Realigning Priorities: The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of ...

Realigning 

Priorities 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance & 

the Future of Extended Deterrence 

A Project Report by: 

the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Realigning Priorities 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future 

of Extended Deterrence 

March 2009 

A Project Report by: 

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 

By: 

James L. Schoff 

Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies 

For further information, please contact: 

Cambridge, Mass., IFPA Office 

James L. Schoff 

jschoff@ifpa.org 

617-492-2116

Contents 

List of Illustrations 

Introduction and Acknowledgements 

Report Summary 

Deterrence under pressure 

Options for the United States and Japan 

Shoring up deterrence, now and in the future 

iv 

v 

viii 

x 

xi 

xiii 

Chapter 1 

The Pertinent Question about a Nuclear Japan: Not “If,” but “Why” 1 

How precarious is a non-nuclear Japan 1 

Threats and vulnerabilities 7 

Alliance durability and balancing the security equation 15 

Chapter 2 

Deterrence: Targets, Tools, and Trends 25 

Opening up the nuclear umbrella 26 

The defense and deterrence debate in Japan 28 

New deterrence approaches in the United States 34 

Conclusion 41 

Chapter 3 

Japan’s (Limited) Options and Implications for the United States 42 

Technical and scientific capacity 44 

How to recognize a change in Japan’s strategic approach 49 

NATO relevance and the Nuclear Planning Group 53 

Reshaping a more multi-faceted extended deterrence 57 

Appendix A 

May 2007 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee 

Appendix B 

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms 

Appendix C 

References 

About the Author and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 

app:1 

app:6 

app:8 

app:17 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence 

iii

List of Illustrations 

Map of East Asia 

xvi 

Japan’s primary energy sources gross supply in 2007 7 

Japan’s top five trading partners in 2007 8 

Number of PRC’s SRBMs 11 

U.S. military personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region 21 

The Road to Alliance Transformation 

Summary of key Security Consultative Committee (SCC or “2+2”) meetings during the Bush administration 58 

U.S.-Japan Alliance: a notional conflict escalation ladder 61 

iv 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence

Introduction and 

Acknowledgements 

Immediately following North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear 

test, Japan reaffirmed its longstanding commitment to 

the so-called three non-nuclear principles of non-possession, 

non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear 

weapons. After Foreign Minister Aso Taro declared that 

Japan should seriously discuss the possibility of developing 

nuclear weapons in light of the changing security environment, 

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo rejected the idea 

of a formal government debate about the subject. Nevertheless, 

discussion about a nuclear option resurfaced in 

Japan, and it sharpened the focus of attention on Japan’s 

unique situation regarding its national defense and deterrence 

strategies, which rely heavily on U.S. long-range strike 

and strategic nuclear military power. If North Korea (the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) moves 

ahead with its nuclear and missile programs, serious talk 

will likely follow in Japan about new defense requirements, 

including whether or not Japan should develop its own nuclear 

deterrent or limited offensive strike capabilities. The 

same could be true if China’s military modernization continues 

apace without a clearly articulated strategic rationale 

or a spending plateau in sight. Moreover, if history is 

a useful guide, Japanese government debates on these issues 

will be relatively opaque and poorly understood in 

Washington. 

In response to these developments, the Institute 

for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) launched an extended 

research effort in 2007 to examine not only Japan’s 

propensity and capacity to “go nuclear,” but also to explore 

the overarching issue of how deterrence is functioning 

and changing in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

It is these latter questions in particular regarding deterrence 

and extended deterrence that proved most interesting 

and, we think, particularly important to U.S. policy 

makers, given the dramatic changes underway in the 

regional security environment in East Asia and relevant 

proposals in the areas of non-proliferation and arms control. 

This report explains the results of our study, which relied 

on an extensive series of interviews with Japanese and 

U.S. officials, scholars, and policy specialists, along with a 

thorough analysis of relevant Japanese and American literature 

on related defense issues and regional geostrategic 

developments. 

It is important to note that IFPA’s study is by no means 

the only project on these issues that was in one way or 

another stimulated by North Korea’s nuclear test. In both 

Japan and the United States, the DPRK test 

prompted a variety of government offices, 

private think tanks, and individual scholars 

to explore what effect a nuclear North Korea 

might have on Japan or the bilateral alliance. 

† Virtually all of these studies and articles 

conclude that there is essentially no 

chance that Japan will pursue an indigenous 

nuclear deterrent in the near future, though 

each offers slightly different analysis of the 

† Some of these have 

already reached publicly 

available conclusions. 

For example, see Chanlett-Avery 

and Nikitin 

2008, Hughes 2007, Izumi 

and Furukawa 2007, 

Kitaoka 2006, Mochizuki 

2007a, and Ogawa 2006, 

among many others. Additional 

government studies 

have been conducted 

in both countries that are 

not publicly available. 


v

t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s 

determining factors, with various implications. Some emphasize 

Japan’s continued confidence in its alliance with 

the United States as a primary factor behind Japan’s anticipated 

nuclear abstinence, while others give greater 

weight to the power of domestic public opinion against 

such a move and Japan’s identity as a non-nuclear weapon 

state (NNWS). Still others highlight in dispassionate 

strategic terms the limited utility of nuclear weapons for 

such a small island nation, or a related cost/benefit analysis 

that underscores potential losses on the diplomatic 

front that would stem from such a major change in nuclear 

policy. 

Our project benefited greatly from this flurry of research 

activity, and overall we found much that corroborates 

the fundamental conclusions of these other workshops 

and articles. In order to enhance the value of IFPA’s 

research effort, therefore, we decided to focus our project 

and this report on issues less thoroughly treated by 

other studies. In particular, we wanted to reconcile some 

of these different explanations for why Japan is unlikely 

to develop nuclear weapons and correspondingly derive 

the circumstances under which Japan might reconsider 

its non-nuclear principles. 

We also believe it is critical to highlight the increasingly 

important role that conventional weapons play in the 

concept of extended deterrence in East Asia, which traditionally 

referred almost exclusively to the extended deterrent 

effect of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. This comes at a 

time when U.S. policy makers are considering further reducing 

the reliance on nuclear weapons in national security 

and extended deterrence policies, and so it is important 

to examine Japanese views on these matters. It may 

be that continued U.S. reaffirmation of its generally stated 

defense commitments to Japan is all that is necessary to 

maintain Japanese confidence on this point, or specific 

upgrades in alliance capabilities might be needed beyond 

rhetoric alone to preserve regional stability. In the latter 

case, the allies will consequently have to determine how 

to coordinate and share the burden for upgrading those 

capabilities. 

Looked at more broadly, the same circumstances that 

are causing Japan to think critically about the effectiveness 

of U.S. extended deterrence (in certain situations) are 

also forcing the alliance to confront fundamental questions 

about its long-term direction and viability. That is, 

Japan’s increasing sense of vulnerability to North Korean 

missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), along 

with China’s comprehensive military modernization, is arguably 

causing leaders in Tokyo to place a greater emphasis 

on homeland defense issues compared to any other 

time since World War II. 

This coincides with Washington’s emphasis on maximum 

flexibility in terms of the use of its military forces 

and assets stationed around the world to prevent nuclear 

terrorism, as well as its desire for stepped-up contributions 

by friends and allies to various coalitions’ missions. 

If anything, the United States would prefer to move away 

from specific defense-of-Japan commitments, precisely at 

a time when Japan is looking for more clarity in this regard. 

The United States might also be entering a phase where it 

focuses more on developing and procuring capabilities 

to go after terrorist networks and support counterinsurgency 

campaigns, rather than building next-generation 

systems to compete with peer or near-peer competitors. 

Reconciling these seemingly competitive positions and redefining 

the alliance narrative amidst a variety of financial, 

legal, political, and strategic restraints in both countries 

are a core challenge facing the United States and Japan. 

North Korea’s nuclear test was a catalyst for debate 

about Japan and nuclear weapons, but the pertinent 

question in this debate is not “if ” Japan will go nuclear, 

but “why.” Why might Japan lose faith in extended deterrence 

provided by the United States, and what does this 

say about the current health of the bilateral alliance and 

how it functions within a changing regional security environment 

If Japanese confidence in current methods of 

deterrence is weakening, how can we observe or measure 

this, and can such a trend be reversed Should the United 

States even care about the nuances of this debate As explained 

in this report, we believe strongly that the United 

States does have an important stake in this debate, and 

successfully participating in the discussion requires a detailed 

understanding of Japanese deterrence concepts, 

strategic priorities, and patterns of decision making. All 

of these issues are examined in this report. 

To keep the report relatively concise and useful to policy 

makers, background explanations and historical context 

are kept to a minimum. There is a good deal of valuable literature 

available in both Japanese and English regarding 

traditional concepts of deterrence, the U.S.-Japan alliance, 

vi 



and the evolution of the two countries’ nuclear policies, so 

a chronology of recent alliance management milestones, 

for example, is limited. † Instead, this report explores the 

future of extended deterrence and the U.S.-Japan alliance 

more narrowly and deeply than have other studies, and 

we aim to provide U.S. policy makers with a nuanced understanding 

of Japanese thinking on these issues, as well 

as to identify the kinds of early indicators that could alert 

Washington to a serious change of strategic thinking in 

Tokyo in the future. We also make recommendations for a 

bilateral approach to reshape extended deterrence for the 

twenty-first century in ways that strengthen and diversify 

our security and political relationships, which can reassure 

Japan while encouraging it to become a more active 

contributor to regional and/or global security initiatives. 

As mentioned above, a key component of the research 

activities for this project was a series of one-on-one and 

group interviews in Japan and the United States regarding 

the alliance and deterrence concepts (past, present, and 

future). Interviewees included influential leaders in Japan 

from the Diet, the foreign ministry, the Cabinet Secretariat, 

the defense ministry, military services, universities, think 

tanks, the business community, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), special interest groups, and journalists. 

Similar interviews were carried out in the United States 

with specialists from Congress, the State Department, the 

Defense Department, the National Security Council, NGOs, 

and think tanks. These interviews were not for attribution, 

and many individuals preferred not to be mentioned at 

all in this report, but IFPA is extremely grateful to all of 

them for lending their time, opinions, and insights to this 

study, among them Akiyama Nobumasa, Akutsu Hiroyasu, 

Larry Allen, Aoki Setsuko, Araki Junichi, Arima Yutaka, 

Suzanne Basalla, Patrick Boyd, Michael Cassidy, Michael 

Chinworth, Michael Dolby, Michael Finnegan, Furukawa 

Katsuhisa, Paul Giarra, Brad Glosserman, Ray Green, 

Mark Hague, Hirata Hidetoshi, John Hill, Llewelyn Hughes, 

Iida Yoichi, Iizuka Keiko, Ishiba Shigeru, Ishii Masafumi, 

Jimbo Ken, Kaihara Kentaro, Kagao Testuro, Kamiya Matake, 

Kanazawa Hironori, Kanehara Nobukatsu, Kawakami 

Takashi, Kono Taro, Kotani Rui, Richard Lawless, Michishita 

Narushige, Mizuno Takaaki, Mizuta Toshiya, Morimoto 

Satoshi, Nagaiwa Toshimichi, Nagashima Akihisa, Ogawa 

Shinchi, Okazaki Hisahiko, Ogawa Shinichi, Otsuka Umio, 

Ozaki Yoshinori, George Packard, Brad Roberts, Saiki 

Akitaka, Saitoh Harukazu, Sasaki Yu, Sasamoto Hiroshi, 

Sato Ken, Serizawa Kiyoshi, Shimada Junji, Shimmi Jun, 

Suzuki Atsuo, Takahashi Sugio, Takamizawa 

Nobushige, Tanaka Hitoshi, Tokuchi Hideshi, 

Tosaki Hirofumi, Umemoto Kazuyoshi, Usami 

Masayuki, Ezra Vogel, Watanabe Akio, 

† On deterrence, see 

Payne 2008, Freedman 

2004, or Ifft 2007. On the 

alliance and deterrence 

see, for example, Self and 

Thompson 2003, Kase 

David Wolff, Yagi Naoto, Yamada Shigeo, Yamamoto 

Noboru, Yoshizaki Tomonori, and 

many others. 

Some final words of acknowledgment and thanks are 

in order before moving on to the body of this report. I 

could not have completed this report without the research 

assistance of Nakai Aki and Oda Yuichi, who helped me 

pore through voluminous Japanese language material and 

tackled challenging research assignments with skill and 

enthusiasm. Dr. Richard J. Samuels also played an important 

role as a key advisor to this project from the very beginning, 

lending support and providing valuable insights 

at critical moments. I am appreciative of the research support 

at IFPA by Bobby Andersen and Yaron Eisenberg; Adelaide 

Ketchum’s editing work; and the graphic art and 

publication design effort of Christian Hoffman. I am also 

grateful for the support from IFPA’s leadership, in particular 

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., who was closely involved 

in all aspects of this project from its inception, but also to 

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, and Dr. Charles M. Perry for their 

insights and assistance. Responsibility for any errors or 

omissions in this report rests with the author. The entire 

project team is grateful to Smith Richardson for its financial 

support and, in particular, for the advice and encouragement 

of senior program officer Allan Song. In this report, 

Japanese, Korean, and Chinese names appear with 

the family name first and the given name second, as is the 

custom in those countries. 

2001, Hughes 2007, Tatsumi 

2008a, or Schoff 2007. 

Introduction and Acknowledgements 

vii


North Korea’s nuclear weapon test in October 2006 and 

the subsequent “debate” in Japan about whether or not to 

ponder its own nuclear future brought renewed attention 

to the subject of Japan and nuclear weapons. Pundits and 

policy makers in both the United States and Japan contemplated 

the implications of Pyongyang’s nuclear breakout, 

and many wondered if this marked the beginning of 

fundamental change in Japanese thinking on these issues. 

Just as North Korea’s long-range missile test over Japanese 

airspace in 1998 contributed significantly to 

Japan’s decision a few years later to embrace 

America’s missile defense (MD) development 

program, might the 2006 nuclear test eventually 

prove to be a similar watershed moment 

in Japanese defense policy Would there be 

a rising tide of Japanese sentiment in favor 

of reexamining the three non-nuclear principles 

of non-possession, non-manufacture, 

and non-introduction 

In pursuit of answers to these questions, the Institute 

for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) conducted an extended 

research effort over the past two years to examine not 

only Japan’s propensity and capacity to “go nuclear,” but 

also to explore the overarching issue of how deterrence 

is functioning and changing in the context of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance. It is these last two questions in particular regarding 

deterrence and extended deterrence that proved 

most interesting and, we think, particularly important to 

1 One exception to this 

statement could be Japan’s 

loosening of legal restrictions 

regarding the use of 

space for defense purposes 

(discussed in this report), 

but the motivation 

for this move can also be 

explained in the context 

of missile defenses and intelligence 

gathering. 

U.S. policy makers, given the dramatic changes underway 

in the regional security environment in East Asia and relevant 

proposals in the areas of non-proliferation and arms 

control. This report explains the results of our study. 

The short answer to the nuclear question in Japan is 

“no.” We have found no evidence to suggest that Japan has 

notably more interest in developing an indigenous nuclear 

deterrent as a result of North Korea’s test, and we have 

not detected any specific new steps that Japan has taken 

to shorten its theoretical lead time for launching a domestic 

nuclear weapons program. 1 The perceived threats 

are not sufficient to warrant such a dramatic policy shift, 

and the alliance with the United States is still considered 

up to the challenges at hand. Moreover, the Japanese public 

would not be supportive of a nuclear push. In fact, a 

few of Japan’s policy moves in the past few years arguably 

make it harder to embark on such a path (the discontinuation 

of its M-V solid-fueled rocket program and the quiet 

return of five hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium 

to the United States over the past decade are two 

such steps). By many estimates (including our own), Japan 

remains about two years away from a functioning, minimal 

nuclear deterrent, which is consistent with U.S. intelligence 

assessments from as far back as 1966. This twoyear 

nuclear lead time appears to strike the right balance 

for policy makers in Tokyo between political realities and 

diplomatic prudence, while maintaining a strategic hedge 

in case of a drastic change in circumstances. 

viii 



North Korea’s nuclear test and continuing missile programs 

are, however, examples of Japan’s eroding security 

position in the region, and they contribute to the growing 

sense of vulnerability that we detected in Japan, which is 

compounded by China’s military modernization, its space 

exploration, and its rising economic and diplomatic influence. 

Japan has always been dependent on energy imports 

(about 94 percent of its primary energy supply), but its reliance 

on food imports is also high (over 60 percent of its 

calorie intake), and instability in the Middle East and the 

rising share of food imports from China exacerbate the uneasiness. 

Japanese policy makers do not particularly fear 

war in the region, but they are concerned about a loss of 

security on the margins, whether this involves becoming a 

victim of coercive diplomacy (territorial disputes, regional 

diplomatic initiatives, or access to natural resources and 

trade routes) or nuclear/missile extortion by North Korea. 

The United States has no intention of abandoning its ally 

and pays close attention to developments in East Asia, but 

it is also a nation at war in other parts of the world, so that 

attention is not undivided. 

Indeed, although the U.S.-Japan alliance is still bound 

together by a strong sense of common interests and shared 

values, the two countries’ security priorities are diverging 

in meaningful ways. The United States is motivated 

primarily by concern about nuclear terrorism and other 

large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S. territory (or attacks 

that could otherwise undermine global economic and energy 

stability), while Japan tends to focus on the defense 

of Japan and maintaining an allied advantage over China’s 

growing area denial capabilities and North Korea’s missile 

programs. Missile and WMD proliferation is a shared 

concern, but their emphasis is different (defense of Middle 

East allies for the United States, and oil supply stability or 

North Korean foreign exchange earnings for Japan). 

All of this suggests a situation that can perhaps be described 

as two friends not being completely honest with 

each other. Washington is trying to recruit Japan to become 

a more capable and proactive partner in multilateral 

coalitions to maintain global stability and promote 

democracy, while Tokyo is primarily concerned with providing 

national defense at a relatively low financial and 

political cost. Each country provides minimal satisfaction 

on issues of paramount importance to the other in order 

to receive what it wants in return. While this is largely 

understandable and has not yet undermined the alliance 

in any serious fashion, it is an inherently weak foundation 

on which to maintain and support the alliance. 

Extended deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance is under 

pressure because it is more complicated than before 

(thanks largely to missile proliferation, China’s expansion 

of air and sea power, and nuclear modernization in the region), 

and this challenge comes at a time when America’s 

and Japan’s security priorities are diverging. For decades, 

extended deterrence was thought of in simple terms, characterized 

by robust U.S. security commitments to its allies 

overseas and underwritten predominately by the provision 

of a nuclear umbrella to deter war with the Soviet 

bloc. The U.S. commitment to counter the Soviet threat 

was largely unquestioned in Tokyo, and the details about 

how deterrence worked mattered little. 

Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense 

planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly who 

is to be deterred and how. U.S. deterrence doctrine has become 

muddled, as some emphasize the role of defenses, 

some push for bigger and better conventional options or 

seek more assertive alliance partners, and others talk about 

deterrence tailored to fit different situations. It is time to 

bring clarity to this important subject, not by simplifying 

the policy but by realigning priorities and deepening Japan’s 

understanding of the policy. U.S. verbal assurances to Japan 

will continue to be useful, but increasingly a more concrete 

and common understanding about how deterrence functions 

in East Asia will also be necessary. 

The United States is deemphasizing the role of nuclear 

weapons in supporting extended deterrence, which is 

acceptable provided Washington works proactively with 

Tokyo to shore up the multiple other components of deterrence 

(strong political and economic relations, conventional 

air and sea power, missile defenses, intelligence 

sharing, and scenario-based planning involving military, 

diplomatic, and economic cooperation). Deterrence has 

always been about more than just the nuclear umbrella, 

but this fact is often overlooked, given the power and symbolism 

of those weapons. Deemphasizing the role of nuclear 

weapons is a welcome development, but it should be 

accompanied by an intense period of political, diplomatic, 

and strategic consultations covering non-proliferation 

policies, regional diplomatic and security initiatives, and 

bilateral security cooperation. 


ix


Deterrence under pressure 

For decades, Japan has enjoyed a favorable security balance 

or “surplus” in the region, thanks to America’s nuclear 

umbrella, U.S. forward-deployed forces, and the absence 

of a near peer on the seas or in the skies that could possibly 

threaten Japan, apart from perhaps the Soviet Union. The 

fact that the Soviet Union was locked in a titanic struggle 

with America was oddly comforting to Japan, since Washington’s 

deterrence credibility was quite high vis-à-vis such 

a stark ideological enemy of relatively minor global economic 

consequence. To deal with the security challenges 

that did exist, Japan’s favored approach ( for a variety 

of legal, political, diplomatic, and budgetary reasons) has 

long been external balancing (through the U.S. alliance) 

coupled with incremental internal improvements in the 

areas of national defense and support for regional and international 

operations. Interviews in Japan for this project 

revealed concern among defense planners that external 

balancing might not be as effective in the future as it has 

been in the past. 

In the twenty-first century, Japan’s security surplus is 

slowly shifting toward a deficit, as North Korea improves 

its missile capabilities (potentially mating them with 

WMDs and/or targeting both Japanese and U.S. territory). 

China’s military modernization is a factor as well, particularly 

its investments in “area denial” capabilities (new submarines, 

missiles, and aircraft) that are narrowing the gap 

in conventional–weapons strength long enjoyed by the allies. 

In addition, China is modernizing its strategic nuclear 

forces at the same time that the United States is reducing 

its nuclear stockpile, likely resulting in a truly viable Chinese 

second-strike capability (possibly even nuclear balance 

someday). 

All of this suggests that the United States and Japan 

could lose their nearly exclusive dominance over the conflict 

escalation ladder in the region, and some in Tokyo 

worry that this will cause Washington to seek to avoid 

escalation (outside of theater) at almost any cost. Thus, 

questions in Japan about the future of nuclear balance immediately 

put the spotlight on the regional conventional 

balance, which is still favorable for the alliance but trending 

undesirably. This is essentially a Japanese version of 

the old Western European fear of “decoupling” during the 

Cold War, when some worried that the United States might 

detach itself from its strategic commitment to Europe in 

the face of a strengthening Soviet Union. The NATO experience 

therefore offers lessons that might be useful for the 

U.S.-Japan case (and they are explained in this report). 

We must be careful not to overstate the degree of Japanese 

concern. After all, defense spending in Japan is lower 

now than it was in 1996, and policy makers have not moved 

away from the country’s “minimum defense” strategy that 

relies heavily on U.S. power projection capability and the 

U.S. nuclear umbrella. The government still follows the U.S. 

debate over nuclear weapons modernization primarily as a 

non-proliferation issue, rather than as a domestic security 

issue, and officially it won’t let U.S. warships with nuclear 

weapons pass through its territorial waters. Japan remains 

ambivalent about joining UN- or U.S.-led peace and security 

operations overseas with any meaningful force, and it 

is only slowly implementing bilateral agreements on U.S. 

base realignment in Japan. These are not indicators of a 

country overly concerned about imminent regional security 

threats or abandonment by its main ally. 

Still, Japan has been careful to take incremental steps 

to strengthen its defenses and the alliance, by collaborating 

on missile defenses, relaxing restrictions on the use of 

space for defense purposes, dispatching the Self-Defense 

Forces (SDF) abroad on select missions, developing Hyuga-class 

helicopter-carrying destroyers, launching its own 

network of spy satellites, and agreeing to closer command 

and military training relationships with U.S. forces (in addition 

to continued host-nation support and payment of a 

sizeable portion of costs associated with U.S. base realignment). 

The key variable is how potential regional threats 

evolve (or don’t) in the future, but Japanese policy makers 

are carefully considering their options so as to be ready for 

any foreseeable outcome. 

For the future, recommendations in Japan for strengthening 

deterrence generally fall within four basic categories: 

1) greater security independence from the United States; 

2) support for the alliance but hedge actively against the 

potential for U.S. abandonment (hedging for substance); 

3) support for hedging, but primarily as a means to deter 

abandonment (hedging for show); and 4) greater military 

cooperation with the United States as a way to avoid 

abandonment (the “indispensable ally” argument). Under 

Prime Minister Koizumi especially, the fourth approach 

held sway, but there have been some security policy choices 

that also drift into the second and third categories (some 

x 


mentioned above). The opposition Democratic Party of Japan 

(DPJ), which could increase its political power in the 

coming years, generally supports the alliance, although it 

envisions a slightly more independent Japan than does the 

ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Political instability 

in Japan has made it difficult for either party to articulate 

a long-term security strategy beyond supporting the alliance 

or hedging for show, but U.S. policy makers should 

be prepared for more substantive hedging by Japan in the 

future, based on current trends. 

Japanese advocates of greater security independence 

from the United States are clearly concerned about the 

regional security trends described in this report. In addition, 

they point out that U.S. military spending will likely 

plateau or even decline in coming years, while U.S. expectations 

of Japan will rise. The U.S. Defense and Energy departments 

clearly stated in 2008 that “at present the United 

States does not have the ability to produce new nuclear 

weapons” and that it is “now the only nuclear weapon state 

that does not have [this] ability.” The new Obama administration’s 

depth of commitment to a variety of defense programs 

is not yet clear, including missile defense, a reliable 

replacement [nuclear] warhead (RRW), the F-22 Raptor 

fighter aircraft, and a prompt global strike initiative. The 

Bush administration argued that these programs, and others, 

were all critical to maintaining the credibility of extended 

deterrence and America’s security commitments. 

