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Cummins Inc. Equity Valuation and Analysis

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<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Valuation</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

Valued at April 1, 2007<br />

John Michell: John.Michell@ttu.edu<br />

Clay Snyder: Clay.Snyder@ttu.edu<br />

Brian Cannon: brian@briansparkscannon.com<br />

Ali Z<strong>and</strong>i: Ali.Zh<strong>and</strong>i@ttu.edu<br />

Alan Jones: ajonesttu@gmail.com


Table of Contents:__________________<br />

Executive Summary………………………………………..3<br />

Company Overview………………………………………..8<br />

Business & Industry <strong>Analysis</strong>……………………………10<br />

Accounting <strong>Analysis</strong>…………………..…………………..20<br />

Ratio <strong>Analysis</strong>………………………...……………………41<br />

Forecast Financials………………..……………………….68<br />

<strong>Valuation</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong>…………………………………………81<br />

Recomm<strong>and</strong>ation………………………………………….93<br />

Appendix …………………………………………………..94<br />

References………………………..……………………….100<br />

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Investment Recommendation: Overvalued, Sell<br />

CMI – NYSE<br />

Revenue (2006) 11,362,000<br />

Market Cap 9.60B<br />

Shares Outst<strong>and</strong>ing 104.20M<br />

Dividend Yield 2.10%<br />

3-month Avg Daily Trading Volume<br />

2,338,760<br />

Percent Institutional Ownership 53%<br />

Book Value Per Share 26.89<br />

ROE 30.65%<br />

ROA 9.79%<br />

Cost of Capital<br />

RSquared Beta Ke<br />

Ke Estimation 11.89%<br />

10-year .3247 1.48 11.89%<br />

Published<br />

Kd 7.13%<br />

WACC 9.37%<br />

EPS Forecast-<br />

____________________<br />

FYE 06 07 08 09<br />

15.02 10.47 12.76 15.34<br />

Ratio Comparison CMI CAT<br />

Trailing P/E 7.0 13.37<br />

Forward P/E 10.23 12.89<br />

P/B 2.3 6.31<br />

P/Sales .62 1.03<br />

P/EBITDA .053 .0124<br />

Multiples <strong>Valuation</strong>s_ CMI<br />

Trailing P/E $200.81<br />

Forward P/E $183.04<br />

P/B $397.59<br />

P/Sales $241.28<br />

P/EBITDA $17.07<br />

Intrinsic <strong>Valuation</strong>s<br />

Discounted Dividends $24.75<br />

Free Cash Flows $85.95<br />

Residual <strong>Inc</strong>ome $123.33<br />

Abnormal Earnings Growth $113.34<br />

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Executive Summary<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is a national <strong>and</strong> global leader in the design, manufacturing, sales<br />

<strong>and</strong> services of diesel engines in more than 160 countries. Founded in 1919,<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has since evolved into four business segments: Engine, Power<br />

generation, Components <strong>and</strong> Distribution. The majority of sales are produced<br />

from the engine segment, whose largest customer is DaimlerChrysler. The main<br />

competitors of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. are Detroit Diesel Corporation (privately owned),<br />

Mack Trucks, <strong>Inc</strong>. (privately owned), <strong>and</strong> Caterpillar <strong>Inc</strong>. The threat of new<br />

entrants into this industry is low due to the large capital investments involved in<br />

the production process. The industry competes on a mix of br<strong>and</strong> image <strong>and</strong><br />

quality, as well as low cost of production.<br />

The products of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. are under high threat of substitution. Essentially<br />

customers are willing to switch producers of engines if the cost of the engine is<br />

lower <strong>and</strong>/or is of higher quality <strong>and</strong> reliability. This is why <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. must<br />

provide quality merch<strong>and</strong>ise at the lowest possible cost to keep or increase<br />

market share. The diversified machinery industry is heavily concentrated allowing<br />

some price control in the h<strong>and</strong>s of the firms, but with little product<br />

differentiation, firms must differ in cost <strong>and</strong> quality. Threat of substitution can<br />

also come from non-diesel engines <strong>and</strong> alternative power sources. The industry<br />

is heavily regulated for safety st<strong>and</strong>ards as well as environmental policies, which<br />

can potentially hinder higher profits in certain situations.<br />

The industry that <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. competes in has little bargaining power over the<br />

consumer. Their products are basically undifferentiated <strong>and</strong> have little switching<br />

costs for the consumer. To combat this, the firm must attain a reputation as<br />

being both reliable <strong>and</strong> reasonably priced in order to steal costumers from their<br />

competitors as well as retain their current customers. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has power<br />

over their suppliers because most of their suppliers are in the natural resource<br />

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industry. With few buyers <strong>and</strong> many suppliers, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. can negotiate lower<br />

prices with little resistance. Firms in the diversified machinery industry must<br />

maintain a mixed strategy for a competitive advantage. It is important that the<br />

firm research in productivity <strong>and</strong> cost cutting as well as innovation of new<br />

technologies to improve the quality of their products. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. must also<br />

explore <strong>and</strong> infiltrate new high growth economies to attain more growth, since<br />

more mature markets are harder to gain market share in.<br />

When evaluating <strong>Cummins</strong>’ key accounting policies, it is important to underst<strong>and</strong><br />

their success factors. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has several major accounting factors. One<br />

factor is the high amount of assets that are needed to operate in this industry.<br />

Management’s ability to accurately estimate depreciation expenses, provisions for<br />

warranties <strong>and</strong> asset impairment have great influence over the financial picture<br />

the firm appears to be in. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is also involved in investing in<br />

derivatives to hedge against rising input costs, <strong>and</strong> heavily invests in research<br />

<strong>and</strong> development to improve efficiency <strong>and</strong> quality. Pension liabilities also take<br />

careful consideration by management when estimating the obligations for future<br />

periods.<br />

Overall <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. accounting policies appear to be more conservative in<br />

nature, <strong>and</strong> the firm prepares its financial statements in accordance with GAAP<br />

(generally accepted accounting policies). Management does disclose in-depth<br />

every aspect of the firms operations, making the firm more transparent for<br />

shareholders. By evaluating <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.’ sales <strong>and</strong> expense ratios, we were<br />

able to search for any ‘red flags’ found in the annual report. Through our<br />

evaluation, we found no major ‘red flags’ that needed to be addressed.<br />

Management has done considerably well in not over or understating any items<br />

that give rise to suspicion of misstating financial information.<br />

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By examining ratios that examine <strong>Cummins</strong>’ liquidity, operating efficiency,<br />

profitability <strong>and</strong> capital structure we were able to underst<strong>and</strong> how the firm<br />

compared to its competitors in the industry. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. liquidity <strong>and</strong><br />

productivity ratios imply improvement their ability to cover short-term debt, while<br />

becoming more productive in generating sales over the five year period. The<br />

profitability ratios illustrate a turn-around in strategy that took the firm from low<br />

earnings <strong>and</strong> returns to rapid growth in profitability <strong>and</strong> shareholders’ equity.<br />

These ratios tell us that management is focused <strong>and</strong> working hard to keep<br />

improving the profitability of the company. When we analyzed the capital<br />

structure ratios, we found that management had focused intensively on reducing<br />

debt <strong>and</strong> focusing on financing growth with cash generated from operations. This<br />

was very attractive to us because the company has taken on little more debt,<br />

which could lead to higher profits <strong>and</strong> financial stability in an economic<br />

downturn.<br />

We also extended our analysis to four additional ratios that focus more on<br />

specific asset turnovers <strong>and</strong> earnings associated with non-cash items. These<br />

ratios also were favorable for <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>and</strong> further instilled the impression<br />

on us that management is achieving attractive productivity <strong>and</strong> implementing<br />

good financial policy.<br />

We forecasted <strong>Cummins</strong>’ financial statements ten years into the future using the<br />

data received from the ratios <strong>and</strong> growth trends of forecast-able line items. We<br />

believe earnings <strong>and</strong> productivity from assets to continue to impress investors.<br />

Also we forecast sales <strong>and</strong> cash flows provided by operations to continue<br />

increasing at an attainable growth rate in line with the industry <strong>and</strong> historical<br />

averages.<br />

We used several different valuation models to find out if <strong>Cummins</strong>’ stock is<br />

undervalued, fair valued or overvalued. Not every model is reliable when applied<br />

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to different structured firms, so we went through each model in order to decide<br />

which methods were accurate. The method of comparables was the least reliable<br />

of the valuation models because of the extreme concentration of the industry,<br />

which only consists of Caterpillar <strong>Inc</strong>. another problem when using Caterpillar’s<br />

price multiples to compute <strong>Cummins</strong>’ share price, is the difference in capital<br />

structures of the two firms. <strong>Cummins</strong> is heavily leveraged towards financing<br />

through shareholders’ equity <strong>and</strong> retained earnings, where Caterpillar relies<br />

almost completely on financing through debt, focusing less on earnings growth.<br />

This method is much like comparing apples to oranges in out opinion, <strong>and</strong> is not<br />

reliable for valuating this particular firm. For the remaining valuation models we<br />

needed to compute the estimated cost of equity <strong>and</strong> the weighted average cost<br />

of capital to plug into the models. The discounted dividends model does not<br />

evaluate the financial policies of <strong>Cummins</strong> very well either. <strong>Cummins</strong> has<br />

basically had flat growth in dividends over the past periods, which means that<br />

dividends paid at the same rate in the future as they are presently are worth less<br />

today (present value of dividends) dragging the value of the firm down to<br />

unreasonable prices. The free cash flows <strong>and</strong> residual income models where<br />

more accurate than the discounted dividends <strong>and</strong> method of comparables, but<br />

still were not the most reliable method for valuating <strong>Cummins</strong>. The abnormal<br />

growth earnings model came closest to our observed price per share of $144.99,<br />

by using a lower cost of equity then our estimated cost of equity, of 9% <strong>and</strong> 0%<br />

growth in perpetuity, which states that the price per share of <strong>Cummins</strong> should be<br />

$202.71. When combining all the data we found from each valuation model, it is<br />

our opinion that <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. should be valued lower than the observed market<br />

price of $144.99.<br />

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Company Overview<br />

We have reshaped the Company into what we are<br />

calling “The New <strong>Cummins</strong>” – a company that is less<br />

cyclical, more diversified, more results-oriented <strong>and</strong><br />

committed to turning a greater share of its sales into<br />

profits. (From the 2005 Annual Report)<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. boasts a long history since being founded in 1919. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

is a national <strong>and</strong> global power leader through the design, manufacture, sales <strong>and</strong><br />

services of diesel engines. Their products can be accessed in more than 160<br />

countries, ranging from Mexico to India, through 550 company-owned as well as<br />

independent distribution facilities, <strong>and</strong> over 5,000 dealers. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has<br />

teamed up in numerous joint ventures to produce the distribution facilities that<br />

allow them to keep <strong>and</strong> gain market share on a global scale.<br />

Both domestic <strong>and</strong> global corporate headquarters are located in Columbus,<br />

Indiana. The corporate structure of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is constructed from four<br />

business segments: Engine, Power Generation, Components, <strong>and</strong> Distribution.<br />

The Components segment can be further dissected into four businesses:<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> Filtration, <strong>Cummins</strong> Turbo Technologies, <strong>Cummins</strong> Emission Solutions<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong> Fuel Systems. The Distribution segment network consists of 17<br />

company-owned distributors coupled with 10 joint ventures, operating in 90<br />

countries through 233 locations. The major products these four complementary<br />

business segments produce consist of heavy-duty engines, for on <strong>and</strong> off-road<br />

vehicles; the sole supplier of diesel engines for DaimlerChrysler in their Dodge<br />

Ram pickups; power generators for use commercially or for consumer needs;<br />

filtration <strong>and</strong> after-treatment supplies; industrial silencers; turbochargers;<br />

engines <strong>and</strong> other related products for use in mining, oil <strong>and</strong> gas, agricultural,<br />

marine <strong>and</strong> military operations.<br />

- 8 -


<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is classified as a member of the diversified machinery industry, but<br />

the main competitors the company fights for market share are spread out into<br />

three different industries. These industries consist of: farm <strong>and</strong> construction<br />

machinery, auto parts <strong>and</strong> trucks <strong>and</strong> other vehicles. Through these industries<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. competes against hundreds of domestic <strong>and</strong> foreign businesses,<br />

but for analysis we break down the competitors to three main rivaling<br />

companies: Detroit Diesel Corporation (privately owned), Mack Trucks, <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

(privately owned), <strong>and</strong> Caterpillar <strong>Inc</strong>. These companies offer the greatest<br />

competition to <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. while also being similar in size <strong>and</strong> operations.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is a large-cap corporation with a market capitalization of 7.28<br />

billion <strong>and</strong> growing. Recently the corporation recorded sales of $11.36 billion for<br />

2006, which blew away analysts estimates for the second year in a row. Sales<br />

have doubled since reporting $5.68 billion five years previous in 2001. For the<br />

same 5 year period, earnings can be slated at a growth rate of almost 71%, only<br />

beating the industry growth by 1%, but out pacing the S&P 500 by more than<br />

61%. Total assets recorded on the balance sheet of 2001, are $4.34 billion <strong>and</strong><br />

in 2006 (in accordance with the 10-k) total to $7.47 billion, that is an increase in<br />

total asset value of $3.13 billion or 72% in a five year period. That gives us a<br />

picture of the growth <strong>and</strong> size of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. In February of 2002, the stock<br />

was trading at $41.58 <strong>and</strong> presently, February 1, 2007, the stock closed at<br />

$136.72, that is just under a 229% return if you held the security during this<br />

period.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is well diversified within its sector <strong>and</strong> industry. We can<br />

underst<strong>and</strong> the size <strong>and</strong> performance of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. through the financial<br />

information published in previous years. The next step in the analysis process is<br />

to dissect the industry <strong>and</strong> competitors of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. to get a good<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing of their performance against similar companies <strong>and</strong> the<br />

competitive environment of the industry.<br />

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Classifying The Industry<br />

In order to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>., we must first classify the industry in which<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. operates, so that we may have a context in which to compare.<br />

We will first classify the industry, determine how firms create competitive<br />

positions in this industry, <strong>and</strong> then we will look at <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. corporate<br />

strategy to determine how well they are implementing this strategy to achieve<br />

competitive advantage.<br />

Classifying the industry allows us to underst<strong>and</strong> the degree of competition that<br />

our firm must compete in. We will use Porter’s Five Competitive Forces in order<br />

to classify the industry. First we will look at the rivalry among existing firms in<br />

the industry by taking a look at such things as industry growth, concentration,<br />

switching costs, <strong>and</strong> barriers to exit in the industry. We will then consider the<br />

threat of new entrants into the industry by discussing scale economies, the first<br />

mover advantage, as well as legal barriers in the industry. We will examine the<br />

threat of substitute products <strong>and</strong> look at the relative price <strong>and</strong> performance, <strong>and</strong><br />

buyers’ willingness to switch to other products.<br />

We can then look at the bargaining power of both the buyers <strong>and</strong> suppliers in<br />

the industry <strong>and</strong> try to underst<strong>and</strong> how these relationships affect the firms in the<br />

industry by looking at the switching costs, <strong>and</strong> the number <strong>and</strong> volume of both<br />

suppliers <strong>and</strong> buyers.<br />

- 10 -


Industry Structure <strong>and</strong> Profitability<br />

Industry: Diversified Machinery<br />

Rivalry Among Existing Firms<br />

We need to examine the competition among firms already established in the<br />

industry. This is an important first step, as it allows us to determine the degree<br />

to which firms compete; you can have one or the other extreme. In industries in<br />

which competition is aggressive, prices are often pushed towards cost. In<br />

industries in which competition is less aggressive, firms do not compete on price,<br />

- 11 -


ut rather on non-price items such as differentiation. The intensity of rivalry is<br />

influenced by such factors as industry growth, concentration, product<br />

differentiation, switching costs, <strong>and</strong> technology. Each of these factors will be<br />

discussed.<br />

Diesel Engine Sales<br />

18<br />

16<br />

14<br />

Sales in Billions of Dollars<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

Cat<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

Years<br />

The Diversified Machinery Industry is an established industry <strong>and</strong> because of<br />

this, taking market share from competitors is the only way to grow. This is a<br />

very concentrated industry with only a few large, well established companies.<br />

Caterpillar <strong>Inc</strong>. (CAT), Detroit Diesel Corporation (privately held), <strong>and</strong> Mack<br />

Trucks <strong>Inc</strong>. (privately held) are the major players in the industry. Because of this<br />

concentration, the firms in the industry are able to control, to some extent,<br />

pricing levels. Product differentiation is for the most part, negligible, <strong>and</strong><br />

therefore firms must compete on other factors. Because of this, firms must<br />

attract, <strong>and</strong> keep customers on the basis of price.<br />

- 12 -


Another key factor that plays into the rivalry among existing firms is the low cost<br />

of switching amongst products. Because of the undifferentiated nature of the<br />

products produced in the industry, customers will ‘switch’ from one firm to<br />

another on the basis of cost.<br />

With the high degree of governmental regulation in the industry, firms must also<br />

keep up with the Environmental Protection Agency st<strong>and</strong>ards. This increases the<br />

level of competition in the industry, because firms are constantly trying to<br />

improve upon current technology in order to meet these ever increasing<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

The diversified machinery industry is a well established industry with a high<br />

concentration of firms, an undifferentiated product, <strong>and</strong> a low degree of<br />

switching costs. In light of this, we believe that the competition among existing<br />

firms is high.<br />

Threats of New Entrants<br />

While existing firms pose a large threat the competitors in an industry, we can<br />

not overlook new firms vying for market share in the industry. New firms trying<br />

to enter into the industry must overcome several barriers to entry. The height of<br />

these barriers dictates the ease to which firms can enter into the industry. Some<br />

significant barriers to entry include: economies of scale, first mover advantage,<br />

<strong>and</strong> legal barriers.<br />

Inventory, Property Plant <strong>and</strong> Equipment make up almost 40% of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

total assets of $6.89 billion. With such large economies of scale, new entrants<br />

find it hard to enter the industry without a significant disadvantage. A company<br />

would have to invest several billions of dollars in order to design a number of<br />

- 13 -


different types of engines <strong>and</strong> manufacturing techniques to effectively compete<br />

with the already established companies in the industry.<br />

Another major hurdle is br<strong>and</strong> image or name recognition, which gives rise to the<br />

first mover advantage. Firms in the industry have already established<br />

themselves as companies that provide a quality dependable product. In the<br />

diesel engine <strong>and</strong> power generation business, having a reputation for reliability is<br />

the main feature that can attract new customers. This is not something that<br />

occurs overnight, but rather is built through years of quality products, services,<br />

<strong>and</strong> relationships.<br />

There are many restrictions set forth by the Environmental Protection Agency<br />

(EPA) that require strict adherence. Adherence to these st<strong>and</strong>ards set by the<br />

