Police Complaints, Civilian Oversight, Democracy - Scadding Court ...

Prepared By: Christopher Bourke, MA
Supervised & Edited by: Dr. Linda Joy Epp
Police Complaints, Civilian Oversight, Democracy
Why Is A System For Police Complaints Important
Police complaints are a significant component, within the larger network of civilian oversight. The ability
to report, record and address citizen complaints against police misconduct ensures a fair and effective
justice system essential in a democratic society.
The purpose of the Bill103-Summit is to:
• consider the Bill 103 :An Act to establish an Independent Police Review Director and create a
new public complaints process by amending the Police Services Act, 2007;
• examine legislation directed towards enacting (and enhancing) these same ideals of democracy;
• evaluate the process of reforming the police complaints system in Ontario (ultimately, through
operative and reasonable policy, protocols and regulations); and,
• do what is necessary to move forward.
Much debate has occurred around this topic, however, there is a general consensus amongst police,
community and government that civilian oversight is necessary 1 . In his report on Ontario’s police
complaints system, the Honourable Patrick Lesage, Q.C. noted: “an overwhelming consensus among
groups whom I met was that police officers are no more likely to engage in misconduct than any other
group of professionals.” 2 We must remember, though, the powers given to police to protect our freedoms
—the ability to arrest, detain and use of force —are far different than any other profession, as is the
impact on citizens’ lives when they are misused. This is why civilian oversight promotes the two
principles—accountability, and independence in policing.
What Is Civilian Oversight Of Police
Civilian oversight of policing is a diverse practice frequently reduced to public complaints against the
police. It is, however, much more than that. As a model of accountability, civilian oversight “refers to
1 Wortley, 2003; Landau, 2000; Lesage, 2004
2 Lesage, 2005: 35

the actual mechanics of holding police accountable for their conduct. It refers to the entire system of
ensuring policing services are delivered in a manner that is conducive to the public good and in
accordance with standards of justice.” 3 Generally, civilian oversight involves people outside the justice
system or citizens/civilians taking responsibility for holding police officers to account 4 . Civilian
oversight therefore involves a network of multiple checks and balances on police that goes well beyond
complaints. The reason people think civilian oversight and police complaints are one-and-the same is
often due to the fact that demands for greater accountability frequently follow a specific incident of police
misconduct, triggering a complaint and a wider debate for stronger oversight 5 . This is not to deny the
importance of an effective complaints process but to remind readers of “the multiple sites where legal
governance of police in a democratic society are negotiated.” 6
Civilian oversight falls along a continuum of reactive and proactive approaches to police accountability 7 .
Reactive models are used after an incident has taken place, including complaints, investigations,
justifications and sanctions. Reactive measures focus on identifying a specific bad-apple, ignoring larger
systemic and structural problems which may have led to the incident.
Overall, “it suggests that deviance by police officers must be analyzed in individual, exceptional terms, so
that the appropriate organizational response to individual misconduct is to deal with that individual
separately, akin to removing a rotten apple from a barrel in order to avoid tainting the other apples.” 8 In
this way, complaint systems have become personified, turning processes into quasi-criminal proceedings
instead of more remedial administrative functions.
This leads into the other end of the continuum, proactive measures of civilian oversight. This form of
oversight seeks to directly influence policies that promote standards of ethics and behaviour. Rather than
waiting for an incident to occur, measures are taken to avoid and deter misconduct.
What Other Forms of Civilian Oversight Are There
Police Boards are required in every municipality that runs a police force. The number of board members
varies according to the population of a city, ranging from three or more members. Boards are made up of
the head of municipal council, members of council, a civilian and members appointed by the Provincial
Government 9 . Their responsibilities include developing policy, hiring Chiefs of Police, appointing police
officers, establishing priorities and objectives and setting guidelines for complaints. In general, the
mandate of police services boards is “one of oversight, general management and the setting of policy.” 10
Police Boards were created with the intent of providing a buffer between politics and the police in the
creation of policies 11 .
3 McKenna, 2003: 29
4 Miller, 2002
5 Goldsmith, 1995
6 Martin, 2007: 259
7 Goldsmith, 1995; Wortley, 2003
8 Goldsmith, 1995: 117; Walker, 2005
9 McKenna, 2003; Martin, 2007
10 Lesage, 2003: 11
11 Eng, 2007