Whatever the Obama administration decides regarding 

these programs and initiatives, the important point 

for the United States is to engage Japan proactively to 

keep allied confidence strong, because the alliance delivers 

value for many in multiple ways. The alliance helps to 

suppress regional competition and plays a vital stabilizing 

role. It is a catalyst for regional security cooperation 

involving different partners, and it fosters other forms of 

diplomatic and economic cooperation around the world. 

Moreover, a reassured Japan can engage China more comfortably 

and forthrightly, and it can facilitate a productive 

U.S.-China dialogue as well, since U.S. officials can worry 

less about how their overtures to Beijing for stronger 

cooperative ties reverberate in Tokyo. More frequent and 

substantive cooperation amongst these three countries 

will have a significant positive impact on regional stability 

and prosperity. 


Options for the United States and Japan 

The future of extended deterrence for Japan and the United 

States depends upon a combination of factors, some 

of which are under the allies’ control and some of which 

are not. The allies cannot directly control the trajectory of 

China’s conventional or nuclear military modernization, 

North Korea’s political-military development in the post- 

Kim Jong-il era, the ultimate effectiveness of MD technologies, 

or broader economic conditions in the region and 

the world. The allies’ individual and collective responses 

to these developments, however, are up to them, and their 

choices will undoubtedly influence the regional security environment. 

Moreover, the allied consultations about these 

issues in and of themselves will also become indicators of 

the health of the alliance, so the frequency, atmosphere, 

and substance of these bilateral interactions will also be 

important. 

In terms of balancing the security equation for Japan 

or stemming the slide from security surplus to security 

deficit, the preferred option is to minimize the potential 

threat side of the equation and eliminate the need for the 

allies to react stridently to bolster deterrence. As House 

of Representatives Speaker Kono Yohei explained in 2008, 

“We should establish a peaceful diplomatic environment 

in East Asia, improve security conditions there, and make, 

at least, a large U.S. military presence at the current level 

unnecessary.” If Kono’s vision comes to pass and Chinese 

and Russian military modernization programs level out, 

North Korea denuclearizes, and regional tensions wane, 

then pressure on the deterrence question and the future 

of the U.S.-Japan alliance will similarly be reduced. This 

would of course be the best option for all concerned. But 

if China does not restrain itself, for example, or if North 

Korea is emboldened by new missile and WMD capabilities, 

then deterrence must be considered in prudent ways 

that do not contribute to a security dilemma in the region. 

This is more easily said than done, for one country’s deterrent 

is often another nation’s perceived threat demanding 

a response, contributing to a vicious cycle. 

Symbols have always been important to the U.S.-Japan 

alliance and to the concept of deterrence, whether 

the symbol is the nuclear umbrella, basing a U.S. aircraft 

carrier in Japan, or forward deploying a hundred thousand 

U.S. military personnel in East Asia (including a sizable 

contingent of Marines in Okinawa). Some of these 


xi


symbols remain intact, but others are changing and seem 

less visible. High-ranking U.S. officials have disparaged the 

future viability of technology supporting the nuclear umbrella 

during the RRW debate, and the number of forwarddeployed 

U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan is declining. 

The Pentagon talks more about stability operations 

and counterinsurgency as core missions for the military, 

while it lists “deterring conflict” as only the fourth of five 

objectives in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. 

Some Japanese defense planners fear that Washington 

is distracted by conflict in the Middle East and Central 

Asia, viewing everything through a prism of hunkereddown 

homeland defense. The reality is quite different, 

and an interesting dichotomy has developed whereby an 

American visitor to Tokyo can hear worry about a U.S. 

pullback, and the same week in Beijing listen to concern 

about America’s build-up in the region! 

Objectively speaking, overall the United States is increasing 

its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, 

not pulling back. This mild build-up is actually one of the 

many objectives of its global repositioning of forces in response 

to a perceived shifting of “the global 

community’s ‘center of gravity’ [toward] the 

Asia-Pacific region.” The build-up is hard to 

quantify, however, as it relies mostly on less 

visible measures such as upgrading equipment, 

more frequent and longer rotational deployments (of 

F-22s, B-2s, SSGNs, among other assets), access agreements 

with partners in the region to broaden deployment flexibility 

in times of crisis, and similar incremental moves. 

Taken together, all of these improvements suggest that 

external balancing vis-à-vis North Korea and China has actually 

been achieved to some degree, even if those in Japan 

who worry about America’s security commitments do not 

realize it. Part of the reason for this is that as old symbols 

of deterrence are phased out, they are being replaced with 

a diffuse range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) 

assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The 

assurance effect is less concrete and immediate, though 

the deterrence effect might actually be stronger, given the 

flexibility of use. The problem is that the relationship of 

these new assets to specific deterrence scenarios involving 

the alliance has not been explored adequately. 

Through continued explanation and consultations 

with Japan (beyond ad hoc briefings), many of America’s 

2 A good example of bilateral 

interagency cooperation 

is the chemical, 

biological, radiological, 

and nuclear (CBRN) defense 

working group. 

regional posture adjustments described in this report 

should reassure Japan in the short term. Still, the United 

States is also reaching the limit of what it can invest 

in East Asian security, and longer-term questions remain 

about how deterrence is expected to function in the alliance. 

Part of this challenge can be addressed through the 

current bilateral dialogue focused on base realignment in 

Japan and alliance transformation (which includes a reassessment 

of the allies’ roles, missions, and capabilities, or 

RMC). The rest of the challenge might require a new forum 

for bilateral dialogue and policy making, which we 

discuss later. 

The roadmap for realignment and the RMC discussions 

stem directly from the allies’ articulation in 2005 of common 

strategic objectives, and these are valuable tools for 

strengthening deterrence and transforming the alliance 

for the future. Closer command relationships, more joint 

training opportunities, and new forms of interagency cooperation 

on security issues will enhance interoperability 

and build confidence that new threats can be deterred and 

defeated. 2 The problem with this process has been that, 

despite agreeing on common objectives, each country has 

different priorities within that list; this is why a realignment 

of priorities will be as important as realigning forces. 

If this cannot be accomplished, then the common objectives 

are not truly common, and the alliance will lose 

its relevance. 

Japan’s preferred option will be to stay with the alliance, 

since this is likely to be the most efficient and reliable way 

to preserve security. Japan could lose confidence in the alliance, 

however, if threats rise and/or U.S. attention wanes. 

Even though U.S. policy makers will likely hear about any 

lack of Japanese confidence through direct bilateral conversations, 

a more dependable gauge of the seriousness 

of Japan’s concerns will be watching what Japan actually 

does, and not just listening to what it says. Our project 

identified possible indicators that could alert Washington 

to changes in Japanese attitudes regarding perceived 

threats, the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the 

credibility of extended deterrence (discussed in chapter 

3). These indicators could include new policy statements, 

legal interpretations, bureaucratic reorganizations, funding 

shifts, diplomatic initiatives, and investments in new 

capabilities with military applications, among other possibilities. 

Such developments could indicate a degree of 

xii 



Japanese hedging intended to buttress the alliance, build 

independent defense capabilities, or some combination of 

the two. Potential indicators include: 

Alliance supporting 

• accelerated progress on the realignment 

roadmap and RMC adjustments 

• further improvements in the protection 

of classified information 

• permission for passage of U.S. ships with 

nuclear weapons through Japan’s territorial 

waters in an emergency 

Hedging for show / hedging for substance 

• passage of a generic law for SDF dispatch overseas 

• increased defense spending 

• strengthening relationships between 

the scientific and civilian industrial research 

community and the defense policy 

and defense industrial community 

• strengthening security cooperation with 

other U.S. partners in the region 

• relaxation of self-imposed restrictions 

on collective self-defense 

Independence 

• new investments in information gathering satellites 

or command and control assets 

• research and pursuit of a longrange 

strike capability 

• development of nuclear-powered 

ship and submarine technology 

Shoring up deterrence, 

now and in the future 

The East Asian region is changing, and deterrence and the 

alliance must change along with it. Japan is looking for 

more commitments from its alliance partner, while the 

United States wants to preserve its flexibility in terms of 

when and how it responds to different contingencies. It 

also wants Japan to contribute more to global missions. 

There are no simple ways to bridge the gaps that are opening 

up in the security relationship, and it will take efforts 

by both sides. This process will be particularly challenging 

for Japan. 

Reshaping extended deterrence for the future requires 

continued emphasis on the political and economic bilateral 

relationship, but it also includes developing new 

habits of scenario-based defense planning and building 

specific capabilities and patterns of cooperation to counter 

the expanding array of potential threats. Missile, WMD, 

cybersecurity, and maritime conflict scenarios should be 

featured. These new capabilities will have both a political 

and an operational function in the shoring up of extended 

deterrence. 

In early 2009, the alliance is off to a good start in renewing 

the alliance commitments and pledging to work 

together on a variety of issues such as climate change, 

global economic recovery, and improving foreign aid and 

assistance programs. The purpose of pursuing such global 

cooperation is not necessarily to strengthen extended 

deterrence, but we cannot overlook the indirect benefit 

that productive bilateral relations can have on deterrence 

by projecting an image of the allies standing shoulder-toshoulder 

to aggressively address world problems. 

There is a limit, however, to how much global partnership 

and solid political ties can buttress deterrence, and so 

any U.S. strategy to strengthen U.S.-Japan extended deterrence 

in Northeast Asia must also address specific security 

concerns and take into account new capabilities developed 

by potential adversaries. Some of these measures 

will likely pay political and psychological dividends for the 

alliance, but they are rooted in strategic and operational 

considerations. 

The first step is to complete the work initiated by successive 

Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meetings 

during the Bush administration after the allies agreed to 

“common strategic objectives” in 2005. A roadmap is in 

place to complete base realignment, and it will be important 

to implement the program. At least as important is 

the carrying out of the accompanying RMC initiatives. 

Strengthening deterrence has less to do with going 

through the motions of implementing RMC initiatives and 

more to do with the spirit and sense of purpose in which 

they are carried out. How does the CBRN Defense Working 

Group evolve, for example, since it was highlighted as 

a sign of RMC progress in the 2007 SCC joint statement 

(see appendix A) Does it become a low-level bureaucratic 

habit dealing with a limited set of esoteric CBRN 

questions, or does it instead serve as a catalyst for broader 

inter-ministry/interagency defense cooperation that 

incorporates new policy making or intelligence components 

and possibly leads to cooperation with other partners 

such as South Korea, Australia, or even NATO A new 


xiii


bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at 

Yokota AFB is another example, as a trial version of this 

initiative proved effective at coordinating the allies’ surveillance 

and tracking of North Korea’s missile tests in 

2006. The BJOCC is scheduled to become a permanent alliance 

asset in 2010, but it remains to be seen how extensively 

it becomes involved in coordinating bilateral exercises, 

whether after-action reviews will be fed back into 

the policy-making and planning process jointly or independently, 

and if the BJOCC model can be applied to maritime 

operations. 

One way to integrate the discussion about common 

objectives and priorities with RMC issues and scenariobased 

planning is to establish a bilateral forum at the policy 

level dedicated to deterrence issues. This recommendation 

is informed by NATO’s experience with its Nuclear 

Planning Group (NPG), but the proposed bilateral forum 

would be different in many respects. We could call it the 

Deterrence Policy Group (DPG) for now, since nuclear issues 

are only a small component, and it is not intended to 

be a planning body. 

This U.S.-Japan DPG could address a wide range of issues, 

but the group should have a clear purpose focused 

on jointly establishing the policy underpinnings necessary 

to maintain credible deterrence in the face of a changing 

security environment. At times, the group might be informed 

by SCC decisions and documents, trying to bridge 

the bilateral policy gap, for example, between broad SCC 

statements on the one hand, and planning or implementation 

at the operational level on the other. In addition, 

it might explore particular issues on behalf of the SCC or 

jointly develop threat assessments and scenarios for later 

planning purposes. 

We do not make this recommendation of a DPG lightly, 

since we understand the extensive array of bilateral 

committees, working groups, task forces, and Track 2 dialogues 

that already exist within the alliance. Still, such 

a dialogue is necessary to reorient the RMC initiatives in 

support of long-term deterrence needs. The most appropriate 

way to structure the DPG is to utilize the bilateral 

Security Sub-Committee (SSC), which has been used at 

various times, most recently by the Bush administration 

to develop the common objectives and subsequent initiatives, 

although DPG meetings would likely be less frequent 

and less intense. 

Nuclear issues could be one agenda item, addressing 

some of the topics mentioned in this report with regard 

to U.S. nuclear policy, non-proliferation initiatives, and 

potential introduction scenarios, but the DPG would also 

consider a wider array of deterrence components, perhaps 

including: 

• joint threat assessments (including cyber 

or space-related threats) 

• joint studies of North Korean or Chinese 

deterrence doctrines 

• missile launch and maritime conflict scenarios 

• dealing with suspected missile or nuclear 

proliferation events 

• the use of economic sanctions or diplomatic 

steps to deter certain actions 

• the role, method, and timing of signaling 

There is no need to discuss U.S. nuclear doctrine in any 

detail, but the allies might want to clarify, for example, if 

the nuclear umbrella is designed to deter a nuclear attack 

only (as the Japanese government suggests), or if it applies 

to other scenarios as well. The DPG would not attempt to 

revise the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, but it could go 

beyond the allies’ current concept of operations with regard 

to an armed attack against Japan or bilateral cooperation 

in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” These 

concepts are broken down into different types of operations 

and have been determined to some degree, but the 

allies have not used corresponding scenario-based planning 

sufficiently to map out in detail how a potential conflict 

might unfold and how they would respond (jointly 

and independently). 

As deterrence in East Asia becomes more complex and 

multi-dimensional, developing a more coherent and common 

understanding of a possible escalation ladder (and 

how and when to signal to adversaries) becomes increasingly 

important. Our project research revealed surprisingly 

little agreement among defense planners and policy makers 

in both countries regarding what different conflict-escalation 

ladders might look like, how they might be controlled, 

or even how tall (or short) they are. Some assumed 

that conflicts would escalate rather quickly, while others 

perceived a longer series of rungs that the allies could potentially 

climb up or down. The allies need to develop a 

clearer common picture in this regard. 

xiv 



The allies have rarely discussed, for example, precisely 

how their two main components of deterrence would actually 

complement each other in various scenarios (the 

two components being deterrence by denial supplied by 

Japan and deterrence by punishment supplied by the United 

States), nor have they clarified how threats of escalation 

can (or should) be conveyed in advance to potential 

adversaries. If gaps appear in a given scenario between 

what Japan expects and what the U.S. is willing to provide 

– such as conflict involving disputed territories or Japan’s 

exclusive economic zone – then Japan can consider developing 

appropriate independent capabilities that are separable 

(but not separate) from the alliance. 

Finally, the regional perspective should not be lost during 

this period of intense bilateral consultation. The purpose 

of a DPG forum, after all, would be to strengthen alliance 

confidence, to reinvigorate RMC discussions in a 

way that better supports extended deterrence objectives, 

and most importantly to promote regional stability by reducing 

the likelihood of miscalculation and promoting 

the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. Efforts to 

strengthen deterrence, therefore, should go hand in hand 

with other regional security initiatives, be they bilateral, 

trilateral, or multilateral. 

Certain modest U.S. and Japanese foreign policy initiatives 

are already aimed at stitching together loose security 

cooperation coalitions in East Asia for the purpose of 

promoting regional stability and, in a way, collective security. 

Most of Japan’s initiatives – signing security cooperation 

agreements with Australia and India, participating in 

multilateral exercises, and even exploring a “global partnership” 

with NATO itself – focus on non-traditional security 

cooperation such as disaster relief, maritime search 

and rescue, and UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) missions. 

By discussing and practicing these useful but benign 

security activities, the nations’ defense communities 

learn more about each other, promote cooperation, and, it 

is hoped, feel more secure. The substance of these interactions 

can be enhanced over time. In addition, the process 

of community building can also deter aggressive behavior 

by putting at stake a nation’s membership in this emerging 

group, in what has sometimes been referred to as collective 

deterrence. 

Overall, if combined allied dominance in conventional 

and nuclear forces in the region is going to diminish, as is 

likely, then their commitment and strategy to maintain escalation 

control in critical situations should be reinforced. 

The tradition of equating extended deterrence with a nuclear 

umbrella is fading away, and this should ultimately 

yield a more practical and operationally sound concept of 

deterrence. The process of getting to that point should create 

opportunities to reshape extended deterrence for the 


the allies’ security and political relationships (possibly in 

closer partnership with other nations), which can underwrite 

stability in the region and reassure Japan as the United 

States seeks a lower nuclear profile. This is both the 

challenge and the promise of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 


xv


RUSSIA 

MONGOLIA 

CHINA 

NORTH 

KOREA 

SOUTH 

KOREA 

JAPAN 

LAOS 

THAILAND 

VIETNAM 

CAMBODIA 

South China 

Sea 

OKINAWA 

TAIWAN 

PHILIPPINES 

Philippine Sea 

Pacific Ocean 

GUAM 

Strait of Malacca 

MALAYSIA 

SINGAPORE 

INDONESIA 

Map of East Asia 

xvi 


chapter 1 

The Pertinent Question 

about a Nuclear Japan 

Not “If,” but “Why” 

North Korea’s nuclear weapon test in October 2006 and 

the subsequent “debate” in Japan about whether or not to 

ponder its own nuclear future brought renewed attention 

to the subject of Japan and nuclear weapons. Pundits and 

policy makers in both the United States and Japan contemplated 

the implications of Pyongyang’s nuclear breakout, 

and many wondered if this marked the beginning of 

fundamental change in Japanese thinking on these issues. 

Just as North Korea’s long-range missile test over Japanese 

airspace in 1998 was a major catalyst leading to Japan’s 

full-fledged embrace of America’s missile defense (MD) development 

program a few years later, might the 2006 nuclear 

test eventually prove to be a similar watershed moment 

in Japanese defense policy Would there be a rising tide 

of Japanese sentiment in favor of reexamining the three 

non-nuclear principles of non-possession, non-manufacture, 

and non-introduction 

With a few exceptions, a survey of opinion polls, policy 

maker interviews, and relevant writings in both countries 

revealed that proponents of a nuclear Japan after North 

Korea’s test were largely the same small number of people 

who advocated such a move in prior years, without 

any noticeable swelling of their ranks. 3 Those who do support 

the idea of Japan’s developing its own nuclear deterrent 

often do so for very different reasons. Some (most of 

them American) see it as a means of “unleashing” Japan 

or “playing the Japan card” in Northeast Asia in the context 

of a stronger and more balanced U.S.-Japan alliance, 

while others (usually Japanese) view the nuclear option for 

Japan as a way to compensate for a potentially weaker alliance, 

a decline in deterrence credibility, or American indifference 

to Japan’s security needs. This highlights a wide 

perception gap regarding alliance durability and the basic 

rationale for considering a change in nuclear policies, and 

it is an important issue that we will examine throughout 

this report. 

While many outside observers have wondered if Japan 

might someday alter its nuclear policies as a result of North 

Korea’s test, the overall conclusion so far has been almost 

unanimously negative (at least in the near to mid-term). 

But recent consideration of that “if ” question has led to a 

more pertinent and pivotal discussion within and among 

the two countries about “why,” as in, “Why would Japan 

change its nuclear policies” What would cause Japan to 

reevaluate the deterrence power of its alliance with the 

United States, and what, if anything, should be done to 

shore up perceived shortcomings Examination of these 

questions has begun at both academic and official levels 

since late 2006, and better understanding of 

why Japan might reconsider long-held policies 

will go a long way to narrowing the perception 

gap mentioned above. 

3 For example, see Krauthammer 

2003 and 2006, 

Lowry 2005 and 2006, Nakanishi 

2003 and 2006, and 

Nishibe 2003 and 2007. 

How precarious is a non-nuclear Japan 

Japan’s non-nuclear bona fides are well established. Although 

one-third of the known nuclear weapon states 

(NWS) in the world are immediate neighbors of Japan (Chi- 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence 1


na, North Korea, and Russia), Japan remains a non-nuclear 

weapon state, and it has long worked actively in international 

forums to promote nuclear non-proliferation and 

disarmament. 4 Japan’s Atomic Energy Basic 

Law ( from 1955) clearly states that research, 

development, and utilization of atomic energy 

will be limited to peaceful purposes, 

and Japan joined the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku 

announced in 1967 his government’s adoption of the 

three non-nuclear principles mentioned above, followed 

by Japan’s signature on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) in 1970 and its ratification in 1976. Sato’s role in 

solidifying Japan’s commitment to abstain from developing 

nuclear weapons was largely responsible for making 

him Japan’s only ever recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize 

in 1974. Japan later supported the indefinite extension of 

the NPT in 1995, and it also signed the IAEA’s Additional 

Protocol in 1998, which allows for a stricter regimen of 

IAEA inspections of Japanese nuclear facilities than previously 

existed. 

The fact that Japan is the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear 

attack, combined with its pacifist constitution prohibiting 

the maintenance of “war potential,” has long made the 

mere mention of a possible nuclear option for Japan a sensitive 

subject in Japanese politics. Japanese public opinion 

has never favored nuclear weapons, and more than a few 

Japanese policy makers have damaged their careers by calling 

for a fuller and more open debate on the topic. In an oftcited 

example, then-parliamentary vice minister of the Japan 

Defense Agency (JDA), Nishimura Shingo, was forced 

to resign in 1999 after suggesting that Japan’s failure to consider 

possessing nuclear weapons left it open to “rape” in 

the international system (Furukawa 2003, 105). North Korea’s 

test, however, seemed to weaken this nuclear debate 

taboo in Japan. 

Immediately after the test, senior members in Japan’s 

ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), most prominently 

Foreign Minister Aso and Chairman Nakagawa Shoichi 

of the Policy Research Council, called for a public debate 

on the nuclear question. Although Prime Minister Abe 

and other LDP leaders quickly dismissed the idea and reiterated 

their support for the non-nuclear principles, they 

did not reprimand their colleagues for raising the issue as 

had sometimes happened before. Shortly afterwards, U.S. 

4 North Korea is not recognized 

as a nuclear weapon 

state from a diplomatic 

standpoint, but it can be 

put in this category for defense 

planning purposes. 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan and reaffirmed 

America’s “will and capability” to meet the “full 

range of its deterrence and security commitments,” in an 

attempt to reassure Japan that it is still well protected under 

the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella (U.S. Department 

of State 2006). 

Despite these formal messages of continuity, however, 

the fact is that a nuclear North Korea has long been considered 

a key potential catalyst that could push Japan over 

the nuclear threshold. For example, Japanese Foreign Minister 

Muto Kabun stated in 1993 that “if North Korea develops 

nuclear weapons and that becomes a threat to Japan, 

first there is the nuclear umbrella of the United States upon 

which we can rely. But if it comes down to a crunch, possessing 

the will that ‘we can do it ourselves’ is important” 

(Jameson 1993). Other similar comments have been made 

by Japanese officials and opinion leaders over the years. 

The truth is that the nuclear issue in Japan, although 

certainly sensitive, was never quite the taboo subject that 

it was frequently made out to be, and Japan’s so-called nuclear 

allergy is not necessarily a genetic condition. A small 

number of influential nuclear advocates have always existed 

in postwar Japan, and a major reason why they remain 

in the minority is because Japan has had the luxury 

of a nuclear deterrent provided for it by the United 

States. The credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance and this 

extended deterrent has been critical to Japan’s sense of 

security, along with another important factor, namely, the 

absence of a serious and consistent existential threat to Japan. 

Consequently, whenever one or both of these factors 

seemed less undeniable, signs of reconsideration in Tokyo 

became apparent. 

China’s first nuclear test in 1964 was one example, leading 

to calls by senior LDP leaders for a reexamination of 

Japan’s nuclear policies. More surprising to U.S. officials at 

the time was Prime Minister Sato’s suggestion that Japan 

should have nuclear weapons if the Chinese Communists 

did, and that although the Japanese public was not ready 

for such a move, the younger generation could be “educated” 

to be more flexible on this point (Campbell and Sunohara 

2004, 222). In the end, Japan decided to deny itself 

nuclear weapons, but the government was careful to give 

itself two hedges against changing circumstances. 

The first hedge was to confirm the U.S. commitment 

to use nuclear weapons in defense of Japan if necessary, 

2 



and to address certain logistical details to make sure that 

this was feasible. In January 1965, for example, Sato asked 

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara to deploy nuclear 

weapons against China if “war” broke out with Japan. Mc- 

Namara gave that assurance (Asahi Shimbun 2008). The 

second hedge involved developing the basis for its own 

nuclear weapons program, should it ever become necessary. 

According to an important policy planning study prepared 

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in 1969, 

for example, “regardless of joining the NPT or not, we will 

keep the economic and technical potential for the production 

of nuclear weapons, while seeing to it that Japan 

will not be interfered with in this regard” (Mainichi Daily 

News 1994a). 

A deputy vice minister for foreign affairs chaired the 

committee, which reportedly held a series of internal 

meetings over five months involving deputy bureau chiefs 

and councilors to produce that one-hundred-page classified 

planning study. At the time, China was considered an 

unpredictable and potentially reckless enemy developing 

a nuclear arsenal, while America was bogged down in an 

intractable war that was sapping its strength and its appetite 

for overseas commitments. Might Japan perceive a 

similar dilemma today, only this time substituting North 

Korea and Iraq/Afghanistan for China and Vietnam 

It is not likely that Japan will decide definitively this 

year or next (or perhaps even in the next decade or two) 

that a startling about-face in security policy is necessary, 

especially while the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong 

and North Korea’s long-term nuclear future remains unclear. 