EPA calls for intensive costs brought on by research <strong>and</strong> development. Because<br />

firms must spend such large amounts on research <strong>and</strong> development without<br />

seeing immediate benefits, firms entering into the industry will find it hard to<br />

compete.<br />

Due to the height of the barriers to entry such as economies of scale, first mover<br />

advantage, <strong>and</strong> other legal restrictions, we believe that the threat of new<br />

entrants is low.<br />

Threat of Substitute Products<br />

We cannot limit our analysis to the confines of one industry. We must take into<br />

account the threat of products that could be used as a substitute for the<br />

products made by the firms in the industry. The threat of substitute products<br />

depends largely upon customers’ willingness to substitute other products<br />

- 14 -


The threat of substitute products is a dangerous one. In the engine segment,<br />

firms in the industry who produce a diesel engine for light-truck applications<br />

have to compete, not only against companies that produce diesel engine, but<br />

other companies outside the industry that produce non-diesel engines for the<br />

same application in the light-truck. Also, as gas prices continue to soar, the<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> for alternative fuel sources are rising. With companies developing<br />

engines that take advantage of these alternative fuels, the threat to the diesel<br />

engine manufacturing industry is compounded.<br />

With companies producing gasoline engines as well as companies trying to take<br />

advantage of alternative fuel sources, we believe that the threat of substitute<br />

products is relatively high.<br />

Bargaining Power of Buyers<br />

The bargaining power of buyers is a key force in determining the level of<br />

competition in the industry. We must consider two key factors in relation to the<br />

bargaining power of buyers: the buyers’ sensitivity to price, <strong>and</strong> the buyers’<br />

power over the bargaining process.<br />

Diversified machinery manufacturers tend to compete on price <strong>and</strong> reputation.<br />

Firms in the industry must compete on both, relying heavily on reputation as well<br />

as pay attention to high price sensitivity giving rise to the high bargaining power<br />

of buyers. Because engines are undifferentiated <strong>and</strong> carry with them few<br />

switching costs, buyers are more price sensitive. To combat this, firms have<br />

tried to develop a reputation for high performance <strong>and</strong> quality. Engines, power<br />

generators, <strong>and</strong> high end components tend to represent a high portion of buyers’<br />

final cost which leads to buyers actively in search of the low cost alternatives.<br />

- 15 -


Also, buyers have relatively higher bargaining power compared to firms. While<br />

there are many buyers, there are many suppliers as well. Since each buyer<br />

tends to buy high volumes, the cost of not doing business is higher for firms in<br />

the industry than to the buyer. Other major factors include the high number of<br />

alternatives along with the low switching costs. Many buyers manufacture<br />

similar products which leaves the door open for reverse engineering by buyers.<br />

With buyers’ sensitivity to price high as well as their overall bargaining power, we<br />

consider the bargaining power of buyers as a high threat.<br />

Bargaining Power of Suppliers<br />

To stay competitive, diversified machinery manufacturers need to be able to<br />

negotiate lower prices with their suppliers. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>, with 2006 sales of<br />

$9.92 billion in their engine segment, competes with companies like Caterpillar<br />

who had 2006 sales in the engine segment of $11.08 billion. With the large<br />

volume of sales, this allows companies in the industry to have a strong<br />

bargaining power over their suppliers.<br />

Furthermore, a main supply purchased by firms in the industry, metals, is a<br />

commodity so many substitutes are available <strong>and</strong> the switching costs are low.<br />

For finished components required for their projects, firms have developed<br />

strategic alliances with a number of companies internationally which help to<br />

maintain lower costs. Due to their relative size, firms in the industry can<br />

negotiate for the lowest price possible allowing firms to keep prices as low as<br />

possible <strong>and</strong> maintain current relationships thus attracting new buyers.<br />

Due to the large amount of sales that firms in this industry create, we contend<br />

that the bargaining power of suppliers is low.<br />

- 16 -


Strategies for Creating a Competitive Advantage<br />

A firm’s profitability is dictated not only by the industry that it competes in, but<br />

also by the way in which it positions itself in their respective industry. There are<br />

two basic ways in which we can classify a firm’s competitive strategy: cost<br />

leadership <strong>and</strong> differentiation.<br />

Cost leadership involves supplying the same products or services at a lower cost.<br />

Employing a cost leadership strategy involves focusing on economies of scale<br />

<strong>and</strong> scope <strong>and</strong> efficient production. <strong>Cummins</strong> deploys a range of strategies in<br />

which to control costs by beginning with implementing the six sigma approach to<br />

manufacturing to cut out unnecessary processes which will improve overall ability<br />

to control quality management <strong>and</strong> reduce defective products form being created<br />

thus cutting costs <strong>and</strong> further benefiting both the company <strong>and</strong> the end<br />

consumer. After the introduction of this strategy in the beginning of 2000,<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has saved 2 percent from its bottom line <strong>and</strong> is now exp<strong>and</strong>ing this<br />

strategy to how it works with it suppliers as well. <strong>Cummins</strong> also takes cost<br />

leadership approach to how it develops new technologies by partnering with<br />

companies in China <strong>and</strong> India <strong>and</strong> sharing development costs with strategic<br />

partners, also <strong>Cummins</strong> relies on making computer models of what could be the<br />

next product instead of making several prototypes to save R&D costs. (Data<br />

collected from <strong>Cummins</strong> 2005 annual report)<br />

Differentiation is focused on supplying a unique product or service at a cost<br />

lower than the price premium customers will pay. <strong>Cummins</strong> differentiates their<br />

products by focusing on superior product quality, variety with different engine<br />

sizes, <strong>and</strong> also customer service. They invest heavily in br<strong>and</strong> image <strong>and</strong><br />

research <strong>and</strong> development, with control systems focused on creativity <strong>and</strong><br />

innovations.<br />

- 17 -


Firms in the Diversified Machinery industry must employ a mixed strategy in<br />

order to achieve a competitive advantage. Leaders in the industry must employ<br />

a low-cost strategy while maintaining product quality. Firms in the industry<br />

achieve lower costs through economies of scale <strong>and</strong> scope. The emphasis on<br />

quality derives from government regulations <strong>and</strong> market dem<strong>and</strong> for increased<br />

product efficiency <strong>and</strong> duration.<br />

Investment in br<strong>and</strong> image <strong>and</strong> the growing constraints of the Environmental<br />

Protection Agency are causing companies to invest heavily in research <strong>and</strong><br />

development. This is an industry that relies heavily on trust. While buyers<br />

concentrate on price, a positive br<strong>and</strong> image known for quality products<br />

supplemented with superior customer service is also required.<br />

Competitive Advantage <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. holds a strong competitive advantage in the industry of diversified<br />

machinery despite competing against companies, such as Caterpillar, with a<br />

significantly larger market share. As a global leader in the production <strong>and</strong><br />

marketing of large diesel engines, the company is well equipped to flourish<br />

through cost-leadership <strong>and</strong> quality in a highly concentrated environment.<br />

Despite this concentration, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. underst<strong>and</strong>s that customers are very<br />

price-sensitive <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> higher product quality, both focal points of the<br />

company’s operations. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. strives to maintain a cost-leadership role by<br />

continuously searching for lower input costs from less expensive international<br />

markets. Company growth is becoming increasingly dependent on <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

ability to meet government st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> regulations before the competition,<br />

especially in its engine line. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. anticipates high future growth by<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>ing the types of products offered to current customers <strong>and</strong> focusing on<br />

growth in related markets, domestically <strong>and</strong> internationally.<br />

- 18 -


<strong>Cummins</strong> has the potential to attract a lot more business in an increasingly global<br />

economy by further exp<strong>and</strong>ing their established international presence. Almost<br />

51% of the company’s consolidated net sales stem from operations abroad.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has a significant presence in India <strong>and</strong> China, two of the world’s fastest<br />

growing economies. A future increase in market share is a likely result of their<br />

presence abroad. Growth potential is significantly larger for <strong>Cummins</strong> abroad.<br />

By incorporating Six Sigma in manufacturing, product design, <strong>and</strong> procedures<br />

with customers, suppliers, <strong>and</strong> distributors, <strong>Cummins</strong> has significantly reduced<br />

costs <strong>and</strong> improved quality in these areas of the business. The effort to attain<br />

perfection through Six Sigma pays dividends through improved customer<br />

relationships <strong>and</strong> product quality. The continuous <strong>and</strong> successful implementation<br />

of Six Sigma is major competitive advantage. However, this advantage will slowly<br />

fade as <strong>Cummins</strong> forces competitors to adopt the strategy or lose market share.<br />

Six Sigma currently plays a major role in minimizing defects throughout the<br />

company’s business, but financial information concerning the quantitative impact<br />

of Six Sigma is unavailable through public information.<br />

This highly concentrated industry naturally forces companies to grow by seizing a<br />

larger market share. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has entered into long-term supply<br />

agreements with key customers such as DaimlerChrysler, Volvo Trucks North<br />

America, <strong>Inc</strong>., <strong>and</strong> Navistar International Corporation. This move not only<br />

improves customer service relationships with buyers, it guarantees holding an<br />

increased market share for several years.<br />

DaimlerChrysler contributes twelve percent of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. net sales. Although<br />

this a small percentage in some industries, losing their business can potentially<br />

have an adverse effect on the company. This is magnified by the fact that<br />

DaimlerChrysler <strong>and</strong> other engine customers outsource this portion of their<br />

business to <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.. These companies have the capabilities to produce<br />

- 19 -


their own engines yet continue to outsource to <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.. Although this<br />

reveals the quality of product <strong>and</strong> low-cost of production for <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>., the<br />

retention of these customers after the duration of the long-term contracts<br />

appears questionable. Customer relations <strong>and</strong> price are key determinants in<br />

ensuring continued business with these customers.<br />

Accounting <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

The purpose behind the accounting analysis is to assess how well a firm’s<br />

accounting captures the reality of the firm’s underlying business reality. In order<br />

to determine the distortion in the accounting numbers, we must first identify<br />

areas that lend themselves to flexibility, <strong>and</strong> determine the appropriateness of<br />

the accounting policies <strong>and</strong> estimates used by the firm. The quality of<br />

accounting is influenced by three factors: rigidity in accounting rules, the degree<br />

of accuracy in management forecasts, <strong>and</strong> management’s selection of certain<br />

accounting choices to achieve a particular end-result. Those account for any<br />

discrepancies between the true underlying economic position of the company<br />

<strong>and</strong> the state of the company according to management’s best estimates.<br />

Identify Key Accounting Policies<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. employs many different accounting policies in order to provide<br />

relevant information in their consolidated financial statements, <strong>and</strong> reveal the<br />

company’s current <strong>and</strong> prospective economic reality. The company’s competitive<br />

business strategy includes a mix of cost-leadership <strong>and</strong> differentiation. Both<br />

elements in the mixed strategy heavily influence the key accounting policies that<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. selects. Both the industry <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. rely on<br />

accounting policies that, depending on management’s selection between the<br />

different policies, can significantly impact the financial statements. The key<br />

- 20 -


accounting policies recognized by <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. relate to Research <strong>and</strong><br />

Development (R&D), Goodwill, Warranty Provisions, <strong>and</strong> Inventory Management.<br />

Under the provision of SFAS 2, Research <strong>and</strong> Development must be expensed in<br />

the time period in which it occurs. The problem with firms that derive such a<br />

benefit from heavy investment in Research <strong>and</strong> Development is that they are<br />

unable to adequately explain the effect that it has on their financial statements.<br />

One way that the benefit of Research <strong>and</strong> Development can be directly attributed<br />

to future benefits is through greater access to international markets dem<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

compliance with more stringent environmental st<strong>and</strong>ards. The development of<br />

engines that comply with U.S. st<strong>and</strong>ards puts <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. in position to be<br />

a leader in foreign markets as they continue to grow. The importance of costleadership<br />

can be seen in the amount spent on Research <strong>and</strong> Development in<br />

order to produce a more efficient product. Research <strong>and</strong> development cost for<br />

2005 accounted for $278 million, which is equivalent to 4.04% of total assets.<br />

For the years 2003-2005 Research <strong>and</strong> Development costs accounted for an<br />

average of about $240 million, which is equivalent to an overall average of 3.9%<br />

of the total assets over the same time period. Access to these foreign markets<br />

allowed sales to increase by 57.5% from net sales of 6.3 billion in 2003 to 9.9<br />

billion in 2005.<br />

Another major accounting policy deals with accounting for Goodwill. Under the<br />

provisions of SFAS 142, “Goodwill <strong>and</strong> Other Intangible Assets,” the carrying<br />

value of assets acquired is reviewed annually. Goodwill, which comprised of<br />

$358 million dollars in 2005, could be significantly altered by changes in<br />

estimates or economic conditions. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. emphasizes the importance<br />

of their br<strong>and</strong>-image, a key success factor accumulated from mergers <strong>and</strong><br />

acquisitions. Goodwill is the “excess of the purchase price paid over the fair value<br />

of net assets acquired in a business combination accounted for as a purchase,”<br />

according to <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. 10-K. While impairment is a more appropriate<br />

- 21 -


accounting policy than amortization, this lends itself to accounting distortions due<br />

to management’s evaluation of the fair value. However, because goodwill<br />

comprises .032% of <strong>Cummins</strong> total revenues, a relatively small amount,<br />

management discretion on fair value estimates will not materially impact the<br />

company’s state of operations.<br />

Warranty provisions are another key factor in accounting policies. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

includes warranties on its products to improve the quality of its br<strong>and</strong> image.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. charges estimated warranty costs to earnings at the time<br />

products are delivered to the customer <strong>and</strong> estimates liabilities associated with<br />

warranty cost using a historical experience of warranty programs. However,<br />

warranty liability estimates can result in higher or lower expenses depending on<br />

management estimates. Revenue is recognized on a straight-line basis over the<br />

contract period. If warranty expense estimates are lower than the actual future<br />

warranty claims, earnings are overstated. Overall during the period of 2002-<br />

2005, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. was relatively consistent in provisions for warranties issued.<br />

Provisions increased at a rate consistent with sales over the same time period.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.’ estimation of warranty liabilities appears to be more conservative<br />

because of their consistent overstatement of provisions for warranty liability.<br />

Actual warranty payments as a percentage of provisions for warranties were<br />

72.22% in 2004 <strong>and</strong> 80.27% in 2005. Because of the conservative reporting of<br />

provisions for warranties, net income is understated.<br />

- 22 -


Warranty Provisions in Relation to Actual Warranty Payments<br />

Millions<br />

450<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

2003 2004 2005<br />

Provision for<br />

Warranties<br />

Actual Warrant<br />

Payments<br />

No period before 2003 is relevant as the provision from warranties <strong>and</strong> the actual<br />

payments were not audited in 2002. Although management estimates for<br />

warranty provisions have improved since 2003 (actual payments made up 49%<br />

of provisions for 2003), it is evident that <strong>Cummins</strong> consistently overstates<br />

warranty provisions.<br />

Warranty Provisions as Realated to Net Sales<br />

(Using a Logarithmic Scale)<br />

1000000<br />

$ in Millions<br />

1000<br />

Net Sales<br />

Warranty<br />

Provisions<br />

1<br />

2001 2002 2003<br />

Year<br />

- 23 -


<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. does not distinguish raw materials from work-in-progress because<br />

of the constant movement of resources from different locations. They also<br />

recognize their inventories using either the lower of cost or the net realizable<br />

value. Inventory management is a huge component of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. key<br />

accounting policies. Choice of accounting policy for valuing inventory can have a<br />

significant influence on the assets of the balance sheet. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. values<br />

78% of its domestic inventory using FIFO <strong>and</strong> the remaining 22%, comprised<br />

mostly of heavy-duty, high-horsepower engines <strong>and</strong> parts are valued using LIFO.<br />

Components of Engine Segment (As % of Engine Sales)<br />

10%<br />

32%<br />

27%<br />

Heavy-Duty<br />

Medium-Duty<br />

Light-Duty<br />

Industrial<br />

Stationary-Power<br />

14%<br />

17%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. reported sales of $2.1 billion in their Heavy-Duty truck engine<br />

segment, which accounted for approximately 22% of overall net sales. When<br />

reporting cost of good sold, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has chosen to use the LIFO method of<br />

accounting for inventory in this heavy-Duty engine segment. By using the LIFO<br />

method, cost of goods sold in the Heavy-Duty truck engine segment is<br />

overstated in a rising price environment. Since this segment makes up almost<br />

- 24 -


22% of sales outst<strong>and</strong>ing, this reduces income taxes payable significantly<br />

through understating gross margin, <strong>and</strong> ultimately reducing net earnings.<br />

Accounting Flexibility<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.’ management team has many different ways that it can account<br />

for its key accounting policies. Managers in diversified machinery have a choice<br />

of how to classify inventory. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. uses a combination of FIFO <strong>and</strong> LIFO,<br />

although FIFO comprises for a majority (78%) of the inventory. If a situation<br />

arises where management needs to increase their expenses <strong>and</strong> lower their tax<br />

base, they could switch to using predominantly LIFO. However, this is a stringent<br />

transition process that the I.R.S. would have to approve. Although FIFO is more<br />

indicative of actual inventory levels, switching to LIFO would reduce the value<br />

created from employing FIFO for tax purposes. Additionally, auditors would<br />

question the switch <strong>and</strong> raise issues about the underlying motive for pursuing<br />

FIFO, a more transparent inventory policy. Caterpillar uses an accounting<br />

strategy that is almost the complete opposite of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. Caterpillar is<br />

considerably larger than <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. with total assets of $47 Billion compared<br />

to that of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. with total assets of $6.9 Billion. Because Caterpillar is<br />

such a large <strong>and</strong> well-established firm, we believe that they use LIFO in order to<br />

reduce their tax base. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>., a smaller company with more growth<br />

potential, uses FIFO to boost earnings <strong>and</strong> portray as much economic growth as<br />

possible. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. discloses the excess of FIFO over LIFO to be 69 million in<br />

2005, <strong>and</strong> an average of 65 million for the period of 2003-2005. With gross<br />

margin being overstated, we can assume that at an income tax rate of 35%,<br />

Cummings is distorting income taxes payable by approximately 24 million. This<br />

helps create value by reducing the taxes paid to the Internal Revenue Service.<br />

Management is allowed to use LIFO for tax purposes <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong> employs LIFO<br />

to reduce taxable income <strong>and</strong> the associated income taxes payable.<br />

- 25 -


Management has no accounting flexibility when recording Research <strong>and</strong><br />

Development in accordance with GAAP. R&D has to be expensed in the time<br />

period it occurs <strong>and</strong> severely limits management’s ability to accurately convey its<br />

true economic position. The rigidity of accounting st<strong>and</strong>ards for reporting R&D<br />

restricts management flexibility in presenting a key success factor of the firm.<br />

Current accounting st<strong>and</strong>ards allow significant management discretion in<br />

estimating warranty liabilities. Warranty liability estimates can result in higher or<br />

lower expenses depending on management estimates. Management can increase<br />

warranty liability estimates to increase expenses <strong>and</strong> smooth earnings or<br />

decrease estimates to reduce the perceived present <strong>and</strong> future liability<br />

obligations, increasing net income <strong>and</strong> improving the appearance of the capital<br />

structure.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>., over many years of acquisitions, has increased its focus on br<strong>and</strong>image.<br />

