Collection and Understanding<br />

and Being: The Collected Works edition is given, with a former edition included in parentheses.<br />

References in process <strong>of</strong> being published in the Collected Works edition at the time <strong>of</strong> this publication are<br />

listed with single page reference to their original publication. (Future updatings <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Primer</strong> will make<br />

reference only to the Collected Works editions.) These references will continue to change and be updated<br />

as terms are added in the future. Suggestions and corrections regarding the references are welcome at any<br />

time and contact can be made with the author and editor <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Primer</strong>, Carla Mae Streeter, OP, Aquinas<br />

Institute <strong>of</strong> Theology, 3642 Lindell Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63108-3396, or at streeter@slu.edu or (314)-<br />

977-3887.<br />

Unpublished resources listed here can be obtained from the <strong>Lonergan</strong> Research Institute, 10 St. Mary<br />

Street, Suite 500, Toronto, Ontario M4Y IP9, Canada, (416) 922-8374.<br />

1C Collection 4<br />

2C A Second Collection 1974<br />

3C Third Collection 1985<br />

GF Grace and Freedom 1<br />

I Insight: A Study <strong>of</strong> Human Understanding 3<br />

M Method in Theology 1971<br />

TE Topics in Education 10<br />

PGT Philosophy <strong>of</strong> God and Theology 1973<br />

DP Doctrinal Pluralism 1971<br />

DVI Dei Verbo Incarnato 1984<br />

WN The Way to Nicea 1976<br />

UB Understanding and Being 5<br />

V Verbum 2<br />

DCC De Constitutione Christi 1984<br />

DDT De Deo Trino 1984<br />

PTP Philosophical and Theological Papers 6<br />

MD Macroeconomic Dynamics 15<br />

PE For a New Political Economy 21


<strong>Lonergan</strong> Wordbook<br />

A <strong>Primer</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong> <strong>Terminology</strong><br />

absolute: What is reached by reflection and judgment; what is independent <strong>of</strong> us and our thinking , what<br />

is really so (M 35). That reality to which the subject stands in conscious relation, which makes us regard<br />

the positive content <strong>of</strong> the sciences as probable, not true or certain (M 16). Objectivity is absolute when<br />

it is the result <strong>of</strong> combining experiential objectivity (the givenness <strong>of</strong> the data <strong>of</strong> sense and the data <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness) with normative objectivity (the fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the needs <strong>of</strong> intelligent and reasonable<br />

operation). Through experiential objectivity conditions are fulfilled. Through normative objectivity<br />

conditions are linked to what they condition. Combined they yield a conditioned with its conditions fulfilled.<br />

In knowledge, this is a fact. In reality, this is a contingent being or event (M 263).<br />

Being for <strong>Lonergan</strong> is completely universal and completely concrete. Complete knowledge <strong>of</strong> being can<br />

be had then only by a an act <strong>of</strong> understanding everything about everything. The content <strong>of</strong> a developing<br />

understanding can never be the idea <strong>of</strong> being, for only the content <strong>of</strong> an unrestricted act <strong>of</strong> understanding<br />

can be the idea <strong>of</strong> being. The idea <strong>of</strong> being in its totality is absolutely transcendent. To grasp it, human<br />

beings would need to be capable <strong>of</strong> an unrestricted act <strong>of</strong> understanding. A metaphysic <strong>of</strong> proportionate<br />

being gives us at least one segment in the total range <strong>of</strong> the idea <strong>of</strong> being (I 666-667 [643-644]). But the<br />

possibility <strong>of</strong> human knowing arises from an unrestricted intention that intends the transcendent. It is<br />

realized in a process <strong>of</strong> self-transcendence that reaches the transcendent, for the intention directs the<br />

process to being. Attaining the virtually unconditioned reveals that point in which some segment <strong>of</strong> the total<br />

range <strong>of</strong> the idea <strong>of</strong> being has been reached (2C 231, esp. ft.nt. 1).<br />

See M 16, 35, 263; I 666-667 [643-644]; 2C 231.<br />

abstract, abstraction: <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s use <strong>of</strong> this term clearly manifests the development <strong>of</strong> his thought, thus<br />

the extensive treatment <strong>of</strong> it here. For the later <strong>Lonergan</strong>, to abstract is to grasp the essential and to<br />

disregard the incidental, to understand what is significant and put aside what is irrelevant, to recognize the<br />

important as important, and the negligible as negligible. Abstraction is the selectivity function <strong>of</strong> intelligence<br />

(I 54-55 [30]).<br />

But for the earlier <strong>Lonergan</strong>, the abstract universal is an inner word consequent to insight (V 42-43<br />

[30]). The universal is abstracted as common matter from phantasm and spoken in an inner word (V 53-<br />

54 [40]). <strong>Lonergan</strong> believes that the Aristotelian and Thomist theory <strong>of</strong> abstraction is not exclusively<br />

metaphysical, but basically psychological. As psychological it is derived from the character <strong>of</strong> acts <strong>of</strong><br />

understanding (V 56-57 [42]). However, knowing the universal in the particular, knowing what is<br />

common, is not abstraction. It is the sensitive potency that Aquinas calls cogitiva. By a psychological<br />

account <strong>of</strong> abstraction <strong>Lonergan</strong> means the elimination by the understanding <strong>of</strong> the intellectually irrelevant<br />

because it is understood to be irrelevant (V 53 [39]).<br />

In this earlier period, there are three degrees <strong>of</strong> abstraction: the first, in which the understanding has<br />

conditions within the empirical order <strong>of</strong> sensible presentations (physical); the second, in which the


understanding has conditions in the imaginable, but not in the empirical order <strong>of</strong> sensible presentations<br />

(mathmatical); and the third, in which the understanding has its conditions all within the intelligible order, the<br />

expression abstracting from both the sensible and the imaginable (judgement). So significant is this<br />

understanding that, for <strong>Lonergan</strong>, a correct theory <strong>of</strong> abstraction is critical to empirical method.<br />

Later <strong>Lonergan</strong> will critique the common notion that the abstract is an impoverished replica <strong>of</strong> the concrete<br />

(I 112-114 [89-90]). To the contrary, says <strong>Lonergan</strong>. Abstraction in all its essential moments is enriching<br />

rather than being a mere impoverishment <strong>of</strong> the data <strong>of</strong> sense. Again, he distinguishes three moments:<br />

abstraction's enriching anticipation <strong>of</strong> an intelligibility to be added to sensible presentations; the erection<br />

<strong>of</strong> heuristic structures and the attainment <strong>of</strong> insight which reveals and names in the data what is<br />

significant, relevant, important, essential: the idea, the form; and finally the formulation <strong>of</strong> the intelligibility<br />

that insight has revealed. It is only in this third moment that the negative aspect <strong>of</strong> abstraction appears: the<br />

omission <strong>of</strong> what is insignificant, irrelevant, negligible, incidental (I 111-113 [88-89]). <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s earlier<br />

intellectualist interpretation <strong>of</strong> Thomist thought (see ft. nt. 6, V 153 [142]) runs counter to the conceptualist<br />

view, and the point <strong>of</strong> the most apparent conflict lies in the issue <strong>of</strong> the abstraction <strong>of</strong> concepts, an issue to<br />

which conceptualists attend almost exclusively. The center <strong>of</strong> Thomist analysis <strong>of</strong> intellect is not so much<br />

the products <strong>of</strong> intelligence, such as concepts, judgments, syllogisms, but intelligence in act itself (V 153<br />

[142]).<br />

To further clarify this earlier distinction between the conceptualist and intellectualist (<strong>Lonergan</strong>ian)<br />

interpretations <strong>of</strong> Aquinas, we need to clarify objective abstraction and the difference between formative<br />

abstraction and apprehensive abstraction. At this time <strong>Lonergan</strong> explains objective abstraction as the<br />

illumination <strong>of</strong> a phantasm by the agent intellect. Such illumination constitutes the imagined object as<br />

something to be understood. Apprehensive abstraction, the insight into the phantasm itself, actually<br />

understands what objective abstraction presented to be understood (V 189 [179]). Formative abstraction<br />

supposes the formation <strong>of</strong> an inner word and yields knowledge <strong>of</strong> something distinct from its material<br />

conditions (without which the thing would not exist). As prior, apprehensive abstraction or insight into the<br />

phantasm itself, precedes and is the basis from which formative abstraction moves toward a concept or<br />

inner word (V 163 [152]).<br />

Continuing in this early vein, direct apprehensive abstraction takes place only in the conversion shift into<br />

phantasm (V 169-170 [159]). The insight or apprehensive abstraction grasps the intelligibility <strong>of</strong> the<br />

imagined object in the imagined object (V 189 [179]). What is grasped in insight is intelligible<br />

organization. Conceptualization is an intending that puts together both the content <strong>of</strong> the insight and as<br />

much <strong>of</strong> the image as is needed for the occurrence <strong>of</strong> the insight (M 10). The object <strong>of</strong> insight into<br />

phantasm is pre-conceptual. But any expression <strong>of</strong> it must be as conceived, not as it is in itself (V 175-176<br />

[165]). For conceptualists, formative abstraction is unconscious and non-rational. It precedes apprehensive<br />

abstraction. In the intellectualist interpretation (<strong>Lonergan</strong>), apprehensive abstraction precedes formative,<br />

and the consequent formative abstraction is an act <strong>of</strong> rational consciousness (V 163 [152]).<br />

In this early period <strong>Lonergan</strong> distinguishes two acts <strong>of</strong> apprehensive abstraction. When the possible<br />

intellect is actuated by a species, it is constituted in the first act <strong>of</strong> apprehensive abstraction. When the<br />

species shines forth in the phantasm and is then considered, the considering is the second act <strong>of</strong><br />

apprehensive abstraction (V 177-178, 187 [167-168, 178]). <strong>Lonergan</strong> describes this second act as


"infallible" in itself.<br />

A type <strong>of</strong> reflection follows in which there is indirect knowledge <strong>of</strong> the singular, a reflective grasping that<br />

the universal nature understood is the nature <strong>of</strong> the particular imagined (V 187 [178]). Formative<br />

abstraction then posits the object apart from its material conditions. It does so by an act <strong>of</strong> meaning or<br />

defining (V 187-189 [178-179]). The objects <strong>of</strong> apprehensive and formative abstraction are really the<br />

same, for it is the same essence. But they are modally different: what apprehensive abstraction knows only<br />

in the imagined instance, formative abstraction knows apart from any instance, and is distinguished by the<br />

special property <strong>of</strong> engaging the rational consciousness (V 178, 180 [187-190]). It is only in reaching the<br />

point <strong>of</strong> the concept that the "inner word" has been formed. The intellectual activity prior to it is preconceptual.<br />