After all, North Korea’s development of a nuclear 

capability is not a thin bright line somehow dividing impotence 

from terrifying lethality with just one test. It is, instead, 

a wide gray zone, scaling up to a potentially serious 

threat posed by a North Korea that can accurately target 

Japan with nuclear weapons or other WMDs, and we have 

not yet reached that final point. In the worst-case scenario, 

in addition to Seoul’s being held hostage to North Korea’s 

artillery and armed forces massed along the demilitarized 

zone (DMZ), Tokyo would become another focal point of 

Pyongyang’s deterrence strategy, and later possibly Fairbanks, 

Seattle, San Francisco, Guam, or Honolulu. If this 

were the case, over time Japan could come to perceive the 

threat from North Korea to be far greater than that posed 

by China or the Soviet Union at any time during the Cold 

War. 5 Japan’s national security 

advisor has clearly stated 

that North Korean development 

of nuclear-armed missiles 

“would gravely threaten 

our security” (Koike 2007). 

Furthermore, China’s rising 

investments today in military 

power projection capabilities 

and strategic nuclear forces pose another threat 

that is evolving slowly but steadily, with uncertain implications 

for Japan over the long term. It is not clear where 

the tipping point is with regard to these perceived threats, 

but such a point does exist from Japan’s perspective, and it 

would behoove alliance managers to do their best to identify 

its general vicinity. The good news is that Northeast 

Asia remains a relatively calm and stable region at present, 

so there is time to carefully consider and possibly mitigate 

disruptive shifts in the regional balance of power. 

Similarly, we do not assume that the credibility of 

America’s security commitments to Japan will weaken 

overnight (if ever), but neither is it a foregone conclusion 

that there will be no change whatsoever in the balance of 

alliance and deterrence responsibilities. Depending on developments 

in the Middle East, for example, U.S. military 

forces could be redeployed for more extended periods of 

time, amounting to what Japan might perceive as American 

distraction or retrenchment from Asia. Furthermore, 

a fatal accident or heinous crime in Japan in the future 

directly involving U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) could seriously 

undermine the political sustainability of a continued U.S. 

military presence in Japan, leaving Japan with important 

deterrence holes to fill. This could occur as well if future 

adjustments to the U.S.-South Korea (Republic of Korea, 

or ROK) alliance, involving a substantial withdrawal of 

forward-deployed U.S. troops from Korea, were to trigger 

broader pressure for similar American force reductions in 

Japan. Presumably this would lead to a serious consideration 

by Tokyo of more potent independent Japanese defense 

capabilities to compensate for such reductions. 

Given that Japan’s national security strategy depends 

so heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its long-range 

strike capability, Japan will always be hyper-sensitive to 

the long-term implications of near-term trends regarding 

America’s security commitments (especially if they suggest 

5 It is worth remembering that when North 

Korea felt most safe behind a strong conventional 

deterrent, its transgressions were numerous. 

Highlights included the seizing of the USS 

Pueblo in 1968, provision of sanctuary for Japanese 

“Red Army” members in 1970, the capture 

of a Japanese fishing vessel in 1975, the Rangoon 

bombing incident in 1983, the downing of 

a Korean airliner in 1987, and the abduction of 

Japanese and South Korean citizens by North Korean 

agents in the 1970s and 1980s, among other 

acts of terrorism and criminal adventurism. 


3


a possible diminution in those commitments), and such 

concerns, however they arise, could prompt broader consideration 

of the nuclear option in Japan. The degree of 

sensitivity to alliance durability is directly proportional to 

the extent of perceived threats or vulnerability in Japan. 

The greater the threat, the greater is the need to balance 

that threat, either externally through Japan’s alliance with 

the United States, or internally by means of Japanese defense 

investments. For Japan to take matters into its own 

hands, however, it will need to overcome significant constitutional, 

political, and financial restrictions, which is 

why Tokyo’s first option has always been to make more 

modest investments in the alliance. 

Other important factors are also worth examining in order 

to determine the likelihood that Japan would seriously 

consider a nuclear option, since the rationale for nuclear 

weapon abstention goes somewhat beyond the two primary 

reasons stated above (the absence of a sustained existential 

threat and the credibility of 

U.S. defense commitments). Additional 

factors have been articulated 

at various times in Japan, 

including by secret (and apparently 

influential) panels of experts, 

either commissioned by, 

or conducted within, the Japanese 

government. 6 As a result, 

a sort of conventional wisdom 

has emerged on this issue with 

regard to strategic, tactical, and 

diplomatic reasons why possessing 

or introducing nuclear 

weapons is not in Japan’s national 

interest. 

Most Japanese defense experts, 

for example, have questioned 

the military utility of 

nuclear weapons for such a 

densely populated and geographically small country as 

Japan (Kase 2001 and interview 2007a). 7 This is true even 

though France and the United Kingdom, also relatively 

small states, deployed nuclear forces several decades 

ago and have continued to modernize their capabilities. 

Whatever its validity against a larger nuclear power such 

as China or Russia, this point about a lack of strategic 

6 The first known report was written by 

four nongovernmental Japanese university 

academics specializing in international 

security and nuclear science, and 

commissioned by Prime Minister Sato 

in the late 1960s (often referred to as the 

1968/70 report, since it was completed in 

two stages; see Kase 2001). Then, JDA director 

general Nakasone Yasuhiro ordered 

a separate cost/benefit study in 1970. The 

third report was an internal JDA assessment 

in 1994/95 of nuclear threats and 

deterrence strategies following the end 

of the Cold War (see Hughes 2007). Other 

related studies are likely to have been 

carried out at various levels of formality, 

including one reportedly completed 

in September 2006 (Tamura 2006). 

7 There are exceptions, of course, 

throughout postwar Japanese history. A 

good example is former Maritime Self-Defense 

Forces (MSDF) chief of staff Uchida 

Kazuomi, who believed in the late 1960s 

and early 1970s that “nuclear weapons 

were absolutely necessary for the defense 

of Japan,” particularly to counter Soviet 

submarines (Mainichi Daily News 1994b). 

depth is less applicable if Japan’s goal is to deter a smaller 

country such as North Korea, since North Korea would 

certainly be vulnerable to nuclear retaliation from Japan. 

Moreover, the deterrence equation shifts somewhat in Japan’s 

favor if the MD systems it is deploying prove effective 

at destroying incoming missiles. 

There are signs that at least a few Self-Defense Force 

(SDF) officers are sympathetic to these kinds of arguments. 

In an article penned anonymously by a “voluntary 

study group” of SDF officers in their early forties, for example, 

the authors write, “When we insist that Japan needs 

a nuclear weapon, we always hear negative opinions such 

as ‘Japan does not have an appropriate nuclear test site,’ 

or ‘Japan does not have a place to deploy a nuclear missile.’ 

However, these are such small issues…Israel has been 

nuclear-armed even though it has only a small territory, as 

large as Shikoku island in Japan. Today’s Japan is a much 

more vulnerable state than Israel because Japan is circled 

by nuclear armed states such as China, Russia and North 

Korea” (Group Ichigaya 2007). Still, most Japanese specialists 

agree with a leading defense analyst who dismissed 

this kind of argument, “There are those who get excited 

about the idea of discussing a nuclear option…but it is an 

emotional argument, not strategic” (interview 2007g). 

Some prominent Japanese foreign policy specialists, 

however, do suggest that even if it was not sufficient to deter 

a China-scale force in all circumstances, a Japanese national 

nuclear deterrent could so complicate strategic calculations 

in Beijing that China would think twice before 

threatening to use (or actually use) its own nuclear forces 

in a regional crisis or conflict (Okazaki 2003). In this way, 

so the argument goes, Japan could play a reinforcing role 

to the U.S. strategic deterrent, as the British nuclear force 

to some extent has done in Europe (Group Ichigaya 2007). 

Strategic calculations are beginning to find their way into 

the debate. 

Another argument against the nuclear option advanced 

in Japan was the fear that a nuclear Japan could 

spark a regional arms race. “[Japan’s deployment of nuclear 

weapons] would significantly destabilize East Asia, 

which in turn would possibly threaten Japan’s security … 

[so] a nuclear arms race is an unfavorable game for Japan” 

(Kitaoka 2006). Such a move would also likely undermine 

Japan’s efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security 

Council and strengthen the NPT and global non- 

4 



proliferation. Still others argued that developing an indigenous 

deterrent might be prohibitively expensive, 8 that 

the Japanese public would not be supportive, that it might 

not be constitutional, or that it would probably weaken 

the alliance with the United States. 

On this last point, it has long been assumed that the 

United States views the value of its alliance with Japan as 

not only stemming from forward bases and military cooperation, 

but also from restraining Japan’s need to militarize 

by itself and thereby destabilize the region. Indeed, an 

influential U.S. congressional commission explained extended 

deterrence as one of the pillars of America’s nonproliferation 

strategy, since it allows an ally like Japan to 

forego building its own nuclear deterrent (Strategic Posture 

Review Commission 2008, 8). 

Japanese and U.S. policy makers should reexamine 

these arguments; understanding the extent to which this 

is already taking place (or will take place) is a critically 

important issue for alliance managers to consider. After 

all, given North Korea’s nuclear test and active missile program, 

as well as China’s ongoing conventional and nuclear 

weapons modernization programs, it would be more accurate 

to say that it is these two countries, and not Japan, 

that are sparking a regional arms race. The real question 

is how Japan and the United States will respond. 

In addition, while Japan’s goal of securing a permanent 

seat on the UN Security Council remains, Tokyo’s expectations 

in this regard are seriously diminished compared to 

a decade or two ago, and this goal may not serve as a brake 

on Japanese nuclear hedging strategies to the degree that 

it has in the past. Japan certainly noticed in 2006 the fact 

that not even one Southeast Asian country was a joint 

recommender for UN reform aimed at giving Japan and 

other countries a permanent seat on the Security Council 

(House of Councilors 2006, 38). Moreover, even if the 

UN can manage to reform itself along these lines, another 

leading candidate for a permanent seat is India, which lies 

squarely outside of the non-proliferation regime as a declared 

nuclear state, and all five current permanent members 

in the Security Council are nuclear weapons states. In 

the years ahead, therefore, the Security Council candidacy 

argument may no longer be a key factor in constraining 

nuclear-related discussions in Japan. 

The future utility of the NPT is also in question, largely 

because of North Korea’s withdrawal and Iran’s ongoing 

nuclear programs, which could lead to a broader nuclear 

breakout in the Middle East. Moreover, the U.S. government 

has tried to lift the sanctions it imposed on India after 

that country became an overt nuclear power in 1998, 

suggesting that “trustworthy” nuclear states are not necessarily 

ostracized by the international community. Additionally, 

just two years ago it was revealed that South 

Korean scientists had conducted uranium enrichment experiments 

as recently as 2000, running afoul of that country’s 

safeguards agreement with 

the IAEA. Nuclear proponents in 

Japan could argue that their detractors 

are simply being naïve 

to forgo any serious study of the 

country’s options. 

Japanese defense leaders a 

decade ago concluded through 

an internal study that Japan was 

better off in a world where just a 

8 By one account, over $2 billion 

just to develop an initial prototype 

(Tamura 2006). 

9 See also, Furukawa 2003, 111. A similar 

poll in the Yomiuri Shimbun that 

same month found that 46 percent supported 

discussing the nuclear option for 

Japan, with 51 percent opposed (Kyodo 

News 2006a). More recent polls 

in 2008 show declining public interest 

in the nuclear debate, as the memory 

of North Korea’s nuclear test fades. 

few states possess nuclear weapons capability, and that Japan’s 

pursuit of such weapons would consequently undermine 

its security by prompting others to go in that direction 

(Kamiya 2002). But how would Japan actually react if 

the proliferation cat is already out of the bag That same 

JDA study asserted as well that it was highly unlikely that 

the United States would allow North Korea to develop nuclear 

weapons (Asahi Shimbun 2003). What does the inaccuracy 

of this assumption mean for the nuclear weapons 

debate in Japan 

Although the Japanese public is still not in favor of the 

country’s pursuing its own nuclear deterrent, opinion 

polls show an increasing willingness to at least discuss 

the option. A November 2006 Mainichi Shimbun poll, for 

example, revealed that a large majority of Japanese do not 

believe Japan should possess nuclear weapons (78 percent, 

which is about the same as the 1981 figure of 82 percent 

by a separate poll), but 61 percent said a debate on the 

question was acceptable (compared to 37 percent in 2006) 

(Reuters 2006a). 9 The political environment in Japan has 

changed to the extent that the public is more familiar with 

discussions about sensitive security-related issues such as 

the dispatch of SDF personnel overseas (to Iraq, for example) 

or working in support of U.S. combat operations ( for 

example, in the Indian Ocean in support of the campaign 

in Afghanistan). 


5


Constitutional and other legal questions remain, but 

Japanese politicians over the years have been careful to 

emphasize that there is nothing in the constitution that 

would prohibit Japan from possessing nuclear weapons as 

long as they are for self-defense. The Abe government reiterated 

this stance in 2006 in a statement before the parliament, 

saying, “Even with nuclear weapons, we’ve understood 

that possessing them would not necessarily violate 

the constitution as long as it is kept within [the limits of 

minimum capabilities necessary for self-defense]” (Reuters 

2006b). Similar statements have been made throughout 

postwar Japan from time to time, first and foremost by 

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke in 1957, as well as by then- 

Chief Cabinet Secretary (later Prime Minister) Fukuda Yasuo 

in 2002 (Kyodo News 2002). 

Finally, while for years it was argued that U.S. policy 

makers would oppose the idea of a nuclear-armed Japan, 

more recently some of America’s highest-ranking officials 

seem to actually be encouraging such an approach, 

although this impression is based only on a few comments 

in interviews by people like Vice President Dick Cheney 

and Senator John McCain. 10 Such comments do not constitute 

formal U.S. policy, and they could be calculated to simply 

remind China of the potential costs if Beijing does not 

pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. 

Some respected Japanese scholars in this field have 

said they find it hard to believe that Washington 

would actually approve of a nuclear Japan, 

which makes it all the more intriguing to 

search for an answer (Ogawa 2006). Although 

the United States has often argued against its 

allies going nuclear in the past, it has also shown that it is 

able to live with such an outcome. 

More broadly, there is an increasingly widespread belief 

in the U.S. government (and within the Defense Department 

in particular) that Japan can and should become 

a fuller partner in preserving global order and contributing 

more tangibly to the protection of democracy and 

free-market economies around the world. To some extent, 

Japan is already playing a more active role as a U.S. ally 

in and beyond the Asia-Pacific area, though Washington 

has higher hopes. This is not to say that the U.S. government 

advocates or expects Japan to develop nuclear weapons 

as a result, but if Japan’s military does eventually operate 

abroad more frequently and robustly, Tokyo could 

10 Similar sentiments 

were expressed in a 

2005 policy paper by 

the U.S. Senate Republican 

Policy Committee. 

determine that it needs its own nuclear deterrent to compensate 

for dispersing its forces around the world. In this 

hypothetical scenario, the U.S. government would be hard 

pressed to argue against such an approach, having pushed 

for it in the first place. 

In strictly financial terms, nuclear weapons can be a 

relatively inexpensive way to deter aggression, although 

such a conclusion is highly equivocal and the military value 

of nuclear weapons is often in the eye of the beholder 

(and depends on the situation). For example, the United 

Kingdom will spend roughly $30 billion to $40 billion to 

procure a renewed nuclear deterrent (including four submarines, 

warhead refurbishment/replacement, and submarine 

infrastructure), with about $3 billion in annual 

in-service costs (House of Commons Defense Committee 

2007). This will result in a near-term annual expenditure 

of about $4 billion, or roughly 5 percent of the total defense 

budget (which is only a slightly higher percentage 

than Japan spends each year on host-nation support of U.S. 

forward deployed forces). 

Of course, all of this debate overlooks an important 

alternative for Japan in terms of nuclear weapons development: 

to simply buy or lease American weapons. A few 

Japanese analysts have raised this possibility, such as a 

possible lease deal with a sunset provision for one hundred 

to two hundred nuclear-warheads with cruise missiles 

( for which the United States would retain control 

over the electronic maps loaded onto them and a right of 

launch refusal) (Matsumura 2006). Although such an approach 

would still require Japan to cross many of the same 

legal and diplomatic hurdles as it would face in building 

its own deterrent, it would be quicker and cheaper to acquire 

and maintain these weapons, and it is also a decision 

more easily reversed if desired, for example, following 

Korean unification and denuclearization. 

There are other variations on this idea of Japan’s tapping 

more directly into the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In 2003, 

for example, the foreign minister’s advisory board recommended 

relaxing one of the three non-nuclear principles 

in order to allow U.S. naval vessels with nuclear weapons 

to visit Japan’s ports (Kyodo News 2003). Japan is known 

to have tacitly allowed such visits in the past, but more 

open acknowledgement could reinforce the U.S. nuclear 

commitment to Japan. Related debates in Japan continue 

to play out, demonstrating just how unsettled some 

6 


of these policies are. One dramatic example came in the 

aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test: JDA’s director 

general, Kyuma Fumio stated that Japan could allow 

U.S. nuclear-weapon-equipped ships to pass through Japan’s 

territorial waters, but backpedalled later to say that 

they would not be allowed. Later still he stated that they 

would be allowed only “in an emergency” (United Press 

International 2006). Three weeks later, however, the Cabinet 

“clarified” this once again to say that, in fact, the ships 

would not be allowed under any circumstances (Kyodo 

News 2006b). 

In the end, it is the interplay of a number of factors that 

will influence Japan’s decision regarding nuclear weapons 

in the face of changing circumstances. The two most important 

variables (mentioned briefly earlier and described 

in more detail below) are 1) the perceived threat that certain 

countries or global circumstances pose to Japan’s vital 

interests, and 2) Japan’s confidence (or lack thereof) 

in America’s commitment and ability to assist Japan in 

deterring and potentially defeating such threats to those 

interests. Overarching all of this is Washington’s attitude 

toward Japan and nuclear weapons, since strong U.S. opposition 

to a nuclear Japan would almost certainly have a 

prohibitive effect. Conversely, U.S. acquiescence to such a 

development opens up a wide variety of options when it 

comes to supplementing or augmenting regional deterrence 

strategies. Exploring such options is unnecessary, 

however, if feared threats do not materialize, so let us begin 

with a threat assessment (or something akin to a forecast) 

from a Japanese perspective. 

Threats and vulnerabilities 

A threat assessment can only be understood in the context 

of that which can be threatened, or that which is considered 

to be most precious or necessary for a nation’s survival 

and prosperity. In Japan’s case, the country is a highly industrialized 

global trading power with relatively few abundant 

indigenous natural resources, but a highly skilled workforce 

and a strong technology knowledge base. Global trade 

is extremely important to Japan, which relies on imports 

for about 94 percent of its primary energy supply and 61 

percent of its calorie intake (Agency for Natural Resources 

and Energy 2008a; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 

Fisheries 2008). 11 National wealth is generated by adding 

value in the manufacturing and service sectors and thereby 

earning more through exports than is paid for imports, 


Japan’s primary energy sources gross supply in 2007 

New Energy, Geothermal Heat etc. 3.0% 

Hydro Power Generation - 2.7% 

Atomic Power Generation - 9.7% 

Natural Gas - 16.3% 

Coal - 21.3% 

Crude Oil - 47.0% 

and investing the surplus domestically and overseas for 

productivity gains, investment return, manufacturing diversification, 

and risk mitigation. 

Japan is the world’s second largest oil importing country 

(after the United States), the third largest oil consumer, 

and the third largest electricity consumer. While Japan’s 

population has increased by about 50 percent since 1950, 

its consumption of energy has soared by nearly 300 percent, 

underscoring the vital role that energy plays in Japan’s 

modern economy (Agency for Natural 

Resources and Energy 2008b). Japan’s 

most important trading partners for energy 

inputs include Saudi Arabia (over a 

quarter of Japan’s oil), United Arab Emirates 

(oil and natural gas), Qatar (oil and natural gas), Australia 

(coal and uranium), and Indonesia (natural gas and 

coal). Iran is another significant supplier of oil (about 10 

percent), China provides over 12 percent of Japan’s coal 

imports, and Canada also sells large amounts of uranium 

(27 percent) and some coal to Japan. 

The United States and China are by far Japan’s largest 

sources of food imports (particularly seafood, meat, grain, 

and fruits and vegetables). Australia is another important 

meat and grain supplier. In terms of metals, two-thirds of 

Japan’s copper imports come from Chile and Indonesia, 

while Australia and Brazil supply most of Japan’s iron ore. 

Other key sources for nickel, molybdenum, and zinc include 

Indonesia, Chile, Australia, and Peru. When it comes 

to supplying Japan with the critical resources it needs to 

fuel its economy and feed its people, therefore, the sources 

are geographically diverse (if somewhat concentrated 

11 Energy self-sufficiency 

does not include nuclear 

power generation, since virtually 

all of the uranium inputs 

are also imported. 


7


Japan’s top five trading partners in 2007 

Australia 

United Arab 

Emirates 

Saudi Arabia 

United States 

People’s 

Republic 

of China 

import 

(US$ millions) 

400000 

350000 

300000 

250000 

200000 

150000 

100000 

50000 

0 

Hong Kong 

Republic of 

China (Taiwan) 

Republic of 

Korea 

People’s 

Republic 

of China 

United States 

amongst a few key countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle 

East, China, and North and South America). 12 

On the export (revenue generating) side of the equation, 

the picture is somewhat different. The United States and 

China are Japan’s largest export markets (20.1 percent and 

15.3 percent of total value respectively in 2007), followed by 

Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. When one considers that 

some fraction of sales to China, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong 

Kong is eventually re-exported to 

the United States, the crucial importance 

of the U.S. market to Japan 

becomes even more apparent. 

Japan enjoyed a trade surplus in 

2007 of $83.4 billion (goods and 

services), and income from overseas 

assets reached a record $138 

billion, which was almost double 

that of four years ago and was the largest component of Japan’s 

$210 billion current account surplus that year (JET- 

RO 2008). The country has generated uninterrupted annual 

current account surpluses since 1981, reaching a nominal 

peak in 2007, but Japan’s surplus fell 34 percent in 2008, its 

steepest annual decline on record. 2009 also started off 

with record deficits. 

Consistent with the fact that the United States is Japan’s 

largest export market, it is also home to the largest 

stock of Japanese investment abroad (at over $174 billion 

or 32 percent of Japan’s total). Japanese investment in China 

is rising faster than in any other country, more than 

12 Trade and investment data described 

in these next few pages is sourced from 

JETRO 2007. Percentage calculations are 

based on trade or investment value. 

13 Inward Foreign Direct Investment 

stocks in Japan as a percentage of GDP 

were only 2.4 percent as of 2005, compared 

to 22.5 percent for the United 

States, 40.9 percent for the United Kingdom, 

11.7 percent for South Korea, and 

24.1 percent for Australia (METI 2007). 

export 

quadrupling since 2000 to over $37 billion. Japan’s investment 

stock in Western Europe is also quite high, amounting 

to about $145 billion. Although foreign direct investment 

in Japan is quite low (especially as a percentage of 

gross domestic product, or GDP), foreign ownership in Japan’s 

stock market is significant at over 27 percent (Tokyo 

Stock Exchange Group 2007). 13 Japan has a strong position 

in terms of foreign currency reserves, worth over $1 trillion 

in foreign currency, gold, and other instruments. Because 

of persistent fiscal deficits, however, Tokyo has run 

up sizable debts in recent years to the point where public 

debt is about 195 percent of GDP and debt service makes 

up roughly 12 percent of the national budget. It is worth 

noting however, that most of the holders of Japanese public 

debt are in country and not from overseas. 

Because the bulk of Japan’s trade is conducted by ship, 

freedom of navigation is critical for Japan to sustain itself. 

Although Japan is a small country in terms of land 

area (ranked sixty-first), its recognized territorial waters 

and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are the sixth largest 

in the world at nearly 4.5 million square kilometers, so it 

has a lot of area to both exploit and patrol (Oceans Policy 

Research Institute 2005). Maritime chokepoints outside 

of the EEZ, such as the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of 

Hormuz, are also strategically important to Japan, since 

any major disruptions there would quickly force timeconsuming 

and expensive re-routing of vital shipments. 

In addition, political stability in and around Japan’s trading 

partners is crucial, as are stable and well-functioning 

financial and commodity markets. Finally, Japan’s foreign 

ministry is responsible for about one million of its nationals 

living overseas, with roughly half of them in either the 

United States or China. 

Unlike the United States (which enjoys an absence of 

regional peer competition in the Western Hemisphere), Japan 

views its national security through two different lenses, 

one is global and the other strictly regional. This means 

that both must be kept in mind when considering threats 

and vulnerabilities. Similar to the United States, Japan has 

a national security outlook that focuses on political and 

economic stability in key regions around the world. National 

defense, however, is less often thought of in a global 

context by Tokyo, and for all the allies’ talk about “capabilities-based 

planning” and responding to a “new security 

environment,” it is still the potential local threats that 

8 



sharpen the mind and dominate defense planning in Japan. 