This is reflected in its $358 million in goodwill. SFAS no. 142 grants the<br />

company the option to check for goodwill impairment annually. Management’s<br />

estimate on the fair value of goodwill determines whether or not goodwill is<br />

considered impaired. For the period of 2003-2005, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.’ management<br />

has decided not to impair goodwill stating that the individual business segments’<br />

fair value of has exceeded their book value, <strong>and</strong> therefore in management’s<br />

opinion does not require impairment.<br />

Post-retirement benefits <strong>and</strong> pension plans make-up a significant portion of<br />

company liabilities <strong>and</strong> could potentially affect <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. ability to achieve<br />

their goal of cost-leadership. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has a defined benefit plan for hourly<br />

employees <strong>and</strong> a cash basis formula for salaried employees. The defined benefit<br />

plan creates a greater liability for the company as it states the expected future<br />

outflow of cash to be distributed to employees when they draw down from the<br />

account. Management estimates on the growth of these defined benefit plans<br />

- 26 -


can result in the plan being over or under-funded. The pension plan has 64.7%<br />

invested in equity securities, making the fund more susceptible to systematic<br />

risk. Management could reduce their pension obligations by switching to a<br />

defined contribution plan, making it difficult to under-fund the plan unless it is<br />

drawn down on by the company. However, existing plans cannot be altered<br />

unless <strong>Cummins</strong> becomes bankrupt. <strong>Cummins</strong> must respect its current<br />

obligations <strong>and</strong> instead alter the benefit program for new employees <strong>and</strong> future<br />

hires. Postretirement benefit plans by <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. provide a variety of health<br />

care <strong>and</strong> life insurance benefits to eligible employees.<br />

Evaluation of Actual Accounting Strategy<br />

All publicly traded companies in the U.S. are required to file the appropriate<br />

financial statements with the Securities <strong>and</strong> Exchange Commission (SEC). These<br />

financial statements must comply with the Generally Accepted Accounting<br />

Procedures (GAAP) which have been set by the Federal Accounting St<strong>and</strong>ards<br />

Board (FASB). In order to determine how well <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. does in reporting<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ards, we can look at how they h<strong>and</strong>led a material accounting mistake.<br />

On August 4 th , 2003 <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. restated its financials for the years 2000-<br />

2002, due to an error in reconciling accounts receivables in two manufacturing<br />

locations, in Fridley Minnesota, <strong>and</strong> Darlington, United Kingdom. These two<br />

manufacturing locations combined accounted for 15-20% of total revenues. Due<br />

to the material impact of the mistake, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. was required to restate its<br />

financials. In January of 2003, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. notified the SEC that they had<br />

identified a potentially material accounting error. After disclosing the error to the<br />

SEC, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. took the following steps: (From the SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF<br />

1934 Release No. 53236 / February 7, 2006 ACCOUNTING & AUDITING ENFORCEMENT Release<br />

No. 2370 / February 7, 2006 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING File No. 3-12173)<br />

- 27 -


“(1) it sent trained accounting personnel from the corporate office <strong>and</strong> the<br />

company’s outside auditor to Fridley to investigate the accounts payable<br />

accounts reconciliation issues <strong>and</strong> resolve them; (2) it retained special counsel to<br />

conduct an internal investigation; (3) it issued a press release announcing the<br />

potential adjustment; <strong>and</strong> (4) it fired the accounting personnel responsible for<br />

the delinquent account reconciliations in question.“<br />

The effect of the adjustments was as follows:<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. Restatement 2002<br />

2001<br />

2000<br />

Pre-2000<br />

(Millions)<br />

(Millions)<br />

(Millions)<br />

(Millions)<br />

Previously reported net earnings $72 $(102) $8<br />

Restatement adjustments (after tax) $10 $(1) $6 ($37)<br />

Restated net earnings $82 $(103) $14<br />

As a percentage of restated earnings 12% 1% 43%<br />

According to the SEC report, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. was ordered to “cease <strong>and</strong> desist<br />

from future violations of the books <strong>and</strong> records <strong>and</strong> reporting rules.” Also, it is of<br />

note that the SEC “took into consideration the cooperation <strong>and</strong> remedial acts of<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. in determining the terms of the settlement.” While this was not<br />

using accounting flexibility to cloud the financial statements, it is of note that<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. was pro-active in response to the accounting mistake which in turn<br />

allowed them to fix the problem without drastic sanctions by the SEC.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. accounting choice of valuing inventory using FIFO is an aggressive<br />

approach when compared to its largest public competitor, Caterpillar. FIFO<br />

reduces expenses <strong>and</strong> increases net income. This allows <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. to show a<br />

higher net income to support further growth in periods of higher costs. However,<br />

because FIFO gives a more realistic portrayal of actual movements in most<br />

- 28 -


inventories, it is a proper accounting choice for the company. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

incorporation of LIFO for its heavy-duty engine line shows that it is not being<br />

overly aggressive in its use of accounting flexibility to increase the bottom line.<br />

The discount rate used for determining pension <strong>and</strong> other postretirement<br />

benefits, at 5.75%, is, in our opinion a little low considering its credit rating is<br />

just below investment grade. An increase in the discount rate will lower the<br />

present value of pension obligations, indicating that the pension fund is wellfunded<br />

for the future. The total benefit obligations are currently under-funded by<br />

$377 million, requiring the company to finance claims through retained earnings.<br />

A continuation of this trend could have an adverse affect on <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. ability<br />

to be a cost leader or pay their debt obligations. Management’s current<br />

assumption of the compensation increase rate (increase in the cost of living) is at<br />

4%, a modest compensation increase rate considering inflation has historically<br />

grown at around 3%, only leaving a 1% cushion for unexpected spikes in<br />

inflation. <strong>Cummins</strong> accounting for pension obligations is slightly conservative by<br />

selecting a low discount rate. A slight increase in this rate can materially change<br />

the status of the pension fund from under-funded to profitable.<br />

Evaluation of the Quality of Disclosure<br />

To determine the extent of accounting distortions, we use sales <strong>and</strong> expense<br />

diagnostic ratios, <strong>and</strong> compare the firm across a five-year period as well as<br />

against the industry. Earnings management is the process of creating “honey<br />

jar” reserves in good years to pad financial statements in bad years. By running<br />

the firm through the various sales <strong>and</strong> expense diagnostic ratios, we will be able<br />

to determine how forthcoming <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has been in their financial<br />

statements.<br />

- 29 -


Sales Diagnostic Ratios for <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. are computed below.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

Net Sales/ Cash from Sales 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.15<br />

Net Sales/ Net Accounts Receivable 10.99 8.66 7.54 8.12 7.55<br />

Net Sales/ Unearned Revenues N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty Liabilities 17.64 18.41 17.59 17.58 17.19<br />

Net Sales/ Inventory 8.33 9.13 8.59 8.31 8.45<br />

Overall, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has done a good job with disclosure. This is evident by<br />

the consistency of the ratios over the period from 2001-2005. The ratio of Net<br />

Sales/ Cash from Sales tells us that <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is consistently doing a good<br />

job with cash collections from sales. This is further shown in the Net Sales/ Net<br />

accounts Receivable ratio. Warranty Liabilities are being properly accounted for,<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is doing a good job with inventory management. We can also<br />

compare the ratios of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. to that of their major competitor Caterpillar.<br />

We will go into a more in-depth discussion of the ratios below.<br />

Caterpillar 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

Net Sales/ Cash from Sales 1.16 1.18 1.24 1.36 1.28<br />

Net Sales/ Net Accounts Receivable 7.34 6.57 5.22 3.80 4.52<br />

Net Sales/ Unearned Revenues N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Net Sales/ Warranty Liabilities 29.18 26.91 33.73 36.10 38.69<br />

Net Sales/ Inventory 6.50 6.75 6.91 6.06 6.51<br />

- 30 -


We can also look at the expense manipulation diagnostic ratios<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

Asset Turnover (sales/assets) 1.32 1.21 1.23 1.30 1.44<br />

Changes in CFFO/OI 1.85 0.85 -1.06 1.21 0.41<br />

Changes in CFFO/NOA 1.78 0.11 -0.17 0.31 0.38<br />

Total Accruals/Change in Sales .27 -1.08 -.6 -.12 -.14<br />

Pension Expense/SG&A 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.09<br />

Other Employment Expenses/ SG&A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

Again, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is doing a good job with disclosure. Asset Turnover has<br />

been relatively steady until 2005 when the Asset Turnover ratio increased by<br />

0.14. This was the result in an almost 18% increase in sales from the year<br />

2004-2005. The drastic change in CFFO/OI was probably due to a 40% increase<br />

in operating income from 2004-2005. Pension expense/SG&A increased over the<br />

five-year period. We also compared the ratios to the industry in order to have a<br />

frame of reference in which to base our assumptions on.<br />

Caterpillar 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

Asset Turnover (sales/assets) 0.77 0.71 0.57 0.66 0.72<br />

Changes in CFFO/OI 0.17 47.38 -22.73 1.60 6.46<br />

Changes in CFFO/NOA -0.04 0.17 -2.04 0.24 1.81<br />

Total Accruals/Change in Sales -0.65 4.21 33.33 26.60 15.49<br />

Pension Expense/SG&A -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.09 0.11<br />

Other Employment Expenses/ SG&A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

- 31 -


In-Depth Quantitative <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

Net Sales/Cash From Sales<br />

1.40<br />

1.40<br />

1.35<br />

1.35<br />

1.30<br />

1.30<br />

1.25<br />

1.25<br />

1.20<br />

1.20<br />

1.15<br />

1.15<br />

1.10<br />

1.10<br />

1.05<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.15<br />

Caterpillar 1.16 1.18 1.24 1.36 1.28<br />

1.05<br />

The ratio between Net Sales <strong>and</strong> Cash from Sales for <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has been<br />

steady, ranging from 1.1 to 1.15 for the years 2001-2005. Overall both<br />

Caterpillar <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. had a ratio that was between 1 <strong>and</strong> 1.5 which tells<br />

us that cash collection policies for the two companies were fairly comparable.<br />

This ratio of a little greater than one tells us that cash collections from sales was<br />

significant compared to net sales. In 2004, Caterpillar experienced a slight<br />

increase in this ratio from 1.24 to 1.36, while <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. remained steady<br />

over the same time. This could be due a more relaxed accounts receivable<br />

policy. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is doing a better job collecting cash from sales than<br />

Caterpillar, although by relatively insignificant amount.<br />

- 32 -


Net Sales/ Net Accounts Receivable<br />

12.00<br />

12.00<br />

11.00<br />

10.00<br />

10.00<br />

9.00<br />

8.00<br />

8.00<br />

7.00<br />

6.00<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

4.00<br />

3.00<br />

2.00<br />

2.00<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 10.99 8.66 7.54 8.12 7.55<br />

Caterpillar 7.34 6.57 5.22 3.80 4.52<br />

Years<br />

0.00<br />

The ratio of Net Sales to Net Accounts Receivable shows how well the company<br />

is managing their accounts receivable. Both <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>and</strong> Caterpillar are<br />

doing a good job stating actual revenues. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. accounts receivables<br />

are a smaller percentage of sales than that of Caterpillar, which indicates that<br />

sales are supported by accounts receivable. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. should be aware that<br />

although net sales drastically increased in 2004 <strong>and</strong> 2005 (33% <strong>and</strong> 18%<br />

increase respectively), the ratio of Net Sales to Net Accounts Receivable did not<br />

increase. When growth slows, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. will be well-positioned to get cash<br />

quicker from Accounts Receivable. Although this ratio declines with an improving<br />

economy, this ratio remains somewhat steady <strong>and</strong> supports the validity of the<br />

company’s performance.<br />

- 33 -


Net Sales/ Inventory<br />

10.00<br />

9.00<br />

8.00<br />

7.00<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

3.00<br />

2.00<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 8.33 9.13 8.59 8.31 8.45<br />

Caterpillar 6.50 6.75 6.91 6.06 6.51<br />

The ratio of Net Sales to Inventory tells us that inventory <strong>and</strong> sales have<br />

remained constant over the period of 2001-2005. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is doing a better<br />

job of managing their inventory. With the high cost to keep inventory on h<strong>and</strong>,<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is showing their ability to forecast sales <strong>and</strong> keep a proper amount<br />

of inventory on h<strong>and</strong>. In this industry, cost-leadership is a key success factor.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. does not have the amount of money tied up in inventory that<br />

Caterpillar does, which allows them to keep risk of an economic downturn at a<br />

minimum. The steadiness of this ratio for both <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong> Caterpillar indicate<br />

that the industry is well-developed <strong>and</strong> mature. Inventory levels are on par with<br />

sales throughout the entire period.<br />

- 34 -


Net Sales/ Warranty Liabilities<br />

45.00<br />

40.00<br />

35.00<br />

30.00<br />

25.00<br />

20.00<br />

15.00<br />

10.00<br />

5.00<br />

0.00<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 17.64 18.41 17.59 17.58 17.19<br />

Caterpillar 29.18 26.91 33.73 36.10 38.69<br />

The ratio of Net Sales to Warranty Liabilities shows that warranty liabilities have<br />

stayed proportional to the fluctuations in sales over the past 5 years. <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

<strong>Inc</strong>. is doing a good job of accurately stating their actual warranty liabilities <strong>and</strong><br />

management estimates have been steady. The consistency of warranty liabilities<br />

in relation to sales supports the significant improvement in sales during this<br />

period of economic expansion.<br />

- 35 -


Asset Turnover (Sales/Assets)<br />

1.60<br />

1.40<br />

1.20<br />

1.00<br />

0.80<br />

0.60<br />

0.40<br />

0.20<br />

0.00<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.32 1.21 1.23 1.30 1.44<br />

Caterpillar 0.77 0.71 0.57 0.66 0.72<br />

Asset turnover measures an entity’s capability to efficiently use assets to<br />

accumulate sales. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has had less fluctuation than Caterpillar <strong>and</strong><br />

more efficiently uses its assets to generate sales. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. asset turnover is<br />

very high as it produced over $1.4 dollars in sales for every dollar of assets.<br />

Caterpillar produced less than a dollar in sales for every dollar it holds as assets.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has a smaller asset base than Caterpillar, explaining why their sales are<br />

- 36 -


lower than Caterpillars.<br />

Changes in CFFO/OI<br />

10.00<br />

60.00<br />

8.00<br />

50.00<br />

6.00<br />

4.00<br />

2.00<br />

40.00<br />

30.00<br />

20.00<br />

0.00<br />

-2.00<br />

-4.00<br />

-6.00<br />

10.00<br />

0.00<br />

-10.00<br />

-8.00<br />

-20.00<br />

-10.00<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.85 0.85 -1.06 1.21 0.41<br />

Caterpillar 0.17 47.38 -22.73 1.60 6.46<br />

-30.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.’ cash flow is in line with operating income. The ratio fluctuates<br />

around one over the period of 2001-2005. Overstating expense on the income<br />

statement would cause the ratio to increase. Caterpillar has had some large<br />

fluctuation possible due to an overstatement of expenses. In general, a lower<br />

number represents cash flows from operations as opposed to investing. This<br />

means that <strong>Cummins</strong> cash flows from operations can be clarified by its operating<br />

income.<br />

- 37 -


Changes in CFFO/NOA<br />

2.50<br />

2.00<br />

1.50<br />

1.00<br />

0.50<br />

0.00<br />

-0.50<br />

-1.00<br />

-1.50<br />

-2.00<br />

-2.50<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.78 0.11 -0.17 0.31 0.38<br />

Caterpillar -0.04 0.17 -2.04 0.24 1.81<br />

The ratio of CFFO to NOA gives us the firm’s return from operating assets in<br />

terms of cash flow from operations. Both companies showed a decrease in the<br />

in the ratio during the year 2001-2003 but investment in operating assets picked<br />

up after 2003. In 2003 <strong>and</strong> 2004 Caterpillar experienced negative cash flow<br />

which explains the sharp increase in the ratio. Investing in operating assets to<br />

produce increased cash flows from operations is not a strategy <strong>Cummins</strong> is<br />

employing.<br />

- 38 -


Pension Expense/SG&A<br />

0.15<br />

0.10<br />

0.05<br />

0.00<br />

-0.05<br />

-0.10<br />

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.09<br />

Caterpillar -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.09 0.11<br />

This ratio show how pension expenses compare to fixed costs <strong>and</strong> overhead over<br />

the five year period. The diversified machinery industry is highly unionized,<br />

making pension expenses a significant cost. The industry requires quality pension<br />

plans to attract quality workers in the labor market. However, if pension cost<br />

consisted of a major part of SG&A, companies can have trouble fulfilling its<br />

pension obligations <strong>and</strong> reduce margins for each item sold. The increase in<br />

pension expenses over SG&A can be attributed to a large number of babyboomers<br />

retiring. Caterpillar’s pension expenses have increased at an alarming<br />

rate <strong>and</strong> could become less competitive as it has assumed large obligations.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. pension expenses have increased to almost 10% of SG&A, but it<br />

has increased at a much slower rate than Caterpillar. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has done a<br />

relatively better job of minimizing its pension obligations as a proportion of<br />

SG&A. Pension assumptions are not very aggressive, especially concerning the<br />

discount rate. An increase in the discount rate would significantly lower this ratio<br />

for <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong> truly convey its financial stability in managing long-term<br />

obligations.<br />

- 39 -


Identification of Potential “Red Flags”<br />

To valuate any company properly you must go through all the accounting books<br />

<strong>and</strong> identify any red flags that might be presented that would make a company<br />

appear more valuable than it really is. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. overall, has sound<br />

accounting methods <strong>and</strong> practices that deliver mostly a clear view of how the<br />

company is currently st<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> where it has potential for future growth. It<br />

does, however, have a few minor sections of its financials that are worth looking<br />

into. The first minor red flag has to do with their operational <strong>and</strong> capital leases<br />

when <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. attempts to state that some of the equipment used to make<br />

the engines that are to be sold is stated as being an operational lease <strong>and</strong> not a<br />

capital lease as it should be. This is usually done to hide some of the liabilities<br />

from an outside entity <strong>and</strong> to appear more profitable to investors. The second<br />

minor red flag that arose when analyzing the financial statements had to do with<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. pension program, which was drastically under funded by $653<br />

million <strong>and</strong> in their statement only reports that the program is under funded by<br />

only $310 million. These numbers might seem large, but when you compare<br />

these numbers to <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. total liabilities it comes only to about 7.2%.<br />

Undo Accounting Distortions<br />

As was stated in the red flags section, there are some minor distortions in the<br />

liability side of the balance sheet that can be explained even though they are<br />

minor when looking at the company as a whole. The most impacting distortion<br />

has to do with the pension program <strong>and</strong> its understatement of its liabilities<br />

towards that program. This program’s obligation was $3 billion in the fiscal year<br />

2005 <strong>and</strong> had a fair value of around 2.3 at end of year which came out to being<br />

$653 million under funded while in the 10k form it states that the benefit plan is<br />

only under funded by $310 million. The remaining 343 million dollars was<br />

- 40 -


transferred to different accounts to get it off of the liabilities <strong>and</strong> make it look like<br />

they are meeting their commitment when it is actually not the case. The other<br />

distortion in the financial statements has to do with their equipment that is being<br />

stated as being rented to produce their product when in face should be moved<br />

from an operating lease over to a capital lease <strong>and</strong> show that they actually owe<br />

money to a bank for the loan payments of that equipment. While having these<br />

two minor distortions, <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. <strong>Inc</strong>. still has a very detailed annual report<br />

<strong>and</strong> 10K that clearly defines the financial state of this company.<br />

Ratio <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

Ratio analysis can provide insightful information about a firm by assessing how<br />

different items of a firm’s financial statement relate to one another. A firm’s<br />

liquidity, profitability, <strong>and</strong> capital structure can be revealed through aggregating<br />

the results of similar ratios <strong>and</strong> interpreting the data. We will evaluate <strong>Cummins</strong>’<br />