But this is not the end <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s understanding <strong>of</strong> abstraction. For the later <strong>Lonergan</strong>, we understand<br />

the concrete in images which simplify for us the complexity <strong>of</strong> the concrete, i.e. <strong>of</strong> the real in all its aspects<br />

and instances. The image as simplifying is the abstracting (M 36).<br />

In other words, what comes to us as sensed or imagined, we can, by the light <strong>of</strong> intelligence (which is<br />

basically our attitude <strong>of</strong> inquiry and is focused by some particular question <strong>of</strong> ours), grasp in as instance <strong>of</strong><br />

our experience a unity or correlation which responds to our question “What is this” or “Why is this as it<br />

is” In evidence to what we have intelligently assembled (and this also is abstraction), we can grasp a<br />

sufficiency <strong>of</strong> evidence which responds to our question “Is my understanding correct” (I 336 [311], V<br />

chapter 4).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> showed us in several fields the importance <strong>of</strong> a correct theory <strong>of</strong> abstraction: in science<br />

(especially in mathematical physics which <strong>of</strong>fers the most precise illustration <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> abstraction<br />

because it has to do with the existence <strong>of</strong> actual positions and frequencies but grasps the ideal frequency<br />

on which these converge non-systematically), in philosophy (including ethics), and in theology (especially<br />

Trinitarian theology and theological method). But he was more interested in showing us that it is not<br />

abstraction but what abstraction makes possible - namely, insight, the act <strong>of</strong> understanding - which is<br />

the central element in human knowing (V 135-37 [126-7], 153 [142], I 111-12 [87-89].<br />

Overemphasis on theories <strong>of</strong> abstraction and on the formation <strong>of</strong> concepts, judgments and syllogisms leads<br />

to conceptualism, that is, to ignoring the concrete mode <strong>of</strong> understanding which grasps intelligibility in the<br />

sensible and the imaginable (or in “operations,” if we are speaking <strong>of</strong> group theory), and it leads also to<br />

what <strong>Lonergan</strong> called conceptualist interpretations <strong>of</strong> Aristotle and Aquinas. (<strong>Lonergan</strong> sometimes calls<br />

his own position “intellectualist” and “intellectualist interpretation.”) (2C 74, V 153 [142 n.6]<br />

Theorems about abstraction have been devised from ancient times to account for the generalities in our<br />

knowing, and for the mode <strong>of</strong> our knowing which for Aquinas is by assimilation <strong>of</strong> knower and known.<br />

The meaning <strong>of</strong> the term “abstraction” has floated, <strong>Lonergan</strong> told us, first <strong>of</strong> all because a related term,<br />

“matter” (as in the <strong>of</strong>ten-used proposition: “Knowing requires abstracting from [determinate] matter”) has<br />

had varied meanings (V 158 ff [147 ff], 167-68 [157], TE 126).


On the all too common notion <strong>of</strong> abstraction as yielding an impoverished replica <strong>of</strong> the concrete, <strong>Lonergan</strong><br />

counters with the assertion that in all its essential moments abstraction is enriching: it adds an anticipation<br />

<strong>of</strong> intelligibility, and structure for the attainment <strong>of</strong> insight and the consequent formulation. A negative aspect<br />

<strong>of</strong> abstraction appears only in the omission <strong>of</strong> what is insignificant or irrelevant, but this omission is neither<br />

absolute nor definitive. What <strong>Lonergan</strong> actually considers the proper use <strong>of</strong> the terms “abstract” and “the<br />

abstract” (with its correlative, “the concrete”) tests our understanding <strong>of</strong> “abstraction.” (I 129 [107], 336<br />

[311], 112-114 [89-90])<br />

The abstract, <strong>Lonergan</strong> said, is not apprehending a sensitive or imaginative gestalt; it is not a name<br />

common to many instances, nor just a matter <strong>of</strong> giving one instance after another; the transcendental notions<br />

(e.g. the true, the good) are not abstract but comprehensive; the notion <strong>of</strong> being prescends from nothing<br />

whatever and therefore is not an abstraction; the good is never abstract but always concrete (I 54-55 [30],<br />

387 [363], M 23, 36).<br />

Examples <strong>of</strong> what <strong>Lonergan</strong> did speak <strong>of</strong> as being abstract are the following: in the context <strong>of</strong> scientific<br />

understanding, laws, correlations, systems, frequencies; that which results from turning attention away from<br />

particular places and times and from our own standpoint, away from whatever is mere matter-<strong>of</strong>-fact in<br />

relation to some particular question; geometries; concepts. For <strong>Lonergan</strong>, abstraction is conscious process.<br />

Intellectual activity, he said, is not a sausage-machine for grinding up data and tossing out concepts (2C<br />

74, UB 37-8 [42], I 758-59 [736-37], UB 165-66 [205]).<br />

The following is a summary sketch <strong>of</strong> several different contexts where we find <strong>Lonergan</strong> using the term “to<br />

abstract” and related words. These contexts reveal something <strong>of</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> his use <strong>of</strong> the term.<br />

In cognitional theory:<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>’s early study <strong>of</strong> Aquinas on the “inner word” i.e., on that formulated understanding which (if not<br />

misunderstood as product) has afforded Trinitarian theology one <strong>of</strong> its enduring analogies, employed all the<br />

traditional vocabulary about human knowing inherited from the metaphysical and psychological interests<br />

<strong>of</strong> Aristotle and Aquinas: object, act, habit; matter and form; agent intellect and possible intellect, intellectual<br />

light, phantasm, abstraction, species, concept. (At one point the whole assemblage evoked for him the style<br />

<strong>of</strong> a Rube Goldberg cartoon.) He placed on the frontispiece <strong>of</strong> Insight and within the book repeated in<br />

several different way, Aristotle’s “The mind knows form in images.” An equivalent phrase in a metaphysics<br />

<strong>of</strong> intellectual activity uses the term we are considering: “Intellect abstracts species from phantasm.” (V 41-<br />

2 [28], 55-6 [42], 137-8 [128]; I 240-1 [215], 699-700 [677], 2C 74).<br />

But in <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s study <strong>of</strong> human understanding in Insight, the traditional elements referred to above are<br />

present in a transformed way. Abstraction was taken (as already noted) as best illustrated by the<br />

procedures and goals <strong>of</strong> physics. Several distinctions within abstraction combine to become <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s<br />

pivoting <strong>of</strong> insight between abstracted image and concrete instances (TE 115, V 163 [152], 185 [161]).<br />

At the risk <strong>of</strong> inaccuracies, and with the assurance that <strong>Lonergan</strong> scholars will point them out, we venture<br />

several correspondences here beyond those <strong>Lonergan</strong> himself proposed: Conceptualization becomes an<br />

intending to know the real that puts together both the content <strong>of</strong> an insight (M 10) and as much <strong>of</strong> the


preparatory image as was needed for the insight to occur, with inner word (concept) following as the<br />

formulation <strong>of</strong> what was understood. The “light” <strong>of</strong> intelligence becomes the “pure desire to know.” (V<br />

99-102 [92f], 194 [186] “Conversion to phantasm” becomes something more like attentiveness to one’s<br />

experience. “Possible intellect” becomes the act <strong>of</strong> understanding. <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s later and full transition (1C<br />

163-64 [174]) from faculty psychology to intentionality analysis (e.g., from “intellect” to a human person’s<br />

consciousness and understanding) and the reference frame <strong>of</strong> science with which he headed up his massive<br />

illustrations <strong>of</strong> what insight is, ensured a transposition <strong>of</strong> the traditional elements <strong>of</strong> cognitional theory (V<br />

90-95 [79-83]).<br />

In science:<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> noted that it took some four hundred years for modern science to get beyond the confusion <strong>of</strong><br />

thinking that the only possible objects <strong>of</strong> its inquiry were imaginable ones.<br />

Scientific investigation <strong>of</strong> the classical type (chiefly that derived from the science <strong>of</strong> Aristotle) was based<br />

on the expectation that there can be understanding only <strong>of</strong> what is universal and necessary. The discovery<br />

<strong>of</strong> classical laws rests on an experimental exclusion <strong>of</strong> factors extraneous to some question being asked.<br />

But classical laws (I 117-118, 124 [94, 100]hold in concrete instances only if a range <strong>of</strong> positive and<br />

negative conditions are fulfilled. Statistical laws are needed for knowledge <strong>of</strong> the concrete since this<br />

includes a non-systematic component (M 11, I 125 [102] which the indeterminacy <strong>of</strong> the abstract brings<br />

to light (M 65, I 131 [108]. Our common expression “other things being equal,” “in the ordinary course<br />

<strong>of</strong> nature,” “the usual run <strong>of</strong> events,” signal our awareness <strong>of</strong> the need for a type <strong>of</strong> investigation other than<br />

the classical - namely, one in which statistical laws are discovered. Conceiving <strong>of</strong> classical laws concretely,<br />

i.e., without the further determination s needed to mediate the application <strong>of</strong> such laws, leads to mechanistic<br />

conceptions <strong>of</strong> the universe and <strong>of</strong> human conduct (I 154 [131], 2C 39).<br />

Both classical and statistical laws are abstract, and their abstractness is complementary (I 87-88, 126-<br />

127,133, 137-138 [65, 103,110,114]). Classical laws prescind from the non-systematic aspects <strong>of</strong> reality.<br />

Statistical laws prescind from actual frequencies <strong>of</strong> actual events but formulate the ideal frequencies on<br />

which the concrete converges (I 126-127 [103]). The affirmation that both types <strong>of</strong> law are possible and<br />

needed for understanding our universe, involves a whole world view in which world process is understood<br />

to be “emergent probability.” (I 114-115, 589-590 [91, 566] A third method <strong>of</strong> inquiry (<strong>Lonergan</strong> called<br />

it genetic method) is based on trends and tries to understand development in the concrete (I 503-504<br />

[479]). (Common sense understanding is concerned solely with the concrete but it is habitually incomplete<br />

without the pertinent on-the-spot insights.)<br />

In <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s analyses <strong>of</strong> cultural shifts:<br />

In his many comments on cutural development, <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s use <strong>of</strong> “abstraction” and “abstract” were<br />

derived chiefly from the negative side <strong>of</strong> the process <strong>of</strong> abstraction - that <strong>of</strong> omission (2C 170, 5, 6, M 38).<br />

He described a “abstract and sterile context” dictated by invariance and by logical clarity, rigor and<br />

coherence - for example, in the abstraction that is “man.” In contrast, he described a “concrete context”<br />

which is open and ongoing, as dictated by attention, inquiry, reflection and deliberation. He saw the<br />

movement <strong>of</strong> modern science toward concreteness as having pushed philosophy toward greater<br />

concreteness also, and especially toward the concreteness <strong>of</strong> human living (M 36, 2C 110).