14 North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs stand 

out, of course, but so do large defense spending increases 

and capability upgrades by China, Russia, and even South 

Korea. 

Such capability improvements by neighbors foster uneasiness 

when accompanied by competitive pressures, such 

as those in the maritime area. Territorial disputes in the 

region remain potential flashpoints, and seizures or interdictions 

of fishing vessels and survey ships in contested 

waters are not uncommon. An annual average of five Japanese 

fishing boats have been seized by Russia and South 

Korea since 2002 (mostly by Russia), and in the same period 

Japan seized an average of more than twenty foreign 

ships (mostly South Korean) each year (Japan Coast Guard 

2008 and Japan Fisheries Agency 2008). In 2006, one Japanese 

fisherman was shot to death by the Russian Coast 

Guard. Japan’s Coast Guard keeps track of the movement 

of foreign oceanographic research vessels operating within 

its EEZ, and separately notes those that take “suspicious 

actions” (a research action not applied for in advance to 

the Japanese government). Since 2000, Chinese vessels account 

for all of the so-called suspicious actions or an average 

of about nine times per year (Japan Coast Guard 2008). 

In one particularly tense incident in 2005, a Chinese naval 

frigate tracked (in what was considered a threatening way) 

a Japanese P3C surveillance plane that was monitoring the 

movements of Chinese vessels. 

In addition to a sense of increased pressure upon its 

maritime domain, violations of Japan’s air space have increased 

in most years since 2000. For example, the Air 

Self-Defense Force (ASDF) scrambled its fighters over 

300 times in 2007 (compared to less than 150 times in 

2004) (Ministry of Defense 2008a). The vast majority of 

these scrambles are in response to Russian aircraft activity, 

but incursions by China more often appear to be politically 

motivated, such as in 2005 when Chinese violations 

jumped from thirteen to over one hundred after the 

Japanese government awarded oil and gas drilling rights 

in a disputed maritime area to a Japanese firm. 15 This is 

the kind of coercive diplomacy or Chinese bullying that 

Japan fears, and it emboldens China to press for greater 

Japanese concessions in negotiations over drilling rights 

in disputed parts of the East China Sea. 16 Related to this, 

the number of fighter aircraft in China and the Russian 

Far East with F-15 equivalent capabilities has roughly quadrupled 

since 2000, and starting in 2005 the number of 

Chinese fourth-generation fighters first began to outnumber 

those of Japan and USFJ combined (Defense Agency of 

Japan 2006, 111). 

The threat from North Korea 

North Korea is the most frequently named potential threat 

to Japan, in large part because of the enmity that endures 

between these two countries, their lack of normalized relations, 

and the fact that Japan’s strategic priorities of regional 

stability and smooth trade flows matter very little 

to North Korea. From the DPRK perspective, diplomatic 

and military escalation (short of prompting an all-out invasion 

of the North) seems to carry relatively few downside 

risks. The least risky means for the North to practice its 

own coercive diplomacy would be for it to engage in clandestine 

special operations 

and sabotage missions, either 

mobilizing agents based 

inside of Japan (thought to 

number in the hundreds) or 

its rudimentary fleet of socalled 

spy ships and small 

submarines that North Korea 

has used for smuggling, 

drug trafficking, and abducting 

Japanese citizens in the 

1970s and 1980s. 17 

For more overt coercion, 

North Korea could use its 

medium-range ballistic missile 

(MRBM) arsenal, namely 

some of its estimated two 

hundred No Dong MRBMs, 

which possess a fifteen-hundred-kilometer 

range, a oneton 

payload, and the ability 

to strike nearly anywhere 

in Japan, although with uncertain 

accuracy. North Korea 

is reportedly developing 

a land-based intermediaterange 

missile (IRBM) (known 

as the Musadan) that could 

14 For a good example of this dichotomy, see 

U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee 

2005. In the section on common strategic objectives, 

after mentioning the ministers’ discussion 

about “the new security environment,” it quickly 

“emphasized that persistent challenges continue 

to create unpredictability and uncertainty 

[in the Asia-Pacific region].” These persistent 

challenges presumably include the Korean peninsula, 

tensions between China and Taiwan, 

regional territorial and maritime resource disputes, 

and the like. For the purposes of this report, 

we view national security in rather broad 

terms to include threats to national economic 

well-being being potentially undermined by regional 

or global events of various types. National 

defense (or defense of Japan), however, has a 

narrower connotation in this report, dwelling 

on protection from physical attack or coercion 

in and around Japan’s exclusive economic zone. 

15 Chinese violations dropped back down 

again after it became clear that the Japanese 

firm, Teikoku Oil, had no immediate 

plans to conduct test drilling. 

16 For example, despite a Japan-China agreement 

in June 2008 regarding the need to consider 

joint development of certain potential 

oil and gas fields in the East China Sea, China 

has declared the Tianwaitian gas field 

off limits for joint development, while Japan 

has argued that it should be considered. 

17 The estimate for North Korean agents currently 

living in Japan is based on interviews with 

Japanese officials. The spy ships and submarines 

are known to exist, and Japan’s Coast Guard and 

MSDF have confronted these vessels in the past 

in Japanese waters, including the sinking of one 

in 2001 that was later salvaged and put on public 

display at a maritime museum in Tokyo. 


9


potentially reach Okinawa and Guam, as well as a mobile, 

solid-fueled short-range missile (SRBM) that would be very 

difficult to intercept (Hildreth 2008). North Korea might 

be able to arm its missiles with a variety of warheads (such 

as conventional, nuclear, chemical, or biological), though 

its skill level in the non-conventional areas is questionable. 

Although the accuracy of DPRK missiles has been derided 

in the past, a battery of test launches in July 2006 suggested 

that North Korea has improved its SRBM and MRBM 

performance (Bodansky 2006). Besides a missile attack (or 

threat of attack), North Korea can also undermine Japanese 

security more broadly through nuclear or missile proliferation 

to certain countries in the Middle East, such as Iran 

and Syria. High-ranking Japanese politicians and officials 

have said quite plainly that “North Korea is our greatest 

concern [and]…represents a clear threat to the security of 

Japan” (Koike 2007). 

Keeping up with South Korea 

Although South Korea is by no means considered to be 

a threat to Japan, the ROK’s military modernization program 

is worth mentioning for its possible long-term implications. 

This program, launched in 2006, is known as Defense 

Reform 2020 for the year by which this intense period 

of force and command restructuring is meant to be completed. 

Reform 2020 will reduce the size of the ROK military 

overall (particularly the army), but strengthen its capabilities 

through acquisition of state-of-the-art weapons, 

communications, surveillance, and mobility 

systems. The reform plan is expected to 

be financed at a total cost of over 620 trillion 

won (or roughly $640 billion) over a decade 

and a half, which is supposed to be achieved 

through steady increases in defense spending 

at a rate of over 9 percent per annum 

between 2006 and 2010, and smaller rates 

thereafter. 18 

Major ROK acquisitions include up to six 

large Aegis-equipped destroyers (the KDX- 

III), Asia’s largest amphibious landing and transport vessel 

(Dokdo LPH), several three-thousand-ton submarines, 

dozens more F-15K fighter jets, and a significantly enhanced 

command and control system bolstered by an independent 

network of satellites that will allow Seoul to 

manage operations thousands of kilometers off peninsula 

18 Lower than expected 

GDP growth, however, 

will likely delay the 

original schedule by 

some five years or more. 

19 U.S. officials estimate 

that China’s actual defense 

spending was roughly 

$60 billion in 2001, and 

that it was about $120 billion 

in 2008. See U.S. Department 

of Defense 2008b 

and U.S. House Armed Services 

Committee 2008. 

(Chosun Ilbo 2007). A new large naval base is planned for 

Jeju Island, strategically located at the intersection of the 

Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Korea Strait (Jung 

2007). South Korea is most likely to use these new capabilities 

in concert with Japan (either through direct cooperation, 

which has arguably strengthened in recent years, 

or in conjunction with U.S. forces), but the potential for 

competition in the future does not lie far below the surface. 

This is subtly (but poignantly) reflected in many of 

the names given to these new weapons systems by the 

ROK government, celebrating past leaders who fended off 

Japanese attacks (such as Jung Ji or King Sejong) or reiterating 

a territorial claim (such as Dokdo). The Dokdo issue 

in particular soured ROK-Japan relations in 2008, and 

Japanese descriptions of these rocky islets as Japan’s own 

territory prompted ROK officials to consider cutting off 

high-level military exchanges (Jung 2008a). 

Much ado about China 

Overall, China is the major long-term concern for Japanese 

defense planners, diplomats, and politicians. As one Japanese 

defense official described it, “China is larger in the 

region than the U.S. perceives” (interview 2007b). Another 

Japanese diplomat offered, “China today is like Japan in the 

1920s…spending twice as much as Japan on military forces, 

yet many frailties persist inside its borders…so much is unknown. 

China could repeat the mistakes that Japan made 

in the 1930s and 1940s, through bad judgment and distorted 

perspectives about how the world works…or could be 

made to work. Bad things happen on miscalculations.” He 

concluded, “The United States is not as worried about China 

as it should be…it should demonstrate more concern” 

(interview 2007c). 

The main source of Japan’s concern is not simply that 

China is spending more on defense and modernizing its 

forces (though China’s defense budget has roughly doubled 

since 2001). 19 It is instead the nature of this modernization 

and the relatively quick and substantial investment 

in certain capabilities that are steadily eroding the 

allies’ ability to dominate the skies and seas around East 

Asia as they once could. Moreover, Chinese strategic force 

modernization will raise the potential costs to the United 

States that U.S. policy makers must weigh when considering 

an option of intervening against Chinese interests 

on Japan’s behalf. For Japan, it is less a specific sense of 

10 



Number of PRC’s SRBMs 

1500 

1200 

900 

600 

300 

0 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

2005 

2006 

2007 

2008 

threat of attack that is troubling than it is a general feeling 

of vulnerability if and when a dispute occurs, especially 

when it comes to low-level skirmishes between Japan 

and China that may (or may not) attract direct U.S. military 

involvement. 

For example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now 

manages the world’s most active ballistic missile program, 

and is rapidly building up—both quantitatively and qualitatively—its 

arsenal of regionally targeted missile systems, 

such as the CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs. Many of these tactical 

weapons have enhanced ranges, accuracies, and payloads, 

and some put Okinawa within range when the missiles 

are forward-deployed (U.S. Department of Defense 

2004b). Current U.S. intelligence reports disclose that China 

has deployed fourteen hundred SRBMs in the vicinity 

of the Taiwan Strait (at least 40 percent more than determined 

in earlier assessments), and is quickly increasing 

this precision strike force at a rate of more than one hundred 

missiles per year (Halloran 2008a). Furthermore, the 

PLA appears to be continuing production of a new medium- 

to intermediate-range, road-mobile ballistic missile, 

codenamed DF-25, that could be used by China as early as 

2010 to target U.S. forces in Japan and in the region (Fisher 

2007). 

China is also developing and testing its newest submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM), the Julang-2 (JL-2), 

which will be deployed aboard Beijing’s fleet of new Jinclass 

(Type 094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 

(SSBN) between 2009 and 2010. With an estimated 

range of about 5,000 miles (7,200-plus kilometers) and the 

potential ability to carry three to four warheads or a number 

of decoys, the JL-2 represents a next-generation strategic 

nuclear capability for China that could be used to target 

Guam, Alaska, and, ultimately, Hawaii (Gertz 2008a). 

The PLA is further modernizing its intercontinental-range 

ballistic missile (ICBM) force by adding more survivable, 

flexible, and effective systems, such as the new solid-fueled, 

road-mobile DF-31 (7,200-plus kilometers) and longer-range 

DF-31A (11,200-plus kilometers) missiles now 

being deployed to units in the Second Artillery Corps. In 

addition, missile warhead upgrades for the Chinese nuclear 

forces, including new maneuvering re-entry vehicles 

(MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles 

(MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, 

and anti-satellite weapons, will undoubtedly strengthen 

Beijing’s deterrent and strategic strike capabilities (U.S. 

Department of Defense 2008b). 

China also has or is acquiring large numbers of highly 

accurate cruise missiles that could perform nuclear missions, 

such as ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles 

(DH-10), and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles 

(SS-N-22/Sunburn and SS-N-27B/Sizzler) outfitted on 

guided missile destroyers and Kilo-class submarines that 

the PLA has acquired from Russia in the last decade. In 

a sustained effort to augment its anti-access/area-denial 

strategy, China is also developing a MaRVed anti-ship 

ballistic missile with a range of over fifteen hundred kilometers, 

which would give the PLA the ability to avoid intercept 

and to attack surface ships, including U.S. aircraft 

carriers, with increased precision and from great distances 

(U.S. Department of Defense 2008b). China will need 

not only to succeed with the missile but also with a reliable 

means to locate, identify, and target ships. 

The Chinese government’s strategic modernization 

builds on its existing nuclear capabilities, including some 

twenty silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 ICBMs capable of 

striking targets in the continental United States, together 

with some twenty liquid-fueled, limited-range CSS-3 

ICBMs, fifteen to twenty liquid-fueled CSS-2 IRBMs and 

more than fifty CSS-5 road-mobile, solid-fueled MRBMs 

that can target Japan, Russia, and regional U.S. bases, as 

well as the dubiously capable JL-1 SLBMs aboard the Xiaclass 

SSBN. Beijing’s nuclear capabilities in terms of range, 

survivability, and lethality will continue to increase rapidly 

over the next ten years, and by 2015, China is projected 


11


to have a credible, survivable nuclear deterrent force with 

as many as seventy-five to one hundred nuclear-armed 

missiles that could target the United States (compared 

to about thirty today) (McConnell 2008). China’s nuclear 

stockpile is estimated today at roughly 250 warheads, but 

the number could double by 2020 (Norris and Kristensen 

2008). Along these lines, an important set of questions to 

be addressed later in this report is how much vulnerability 

the United States is willing to tolerate amidst China’s 

strategic modernization, what it is prepared to do (if anything) 

in response to China’s moves, and how comfortable 

Japan will be with Washington’s decision (Roberts 2007). 

On the conventional side of its military buildup, China 

is engaged in a broad air force modernization program encompassing 

both newer and more advanced aircraft and 

weapons systems, designed to provide air superiority in 

and around the continent. As a consequence of significant 

new capabilities and the rapid improvement in Chinese 

air defenses, China’s airspace has become nearly impossible 

to penetrate with the type of U.S. fighters—F-15s and 

F-16s—now deployed in Japan (Talmadge 2007). The PLA 

Air Force (PLAAF) is also acquiring an air-refueling platform, 

similar to the Russian IL-78, which would extend the 

operational ranges for these aircraft (U.S. Department of 

Defense 2008b). 

The PLAAF is demonstrating technological improvements, 

such as the indigenous J-10 (F-10) fighter jets revealed 

in January 2007. The J-10 represents a generational 

advance in Chinese domestic combat fighter capabilities, 

and work is underway to develop a further improved model, 

the Super-10, that will be equipped with a more powerful 

engine and passive phased-array radar 

(Jane’s Defence Weekly 2007). The PLAAF is 

also upgrading its obsolete B-6/H-6 strategic 

bomber fleet (based on the Russian Tu-16) 

with a modern variant, which will be armed 

with new long-range cruise missiles. Further, 

the Chinese military is deploying up to several 

hundred newer Sukhoi Su-27 Flankers acquired from 

Russia, and has modernized its FB-7 fighter-bomber to 

augment other multi-role and strike aircraft, such as the 

J-10 and Su-30MKK, already in service with China’s air and 

naval air forces (U.S. Department of Defense 2008b). These 

enhanced fighter jets are being fitted with a new class of 

standoff air-to-surface missiles and air-to-air munitions. 

20 A private report based 

on declassified U.S. naval 

intelligence said that Chinese 

attack submarines 

conducted twelve patrols 

in 2008, compared to seven 

in 2007, two in 2006, and 

zero in 2005 (AFP 2009). 

In fact, armed with Chinese-built anti-radiation missiles, 

the FB-7 attack plane now functions as a dedicated suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses 

(SEAD) aircraft—an entirely 

new capability for the PLAAF (Hewson 2007). 

In another important development, China is acquiring 

several battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 

extended-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems 

that reportedly provide ballistic and cruise missile defense 

capabilities. Furthermore, the Chinese aviation industry 

is well advanced in the development of new types 

of airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, 

such as the KJ-2000 system and the KJ-200, also outfitted 

for intelligence collection and maritime surveillance. 

In addition, longer-range unmanned aerial vehicles and 

unmanned combat aerial vehicles being purchased and 

developed by the PLAAF will expand China’s options for 

long-range reconnaissance and strike. 

Chinese naval modernization is occurring at a similar 

pace, and the PLA Navy (PLAN) has increased its procurement 

of advanced, increasingly stealthy submarines, many 

of which are armed with state-of-the-art torpedoes and anti-ship 

missiles. As a result of its significant expansion in 

naval shipbuilding, China now has more submarines than 

Russia and is projected to have more submarines than the 

United States by the end of the decade, although it will still 

lag in overall capacity (Lague 2008). Chinese attack submarine 

patrols are increasing, for example, but the patrol rate 

is still much lower than that of the United States. 20 

An indigenous aircraft carrier capability is a long-term 

strategic priority for the Chinese navy, along with the effective 

protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOCs). 

China took further steps in this direction in December 2008, 

dispatching two warships to help battle pirates off Somalia 

as part of a multinational combined maritime force. That 

same month a defense ministry spokesman indicated that 

China is “seriously considering” adding an aircraft carrier 

to its fleet (Oster 2008). Other reports indicate more specific 

Chinese plans to begin construction of two carriers in 

2009 for completion in 2015 (Minemura 2008). 

The PLAN is also in the process of acquiring two new 

Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), as 

well as one or two Jin-class SSBN armed with the new JL-2 

nuclear missiles capable of hitting the United States. The 

Jin-class is considered an important step for China in establishing 

a sea-based nuclear retaliatory capability and 

12 


a credible minimal deterrent. The significance is not that 

use is more likely, but “rather that both Washington and 

Beijing perceive China as a more serious nuclear power” 

(Minnick 2008). So does Japan. 

China’s Kilo-class submarines—among the quietest 

and most difficult to detect and armed with the most advanced 

supersonic, evasive anti-ship cruise missile (the 

Sizzler) with a range of over a hundred miles—would present 

serious challenges to the United States in a potential 

anti-sub effort (Minnick 2008). Currently, the U.S. Navy 

lacks a program to test its defenses against the Sizzler 

(SS-N-27B), thus it is unclear if the Navy’s Aegis system is 

capable of tracking and intercepting this fast, low-flying 

missile (Capaccio 2008). Stealthy submarines would also 

pose a direct threat to the deployment of U.S. aircraft-carrier 

battle groups in the region, as evidenced in October 

2006, when one of China’s new Song-class submarine was 

able to remain undetected as it shadowed the U.S. carrier 

Kitty Hawk off the coast of Okinawa, until it surfaced well 

within the firing range of torpedoes (O’Rourke 2007). 

Of significant concern is the newly confirmed PLA underground 

nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island, located 

close to vital sea lanes in Southeast Asia. The unique 

base, which could conceivably obscure and protect a score 

of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers 

from spy planes, points at Beijing’s growing interest 

in projecting power into waters far from the Taiwan Strait. 

Analysts suggest that the base could be used for “expeditionary 

as well as defensive operations,” and would allow 

Chinese submarines to “break out to launch locations 

closer to the [United States]” (Harding 2008). As one Japanese 

security strategy report put it, “If China’s naval and 

air operational capability is extended beyond the first island 

chain…to the second island chain in the Western Pacific 

Ocean, its ability to block the access of U.S. Pacific 

Command (PACOM) will be enhanced, affecting the U.S. 

deterrence capability in the entire East Asian region” (Tokyo 

Foundation 2008). 21 

As another part of its strategic modernization, China 

is developing an impressive array of space-denial, satellite, 

and lift capabilities intended to undermine the present 

U.S. technological dominance of space. The PLA, according 

to U.S. officials, does not distinguish between military 

and civilian production and technology, and the Chinese 

commercial space program certainly demonstrates space 


launch and control capabilities with direct military application 

(U.S. Department of Defense 2008b). In addition to 

a “kinetic kill” capability, the PLA’s direct assent, anti-satellite 

(ASAT) weapons test of January 2007 also displayed 

Beijing’s ability to shoot down satellites operating in low- 

Earth orbit. China’s nuclear arsenal has long supplied Beijing 

with an inherent ASAT capability, and the new JL-2 

nuclear missile could be deployed with an anti-satellite 

warhead capable of killing U.S. satellites, much like the 

land-based missile used in the 2007 ASAT test (Gertz 

2008a). Additionally, China is deploying advanced imagery, 

reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems, such as 

the Ziyuan-2 series, the Haiyang-1B, and the CBERS-1 and 

-2 satellites. Such remote sensing programs have important 

military applications in terms of providing time-critical 

information superiority needed for all aspects of military 

operations. 

The PLA is also exploring ways of restricting the U.S. use 

of space-based assets in a conflict, and is developing electronic/signals 

intelligence satellites; kinetic kill vehicles; 

sophisticated microsatellites (weighing less than a hundred 

kilograms) for remote sensing and surveillance superiority; 

jammers that could target Global Positioning System (GPS) 

receivers; high-powered lasers to blind, damage, or destroy 

reconnaissance satellites; mobile small-satellite capabilities; 

and electro-magnetic pulse weapons (U.S. Department 

of Defense 2008b). Although its space surveillance capacity 

is still limited and lacks a space-based early warning capability 

against missiles, China has sufficient tracking and 

space surveillance systems to pinpoint and monitor most 

U.S. military satellites (Johnson-Fresse 2005). In fact, Beijing 

is projected to possess enough ASAT weapons by 2010 

to allow it to attack and strike down almost all U.S. satellites 

operating in low-Earth orbit (Cartwright 

2007). The launch of China’s first lunar orbiter 

(the Chang’e 1) in late 2007 and the 

successful completion of this mission indicate 

Beijing’s ability to conduct increasingly 

complicated space maneuvers. 

This laundry list of Chinese capability 

improvements is not intended to frighten 

the reader or imply that conflict is somehow 

inevitable. In fact, very few analysts 

think that China has any intention of instigating 

a skirmish with Japan or the 

21 This first and second island 

chain reference borrows 

from Chinese strategic 

writings that describe an incremental 

strategy for establishing 

maritime dominance 

in the Asia-Pacific region. The 

first island chain essentially 

bounds the East China Sea and 

the South China Sea from the 

East (i.e. Ryukyu Islands and 

the Philippines), while the second 

island chain might push 

out to the Bonin Islands and 

the Mariana Islands (possibly 

including Guam) (U.S. Department 

of Defense 2008b). 


13


United States, let alone a war. For its part, China considers 

this military modernization program necessary to maintain 

a “lean and effective deterrent force,” responding to 

“strategic maneuvers and containment from the outside” 

(Banchard 2009). As always, one country’s threat perception 

is another country’s prudent deterrent, and this underscores 

the need to be careful when justifying military 

investments in terms of deterrence, without questioning 

their need or impact on the regional balance. 

But the change in Chinese military capabilities is still 

important to note, because although politicians and diplomats 

often try to judge another nation’s strategic intentions, 

they rely on defense planners to focus on capabilities 

and to be prepared to handle any conceivable 

situation. Relative capabilities have a psychological impact 

on both deterrence (of potential adversaries) and reassurance 

(of allies), and they cue planners regarding what 

to buy, how to train, and how to signal. They also have 

practical implications in low-intensity conflict situations 

and how the escalation ladder unfolds in each case (and 

who controls it). 

In that regard, China may well have already achieved 

the capability with respect to weapon systems, if not full 

operational capability, to deter or defeat Taiwan readily, in 

the event that its leaders feel there is no alternative, and to 

threaten or thwart a U.S. attempt to intervene effectively 

and promptly in an attack on Taiwan. Chinese interlocutors 

insist this is all for deterrence, but they do plan to 

confront both Taiwan and the United States if deterrence 

fails. 

Questions about Russia 

Russia’s renewed interest in spending its growing national 

wealth on military hardware and training activities constitutes 

another source of allied concern. As then-first deputy 

prime minister Sergei Ivanov put it in 2007, “Military 

potential, to say nothing of nuclear potential, must be at 

the proper level if we want…to just stay independent,” and 

he emphasized that Russia was seeking “a qualitative rather 

than a numerical parity” (Los Angeles Times 2007). Former 

president Vladimir Putin blamed U.S. missile defenses 

and other policies for Russia’s push to improve its arsenal, 

saying, “It wasn’t us who initiated a new round of arms 

race” (Isachenkov 2007a). In light of the unpredictable security 

situation, Russia expects its Pacific fleet to eventually 

become its largest fleet . “This is a region where there 

is risk of conflict,” Ivanov said during a trip to the Far East. 

“Here you have the United States, China, Korea, and Japan, 

and there are absolutely no rules of the game” (New York 

Times 2007). 