Independence is as fundamental to the ideals and practice of policing, as it is to civilian oversight. Police
are thought to be outside or separate from any specific interest or ideology. Given their extensive and farreaching
powers, police must remain neutral and beyond the reach of particular interests. The emphasis
on independence often conflicts with measures of external accountability and tensions have emerged
between a board’s duty to create policy and internal police control over day-to-day operations 12 . Police
Boards also exist to translate community-defined needs into effective policy and standards of behaviour.
Standards of Ethics and Behaviours create uniformity across police
services and provide some measure of acceptable practice. The Adequacy
and Effectiveness of Police Services Regulations of Ontario, for example,
outlines specific duties and responsibilities of police officers across the
province 13 .
Community-Policing practices or police-community partnerships are
another form of civilian oversight wherein police liaise and engage with
citizens. These partnerships typically address community-defined needs by
developing mutually agreed upon priorities and problem-oriented solutions. 14
Did You Know
Civilian oversight in Ontario
has a long history. Police
Boards were created in 1858,
with the passing of Municipal
Institutions of Upper Canada
Act, 1858.
The Special Investigations Unit is a completely independent civilian
agency in Ontario responsible for investigating deaths or serious bodily harm
caused by police conduct. The director cannot be a former police officer and is accountable to the
Ministry of the Attorney General. Investigators review facts of an incident and may lay criminal charges
on the finding of misconduct 15 . “The SIU investigates occurrences across Ontario, encompassing all
municipal, regional and provincial police officers. This represents sixty-five police services and
approximately 21,600 officers” 16 .
The Courts System or Judiciary, on behalf of the public, also holds the police accountable. Standards
of evidence ensure police investigate cases fairly and ethically. Furthermore, the courts also administer
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has a direct impact on police powers when
arresting, detaining, interrogating and investigating individuals they interact with 17 .
12 Martin, 2007
13 McKenna, 2003
14 Ward & Stone, 2000
15 Martin, 2007; Wortley, 2003
16 SIU, 2008 Available: http://www.siu.on.ca/aboutsubmain7e37.htmlsectionid=3
17 Martin, 2007

Civilian Oversight
In Ontario
1858
‣ Police Boards established under the
Municipal Institutions of Upper
Canada Act, 1858
1960s & 1970s
‣ 1968: OCCOPS created, known as
the Ontario Police Commission
‣ 1975: Maloney Commission on
racial bias and discrimination
1980s
‣ 1983: Pilot Project of police
complaints in Toronto with the
passing of Metropolitan Toronto
Police Complaints Act
1990-1997
‣ 1990: Police Services Act, 1990
passed – expanding pilot project to
the entire Province of Ontario
‣ 1996: Rod McLeod, Q.C. releases
report on amendments to police
complaints procedure, entitled A
Report And Recommendations On
Amendments To The Police Services
Act Respecting Civilian Oversight
Of Police
1997-Present
‣ 1997: Amendments made to the
Police Services Act. Office of Police
Complaints Commissioner
disbanded and its powers handed
over to OCCOPs to streamline
complaints.
‣ 2005: Patrick LeSage, Q.C. releases
Report on Ontario’s Police
Despite the multiple channels of civilian oversight available,
citizen complaints remain at the centre. There are several
barriers and inefficiencies to the other models; disempowered
citizens (especially those acting alone) typically lack access to
the courts and policy-making process. As such, “there is no
obvious challenge in principle to the structured opportunity that
public complaints procedures provide for ordinary citizens to
make a direct input on matters of policing directly affecting their
lives.” 18 Citizens complaints also provide valuable feedback to
police on the quality of their service and potentially recurrent
problems. This, in turn, improves the appearance of legitimacy
for the public since concerns are being addressed.
What Does Civilian Oversight Mean for Stakeholders
The success of civilian oversight is dependent upon a hybrid
model, one that incorporates the three pillars of police,
government and community interests. Conflicts sometimes
emerge between these three stakeholder groups as to what the
appropriate level of civilian oversight is. As described by
scholars in this field, “where oversight mechanisms have been
established, they have rarely emerged because of consensus
among police, government and advocated [communities]...More
often, they are the products of struggles and compromises made
between those who support oversight and those who resist it, and
between those with competing visions of what oversight should
look like.” 19 Bill 103: [The]sic. Act to establish an Independent
Police Review Director and create a new public complaints
process by amending the Police Services Act, 2007, however,
has the potential to strike a balance between these interests.
Community groups have stressed the importance of
transparency, accessibility, responsiveness and sustained
resources within the administration of police complaints 20 .
Some complainants have reported feeling intimidated when
making complaints directly to police, whereas others knew very
little about the complaints process and where their complaints
should be directed 21 . As such, fair accessibility and public
awareness is paramount. The Ontario Council of Agencies
Serving Immigrants, well aware of their clients’ struggle to
overcome language barriers in making complaints, emphasized
18 Goldsmith, 1995: 111
19 Miller, 2003: 2; Goldsmith, 1995
20 CEAPC, 2007
21 Landau, 1995; LeSage, 2003