Across these several reference frames (above), <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s understanding <strong>of</strong> “abstraction” remained that<br />

human understanding grasps intelligibility in sensible, imagined, or ordered data, and that human wonder<br />

initiates the bringing <strong>of</strong> instances <strong>of</strong> reality from potential to actual intelligibility (M 10).<br />

Implications <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s transcendental method - including the element <strong>of</strong> abstraction in human knowing -<br />

are yet to be drawn out and integrated into an account <strong>of</strong> contemplative consciousness (IC 38). For<br />

example, there was his suggestion in an early writing, that our abstraction images the divine stance outside<br />

the temporal flow. (Probably it was the conscious but pre-conceptual aspects <strong>of</strong> abstraction which seemed<br />

relevant there. The suggestion may have been eclipsed later by the concreteness <strong>of</strong> his “universal<br />

viewpoint” that world process is emergent probability. Would the notion <strong>of</strong> the divine abstraction then yield<br />

to something like “God the methodologist”) Worth exploration also is his description <strong>of</strong> the mystic’s<br />

prolonging the awareness <strong>of</strong> his/her participation, as image <strong>of</strong> God, in the divine Light.<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>'s early distinctions <strong>of</strong> Aquinas' intelligence in act provides us with an intelligence operating in a<br />

wider context than the distinctly rational, thus providing a base in cognitional theory and its resulting<br />

epistemology for contemplative consciousness as constitutive, not foreign, to human intelligence. Although<br />

life's actual events are at different times in their internal temporal relationships, it is still possible, says<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>, for the human intellect to imitate the divine and by abstraction stand outside the temporal flow<br />

in which really, though it may not be intentionally, the human intelligence is involved (1C, 38 [38]). The<br />

integrative potential <strong>of</strong> this position for gaining psychological perspective and the role <strong>of</strong> a contemplative<br />

attitude, in the midst <strong>of</strong> ordinary activities arising from being religiously in love, has yet to be thoroughly<br />

addressed from a cultural perspective.<br />

(We are indebted to Cathleen Going, OP, for much <strong>of</strong> the above work on the term abstract.)<br />

alienation: <strong>Lonergan</strong> admits this term has many meanings. As he uses it, however, it refers to the basic<br />

human disregard <strong>of</strong> the transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible.<br />

Such disregard justifies itself by becoming an ideology; and ideologies so derived corrupt the social good<br />

to the point <strong>of</strong> cumulative decline <strong>of</strong> a culture (M 55). To self-justify this alienation from the true self is for<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> the most basic form <strong>of</strong> ideology (M 357). The person who lives by the disregard named as<br />

alienation, is disregarding his/her own self-transcendence. Sin is alienation from authentic humanness and<br />

the community <strong>of</strong> the Church is, for <strong>Lonergan</strong>, a redemptive process which, by self-sacrificing love<br />

(charity), can reconcile human persons to their true being. This dynamic undoes the havoc brought about<br />

by alienation and enshrined in ideology (M 364, 2C 85-86). The worst alienation, the one characteristic<br />

<strong>of</strong> contemporary culture, is to refuse even to ask the questions about how one knows and what difference<br />

it might make.<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> identifies the disregard <strong>of</strong> one’s feelings as another form <strong>of</strong> alienation. This can create a conflict<br />

between the self as conscious and the self as objectified. Such disregard would be a neurotic form <strong>of</strong><br />

alienation. This condition would give added meaning to the term "unconscious" as the "twilight <strong>of</strong> what is<br />

conscious but not objectified" (M 34, esp. nt. 5).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> also refers to alienation as a negation <strong>of</strong> value. This negation may manifest itself as an


estrangement <strong>of</strong> the human from the human world. Displacement is experienced when the social fabric<br />

<strong>of</strong> one's world is alien to the human and such estrangement can erupt in violent hatred. The result is<br />

neurotic art, frustration, a sense <strong>of</strong> hopelessness. To this negation <strong>of</strong> value in an objective sense can be<br />

added the sense <strong>of</strong> the loss <strong>of</strong> order within a person. The negation <strong>of</strong> ethical value shows itself in drifting,<br />

in making no choices at all. One finds it easier to conform, to let others make the decisions. This opens the<br />

door to the indiscriminate power manipulators. When there is the negation <strong>of</strong> religious value, God is no<br />

longer in the horizon, secularism reigns, sin is fun and there is full assertion <strong>of</strong> the self. This eclipse gives<br />

birth to illusion regarding human capabilities, or despair in the face <strong>of</strong> disillusion (TE 46).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> also uses the term alienation for a certain frivolity and superficiality in respect to science. This<br />

attitude arises when it is assumed that for something to be “scientific” it must involve palpable consequences<br />

that everyone immediately recognizes. Science is reduced to techniques rather than an intelligent account<br />

<strong>of</strong> some aspect <strong>of</strong> the real (TE 47-48). The most pr<strong>of</strong>oundly alienating aspect <strong>of</strong> this situation is the<br />

rejection <strong>of</strong> the possibility <strong>of</strong> a science <strong>of</strong> the human person; for in such a science immediately palpable<br />

consequences are not the norm.<br />

Social alienation is a "conjunction <strong>of</strong> dissatisfaction and hopelessness" arising from large establishments and<br />

their bureaucratic organizations. <strong>Lonergan</strong> holds four defects responsible: the policies and procedures <strong>of</strong><br />

products and services are held as universals, but real good is always concrete; systems operate rigidly,<br />

allowing little or no discretionary adaptation; there is little encouragement for alert observation and critical<br />

reflection that generates new and creative ideas; and finally, the size, complexity, and solidarity <strong>of</strong><br />

establishments and bureaucracies give broad range to crafty egoists, group biases, and the oversights that<br />

invite disaster. <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s starting place is a close scrutiny <strong>of</strong> the conjunction <strong>of</strong> dissatisfaction and<br />

hopelessness, and the neglect <strong>of</strong> the human operations causing it (3C 60-63).<br />

To merely assert that knowledge exists without saying exactly what knowledge is, is to utter a type <strong>of</strong><br />

abstraction which gives rise to alienation. This happens, for example, when a thinker concentrates on<br />

commonsense knowledge alone, and asks an abstract question such as “Does knowledge exist” The<br />

thinker creates a small little world in which he or she has a narrow little certitude. The power <strong>of</strong> influencing<br />

and integrating other fields is lost. The solution is to ask for a fuller account <strong>of</strong> knowledge. To leave this<br />

issue “abstract” is to have the abstraction in this case perceived as alien (UB 101-102 [122-123]).<br />

already out there now real: See real.<br />

a priori: "...Is our notion <strong>of</strong> being simply an a priori category that is imposed on data Is our position<br />

Kantian If our position is not Kantian, how does it differ from the Kantian position" With these words<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> creates the canvas for the discussion <strong>of</strong> the term a priori and addresses the suspicion that he is<br />

really a Kantian in disguise (UB 156-157 [193]). The critical nature <strong>of</strong> this question will come clear as the<br />

distinctions unfold.<br />

The crux <strong>of</strong> the matter for <strong>Lonergan</strong>, has to do with the notion <strong>of</strong> being and the notion <strong>of</strong> knowing, and<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> takes care to distinguish his position from that <strong>of</strong> Kant. If knowing comes from the look, the<br />

question <strong>of</strong> a priori is <strong>of</strong> great significance. If knowing is a perfection in the subject, then the question <strong>of</strong>


the a priori, what comes from the subject and what comes from the object, is <strong>of</strong> minor importance, for the<br />

real issue is how much <strong>of</strong> knowing comes from subject and object and what the significance <strong>of</strong> this might<br />

be (UB 159-170 [196-210])<br />

The pivot <strong>of</strong> this discussion is one's notion <strong>of</strong> what knowing is. How much <strong>of</strong> this thing called "knowing"<br />

comes from the subject How much from the object What is knowing If one answers that knowing<br />

is confrontation, taking a look, seeing what is there, or intuition, then nothing comes from the subject. If<br />

knowing is an ontological perfection <strong>of</strong> the subject, however, then the more knowing there is, the better <strong>of</strong>f<br />

the subject is. The question then becomes, in what sense, when our notion <strong>of</strong> being is from the subject, is<br />

that notion a priori<br />

If knowing is not looking, but rather the ontological perfection <strong>of</strong> the knower, then what <strong>Lonergan</strong> finds<br />

when he explores the knowing subject is experience, acts <strong>of</strong> understanding and formulation <strong>of</strong> concepts,<br />

grasp <strong>of</strong> the unconditioned and judgment - perfections <strong>of</strong> the knower. The question <strong>of</strong> what comes from<br />

the subject thus becomes insignificant. Likewise insignificant is the query <strong>of</strong> what comes from the object.<br />

The object simply helps the knower to come to know being. Once what knowing is, is clarified, and its<br />

object is clarified, then the task becomes working out in just what sense our notion <strong>of</strong> being is from the<br />

subject or knower, a priori.<br />

The scholastic distinction between what is known by nature and what is known by acquisition is helpful<br />

here. (In addition there is also infused knowing e.g., the gifts <strong>of</strong> the Holy Spirit, and bestowed knowing<br />

i.e, the beatific vision <strong>of</strong> God.) <strong>Lonergan</strong> holds that for human beings there is no actual knowedge by<br />

nature. Nature gives nothing in act, but by nature we have the potency to know because all our cognitional<br />

faculties are from nature. Nature for <strong>Lonergan</strong> includes the natural spiritual capacity <strong>of</strong> the human being<br />

for cognition and choice.<br />

It is by acquisition that we move from knowing in potency to knowing in act. Thus, our potency to know<br />

comes from nature, but any actual knowing is going to involve some influence from the object. The object<br />

is needed to effect the transition from the potency to know to actually knowing. By nature, the intellect has<br />

a range that is determined. Its range is everything, and because its range is everything, says <strong>Lonergan</strong>, (UB<br />

162 [201]) its range is being. Does this mean then that because knowing being is natural in this sense, that<br />

being is somehow a priori<br />

To reply to this we need to recall that the distinction <strong>of</strong> the scholastics between what is known naturally and<br />

what is known by acquisition is not really how Kant distinguishes the a priori and the a posteriori. For<br />

Kant the a priori is what is absolutely independent <strong>of</strong> experience. Is what we have explained above<br />

regarding knowing absolutely independent <strong>of</strong> experience <strong>Lonergan</strong> replies (UB 164 [203]) that on the<br />

level <strong>of</strong> potency, from nature, our knowing is independent <strong>of</strong> experience. But once the process is going -<br />

the wonder, the asking <strong>of</strong> questions, the actual inquiry - this is not absolutely independent <strong>of</strong> experience.<br />

Experience provides the material for inquiry to actually occur. Thus, only as potency from nature is<br />

knowing a priori as Kant understands the term. The exercise involves experience, and so the two thinkers<br />

differ; the difference lies in the understanding <strong>of</strong> what knowing is.


authenticity: A person is becoming authentic who is consistent in the struggle to be attentive, intelligent,<br />

reasonable, responsible, and in love. The precarious and ever-developing state <strong>of</strong> a human being is<br />

reached only by long and sustained faithfulness to the transcendental precepts (3C 8). <strong>Lonergan</strong><br />

distinguishes a tw<strong>of</strong>old authenticity: a minor authenticity <strong>of</strong> the person regarding faithfulness to the tradition<br />

that nourishes him or her, and a major authenticity that is able to justify or condemn the tradition itself when<br />

the failures <strong>of</strong> individuals become the norm (3C 120-121, 130). The human being achieves authenticity<br />

through self-transcendence (M 104) and through a continual withdrawal from unauthenticity (M 110).<br />

What does the process <strong>of</strong> self-transcendence imply What is this struggle In Chapter two <strong>of</strong> Method<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> writes <strong>of</strong> the human good. The chapter reveals the <strong>Lonergan</strong> beyond Insight, the <strong>Lonergan</strong><br />

beyond cognition and the vital role <strong>of</strong> the intelligence in human flourishing. Here we catch a glimpse <strong>of</strong> the<br />

struggle for concrete human authenticity and the dynamic self-transcendence that brings it about.<br />