As for the salient components of Russia’s military modernization 

program, they include a new generation of ballistic 

missile submarines (the Borei class) being launched, 

which will eventually be equipped with newly developed 

Bulava SLBMs that Russia boasts will be “capable of overcoming 

any existing or future missile defense systems” 

(Gutterman 2007). Moscow is also putting money behind 

improving its nuclear arsenal, its cruise missile technology, 

and in 2007 the military tested the world’s largest nonnuclear 

bomb, a thermobaric device reportedly twice as 

powerful as a similar U.S. weapon (Isachenkov 2007b), 

with Russian news reports putting the bomb’s yield at the 

equivalent of forty-four tons of TNT. A Russian military officer 

commented on television that “the air-delivered ordnance 

is comparable to a nuclear weapon in its efficiency 

and capability” and that it is less damaging to the environment. 

The idea that such a powerful weapon might be 

deemed more acceptable and therefore “useable” in various 

situations is troubling from a deterrence standpoint. 

Perhaps even more troubling, closer U.S. missile defense 

cooperation with Poland has upset Russia enough 

to provoke a threat of nuclear attack against Poland, because 

Poland would thus be among “the allies of countries 

having nuclear weapons,” as described by Russia’s 

deputy chief of staff. General Anatoly Nogovitsyn said, “By 

hosting these [U.S. MD assets], Poland is making itself a 

target…[and] such targets are destroyed as a first priority” 

(de Quetteville and Pierce 2008). Moreover, Russia is 

reportedly considering arming its Baltic fleet with nuclear 

weapons for the first time since the Cold War (Franchetti 

2008). “In view of America’s determination to set up 

a missile defense shield in Europe,” this source said, “the 

[Russian] military is reviewing all its plans to give an adequate 

response.” To date, U.S.-Japan MD cooperation has 

not evoked the same visceral reaction from Moscow, but 

the allies are not pleased, to say the least, that Russia increasingly 

places MD (rhetorically and strategically) in 

the context of a security dilemma and perceived threat 

escalation. 22 

14 



Summing up 

Overall, it is important to evaluate all of these evolving capabilities, 

potential threats, and vulnerabilities described 

above from a long-term perspective. Japan does not expect 

to be attacked or invaded by a regional power, and at 

present it probably does not fear any significant intimidation 

in the near to medium term (though on this last point 

one can find diverging opinions). Longer term, however, if 

Japan’s economic clout is diluted by others’ growth, and 

if China maintains the sole Asian permanent seat on the 

UN Security Council and develops a massive military capable 

of effectively imposing its will within the region (especially 

at seemingly low thresholds related to so-called 

Asian problems of less concern to Washington), then this 

becomes a major issue for Japan. Such a scenario might 

not come about, but if it does, then Japan will respond 

in some way, either in close cooperation with the United 

States or on its own. 

Almost 120 years ago in a speech before the first Imperial 

parliament, Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo argued 

that Japan must defend not only its “line of sovereignty,” 

but also its “line of interest,” if Japan was to successfully 

stand against the Western powers (Yamagata 1890). Japan’s 

aggressive defense of its perceived line of interest led 

to a militarized society and war throughout much of the 

first half of the twentieth century. Faced with a changing 

balance of power in East Asia and a less predictable global 

security environment in the twenty-first century, Japanese 

policy makers are in many ways just now beginning to 

think seriously about where they should draw this line today 

and how vigorously to defend it. Japan won’t repeat its 

past mistake, but neither will it surrender the nation’s interest. 

The challenge for the alliance is to shape a partnership 

that protects mutual interests and strikes the right 

balance between interdependence and independence. 

Alliance durability and balancing the 

security equation 

The other side of the security equation is the durability of 

Japan’s alliance with the United States. During the Cold War, 

Japan clearly understood that it was the anchor in America’s 

East Asian security strategy to counter Communism 

and regional Soviet influence. U.S. ambassador to Japan 

Mike Mansfield popularized the concept that the “U.S.-Japan 

relationship was the most important bilateral relationship, 

bar none,” and as Japan’s power and influence grew in 

the 1970s and 1980s in the context of a dynamic Asia-Pacific 

region that lacked effective multilateral mechanisms, there 

were very few who would challenge the ambassador’s statement 

(Mansfield 1999). Although the alliance was often 

described as “adrift” in the 1990s, the two countries dedicated 

themselves to refocusing the alliance and updating its 

ability to deal with regional contingencies, culminating in 

the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security 

in 1996 and revision of the Guidelines 

for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1997 

(Funabashi 1999). In addition, Washington 

reaffirmed in writing its commitment to 

maintain a forward-deployed force structure 

in the region numbering about one 

hundred thousand (Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration 

on Security 1996). 

Today, the U.S.-Japan alliance remains 

the cornerstone of America’s security 

strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Japan continues 

to host the largest contingent of 

U.S. forces in Asia (currently around thirty-five 

thousand), including the region’s 

only base for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the 

only forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carrier, together with 

many other assets that are regularly deployed for training 

and operations in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, various 

parts of Central Asia, and elsewhere. Japan has often 

been flexible in accommodating America’s use of its Japan-based 

military assets for operations within and outside 

of the region. In addition, Japan pays for three-quarters 

of the total cost for stationing U.S. forces there (and 

over 50 percent of the total cost for host nations’ contributions 

paid by twenty-six American allies around the world 

(U.S. Department of Defense 2004a). The U.S.-Japan alliance 

is still bound together by a strong sense of common 

interests and shared values, and although this mantra is 

repeated often enough to risk reducing it to a cliché, it remains 

true and helps to explain the continued relevance 

and strength of this bilateral relationship. 23 

22 The term “security dilemma” 

generally refers to the situation 

where actions by a 

state to increase its own security 

lead to feelings of insecurity 

by another state, 

prompting the second state to 

take corrective measures (and 

so on) that threaten an ongoing 

spiral of back-and-forth 

military investments and possible 

conflict. See, for example, 

Herz 1951 or Jervis 1978. 

23 These shared (or “universal”) 

values ( fuhenteki 

kachi) are often described 

as freedom, democracy, human 

rights, the rule of law, 

and market economics. 

Diverging priorities 

Within the sphere of common interests, however, there appears 

to be a growing split in terms of each country’s priorities 

when it comes to security, and this is nowhere more 

evident than in how defense budgets are being spent. The 


15


United States is motivated primarily by concern about nuclear 

terrorism and other large-scale terrorist attacks on 

U.S. territory (or that could otherwise undermine global 

economic and energy stability). Nuclear terrorism is a powerful 

motivating force, and partly in response to this concern 

U.S. defense spending has risen steadily since 2000 

( from about $300 billion per year to an 

estimated $686 billion for FY2009) (U.S. 

Department of Defense 2008a). Additional 

justification for these year-on-year increases 

includes America’s basic strategy 

to dissuade (then deter and defeat, if necessary) 

the potential rise of a peer competitor, 

near peer, or regional peer (such 

as China, Russia, or Iran), as well as the 

protection of Israel and other major allies (including Japan). 

Unfortunately for American taxpayers, this large increase 

in spending falls short of meeting all the needs of 

an undercapitalized U.S. military, so there will continue 

to be a need to replace old and worn-out equipment, aircraft, 

and ships, not to mention investment requirements 

for the next generation of weapons systems. These large 

U.S. defense budgets demonstrate America’s focus on protecting 

the homeland and its global interests through engagements 

in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, establishing a 

new command for Africa, and similar moves. 

On the one hand, Tokyo can take comfort in Washington’s 

high tolerance for defense spending (now at over 4 

percent of GDP), as a strong sign of its ally’s commitment 

to do whatever it takes to maintain deterrence capabilities 

in the region and around the world. On the other hand, 

it is a potential source of resentment in Washington, especially 

during difficult economic times when many voters 

are struggling just to heat their homes and put food 

on the table, let alone pay higher tax bills. U.S. budget deficits 

are at historic highs. Right now the U.S. military is 

wrestling with the perceived need to prepare for all types 

of warfare, from counter-insurgencies to large-scale stateto-state 

conflict against modernizing forces. Defense 

budgets are likely to tighten as the United States winds 

down its operations in Iraq and the corresponding use of 

24 The U.S. Army is already 

implementing a plan to increase 

its active duty force 

by thirty-five thousand soldiers, 

and President Obama 

pledged further increases 

during the 2008 campaign. 

25 The Defense Department’s 

FY2009 healthcare 

budget request for 2.2 million 

active and reserve members 

was $41.6 billion. 

supplemental funding mechanisms that allowed the military 

services to temporarily offset rising costs and procurement 

needs. 

There is no clear answer yet to the question of whether 

and how to reorient U.S. forces, and so far the response by 

policy makers has been to pursue both strategies (prepare 

for both counterinsurgency and state-to-state conflict) 

and to increase the size of the military in the near term. 24 

This will put further long-term pressure on U.S. defense 

spending, since people are one of the most expensive budget 

components. Just the annual healthcare bill alone for 

active and reserve members of the armed forces is nearly 

equivalent to Japan’s entire defense budget, and that 

doesn’t even factor in the long-term pension and health 

care commitments to these future veterans, current payouts 

to veterans, or the entire civilian defense and intelligence 

community (U.S. Department of Defense 2008c). 25 

As a result, politicians in Washington will have to 

make some difficult decisions, essentially either consistently 

funding relatively large defense budgets (at 4 percent 

to 5 percent of GDP, and perhaps higher), or cutting 

back significantly on major new weapons systems (such 

as the F-22 Raptor fighter jets, littoral combat ships (LCS), 

DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers, Virginia-class attack 

submarines, and possibly eliminating whole categories of 

the most expensive systems). The Bush administration’s 

national defense strategy stated in 2008 that “improving 

the U.S. Armed Forces’ proficiency in irregular warfare is 

the Defense Department’s top priority,” but shortly after 

the strategy’s release, Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia 

against Georgia bolstered the arguments of those who 

support more traditional defense spending (U.S. Department 

of Defense 2008d). Regardless of what the politicians 

decide, Washington will continue to look for ever more 

significant contributions to common defense and peacebuilding 

missions from its friends and allies. 

Indeed, U.S. ambassador to Japan J. Thomas Schieffer 

in 2008 specifically called on Japan to boost its defense 

spending, noting that Japan’s ratio of defense spending to 

GDP has been declining despite its growing concerns over 

potential military threats. “We believe that Japan should 

consider the benefits of increasing its own defense spending 

to make a greater, not lesser, contribution to its own security” 

(Hosaka 2008). U.S. officials also press these points 

in less public settings. Part of the reasoning for such a belief 

is that the United States generally views much of its 

own defense spending as serving the global public good by 

promoting geopolitical stability and protecting free and 

16 



open trade. Washington’s urging Tokyo to spend more on 

defense is not a new phenomenon, of course, as it has a 

long history going back to shortly after the end of World 

War II, but the gap in spending is increasingly stark not 

only in nominal terms, but also considering regional economic 

growth in East Asia. 26 

To be sure, the United States is spending and fighting 

to protect itself from specific and unique threats, such as 

Al Qaeda and related terrorist networks, but most Americans 

believe that they are a target of terrorism precisely 

because they have been the standard bearer for freedom, 

democracy, and free-market capitalism in the world, and 

that they will continue to fight for this greater good, from 

which other nations benefit. The United States has often 

fought in support or on behalf of others when it perceived 

the existence of strong common interests and recognized 

its own vital stake in the success of that friend or ally. Consequently, 

U.S. officials have a hard time understanding 

why others do not rush more enthusiastically to the “common 

defense,” be it in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other global 

hot spots, when the world’s stake in America’s success is 

just as great. 

This sense of disappointment is not reserved just for 

Japan, but it applies to other allies as well, such as South 

Korea and certain NATO countries that have even contributed 

troops to Afghanistan (though in low numbers 

and with tight restrictions regarding their deployment). 

As one U.S. defense advisor commented about NATO involvement 

in Afghanistan, “The mood [in the Pentagon] 

veers between acceptance and despair…we ask for more 

troops, and they’re not forthcoming. For many countries, 

being in Afghanistan seems to be about keeping up appearances, 

rather than actually fighting a war that needs 

to be won” (Shipman 2008). 

Part of the problem has been the way that Washington 

talks about and pursues the global fight against terrorist 

networks and rogue states. As professor Watanabe 

Akio has pointed out, extra effort is needed overall to explain 

how the ‘war on terror’ is an international war that 

requires a large group of willing and capable participants. 

“To the extent that the United States tends to explain the 

Afghan and Iraqi wars as American wars,” he said, “Japanese 

leaders will find it harder to justify contributions of 

the SDF before domestic opinion” (Watanabe 2004). 

In this way, those in Japan who advocate an “internationalist” 

security policy that aligns closely with the United 

States are limited by public perceptions of how judiciously 

America wields its military might around the world, and 

for whose benefit. In its efforts to share the defense burden 

with allies and friends, therefore, the United States 

must not lose sight of the fact that capabilities cannot be 

divorced from circumstances or the political decisions to 

employ certain capabilities. Indicative of this was a 2008 

comment by former LDP secretary general Kato Koichi 

when the subject came up of 

possibly extending the Maritime 

SDF’s refueling of coalition 

ships in the Indian Ocean. “It’s 

time to stop it,” he said. “While 

the mission has been significant 

in providing support to the United 

States, we will not obtain parliamentary 

approval for it” (Kyodo 

News 2008a). Kato apparently 

did not realize (or chose to ignore) 

that more than half of the 

fuel provided by Japan in the last 

three years went to ten different 

countries other than the United 

States, and in 2008 U.S. vessels 

received only about 15 percent 

of all delivered fuel (Ministry of 

Defense 2008c). 

Still, Japan has tried to be supportive of America’s military 

engagements around the world, both through financial 

assistance to distressed countries and through non-combat 

missions in support of operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

in the Indian Ocean, as well as the dispatch of SDF personnel 

to Iraq and other missions. Japan has also been an active 

partner in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 

to hinder the international transportation of WMDs and 

related materials. Some Japanese policy makers embrace 

this expansion of geographic and situational applicability 

of the alliance because they readily agree that global stability 

has a direct, positive impact on Japan’s national security, 

and they recognize Japan’s responsibility in this area. 

27 Japan also stated in its 2004 National Defense Program 

Guideline (NDPG) that “the peace and stability of Japan is 

inextricably linked to that of the international community,” 

26 As former JDA vice minister Nishihiro 

Seiji described it, “In the 1950s, the 

Ministry of Finance and the JDA planned 

the budget proposal, but the United 

States was not satisfied with the proposal 

and suggested a higher amount. 

So, we had more money than we actually 

needed, and we had a hard time finding 

ways to spend it” (Nishihiro 1995). 

27 In a speech at IISS Asia Security Conference, 

Singapore, June 5, 2004, thendefense 

chief Ishiba Shigeru said, “I do 

not agree that Japan cannot bear its responsibility 

in the international community 

because it cannot exercise the 

right of collective self-defense. In today’s 

world, where terrorist attacks and 

the act of war are more difficult to distinguish, 

we should further contemplate 

the possibility of utilizing military 

power for a policing purpose. Japan… 

wishes to actively speak out and take action 

as mentioned above, without simply 

becoming a financial contributor.” 


17


and that “Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate 

in international peace cooperation activities.” As a result, 

the Japanese government decided in 2006 to elevate 

international peace cooperation operations to a “primary 

mission” of the SDF (Ministry of Defense 2007). 

For all of this rhetoric, however, Japan’s level of international 

involvement in such missions is highly restricted, 

and in many respects its operational tempo has actually 

decreased in recent years. Japan’s Ground SDF mission in 

Iraq wrapped up in 2007, and its Air SDF cargo deployment 

there concluded at the end of 2008. Although Japan 

continues to be involved in UN peacekeeping operations 

(PKO) around the world, most missions involve only a 

handful of SDF personnel. 28 Moreover, the list of potential 

missions that Japan has declined to join highlights the legal 

and practical limits of Japan’s stated desire to expand 

28 The most recent UN PKO deployments, 

for example, involve three SDF 

personnel to Sudan (2008), six to Nepal 

(2007), three to East Timor (2007), 

and eight to the Congo (2006). 

international activities, such as 

a quiet American suggestion in 

the summer of 2006 that Japan 

could provide airlift support to 

Indonesian troops committed to help stabilize southern 

Lebanon after Israel’s push against Hezbollah militia forces. 

Also, Japan in 2008 backed off earlier ideas of dispatching 

the SDF to Afghanistan and declined a December 2007 

request from Burundi to help airlift its soldiers to take 

part in the UN PKO in Darfur, Sudan. At the end of 2008, 

the Japanese government watched China join a twentythree-nation 

maritime task force to fight piracy off Somalia, 

while it pondered a legal mechanism to participate. 

Elements of Japan’s political and bureaucratic elite 

have been pushing for years to loosen these restrictions, 

with modest success. However, each incremental change 

heralded as some new pinnacle along the country’s road 

to becoming a so-called normal country (or reverting back 

to its militarist / imperialist past, depending on one’s perspective) 

has most often turned out to be less momentous 

than advertised. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s establishment 

of a high-level panel to recommend possible 

changes to Japan’s traditional interpretation that it cannot 

exercise its right to collective self-defense was one of 

the more recent examples. After Abe’s political fall, however, 

the report’s path-breaking conclusions landed with 

a dull thud on the new prime minister’s desk (Japan Times 

2008). Prime Minister Fukuda showed no interest, and neither 

does there appear to be sufficient interest among the 

majority of lawmakers at this time to push these legal and 

political boundaries. 

Equally telling are the budget and procurement decisions 

Japan has made in recent years, which belie a clear 

dedication to support this new priority mission of international 

peace cooperation activities. In fact, by all appearances 

Japan has failed to put sufficient resources behind 

its new overseas missions. As alluded to before, the country’s 

defense spending has dropped from roughly $46 billion 

in 2000 to $45 billion in 2008, which means that the 

decline is slightly more pronounced when adjusted for 

Japan’s modest inflation during that period (Ministry of 

Defense 2008b). When Japan considered a replacement 

for its aging C-1 transport aircraft, it made sure that the 

new C-X cargo plane could ferry around Patriot missile defense 

batteries for national defense, but it is not as large 

as the U.S. C-17 Globemaster III, which means it cannot 

carry Japan’s CH-47Js transport helicopters that are often 

the most critical equipment needed for disaster relief or 

PKO missions (interview 2008b). Japan’s major new airlift 

investment, therefore, is sub-optimal when it comes 

to supporting this new priority mission. Overall, with the 

possible exception of the new Hyuga class helicopter destroyer, 

most of Japan’s defense capital spending will go to 

traditional air and maritime defense, missile defense, and 

anti-submarine capabilities. 

All of this suggests a situation that can perhaps be described 

as two friends not being completely honest with 

each other. Washington is trying to recruit Japan to become 

a more capable and proactive partner in multilateral 

coalitions to maintain global stability and promote democracy, 

but it still needs to reassure Japan that it remains 

committed to regional deterrence. U.S. officials regularly 

voice their ready support for the defense of Japan and its 

interests, but they are reluctant to get pinned down on 

specifics regarding which units would respond to different 

defense-of-Japan scenarios. This includes conversations 

about when nuclear weapons might come into play. Overall, 

the United States wants to preserve flexibility for international 

missions and do as little as necessary to reassure 

Japan of its security commitments. This is not to say that 

Washington takes these commitments lightly. Far from it. 

But invariably the U.S. threshold of satisfaction regarding 

plans and preparations for Japan’s defense (broadly speaking) 

will be lower than in Tokyo. 

18 


On the flip side, although Japan does contribute to 

global stability and prosperity in many different ways, on 

the security front Tokyo has been doing as little as possible 

to keep up Japan’s credentials as an international 

partner of the United States, while being primarily concerned 

with providing national defense at a relatively low 

financial and political cost. These costs are not insignificant, 

of course, and they include allowing for flexible U.S. 

use of bases in the country, providing host-nation support 

(HNS), and standing together with the United States in 

places like Iraq and Afghanistan. But one could argue that 

the overall goal behind accepting these costs is the preservation 

of national security and deterrence credibility (as 

underwritten by U.S. economic and military power) and 

continued high-level access to America’s top leadership. 

There is not monolithic thinking among Japanese policy 

makers about these goals and appropriate means and 

costs, of course, and they advocate a variety of strategies 

and tactics to protect and enhance Japan’s national interests, 

but the end result is a central preoccupation with national 

defense in relatively narrow terms. 29 

In a way, each country is providing minimal satisfaction 

to the other on issues of paramount importance in order 

to receive what it wants in return. While this is largely 

understandable, not uncommon, and apparently has not 

yet undermined the alliance in any crippling fashion, it is 

an inherently weak foundation for the alliance going forward, 

and greater attention and candor will be required in 

the future to stabilize it. Moreover, there are geopolitical 

developments that suggest this grand bargain could possibly 

lose its value for the allies if accommodating steps are 

not taken. Quickly stated, if a less stable and more multipolar 

geopolitical environment evolves in the context of 

zero-sum thinking and heightened competition for vital 

natural resources, the allies could reconsider whether the 

alliance “dues” they are paying are worth the cost. Greater 

global instability is certainly not a foregone conclusion, 

and even if it came to pass in some form the allies might 

decide that they need each other even more in that case. 

But either way, alliance managers need to communicate 

well and understand what their counterparts think they 

need as they try to balance the regional and global security 

equation. 


A declining security surplus for Japan 

To understand the regional security equation, it is helpful 

to view the situation in terms of security surpluses or 

deficits. This also clarifies the concept of power balancing 

and the options available to states dealing with a rising 

neighbor of potentially hegemonic proportions. 30 For 

decades, Japan has enjoyed a favorable security balance or 

“surplus” in the region, thanks to America’s nuclear 

umbrella, U.S. forward-deployed forces, 

and the absence of a near peer on the seas or 

in the skies that could possibly threaten Japan, 

apart from perhaps the Soviet Union. The fact 

that the Soviet Union was locked in a titanic 

struggle with America was oddly comforting 

29 For a discussion 

of these various viewpoints, 

see Schoff 2007. 

30 For the inspiration to 

characterize Japan’s security 

position as one of 

deficit, contrasted with 

surplus, I am indebted to 

Professor Watanabe Akio. 

For an excellent discussion 

to Japan, since Washington’s deterrence credibility 

was quite high vis-à-vis such a stark 

ideological enemy of relatively minor global 

economic consequence. Moreover, the United States had 

demonstrated a willingness to dispatch hundreds of thousands 

of troops to the region to combat Communist forces 

(in Korea and Vietnam), in addition to deploying tactical 

nuclear weapons to Korea and occasionally threatening 

to use them. 

Japan experienced panicky moments from time to time, 

such as when China carried out its first nuclear test, when 

many Americans became disillusioned at the failure to defeat 

North Vietnam, when President Jimmy Carter contemplated 

a significant U.S. redeployment out of South 

Korea, and during the regional arms build-ups by the Soviets 

in the 1970s and 1980s. But Japan never faced the kind 

of security “deficit” that Western Europe confronted during 

the Cold War, when the Soviets enjoyed a quantitative 

conventional military superiority that they could deploy 

quickly, if desired. Today that situation is slowly reversing, 

and although Western Europe still faces a persistent terrorist 

threat and potential flashpoints in the former Soviet 

Republics to the east, this region is much more comfortable 

overall than it has been throughout its history. Japan, 

however, feels more vulnerable. 

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been essentially 

“investing” its surplus security in the form of interventions 

in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and in maritime 

security operations in the Mediterranean Sea. In contrast, 

Japan faces the prospects of a security deficit from multiple 

directions, as described earlier, and this comes at a time 

of Japan’s strategic options 

in response to a rising China, 

see Mochizuki 2007b. 


19


when unfettered access to global markets and commodities 

is increasingly vital to Japan’s survival. To respond to 

this situation, Tokyo has a small number of basic options, 

and some components of these options lie outside of its 

control. Simply put, Japan can either accept this evolving 

change in the security equation, or it can actively seek to 

maintain its advantageous position vis-à-vis would-be regional 

rivals. Both approaches have important implications 

for U.S. policy makers. 

Accepting the devolving security situation in East Asia 

does not necessarily mean passivity on the part of Japan, 

but it does imply a measured response by Tokyo and greater 

deference to China’s and Russia’s interests overall. On 

the far end of such acceptance are strategies of appeasement 

and “bandwagoning,” and while Japan has perhaps 

indulged in a bit of bandwagoning on the trade and economic 

front with China, these are not viable security options 

for a country as strong and proud as Japan (Mochizuki 

2007b). Instead, a possible Japanese option in the face 

of Chinese hegemonic behavior is to make very modest 

investments in certain military capabilities and maintain 

the U.S. alliance to preserve autonomy. At the same time, 

diplomatic steps could be taken that demonstrate a willingness 

to coexist peacefully and cede certain rights and 

advantages to Beijing, all in an attempt to induce restraint 

and encourage China to tone down its aggressive tendencies. 

Mochizuki called this “cooperative engagement with 

a soft hedge,” and it resonates with other efforts to motivate 

China to become “a responsible stakeholder” in the 

regional and global order. 

Proponents of this general approach (and there are 

many variations) have been identified as “middle power 

internationalists,” who are the ideological descendents of 

the “small Japanists” of Meiji Japan and who basically eschew 

the use of force and emphasize Japan’s continued 

development as a trading nation committed to regional 

and international institutions as a way to address global 

problems and help arbitrate disputes (Samuels 2007). In 

terms of balancing the security equation, this approach 

generally seeks to reduce (or at least limit) the threat side 

of the equation, in part based on the assumption that 

China seeks the same basic things that most nations seek 

and recognizes that cooperation will produce better results 

than zero-sum competition. As House of Representatives 

Speaker Kono Yohei explained at the sixty-third 

anniversary of the end of the battle of Okinawa, “We 

should establish a peaceful diplomatic environment in 

East Asia, improve security conditions there, and make, 

at least, a large U.S. military presence at the current level 

unnecessary” (Kyodo News 2008b). 