the point that equity and equality are tied to accessibility 22 . There is also the issue of objectivity and the
appearance of legitimacy. Some community groups, including Toronto’s Community Education and
Police Complaints Partnership, stress the importance of trust-building between community and police.
This is guaranteed through civilian oversight mechanisms that are neutral, independent and sustainable.
It is difficult to speak for and represent the views of every stakeholder in this process. Canadian society is
premised upon the principles of multiculturalism. Accordingly, “the growing diversity of public life
means the concept of citizen and community beg the question far more than they once did.” The existence
of communities rather than a single community of unified interests is important to highlight 23 .
Police Associations share in the support for an effective oversight framework. For example, the Police
Association of Ontario emphasizes the need for an accessible complaints system that is fair for all parties,
provides meaningful solutions, both informally and formally, while also striving for remedial solutions 24 .
Civilian oversight is also supported by the government because it allows for a measure of systems
monitoring that preserves public confidence. Attention must be made to addressing or ‘remedying’ the
underlying causes of police misconduct, rather than merely punishing individual offenders. There is a
concern, however, amongst Chiefs of Police regarding oversight and external investigations. Some have
put forward the argument that external discipline reduces their responsibility for internal line-command
and that “the point of civilian review should be to strengthen the resolve and capacity of police
supervisors, not supplant their role in disciplinary matters.” 25
How Has Civilian Oversight Evolved In Ontario
Attention to evolution is imperative, as successful outcomes for civilian oversight and complaints
procedures are linked to a better understanding of “the history of the relationship and reasons for
prevailing doctrines.” 26 The shifts in civilian oversight in Ontario have been likened to a pendulum
swing, with control for oversight swinging back and forth from a ‘hands-offs’ period in the 1970s to
periods of pro-civilian oversight in the early 1990s 27 .
Civilian oversight of complaints in Ontario began in the early 1970s, amidst a period of police mistrust
and criticisms of the secretive nature in which complaints were handled 28 . This period is marked by a
concern for individual rights and resolution for specific wrongdoings 29 . Following the Maloney
Commission in 1975, the Toronto Police Service began a pilot project of civilian complaints in 1983, as
detailed in the Metropolitan Toronto Police Complaints Act. This act established the Public Complaints
Investigation Bureau, which was responsible for investigating and handling complaints made against
Toronto police.
22 OCASI, 2007
23 Goldsmith, 1995: 133; Sklansky, 2005
24 PAO, 2007
25 Wortley, 2003: 28; OACP, 2007
26 Martin, 2007: 255
27 Landau, 2000:
28 Wortley, 2003; Landau, 2000; McKenna, 2003
29 Goldsmith, 2000