There are components to the struggle. The first is skill: adaptation, assimilation, adjustment; the mastery<br />

that comes <strong>of</strong> the repeated differentiation <strong>of</strong> operations so that one’s human repertory grows (M 27). The<br />

human becomes human by operating humanly. These operations are immediate when the objects we are<br />

dealing with are present. They are mediated when images, symbols, and speech open up the far wider<br />

world that is mediated by multiple meanings, past, present, and future. As the human repertory grows, the<br />

consciousness is differentiated, aesthetically, scientifically, mystically.<br />

Simultaneously with this operational skill development there is the development <strong>of</strong> feeling. <strong>Lonergan</strong><br />

distinguishes non-intentional feeling states such as tiredness and hunger and intentional responses (M 30).<br />

Intentional feeling response answers to what we intend, what we apprehend, objects represented to us.<br />

It is such feeling that drives and empowers intentional consciousness. The human person will be driven by<br />

what pleases or displeases, and by what is <strong>of</strong> value. It is response to value that carries us toward the selftranscendence<br />

that is the goal, and selects the very objects that can lure us beyond ourselves. There are<br />

vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values: health, fair wages, music, self-esteem, and piety.<br />

Neglect <strong>of</strong> feeling results in self-alienation, an effective crippling <strong>of</strong> the struggle toward authenticity (M 31-<br />

34).<br />

Value is what is intended in the questions for deliberation leading to choice. Such intending is not knowing,<br />

it is a notion or a tending toward. The transcendental notion <strong>of</strong> value is a dynamism <strong>of</strong> conscious<br />

intentionality, actually prompting the human subject from lower to higher levels <strong>of</strong> consciousness. As such,<br />

the drive to value not only prompts self-transcendence, but provides a criteria which reveals whether one’s<br />

goals are being reached. Self-transcendence is achieved by conscious intentionality driven by what one<br />

values, and it is sustained self-transcendence that equips one to be a good judge on the whole range <strong>of</strong><br />

human goodness (M 34-36). When such judgments proceed from a self-transcending subject, their truth<br />

or falsity has its criterion in the authenticity or lack <strong>of</strong> it in the person. True judgments <strong>of</strong> value will go<br />

beyond merely intentional self-transcendence, but will not necessarily reach full moral self-transcendence.<br />

Yet such a judgment is already in the moral order. The person is beyond simple knowing. By such a<br />

judgment the person is constituting him or herself as capable <strong>of</strong> moral self-transcendence (M 37-39).<br />

Further, the horizontal liberty that fosters choice within a determinate horizon situated in a corresponding<br />

existential stance opens up to a vertical liberty that chooses the stance and the horizon within it. Thus the<br />

transcendental notion <strong>of</strong> value becomes critical to the self-transcendence that marks authentic human moral


development (M 40-41)<br />

It is through belief that one appropriates the vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values <strong>of</strong> one’s<br />

heritage. Our meager personally generated knowledge is supplemented by the rich experiences <strong>of</strong> others.<br />

Human knowledge is indeed a common fund. <strong>Lonergan</strong> carefully sketches five steps in the process <strong>of</strong><br />

coming to believe. The first step is being presented with someone authentic enough to be believed,<br />

someone with not only the cognitional self-transcendence to merit belief in their judgments <strong>of</strong> fact, but with<br />

the moral self-transcendence that merits confidence in their judgments <strong>of</strong> value. Secondly, the believer must<br />

enter into what <strong>Lonergan</strong> calls a general judgment <strong>of</strong> value. It is the decision to enter into the collaborative<br />

search for knowledge and truth rather than regress to an uncritical acceptance <strong>of</strong> error. Third, the believer<br />

makes a particular judgment <strong>of</strong> value. A teacher, a report, a source is believed because <strong>of</strong> trustworthiness.<br />

The fourth step is the decision to believe, following on the general and particular judgments <strong>of</strong> value.<br />

Finally, there is the act <strong>of</strong> believing. I judge to be true what I have been told, and choose to believe it (M<br />

41-47).<br />

Because the human good is both individual and social, cooperation becomes a key to self-transcendence<br />

and thus to authenticity. When cooperation actually works out, we have what is known as the good <strong>of</strong><br />

order. It is the actually functioning set <strong>of</strong> relationships guiding human operators and coordinating their<br />

human operations. Terminal values are those that are chosen. Originating values are those doing the<br />

choosing. Both are authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by making good choices. When<br />

members <strong>of</strong> communities will both authenticity in themselves and promote it in others, then the originating<br />

values that choose and the terminal values that are chosen intermingle. This is accomplished through skill<br />

and development. The process is fraught with pitfalls and setbacks, and marked by frequent conversion.<br />

The process is the very making <strong>of</strong> the human person, his or her advance in authenticity (M 47-52).<br />

Progress flows from human persons being authentic, and authenticity proceeds from the self-transcendence<br />

brought about by the transcendental precepts: Be attentive to human affairs; Be intelligent in inquiring into<br />

any and all possibilities; Be reasonable in judging not only what won’t work, but what might; Be<br />

responsible by basing your decision on unbiased evaluations <strong>of</strong> possible personal and group outcomes.<br />

Decline is the result <strong>of</strong> a process <strong>of</strong> cumulative choices to reject self-transcendence. Instead, the choice<br />

is for what I want, what my group wants, what will give immediate results, and how I can avoid discomfort.<br />

It is the culture that chooses to abort the struggle for authenticity (M 52-55). It is the culture that chooses<br />

the self as transcended rather than the self as transcending (M 110-111).<br />

communications: The eighth <strong>of</strong> <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s eight functional specialties in theology. Communications brings<br />

what has been discovered through scholarship back into the realm <strong>of</strong> common sense, where it can make<br />

a difference in the real lives <strong>of</strong> individuals and cultures. It does this by transposing the discoveries <strong>of</strong> the<br />

differentiated realms <strong>of</strong> interiority and theory into the language and imagery <strong>of</strong> common sense. Theological<br />

communications operates through the basic art <strong>of</strong> talking, teaching, preaching, writing, art, gesture, etc.<br />

This distinct meaning for <strong>Lonergan</strong> makes clear the shift in the conscious subject from the more universal<br />

and abstract language <strong>of</strong> theory to the language <strong>of</strong> the particular in its environmental and cultural<br />

distinctiveness. In a more general sense, communication (without the s) is the communication <strong>of</strong> insight or<br />

understanding to the experience <strong>of</strong> another. What one means is communicated intersubjectively, artistically,


symbolically, linguistically, incarnately (M 78).<br />

Communication can take place on various levels or in various differentiations <strong>of</strong> consciousness: common<br />

sense, scholarly, aesthetic, scientific (theoretical). religious or mystical. In an interesting discussion <strong>of</strong><br />

symbol <strong>Lonergan</strong> stresses the importance <strong>of</strong> internal communication (M 66-67). By this he means an<br />

attentiveness to what is going on in one's feelings. It is in feeling that links are discovered between mind<br />

and body, mind and heart, and heart and body. The symbol recognizes and expresses what usual logical<br />

speech abhors: internal tension, what is incompatible, conflicting, or destructive. Dialectic can do this<br />

logically, but symbol does it before logic can get to it. Symbol complements and fills out logic. It<br />

contextualizes it in the rich world <strong>of</strong> feeling. Elemental communication is found in symbol, and it is through<br />

symbol that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate (M 67). Then by explaining<br />

the symbol, one goes beyond it. The transition takes place from elemental meaning to linguistic meaning,<br />

with its listening and speaking.<br />

The meaning <strong>of</strong> communications most pr<strong>of</strong>ound for those engaged in community building is <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s<br />

reference to communications as the condition <strong>of</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> the collective subject (1C 219-220 [237-<br />

238]). The principle communication <strong>Lonergan</strong> refers to here is not that <strong>of</strong> speaking what we know. It is<br />

revealing who we are. It is not introspection that reveals us to ourselves, <strong>Lonergan</strong> stresses. It is reflecting<br />

on who we are as we live in common with others (1C 220 [238]). This is incarnate meaning. It is the<br />

meaning <strong>of</strong> a person. Such meaning combines the intersubjective, the artistic, the symbolic, and the<br />

linguistic for just one other person, or for an entire people (M 73).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> also stresses the need for a pluralism <strong>of</strong> communications, a meeting <strong>of</strong> people in terms <strong>of</strong> their<br />

distinct worlds <strong>of</strong> common sense (M 276, 328; DP 2). Because there are multiple worlds <strong>of</strong> common<br />

sense, preachers need to get to know the people to whom they are sent. Coming to know a peoples’ way<br />

<strong>of</strong> thinking, speaking, and responding, is primarily a pluralism <strong>of</strong> communications rather than doctrines.<br />

When the consciousness in undifferentiated, for example among a people who have no written language,<br />

this is a limitation, and communication <strong>of</strong> doctrine needs to be done through ritual and metaphors readily<br />

understood. What needs to be kept in mind for authentic communications is the transposing <strong>of</strong> meaning<br />

from the realm <strong>of</strong> theory to the realm <strong>of</strong> common sense where people deal with the day-to-day.<br />

See I 197-203 [173-181]; UB 222-224 [273-276]; M, 66-67, 78, 132, 168-169, 194, 276, 282, 285,<br />

300, 328, 330, 355-368; PGT, 65-66; DP, 2-4; 1C, 219-220 [237-238].<br />

conversion: A resultant change <strong>of</strong> course and direction (M 52; 2C 66), from one set <strong>of</strong> roots to another<br />

(M 271). The beginning <strong>of</strong> a new mode <strong>of</strong> developing (3C 247). <strong>Lonergan</strong> originally discusses conversion<br />

as three-dimensional: as intellectual in our orientation to the intelligible, as moral in our orientation to the<br />

good, and as religious in our orientation to God (DP 34). This threefold designation continued as late as<br />

Method (M 267). Here <strong>Lonergan</strong> writes <strong>of</strong> religious conversion as "being grasped by ultimate concern,"<br />

moral conversion as changing "the criterion <strong>of</strong> one's decisions and choices from satisfactions to values," and<br />

intellectual conversion as knowing "precisely what one is doing when one is knowing" (M 239-241).<br />

Conversion is the process <strong>of</strong> moving from unauthenticity to authenticity, and as such it is tenuous and fragile.