(C.M.I.) performance using trend analysis, a time-series comparison of company<br />

performance over the past five years, <strong>and</strong> industry benchmarks, comparing<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong>’ liquidity, profitability, <strong>and</strong> capital structure to that of Caterpillar’s.<br />

Trend analysis can be indicative of <strong>Cummins</strong>’ past, present, <strong>and</strong> future<br />

performance. Industry analysis, in the case of <strong>Cummins</strong>, consists of comparing<br />

selected ratios to the firm’s only public competitor, Caterpillar.<br />

We will employ a variety of ratios that thoroughly explain <strong>Cummins</strong> liquidity,<br />

profitability, <strong>and</strong> capital structure. Liquidity ratios provide useful information on a<br />

firm’s ability to maintain adequate cash <strong>and</strong> other current assets necessary to<br />

meet its obligations in a timely manner. Poor liquidity ratios can spell financial<br />

distress for <strong>Cummins</strong> in the near future. Too much relative debt can cause C.M.I.<br />

to default on interest <strong>and</strong> principal payments, a solvency issue investors can<br />

foresee through correct interpretation of the company’s liquidity ratios.<br />

- 41 -


Profitability ratios can be broken down into four vital factors related to profits:<br />

operating efficiency, asset productivity, the rate of return on assets, <strong>and</strong> the rate<br />

of return on equity. These ratios utilize common size income statements to<br />

explain important factors as a percentage of sales <strong>and</strong> measure how well the<br />

company generates profit <strong>and</strong> revenue from equity <strong>and</strong> assets. The capital<br />

structure of <strong>Cummins</strong> refers to the sources of financing, liabilities <strong>and</strong><br />

stockholder’s equity, used to buy assets. Capital structure ratios can be indicative<br />

of the financing policies of <strong>Cummins</strong> management, their level of comfort with<br />

leverage, <strong>and</strong> attitude toward business risk.<br />

Trend <strong>and</strong> Cross-Sectional <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> liquidity, profitability, <strong>and</strong> capital structure can be accurately assessed<br />

through trend <strong>and</strong> cross-sectional analysis. Trend analysis <strong>and</strong> cross-sectional<br />

analysis are relative benchmarks comparing <strong>Cummins</strong> present performance to its<br />

performance in the past <strong>and</strong> to the industry as a whole. A five-year trend<br />

analysis is necessary to underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong>’ recent progression <strong>and</strong> provides<br />

insight to the company’s direction. Cross-sectional analysis allows investors to<br />

gauge <strong>Cummins</strong> performance to rest of the industry. Results from cross-sectional<br />

<strong>and</strong> trend analysis are used to make educated forecasts from identified trends.<br />

These two forms of financial analysis bring to light <strong>Cummins</strong> operating efficiency,<br />

annual trends, <strong>and</strong> financial hierarchy in its industry.<br />

Liquidity<br />

A company’s ability to maintain a certain percentage of cash equivalent assets<br />

that can be used to pay off its current liabilities is referred to a company’s<br />

liquidity. In the past five years <strong>Cummins</strong> has become much more liquid which is<br />

giving them the ability to pay off more of their current liabilities <strong>and</strong> to pay off<br />

more of their long term obligations, this however has made their operation<br />

- 42 -


efficiency ratios go down steadily over the previous years. This section will<br />

analyze these five ratios current ratio <strong>and</strong> quick asset ratio to judge liquidity, <strong>and</strong><br />

to further underst<strong>and</strong> the operating efficiency the inventory, receivables, <strong>and</strong><br />

working capital turnover ratios will be used <strong>and</strong> explained to produce a clear<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing of <strong>Cummins</strong> liquidity.<br />

Current Ratio<br />

2.00<br />

1.80<br />

1.60<br />

1.40<br />

1.20<br />

1.00<br />

0.80<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

0.60<br />

0.40<br />

0.20<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.49 1.53 1.49 1.77 1.87<br />

Caterpillar 1.23 1.33 1.22 1.20 1.20<br />

The current ratio is calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities. The<br />

ratio measures the ability of the firm to pay its short-term obligations. <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

averaged a current ratio of 1.63 for the five year period from 2002 through 2006,<br />

while the industry ratio averaged 1.24, for the same period. Both <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />

Caterpillar have sufficient means to cover their current obligations, but while<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> is increasing its ratio year over year by 12.24% from 2004 to 2006,<br />

Caterpillar’s ratio has remained stagnant at around 1.2. We think that through<br />

the cost cutting <strong>and</strong> efficiency programs that <strong>Cummins</strong> has applied, net earnings<br />

have increased substantially affecting the retained income that is reinvested into<br />

- 43 -


the company, <strong>and</strong> with low capital expenditures <strong>Cummins</strong> has been able to<br />

increase the size <strong>and</strong> growth of their current assets.<br />

Quick Ratio<br />

1.20<br />

1.00<br />

0.80<br />

0.60<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

0.40<br />

0.20<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 0.83 0.81 0.84 1.02 1.13<br />

Caterpillar 0.83 0.92 0.82 0.80 0.81<br />

The quick ratio is calculated by adding cash, securities <strong>and</strong> receivables <strong>and</strong> then<br />

dividing by the current liabilities. This ratio reveals the amount of liquid assets<br />

the company has on h<strong>and</strong> to cover their short-term debt obligations. <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

averaged .92 <strong>and</strong> 8.29% growth in for their quick ratio for the five year period,<br />

while Caterpillar averaged .82 <strong>and</strong> had flat growth for the same period. <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

is not outperforming the industry by much, but is growing at an average 8.29%<br />

<strong>and</strong> will in our opinion be able to break away from the industry <strong>and</strong> set a new<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard. Much of this growth is attributed to the company’s ability to generate<br />

<strong>and</strong> retain cash better than Caterpillar.<br />

- 44 -


The Accounts Receivable Turnover<br />

8.00<br />

7.00<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

3.00<br />

2.00<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 7.27 6.78 7.27 6.97 6.43<br />

Caterpillar 2.10 2.02 2.40 2.60 2.77<br />

The accounts receivable turnover is found by dividing sales by accounts<br />

receivable. This ratio measures the firm’s ability to collect cash from previous<br />

sales. <strong>Cummins</strong> had an average turnover of 6.94 which means that it is taking<br />

them 52.56 days to collect on their receivables. One alarming fact is that the rate<br />

at which <strong>Cummins</strong> collects has been increasing from 50.2 days outst<strong>and</strong>ing in<br />

2002, to 56.76 days in 2006. we are not pleased with managements<br />

ineffectiveness to decrease the collection period. Caterpillar had an average<br />

turnover of 2.38, meaning that their collection period for the five year period<br />

averaged 153.45 days, while reaming relatively flat through the period. While<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> may be extending their collection period, they are obviously performing<br />

above the industry average. We attribute the growth into developing economies<br />

as one of the reasons that <strong>Cummins</strong> has let their turnover ratio slip. These<br />

developing economies are growing at a high rate <strong>and</strong> have a harder time paying<br />

- 45 -


their short-term debts. By lowering the collection period <strong>Cummins</strong> could have<br />

more cash to reinvest back into the firm. It would be a bad decision by<br />

management to let this trend continue.<br />

Inventory Turnover<br />

8.00<br />

7.00<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

3.00<br />

2.00<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 7.50 7.06 6.65 6.59 6.29<br />

Caterpillar 5.48 5.56 4.81 5.08 4.65<br />

The inventory turnover is computed by dividing cost of goods sold by inventories.<br />

This ratio tells whether inventories are building up or declining. <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

experienced an average turnover of 6.94 or 52.56 days of inventory on h<strong>and</strong>,<br />

while Caterpillar had an average ratio of 5.12 or 72.66 days in the period<br />

between 2002 <strong>and</strong> 2006. <strong>Cummins</strong> is performing above the industry average but<br />

has seen a higher increase in the inventory holding period with an average<br />

increase by 7.28% as opposed to Caterpillar’s average increase of 4.51%. We<br />

believe that this trend has been increasing at this alarming rate due to<br />

- 46 -


management’s inability to accurately forecast sales, <strong>and</strong> this fault is hurting the<br />

firm’s profitability.<br />

Working Capital Turnover Ratio<br />

12.00<br />

10.00<br />

8.00<br />

6.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

4.00<br />

2.00<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 8.96 8.57 7.84 5.84 5.44<br />

Caterpillar 7.44 5.46 8.55 9.43 10.81<br />

The working capital turnover is calculated by finding the working capital, which is<br />

current assets less current liabilities <strong>and</strong> then dividing sales by that number.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> averaged a turnover ratio of 7.33 for 2002 through 2006, compared to<br />

Caterpillar’s average turnover of 8.34 for the same period. <strong>Cummins</strong> is above the<br />

industry with higher working capital compared to sales, <strong>and</strong> is also decreasing<br />

their turnover rate at 11.32%, compared to Caterpillar’s increasing turnover rate<br />

of 13.73%. A decreasing turnover rate means that the firm is increasing current<br />

assets more than current liabilities, <strong>and</strong> therefore is using retained earnings to<br />

finance day to day assets <strong>and</strong> activities rather than using debt. Caterpillar is<br />

using short-term debt to finance their day to day activities. We think that<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong>’s trend in increasing working capital can continue to improve the<br />

overall liquidity of the firm as well as the profitability in the next few years.<br />

- 47 -


Profitability <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

Profitability analysis is composed of six ratios that measure <strong>Cummins</strong> efficiency in<br />

generating a profit. These various ratios include gross profit margin, operating<br />

expense, net profit margin, asset productivity, return on assets, <strong>and</strong> return on<br />

equity. The first three are all measures operating efficiency, a factor of<br />

profitability that attempts to reach a given level of sales with minimum<br />

associated costs. The latter three measure the revenue or profit productivity of<br />

resources utilized by <strong>Cummins</strong>. Profitability analysis provides insight to how<br />

efficiently the company is employing resources <strong>and</strong> mitigating costs to produce a<br />

profit.<br />

Profitability <strong>Analysis</strong> for <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

Gross Profit Margin 17.85% 17.84% 19.91% 22.04% 22.84<br />

Operating Expense 15.48% 15.25% 13.46% 13.03% 12.93<br />

Net Profit Margin 1.40% 0.79% 4.15% 5.55% 6.29%<br />

Asset Productivity 1.21 1.23 1.29% 1.44 1.52<br />

Return on Assets 1.70% 0.98% 5.36% 7.99% 9.58%<br />

Return on <strong>Equity</strong> 8.79% 4.66% 21.75% 26.33% 23.40<br />

Profitability <strong>Analysis</strong> for Caterpillar<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

Gross profit margin 24.84% 25.56% 25.77% 26.92% 28.83%<br />

Operating expense ratio 18.27% 18.14% 16.91% 16.50% 16.97%<br />

Net profit margin 3.96% 4.83% 6.71% 7.85% 8.52%<br />

Asset turnover 0.62 0.62 0.70 0.77 0.82<br />

Return on assets 2.44% 3.01% 4.72% 6.06% 6.95%<br />

Return on equity 14.58% 12.11% 27.25% 33.85% 51.57%<br />

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In summation, all measures of profitability have considerably increased <strong>and</strong><br />

improved in almost every consecutive year. This can be attributed to three<br />

dominant factors: (1) management’s focus on creating investor value through<br />

higher profits <strong>and</strong> lower expenses using programs such as Six Sigma <strong>and</strong> (2)<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>ing into high growth related markets, such as South East Asia <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Middle East <strong>and</strong> (3) a rising economic dem<strong>and</strong> for the industry throughout the<br />

entire five year period.<br />

Gross Profit Margin<br />

35.00%<br />

30.00%<br />

25.00%<br />

20.00%<br />

15.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

10.00%<br />

5.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 17.85% 17.84% 19.91% 22.04% 22.84%<br />

Caterpillar 24.84% 25.65% 25.77% 26.92% 28.83%<br />

The gross profit margin is the percentage of which revenues exceed the direct<br />

costs associated with the revenue. This ratio is affected by the premium<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong>’ charges, the industry structure <strong>and</strong> product offered, <strong>and</strong> the cost<br />

efficiency of the firm’s production. Gross profit margins for the entire industry<br />

- 49 -


have consistently improved over the past five years. <strong>Cummins</strong> has witnessed the<br />

most year-to-year growth in the period from 2004 to 2006 as a result of the<br />

company’s change in business strategy in 2003. While Caterpillar’s margins are<br />

more favorable (28.84% in 2006 versus <strong>Cummins</strong>’s margin of 22.84%), <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

is improving its margin at faster rate of 7.16% on average, as compared to the<br />

average of 5.78% that Caterpillar has been growing at over the previous three<br />

years. With this higher growth rate, we believe that <strong>Cummins</strong> should be able to<br />

catch up to Caterpillar’s higher gross profit margins, which we have designated<br />

the industry average, because of the high concentration of the industry.<br />

Although C.M.I.’s gross profit margin falls below the industry average for 2002-<br />

2006, it is improving <strong>and</strong> is indicative of the company’s growth.<br />

Operating Expense Ratio<br />

20.00%<br />

18.00%<br />

16.00%<br />

14.00%<br />

12.00%<br />

10.00%<br />

8.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

6.00%<br />

4.00%<br />

2.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 15.48% 15.25% 13.46% 13.03% 12.93%<br />

Caterpillar 18.27% 18.14% 16.91% 16.50% 16.97%<br />

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The operating expense ratio compares selling, general, <strong>and</strong> administrative<br />

expenses to sales, reflecting the efficiency of a firm’s operating structure.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> efficiently utilizes operating expenses as a part of sales relative to<br />

Caterpillar. <strong>Cummins</strong> has been effectively reducing their margin from 15.48% in<br />

2002 to 12.93% in 2006, a 19% improvement for the entire period <strong>and</strong> an<br />

average yearly reduction of 4.3%, compared to Caterpillar’s average reduction of<br />

only 1.76%. It should also be noted that SG&A expenses only rose at a rate of<br />

12.43% from 2004 to 2006, while net sales increased at a rate of 22% for the<br />

same period. <strong>Cummins</strong> is an industry leader in controlling operating expenses,<br />

operating 4% more efficiently than Caterpillar’s operating expense ratio of<br />

16.97%. We believe this to be a great competitive advantage for <strong>Cummins</strong> as it<br />

can generate more sales without a large increase in SG&A, producing wider,<br />

more profitable margins than the industry st<strong>and</strong>ards.<br />

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Net Profit Margin<br />

9.00%<br />

8.00%<br />

7.00%<br />

6.00%<br />

5.00%<br />

4.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

3.00%<br />

2.00%<br />

1.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.40% 0.79% 4.15% 5.55% 6.29%<br />

Caterpillar 3.96% 4.83% 6.71% 7.85% 8.52%<br />

Net profit margin is the percentage of net income to sales. <strong>Cummins</strong> has<br />

obtained a net profit margin of 6.29% in 2006. In this low profit industry with a<br />

high level of fixed costs, net profit margins in this range are expected. Compared<br />

to its previous profit margins in the period of 2002 to 2003, <strong>Cummins</strong> has<br />

significantly improved upon turning a profit. This is attributable to a restructuring<br />

phase the business endured between 2003 <strong>and</strong> 2004 that focused on<br />

productivity <strong>and</strong> cost control. The restructuring included the implementation of<br />

the Six Sigma program, an increased push to grab a larger international market<br />

share which in turn boosted sales through accessing related markets in<br />

developing economies. <strong>Cummins</strong> went from profits of 1.4% <strong>and</strong> .79% in 2002,<br />

2003 <strong>and</strong> jumped to 4.15%, 5.55% <strong>and</strong> 6.29% in 2004, 2005 <strong>and</strong> 2006.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> net profit margin is almost 2% lower than the industry st<strong>and</strong>ard.<br />

Caterpillar experienced an 8.52% net profit margin in 2006, but has only been<br />

- 52 -


able to grow their earnings by an average of 12.72% in the last two years, while<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has grown in the same period by an average of 23.6%. Even though<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> is currently underperforming compared to the industry, we believe that<br />

the company is producing earnings at a reasonable level <strong>and</strong> will not have a<br />

problem reaching the industry level because of their attractive earnings growth<br />

rate.<br />

Asset Productivity<br />

1.60<br />

1.40<br />

1.20<br />

1.00<br />

0.80<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

0.60<br />

0.40<br />

0.20<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.21 1.23 1.29 1.44 1.52<br />

Caterpillar 0.62 0.62 0.70 0.77 0.82<br />

Asset productivity measures how efficiently resources are employed in<br />

generating revenue. Asset productivity is derived by dividing sales by total<br />

assets. <strong>Cummins</strong> asset productivity exceeds Caterpillar’s for the entire period.<br />

This is a result of Caterpillar having trouble finding efficient ways to generate<br />

sales from its enormous asset base. Simultaneously, <strong>Cummins</strong> was able to grow<br />

sales without investing in new assets <strong>and</strong> instead, relied on improving previous<br />

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capital investments to increase capacity. <strong>Cummins</strong> has a relatively smaller asset<br />

base although both own tremendous amounts of resources. <strong>Cummins</strong> asset<br />

turnover averages 1.42 from 2004 to 2006, meaning that they are bringing in<br />

$1.42 in sales for every dollar spent on assets, as opposed to Caterpillar’s<br />

average of $0.76 in sales revenue for every dollar spent on assets in the same<br />

period. Obviously <strong>Cummins</strong> is outperforming the industry average in this area,<br />

but are they are only growing their turnover ratio by an average of 5.96%, while<br />

Caterpillar is growing theirs at a rate of 7.39%. <strong>Cummins</strong> is very productive with<br />

its assets, so it is becoming harder <strong>and</strong> harder to squeeze sales revenue out of<br />

assets that are producing as close to capacity as possible. Although Caterpillar<br />

has been growing its asset base in order to boost sales, they also have plenty of<br />

room to improve turnover by focusing on productivity. This will in turn make it<br />

easier to attain a higher growth rate. For this reason, we believe that <strong>Cummins</strong>’<br />

asset turnover ratio growth will slow <strong>and</strong> level off, allowing the industry to<br />

eventually catch up to <strong>Cummins</strong>’s productive st<strong>and</strong>ards. While the growth in<br />

asset turnover for <strong>Cummins</strong> will most likely start to level off, we believe that the<br />

company can continue to produce an attractive asset turnover ratio in the future<br />

<strong>and</strong> stay an industry leader in productivity.<br />

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Return on Assets<br />

12.00%<br />

10.00%<br />

8.00%<br />

6.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

4.00%<br />

2.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.70% 0.98% 5.36% 7.99% 9.58%<br />

Caterpillar 2.44% 3.01% 4.72% 6.06% 6.95%<br />

Return on assets is a comprehensive measure of profitability that observes both<br />

profits <strong>and</strong> resources utilized to generate profits. The rate of return is found by<br />

dividing net income by assets. Alternatively, the rate of return on assets can be<br />

found by multiplying the profit margin by asset turnover. As discussed above,<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> is the industry leader in productivity of assets. <strong>Cummins</strong> has<br />

outperformed the industry’s average return on assets of 5.91%, with an average<br />

of 7.64% over the last three years. Also they have been able to outgrow the<br />

industry’s average return on asset growth rate by almost 13% for the same<br />

period. This performance level is attributable to <strong>Cummins</strong>’ ability to control costs<br />

through programs such as Six Sigma <strong>and</strong> its ability to control capital spending by<br />

investing in already owned assets. Both boost capacity <strong>and</strong> productivity, two<br />

areas that eventually enhance net income ROA. We believe that <strong>Cummins</strong> can<br />

continue to grow ROA at such profitable levels because of their past performance<br />