If Kono’s vision comes to pass and Chinese and Russian 

military modernization programs level out, North Korea 

denuclearizes, and regional tensions wane, then pressure 

on the deterrence question and the future of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance will similarly be reduced. This is the preferred 

option for the United States and Japan, to minimize the 

potential threat side of the equation and eliminate the 

need for the allies to react stridently to bolster deterrence. 

But if China does not restrain itself, for example, or if it 

cannot be nudged in the direction of limiting possible future 

hegemonic behavior, then Japan can try to balance 

against Beijing’s newly developing capabilities. A similar 

response by Japan might be considered if a more unstable, 

mutli-polar regional and global security dynamic evolves, 

where potential rivals include Russia, China, Iran in the 

Middle East, or others. In this case, Japan’s soft hedge becomes 

harder and sharper. 

Maintaining the ability to resist coercive tactics and 

balance against potential threats can be accomplished 

externally, meaning through the alliance with the United 

States, or balancing internally by more assertively developing 

Japan’s independent capabilities. Japan’s favored 

approach ( for a variety of legal, political, diplomatic, and 

budgetary reasons) has long been external balancing coupled 

with incremental internal improvements in the areas 

of national defense, support for regional operations, 

and international PKO. Pushing the envelope on internal 

balancing has never been attractive to Japanese policy 

makers in the post-World War II environment because it 

would involve a huge domestic political fight. Laws would 

have to be changed (possibly including the constitution, 

which has never been amended in over sixty years), Japan’s 

neighbors would object vehemently, and they would 

probably feel compelled to increase their own defense 

budgets in response. So, although external balancing is 

Tokyo’s preference, how well will external balancing continue 

to function if a gap grows between American and 

Japanese threat perceptions and priorities in the region 

Interviews in Japan for this project revealed a noticeable 

amount of concern among defense planners that external 

20 



balancing might not be as effective in the future as it has 

been in the past. 

For now, the U.S.-Japan alliance is fairly comfortable 

with its conventional and nuclear military superiority visà-vis 

potential rivals in the region, and although many in 

Japan sense a creeping American disinterest in East Asia 

leading to a possible military pullback on the part of the 

United States, evidence points to the contrary. Symbols 

have always been important to the alliance and to the 

concept of deterrence, and for many years an American 

policy to forward deploy at least a hundred thousand military 

personnel in East Asia was seen as a symbol of U.S. 

security commitment to its allies in the region. 31 The one 

hundred thousand threshold was also judged by the Pentagon 

to be roughly the minimum required to win two 

overlapping major theater wars (MTWs) with acceptable 

risk (U.S. Department of Defense 1997). 

But when the Bush administration began to deemphasize 

the hundred thousand threshold and the two MTW 

construct in 2001, followed by personnel moves out of Korea 

and planned redeployments out of Japan as part of the 

Pentagon’s Global Posture Review (GPR), suspicions of a 

slow U.S. retreat from East Asia grew in Tokyo. When the 

new Quadrennial Defense Review came out in 2006 during 

Bush’s second term, at least a few key Japanese policy 

makers and defense planners noted that subheadings in 

the 2001 review such as “maintaining favorable regional 

balances” and “deterring forward” were replaced by an intense 

focus on “fighting the Long War” against terrorist 

networks and “defending the homeland in depth” (interview 

2007d). The simple explanation was that Washington 

was distracted by conflict in the Middle East and Central 

Asia, and it viewed everything through a hunkered-down 

prism of homeland defense. The reality was quite different, 

and an interesting dichotomy developed whereby an 

American visitor to Tokyo would hear worry about a U.S. 

pullback, and the same week in Beijing he would listen to 

concern about America’s build-up in the region! 

U.S. military personnel deployed in the 

Asia-Pacific region 

150000 Republic of 

Korea 

120000 

Japan 

90000 

60000 

30000 

0 

2001 

2004 

source: U.S. Department of Defense 

2008 

Hawaii 

Guam 32 

Alaska 

Staying focused on Asia 

Objectively speaking, overall the United States is increasing 

its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, not pulling 

back. This mild build-up is actually one of the many objectives 

of the GPR, as a way of responding to a perceived 

shifting of “the global community’s ‘center of gravity’ [toward] 

the Asia-Pacific region” (Fallon 2005). This build-up 

is hard to quantify, however, as it relies mostly on less visible 

measures such as upgrading equipment, more frequent 

rotational deployments, access agreements with partners 

in the region to broaden deployment flexibility in times of 

crisis, and similar incremental moves. Defense spending 

is also hard to track on a regional basis, so it is nearly impossible 

to evaluate, for example, if more U.S. defense dollars 

are being spent in East Asia compared to past years 

or not. Taking a closer look at some of these upgrades and 

rotational deployments, however, can help to clarify the 

situation. 

First, on the issue of troop deployments, modest increases 

in Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii somewhat offset the 

draw-downs in Japan and Korea, and if 

this broader concept of the Asia-Pacific is 

taken into consideration, the number of 

U.S. military personnel in the region continues 

to exceed one hundred thousand. 

Moreover, U.S. command relationships 

are generally strengthening with key allies, 

such as by collocating Japan’s air defense 

command with the United States at 

Yokota Air Force Base (AFB), and bringing 

up to Yokota ( from Hawaii) personnel 

from the 13 th Air Force, which will help to 

tie Japan more closely to decision makers 

at U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). In 

addition, cooperation between U.S. and Japanese ground 

forces was strengthened by the establishment of a forward 

command element of I Corps (headquartered in Washington 

State) at Camp Zama in Japan in 2007. I Corps ( forward) 

should be fully operational in 2009. 

31 The 100,000 figure was often 

cited in U.S. policy and 

strategy documents, for example 

see U.S. Department of Defense 

1998. The number was 

even higher in earlier years. 

32 Includes a rough estimate 

of 5,000 personnel involved 

in or supporting rotational 

deployments at any given 

time. Also, current U.S.-Japan 

plans are to relocate 

eight thousand U.S. Marines 

and the headquarters of III 

MEF from Okinawa to Guam 

by 2014, so the balances between 

Japan and Guam will 

be adjusted by that amount. 


21


Troop levels tell only a small part of the story, however, 

and more significant changes are taking place in the areas 

of capabilities upgrades and rotational deployments. 

The U.S. territory of Guam, most noticeably, is undergoing 

dramatic change as the military improves its facilities 

so that the island can field advanced air and sea assets. In 

2000, the air force transferred AGM-86 conventional Air- 

Launched Cruise Missiles to the island. Since 2004, the 

sprawling twenty-one-thousand-acre Andersen AFB has 

served as a home for a variety of aircraft, as regular rotations 

of bomber and fighter aircraft create a persistent air 

presence. These rotations are now more frequent and up 

to four times longer than they were in the 1990s (Jane’s Defence 

Weekly 1998; Halloran 2008b). Also, the deployment 

of KC-135 refueling tanker aircraft enhances Guam’s air 

capabilities by providing critical air refueling support to 

the increased rotations, as well as potentially for other U.S. 

and allied aircraft in the region (Cody 2005). 

F-16 and F-15 fighter aircraft regularly rotate to Guam, 

especially since the activation of Guam’s new Air Expeditionary 

Wing (Kan and Niksch 2008). For example, F-15E 

Strike Eagles from Idaho’s 389 th Expeditionary Fighter 

Squadron spent considerable time at Andersen in 2008, 

and state-of-the-art F-22 Raptors, now permanently stationed 

in Alaska, deployed to Guam that same summer for 

joint exercises with Japan (Jung 2008b). Thinking beyond 

frequent rotational deployments, senior Navy officials 

speculate that Guam could evolve into a more permanent 

basing option for F-22 squadrons and KC-135s in the 

future, if the U.S. Air Force decides to permanently base 

advanced fighter aircraft on the island (Kan and Niksch 

2008). B-52 bombers arrived in February 2004 from their 

base in North Dakota, recalling the days when B-52s flew 

missions out of Guam during the Vietnam War. Advanced 

bombers such as the B-2 Stealth bombers have flown out 

of Andersen Air Force Base since April 2005 and B-1 bombers 

since 2004 (Kan and Niksch 2008). Guam will eventually 

house a permanent presence of up to forty-eight aircraft 

(O’Hanlon 2008). 

The Pentagon also seeks to enhance Guam’s intelligence 

capabilities by positioning sophisticated intelligence-gathering 

platforms. The Global Hawk unmanned 

aerial vehicle (UAV) will operate permanently out of 

Guam by 2009. The last installment of Global Hawk deliveries 

is projected for 2014, at which point up to ten UAVs 

may find their home at Andersen AFB. These assets will 

support PACOM’s counter-piracy operations in Southeast 

Asia, counterterrorism, and other regional missions. 

Furthermore, the Pentagon is studying the possibility of 

expanding Guam’s UAV fleet to include Predator aircraft, 

potentially operating two Predator UAV squadrons in the 

Asia-Pacific region from Guam and South Korea (Tirpak 

2007). 

Farther afield, the U.S. Air Force plans to station three 

F-22 squadrons in the Pacific theater, two in Alaska and 

one in Hawaii. The first squadron of twenty planes and 

two reserve planes arrived at Elemndorf AFB in Alaska on 

August 2007 (Halpin 2007). The F-22 squadron projected 

to arrive at Hickam AFB in Hawaii in 2010 will join the 

Air National Guard’s 154 th Wing of the 199 th Fighter Squadron 

(Jung 2008b). In addition, the 27 th F-22 fighter squadron 

based in Virginia now spends one-third of every year 

at Kadena AFB in Okinawa. Expanding Alaska’s strategic 

potential progressed beyond upgrading air capabilities as 

the Pentagon added a Stryker brigade combat team and an 

airborne infantry brigade combat team, strengthening the 

infantry brigade already there. Further enhancing Alaska’s 

reach, a new aviation brigade task force is also based in 

the state (Karniol 2007). This is all in addition to substantial 

MD and early detection capabilities in the region. 

On the maritime front, Guam is emerging as a new 

home for forward-deployed submarines and other advanced 

naval vessels. Guam’s submarine fleet has strengthened 

with the reactivation of Submarine Squadron 15 in 

2001, and Guam’s Apra Harbor now ports three Los Angeles-class 

nuclear attack submarines. This arrangement, 

and Apra’s improved support and maintenance facilities, 

allows the subs to spend more time on patrol in the Pacific. 

In addition, twenty-seven years after American SSBNs left 

the island in 1981, a modified version of that vessel known 

as a conventional guided missile submarine (SSGN) returned 

as part of its maiden one-year deployment in 2008, 

following the renovation of port facilities there (Hawn 

2008). 

The SSGNs are some of the most modern in the U.S. 

submarine fleet, with a conversion cost of about $1 billion 

per vessel. The upgraded and modified SSBNs cannot fire 

nuclear ballistic missiles from the depths of the ocean, but 

the new platform provides a unique special operations 

and command and control platform. The SSGN can carry 

22 



a significant SEAL contingent, launch unmanned aerial 

and unmanned sea vehicles, and launch 154 Tomahawk 

missiles. The USS Ohio, the first ship to undergo such a 

conversion, stopped in Guam for a crew swap and replenishment 

in January 2008. The Ohio will swap crews a total 

of three times during its year-long deployment, underscoring 

the importance of the facilities on Guam. A total 

of four SSGNs have been delivered to the U.S. Navy (Navy. 

mil 2008). Overall, the Pentagon intends for PACOM to 

host 60 percent of America’s submarine fleet by 2011, including 

three of the four brand new Virginia-class attack 

submarines (Cole 2007). Already more than 60 percent of 

SSBN patrols occur in the Pacific, compared to only 15 percent 

in the 1980s (Grotto and Cirincione 2008). 

Although the navy has considered forward deploying 

an aircraft carrier strike group to Guam or Hawaii, the 

leadership has so far declined to pursue this idea. The USS 

Carl Vinson will join the Pacific fleet in early 2010 and port 

in San Diego, but this still raises the number of U.S. aircraft 

carriers based in the Pacific to six (Schogol 2007). 33 

Moreover, the United States upgraded its forward-deployed 

carrier in Japan in 2008 by replacing the aging USS 

Kitty Hawk with a larger, nuclear-powered Nimitz-class 

vessel, the USS George Washington. 34 

Taken together, all of these improvements, additions, 

and more frequent and lengthy rotational deployments 

suggest that external balancing has actually been operating 

to some degree, even if those in Japan who worry 

about America’s security commitments do not realize it. 

Part of the reason for this is that as old symbols of deterrence 

are phased out, they are being replaced with a diffuse 

range of more capable (but only vaguely understood) 

assets, oftentimes deployed from farther away. The assurance 

effect is less concrete and immediate, though the deterrence 

effect might actually be stronger, because a potential 

adversary’s defense planners are paying perhaps 

the closest attention to the whole array of new capabilities. 

This helps explain why Tokyo can be underwhelmed 

with recent developments while at the same time Beijing 

is alarmed. As a Chinese defense report noted, “The United 

States has increased its strategic attention to and input 

in the Asia-Pacific region…enhancing its military capabilities” 

(Blanchard 2009). 

A similar dynamic was at work in South Korea early 

in the Bush administration when the United States began 

pulling about ten thousand troops off the peninsula, consolidating 

bases, and moving most of the U.S. forces farther 

south near Pyongtaek. 35 Conservatives 

in South Korea worried that the Americans 

were leaving, while North Korea focused 

on the capabilities upgrades and improved 

counterattack positioning of the redeployed 

forces. Eventually, the U.S. government was 

effective at convincing skeptics in Seoul of 

its continued commitment to the ROK’s defense, 

in part by constantly highlighting the 

$11 billion in capability upgrades and all of 

the other improvements that Pyongyang was 

worried about (Singapore Straits Times 2004; 

Joongang Ilbo 2004). It was essentially a long 

and sustained public relations campaign that paid dividends 

in terms of reassuring Seoul and bolstering deterrence 

on the peninsula. 

It is easier to keep hammering away at how capable 

one is at destroying an adversary, however, when you are 

talking about North Korea, with which the United States 

has virtually no diplomatic or economic ties. It is another 

story if a major object of deterrence also happens to 

be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is 

your largest source of imports (as is the case with China 

for both the United States and Japan), or holds about $1 

trillion (6 percent) of your nation’s long-term debt. Thus, 

even if it wanted to, it is much harder politically for Washington 

to be strident about reassuring Japan vis-à-vis China, 

especially if that requires senior officials and officers 

to regularly and publicly emphasize all of the incremental 

improvements noted above. 

At this point it seems clear that, while there is no immediate 

crisis of confidence regarding the durability of the alliance 

or its ability to deter aggression, there are questions 

about the long-term future of deterrence in the face of potentially 

significant shifts in the regional balance of power, 

and to what extent rising powers comfortably assimilate 

into global markets, legal and diplomatic norms, and the 

overall geopolitical status quo. Here the concern is less 

about repelling theoretical invasions and existential deterrence 

involving nuclear weapons, and more about Japan’s 

declining sense of comfort with the alliance’s air and 

sea power dominance in certain situations and America’s 

willingness to jump to Japan’s defense at various lower 

33 Correspondingly, the 

number of strike and surveillance 

aircraft will increase 

by eighty-five. 

34 The Nimitz-class carriers 

can operate approximately 

five additional F/A-18 Hornets, 

compared to the Kitty Hawk 

Class. In 2003, the USS Ronald 

Reagan replaced the only other 

Kitty Hawk-class carrier in the 

Pacific, the USS Constellation. 

35 For a description of changes 

and negotiations during 

this time regarding the 

U.S.-ROK security relationship, 

see Perry et. al. 2004 


23


levels of conventional conflict and coercive diplomatic 

tactics. Some of America’s moves described above should 

reassure Japan in the short term, but longer-term questions 

about how deterrence is expected to function in the 

alliance remain. This is particularly true as incoming U.S. 

officials ponder further de-emphasizing nuclear weapons 

in U.S. deterrence strategy as a way to support non-proliferation 

and arms control objectives. The two chapters 

that follow examine evolving trends in thinking about deterrence 

in the United States and Japan, and how current 

alliance transformation efforts are beginning to address 

some (though not all) of the changes taking place. 

24 


chapter 2 

Deterrence 

Targets, Tools, and Trends 

The strategy of deterrence is about as ancient a concept as 

they come, though in the second half of the twentieth century 

thinking about deterrence and extended deterrence 

took on new salience with the invention of nuclear weapons 

and the means to deliver them via ICBMs and SLBMs. 

As Keith Payne describes, “During the Cold War, nuclear 

deterrence became the centerpiece of U.S. grand strategy 

to contain the Soviet Union. Given the enormous, prompt 

lethality of nuclear weapons, they are well-suited to support 

strategies involving extreme threats” (Payne 2008). All 

of the nuclear powers that evolved during that time cited 

those weapons’ role in deterrence as justification for their 

development and maintenance. Because the “concept of 

deterrence was central to all strategic discourse” during 

the Cold War, “this special status as policy transferred into 

respectful treatment as a concept, reflected in the libraries 

of books and numerous articles…[and] acquiring all the 

trappings of an orthodoxy” (Freedman 2004). 

Today, deterrence is still a primary concern for defense 

planners, but there is less consensus regarding exactly 

who is to be deterred and how, and many wonder 

whether or not some adversaries are, in fact, undeterrable. 

Deterrence means different things to different people, and 

the appropriate role for nuclear weapons is particularly 

unsettled. In the United States, there is a movement afoot 

to decrease the importance and role of nuclear weapons 

in U.S. deterrence strategy ( for some, with a goal of completely 

eliminating the weapons), but it is not yet clear 

how that nuclear gap would be filled. 

The purpose of this chapter is not to review the history 

of deterrence theory, but rather to examine how deterrence 

has been preached and practiced in the U.S.-Japan alliance, 

with a particular emphasis on the view from Tokyo. 

Japan has often been considered a “free rider” in the security 

arena, and although this does not do justice to Japan’s 

contributions, it is fair to say that Japan has been a relatively 

cheap rider. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has always been 

a major symbol of Japan’s cheap ride, not only in financial 

terms, but also politically and diplomatically. In addition, 

for some in Japan it has become a symbol of the country 

settling for a sort of second-tier status. MOFA warned in 

1959 that Japan should not rule out the possibility of developing 

nuclear weapons, lest the country lose flexibility in 

pursuing national security (Kyodo News 2008c). 

Even Japan’s primary architect of the Yoshida Doctrine, 

which focused the country on economic development 

while taking a back seat to the United States in security 

and global diplomatic affairs, later lamented how 

entrenched his policy approach had become. In the early 

1950s, then-Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru stiff-armed 

U.S. requests for more robust rearmament in part by encouraging 

the opposition Socialists to stage anti-military 

demonstrations for the benefit of visiting U.S. negotiators. 

Only a decade or so later he bemoaned Japan’s passive approach 

to the defense issue (which he called a “deformity 

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended Deterrence 25


of the state”) and recognized his own role in that outcome. 

“For Japan, a member of the United Nations and expecting 

36 See, in particular, 

Payne 2008. 

37 In fact, the “alliance” was 

not explicitly named as such 

in Japanese official statements 

and documents until May 8, 

1981, in a joint statement by 

Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko 

and President Ronald Reagan. 

This created a small controversy 

back in Japan, where the 

media questioned if this was 

now a “military alliance” or 

an “anti-Soviet alliance,” and 

eventually Foreign Minister 

Ito Masayoshi had to explain 

in the Diet that the “alliance” 

term was nothing more than 

an affirmation of the close political, 

economic, and cultural 

affairs between the two countries 

(Associated Press 1981). 

its benefits, to avoid support of its peacekeeping 

mechanisms is selfish behavior… 

[and] I myself cannot escape responsibility 

for the use of the Constitution as a pretext 

for this way of conducting national policy” 

(Pyle 2007). In the forty-five years since 

Yoshida wrote those words, there has been 

very little fundamental change. 

It seems clear that the legacy of relying 

on the United States for extended deterrence 

lives on in Japan, even if discomfort 

with the status quo is growing. This discomfort 

stems from different sources of 

concern, with some worried that extended 

deterrence might become less reliable and 

less credible (so they seek closer ties with 

Washington). Meanwhile, others are more 

focused on changing the whole nature of the postwar relationship 

with the United States, by climbing into the front 

seat and taking more security and diplomatic matters into 

their own hands. This is not necessarily an anti-U.S. position, 

but it indicates more noticeable chaffing under the 

postwar legal and diplomatic restraints that Japan agreed 

to live with for the sake of national development. 

The short tenure of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo probably 

best exemplified this latter group. In his first major 

parliamentary policy address, Abe stated, “It is now time 

to embark anew and boldly revise the postwar regime,” 

which he linked to constitutional revision and education 

reform, among other policy changes. He cited the need to 

“reconstruct our legal basis for national security that fits 

the current times” (Kyodo News 2007). Abe’s failure to realize 

his goals partly reflects how little consensus actually 

exists in Japan regarding adjustments to the status quo, 

though the fact that constitutional revision was that high 

on the prime minister’s agenda at all represents a significant 

change. But it is not just new thinking about deterrence 

in Japan that is affecting the alliance relationship, 

as deterrence discussions in Washington are also having 

a major impact. 

With the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, 

the U.S. intellectual and policy debates about deterrence 

tools and targets have become more frequent and vigorous. 

Whereas during the latter half of the Cold War, Washington 

settled on a “balance of terror” approach with the 

Soviet Union that allowed for mutual vulnerability, or “mutual 

assured destruction,” modern theorists began to question 

the utility of those policies in today’s security environment. 

36 The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR) sought to deemphasize the role of nuclear 

weapons in sustaining deterrence and proposed a new 

planning framework consisting of 1) strategic nuclear and 

non-nuclear forces, 2) active and passive defenses, and 3) 

a responsive infrastructure capable of adapting quickly to 

a changing security setting. 

Deterrence doctrine has become muddled, however, 

as some emphasize the role of defenses, some push for 

bigger and better conventional options or seeking more 

assertive alliance partners, and others talk about deterrence 

tailored to fit different situations, or even preemption 

or preventative war to deal with undeterrable threats. 

The Obama administration will have its own chance to influence 

U.S. nuclear policy as it prepares for a new 2009- 

10 NPR, which is mandated by Congress. In light of this 

pending review, this chapter, while focusing primarily on 

the view from Tokyo, also examines evolving U.S. thinking 

about extended deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons 

and how Washington’s perspective could affect the 

U.S.-Japan alliance now and in the future. 

Opening up the nuclear umbrella 

The U.S.-Japan alliance established by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 

Cooperation and Security (security treaty) did not begin 

with any mention of extended deterrence or a so-called 

nuclear umbrella protecting Japan. 37 Public aversion to any 

mention of nuclear weapons was quite strong, and Japan’s 

somewhat optimistic perception of the security situation 

in East Asia at the time did not force policy makers to seriously 

question the necessity and credibility of the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella. China’s first nuclear test in 1964 changed 

Tokyo’s views to some degree, but the official response to 

the nuclear test by the Japanese government was relatively 

muted, and China was not the target of Japan’s defense 

planning at that time (Nishihiro 1995). 

Though Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and others occasionally 

talked publically about the idea of sliding under 

an American “nuclear umbrella” as early as 1965, it was still 

a controversial concept in the mid-1960s. In the Diet, left 

26 



wing politicians argued that this was just a policy pushed 

by Washington so that the United States could increase 

its influence over non-nuclear states (House of Councilors 

1965). More than a few Japanese feared entanglement 

in a nuclear exchange of some sort that could take place 

on the Korean peninsula or involve the United States and 

the Soviet Union. That is why Sato’s request to McNamara 

in 1965 for nuclear protection was kept secret. 

Even inside the bureaucracy, there were arguments 

that deviated from the government’s quiet acceptance of 

American nuclear protection. In early 1966, for example, 

Shimoda Takezo, then the administrative vice-minister of 

MOFA, stated in a press conference that he thought Japan 

was not under the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Kurosaki 2006, 

196-97). This comment was replaced by MOFA’s “unified 

viewpoint” a few days later, a handy double negative that 

in essence conveyed that it was not accurate to say that 

Japan was not covered by the nuclear umbrella. In fact, as 

noted earlier, Sato had already taken the initiative in January 

1965 to clarify the U.S. commitment to Japan, which 

formed the modern basis of U.S. extended deterrence visà-vis 

Japan (Asahi Shimbun 2008). 

Sato, initially a supporter of Japanese nuclear armament 

(at least in theory), changed his mind when confronted 

with Washington’s strong non-proliferation policy 

and his government’s own internal studies suggesting that 

reliance on U.S. nuclear arms was the best way forward for 

Japan. None of the conceivable alternatives, either domestic 

nuclear weapons production, nuclear sharing with the 

United States, or overtly denying itself America’s nuclear 

protection, was considered viable at that time by most 

Japanese policy makers. This is why Sato subsequently 

pushed Washington to clarify its commitment to the defense 

of Japan on several occasions, especially in meetings 

with President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 and 1967 (Kurosaki 

2006). Still, the leaders’ joint statement after their meeting 

in January 1965 made only oblique reference that “the 

President reaffirmed the United States’ determination to 

abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan 

against any armed attack from the outside” (U.S.-Japan 

Joint Statement 1965). 