Conversion is a prolonged, dynamic process and is linked to the functional specialty Foundations, which<br />

is the objectification <strong>of</strong> the experience <strong>of</strong> religious conversion. Conversion as communal and historical calls<br />

forth reflection on institutions and cultures, exploring their “origins, developments, purposes, achievements,<br />

failures.” (M 130-131)<br />

Our concrete being as human is a dynamic integration on the organic, psychic and intellectual levels.<br />

Harmonious orientation on the psychic level in this integration <strong>of</strong> the person “would have to consist in<br />

some...intimations <strong>of</strong> unplumbed depths that accrued to man’s (sic) feelings, emotions, sentiments.”<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> refers to this as the second sphere <strong>of</strong> reality beyond the “familiar, the domesticated, the<br />

common.” The “primary field <strong>of</strong> mystery and myth and the affect-laden images and names” have to do with<br />

this second sphere <strong>of</strong> the “unplumbed depths,” “the unexplored, the strange.” Integration on the psychic<br />

level requires an openness to the unknown, to this second sphere <strong>of</strong> reality (I 555-556 [531-532]).<br />

Later, in part as a result <strong>of</strong> conversations with Robert Doran, SJ, who was working on <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s own<br />

references to the healing <strong>of</strong> the psyche in chapter XVII <strong>of</strong> Insight, <strong>Lonergan</strong> accepted the category <strong>of</strong><br />

affective conversion. Doran would later rename this psychic conversion. Psychic conversion dissolves<br />

dramatic bias, the scotosis or psychic scarring <strong>of</strong> an experience that blocks or censors images. By means<br />

<strong>of</strong> therapy, contemplative prayer, or both, the censorship that polices feelings that are laden with pain can<br />

be dissolved. The blockage <strong>of</strong> feeling prevents certain images from emerging in the psyche. These images<br />

are the seeds <strong>of</strong> new insight, and thus this psychic restriction aborts the very possibility <strong>of</strong> new insight in an<br />

area too painful to address (I 214-217, 555-556 [191-193, 531-533]; M 77)<br />

Religious conversion was further differentiated as Christian religious conversion when salvation was<br />

experienced in the context <strong>of</strong> Christ Jesus in the incarnation. Because it directly influences the human<br />

capacity for self-transcendence, religious conversion grounds both moral and intellectual conversion (M<br />

283). Religious conversion is being grasped by religious love. When religious love enters the horizon <strong>of</strong><br />

a human being the entire horizon is transformed, for transcendent being has become the context for<br />

consideration <strong>of</strong> contingent being in the awareness. The self becomes a different self, because the horizon<br />

within which all reality is considered has been radically altered (M 122). Religious conversion is “the gift<br />

<strong>of</strong> God’s love flooding our hearts.” (M 105) This gift is properly itself not in an isolated individual, but only<br />

in a plurality <strong>of</strong> persons that disclose their love to one another (M 283). Religious conversion is very <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

experienced religiously but not understood as religious. Very <strong>of</strong>ten it is experienced outside <strong>of</strong> the context<br />

<strong>of</strong> ritual or institutionalized religion.<br />

Moral conversion is a shift from attending to what is merely satisfying to what is good in the long run. The<br />

quality <strong>of</strong> moral conversion will depend to some extent on the depth <strong>of</strong> religious conversion. Conscience<br />

can be explained as the moral demand we experience to choose and act in accordance with what we know<br />

is true in any given situation.<br />

Intellectual conversion is becoming aware <strong>of</strong> one's own conscious operations and processing. It is a<br />

process <strong>of</strong> liberation and discovery. The intellectually converted subject recognizes that knowing is not like<br />

looking and that the real human world we live in is constituted by acts <strong>of</strong> meaning. Not achieved by many,<br />

intellectual conversion is the critical tool to assess one's own thought processes and uncover one’s


motivation.<br />

See GF 124ff; DP 34; M 105, 122, 130-131, 239-241, 267, 271, 283.<br />

culture: The set <strong>of</strong> meanings and values inherent in a way <strong>of</strong> life (2C 183-184; PGT 15, 50). All cultures<br />

are humanly constructed, contingent, and capable <strong>of</strong> both development and decay (2C 184). Culture is<br />

local and very concrete. Its meanings are felt, intuited, and acted out in rites, symbols, and language (2C<br />

102-103). <strong>Lonergan</strong> understands culture empirically, rather than normatively. A normative view <strong>of</strong> culture<br />

projects a rigidity and permanence upon laws and institutions that history shows to be illusionary (2C 283).<br />

An empirical perspective, the view <strong>Lonergan</strong> prefers, has to do with the manner in which certain meanings<br />

and values inform a human community as it lives life as a continuous slow development or a rapid decline<br />

(M xi).<br />

Meaning is intrinsic to any culture (M 78). In a discussion <strong>of</strong> the writings <strong>of</strong> Pitirim Sorokin, <strong>Lonergan</strong><br />

agrees with Sorokin's distinction <strong>of</strong> three types <strong>of</strong> culture: sensate, idealistic, and ideational, and correlates<br />

the three types to three degrees <strong>of</strong> self-appropriation (UB 221 [273]). However, <strong>Lonergan</strong> distinguishes<br />

the social from the cultural (2C 102). The social refers to the ways people interact to express their<br />

customs, government, laws, business, technology, and religions. The cultural refers to ways people<br />

understand and find meanings in their social interaction. Beyond mere living and operating (social),<br />

people seek the menaing and value in their living and operating (cultural). Cultures have histories. “It is the<br />

function <strong>of</strong> culture is to discover, express, validate, criticize, correct, develop, and improve such meaning<br />

and value.” (M 32) There are dilemmas <strong>of</strong> modern culture in need <strong>of</strong> being addressed (2C 183-187; I<br />

261-267 [236-242]).<br />

See 2C 183-187, 102-103, 233; PGT 15, 50; UB 221 [273]; TE 67; M xi, 78.<br />

desire to know: The dynamic orientation <strong>of</strong> the human intelligence toward a totally unknown, toward<br />

being (I 372-373 [348-349]). This desire differs radically from other desires. It is called the pure desire<br />

because it is about “giving free rein to intelligent and rational consciousness.” (I 373-374 [349-350]. In<br />

the human person, knowledge by essence is the object <strong>of</strong> a natural desire. The objective <strong>of</strong> the natural<br />

desire is to know being, and the notion <strong>of</strong> being is unrestricted, that is, the object <strong>of</strong> the desire to know<br />

encompasses both proportional and transcendent being. Knowing proportionate beings concretely means<br />

knowing all there is to know about everything. Knowing transcendent being means knowing divine<br />

mystery. The natural desire is the basis for all questioning regarding both (1C 147 [157]). Because it is<br />

unrestricted, the desire to know must be oriented towards mystery. <strong>Lonergan</strong> says the objective <strong>of</strong> the<br />

“pure” desire to know is being which is all that is known and all that remains to be known<br />

The desire to know is an alertness <strong>of</strong> mind, an unrestricted intellectual curiosity, spirit <strong>of</strong> inquiry, or active<br />

intelligence. It powerfully engages (people) <strong>of</strong> action to find solutions or act shrewdly in situation. It is<br />

what absorbs scientists and philosophers in their investigations. The drive is pure questioning, prior to<br />

insights, concepts, words. It is prior to understanding and compatible with not understanding. It must be<br />

supplemented by inquiry and reflection to reach knowledge. The objective <strong>of</strong> the desire to know is what<br />

becomes known through understanding a situation in which we need to act, or the new knowledge that is


verified through scientific investigations. As we pursue knowledge, more becomes known, but further<br />

questions always remain. This "wanting" is pure question, an "eros <strong>of</strong> the mind" (I 33-34 [9], 97 [74]).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> qualifies this phrase with the terms "pure, detached, disinterested." He uses them more<br />

specifically to refer to scientific detachment, scientific disinterestedness, and scientific impartiality. (I, 97<br />

[74]<br />

(See being: transcendent and proportional , I 663[640]. We are indebted to Eileen de Neeve for much<br />

<strong>of</strong> the work on this term.)<br />

dialectic: The fourth functional specialty. Dialectic and Foundations correspond to the fourth level <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness. Dialectic is a concrete unfolding <strong>of</strong> linked but opposed principles <strong>of</strong> change (I 242 [217]),<br />

and deals with conflicts. It brings conflicts to light and provides a technique that objectifies subjective<br />

differences and promotes conversion (M 235). "The presence or absence <strong>of</strong> intellectual, <strong>of</strong> moral, <strong>of</strong><br />

religious conversion gives rise to dialectically opposed horizons." (M 247) The cause <strong>of</strong> irreconcilable<br />

difference is a difference <strong>of</strong> horizon, and the solution is nothing less than a conversion (M, 246).<br />

As an example <strong>of</strong> dialectic, <strong>Lonergan</strong> refers to a process in which persons are moving from a world<br />

centered on themselves and their concerns as the real, toward a more unrestricted viewpoint which takes<br />

the whole <strong>of</strong> reality as the world towards which we are all oriented (UB 182-183 [226-227]). When this<br />

whole is what we want to understand, judge, and take as our concern, we approach what <strong>Lonergan</strong> means<br />

by the universal viewpoint. The process is dialectical in that it is (1) concrete (i.e., happening in the<br />

desires and consciousness <strong>of</strong> a person); it is (2) contradictory in that the consciousness <strong>of</strong> the person is<br />

centered on him/herself rather than on understanding and reflecting on what is to be known in itself; it (3)<br />

involves change, i.e., some movement to resolve the tension <strong>of</strong> the contradiction.<br />

In the practice <strong>of</strong> dialectic as presented by <strong>Lonergan</strong> in Method, the strategy <strong>of</strong> a person is “not to prove<br />

his own position, not to refute counter-positions, but to exhibit diversity and to point to the evidence for its<br />

roots.” (M 254) “Every investigation is conducted from within some horizon.” Dialectic requires an<br />

encounter <strong>of</strong> persons to put self-understanding and horizon to the test. “(Encounter) is meeting persons,<br />

appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects and allowing one’s living to be challenged at<br />

its very roots by their words and by their deeds.” (M 247)<br />

Dialectic compares and evaluates "the conflicting views <strong>of</strong> historians, the diverse interpretations <strong>of</strong><br />

exegetes, the varying emphases <strong>of</strong> researchers." (PGT 22) When the divine solution to evil and the decline<br />

<strong>of</strong> culture is admitted, the horizon becomes broad enough to make a comprehensive viewpoint possible (I<br />

749-750 [727-728]). Dialectic deals with concrete positions and counter-positions. It is concerned with<br />

the contradictory and is interested in change (UB 184-185 [227-228]). The concrete process that dialectic<br />

describes is one in which intelligence and obtuseness, reasonableness and silliness, responsibility and sin,<br />

love and hatred commingle and conflict (3C 182). Fundamental dialectic takes place within the concrete<br />

human subject. It is presumed that what one states publicly is intended to be intelligent and rational. If<br />

there is contradiction between what one states and what is done, the dialectic between position and<br />

counter-position emerges (UB 186 [228]). The materials <strong>of</strong> dialectic are conflicts in the history <strong>of</strong> Christian


movements. Its aim is a comprehensive viewpoint, some single base or some single set <strong>of</strong> related bases<br />

from which any individual viewpoint may be critiqued. Some differences are complementary. They can<br />

be brought together within a larger whole and seen as successive stages in a single process <strong>of</strong> development<br />

(M 129). When comparison shows differences to be irreducible there is true dialectic, yet not all<br />

irreducible differences are serious. The seriousness must be determined in dialectical process (M 130).<br />