<strong>and</strong> new operating strategies.<br />

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Return on <strong>Equity</strong><br />

60.00%<br />

50.00%<br />

40.00%<br />

30.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

20.00%<br />

10.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 8.79% 4.66% 21.75% 26.33% 23.40%<br />

Caterpillar 14.58% 12.11% 27.25% 33.85% 51.57%<br />

Return on equity (R.O.E.) reflects the profitability of the owner’s interest in total<br />

assets. This rate of return measure is found by dividing net income by owner’s<br />

equity. Return on equity is dependent on profit margins, asset turnover, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

ratio of total debt to owner’s equity (a ratio discussed under Capital Structure<br />

Ratios). <strong>Cummins</strong> has witnessed 18.4% growth in its R.O.E. since 2003.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> R.O.E. peaked in 2005 at 26.33% <strong>and</strong> has since leveled off at 23.40%.<br />

Although <strong>Cummins</strong> has significantly improved its R.O.E., <strong>Cummins</strong> shareholder’s<br />

should be cognitive of the fact that Caterpillar experienced a 36.44% increase in<br />

its R.O.E. from 2002-2005. This includes a 17.72% improvement in R.O.E. in<br />

2006, a period in which <strong>Cummins</strong> return on equity experienced a slight decline.<br />

This poses an interesting consideration for <strong>Cummins</strong> investors who might see<br />

that as an indication that their ownership interest will not improve its profitability<br />

in the future. However, <strong>Cummins</strong> decline in R.O.E. in 2006 stems mostly from<br />

increasing total shareholder equity from 1,864 billion dollars in 2005 to 2,802<br />

- 56 -


illion in 2006. Net income increased significantly from 2005 to 2006 (30%) so<br />

the variance in R.O.E. between <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong> Caterpillar should not be of great<br />

concern. Caterpillar increased their R.O.E. through repurchasing 4,075 million<br />

dollars worth of outst<strong>and</strong>ing shares. This financial management policy employed<br />

by Caterpillar has allowed it to possess a superior R.O.E.<br />

Capital Structure <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

A company’s capital structure is composed of debt <strong>and</strong> equity. These are the<br />

financing options used to obtain assets. Analyzing capital structure involves<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing the amount of relative debt to equity <strong>and</strong> the ability to cover<br />

principal <strong>and</strong> interest requirements on debt. Three significant capital structure<br />

ratios are: debt to equity, times interest earned, <strong>and</strong> debt service margin.<br />

Interpreting these three ratios as a whole provides a balanced picture of a<br />

company’s capital structure.<br />

Capital Structure <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

Debt<br />

<strong>Equity</strong><br />

Times<br />

Interest<br />

Earned<br />

Debt<br />

Service<br />

Margin<br />

to<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

4.18 3.78 3.06 2.30 1.44<br />

2.28 2.01 4.94 8.32 12.23<br />

1.40 3.22 1.77 4.94 5.12<br />

Overall, <strong>Cummins</strong> capital structure has improved every year since 2002, a result<br />

of higher income <strong>and</strong> cash from operations as well as offering more equity<br />

relative to debt.<br />

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Debt to <strong>Equity</strong> Ratio<br />

7.00<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

3.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

2.00<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 4.18 3.78 3.06 2.30 1.44<br />

Caterpillar 4.98 5.00 4.77 4.58 6.42<br />

The debt to equity ratio measures the proportion of total debt relative to equity.<br />

Debt to equity is found by dividing total liabilities by total owner’s equity. A firm’s<br />

debt to equity ratio serves as a good indicator of a company’s credit risk.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has been decreasing their debt to equity ratio from 4.18 in 2002, to<br />

1.44 in 2006. That is an average decline in debt leverage of 22.7% during the<br />

five year period. Their credit risk also declined <strong>and</strong> St<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>and</strong> Poor’s elevated<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> credit rating to investment grade with a stable outlook during 2005.<br />

This reduced the company’s cost of debt. Management policies that improved<br />

this ratio include significantly increasing equity financing during 2006 (discussed<br />

under Return on <strong>Equity</strong> section above) <strong>and</strong> entering into long-term supply<br />

contracts with suppliers, reducing credit risk <strong>and</strong> the cost of obtaining debt.<br />

- 58 -


<strong>Cummins</strong> is well-positioned to repay its obligations in 2007 with a debt to equity<br />

ratio of 1.44. This is important as the industry is anticipating a leveling out or<br />

slight decline in sales for 2007. Caterpillar experienced a slight annual decline in<br />

their debt to equity ratio from 2002 to 2005. In 2006, the company repurchased<br />

4.075 billion dollars worth of outst<strong>and</strong>ing stock, reducing its equity base <strong>and</strong><br />

increasing its debt to equity. This indicates that Caterpillar has substantial<br />

leverage <strong>and</strong> a higher credit risk than <strong>Cummins</strong>. Caterpillar has increased its<br />

leverage, possessing a 6.42 debt to equity ratio, without reducing its credit<br />

rating. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the cost of equity is more expensive than debt,<br />

allowing Caterpillar to continue paying out lower dividends to investors. <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

is leading the industry in lower debt to equity through growing by retaining<br />

earnings <strong>and</strong> acquiring as little debt as possible.<br />

Times Interest Earned<br />

20.00<br />

18.00<br />

16.00<br />

14.00<br />

12.00<br />

10.00<br />

8.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

6.00<br />

4.00<br />

2.00<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 2.28 2.01 4.94 8.32 12.23<br />

Caterpillar 4.98 7.09 13.03 16.28 19.04<br />

Times interest earned is a ratio that measures the ability of a firm’s income from<br />

operations to cover interest charges. This ratio is found by adding back interest<br />

- 59 -


<strong>and</strong> taxes to net income (NIBIT) <strong>and</strong> dividing it by interest expense. From 2002<br />

to 2006, <strong>Cummins</strong> increased its times interest earned from 2.28 to 12.23, a<br />

437% improvement. The jump can be attributed to a higher growth rate of<br />

income from operations in proportion to interest expense. The high timers<br />

interest earned ratio indicates that the company has substantially enhanced its<br />

ability to pay interest expenses with cash on h<strong>and</strong>.<br />

While <strong>Cummins</strong> has plenty of cash to cover interest expenses, Caterpillar has<br />

even more. Caterpillar, an industry leader in this area, increased its times<br />

interest earned ratio from 4.98 in 2002 to 19.04 in 2006. Both firms increased<br />

this ratio at similar annual rates. However, Caterpillar is better positioned to<br />

cover interest expenses with available cash from operations in the event of an<br />

economic downturn. Under current economic conditions, both companies could<br />

increase their dividend per share. However, if future economic conditions<br />

worsen, <strong>Cummins</strong> would have to reduce its dividend per share before Caterpillar,<br />

adversely affecting its stock price.<br />

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Debt Service Margin<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

3.00<br />

2.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

-1.00<br />

-2.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 1.40 3.22 1.77 4.94 5.12<br />

Caterpillar 0.60 0.69 -1.13 0.69 1.30<br />

The debt service margin illustrates the firm’s ability to cover current maturities in<br />

debt with cash provided from operations. The ratio is found by dividing the cash<br />

flows from operations by the current installments due in long-term debt.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has been increasing their ratio by 3.8% from 2005 to 2006, from 4.94<br />

to 5.12. Caterpillar only attained ratios of .69 <strong>and</strong> 1.3, but has grown the ratio by<br />

87.87% in the same period. While <strong>Cummins</strong>’ ratio is not growing as quickly as<br />

the industry’s is, they are leading the industry in debt coverage. Caterpillar is<br />

providing only $1.30 in cash flows from operations for every dollar in current<br />

maturities of debt, while <strong>Cummins</strong> is providing $5.12 from operations for every<br />

dollar in installments due. Clearly management is doing a good job of debt<br />

control <strong>and</strong> expansion of cash flows from operations. We believe that <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

will continue to grow their debt service margin slowly but will be able to sustain<br />

attractive levels of coverage, <strong>and</strong> lead the industry.<br />

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Extended Ratio <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

The extended ratio analysis goes beyond the basic 14 ratios used to evaluate a<br />

firm’s performance. We decided to further evaluate <strong>Cummins</strong> using ratios that<br />

focus on more specific items we deem important to the valuation of the<br />

company, to get a better grasp on management’s performance.<br />

Dividend Payout Ratio<br />

120.00%<br />

100.00%<br />

80.00%<br />

60.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

40.00%<br />

20.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 60.98% 100.00% 15.14% 10.18% 9.23%<br />

Caterpillar 0.18% 0.13% 0.04% 0.03% 0.03%<br />

The dividend payout ratio is found by dividing the amount of dividends paid by<br />

net income. This ratio describes what percentage of net income is being paid to<br />

shareholders. The payout ratio for <strong>Cummins</strong> has been considerably higher than<br />

the industry average of .04% over the past three years, as compared to an<br />

average of 11.52% in the same period. One reason that Caterpillar’s ratio has<br />

remained basically flat <strong>and</strong> low since 2004 is that they have a more conservative<br />

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dividend policy <strong>and</strong> choose to retain most of their income in order to finance<br />

further growth. <strong>Cummins</strong> has a more aggressive dividend policy <strong>and</strong> chooses to<br />

pay out a higher percent of earnings to its shareholders. One reason for<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong>’ higher payout rates is its tendency to issue common stock to finance<br />

their asset growth as opposed to raising funds through debt. This falls in line<br />

with management’s strategy of paying down previously owned debt <strong>and</strong><br />

maintaining a more reasonable debt to equity ratio. Paying out high yielding<br />

dividends is attractive to investors, which in turn allows C.M.I. to easily raise<br />

equity financing. It should also be noted that <strong>Cummins</strong>’s ratio has been declining<br />

since 2004, but dividends paid per share of common stock have actually<br />

increased. This is due to the fact that earnings growth is outpacing the declared<br />

dividend growth rate. Therefore the percentage of net income used in paying out<br />

cash dividends is declining.<br />

Net Long-Term Asset Turnover Ratio<br />

4.50<br />

4.00<br />

3.50<br />

3.00<br />

2.50<br />

2.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

1.50<br />

1.00<br />

0.50<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 2.05 2.10 2.59 3.34 3.82<br />

Caterpillar 1.32 1.28 1.54 1.84 1.68<br />

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Net long-term asset turnover is a way of measuring the amount of dollars in<br />

sales produced from every dollar invested in long-term assets. Long-term assets<br />

play an important role in this industry; <strong>Cummins</strong> needs to be able to produce an<br />

acceptable turnover to keep capital investing in check. The average turnover<br />

ratio for <strong>Cummins</strong> over the past five years was 2.78 <strong>and</strong> has been growing<br />

during the same period at an impressive average of 17.24%. Compared to the<br />

industry’s average turnover ratio <strong>and</strong> growth rate at 1.53 <strong>and</strong> 7.03%, <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

is setting the st<strong>and</strong>ards for Caterpillar to follow. As previously discussed in the<br />

total asset turnover <strong>and</strong> ROA sections, <strong>Cummins</strong> has ingeniously been able to<br />

increase sales from previous investments in capital rather than investing in new<br />

assets to grow revenues, as Caterpillar has done. We believe that this is the<br />

greatest competitive advantage that <strong>Cummins</strong> has over the industry, <strong>and</strong> that<br />

they will continue to lead the industry in productivity <strong>and</strong> asset turnover.<br />

PP&E Turnover Ratio<br />

8.00<br />

7.00<br />

6.00<br />

5.00<br />

4.00<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

3.00<br />

2.00<br />

1.00<br />

0.00<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 4.49 4.67 5.12 6.37 7.22<br />

Caterpillar 2.86 3.12 3.95 4.55 4.69<br />

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The PP&E turnover is a measurement of the dollars in sales produced for every<br />

dollar invested in PP&E. This is simply a narrow look at the turnover that the<br />

company is experiencing from the PP&E portion of the fixed assets. We believe<br />

that this ratio is significant because it is highlighted by management in the 10-K.<br />

C.M.I. plans to focus on exp<strong>and</strong>ing PP&E minimally <strong>and</strong> grow sales from these<br />

specific fixed assets by investing in already existing PP&E. This should allow<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> to generate the products needed to supply new dem<strong>and</strong> in newly<br />

entered markets without a drastic increase in fixed costs. <strong>Cummins</strong> averages a<br />

PP&E turnover ratio of 5.57, outperforming the industry average ratio of 3.83.<br />

However, as was the case in the total asset turnover section, <strong>Cummins</strong>’ 12.9%<br />

growth rate of the PP&E turnover is slightly lower than Caterpillar’s average<br />

growth of 13.5%. We believe that if <strong>Cummins</strong> is to continue to exp<strong>and</strong> sales they<br />

will have a tough time growing their PP&E ratio much more than they already<br />

have. Instead of investing in improving PP&E, C.M.I. may have to start investing<br />

in new PP&E. Even though the growth rate of the ratio has slowed, we believe<br />

that the average ratio of 5.57 is impressive <strong>and</strong> can be maintained <strong>and</strong> improved<br />

upon by the company at a slower rate of ratio growth.<br />

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EBITDA Margin<br />

18.00%<br />

16.00%<br />

14.00%<br />

12.00%<br />

10.00%<br />

8.00%<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong><br />

Caterpillar<br />

6.00%<br />

4.00%<br />

2.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> 5.07% 4.99% 8.40% 11.02% 12.09%<br />

Caterpillar 13.96% 14.35% 14.01% 14.95% 15.70%<br />

The EBITDA margin is a means of measuring profitability after compensating for<br />

taxes, interest, depreciation <strong>and</strong> amortization. Over the period of 2004 to 2006,<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has averaged a profitability margin of 10.51%, underperforming the<br />

industry average of 15%. The industry has been growing the margin by an<br />

average of 5.86%, while <strong>Cummins</strong> has been growing their margin at an average<br />

of 20.44% per year since 2004. <strong>Cummins</strong> is underperforming the industry in<br />

profit margins, but is outpacing the industry in its growth of profitability. While<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> is not yet at the desired level of earnings performance, we believe that<br />

management has done a good job turning around <strong>and</strong> restructuring the<br />

company. In our opinion, C.M.I. should attain or exceed the industry average<br />

because of the rate at which profitability is growing.<br />

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SGR & IGR <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

IGR & SGR<br />

25.00%<br />

20.00%<br />

15.00%<br />

10.00%<br />

IGR<br />

SGR<br />

5.00%<br />

0.00%<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

IGR 0.66% 0.00% 4.55% 7.18% 8.69%<br />

SGR 3.43% 0.00% 18.46% 23.65% 21.24%<br />

The sustainable growth rate (SGR) is the maximum rate of growth that a firm<br />

can sustain without borrowing additional equity. The internal growth rate (IGR)<br />

is the highest rate of growth that a firm can attain while keeping earnings <strong>and</strong><br />

financial policies the same. These ratios allow us to benchmark <strong>and</strong> asses<br />

managements strategy for growing the firm. IGR is found by multiplying the ROA<br />

by 1 less the dividend payout ratio, <strong>and</strong> SGR is found by multiplying the IGR by 1<br />

plus the debt to equity ratio. These are <strong>Cummins</strong>’ ratios as follows.<br />

SGR will always be either greater than or equal to IGR, <strong>and</strong> will increase or<br />

decrease at the same rate. In the years 2002 <strong>and</strong> 2003, before the company<br />

restructured, both ratios showed little ability for the firm to grow using the same<br />

financial practices or without adding additional equity. There was a sharp<br />

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increase from 2003 to 2004, that illustrated a change in managements strategy<br />

for growth. By looking back at the company’s previous five years of income<br />

statements, we see that <strong>Cummins</strong> experienced an increase in net earnings of<br />

600%, from 50 million in 2003, to 350 million in 2004, <strong>and</strong> continued to grow<br />

earnings through 2006 at a new pace than in the previous periods. We believe<br />

that the years prior to 2004 should be discounted when assessing growth,<br />

because prior to 2004, <strong>Cummins</strong> was financially a different company than in the<br />

later three years. By examining the ratios we believe that <strong>Cummins</strong> has potential<br />

for attractive growth in the future by using the same financial policies during<br />

2004 to 2006 <strong>and</strong> by keeping up the same rate of growth in earnings will reduce<br />

the need to borrow additional equity to finance further growth.<br />

Forecasting<br />

We have evaluated the past trends <strong>and</strong> ratios of <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong> the industry in<br />

order to forecast the firm’s financial position <strong>and</strong> growth through 2016.<br />

Since the fiscal year of 2000, <strong>Cummins</strong> has been working towards their strategy<br />

to become a low cost provider <strong>and</strong> a participant in related high growth markets,<br />

mainly in regards to developing countries. Between 2003 <strong>and</strong> 2004, there are<br />

considerable differences in the five year growth trends concerning net earnings,<br />

sales, <strong>and</strong> total assets to name some of the more forecast-able statement items.<br />

This ‘blemish’ to the trend, gives us reason to discount the 2003 to 2004 period<br />

as part of a restructuring time frame that will most likely not continue to produce<br />

these abnormal increases on future financial statements. When including this<br />

period of the company’s performance, the average of all five years data<br />

constructs growth in some areas of the balance <strong>and</strong> income statements that is<br />

not reasonably sustainable. For this reason, we have decided to use the period of<br />

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2005 to 2006 to forecast a more rational direction that we believe <strong>Cummins</strong> is<br />

headed.<br />

Total assets during the 2003 to 2004 period increased by more than 27%,<br />

around 20% more than the growth attained over the 2005, 2006 period of<br />

5.48% <strong>and</strong> 8.42%, that averages out to 6.95%. This more reasonable rate also<br />

compares well with the asset growth rate of 5.97%, from 2002 to 2003. The<br />

return on assets for the periods 2004, 2005 <strong>and</strong> 2006, are 5.36%, 8% <strong>and</strong><br />

9.58%, compared to returns of 1.4% <strong>and</strong> .79%, in the 2002, 2003 period. These<br />

ratio results further strengthen our assumption that in the middle of the<br />

observed period, from 2002 to 2006, <strong>Cummins</strong> changed their company’s<br />

operations <strong>and</strong> strategies <strong>and</strong> are now operating at a drastically different level in<br />

2005 <strong>and</strong> 2006 than in the previous years.<br />

The 2004 statement of earnings also mirrors the changes made in 2003 <strong>and</strong><br />

2004. During this time frame earnings grew by 600%, an obviously irrational<br />

number to include in our forecast of future earnings. Net sales jumped as well in<br />

2004, increasing by 34% compared to an average growth rate of around 7% in<br />

years prior to 2004, <strong>and</strong> then leveled off to an average of 16%, in 2005 <strong>and</strong><br />