Little by little, discussion in Japan and between the allies 

about extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella 

became more open and more common. The main drivers 

behind this phenomenon in the mid- to late 1960s 

included China’s nuclear breakout, the pending 1970 deadline 

for extending the U.S.-Japan security treaty after its 

initial, ten-year term, and international debate about the 

NPT including issues such as deployment of nuclear weapons 

to NNWS and the security of those states. Combined 

with other factors, this led to Sato’s announcement of the 

three non-nuclear principles in 1967, to his articulation of 

the “four pillars” policy in 1968, and eventually to Japan’s 

decision to sign the NPT in 1970 (though Japan waited six 

years before ratifying the treaty). 

The four-pillars policy was important because it left no 

doubt about Japan’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

The policy identifies the three non-nuclear principles as 

one pillar, accompanied by three additional pillars: 1) promoting 

nuclear power for peaceful purposes, 2) promoting 

global nuclear disarmament, and 3) relying on the U.S. nuclear 

deterrent for protection from “the international nuclear 

threat” (National Diet 1968). With the four pillars policy, 

one could say that the nuclear umbrella was officially 

and fully opened (or at least formally recognized as such), 

and it has remained open ever since. From Japan’s perspective, 

the umbrella was only meant (ostensibly) 

to deter a nuclear attack. It was not 

meant to deter a conventional attack. This 

was clearly stated whenever the government 

mentioned the nuclear umbrella in 

public. 38 From the historical record, it is 

not clear if that was a commonly held position 

by the allies, or if one country (or 

both) believed that nuclear weapons could 

have a broader deterrence role. 

In fact, throughout the forty years since the four pillars 

policy was announced, U.S. and Japanese policy makers 

and alliance managers have spent little time trying to 

define in any detail the scope and nature of that umbrella. 

Today, North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test and a changing 

U.S. nuclear posture have prompted serious reflection on 

some of these issues, even if the primary goal is overall alliance 

strengthening rather than resolving specific nuclear 

deterrence questions. 

Japanese scholars themselves have noted that throughout 

the Cold War Japan rarely discussed or debated extended 

deterrence in the U.S.-Japan alliance, and only 

recently have academics and policy makers begun to examine 

these concepts more closely from a theoretical and 

38 Most Japanese government 

reports (such as Japan’s 

NDPG FY2005-), reiterate the 

policy that U.S. nuclear weapons 

are a deterrent against a 

nuclear attack on Japan (Defense 

Agency of Japan 2006, 

428), but some have suggested 

a broader role in deterring 

other WMD attacks 

(Council on Security and Defense 

Capabilities 2004). 


27


strategic viewpoint that is uniquely Japanese (Ogawa 1989; 

Noguchi 2005). This does not mean that Japanese defense 

planners did not think about deterrence issues during the 

Cold War, but they generally approached deterrence in a 

passive way that reflected their country’s dependence on 

the U.S. nuclear umbrella and forward-deployed forces 

(Ogawa 1989). To the extent that scholars did study deterrence, 

it was usually limited to describing the theories developed 

in Europe and the United States, and what was 

going on in NATO vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 

During the Cold War, it hardly mattered exactly how deterrence 

functioned in East Asia, as long as the U.S.-Japan 

political and security commitments were perceived to be 

strong and credible. The United States’ nuclear and conventional 

military capabilities were so overwhelming, from 

a Japanese perspective, that Tokyo rarely concerned itself 

with the details. Japan’s national security needs were relatively 

simple and modest, and U.S. power was more than 

enough to satisfy them, as long as the bilateral relationship 

was solid. Thus, with deterrence requirements seemingly 

well under control, and given the domestic political 

sensitivities surrounding military issues, Cold War Japan’s 

policies regarding deterrence and national defense have 

been described more as a manifestation of political correctness 

than a result of real strategic calculation (Jimbo 

2003; Tanaka 1997). 

Arguably, Japan today still has not incorporated deterrence 

theory into its defense planning processes, though 

it is beginning to make progress in this area. U.S.-Japan bilateral 

discussions about deterrence strategy usually consist 

of only occasional briefings and rarely connect directly 

to joint decisions about procurement, deployments, or 

training. The “political correctness” mentioned above is 

still an important factor, and indicative of this is the fact 

that MOFA considers the U.S. debate about a so-called reliable 

replacement nuclear warhead (RRW) to be primarily 

an arms control issue, even though it is also essentially 

a debate about the future viability of the nuclear umbrella 

protecting Japan. 

The shukanka, or MOFA division, responsible for following 

the RRW issue is the Arms Control and Disarmament 

division, not the National Security division or the 

Japan-U.S. Security Treaty division, which underscores 

the overall lack of concern about the technical details behind 

America’s nuclear deterrent. As one MOFA official 

explained, “We can break this down into three considerations: 

1) political/policy, 2) strategic, and 3) technical. Japan 

doesn’t have the ability to analyze the technical piece… 

we cannot assess the integrity of a nuclear explosive device. 

There is some movement in looking at this from a 

strategic perspective, by raising this at the joint staff committee 

(Togo Bakuryo Kaigi), but this is preliminary and 

has been completely disconnected from the political/policy 

side of the equation, which is handled by MOFA” (interview 

2007h). 

In any event, from an official perspective, the Ministry 

of Defense (MOD) does not have any nuclear weapons, 

so it has no need for a nuclear weapons policy on issues 

related to testing or redevelopment (interview 2007e). 

MOD defers to MOFA on these issues. In 2008, however, 

the allies did begin quiet consultations by diplomats and 

defense planners about evolving deterrence theories, ostensibly 

as an alliance-strengthening exercise in the context 

of the United States drafting its next NPR by the end 

of 2009, but the content of these meetings has been described 

as “rudimentary” (interview 2008c and 2008d). 

The four-pillars policy described earlier expresses a 

fundamental inconsistency in Japanese policy that persists 

to this day: although Japan promotes global nuclear 

disarmament, it does so while benefiting from America’s 

possession of nuclear weapons. The government disagrees 

that this stance is inconsistent, and it has tried to strike a 

balance between the two policies, emphasizing that both 

are rooted in national security considerations. Japan 

points out that it promotes a practical plan for disarmament 

that includes the United States, but the two policies 

do occasionally conflict (Amano 2002). Japan will sometimes 

criticize U.S. nuclear weapons policy, for example, 

and the two often end up on opposite sides of nuclear disarmament 

resolutions at NPT review conferences or other 

measures like the fissile material cutoff treaty. Japan has 

also opposed U.S. subcritical testing on occasion, such as 

in 1998 and 1999, even though these tests help to maintain 

the viability of Japan’s nuclear umbrella. Overall, Japan has 

not been able to bridge the gap between its fervent nuclear 

disarmament policies and its long-term reliance on the 

U.S. nuclear umbrella. 

The defense and deterrence debate in Japan 

One of the future challenges for the alliance will be to take 

abstract and symbolic concepts of deterrence and trans- 

28 


late them into a set of complementary capabilities with a 

nuanced understanding of each other’s roles and responsibilities 

in various situations. Before embarking on this discussion, 

it is useful to review how defense and deterrence 

thinking has evolved in Japan over time. 

Following WWII, in the early days after the JDA was 

established in 1954, Japanese defense officials developed 

plans to build up and equip the SDF in order to protect the 

country. The first defense plan was ambitious, envisioning 

a future military capable of defending itself in a forwardleaning 

manner, with about two thousand aircraft and a 

large naval fleet consisting of up to seven aircraft carriers, 

primarily to counter the potential threat from the Soviet 

Union (Nishihiro 1995). The second defense plan, completed 

in 1961, better reflected political and economic realities 

of the time. The revised U.S.-Japan security treaty had 

been signed, and the allies decided that Japan need only 

defend itself within Japanese territory. With this defense 

plan, Japan did not have to think at all in terms of power 

projection or create special medical, transport, or other 

support units that could reasonably be supplied by the domestic 

civilian infrastructure. Still, the main driver behind 

defense planning was the objective of responding to potential 

threats or “threat repulsion,” even if it meant just 

having the ability to hold off an invader long enough for 

U.S. forces to mobilize and “take over the situation” (Maruyama 

1996). 

Throughout the 1960s Soviet capabilities increased, 

and in 1969 President Richard Nixon articulated his 

Guam Doctrine, which emphasized U.S. allies’ primary 

responsibility for their own defense. Debate emerged in 

Tokyo regarding how to respond to these developments. 39 

Threat-based planning demanded that Japan build up its 

own forces in response to Soviet moves, and the Guam 

Doctrine offered a political opportunity to move toward 

“independent defense” (jishu boei), when what had been 

pursued before was “necessary defense capability” (shoyo 

boeiryoku). This was precisely the direction advocated by 

the new JDA director, Nakasone Yasuhiro, in 1970 and the 

proposed fourth defense plan that featured large budget 

increases and an emphasis on independent defense capability. 

But the plan came under fierce attack in the Diet, it 

was widely opposed by the public, and it was quickly withdrawn. 

This situation forced the government to adopt a 

different approach to defense planning, one that solidified 


the concept of minimal or basic defense and turned away 

from a threat-based force structure. 

A bellwether document that early on reflected this new 

direction toward basic defense was penned by the director 

of the Defense Bureau at the time, Kubo Takuya, and despite 

opposition within the JDA and SDF, the reasoning expressed 

in that memo eventually became a kind of touchstone 

for postwar defense planning. The so-called KB thesis 

rationalized a small defense establishment and close alliance 

with the United States. 40 “There is no probable threat 

[to Japan],” he wrote, “though there is a possible threat… 

thus, Japan will not aim to build up its defense capability 

enough to address currently forecast future threats. Instead, 

Japan will consider a basic standing defense to be 

the goal of the defense program.” 

Because there was no “probable threat,” defense spending 

would be limited (to about 1 percent of GDP). He argued 

that insufficient human resources, land area, and 

budget made it unrealistic for Japan to maintain a maximum 

defense, and it would be too expensive to upgrade 

and modernize over time (Kubo 1971). In this calculation, 

because Japan was an island nation (unlike those in Europe), 

ground forces were not the main factor for calculating 

two countries’ power balance, and so Japan could 

focus on naval forces and air power, which were not critically 

inferior to the Soviet Union’s, especially not when 

U.S. forces were included in the calculation (Ogawa 1989; 

Umemoto 2000). 

Critics derided Kubo’s “beyond-the-threat theory” or 

“escape-from-the-threat theory,” since, in the words of one 

former JDA official, “The idea of threat opposition was like 

the ABC’s of defense preparation. There was 

a lot of criticism saying that if Japan lost its 

footing with regard to this fundamental component, 

the future of its defense capability 

would be in jeopardy” (Maruyama 1996). But 

JDA officials had no real answers for the kinds 

of potential threats the country faced, particularly 

in response to nuclear weapons. Another 

former JDA official recalled, “Not long after 

Nakasone arrived, he asked us to work out 

the defense capability estimates for both a nuclear weaponequipped 

force and a conventional force.” In other words, 

what kind of conventional military deterrent would be 

necessary to counter the Soviet Union on its own, if Japan 

39 The Guam Doctrine 

also promised to “provide 

a shield if a nuclear power 

threatens the freedom 

of a nation allied with us.” 

40 Kubo wrote the memo, 

“A Framework to Consider 

the Arrangement 

of Japan’s Defense Capabilities,” 

in 1971. Kubo 

often marked his memos 

with “KB” at the top. 


29


decided to have such a force “I was told that we were doing 

this ‘to determine how much merit should be placed 

on nuclear weapons’…we tried to figure it out, but eventually 

we had to come back with the answer that we just 

didn’t know” (Hoshuyama 1996). 

Kubo assumed that Japan did not intend to develop 

nuclear weapons for national prestige purposes, and he 

believed that nuclear weapons had no military utility for 

Japan. Japan was too dense and too small, he thought, and 

Japan would always lose more than it gained in a nuclear 

exchange. No one would believe that Japan would actually 

use its nuclear weapons, and that reality, he argued, 

completely undermined their potential deterrent effect. 

“There is no choice but to rely on the U.S. extended deterrence,” 

he concluded, and so Japan should focus on maintaining 

the trustworthy and friendly bilateral relationship, 

make the existence of Japan very attractive to the West 

and the East, and strengthen bilateral military cooperation 

(Kubo 1971). Interestingly, he also suggested that Japan 

“establish a structure to develop considerable nuclear 

armament capability at any time…[so] the United States 

will get worried about unstable international relations 

due to nuclear proliferation and will desire to maintain 

the U.S.-Japan security regime including extended deterrence” 

(Kubo 1971). 

The mainstream idea among Japanese military analysts 

at that time was the so-called rational deterrence 

theory. This theory basically assumes that, if the possibility 

of retaliation is even as low as 1 percent, the challenger’s 

military action will still be deterred by the unimaginably 

high destructive power of nuclear forces. As Kubo and 

others argued, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella 

was primarily a psychological matter for Japan. The only 

thing Japan could and should do was to trust the United 

States, as long as the United States publicly promised to 

defend Japan (Kubo 1971). One MOFA official explained it 

this way, “When it comes to the nuclear umbrella, it is like 

a talisman from the United States. Japan is not sure how it 

works, but they put their faith in it and believe it will protect 

them” (interview 2007f). 

Extended deterrence is more than just a psychological 

matter for Japan, however, as defense analysts and academics 

argued in the secret (government-sponsored) 1968-70 

report on nuclear weapons. What was most important, the 

report explained, was the thinking of both sets of policy 

makers involved in a potential conflict (the United States 

as the “deterrer” and, for example, China as the “deterree”). 

In this sense, it did not really matter what Japan thought, 

and the 1968-70 report concluded that Japan could do little 

but rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, regardless of its 

credibility in Japan’s eyes (Kase 2001). This viewpoint helps 

to explain Japan’s sensitivity to the closeness of U.S.-China 

relations or increased U.S. vulnerability to Chinese strategic 

nuclear forces. Either development would tend to increase 

Beijing’s confidence that the United States might not 

retaliate severely against it on behalf of Japan. 

As the Cold War wound down, theoretical and strategic 

analyses of extended deterrence appeared more frequently 

in Japan’s academic community. Some began to 

question certain assumptions regarding deterrence and 

the alliance, though scholars did not necessarily agree on 

the source of their doubt. Ogawa, for example, believed 

that the credibility of extended deterrence depended on 

ethnical, cultural, and historical ties between the deterrence 

provider and the receiver, and that the strategic importance 

of the country being protected does not necessarily 

affect deterrence credibility. As a result, he reasoned, 

America’s strong historical and cultural ties with many European 

countries meant that the nuclear umbrella over 

NATO was sturdier than the one that covered Japan (Ogawa 

1989). 

Others, like Noguchi, argued that a country risks its 

own security to protect others only when its national interest 

is jeopardized, and so the idea of shared interests 

and codependence is crucial. Self-interest and materialistic 

factors are more important than a psychological sense 

of cultural or historical connection. Noguchi worried that 

in a uni-polar world, Washington might not value its alliances 

as strongly as before, which in turn could weaken 

the credibility of extended deterrence (Noguchi 2005). For 

several years after the Cold War, however, this academic 

debate remained just that…academic, since the preponderance 

of American power meant that few in Japan believed 

there was anything that could seriously threaten 

the alliance (or, to put it more accurately, that any country 

could threaten the United States). As before, the nuts and 

bolts regarding how deterrence in the alliance functioned 

was simply not a pressing issue for defense planners. 

Just about the only exception to this phenomenon of 

near indifference to deterrence has been the development 

30 



and modernization of MRBMs and ICBMs by China and 

North Korea, and this helps explain Japan’s significant 

commitment to deploying missile defenses. During the 

Cold War, Japan considered the U.S. nuclear umbrella to 

be “existential deterrence,” because the prime focus of deterrence 

was large-scale aggression of the Soviet Union. 

Some Japanese scholars now argue, however, that the major 

threat has become regional contingencies, coercive diplomacy, 

or asymmetric threats. As a result, Japan should 

start assessing the pros and cons of other types of deterrence, 

including deterrence by denial such as MD, indigenous 

deterrence such as pre-emptive strike capability, and 

possible nuclear armament (Jimbo 2003). 

Bolstering the MD component of deterrence is an attractive 

step for Japan, and after North Korea’s 1998 Taepo 

Dong missile launch over Japanese airspace it became 

easier to support this move politically. Public support increased 

in 2003, following North Korea’s expulsion of international 

nuclear inspectors and its reprocessing of 

plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Missile defense fit 

with Japan’s non-offensive military stance and its focus on 

denial deterrence, and it also served to strengthen the alliance 

with the United States, since joint development was 

such a high priority for Washington. 

Co-development and co-deployment has by no means 

been cost-free for Tokyo, however, and not just in a financial 

context. Since Japan agreed in December 2003 to collaborate 

on putting a new MD system in place, the government 

has spent an annual average of ¥1.3 trillion on 

the program, which has reduced the amount of money 

available for other defense budget categories by a similar 

degree. In addition, Japan invited diplomatic criticism 

from China and Russia that MD could be a destabilizing 

force in the region that the two said would only lead them 

to develop more and better missiles. If this proved true, 

then Japan’s support for MD would have the opposite intended 

effect by forcing China, in particular, to move beyond 

its minimum nuclear deterrence strategy and build 

up its missile forces. Some Japanese scholars raised such 

concerns as early as 2000, but most still believed that MD 

strengthened Japan’s deterrence position overall, as long 

as the system worked as advertised (Umemoto 2000). 

Moreover, MD opened up a few problems within the 

alliance on the question of whether or not Japan’s system 

could be used to shoot down an enemy’s ICBM that was 

headed toward U.S. territory (and thus, in theory, violate 

Japan’s prohibition of collective self-defense). Despite being 

an unlikely scenario, it highlighted the unequal nature 

of the alliance in that the United States has pledged to defend 

Japan, but the favor is not explicitly returned. Yet, as 

an example of some of the new creative thinking going on 

in Japan about defense and deterrence issues, some have 

argued that any threats to U.S. military assets in Hawaii, 

Guam, or Alaska could also be interpreted as a threats 

to Japan as well, since those assets are critical to the “defense 

of Japan” and could be considered as such (Kawakami 

2007). Ultimately, U.S. officials are confident that Japan 

will “do the right thing” in an emergency, because it 

is hard to imagine how alliance trust could be recovered if 

Japan failed to do what it could to protect U.S. forces. 

Many Japanese scholars are quick to note that MD 

plays only a supplemental role in the context of the alliance’s 

overall deterrence posture, and they emphasize 

that in the case of China, the allies’ superiority in conventional 

forces is more important than MD (Umemoto 2000, 

Kawakami 2007). This comes in part from the dilemma 

of extended deterrence, as one Japanese scholar explains, 

such that deterrence providers seek to limit a conflict to 

the region they are protecting, in order to avoid an all-out 

war that might entangle their homeland (Nakanishi 1990). 

The United States, therefore, will do everything it can to 

prevent the escalation and/or expansion of an East Asian 

regional conflict, and if it cannot do this through overwhelming 

conventional superiority, then it could default 

to a policy akin to appeasement (because it would want 

to avoid resorting to nuclear weapons). As a former MOFA 

diplomat explained, “the conventional superiority advantage 

is critical, because it obviates the whole debate about 

whether or not Washington would ‘sacrifice Los Angeles 

to save Tokyo’ in a nuclear exchange” (interview 2007i). So, 

even though nuclear weapons are a major psychological 

component of extended deterrence (and the most talked 

about), Japan is increasingly focused on the conventional 

aspects. 

This is essentially a Japanese version of the old European 

fear of “decoupling” during the Cold War, when some 

worried that the United States might detach itself from 

its strategic commitment to Western Europe in the face 

of a strengthening Soviet Union. Decoupling fears waxed 

and waned throughout the Cold War, depending on the 


31


intensity of the security situation. Now, some in Japan are 

concerned about the implications of current trends in East 

Asia, suggesting, “If the U.S.-China military balance in East 

Asia reaches parity, then the credibility of the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella will be gravely shaken” (Nakanishi 2006). Following 

this line of thinking, China’s nuclear force modernization 

program should exacerbate the decoupling problem 

for Japan. 

According to Nakanishi, this is what happened to the 

41 South Korean attitudes 

to this question of 

“no first use” would obviously 

have to be taken into 

consideration, and policy 

makers would want to 

be sure that such a pledge 

did nothing to undermine 

deterrence on the Korean 

peninsula, but this all 

demonstrates that there 

are some important nuclear 

policy questions that 

could benefit from bilateral 

and trilateral discussion. 

United States and Europe after the “Sputnik 

crisis,” when Washington pushed its allies in 

Europe to step up investments in conventional 

forces (to match Soviet gains), while many 

European capitals believed that U.S. nuclear 

forces could play the deterrent role more economically. 

The two sides struggled to find an 

acceptable balance between them, resulting 

in NATO’s “flexible response” strategy in 1967, 

whereby NATO would not rule out the use of 

nuclear weapons to repel a conventional attack 

(Nakanishi 1990). 

This line of thinking leads Nakanishi to recommend 

that Japan should be aware of a possible “priority gap” 

with the United States in a limited war, and be prepared 

for regional conflict in East Asia by strengthening naval 

and air forces, including the option of procuring the F-22 

fighter aircraft from the United States. He also suggests 

that “Japan should revise the principle of non-introduction 

of nuclear weapons,” and “like the Pershing II in Europe, 

Japan should consider deploying U.S. tactical nukes 

that are dedicated exclusively to the defense of Japan” and 

jointly operated (Nakanishi 2006). A few other scholars 

in Japan have reached similar conclusions for similar reasons, 

though there is no sign that the government agrees 

at this point (see, for example, Nishioka 2006). 

Some Japanese scholars differentiate between how deterrence 

works vis-à-vis wars of opportunity versus wars 

of vulnerability (Tsuchiyama 2004). They argue that deterrence 

does not work well to thwart a war of vulnerability, 

when an aggressor feels compelled to take military action 

in order to survive. A few Japanese government officials 

have also voiced their fear that a collapsing North Korean 

state would be most likely to fire missiles in anger or desperation 

at Japan, rather than at South Korea or the United 

States, and this situation must either be prevented or 

deterred (interview 2008a). 

As a result, these Japanese scholars suggest that to address 

potential wars of vulnerability, certain conciliatory 

gestures might be useful, and a declaratory policy of nofirst-use 

of nuclear weapons by the United States against 

North Korea could be considered, in addition to pledges 

to respect North Korea’s sovereignty. The main opposition 

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) promoted this general idea 

more broadly in its party manifesto in 2000. The DPJ suggested 

that Japan and the United States conclude an agreement 

for the “non-preemptive use” of nuclear forces, and 

work to establish a nuclear-free zone in East Asia in the future 

(Kurosaki 2006). 41 But others point out that this should 

only be considered in tandem with other joint deterrence 

policies that also reassure Japan, such as more detailed scenario-based 

planning with regard to possible North Korean 

contingencies, both bilaterally and trilaterally with South 

Korea. One could also consider a declaratory policy that 

cuts both ways, pledging no first use vis-à-vis North Korea, 

but also promising utter annihilation if North Korea first 

uses WMDs against Japan or South Korea. 

Despite arguments in Japan on the far ends of the nuclear 

deterrent spectrum (those arguing for greater Japanese 

nuclear autonomy versus those trying to take nuclear 

weapons out of the security equation), the mainstream 

view has been continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent 

as an indispensable component of Japanese defense 

policy. This is evident in the so-called Araki report, 

which was delivered to the prime minister in 2004 and 

clearly stated that the U.S. extended deterrence is still necessary 

for countering the threat of WMD including nuclear 

weapons (Council on Security and Defense Capabilities 

2004). The 2004 NDPG reiterated that Japan will rely 

on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to protect Japan against the 

threat of nuclear weapons (Defense Agency of Japan 2006, 

428), and in 2007 the allies reaffirmed that the “full range 

of U.S. military capabilities – both nuclear and non-nuclear 

strike forces and defensive capabilities – form the 

core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments 

to the defense of Japan (Security Consultative Committee 

2007). The key question is how long alliance managers 

can expect this theme of deterrence continuity to 

carry on without adjustment, and what (if anything) they 

32 



should be doing to influence the future shape of extended 

deterrence. 

Reviewing the past, Japan has always understood how 

important the non-proliferation objective was to Washington 

when it decided to “extend” deterrence and provide 

the nuclear umbrella to countries such as Japan and 

South Korea. Reflecting on his 1965 meeting with Prime 

Minister Sato, Robert McNamara explained that Washington 

was concerned at the time about Tokyo’s response to 

China’s nuclear test and worried that failure to reassure Japan 

would trigger further proliferation in the region (Asahi 

Shimbun 2008). Some of Japan’s neighbors also worry that 

deep down Japan harbors aspirations to become a nuclear 

power. Most Japanese do not believe so, but many policy 

makers understand that “this doubt in neighbors’ minds 

can be useful, as a way to convince China and South Korea 

to put some pressure on North Korea in order to forestall 

Japanese militarization” (interview 2007j). The KB thesis 

made the same point. 

As a result, Japanese policy makers occasionally remind 

their U.S. and regional counterparts (privately and publicly) 

about the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and 

Japan’s own capabilities to go nuclear if absolutely necessary. 