The success of this model in responding to citizen complaints led to a province-wide expansion in 1990
through the Police Services Act. Every police service was required to create an internal investigation
bureau overseen by the newly appointed Police Complaint Commissioner (PCC), who had the power to
register complaints, monitor investigations, intervene when cases were not proceeding and review
decisions made by all Ontario police. If he/she was not satisfied, the PCC could order a new investigation
or could conduct a hearing to adjudicate the case and make disciplinary decisions.
This model was replaced in 1996, when Rod McLeod, Q.C. conducted an
inquiry into the Province’s complaints procedures, addressing the technical
and overly-bureaucratic nature of police complaints. The result of this
process was the dissolution of the PCC, as its responsibilities were handed
over to the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCOPS).
Emphasis was placed upon a “narrow legislative framework” in an attempt
to streamline the complaints process, increase efficiency and promote
accountability 30 . Under this system, Chiefs of Police were given “broad
discretion over all aspects of the public complaints process” and, upon the
receipt of a complaint, they would determine if it related to policy, service
or conduct. Also, time was spent determining if a complaint was frivolous,
vexatious or made in bad faith 31 .
Did You Know
Research indicates that
individuals who participate
in informal resolution report
higher levels of satisfaction
with complaints process.
The Chief of Police (or Commissioner of OPP) was responsible for initiating investigations and
conducting disciplinary hearings. Determinations by Chiefs could be appealed to the OCCOPS who,
could issue a new investigation, substantiate a complaint, order a hearing and/or review discipline
decisions. Overall, OCCOPS played “a general supervisory role in relation to municipal police services
within Ontario.” 32 During this period police essentially “re-colonized” or resumed control over the
administration of complaints 33 .
This leads into the present period, which has been marked by a greater professionalization of the police
and increasing collaboration with communities. Characterized as a ‘corporate management approach to
policing,’ private sector models of client-provider relations are being imported into policing—leading to
an emphasis on efficient and expedient processes, mainly through informal resolution 34 .
What Is Informal or “Local” Resolution
Informal resolution is a longstanding practice of resolving disputes promoted by the Bill 103, 2007.
Several other jurisdictions incorporate informal resolution as an integral part of their complaint process:
including, the United Kingdom and the Province of Quebec. In Quebec, informal mediation or
conciliation between complainant and police is mandatory. However, individuals may object to its use to
the Police Ethics Commissioner, who may instead conduct a formal investigation 35 .
30 Martin, 2007: 269
31 McKenna, 2003: 27
32 Lesage, 2005: 8
33 Goldsmith, 2000; Landau, 2000
34 Goldsmith, 2000
35 Available: http://www.deontologie-policiere.gouv.qc.ca/index.phpid=162&L=1