2006.<br />

We have found some explanations to validate our opinion that the 2003 to 2004<br />

period was a restructuring phase of the company <strong>and</strong> should not be included in<br />

the forecasting of future growth.<br />

One of the company’s strategies in 2000, was to become a low cost leader in<br />

their industry by implementing the ‘Six Sigma’ program. The sole purpose behind<br />

the program is to make the company as a whole more productive <strong>and</strong> cost<br />

effective allowing <strong>Cummins</strong> to earn more money on every dollar brought in by<br />

sales. Six Sigma shows evidence that the strategy is working through an increase<br />

- 69 -


in operating income of 234% <strong>and</strong> increases to net income of 600% in 2004,<br />

while only stating an increase in net sales of 34% <strong>and</strong> an operating expense<br />

ratio of 13.46%, <strong>and</strong> sales growth into 2005, 2006 averaging 16%, with a<br />

declining operating expense ratio of 13.03% <strong>and</strong> 12.93%. One should also figure<br />

in the high growth seen during this period in the capital industry, but the world<br />

<strong>and</strong> domestic economic growth alone can not support this abnormal year of<br />

2004. <strong>Inc</strong>reases of earnings at this level also can not be explained by mere cost<br />

cutting programs even though <strong>Cummins</strong> has been effectively cutting operating<br />

costs since 2003.<br />

As previously mentioned, <strong>Cummins</strong> also planned to exp<strong>and</strong> into related markets.<br />

These related markets do not require drastic changes in the capital structure or<br />

investments <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> existing products so that <strong>Cummins</strong> could utilize unused<br />

capacity to supply these markets needs. Most of these new markets are located<br />

in developing economies that have been experiencing high growth, such as<br />

China <strong>and</strong> the Middle East. Through examining managements’ notes in the 2004<br />

10-K report, we believe that the increase of total assets by 27% in 2004, is due<br />

to a partnership that <strong>Cummins</strong> Captured in China with Dongfeng Auto, <strong>Inc</strong>. In<br />

February of 2003, <strong>Cummins</strong> entered into an agreement with Dongfeng Auto <strong>and</strong><br />

attained a large market share as well as high growth in the booming Chinese <strong>and</strong><br />

Asian economies that explains the jump in sales in 2004 of 34% in sales <strong>and</strong><br />

increases in net income. <strong>Cummins</strong> had to contribute large amounts of capital to<br />

this new partnership in order to supply the new related market. Between 2003<br />

<strong>and</strong> 2004 this can be seen by examining the new issuance of common stock, for<br />

financing the build up, as well as examining the increase of total assets by $1.4<br />

billion, an increase of 27%. It is our belief that, after this large initial investment<br />

in the Chinese market, management will not continue to grow assets at this<br />

unsustainable rate, <strong>and</strong> will only continue to grow assets at a more reasonable<br />

rate, as they did in 2005 <strong>and</strong> 2006 at 5.48% <strong>and</strong> 8.42%, in order to keep up<br />

with these growing markets in developing economies. One fact that we are using<br />

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to support this assumption is that capital expenditures have not deviated by<br />

enough to suggest that the company is still attempting to exp<strong>and</strong> at this rate.<br />

Over the period from 2002 to 2006 capital expenditures have not deviated much<br />

from year to year <strong>and</strong> average approximately 29%. This steady trend in the<br />

increase of capital spending supports management’s statement that they are<br />

keeping capital expenditures in check by focusing not on acquiring new plants<br />

<strong>and</strong> machinery to support growth, as <strong>Cummins</strong> did prior to the year 2000, but<br />

instead improving already existing facilities to support more productivity while<br />

teaming up with partners to help grow at a more sustainable cost to the<br />

company.<br />

Through the extensive restructuring <strong>and</strong> strategy re-evaluations that the<br />

company experienced in 2003 <strong>and</strong> 2004, we believe it is best not to incorporate<br />

this time period into our forecasting of the company’s heading. We believe that<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> finished the ‘overhauling’ of their business strategy <strong>and</strong> investment<br />

structure, during the period of 2003, 2004 <strong>and</strong> has been implementing the new<br />

company structure <strong>and</strong> operating through the years 2005 <strong>and</strong> 2006, at a pattern<br />

that is likely to continue. Therefore, we will be deriving most of our opinions <strong>and</strong><br />

assumptions from the last two years data instead of all five years.<br />

Statement of Earnings<br />

In trying to forecast the financial information for <strong>Cummins</strong>, we determined that<br />

the best point of departure was to determine the sales growth. We found the<br />

average growth rate of sales to be about 16.05% for the years 2005-2006. The<br />

Industry average was about 10% growth in sales (MSN Money). We decided<br />

long term sales growth would be about the average of 10%. We do not believe<br />

that <strong>Cummins</strong> will be able to sustain this high growth rate through 2016,<br />

because sales are starting to catch up to the industry average <strong>and</strong> it will be<br />

harder to sustain more than the industry rate of 10% as the benchmark becomes<br />

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larger <strong>and</strong> larger. The growth rate declined from 16.05% to 14.56% in 2005 <strong>and</strong><br />

2006, <strong>and</strong> we believe this trend in growth should continue to decline until<br />

reaching the industry average. We continued to decline sales growth this decline<br />

in sales growth each year by 1% until we reached the industry average of 10%.<br />

With our forecast <strong>Cummins</strong>’ sales will reach approximately 20.02 billion in the<br />

next five years, growing by 54.53% <strong>and</strong> 32.24 billion at a growth rate of almost<br />

149% in ten years.<br />

Through <strong>Cummins</strong>’ implementation of Six Sigma, they have been able to<br />

decrease cost of goods sold as a proportion of sales by an average of 2% since<br />

2003 when the program began to show improvements. In 2006 the decrease in<br />

cost of goods sold began to taper off, so we continued that trend by decreasing<br />

cost of goods sold by .05% each year for 5 years before leveling of at 74% of<br />

sales. Caterpillar averaged a cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales of 72%<br />

over the past two years, so our forecast was consistent with the industry<br />

average.<br />

We believe that <strong>Cummins</strong> has the ability to sustain operating expense at 13.7%<br />

of sales. This was in part due to the fact that the Six Sigma program that they<br />

implemented in 2000 included focusing on not only the manufacturing processes,<br />

but the Selling General <strong>and</strong> Administrative related activates as well.<br />

With the firms management focusing on productivity <strong>and</strong> cost control we believe<br />

that earnings will sustain an average of 7.85% of sales through 2016.<br />

With this assumption we forecast sales to more than double to 1.67 billion by<br />

2011, <strong>and</strong> reach 2.7 billion in ten years, attaining a growth rate of 227%.<br />

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CUMMINS INC. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES<br />

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS<br />

(in millions, except per share earnings)<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Net sales 5,853 6,296 8,438 9,918 11,362 12953 14637 16393 18196 20016 22017 24219 26641 29305 32236<br />

Cost of sales 4,808 5,173 6,758 7,732 8,767 9844 11051 12295 13556 14812 16293 17922 19714 21686 23854<br />

107<br />

Gross margin 1,045 1,123 1,680 2,186 2,595 3109 3586 4098 4640 5204 5725 6297 6927 7619 8381<br />

Operating expenses <strong>and</strong> income<br />

Selling <strong>and</strong> administrative expenses 736 830 1,015 1,145 1,283 1,424<br />

Research <strong>and</strong> engineering expenses 201 200 241 278 321 330<br />

Investee equity, royalty <strong>and</strong> other<br />

income (22) (70) (120) (131) (140)<br />

Other operating expenses (income) (9) 5<br />

Total operating expenses <strong>and</strong><br />

income 906 960 1,136 1,292 1,469 1,775 2,005 2,246 2,493 2,742 3,016 3,318 3,650 4,015 4,416<br />

Operating earnings 139 163 544 894 1,126 1,334 1,581 1,852 2,147 2,462 2,708 2,979 3,277 3,605 3,965<br />

Interest income (12) (24) (47)<br />

Interest expense 61 90 111 109 96 149 168 189 209 230 253 279 306 337 371<br />

Other expenses (income) (18) 8 11 (1)<br />

Earnings before income taxes <strong>and</strong><br />

minority interest 78 91 437 798 1,078 1,185 1,412 1,664 1,938 2,232 2,455 2,700 2,970 3,268 3,594<br />

Provision (benefit) for income taxes (20) 27 56 216 324 324 366 410 455 500 550 605 666 733 806<br />

Minority interest in earnings of<br />

consolidated subsidiaries 16 14 26 32 44 39 44 49 55 60 66 73 80 88 97<br />

Net earnings 82 50 350 550 715 822 1,003 1,205 1,428 1,671 1,838 2,022 2,225 2,447 2,692<br />

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CUMMINS INC. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES<br />

COMMON SIZED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

7.57% 34.02% 17.54% 14.56% 14.00% 13.00% 12.00% 11.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00% 10.00%<br />

Net sales 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />

Cost of sales 82.15% 82.16% 80.09% 77.96% 77.16% 76.00% 75.50% 75.00% 74.50% 74.00% 74.00% 74.00% 74.00% 74.00% 74.00%<br />

Gross margin 17.85% 17.84% 19.91% 22.04% 22.84% 24.00% 24.50% 25.00% 25.50% 26.00% 26.00% 26.00% 26.00% 26.00% 26.00%<br />

Operating expenses <strong>and</strong><br />

income avg 11.42%<br />

Selling <strong>and</strong> administrative<br />

expenses 12.57% 13.18% 12.03% 11.54% 11.29% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00% 11.00%<br />

Research <strong>and</strong> engineering<br />

expenses 3.43% 3.18% 2.86% 2.80% 2.83% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70% 2.70%<br />

Investee equity, royalty <strong>and</strong><br />

other income -0.38% -1.11% -1.42% -1.32% -1.23%<br />

Other operating expenses<br />

(income) -0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04%<br />

Total operating expenses<br />

<strong>and</strong> income 15.48% 15.25% 13.46% 13.03% 12.93% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70% 13.70%<br />

Operating earnings 2.37% 2.59% 6.45% 9.01% 9.91% 10.30% 10.80% 11.30% 11.80% 12.30% 12.30% 12.30% 12.30% 12.30% 12.30%<br />

Interest income 0.00% 0.00% -0.14% -0.24% -0.41%<br />

Interest expense 1.04% 1.43% 1.32% 1.10% 0.84% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15% 1.15%<br />

Other expenses (income) 0.00% -0.29% 0.09% 0.11% -0.01%<br />

Earnings before income taxes<br />

<strong>and</strong> minority interest 1.33% 1.45% 5.18% 8.05% 9.49% 9.15% 9.65% 10.15% 10.65% 11.15% 11.15% 11.15% 11.15% 11.15% 11.15%<br />

Provision (benefit) for income<br />

taxes -0.34% 0.43% 0.66% 2.18% 2.85% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% 2.50%<br />

Minority interest in earnings of<br />

consolidated subsidiaries 0.27% 0.22% 0.31% 0.32% 0.39% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 0.30%<br />

Net earnings 1.40% 0.79% 4.15% 5.55% 6.29% 6.35% 6.85% 7.35% 7.85% 8.35% 8.35% 8.35% 8.35% 8.35% 8.35%<br />

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Balance Sheet<br />

By forecasting the balance sheet we can underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> predict how the firm is<br />

going to structure its self through debt, equity <strong>and</strong> assets to produce the<br />

forecasted sales <strong>and</strong> earnings. We decided that the most accurate way to<br />

forecast assets was through the use of the total asset turnover ratio. As<br />

discussed previously, management has been <strong>and</strong> is implementing programs<br />

concerning asset productivity, as shown through our evaluation of the asset<br />

turnover ratio. <strong>Cummins</strong> was not increasing Assets in order to increase sales<br />

after their restructuring period ended in 2003, but instead produced more sales<br />

from previous investments through Six Sigma programs. We think that <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

will be able to further improve their asset turnover ratio through 2016, by 5.68%<br />

per year. After assuming this growth in productivity we believe assets will grow<br />

to 9.97 billion in five years at a growth rate of 23.89%, <strong>and</strong> will grow assets in<br />

ten years by 51.37% to 12.19 billion. To find Current Assets, as well as current<br />

liabilities, we determined that after taking an average of the past two years as a<br />

percentage of total assets that <strong>Cummins</strong> would sustain the current relationship<br />

between Current Assets/liabilities <strong>and</strong> Total Assets. We forecasted total liabilities<br />

to continue to decrease as the firm has already shown in the previous five years.<br />

We think that this is possible because management is using less debt every year<br />

<strong>and</strong> more cash to finance company growth. We forecast <strong>Cummins</strong> to decrease<br />

total liabilities by .5% per year, through the ten year period, reducing the debt to<br />

equity ratio by 16.4% in five years <strong>and</strong> 26.8% in ten years. We predicted<br />

shareholders’ equity through our assumption that the firm will continue with<br />

management’s strategy to finance growth through retained earnings, by taking<br />

the difference in total liabilities <strong>and</strong> total assets. Growth in shareholders’ equity<br />

will bring the firm to approximately 4.72 <strong>and</strong> 6.18 billion, in five <strong>and</strong> ten years.<br />

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CUMMINS INC. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES<br />

CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS<br />

( in millions)<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

ASSETS<br />

Current assets:<br />

Cash <strong>and</strong> cash equivilants 224 108 611 779 840<br />

Marketable securities 74 87 79 61 95<br />

Recievables, net 805 929 1,160 1,423 1,767 2,032 2,345 2,706 3,123 3,604 4,159 4,799 5,538 6,391 7,375<br />

Inventories 641 733 1,016 1,174 1,393 1,523 1,664 1,816 1,980 2,157 2,350 2,560 2,789 3,038 3,310<br />

Deffered income taxes 238 192 301 363 277<br />

Prepaid exp <strong>and</strong> other current<br />

assets 81 106 116 116<br />

Total current assets 1,982 2,130 3,273 3,916 4,488 4,832 4,994 5,019 5,272 5,487 5,711 5,945 6,188 6,441 6,704<br />

Long-term assets<br />

Property, plant <strong>and</strong> equipment,<br />

net 1,305 1,347 1,648 1,557 1,574<br />

Investments in <strong>and</strong> advances to<br />

equity investees 264 339 286 278 345<br />

Goodwill 343 344 355 358 356<br />

Other intangible assets, net 96 92 93 100 128<br />

Deffered income taxes 640 663 689 500 433<br />

Other assets 207 211 183 176 141<br />

Total Assets 4,837 5,126 6,527 6,885 7,465 8,053 8,610 9,125 9,585 9,977 10,384 10,809 11,251 11,711 12,189<br />

LIABILITIES AND<br />

SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 6.95% 0.08<br />

Current liabilities:<br />

Short-term borrowings 138 49 346 154 164<br />

Accounts payable 427 557 823 904 1,104<br />

Other accrued expenses 764 789 1,028 1,160 1,131<br />

Total current liabilities 1,329 1,395 2,197 2,218 2,399 2,577 2,755 2,920 3,067 3,193 3,323 3,459 3,600 3,747 3,901<br />

Long-term liabilities<br />

Long-term debt 999 1,380 1,299 1,213 647<br />

Pensions 438 439 466 396 367<br />

Postretirement benefits other<br />

than pensions 575 577 570 554 523<br />

Other liabilities <strong>and</strong> deffered<br />

revenue 563 263 386 415 473<br />

Total Non-Current Liabilities 2,575 2,659 2,721 2,578 2,010 2,020 2,030 2,040 2,051 2,061 2,071 2,081 2,092 2,102 2,113<br />

Total liabilities 3,904 4,054 4,918 4,796 4,409 4,597 4,786 4,960 5,118 5,253 5,394 5,540 5,692 5,850 6,013<br />

Minority interest 92 123 208 225 254<br />

Shareholders' equity:<br />

issued authorized, 55.0 <strong>and</strong><br />

48.5 shares issued 121 121 121 121 137<br />

Additional contributed capital 1,115 1,113 1,167 1,201 1,500<br />

Retained earnings 569 569 866 1,360 2,009<br />

Accumulated other<br />

comprehensive loss (964) (854) (753) (818) (844)<br />

Total shareholders' equity 933 1,072 1,609 2,089 3,056 3,456 3,825 4,165 4,467 4,723 4,990 5,269 5,559 5,861 6,176<br />

Total liabilities <strong>and</strong><br />

shareholders' equity 4,837 5,126 6,527 6,885 7,465 8,053 8,610 9,125 9,585 9,977 10,384 10,809 11,251 11,711 12,189<br />

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CUMMINS INC. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES<br />

COMMON SIZED BALANCE SHEET<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

ASSETS<br />

Current assets:<br />

Cash <strong>and</strong> cash equivilants 4.63% 2.11% 9.36% 11.31% 11.25%<br />

Marketable securities 1.53% 1.70% 1.21% 0.89% 1.27%<br />

Recievables, net 16.64% 18.12% 17.77% 20.67% 23.67% 25.23% 27.23% 29.65% 32.58% 36.12% 40.05% 44.40% 49.23% 54.58% 60.51%<br />

Inventories 13.25% 14.30% 15.57% 17.05% 18.66% 18.91% 19.32% 19.90% 20.66% 21.62% 22.63% 23.68% 24.79% 25.94% 27.15%<br />

Deffered income taxes 4.92% 3.75% 4.61% 5.27% 3.71%<br />

Prepaid expenses <strong>and</strong> other current assets 0.00% 1.58% 1.62% 1.68% 1.55%<br />

Total current assets 40.98% 41.55% 50.15% 56.88% 60.12% 60.00% 58.00% 55.00% 55.00% 55.00% 55.00% 55.00% 55.00% 55.00% 55.00%<br />

Long-term assets<br />

Property, plant <strong>and</strong> equipment, net 26.98% 26.28% 25.25% 22.61% 21.09%<br />

Investments in <strong>and</strong> advances to equity<br />

investees 5.46% 6.61% 4.38% 4.04% 4.62%<br />

Goodwill 7.09% 6.71% 5.44% 5.20% 4.77%<br />

Other intangible assets, net 1.98% 1.79% 1.42% 1.45% 1.71%<br />

Deffered income taxes 13.23% 12.93% 10.56% 7.26% 5.80%<br />

Other assets 4.28% 4.12% 2.80% 2.56% 1.89%<br />

Total Assets 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY<br />

Current liabilities:<br />

Short-term borrowings 2.85% 0.96% 5.30% 2.24% 2.20%<br />

Accounts payable 8.83% 10.87% 12.61% 13.13% 14.79%<br />

Other accrued expenses 15.79% 15.39% 15.75% 16.85% 15.15%<br />

Total current liabilities 27.48% 27.21% 33.66% 32.21% 32.14% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00% 32.00%<br />

Long-term liabilities<br />

Long-term debt 20.65% 26.92% 19.90% 17.62% 8.67%<br />

Pensions 9.06% 8.56% 7.14% 5.75% 4.92%<br />

Postretirement benefits other than pensions 11.89% 11.26% 8.73% 8.05% 7.01%<br />

Other liabilities <strong>and</strong> deffered revenue 11.64% 5.13% 5.91% 6.03% 6.34%<br />

Total liabilities 80.71% 79.09% 75.35% 69.66% 59.06% 57.09% 55.58% 54.36% 53.39% 52.66% 51.94% 51.26% 50.59% 49.95% 49.33%<br />