Dialectic affects community. for just as common meaning is constitutive <strong>of</strong> community, so dialectic divides<br />

community into opposing groups (M 358). <strong>Lonergan</strong> holds that dialectic has two levels structurally. On<br />

an upper level are operators, and on a lower level are the materials to be operated on. The operators are<br />

two precepts: develop positions; reverse counter-positions. The materials to be operated on must be<br />

assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, and selected (M 249). To the history that grasps<br />

what was going forward must be added a history that evaluates the worth <strong>of</strong> achievements (M 246).<br />

See PCT 22, UB 184-186 [227-228]; M 129-130, 235-266, 358; I 749-750 [727-728], 242-243<br />

[217-218]; 3C 182.<br />

doctrines: The sixth functional specialty. It is found in the third level <strong>of</strong> consciousness, corresponding to<br />

the third functional specialty, history. From within the framework chosen in foundations, doctrines is a<br />

selection from among the alternatives considered in dialectic (PGT 22, 67-68). What is selected is how<br />

to state clearly and distinctly what the religious community's beliefs are regarding "the mysteries so hidden<br />

in God" that the community could not know if God had not made them known. The assent made to these<br />

statements <strong>of</strong> belief is the assent <strong>of</strong> faith (M 349). The statements that doctrines express are judgments<br />

<strong>of</strong> fact and judgments <strong>of</strong> value. Doctrines is not only concerned with affirming and negating what pertains<br />

to dogmatic theology. It is concerned with facts and values that pertain to moral, ascetic, mystical, pastoral,<br />

liturgical, etc. theology (M 132).<br />

Doctrines can be regarded as mere verbal formulae unless the meaning reached is clearly worked out for<br />

different cultures and classes in systematics (M 142). Doctrines, valuable and true as they are, are but the<br />

skeleton <strong>of</strong> the original message, for the word is the word <strong>of</strong> a person. Doctrine objectifies and thus<br />

depersonalizes. However, the word <strong>of</strong> God came to us through the God-man (3C 227). When<br />

introduced successfully to a culture, doctrines will proceed to develop according to that culture (DP 3),<br />

thus grounding an authentic indigenization.<br />

Foundations (the fifth functional specialty) are established with the expanded horizon achieved through the<br />

dialectical encounters. Doctrines (the sixth functional specialty) are judgments <strong>of</strong> fact and judgments <strong>of</strong><br />

value about what is accepted as true from understanding the data found through procedures <strong>of</strong> research,<br />

interpretation, history, and dialectic (PGT 22). “By applying foundations to dialectics you get doctrines.”<br />

(PGT 68)<br />

“(Doctrines) have their precise definition from dialectic, their wealth <strong>of</strong> clarification and development from<br />

history, their grounds in the interpretation <strong>of</strong> the data...found through research.” (M 132) As he was writing<br />

about method in the field <strong>of</strong> theology, <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s functional specialties are referred to as reflections on<br />

religion. But the method with its eight functional specialties is also applicable to the human sciences, in<br />

particular the first four specialties.


In theology, “...doctrinal expression may be figurative or symbolic. It may be descriptive and based<br />

ultimately on the meanings <strong>of</strong> words rather than on an understanding <strong>of</strong> realities...It may, if pressed, become<br />

vague and indefinite.” (M 132) It will be the role <strong>of</strong> Systematics, the seventh functional specialty, to<br />

interpret the meaning <strong>of</strong> the doctrines for different cultures and classes. (Much <strong>of</strong> the work on this term<br />

has been done by Eileen de Neeve.)<br />

See PGT 22, 67-68; M 132, 349; 3C 227; DP 3.<br />

finality: The term refers, not to extrinsic causality such as final causality, but to the immanent constituents<br />

<strong>of</strong> proportionate being, an upward but indeterminately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization<br />

<strong>of</strong> being. The determinacy <strong>of</strong> any genus and species is limitation, and limitation is to finality a barrier to be<br />

transcended (I 477[452]). Extrinsically a final cause is truly final only when the specific or formal<br />

constituent <strong>of</strong> the cause is the good. This extrinsic final causality is there, but the finality <strong>Lonergan</strong> is<br />

referring to is the dynamic aspect <strong>of</strong> the real (I 472 [446]).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> distinguishes three types <strong>of</strong> finality: absolute, horizontal, and vertical. There are two classes <strong>of</strong><br />

the common instances <strong>of</strong> finality: the response <strong>of</strong> appetites to motives and the orientation <strong>of</strong> processes to<br />

terms. When these two instances specify limiting essence to limited mode <strong>of</strong> appetition and <strong>of</strong> process, we<br />

have what <strong>Lonergan</strong> calls horizontal finality. Absolute finality refers to the orientation <strong>of</strong> all things to God's<br />

intrinsic goodness. A third type <strong>of</strong> finality, the innate directed dynamism <strong>of</strong> being developing from any<br />

lower level <strong>of</strong> appetition and process to any higher level, <strong>Lonergan</strong> names vertical finality. Horizontal<br />

finality is abstract and deals with generalities, but the power <strong>of</strong> vertical finality lies in its concretness. It is<br />

in light <strong>of</strong> vertical finality that the levels <strong>of</strong> consciousness clarified by <strong>Lonergan</strong> can be understood (1C 19-<br />

23 [18-22]).<br />

Vertical finality manifests itself in four ways: instrumentally, dispositivly, materially, and obedientially. In<br />

instrumental, a concrete plurality <strong>of</strong> lower activities might be instrumental toward a higher end: the mixing<br />

<strong>of</strong> ingredients toward a finished cake. In dispositive, a concrete pluralism <strong>of</strong> activities might dispose toward<br />

a higher end: the work <strong>of</strong> the research scientist arriving finally at a discovery such as interferon. Materially,<br />

a concrete plurality <strong>of</strong> lower entities may be the material cause from which a higher form comes: the single<br />

cells <strong>of</strong> ovum and sperm uniting to form human life. Obedientially, a concrete plurality <strong>of</strong> rational creatures<br />

such as human beings have the obediential potency to receive the very self-communication <strong>of</strong> God which<br />

we call grace. <strong>Lonergan</strong> believes that the nature <strong>of</strong> vertical finality has been studied very little.<br />

See I 470-484 [444-458]; 1C 19-23 [18-22].<br />

foundations: The fifth functional specialty, operating on the fourth (evaluative) level <strong>of</strong> consciousness as<br />

does dialectic. Foundations is concerned with objectifying the human event known as conversion.<br />

Conversion reveals the personal horizon <strong>of</strong> the theologian (historian, etc.) through a decision about the<br />

world-view, the outlook one chooses to maintain. Foundations is the identification and selection <strong>of</strong> the<br />

framework in which doctrines, systematics, and communications will have meaning and effectiveness (M<br />

267-268). It is specifically the foundation for these three remaining specialties, not for all <strong>of</strong> the theological


task. Research, interpretation, history, and dialectic is done by the converted and the unconverted. When<br />

performed by one converted, however, these same functions have a different kind <strong>of</strong> "self" doing them.<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> holds that this difference must be thematized because it is real. One’s foundations operate, not<br />

only in theology but in every discipline. In other disciplines, however, the “kind <strong>of</strong> self doing them” is not<br />

in the job description. To objectify conversion one has need <strong>of</strong> intentionality analysis, the ability to attend<br />

to one's own conscious operations, to objectify them. This ability enables one to deal with the data <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness in addition to the data <strong>of</strong> sense. Foundations thematizes the selection made by the conscious<br />

subject <strong>of</strong> a position sifted from the possibilities presented in dialectic (M 268).<br />

As a fourth level function, foundations is where consciousness becomes conscience (M 268). The<br />

conversion foundations is concerned with can be <strong>of</strong> several types. Three forms were initially discussed by<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>. (See conversion above.) Conversion can be intellectual, which means one knows how<br />

consciousness works, not from theory, but from self-appropriation. Conversion can be moral, in which<br />

choice opts for long-term good over short-term satisfaction, effectivly dissolving individual, group, and<br />

general bias. It can be distinctly religious, an alteration <strong>of</strong> the human horizon itself, as a result <strong>of</strong> encounter<br />

with the Holy. Conversion <strong>of</strong> any kind is moving from one set <strong>of</strong> roots to another (M 271, 2C 65-66).<br />

There is a new human subject, a new self as a result <strong>of</strong> conversion. The converted and unconverted have<br />

radically different horizons with which to entertain possibilities (M 271).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> distinguishes a simple manner <strong>of</strong> doing foundations in a static deductionist style, proceeding from<br />

a set <strong>of</strong> premises, from his own preference, where meaning follows a more complex "methodical" style<br />

moving from discovery to discovery. He regards foundations as what is first in any ordered set (M 269-<br />

270, 2C 63-64). "First" for theological foundations is religious conversion, a personal but not necessarily<br />

private encounter with Transcendent Reality (3C 218).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> also distinguishes foundations from fundamental theology. The latter is really a set <strong>of</strong> doctrines<br />

about the church, about inspiration, etc. Foundations is the objectification <strong>of</strong> the theologian's conversion,<br />

forming the horizon or world-view within which doctrines are apprehended (M 131-132, 267; PGT 22).<br />

For <strong>Lonergan</strong> intentionality analysis is the basis that provides foundations not only for theology but for<br />

personal ethical decisions, for hermeneutics, critical history and any discipline the person explores (2C 39,<br />

203).<br />

See M 131-132, 267-271; 2C 39, 63-66, 203; 3C 218; PGT 22.<br />

generalized empirical method: See method.<br />

history: The third <strong>of</strong> the functional specialties. History and doctrines are functions <strong>of</strong> the third level <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness, that <strong>of</strong> judgment. This position is the clue to <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s distinct meaning <strong>of</strong> history. History<br />

for <strong>Lonergan</strong> is not the gathering <strong>of</strong> historical data. Gathering <strong>of</strong> historical data is a research function in the


area <strong>of</strong> history. Nor is history understanding the meaning <strong>of</strong> the data gathered. Historical understanding<br />

is an interpretive function. History as a functional specialty is a judgment <strong>of</strong> precisely what is going forward<br />

in the data <strong>of</strong> the past uncovered and understood (PGT 22). History for <strong>Lonergan</strong> is the fact <strong>of</strong> this<br />

dynamic movement forward affirmed in terms <strong>of</strong> historical evidence (M 185-186).<br />

There is a double process involved in history understood in a <strong>Lonergan</strong> perspective. First, one comes to<br />

understand what is going forward in the sources uncovered. Second, one comes to understand how what<br />

is going forward in the sources has something to do with what is going forward in the present human<br />

community (M 189). It is in the judgment <strong>of</strong> what is indeed historical fact, not merely in the understanding<br />

<strong>of</strong> its meaning, that distinguishes fact from fiction and history from legend. The act <strong>of</strong> judgment is the key<br />

(1C 206-207 [222-223]).<br />

But <strong>Lonergan</strong> will also distinguish the precise type <strong>of</strong> intelligibility to be found in historical data. Insight can<br />

grasp possibility or it can grasp necessity in data. The intelligibility grasped by the historian will have<br />

elements <strong>of</strong> necessity and probability in it. But historical intelligibility but will also be threatened by its<br />

opposite, it will not be free <strong>of</strong> surd, <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s term for the accumulation <strong>of</strong> the results <strong>of</strong> unreasonable<br />

decisions (PE 351-352).<br />

See M 185-186, 189; PE 351-352; PGT 22; 1C 206-207 [222-223].<br />

intentionality analysis: See method.<br />

interiority: The term as used by <strong>Lonergan</strong> is philosophical as well as religious. It refers to that realm <strong>of</strong><br />

the human subject concerned with the data <strong>of</strong> consciousness and its operations, the "realm <strong>of</strong> interiority."<br />