Police complaint procedures were recently reformed in the United Kingdom with the creation of the
Independent Police Complaints Commissioner in 2004. Part of this new system involves “local
resolution’” where police officers complained against meet with the complainant and a trained mediator
to resolve disputes outside of the traditional disciplinary proceedings. Thames Valley Police is an
exceptional example of this model, as it has successfully applied the principles of restorative justice to
achieve mutual understanding and the acceptance of responsibility. When a complaint is received,
individuals are given the option of addressing their complaints through mediation procedures, led by
neutral facilitators trained in conflict-resolution. Research has revealed that local resolution produces
heightened levels of satisfaction, increased positive attitudes towards the police and a greater degree of
perceived institutional legitimacy on the part of complainants 36 . Instead of punishing an officer for
misconduct, words are exchanged (including apologies) with the emphasis on repairing harms.
The adversarial nature of disciplinary proceedings tends to exclude individuals, creating a major gap
between the complainants’ expectations and real experience. Research on complainant attitudes
throughout North America and the United Kingdom reveals a diversity of expectations for complaints
procedures: many want nothing more than to have their grievances heard, accepted and to be given an
explanation and, most assuredly, an apology for the misconduct. 37 CEAPC supports this point,
emphasizing the need to have a range of possibilities in the resolution of complaints, including informal
resolution.
A few cautions must be mentioned, though. Firstly, community groups have raised the concern that
informal resolution will be used to expedite the process, meaning “substantive access to justice gives way
to administrative efficiency.” 38 Individuals may be pressured to accept informal resolution over other
mechanisms. Secondly, there is the issue of reporting and recording complaints resolved through
informal mechanisms. It is critical to record all complaints, including those resolved informally, to ensure
a complete record of misconduct and the measures taken to resolve it. Complaint data allows police
supervisors to detect patterns of behaviour and take proactive measures to address them. Thirdly, an issue
raised by the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police relates to the incidents that are recommended for
informal resolution, those “not of a serious nature.” As the Association suggest, this wording has the
potential to demean or diminish the experiences of complainants.
How is Civilian Oversight Linked to Democracy
Police perform a fundamental function in our society. They protect and promote our democratic rights
and freedoms. This duty to protect means police perform a public good, making them a political
institution accountable to all citizens in Canada “where democratic principles inform all public
services.” 39 These links were clearly made in Justice LeSage’s terms of reference:
• The police are ultimately accountable to civilian authority;
• The public complaints system must be and seen to be fair, effective and transparent;
36 Young, Hoyle, Cooper & Hill, 2005
37 Wortley, 2003;
38 CEAPC, 2007
39 McKenna, 2003: 19

• Any model of resolving public complaints about police should have the confidence of the public
and the respect of the police and;
• The Province’s responsibility for ensuring police accountability in matters of public safety and
public trust must be preserved 40 .
To understand the significance of police in a democratic society, it is important to elaborate on what
democracy means since, “our thoughts about policing are bound up with, and depend on, the way we
understand democracy.” 41 Democracy has been defined and understood in varying terms, but the
overarching point is that its ideals promote equality, opposition and collective participation. Civilian
oversight supports these principles by opening up lines-of-communication between police and citizens. It
provides the institutional space for collective decisions and dissent. Such mechanisms prevent a few
leading interests from dominating over others 42 .
Police help to secure the context in which these democratic freedoms are exercised. Contradictions,
however, emerge in the practice of maintaining order and promoting democratic freedoms. Often police
must reduce the rights of some to protect the public good. As such, mechanisms must be in place to
ensure that a police officer’s authority is used appropriately and with the least possible harm. Police
power “requires constant and complex democratic oversight, especially when directed at groups who are
generally under-represented.” 43
Multiple mechanisms of accountability are the most effective way to deter and prevent police misconduct.
Scholars have attempted to move away from “the false dichotomy between one kind of accountability
mechanism and another.” 44 In other words, debating the merits of external versus internal accountability
in policing is counterproductive. Oversight must function both externally and internally to be effective:
“despite the recognition that there are valid concerns about overly complex mechanisms...locating
responsibility for police governance in multiple sites ensures that issues ignored or dismissed at one site
will be raise in another.” 45 Civilian oversight must be a ‘shared responsibility’ 46 among citizens,
government and police supervisors.
Finally, civilian oversight shores up the appearance of legitimacy and impartiality of policing institutions,
which helps to confront perceptions of injustice or bias 47 , as well as increasing public trust. Communities
are more likely to cooperate with police in an environment of mutual trust and respect. Providing a
dense network of checks and balances through civilian oversight promotes the collective principles of
democracy and improves public confidence in police. As it has been argued, “public confidence cannot
be legislated or mandated in some other way, but has to be earned.” 48
40 LeSage, 2005: 56
41 Sklansky, 2005: 1812
42 ibid
43 Ward & Stone, 2000:18
44 Ibid: 13
45 Martin, 2007: 259
46 McKenna, 2003
47 Wortley, 2003; Goldsmith, 1995;
48 Goldsmith, 1995: 129

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