Minority interest 1.90% 2.40% 3.19% 3.27% 3.40%<br />

Shareholders' equity:<br />

issued authorized, 55.0 <strong>and</strong> 48.5 shares<br />

issued 2.50% 2.36% 1.85% 1.76% 1.84%<br />

Additional contributed capital 23.05% 21.71% 17.88% 17.44% 20.09%<br />

Retained earnings 11.76% 11.10% 13.27% 19.75% 26.91%<br />

Accumulated other comprehensive loss -19.93% -16.66% -11.54% -11.88% -11.31%<br />

Total shareholders' equity 19.29% 20.91% 24.65% 30.34% 40.94% 42.91% 44.42% 45.64% 46.61% 47.34% 48.06% 48.74% 49.41% 50.05% 50.67%<br />

Total liabilities <strong>and</strong> shareholders' equity 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%<br />

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Cash Flows Statement<br />

In order to forecast the Statement of Cash Flows, we took the average growth<br />

rate from 2005 to 2006, which came out to 17%, <strong>and</strong> increased the annual<br />

growth rate until we reached 17% <strong>and</strong> then continued to grow at that level. One<br />

reason we took an average instead tying the growth to sales or income, is that<br />

we think that management will be able to improve on cash from operating<br />

activities to outpace growth in sales. We were able to forecast a limited number<br />

of items on the Statement of Cash Flows. The Pension Expense was forecasted<br />

by taking an average of the growth rate for the previous two years, which was<br />

16.12%. Due to the growth rate leveling of in years 2005-2006, we kept this<br />

growth rate constant. Depreciation was forecasted by increasing the growth rate<br />

by .5% due to limited growth in assets. Cash flows from investing activities was<br />

forecasted by taking the average of the past two years <strong>and</strong> extending it at 17%,<br />

plus an additional 4% per year to compensate for maintenance on already<br />

existing PP&E.<br />

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Cash flows from operation activities<br />

(in millions)<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Net earnings 82 50 350 550 715 822 1,003 1,205 1,428 1,671 1,838 2,022 2,225 2,447 2,692<br />

Adjustments to reconcile net earnings to net cash<br />

provided<br />

by operating activities<br />

CUMMINS INC. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES<br />

CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS<br />

Depreciation <strong>and</strong> amortization 219 223 272 295 296 297 299 300 302 303 305 307 308 310 311<br />

Pension expense 21 61 89 103 120 139 162 188 218 253 294 342 397 461 535<br />

Pension contributions (81) (118) (135) (151) (266)<br />

Change in current assets <strong>and</strong> liabilities:<br />

Receivables (87) (64) (163) (309) (301)<br />

Inventories 46 (63) (204) (187) (158)<br />

Other current assets (71) 4 (10) (9) (4)<br />

Accounts payable 26 100 210 108 149<br />

Accrued expenses 83 22 237 89 88<br />

Changes in long-term liabilities (13) 88 23<br />

Other, net 9 21 (6) (17) 45<br />

Net cash provided by operating activities 193 160 615 760 840 933 1045 1181 1346 1548 1795 2100 2458 2875 3364<br />

Cash flows from investing activities 17% avg<br />

Capital expenses (90) (111) (151) (186) (249) 0.2333 0.3604 0.2318 0.3387<br />

Investments in internal use software (20) (29) (33) (39) (52)<br />

Proceeds from disposals of property, plant <strong>and</strong><br />

equipment 16 13 12 21 49<br />

Net cash used in investing activities (152) (135) (181) (212) (277) -335.2 -405.6 -490.7 -593.8 -718.5 -869.3 -1052 -1273 -1540 -1864<br />

Cash flows from financing activities 131 (145) 66 (372) (508)<br />

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CUMMINS INC. AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES<br />

COMMON SIZED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS<br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Cash flows from operation<br />

Net earnings 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%<br />

Adjustments to reconcile net<br />

earnings to net cash provided by<br />

Depreciation <strong>and</strong> amortization 267.1% 446.0% 77.7% 53.6% 41.4% 36.2% 29.8% 24.9% 21.1% 18.2% 16.6% 15.2% 13.8% 12.7% 11.6%<br />

Pension expense 25.6% 122.0% 25.4% 18.7% 16.8% 17.0% 16.1% 15.6% 15.3% 15.2% 16.0% 16.9% 17.8% 18.8% 19.9%<br />

Pension contributions -98.8% -236.0% -38.6% -27.5% -37.2%<br />

Change in current assets <strong>and</strong><br />

Receivables -106.1% -128.0% -46.6% -56.2% -42.1%<br />

Inventories 56.1% -126.0% -58.3% -34.0% -22.1%<br />

Other current assets -86.6% 8.0% -2.9% -1.6% -0.6%<br />

Accounts payable 31.7% 200.0% 60.0% 19.6% 20.8%<br />

Accrued expenses 101.2% 44.0% 67.7% 16.2% 12.3%<br />

Changes in long-term liabilities 0.0% 0.0% -3.7% 16.0% 3.2%<br />

Other, net 11.0% 42.0% -1.7% -3.1% 6.3%<br />

Net cash provided by operating<br />

activities 235.4% 319.8% 175.6% 138.2% 117.5% 113.5% 104.2% 98.0% 94.2% 92.6% 97.7% 103.9% 110.5% 117.5% 125.0%<br />

Cash flows from investing<br />

activities<br />

Net cash used in investing<br />

activities -185.4% -270.0% -51.7% -38.5% -38.7% -40.8% -40.4% -40.7% -41.6% -43.0% -47.3% -52.0% -57.2% -62.9% -69.2%<br />

Cash flows from financing<br />

activities<br />

Net cash (used in) provided by<br />

financing activities<br />

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<strong>Valuation</strong> <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

There are a variety of ways to value a company’s stock price to determine if the<br />

stock’s market price is valued fairly, undervalued, or overpriced. The valuation<br />

models employed below are deemed particularly insightful if deviations are 15%<br />

or more between the intrinsic value we derive <strong>and</strong> the market price of the stock.<br />

These valuation models, combined with subjective topics addressed in prior<br />

sections, provide a comprehensive base for determining a company’s accurate<br />

valuation. The Method of Comparables is used to gauge a company’s<br />

performance <strong>and</strong> profitability relative to the industry it competes in. This method<br />

is primarily employed for initial valuations. More valuation models are necessary<br />

to gain a well-rounded underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the company’s stock price due to the<br />

difference in results from each valuation model.<br />

The other valuation models we use to most accurately determine <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

intrinsic value is the weighted average cost of capital, weighted average cost of<br />

debt, <strong>and</strong> weighted average cost of equity. These are inputs are discounted<br />

using present, historical, <strong>and</strong> estimated data. The discounted dividend model,<br />

residual income, abnormal earnings growth, long-run residual income perpetuity,<br />

<strong>and</strong> free cash flow model utilizes the cost of equity <strong>and</strong> debt. Aggregating the<br />

results of these numerous valuation models provides us with a deep<br />

underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the state of the company <strong>and</strong> enhances the accuracy of<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> share price. All of these models are based off theory <strong>and</strong> deviations in<br />

each model’s accuracy are overcome by comprehensively analyzing the data.<br />

More consideration is given to models that best represent the company’s method<br />

of operations, <strong>and</strong> coupled with the rest of the valuation models, should<br />

reasonably indicate the intrinsic value of <strong>Cummins</strong>.<br />

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Method of Comparables <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. Share<br />

Price<br />

Forward P/E 183.04<br />

Trailing P/E 200.81<br />

P/B 397.59<br />

Price/Sales 241.28<br />

PEG<br />

N/A<br />

Price to EBITDA 17.07<br />

Forward Price to Earnings (2007)<br />

Forward P/E<br />

PPS EPS P/E<br />

Industry<br />

average<br />

CMI share<br />

price<br />

CMI 145.21 14.2 10.23 183.04<br />

CAT 67.03 5.2 12.89 12.89<br />

To find the forward price to earnings, we found the industry average P/E <strong>and</strong><br />

then multiplied by the earnings per share to get the share price of <strong>Cummins</strong>. The<br />

forward P/E of <strong>Cummins</strong> comes out to be 183.04, leading us to believe that the<br />

firm’s stock is undervalued when compared to the observed price of 145.21. It is<br />

difficult for us to put much trust in this model since the industry consists of only<br />

Caterpillar <strong>and</strong> does not give us sufficient evidence of the firm’s actual value, but<br />

rather is based upon what the market is willing to pay for the earnings per share<br />

of the company. However, based upon this valuation <strong>Cummins</strong> is in good<br />

position in its industry for the upcoming future.<br />

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Trailing Price to Earnings (2006)<br />

Trailing P/E<br />

PPS EPS P/E<br />

Industry<br />

average<br />

CMI share<br />

price<br />

CMI 105.1 15.02 7 200.81<br />

CAT 71.81 5.37 13.37 13.37<br />

To find the trailing price to earnings, we divided the price per share by the<br />

earnings per share to get the P/E. Then we took the average industry P/E <strong>and</strong><br />

multiplied by the earnings per share of <strong>Cummins</strong>. The trailing P/E for <strong>Cummins</strong> is<br />

200.81, which tells us that <strong>Cummins</strong> is undervalued at the observed price of<br />

105.10. Again this valuation depends on investor’s willingness to pay for earnings<br />

per share as well as Caterpillar being the industry average. The model does<br />

suggest that <strong>Cummins</strong> is in good position with the industry average.<br />

Price to Book<br />

Price to Book<br />

PPS BPS P/B<br />

Industry<br />

average<br />

CMI share<br />

price<br />

CMI 145.21 63.01 2.3 397.59<br />

CAT 67.03 10.62 6.31 6.31<br />

To find the price to book, we took the price per share <strong>and</strong> divided by the book<br />

value per share to get the industry average P/B. We then took the industry P/B<br />

<strong>and</strong> multiplied by the book value per share of <strong>Cummins</strong>. The price to book states<br />

that <strong>Cummins</strong> is valued at 397.59 compared to the observed price of 145.21,<br />

implying that the firm is greatly undervalued. We do not believe this model to be<br />

reliable in valuing the firm because of the difference in capital structures<br />

between <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong> the industry, Caterpillar. <strong>Cummins</strong>’ management focuses<br />

on creating retained earnings to finance the growth of assets which creates a<br />

- 83 -


higher book value, where Caterpillar’s management relies on financing with debt<br />

which lowers book value. These two firms are complete opposites when looking<br />

at the shareholders’ equity portion of the balance sheet. For this reason this<br />

valuation model is like comparing apples to oranges, <strong>and</strong> we will be discounting<br />

these outcomes.<br />

Price to Sales<br />

Price to<br />

Sales<br />

PPS SPS P/S<br />

Industry<br />

average<br />

CMI share<br />

price<br />

CMI 145.21 234.26 0.62 241.28<br />

CAT 67.03 64.87 1.03 1.03<br />

To find the price to sales, we found the sales of the firm <strong>and</strong> divided by the<br />

number of shares outst<strong>and</strong>ing to get the Sales per share. Then we divided the<br />

price per share by the sales per share to find the industry average P/S. <strong>Cummins</strong>’<br />

share price computes to 241.28 as opposed to the observed price of 145.21,<br />

again implying that the firm is undervalued. We will also be discounting this<br />

model because Caterpillar has many more shares outst<strong>and</strong>ing than <strong>Cummins</strong>. If<br />

Caterpillar’s sales were divided by the number of shares <strong>Cummins</strong> has in<br />

circulation then the sales per share of Caterpillar would be 853.60, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

would be underperforming the industry substantially.<br />

- 84 -


Price Earnings Growth<br />

Due to a negative earnings growth rates from both Caterpillar <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cummins</strong>,<br />

PEG could not be calculated.<br />

Price to EBITDA<br />

Price to EBITDA<br />

CMI share<br />

Calculated Multiples price<br />

0.1053 0.0124 17.07<br />

Formula data<br />

CMI<br />

CAT<br />

PPS 145.21 67.03<br />

EBITDA 1,379 5,414<br />

The price to EBITDA valuation takes into account non-cash items. We found the<br />

price to EBITDA by dividing the price per share by the EBITDA, which gave us a<br />

multiple of the industry average. Then we multiplied the industry average by the<br />

EBITDA for <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>and</strong> got a share price of 17.07 that implies that <strong>Cummins</strong> is<br />

severely overvalued at an observed price of 145.21. We believe that this model<br />

does not evaluate <strong>Cummins</strong> well because of the heavily asset accumulation that<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> has.<br />

- 85 -


Cost of Capital<br />

In order to value a company, an appropriate cost of capital must be determined.<br />

The cost of capital consists of three elements: the Weighted Average Cost of<br />

Capital (WACC), the Cost of Debt, <strong>and</strong> the Cost of <strong>Equity</strong>.<br />

Cost of Debt<br />

To find the cost of debt, we examined all of the liabilities that are disclosed in<br />

the notes of the annual 10-K report. We then took the weighted average of the<br />

different obligations <strong>and</strong> their corresponding interest rates as a percentage of<br />

total liabilities. By adding all of the rates together we calculated a 7.13% total<br />

cost of debt.<br />

Cost of <strong>Equity</strong><br />

In order to determine the Cost of <strong>Equity</strong>, we used the capital asset pricing model<br />

(CAPM), where the Cost of <strong>Equity</strong> is the sum of the Risk Free Rate (Rf) plus the<br />

Systematic Risk (β) multiplied by the Market Risk Premium (which is the Risk<br />

Free Rate (Rf) subtracted from the Expected Return on the Market Index (E(rm).<br />

Ke = Rf + β[E(rm)-Rf]<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. Cost of <strong>Equity</strong><br />

11.89% = 4.5% + 1.48 * 5%<br />

To determine the Risk Free Rate, we used monthly percentage data from the 3<br />

month T-Bill. This was used due to the high correlation between <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>.<br />

monthly returns <strong>and</strong> the returns from the S&P 500. Beta was calculated by<br />

running a regression between <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. monthly returns <strong>and</strong> the monthly<br />

returns from the S&P 500. The adjusted R square was 32.47% which is<br />

comparatively a high percentage. A Market Risk Premium was determined by<br />

- 86 -


taking the average of a historical percentage of 7% <strong>and</strong> current market studies<br />

that show a lower Market Risk Premium of 3%. There is evidence that shows<br />

that there has been a substantial decline in the Expected Market Risk Premium,<br />

that the historical rate is not valid in the current market.<br />

Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)<br />

The WACC is calculated by weighting the costs of debt <strong>and</strong> equity capital<br />

according to their respective market values. Several variables are including the<br />

WACC: the market value of debt (Vd), the market value of equity (Ve), the cost<br />

of debt capital (Rd), the cost of equity capital (Ke), <strong>and</strong> the appropriate tax rate<br />

(T). The WACC is then calculated by:<br />

% Vd Ve<br />

WACC= [Rd(1-T)] + (Ke)<br />

Vd+Ve Vd+Ve<br />

We used the book value of debt of 4409 (total liabilities), a market value of<br />

equity of 7032 (the market value of shares multiplied by the number of<br />

outst<strong>and</strong>ing shares), <strong>and</strong> the appropriate tax rate of 35% (all numbers in<br />

millions). The value of debt was taken from the most recent 10-k <strong>and</strong> the value<br />

of equity we determined by analyzing current market conditions.<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. WACC<br />

% 4409 7032<br />

9.37%= [7.13%(1-35%)] + 11.89%<br />

11441 11441<br />

- 87 -


Credit <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006<br />

Altman Z-<br />

Scores 1.592 1.631 1.983 2.492 2.884<br />

The Altman Z- score is a weighted ratio based formula that incorporates several<br />

financial statement items, to assess the credit risk of a firm. We can plug<br />

historical data into the formula to see how the company is leveraged, <strong>and</strong> the<br />

company’s ability to pay debt installments on principal as well as the interest on<br />

their obligations. A Z-score greater than 2.7 implies that the firm has a low level<br />

of risk to default on their debt, <strong>and</strong> a score of less than 1.8 signals that the firm<br />

is at a higher risk of defaulting. A firm’s credit risk plays an important role in their<br />

ability to raise capital through debt. If a company with little risk of default<br />

(investment grade) wishes to raise capital through debt, their debt will trade at<br />

par (the face value of the debt) or at a premium to par. This means that they<br />

most likely will not have trouble reaching their goal amount. Conversely, if a high<br />

credit risk (junk status) firm wishes to raise the same amount of debt as the<br />

previous firm, their debt will trade at a discount to par. This means that they will<br />

have to issue more debt than the investment grade firm to raise the same<br />

amount of capital, making it more difficult to attain the financing needed. By<br />

examining <strong>Cummins</strong>’ Z-scores from the past five years we can see that the firm<br />

has been consistently decreasing their credit risk, from 1.592 in 2002, to 2.884 in<br />

2006. We attribute this building of credit worthiness to management’s focus in<br />

turning the capital structure of the company around in 2004. <strong>Cummins</strong> has<br />

focused on financing growth through cash generated from operations while using<br />

what is left over to pay down debt. Evidence can be found by looking at the past<br />

financial statements that shows a dramatic decrease in debt to equity. The firm<br />

crossed over into investment grade status in 2006 that will give them the ability<br />

to issue debt to banks <strong>and</strong> pension funds increasing their ability to raise capital<br />

with more ease. Management must keep <strong>and</strong> improve their investment status, or<br />

- 88 -


they will not be able to issue debt to banks <strong>and</strong> pension funds that are restricted<br />

from any investments lower than investment grade. Since those entities are<br />

responsible for investing in the majority of debt issuances, the credit risk<br />

associated with <strong>Cummins</strong> could be vital to the company’s profitability <strong>and</strong> growth<br />

in the future.<br />

Discounted Dividends Model<br />

Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong> Observed Price 144.99<br />

g<br />

0 0.02 0.04 0.06 Undervalued<br />

0.09 35.10 45.12 63.17 105.29 Overvalued<br />

0.119 24.75 29.75 37.30 49.96<br />

0.129 22.33 26.43 32.37 41.75<br />

0.139 20.32 23.74 28.53 35.76<br />

0.149 18.62 21.51 25.45 31.17<br />

The discounted dividend model is a “traditional” finance model that calculates<br />

the firm’s equity by taking the present value of forecasted dividends. For the<br />

model we forecasted 10 years out with a terminal value (perpetuity) in year 11.<br />

The model requires the use of forecasted future dividends <strong>and</strong> the estimated<br />

cost of equity for the firm. We took the present value of the dividends for year<br />

1-10 $9.61, the present value of the terminal value (with zero growth) $6.06 for<br />

a value of equity of $24.69. We then took the estimated value at April 1, 2007<br />

of $24.75. The Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong> was run by taking different costs of equity<br />

<strong>and</strong> growth rates for the terminal value. The higher growth rates caused the<br />

equity to spike, but still showed that <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. stock price is overvalued.<br />