Intentionality analysis goes on in the realm <strong>of</strong> interiority. There are the outer realms <strong>of</strong> common sense and<br />

theory, and the inner realm <strong>of</strong> one's subjectivity, or interiority, attending not merely to objects but to the<br />

intending subject and his or her acts (M 83). Finally there is the realm <strong>of</strong> transcendence where God is<br />

known and loved (M 84).<br />

When the critical exigence (the need to know) turns its attention on interiority, the differentiated<br />

consciousness emerges, and self-appropriation results. The unity <strong>of</strong> the consciousness is not in its<br />

undifferentiation. It is in the self-knowledge that understands the different realms and knows how to shift<br />

from one to the other (M 84). It is by finding one's way into interiority that a basis is achieved through selfappropriation<br />

for both common sense and theory (M 85). The entry into another's differentiation <strong>of</strong><br />

consciouness is to effect that same differentiation in oneself (M 327-328).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> maintains that philosphy today is being driven into the realm <strong>of</strong> interiority (DP 55).<br />

See M 83-85, 114-115, 257, 265-66, 272-273, 316, 327-328; DP 55.<br />

interpretation: The second <strong>of</strong> the functional specialties.(Research, Interpretation, History, Dialectic,<br />

Foundations, Doctrines, Systematics, and Communication). Interpretation corresponds to the seventh


specialty, systematics, as both are functions <strong>of</strong> the second level <strong>of</strong> consciousness, that <strong>of</strong> understanding.<br />

Interpretation understands what is meant. As a functional specialty <strong>of</strong> theology it understands the meaning<br />

<strong>of</strong> the data made available by research in the area <strong>of</strong> the Christian scriptures and the writings and<br />

documents <strong>of</strong> the tradition. The meaning it seeks to uncover is understood according to its historical<br />

context, its proper mode and level <strong>of</strong> expression, and the circumstances and intent <strong>of</strong> the author. Its written<br />

form is the commentary or the monograph (M 127). Both in theology and in other fields interpretation has<br />

to do with hermeneutics.<br />

A systematic treatment <strong>of</strong> the problems involved in interpretation is given in Insight. There <strong>Lonergan</strong> calls<br />

for a distinction between the expression itself, a simple interpretation, and a reflective interpretation (585-<br />

587 [562-564]). He introduces the notion <strong>of</strong> universal viewpoint which is like a pegboard allowing for<br />

every possible interpretation to be "posted." This notion opens up the horizon <strong>of</strong> the thinker so that nothing<br />

is excluded, but must be assessed as to the truth it contributes to the complete meaning. This notion will be<br />

the basis for <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s notion <strong>of</strong> dialectic (587-591 [564-568]).<br />

Central to <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s view <strong>of</strong> interpretation is the interpreter. The interpreting task depends on the one's<br />

ability to move from personal experience into an imaginative reconstruction <strong>of</strong> the situation <strong>of</strong> the past (UB<br />

223 [275]). <strong>Lonergan</strong> considers his work in Method, chapters seven through eleven, as a more concrete<br />

expression <strong>of</strong> what he had done in the third part <strong>of</strong> chapter XVII in Insight. He also considered these<br />

chapters to be a "set <strong>of</strong> directions" toward attaining the universal viewpoint he regarded as necessary if true<br />

interpretation is to be reached (2C 275-276).<br />

A case in point is <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s reference to history as the assembly <strong>of</strong> a manifold <strong>of</strong> particular events into a<br />

single interpretive unity (M 199), and historical reality as an inexhaustible incentive to fresh historical<br />

interpretations (M 214). Historical data arrived at by the critical process must then go through an<br />

interpretive process. Here the historian pieces together the fragments. Only when this interpretive process<br />

<strong>of</strong> reconstruction is completed can one refer to historical "facts" (M 203).<br />

The interrelationship <strong>of</strong> chapters seven through eleven <strong>of</strong> Method (interpretation through foundations) can<br />

be understood further when <strong>Lonergan</strong> explains that the interpreter may understand the text, the author, and<br />

him or herself, but should conversion take place, there is a different self to do the understanding. This new<br />

horizon in turn can modify one's understanding <strong>of</strong> the text, the author, and oneself (M 246).<br />

See I 585-616 [562-594], 761-762 [739-740]; UB 217-218 [267-269], 222-224 [273-276]; PGT 24-<br />

25; 1C 131-132 [140-141], 243-244 [265-266]; 2C 251-252, 275-276; M 127, 153-173, 199, 203,<br />

214; WN 12.<br />

law <strong>of</strong> the cross: The notion <strong>of</strong> the cross as it pertains to the new covenant (DVI art. 23). The heart <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>'s understanding <strong>of</strong> the law <strong>of</strong> the cross is the transformation <strong>of</strong> evil into good. The law <strong>of</strong> the<br />

cross pertains to the new covenant by way <strong>of</strong> precept, example, conformation and association, and by way<br />

<strong>of</strong> the economy <strong>of</strong> salvation.


By precept <strong>Lonergan</strong> means the direct commands found in the New Testament itself: "Do not resist evil...,<br />

Love your enemies and do good to those who hate you..." Mt. 5: 38-48. By example is meant those New<br />

Testament passages that model a whole new way <strong>of</strong> being: "...anyone who wants to be first among you<br />

must be the servant <strong>of</strong> all..." Mk. 10:42-45. Conformation and association refers to a direct imitation <strong>of</strong><br />

the behavior <strong>of</strong> Christ: As Jesus lays down his life in love so as to take it up again (Jn. 10:17-18), so we<br />

suffer with him to be glorified with him (Rom. 8:17). Finally, the law <strong>of</strong> the cross gives the new covenant<br />

the basic law governing its economy <strong>of</strong> salvation: The power and wisdom <strong>of</strong> God are to be discerned in<br />

Christ crucified, not in some new order in which no injustices are perpetrated on the good (DVI art. 23).<br />

See DVI chap. 4 and 5, especially art. 23; 2C 8-9, 113.<br />

levels <strong>of</strong> consciousness and intentionality: The term "level" is <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s metaphor for the manifold <strong>of</strong><br />

human consciousness in its various identifiable sets <strong>of</strong> operations. That there are various operations is a<br />

fact. That they are grouped in related and identifiable sets is <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s distinctive insight into human<br />

cognition and the basis for his “method.” The verification <strong>of</strong> these related operations in their recurrent<br />

pattern through "applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious" brings an awareness<br />

<strong>of</strong> the intending itself in contrast to what is intended (M 14-15).<br />

Anyone can discover the pattern then by what <strong>Lonergan</strong> calls self-appropriation or the attending to one's<br />

intending. The levels are empirical, intelligent, rational, and responsible. The empirical level is that set <strong>of</strong><br />

human operations that are identified as sensing, percieving, imagining, feeling, speaking, and moving. The<br />

human subject is simply experiencing. The intelligent level is identified by inquiry, understanding,<br />

expressing, and the working out <strong>of</strong> the presuppositions and implications <strong>of</strong> our expressions. In short it has<br />

to do with understanding. The rational level is identified by the operations <strong>of</strong> reflecting, marshalling<br />

evidence, passing judgment, and concluding. It is concerned with judging. The responsible level is<br />

identified by such operations as evaluating, deciding, choosing, acting out. Its main concern is deciding<br />

(M 9).<br />

What <strong>Lonergan</strong> refers to as the level <strong>of</strong> transcendence is really the root and ground <strong>of</strong> all the operations,<br />

and part <strong>of</strong> the fourth level. The fourth level <strong>of</strong> deciding is characterized by judgments <strong>of</strong> value in contrast<br />

to judgments <strong>of</strong> truth or meaning that identify the third level <strong>of</strong> judgment. Transcendent Mystery has to<br />

do with ultimate value. The higher levels "sublate" or include and transform the lower levels, but the<br />

reversal is not true (M 120).<br />

The priority <strong>of</strong> intellect is simply the priority <strong>of</strong> the first three levels (M 340). The human subject (in its<br />

conscious, attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible operations) is referred to by <strong>Lonergan</strong> as the<br />

"rock." In this reference <strong>Lonergan</strong> alludes to "the more important part <strong>of</strong> the rock" to be uncovered in the<br />

fourth chapter <strong>of</strong> Method. It is the chapter on religion (M 19-20).<br />

See M 9, 14-15, 19-20, 106-107, 120-121, 340.


mediation: As used by <strong>Lonergan</strong> the term refers to the transposition from one set <strong>of</strong> operations <strong>of</strong> the<br />

consciousness to another as the subject engages the real world. The world <strong>of</strong> the infant is referred to as<br />

"immediate." The child responds only to objects present, what is seen, felt, and heard in the world <strong>of</strong><br />

immediate experience (M 28, 76).<br />

With language consciousness develops and that world expands. There is the "mediation <strong>of</strong> immediacy by<br />

meaning when one objectifies cognitional process in trascendental method and discovers, identifies, accepts<br />

one's submerged feelings..." (M 77). Meaning, mediated through the operations <strong>of</strong> the conscious subject,<br />

actually changes one's world to a world mediated by meaning and motivated by value.<br />

Meaning differentiates the consciousness. The consciousness can be theoretically or scientifically<br />

differentiated; it can be differentiated aesthetically or mystically. The world mediated by meaning is the<br />

world <strong>of</strong> the memories <strong>of</strong> others, the common sense <strong>of</strong> various communities, literature, the works <strong>of</strong><br />

scholars and scientists, the experience <strong>of</strong> holy people <strong>of</strong> every culture, and the reflections <strong>of</strong> philosophers<br />

and theologians (M 28).<br />

Reflexive techniques are developed. The mediator is the human subject as operator who relentlessly<br />

transforms the self through the raising <strong>of</strong> further questions (2C 20). Meaning as intentionality mediates<br />

the mediator as the desire to know creates or unfolds the self as it is drawn toward what is meant; thus a<br />

nuanced meaning <strong>of</strong> "self" mediation or mutual self-mediation. The authentic self emerges as the human<br />

consciousness interacts with reality. It is not an enclosed, self-contained entity, but an entity-in-relation.<br />

See 2C 20; M 28, 76, 77.<br />

method: The term for <strong>Lonergan</strong> does not mean a technique. It refers to the innate dynamic operation <strong>of</strong><br />

the human consciousness, its "method." (See levels <strong>of</strong> consciousness and transcendental precepts).<br />

The consciousness <strong>of</strong> the human subject is innately intentional. Intentionality analysis is charting the pattern<br />

<strong>of</strong> the operating consciousness <strong>of</strong> the human subject (PGT 18) or objectifying the contents or data <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness (M 8).<br />

The pattern <strong>of</strong> human consciousness is recurrent, and its operations, once identified, can be understood in<br />

relation to one another. Following its recurrent pattern <strong>of</strong> authentic, not distorted operations, the method<br />

<strong>of</strong> human consciousness yields results that are both cumulative and progressive, not merely repetitious (M<br />

4). <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s basic method is distinct from the transcendental method referred to by such transcendental<br />

thomists as Otto Muck (The Transcendental Method, New York: Herder and Herder, 1968). The<br />

transcendental method <strong>Lonergan</strong> has in mind is not merely theoretical. It is utterly concrete and empirical,<br />

an attentive charting <strong>of</strong> the data <strong>of</strong> consciousness itself (M 13-14, footnote). <strong>Lonergan</strong> has actually<br />

tranformed the transcendental method <strong>of</strong> Marechal in correction <strong>of</strong> and in complementing Kant's call for<br />

a critical appropriation <strong>of</strong> human cognitional structure as basic to a methodical science and philosophy for<br />

our day (1C xiii).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>'s transcendental method is concerned with objectifying the human subject's actual cognitional


process, and (what is frequently missed due to the cognitional emphasis) the discovery, identification, and<br />

acceptance <strong>of</strong> one's submerged feelings in psychotherapy or emotional healing (M 77).<br />

The work <strong>of</strong> this thematizing must be done by the individual him or herself. The grasp <strong>of</strong> what is really<br />

going on in transcendental method <strong>Lonergan</strong> calls "self-appropriation" (M 83). Self-appropriation is<br />

attending to one's own operations, and discovering through observation the recurrent pattern <strong>Lonergan</strong><br />

himself discovered by attending to his own conscious operations. The method is called "transcendental"<br />

because it progresses through recognizable sets <strong>of</strong> operations that mount in complexity, "sublating" lower<br />

operations into higher ones and transforming them in the process. "Higher" in this context refers to fulness,<br />

a mounting from a fixation with the world <strong>of</strong> immediacy to the world filled with meaning and permeated with<br />

value. Each level sets the conditions for the subject’s continuing conscious activities. The process has to<br />

do with the struggle toward the authentic human functioning identified with knowledge and choice.<br />

Intentionality analysis provides an understanding <strong>of</strong> the operations that have to do with knowing and<br />

deciding. The phrase "generalized empirical method" refers to the fact that <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s method involves an<br />

attentiveness to the data that consciousness provides. This data can be the object <strong>of</strong> study as is the data<br />

<strong>of</strong> sense in the sciences. We can attend to our experiencing, our inquiry, understanding, formulating,<br />

reflecting, checking, and on our passing <strong>of</strong> judgment (3C 140-143).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong>'s transcendental method is transcultural, not in its formulation, for that will carry the unique<br />

particularity <strong>of</strong> a culture, its time and place. Transcendental method has universal relevance because it is<br />

foundational to every field <strong>of</strong> human investigation - the realities referred to in distinct formulations (M 282).<br />

Three important realities are clarified in <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s method: the subject is clarified from the objects known,<br />

and the objects are clarified from the operations by which they are known (3C 79). <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s<br />

transcendental generalized empirical method is the basic invariant dynamic pattern or structure <strong>of</strong> conscious<br />

and intentional operations in subjects themselves. <strong>Lonergan</strong>’s proposal for an empirical theology is a way<br />

<strong>of</strong> doing theology that begins, not with premises, but with the dynamic human subject and her or his<br />

intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and loving operations. He proposes that it is these very operations that<br />

are illumined by faith. If problems <strong>of</strong> critical method are not attended to first, (if the theologian as subject<br />

continues to be overlooked) theological method will continue to flounder (1C 130-132 [139-141]).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> clearly distinguishes between empirical method and generalized empirical method. The former<br />

has to do with the data <strong>of</strong> sense, the latter, using basic principles from the former, has to do with the data<br />

<strong>of</strong> consciousness itself (I 95-96 [72-73]).<br />

See I 95-96 [72-73; PGT 18; M 4, 13-20, 77, 83, 101, 282, 289; 1C xiii-xiv (1967 ed.), 130-132;<br />

3C 79, 140-143.<br />

mutual self-mediation: See mediation.<br />

realism: The truth that is acknowledged in the mind corresponds to reality (WN 128). The term refers


to the progression <strong>of</strong> the mind to objective truth, and through truth, to knowlege <strong>of</strong> reality (V 73 [61]).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> generally refers to three types <strong>of</strong> realists: naive, dogmatic, and critical. The naive realist simply<br />

affirms that we know, and <strong>of</strong>fers no further explanation (V 72 [60]). The dogmatic realist asserts that the<br />

intellect confronts reality directly through perception, but <strong>of</strong>fers no philosophic reflection to substantiate how<br />

this takes place (V 192-193 [184], 1C 196 [210-211], WN 129). The critical realist explains what<br />

knowing is and how it takes place. He or she realizes that the world in which we live is not only constituted<br />

by those facts our senses reveal, but also by the facts our understanding intends or means, i.e., personal,<br />

interpersonal, and social facts.<br />

Realism for <strong>Lonergan</strong> is immediate, not because it is naive and unreasoned or blindly affirmed, but because<br />

one knows the real before one knows the difference between object and subject (V 88). To move beyond<br />

idealism to realism it is necessary to discover human intellectual and rational operations. But it is essential<br />

to understand that these operations involve a transcendence <strong>of</strong> the operating subject.<br />

The real is what we come to know through a grasp <strong>of</strong> what <strong>Lonergan</strong> calls the virtually unconditioned,<br />

that is, an area <strong>of</strong> inquiry about which no questions remain (M 76). A prospective judgment is virtually<br />

unconditioned when the evidence for its affirmation is sufficient. It is virtually unconditioned because it has<br />

conditions that have been fulfilled. A formally unconditioned has no conditions at all (I 305-306 [280-<br />

281]). For the critical realist a verified hypothesis is probably true, and being probably true, refers to what<br />

in reality probably is so. Historical facts are events in the world mediated by acts <strong>of</strong> meaning (M 239,<br />

263).<br />

See V 72-73 [60-61], 99 [88], 192-193 [184]; 1C 196 [210-211]; I 305-306 [280-281]; M 76, 239,<br />

263; WN 128.<br />

religion: As <strong>Lonergan</strong> is wont to do, a functional definition is given to us. Religion is the capacity <strong>of</strong> the<br />

human consciousness to apprehend ultimate meaning and ultimate value symbolically (3C 161). In<br />

contrast, theology questions this apprehension. It mediates between religion and the role <strong>of</strong> that religion<br />

in its cultural matrix (M xi). Religious studies, a third term, is the historical study <strong>of</strong> religions. Theology<br />

is to religion what economics is to business and biology is to health (2C 97).<br />

The function <strong>of</strong> religion is to provide a world view within which one might live intelligently, reasonably, and<br />

responsibly. Theology endeavors to discern whether there is any real fire behind the smoke <strong>of</strong> symbols<br />

employed in this or that religion. (3C 161). The responsibility prompted by religion includes not only<br />

morality but the total commitment that authentic religion prompts (2C 154-155, 211).<br />

<strong>Lonergan</strong> speaks <strong>of</strong> a religion's inner word: the gift <strong>of</strong> God's love to that people. He also refers to the<br />

religious tradition itself as an outer word (M 119).<br />

See 3C 161-163; 2C 97, 149-163, 211; M 101-124.<br />

research: The first <strong>of</strong> the functional specialties. As a functional specialty <strong>of</strong> theology it refers to the


gathering <strong>of</strong> data pertinent to a specific area <strong>of</strong> theology. <strong>Lonergan</strong> refers to two types <strong>of</strong> data: that <strong>of</strong><br />

sense, and that <strong>of</strong> consciousness itself. It is central to <strong>Lonergan</strong>'s thought that the data <strong>of</strong> consciousness,<br />

or how the human mind works, be part <strong>of</strong> the theologian's "data" as he or she goes about theological<br />

research in the data available to the senses through reading and personal experience.<br />

Research can be special or general. Special research is the gathering <strong>of</strong> data pertaining to a specific<br />

problem or question. General research locates, excavates, maps, reproduces, decodes, catalogues, and<br />

prepares critical editions. It produces indices, tables, bibliographies, abstracts, bulletins, handbooks,<br />

dictionaries, and encyclopedias (M 127). In short, research makes available what information exists on<br />

any subject.<br />

See M 127, 140, 149-151, 198-203, 246-247; 1C 128-129 [137-138], 238-240 [259-261].<br />

Self-affirming precepts: See transcendent precepts.<br />

self-appropriation: See method, interiority. and levels <strong>of</strong><br />

consciousness and interiority.<br />

self-mediation: See mediation.<br />

systematics: The seventh functional specialty, operating on the second level <strong>of</strong> consciousness as does<br />

interpretation. Systematics is concerned with the meaning <strong>of</strong> doctrinal statements. The facts and values<br />

expressed in doctrines may be clear on the meaning <strong>of</strong> the words chosen but ambiguous on how the reality<br />

is to be understood. Systematics aims at an understanding <strong>of</strong> the religious realities affirmed by doctrines<br />

(M 349-350). Doctrinal statements may simply generate further questions. Systematics is concerned with<br />

these questions, with clarifying ambiguity, providing explanation, working to remove inconsistancies, with<br />

bringing about inner coherance through an understanding <strong>of</strong> what is meant by the words (M 132).<br />

Systematics gets to the kernel <strong>of</strong> the message to be communicated, and reciprocally, communications <strong>of</strong>ten<br />

poses new questions for systematics (M 142). It is not the intent <strong>of</strong> systematics to increase certitude but<br />

to promote an understanding <strong>of</strong> what one is already certain about. It does not seek to establish the facts,<br />

but strives to uncover why the facts are what they are. Systematics takes the facts asserted in doctrines<br />

and works them into a coherent whole (M 336). Systematics is an imperfect effort on the part <strong>of</strong> human<br />

understanding to gain some insight into revealed truths (PGT ix).<br />

See M 132, 142, 336-340, 345, 349-350; PGT ix, 22, 35.<br />

transcendental method: See method.<br />

transcendental precepts: The term <strong>Lonergan</strong> uses to describe the five distinct imperatives that impel the<br />

human subject toward transcendence by an ever-deepening authenticity or genuine humanness. 1. Be<br />

attentive to your experience. 2. Be intelligent in your inquiry into the meaning <strong>of</strong> that experience. 3. Be


easonable in your judgments <strong>of</strong> the accuracy <strong>of</strong> your understanding <strong>of</strong> your experience. 4. Be<br />

responsible in your decisions and subsequent actions based on the conclusions <strong>of</strong> the accuracy <strong>of</strong> your<br />

understanding <strong>of</strong> your experience, and based also on the value/givenness <strong>of</strong> that reality: what can be and<br />

what is truly worthwhile. 5. Be in love with the Mystery that grounds all your human operation, and with<br />

the human and the world with which that human is primordially interrelated.<br />

The precepts transcend or are themselves transcendental. They cut across all categories because they<br />

objectify inner dynamisms and are rooted in what transcends - the inner potentially cross-cultural intending<br />

<strong>of</strong> the human spirit.<br />

See 2C 170; M 132-132; PGT 48.<br />

virtually unconditioned: See realism.

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