The discounted dividends model is not applicable due to <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. low<br />

dividend payout ratio which has been decreasing from 15% down to about 9%.<br />

- 89 -


Free Cash Flow Model<br />

Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

g<br />

Observed Price<br />

$144.99<br />

0 0.01 0.02 0.04<br />

WACC 0.0937 $85.95 $96.84 $110.68 153.84 Undervalued<br />

0.104 $65.36 $73.31 $83.16 112.09 Overvalued<br />

0.114 $49.11 $55.11 $62.38 82.81<br />

0.124 $35.64 $40.24 $45.72 $60.60<br />

0.134 $24.31 $27.89 $32.10 $43.20<br />

The Free Cash Flow Model is another “traditional” finance models. It uses<br />

the forecasted free cash flows to the firm <strong>and</strong> discounts them back using the<br />

weighted average cost of capitol (WACC). Free cash flows to the firm is<br />

estimated by taking the cash from operations <strong>and</strong> adding the cash from investing<br />

activities. The total present value of the free cash flows was $4158 <strong>and</strong> the<br />

present value of the terminal cash flows was $4409 assuming no growth. The<br />

value of the firm’s equity was $85.95. The Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong> allowed us to look<br />

at what a different WACC <strong>and</strong> growth rates would do to the value of the firm’s<br />

equity. In all variations of WACC <strong>and</strong> the growth rate, the firm is overvalued<br />

except when the growth rate of 4% was used.<br />

Residual <strong>Inc</strong>ome (RI)<br />

- 90 -


Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

g Observed Price 144.99<br />

0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5<br />

Ke 0.09 186.48 156.45 147.13 138.13 Undervalued<br />

0.119 123.33 114.92 111.79 108.46 Overvalued<br />

0.129 105.34 101.42 99.88 98.20<br />

0.139 88.89 88.46 88.29 88.10<br />

0.149 73.50 75.87 76.88 78.04<br />

The Residual <strong>Inc</strong>ome Model is found by finding the forecasted residual income of<br />

the firm, <strong>and</strong> discounting it back using the estimated cost of equity. The current<br />

book value of equity is added to the residual income for years 1-10, <strong>and</strong> then<br />

added to the terminal value residual income. The book value of equity for the<br />

end of 2006 (beginning of 2007) was $76.31, the residual income for years 1-10<br />

was $28.34, <strong>and</strong> the terminal value (zero growth) was $18.36. This put the<br />

firm’s value at $123.02. We then found the value at April 1, 2007 to be $123.33.<br />

The Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong> was used to determine the effects of various<br />

combinations of the cost of equity <strong>and</strong> growth rates. A negative growth rate was<br />

used because in the long run, a positive terminal residual income cannot be<br />

sustained. In all variations, the firm is overvalued unless a cost of equity of 9%<br />

is used with a growth rate of less then -20%.<br />

- 91 -


Abnormal Earnings Growth<br />

Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

g<br />

Observed Price $144.99<br />

0 0.02 0.03 0.05<br />

Ke 0.09 $202.71 $206.48 $210.23 221.49 Undervalued<br />

0.1189 $113.34 $112.88 $112.57 111.68 Overvalued<br />

0.1289 $95.99 $95.34 $94.91 93.73<br />

0.1389 $82.34 $81.66 $81.23 $80.07<br />

0.1489 $71.37 $70.74 $70.35 $69.32<br />

The Abnormal Earnings Growth Model is used to value the firm’s equity by<br />

discounting the firm’s increase in earnings each year. The earnings are then<br />

invested in a Dividend Reinvestment Program (DRIP) at the estimated cost of<br />

equity. The present value of the DRIP is added to the earnings per share, which<br />

is the cumulative dividend earnings. Normal earnings are calculated by taking<br />

last years earnings <strong>and</strong> multiplying by the estimated cost of equity. The<br />

difference between the normal earnings <strong>and</strong> the cumulative dividend earnings is<br />

the abnormal earnings growth. The abnormal earnings are then discounted back<br />

to year one using the estimated cost of equity. To determine the intrinsic value<br />

per share, the core earnings per share (2007) is added to the present value of<br />

the abnormal earnings growth <strong>and</strong> the present value of the terminal year (year<br />

11). The terminal value with the estimated cost of equity was negative, so we<br />

chose a positive growth rate in our sensitivity analysis. In all of the various<br />

combinations, the firm is overvalued. When we used a cost of equity that was<br />

less than our estimated cost of equity, we were able to get a value that was<br />

closer to the firm’s value. (If the cost of equity were in fact closer to 9%, a<br />

negative growth rate would have been used which would have shown an intrinsic<br />

value that was closer to the observed price)<br />

- 92 -


Analyst Recommendation<br />

Through a careful analysis of the five competitive forces, the industry that<br />

<strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. operates, the competition that it faces as well as the immediate<br />

threat of substitute products, we are able to see how <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. has<br />

remained the cost leader in the industry. <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is closely following these<br />

key success factors that have helped them to produce a low cost, affordable<br />

product while maintaining industry leading quality. Through overhaul in<br />

management in 2003, <strong>Cummins</strong> has been able to go from a stagnant growth rate<br />

in earnings to a high growth firm returning more earnings to the company to<br />

finance investments, <strong>and</strong> not issuing debt while attempting to exp<strong>and</strong>. This is<br />

fundamental to the financial stability of the firm in the future, because the<br />

extreme growth rates recorded over the past three years, after the<br />

reconstruction period, most likely can not be sustained, putting the firm in better<br />

position to h<strong>and</strong>le slower sales growth as well as any economic downturns that<br />

may arise. Through intrinsic valuation, we believe that <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is currently<br />

overvalued. The main reason that we believe the market is overvaluing <strong>Cummins</strong><br />

<strong>Inc</strong>. is because of the abnormal growth rates attained in the 2004 to 2006<br />

period, after management overhauled <strong>and</strong> implemented their new financial<br />

strategies. These attractive growth rates may continue in the short-run, but we<br />

believe, through the valuation models we have applied, that these high growth<br />

rates can not be sustained. Our valuations price the future growth attainable<br />

much less than what investors are willing to pay for them. We believe that the<br />

observed market price of $144.99, is overvalued. Through our research <strong>and</strong><br />

analysis it is in our opinion that <strong>Cummins</strong> <strong>Inc</strong>. is currently overvalued <strong>and</strong><br />

presents a selling opportunity.<br />

- 93 -


APPENDIX<br />

Financial Statement Ratio <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Liquidity Ratios<br />

Current Ratio 1.49 1.53 1.49 1.77 1.87 1.88 1.81 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72 1.72<br />

Quick Asset Ratio 0.83 0.81 0.84 1.02 1.13 0.79 0.85 0.93 1.02 1.13 1.25 1.39 1.54 1.71 1.89<br />

Efficiency Ratios<br />

Inventory Turnover 7.50 7.06 6.65 6.59 6.29 6.46 6.64 6.77 6.85 6.87 6.93 7.00 7.07 7.14 7.21<br />

Days 48.66 51.72 54.87 55.42 58.00 56.47 54.96 53.91 53.31 53.16 52.64 52.14 51.63 51.14 50.64<br />

Receivables<br />

Turnover 7.27 6.78 7.27 6.97 6.43 6.37 6.24 6.06 5.83 5.55 5.29 5.05 4.81 4.59 4.37<br />

Days 50.20 53.86 50.18 52.37 56.76 57.26 58.48 60.25 62.64 65.72 68.94 72.33 75.88 79.60 83.51<br />

Working Capital<br />

Turnover 8.96 8.57 7.84 5.84 5.44 5.74 6.54 7.81 8.25 8.72 9.22 9.74 10.30 10.88 11.50<br />

Profitability<br />

Gross Profit Margin 17.9% 17.8% 19.9% 22.0% 22.8% 24.0% 24.5% 25.0% 25.5% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0%<br />

Operating Expense<br />

Ratio 15.5% 15.2% 13.5% 13.0% 12.9% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7% 13.7%<br />

Net Profit Margin 1.4% 0.8% 4.1% 5.5% 6.3% 7.1% 8.0% 9.1% 10.3% 11.6% 13.1% 14.8% 16.7% 18.9% 21.4%<br />

Asset Turnover 1.21 1.23 1.29 1.44 1.52 1.61 1.70 1.80 1.90 2.01 2.12 2.24 2.37 2.50 2.64<br />

Return on Assets 1.7% 1.0% 5.4% 8.0% 9.6% 9.0% 8.5% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%<br />

Return on <strong>Equity</strong> 8.8% 4.7% 21.8% 26.3% 23.4% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 23.8%<br />

Capitol Structure<br />

Debt to <strong>Equity</strong> 4.18 3.78 3.06 2.30 1.44 1.33 1.25 1.19 1.15 1.11 1.08 1.05 1.02 1.00 0.97<br />

Times Interest<br />

Earned 2.28 2.01 4.94 8.32 12.23 8.96 9.39 9.83 10.26 10.70 10.70 10.70 10.70 10.70 10.70<br />

Debt Service Margin 1.40 3.26 1.78 4.94 5.12 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A<br />

- 94 -


Value Weighted Cost of <strong>Equity</strong><br />

72 Month Summary Output<br />

Regression Statistics Beta 1.4799914<br />

Multiple R 0.5780813 Adj. R Squa 32.47%<br />

R Square 0.3341779 Ke 0.0505787 5.06% annual measure 0.1188898<br />

Adj. R 0.3246662 Rf 0.0448903<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard Er 0.0805332 MRP 0.0038435 0.05 0.0525<br />

Observation 72<br />

CoefficientsSt<strong>and</strong>ard Erro t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.0209325 0.0095112 2.200832 0.0310484 0.0019631 0.039902 0.0019631 0.039902<br />

X Variable 1 1.4799914 0.2496896 5.9273262 1.052E-07 0.9820013 1.9779815 0.9820013 1.9779815<br />

60 Month Summary Output<br />

Regression Statistics Beta 1.5722205<br />

Multiple R 0.5580955 Adj. R Squa 29.96%<br />

R Square 0.3114706 Ke 0.0915028 9.15%<br />

Adj. R 0.2995994 Rf 0.043885<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard Er 0.0839981 MRP 0.030287<br />

Observation 60<br />

CoefficientsSt<strong>and</strong>ard Erro t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.0190389 0.0109372 1.7407522 0.0870299 -0.002854 0.0409321 -0.002854 0.0409321<br />

X Variable 1 1.5722205 0.3069391 5.1222562 3.603E-06 0.9578152 2.1866258 0.9578152 2.1866258<br />

48 Month Summary Output<br />

Regression Statistics Beta 1.1334176<br />

Multiple R 0.323834 Adj. R Squa 8.54%<br />

R Square 0.1048685 Ke 0.162324 16.23%<br />

Adj. R 0.0854091 Rf 0.0437458<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard Er 0.078872 MRP 0.1046201<br />

Observation 48<br />

CoefficientsSt<strong>and</strong>ard Erro t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.0286745 0.0125958 2.2765119 0.0275153 0.0033205 0.0540285 0.0033205 0.0540285<br />

X Variable 1 1.1334176 0.4882384 2.3214429 0.0247468 0.1506446 2.1161905 0.1506446 2.1161905<br />

36 Month Summary Output<br />

Regression Statistics Beta 0.5124391<br />

Multiple R 0.1526323 Adj. R Squa -0.54%<br />

R Square 0.0232966 Ke 0.0640343 6.40%<br />

Adj. R -0.00543 Rf 0.0448667<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard Er 0.0685174 MRP 0.0374047<br />

Observation 36<br />

CoefficientsSt<strong>and</strong>ard Erro t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.0285839 0.0119091 2.4001631 0.0220094 0.0043816 0.0527862 0.0043816 0.0527862<br />

X Variable 1 0.5124391 0.5690333 0.9005431 0.374166 -0.643976 1.6688539 -0.643976 1.6688539<br />

24 Month Summary Output<br />

Regression Statistics Beta 0.8797089<br />

Multiple R 0.2816152 Adj. R Squa 3.75%<br />

R Square 0.0793071 Ke 0.0792 7.92%<br />

Adj. R 0.0374574 Rf 0.0458625<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard Er 0.0594897 MRP 0.037896<br />

Observation 24<br />

CoefficientsSt<strong>and</strong>ard Erro t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%<br />

Intercept 0.0224605 0.0128764 1.7443203 0.0950606 -0.004243 0.0491645 -0.004243 0.0491645<br />

X Variable 1 0.8797089 0.6390413 1.3766073 0.1824834 -0.445582 2.2049994 -0.445582 2.2049994<br />

- 95 -


Dividend Discount 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10<br />

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Termina<br />

DPS 1.44 1.50 1.57 1.64 1.71 1.79 1.86 1.95 2.03 2.12 2.21<br />

PV Factor 0.8937 0.7988 0.7139 0.6380 0.5702 0.5096 0.4555 0.4071 0.3638 0.3252<br />

PV of Future Dividends 1.29 1.20 1.12 1.05 0.98 0.91 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.69<br />

Total PV of Forecasted<br />

Future Dividends 9.61<br />

Continuing (Terminal)<br />

Value 18.63<br />

Present Value of<br />

Continuing Terminal<br />

Value 6.06<br />

Esitmated Value per<br />

Share (12/31/06) 24.69<br />

FV Factor 1.0025 0.01022<br />

Esitmated Value per<br />

Share (04/01/07) 24.75 Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong> Observed Price 144.99<br />

Observed Value 144.99 g<br />

Diff -120.24 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 Undervalued<br />

Ke 0.09 35.10 45.12 63.17 105.29 Overvalued<br />

Actual Price per share 144.99 0.119 24.75 29.75 37.30 49.96<br />

Cost of <strong>Equity</strong> 0.1189 0.129 22.33 26.43 32.37 41.75<br />

growth rate 0 0.139 20.32 23.74 28.53 35.76<br />

0.149 18.62 21.51 25.45 31.17<br />

- 96 -


Residual <strong>Inc</strong>ome (RI) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Terminal<br />

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Beginning BE (per share) 63.01 76.31 85.34 96.53 110.15 126.45 145.68 166.85 190.15 215.81 244.05<br />

Earnings Per Share 14.74 10.47 12.76 15.34 18.18 21.27 23.40 25.74 28.31 31.14 34.26<br />

Dividends per share 1.44 1.44 1.57 1.72 1.87 2.04 2.23 2.44 2.66 2.90 3.17<br />

Ending BE (per share) 76.31 85.34 96.53 110.15 126.45 145.68 166.85 190.15 215.81 244.05 275.14<br />

Ke 0.1189<br />

"Normal" <strong>Inc</strong>ome 9.07 10.15 11.48 13.10 15.04 17.32 19.84 22.61 25.66 29.02<br />

(Change) 1.22 1.24 1.23 1.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24<br />

Residual <strong>Inc</strong>ome (RI) 1.40 2.61 3.86 5.08 6.24 6.08 5.90 5.70 5.48 5.24 5.24<br />

Discount Factor 0.92 0.84 0.77 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.42<br />

Present Value of RI 1.28 2.19 2.97 3.58 4.03 3.59 3.20 2.83 2.49 2.18<br />

BV <strong>Equity</strong> (per share) 2006 76.31<br />

Total PV of RI (end 2006) 28.34<br />

Continuation (Terminal)<br />

Value 44.08<br />

PV of Terminal Value (end<br />

2006) 18.36<br />

Estimated Value (2006) 123.02 Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

FV Factor 1.0025 0.01022 g Observed Price 144.99<br />

Esitmated Value per<br />

Share (04/01/07) 123.33 0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5<br />

Ke 0.09 186.48 156.45 147.13 138.13 Undervalued<br />

Actual Price per share 144.99 0.119 123.33 114.92 111.79 108.46 Overvalued<br />

Growth 0 0.129 105.34 101.42 99.88 98.20<br />

Ke 0.1189 0.139 88.89 88.46 88.29 88.10<br />

0.149 73.50 75.87 76.88 78.04<br />

- 97 -


Free Cash Flow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Terminal<br />

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

Cash Flow from Operations 840 933 1045 1181 1346 1548 1795 2100 2458 2875 3364<br />

Cash Provided (Used) by<br />

Investing Activities -335 -406 -491 -594 -718 -869 -1052 -1273 -1540 -1864<br />

Free Cash Flow (to firm) 505 527 554 587 627 678 743 828 917 1,012 1,012<br />

discount rate (9.37% WACC) 0.914 0.836 0.764 0.699 0.639 0.584 0.534 0.488 0.447 0.408<br />

Present Value of Free Cash<br />

Flows 462 441 423 410 401 396 397 404 410 413<br />

Total Present Value of Annual<br />

Cash Flows 4,158<br />

Continuing (Terminal) Value 10,798<br />

Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

PV of Continuing (Terminal)<br />

Value 4,409 g Observed Price $144.99<br />

Value of the Firm (end of<br />

2006) 8,567 0 0.01 0.02 0.04<br />

Preferred Stock $4,409 WACC 0.0937 $85.95 $96.84 $110.68 153.84 Undervalued<br />

Value of <strong>Equity</strong> (end of 2006) 4,158 0.104 $65.36 $73.31 $83.16 112.09 Overvalued<br />

Estimated Value per Share 85.73 0.114 $49.11 $55.11 $62.38 82.81<br />

FV Factor 1.0025 0.01022 0.124 $35.64 $40.24 $45.72 $60.60<br />

Esitmated Value per Share<br />

(04/01/07) 85.95 0.134 $24.31 $27.89 $32.10 $43.20<br />

Actual Price per share $144.99<br />

WACC 0.0937<br />

terminal growth 0.00<br />

- 98 -


AEG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Termina<br />

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016<br />

EPS 15.02 10.47 12.76 15.34 18.18 21.27 23.40 25.74 28.31 31.14 34.26<br />

DPS 1.44 1.44 1.57 1.72 1.87 2.04 2.23 2.44 2.66 2.90 3.17<br />

DPS invested at 11.89% (Drip) 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.34<br />

Cum-Dividend Earnings 10.64 12.93 15.52 18.38 21.49 23.64 26.00 28.60 31.46 34.60<br />

Normal Earnings 16.81 11.71 14.28 17.16 20.34 23.80 26.18 28.80 31.68 34.85<br />

Abnormal Earning Growth (AEG) -6.17 1.22 1.24 1.23 1.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24<br />

PV Factor 0.89 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.57 0.51 0.46 0.41 0.36<br />

PV of AEG 1.09 0.99 0.87 0.74 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09<br />

Core EPS 10.47 -0.746<br />

Total PV of AEG 3.25<br />

PV of Terminal Value -0.27<br />

Total Average EPS Perp (t+1) 13.44<br />

Capitalization Rate (perpetuity) 0.1226<br />

Intrinsic Value Per Share 109.64<br />

FV Factor 1.0025 0.01<br />

Esitmated Value per Share<br />

(04/01/07) 109.92<br />

Actual Price per share 144.99<br />

Sensitivity <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

Ke 0.1189 g Observed Price $144.99<br />

g 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.05<br />

Ke 0.09 $148.81 $151.96 $154.33 162.6 Overvalued<br />

0.1189 $109.92 $109.47 $109.17 108.31 Undervalued<br />

0.1289 $100.93 $100.24 $99.79 98.54<br />

0.1389 $93.29 $92.52 $92.03 $90.71<br />

0.1489 $86.68 $85.92 $85.44 $84.19<br />

- 99 -


References:<br />

1. Yahoo Finance: http://finance.yahoo.com<br />

2. MSN Money:http://money.msn.com<br />

3. <strong>Cummins</strong> Corporate Website: http://www.cummins.com<br />

4. Caterpillar Corporate Website: http://www.cat.com<br />

5. Securities <strong>and</strong> Exchange Commission Website: http://www.sec.gov<br />

6. Palepu, Healy <strong>and</strong> Bernard, Business <strong>Analysis</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Valuation</strong> (Ohio: Thomson-<br />

Southwestern, 3rd Edition, 2004)<br />

7. St. Louis Federal Reserve:<br />

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/22<br />

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