Sato did it in 1965, opposition leader Ozawa Ichiro 

raised the issue in Beijing in 2002, Foreign Minister Aso 

mentioned it after North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, among 

countless other examples. One could also speculate that 

the December 2008 declassification of the Sato-McNamara 

notes itself was another subtle reminder. At the same time, 

Japan has slowly but steadily upgraded the substance of its 

alliance contributions, taking on a wider range of support 

missions, participating in international peacekeeping activities, 

and moving forward with MD development and deployment. 

This basic Japanese formula for bolstering deterrence 

(a combination of quasi-blackmail and small but 

steady investments in the alliance) has been sufficient to 

date, but many in Japan are clearly thinking about what 

will be the best strategy going forward. Besides, none of 

this really addresses the deterrence challenges of today, 

such as North Korean missile launches or regional maritime 

skirmishes. 

For the future, recommendations in Japan for strengthening 

deterrence generally fall within four basic categories: 

1) those who advocate greater security independence 

from the United States (Group Ichigaya 2007); 2) those who 

support the alliance but seek to hedge actively against the 

potential for U.S. abandonment (hedging for substance) 

(Ito 2007; Maehara 2007); 3) those who support hedging, 

but primarily as a means to deter abandonment (hedging 

for show) (Kitaoka 2006; Ebata 2007, 98-103); and 4) those 

who seek greater military cooperation with 42 Interestingly, there 

is no single Japanese language 

equivalent for the word 

the United States as a way to deter abandonment 

(the indispensable ally argument) (Teshima 

2006; Ishiba 2007). 42 

alysts and scholars often use 

“hedge.” Japanese defense an- 

the English word when conveying 

this strategy in a secu- 

Under Prime Minister Koizumi especially, 

the fourth group held sway, but there rity context. More generically, 

hoken o kakeru ( 

have been a few security policy choices that 

保険をかけ 

る) is one neutral option (be 

also drift into the second and third categories 

(such as MD, development of Hyuga- 

another phrase with a slight- 

insured, take insurance), and 

ly negative (or sly) connotation 

is futamata o kakeru ( 二 

class-helicopter-carrying destroyers, and 

the launching of intelligence satellites). The またをかける) (have it 

both ways, sit on the fence, a 

DPJ, which stands a good chance to increase 

foot on each side, which can 

its political power in the years to come, generally 

supports the alliance, albeit with a the same time, for example). 

also refer to dating two girls at 

slightly more independent streak compared to the LDP 

due to conflicting political ideologies. One could even argue 

that DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro’s emphasis on UN authorization 

to legitimize Japanese military involvement is 

closest to the first group of independence advocates, but 

the truth is that the DPJ is fractured when it comes to attitudes 

toward the alliance. Political instability in Japan 

has made it difficult for either party or recent administrations 

to articulate a long-term security strategy beyond 

supporting the alliance or hedging for show, but U.S. policy 

makers should be prepared for more substantive hedging 

by Japan in the future, based on current trends. 

In this environment, Washington should continue to 

demonstrate its strong commitment to bilateral security 

relations while encouraging greater Japanese contributions 

to both the alliance and to regional and international 

security initiatives. If Japan begins to hedge more 

for substance rather than for show, this should not be a 

problem as long as Japan is developing capabilities that 

can contribute to alliance missions and/or strengthen deterrence. 

Keeping these capabilities in an alliance framework 

would bring added value to the bilateral partnership 

and should not be destabilizing to the region. The least desirable 

outcomes from a U.S. perspective would be a Japanese 

military and security policy that splits away from 

the alliance, or a failure by Japan to make any meaningful 


33


investments in the alliance beyond token gestures. Both 

would ultimately serve to weaken deterrence vis-à-vis potential 

adversaries. 

As one senior MOFA official put it, “no rash decisions 

by Japan or the United States are necessary at this point. 

To mitigate uncertainty and bolster deterrence, the first 

steps are verbal assurances from Washington and MD deployment…then 

up the ladder we go, to B-52s in Guam, 

perhaps an F-22 sale, U.S. sub patrols in the region, a Japanese 

pre-emptive strike capability, and collective self-defense. 

All of this would happen before Japan considered 

going nuclear itself,” he asserts (interview 2007c). Other 

analysts echo this view. “Most of Japan’s policy makers favor 

a steady ladder for strengthening deterrence, beginning 

with more investment in the alliance, then MD and 

deterrence by denial, followed by deterrence by punishment, 

indigenous conventional strengthening, and finally 

indigenous nuclear” (interview 2007h). We are still on the 

lower rungs of this ladder. 

When pondering a deteriorating security environment, 

the Japanese reflex is still to think in terms of the alliance. 

One scholar remarked, “The credibility of U.S. extended 

deterrence could deteriorate if North Korea has reliable 

ICBMs that can strike the United States…and so Japan 

and the United States should take steps as an alliance to 

upgrade the national missile defense in Alaska and later 

consider cooperation for air strikes against the DPRK’s 

missile bases” (interview 2007k). Working together to improve 

a U.S. national MD system would be a novel way to 

demonstrate alliance solidarity and boost the psychological 

side of deterrence, as well as the logistical component. 

This kind of creative and proactive thinking is not necessarily 

widespread in Tokyo at the moment, but it can be 

cultivated in the years ahead. 

Considering the high stakes for such a small and densely 

populated country as Japan (as described in chapter 1), 

partnering with the United States on security matters is 

still the most cost-effective approach from Tokyo’s perspective. 

For the United States as well, the overall benefits 

of an alliance with Japan continue to outweigh the costs of 

maintaining it. On the margins, however, it is understandable 

that both nations recalibrate their cost-benefit analyses 

as circumstances change. If the alliance is going to cost 

Japan increasingly more politically and financially, then it 

is natural if some Japanese policy makers think that those 

investments should also be directed toward development 

of a stronger indigenous defense capability. The important 

point is that this should be done in close collaboration 

with the United States. Japan might also want greater decision-making 

power within the alliance, which should be 

acceptable if it is taking on more risk. 

Ultimately, what Japan thinks and the policy choices it 

makes are largely beyond Washington’s control, but there 

are ways that U.S. policy makers can try to influence Japanese 

decision making and steer toward a mutually beneficial 

outcome. One key area, of course, will be how the 

United States conducts its own policy debates regarding 

extended deterrence strategies and the country’s nuclear 

force posture. U.S. officials should keep in mind the signals 

they are sending through these discussions. This consideration 

poses challenges for U.S. diplomats and defense 

planners because Japan is not their only consideration as 

they approach these issues, but it also creates opportunities 

to involve their Japanese counterparts at critical stages 

throughout this process. 

New deterrence approaches 

in the United States 

As mentioned above, deterrence theory and doctrine have 

become muddled in the United States in recent years, as 

the targets and tools of deterrence are more varied and less 

clear cut than before. During the Cold War, policy makers 

in Washington had one main adversary to consider, and a 

primary means of deterrence were nuclear weapons. As Edward 

Ifft described, “Certain principles went along with the 

theory of deterrence and came to acquire an almost theological 

significance in the strategic arms negotiations” (Ifft 

2007). These included the principle that stability required 

each side to be able to absorb a surprise first strike and still 

inflict unacceptable damage in return. Strategic offensive 

forces had to be survivable, which led to hardened missile 

silos, diversified means of delivery, and large numbers of 

nuclear weapons. As a result, global nuclear stockpiles kept 

growing from the 1950s and peaked in the 1980s at nearly 

sixty-five thousand warheads, with about 98 percent of 

them in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union 

(Grotto and Cirincione 2008). At the end of 2008, the global 

stockpile is less than one-third that number. 

Deterrence also rested strongly on the concept of credibility. 

It was not enough to simply have the ability to survive 

a first strike and devastate your opponent, but U.S. 

34 



leaders had to convince their opponents that Moscow 

would risk incalculable damage to the nation if the Soviets 

placed missiles in Cuba, for example, or infringed upon 

the sovereignty of a U.S. ally overseas. Policy makers also 

had to consider what would happen if deterrence failed, 

and so together this placed a premium on being prepared 

to fight. Readiness and warfighting ability required constant 

attention and monitoring of developments by the 

other side. Ifft explains this “continuing tension between 

deterrence and war fighting. Preparation for damage limitation 

and war fighting could be portrayed as either enhancing 

or undermining deterrence, and both arguments 

played prominently in debates about changes to both 

hardware and doctrine” (Ifft 2007). Both capability and 

credibility were required for a strong deterrence posture, 

but credibility was difficult to measure and its boundaries 

were fuzzy. Demonstrating a willingness to use force 

often led to the actual use of force by both sides in various 

regional conflicts, as well as to financial and materiel support 

for opposing groups throughout the world. 

By 1972, with the signing of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) treaty, the “balance of terror” or “assured vulnerability” 

approach to deterrence was firmly entrenched between 

the two superpowers. The ABM treaty limited defenses 

against ballistic missiles to very low levels for the 

purpose of leaving “unchallenged the penetration capability 

of the other’s retaliatory missile forces” (ABM Treaty 

1972). One major goal was to “curb the race in strategic 

offensive arms,” though the fact that the Soviet nuclear 

stockpile roughly doubled in the next decade demonstrated 

the limits of that idea. By then, the Regan administration 

had begun challenging the policy that eschewed 

missile defenses, which led to ballistic missile defense research 

under the Strategic Defense Initiative and eventually 

to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the treaty in 

2001. President Bush had concluded that “the ABM treaty 

hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect 

our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile 

attacks” (White House 2001). 

Terrorist networks and rogue states (notably North 

Korea, Iran, and Iraq at the time) were becoming higherlevel 

deterrence targets because of their unpredictability 

and their apparent commitment to develop asymmetric 

WMD capabilities that could threaten the United States 

or its allies under certain circumstances. Missile defense 

was useful in two ways, since policy makers hoped that it 

would have a deterrent effect on the one hand, and it offered 

an element of insurance if deterrence failed on the 

other. U.S. officials explained to their Russian and Chinese 

counterparts that MD was not targeted at them, and that 

the MD architecture would only be effective against smaller 

missile arsenals. Moscow and Beijing are not so sure. 

Though Washington talks about how deterrence can be 

tailored, the fact is that even though one deterrence tool 

might be meant for a specific target, it can always be reconfigured 

for someone else. As MD technology matures 

and becomes more portable, it will increasingly concern 

Russian and Chinese defense planners, and it will cause 

them to recommend countervailing investments. 

The demise of the ABM treaty was not the only outcome 

of the Cold War’s end and the September 11 terrorist 

attacks. Other nuclear policy and deterrence questions 

are being raised again, such as whether or not a “no first 

use” policy should be adopted by the United States, given 

America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority 

these days. A strong argument against such a policy 

in the past stemmed from the Warsaw Pact nations’ conventional 

strength vis-à-vis NATO and the ultimate conclusion 

that deterrence would benefit from a “flexible 

response” policy by NATO during the Cold War era. The 

Soviets would be less likely to attack the West conventionally, 

U.S. policy makers believed, if there was a chance that 

NATO would respond with nuclear weapons against the 

attacking forces. 

Although this line of thinking seems less appropriate 

today, it is still relevant given the wide range of security 

commitments that the United States continues to offer 

around the world. U.S. forces cannot be in too many 

places at once, and adversaries are unlikely to wait their 

turn to be “dealt with” by conventional means if the U.S. 

military is engaged on another front. For example, we do 

not know if the underlying threat of U.S. nuclear weapons 

is the reason why Kim Jong-il has not taken advantage 

of America’s preoccupation in Iraq and Afghanistan 

since 2003 to send his million-man army into South Korea 

(probably not), but are the benefits of a no-first-use policy 

so valuable as to risk finding out That said, how likely is 

the United States to use Cold War-era nuclear weapons 

designed to destroy major Soviet cities against an invading 

DPRK army that may or may not have even enough 


35


fuel to support a month’s worth of operations Would the 

ROK government even want to be responsible for administering 

and absorbing the North after it had been devastated 

by nuclear bombs Would the U.S. response be any different 

if North Korea attacked Japanese interests in some 

way (with or without WMD) The answers to these questions 

have important implications for the future of extended 

deterrence in the region. 

Besides the issues of no first use and related declaratory 

options regarding U.S. nuclear doctrine, there are also a 

number of other relevant nuclear questions to reconsider 

in the context of defense planning and their presumed impact 

on extended deterrence. These include what should 

be targeted (such as military targets, industrial capacity, 

leadership “decapitation,” or large population centers), 

how to match the yield of the weapon or the delivery method 

to fit the task, how many weapons (of what kind) are 

enough, and what is the proper level of signaling to demonstrate 

credibility without frightening the opponent into 

reckless decision making. Addressing these questions is 

complicated by the multiplicity of scenarios that defense 

planners can dream up to guide their evaluation processes, 

because what might be ideal for a North Korean case 

(in terms of weapon design, targeting, and signaling), is 

not appropriate for Iran, or China, or Russia. 

What U.S. defense planners have discovered, however, 

is that when modern-day security problems are pushed 

to the higher reaches of a conflict escalation ladder, the 

nuclear arsenal that U.S. policy makers inherited from 

the Cold War looks increasingly inappropriate and useless 

beyond deterring a large-scale nuclear attack against 

the United States or a close ally. As former Deputy Secretary 

of Defense John Hamre observed, “The Cold War left 

us with a massive inventory of [nuclear] weapons we no 

longer need…[and] a shrinking community of nuclear experts 

hold on to a massive and aging inventory as a security 

blanket for a future they cannot define” (Hamre 2005). 

Over time, America’s nuclear capabilities have atrophied. 

The United States has not developed a new warhead 

in over twenty years, and it has not tested a weapon 

since 1992. The U.S. Defense and Energy departments 

clearly stated in 2008 that “at present the United States 

does not have the ability to produce new nuclear weapons,” 

and that it “is now the only nuclear weapons state 

party to the NPT that does not have the ability to produce 

a new nuclear warhead” (emphasis in the original, U.S. Department 

of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense 2008). 

The same report notes that experienced designers and engineers 

are retiring, and that “in the absence of a viable 

nuclear infrastructure, their expertise cannot be replaced.” 

This also helps to explain why oversight and strategic planning 

for the nation’s nuclear deterrent is not a particularly 

popular career path within the U.S. military, and why the 

military has suffered high-profile mishaps in recent years 

such as the mistaken shipment of nuclear missile nose 

cones to Taiwan in 2006 and the air force’s losing track of 

six nuclear warheads for a day-and-a-half in 2007. 

For people who believe that the United States should 

deemphasize the defense role for nuclear weapons, such 

declining capacity in this area does not pose a significant 

problem. Dennis Gormley argues, for example, that “deterrence 

through conventional weapons is decisively more 

credible than it is through any existing or prospective nuclear 

alternatives…[and] America must reformulate its 

position on nuclear weapons into one that severely diminishes 

their salience” (Gormley 2006). Senior Senator 

Dianne Feinstein put it more bluntly, urging Americans 

to “recognize nuclear weapons for what they are – not 

a deterrent, but a grave and gathering threat to humanity” 

(Feinstein 2009). Even a top Japanese defense planner 

(and military officer) suggested that we already “live in a 

virtual non-nuclear world” thanks to the major powers. 

“[Nuclear weapons] have not been used for over sixty years,” 

he observed, “and if we can continue this way for forty or 

so more years, then it might be a truly non-nuclear world” 

(interview 2007a). 

For others, however, this policy and capacity drift in the 

nuclear weapons arena is a cause for concern. It might be 

true that these weapons address only a narrow and largely 

abstract security problem, but as a few have noted, they 

do cast a long shadow (Alagappa 2008). For some it is a 

budget shadow, and they point out that the United States 

still spends about $30 billion a year to maintain this aging 

nuclear stockpile, so surely there must be a way to discard 

old weapons and reduce this burden. Others fear that 

nuclear weakness could lead nations to miscalculate, and 

they worry that opponents could be emboldened or our 

allies will take matters into their own hands if the United 

States does not retain a reliable nuclear deterrent. 

36 



Although the Bush administration sought to deemphasize 

the role of nuclear weapons in sustaining deterrence, 

no one in the U.S. government proposed eliminating 

the U.S. arsenal as long as other countries possess them. 

Washington still sees nuclear forces as necessary to deter 

nuclear or other WMD attacks, major conventional attacks, 

and to hold at risk certain key enemy targets that 

cannot be threatened effectively by non-nuclear weapons 

(U.S. Department of Energy and U. S. Department of Defense 

2008). So, if the United States is going to keep nuclear 

weapons, what kind of deterrent should it have As 

mentioned above, the 2001 NPR proposed a new deterrence 

planning framework consisting of 1) strike forces 

(nuclear and conventional), 2) defenses (active and passive), 

and 3) a responsive infrastructure capable of adapting 

quickly to a changing security setting. 

The first point (strike forces) is not particularly revolutionary, 

although some critics argue that by lumping 

nuclear and conventional weapons together (rather than 

treating nukes separately), Washington is creating the 

impression that it might be quicker to consider a nuclear 

option. The truth is that the United States has always 

relied on both types of weapons to bolster deterrence at 

home and abroad, and military commanders can hardly 

be blamed for wanting as wide a range of options as possible 

to offer to civilian leaders when dealing with various 

contingencies. This concept also fits neatly with the goal 

of being able to tailor deterrence. 

What is new and somewhat controversial is the idea 

of developing a conventional “prompt global strike” (PGS) 

capability that could destroy a terrorist hideout or an enemy 

missile launch pad anywhere in the world within 

an hour or two. Possible approaches to delivery systems 

range from converting a number of Trident SLBMs to carry 

conventional warheads, retrofitting certain ICBMs, or 

developing a new so-called hypersonic technology vehicle 

that would launch into lower space and place a bomb 

thousands of miles away (Manzo 2008). The U.S. government 

has not decided whether or not to deploy a PGS 

capability. 

Pertinent to the U.S.-Japan alliance, there has been little 

to no bilateral dialogue about how PGS might relate to 

the alliance in terms of deterrence targets, whether or not 

U.S. assets based in or near Japan might be involved, what 

impact PGS might have on U.S. arms control negotiations 

with Russia, and whether or not a conventional weapon 

could be mistaken for a nuclear launch by a nuclear power, 

possibly sparking an inadvertent nuclear exchange. In 

fact, some U.S. global strike plans are reported to include 

a nuclear option if deeply buried and hardened key targets 

are involved, for example in North Korea or Iran (Arkin 

2005). If true, this might validate the critics’ fears that 

Washington is seeking to expand the circumstances under 

which nuclear weapons might be used. Of course, others 

could counter that this is precisely what would strengthen 

deterrence, because all of these different options would 

be available and viable, and thus conflict is more likely to 

be averted in the first place. This is an age-old conundrum 

of deterrence, where “threat’ and “deterrent” are two sides 

of the same coin, and they often form the crux of a security 

dilemma. 

The defense side of the new deterrence framework (particularly 

MD) also makes a good deal of sense at first glance, 

but it can create problems similar to PGS or other means 

of tailoring deterrence, primarily because potential opponents 

cannot (or will not) distinguish between measures 

meant to deter them or someone else. Missile defense 

systems might be intended to deter and defend against 

North Korea and Iran, but any effective system could possibly 

be used to defend Taiwan from China, or NATO installations 

from Russian missiles (if not now, 

then perhaps sometime in the future). This 

could prompt China, for example, to develop 

a missile strike force larger than it otherwise 

would, further exacerbating Japan’s and 

Taiwan’s feelings of vulnerability. 43 The issue 

also comes up during arms control negotiations 

between the United States and Russia, 

as Washington would prefer to reduce nuclear warheads 

but allow each country to keep its strategic delivery vehicles 

(to allow for PGS options against terrorists or rogue 

states, for example), while Moscow is worried about the potential 

reversibility of such an arrangement and the problem 

of distinguishing between nuclear and conventional 

launches. From both an arms control and a national security 

perspective, therefore, Japan has an interest in how the 

PGS and MD debates unfold in Washington. 

The vaguely written third point in the deterrence framework, 

about responsive infrastructure, was conceived 

early in 2001 at a time when new Bush administration 

43 In fact, a high-ranking 

Japanese diplomat and candidate 

to head the IAEA in 

2009 noted this concern in a 

2002 article, and he put the 

onus on the United States to 

demonstrate to China and 

Russia that MD is only targeted 

at certain states of 

concern (Amano 2002). 


37


officials were concerned about declining defense spending 

and a slow, politicized process of military innovation 

in the wake of the Cold War, so they intended this to be 

a broad goal of stepping up defense-related industrial investments 

and streamlining the way that the military establishment 

procures and deploys new technologies. The 

point seems slightly less relevant in an era of nearly $700 

billion defense budgets, but it remains particularly germane 

when talking about nuclear weapons. In fact, part of 

the U.S. rationale for retaining large numbers of warheads 

in reserve is to compensate for the lack of confidence in 

the current infrastructure as a hedge against technical 

problems or adverse geopolitical changes (U.S. Department 

of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense 2008). Although 

scientists and policy makers argue about just how 

dire the situation is with the nation’s nuclear infrastructure, 

most would agree that while the warheads are sufficiently 

reliable for the near future, investments in the supporting 

infrastructure are needed quite soon for a variety 

of reasons. 44 The question is, what kind of supporting infrastructure 

and designed toward 

what end 

This is where U.S. policy 

makers often get stuck in a 

series of circular arguments 

from which they find it hard 

to break out and make a clear 

decision. Policy makers and 

strategists on different sides 

of the debate cannot agree on 

the relative importance of nuclear 

weapons to U.S. and allies’ 

security, and so they cannot 

decide how many or what 

kinds of weapons are needed. 

Underlying this, there appears 

to be a fundamental disagreement 

over what constitutes 

deterrence credibility, with 

some emphasizing the visibility and viability of the nuclear 

component, while others are content to push that 

much further into the background. 45 There is also disagreement 

regarding the need for three types of delivery systems 

(air-, sea-, and land-based), as some believe that the nuclear 

44 For example, currently the United States 

has a small plutonium pit production capacity 

of about ten pits per year, which are 

needed to replace pits in the stockpile that 

have been tested as part of the Stockpile 

Stewardship Program (or are at the end of 

the pit’s estimated minimum “lifetime”). 

Even if the total U.S. stockpile is reduced to 

about twenty-five hundred warheads in future 

years, a pit production rate of about fifty 

pits per year would be required to keep 

up with the demands for replacement, based 

on a minimum pit life of eighty-five to one 

hundred years (U.S. Department of Energy 

and U.S. Department of Defense 2008). 

45 For example, see Secretary of Defense 

Task Force 2008 for an argument in support of 

the importance of the “credibility of our nuclear 

capabilities in the minds of those we 

seek to deter, dissuade, or assure.” For opposing 

views, see Grotto and Cirincione 

2008 or Strategic Posture Review Commission 

2008 on the potential value of deemphasizing 

the nuclear component of deterrence 

as a means to increase collective international 

action to combat proliferation. 

bomber fleet and/or ICBMs could be eliminated to improve 

efficiency and effectiveness (Joint Working Group 2008). 

Officials have made some progress on the numbers 

question, agreeing at least that the force sizing criteria 

are no longer based on Russian forces or military targeting 

requirements, and instead are based on the ability of 

the deployed force and the supporting infrastructure “to 

meet a spectrum of political and military goals” (U.S. Department 

of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense 2008). 

At least one of those key political goals is to maintain Japanese 

confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, such that 

Japan does not feel compelled to explore an indigenous 

nuclear option, so there is room for bilateral dialogue on 

this issue to help the United States strike the right balance. 

Most of those interviewed in Japan for this project, 

when this subject came up, expressed comfort with a U.S. 

strategic nuclear force down to about one thousand deployable 

weapons, but below that psychological threshold 

many saw cause for concern. 

It is also not clear whether or not replacement warheads 

are necessary (the RRW), and which scenario is 

more likely to require future testing (that is, old weapons 

to verify their reliability in old age, or replacement weapons 

to confirm functionality of minor new design changes). 

This debate connects to the decision on warhead numbers, 

since RRW supporters argue that managing an older nuclear 

stockpile requires more warheads to provide spare 

parts and compensate overall for declining confidence in 

performance. This means higher rates of pit production 

and other infrastructure investments, which might not be 

necessary if a smaller stockpile is adopted. RRW critics, 

however, would call such investments overkill. Some RRW 

supporters also try to link all of these arguments together 

to create an attractive package for congressional approval, 

by offering smaller warhead numbers and ratification 

of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 

exchange for developing the RRW. With this kind of horse 

trading going on, it is sometime hard to identify the key 

driving forces behind U.S. nuclear strategy development: is 

it 1) deterrence ideology, 2) political and diplomatic compromise, 

or 3) threat perceptions and contingency planning 

In truth, U.S. nuclear strategy is driven by a combination 

of all three factors. 

Regarding this final point of threat perceptions and contingency 

planning, important variables include the Iranian 

38 



and North Korean nuclear programs, the near-term trending 

of Russia’s and China’s nuclear forces, as well as choices 

by U.S. allies including the United Kingdom (UK) and 

France. In particular, China, which has traditionally followed 

a “minimum deterrence” approach, might begin 

blurring this definition if it moves toward a stockpile of 

five hundred or so warheads. At what point would it appear 

that China is trying to gain escalation dominance visà-vis 

the United States in a regional contingency, such as 

one involving Taiwan, and would this change U.S. calculations 

and rule out reductions down to around one thousand 

warheads (as some policy makers have suggested) Japan 

would certainly have an opinion on this issue. Additionally, 

the UK and France in recent years have both committed to 

modernizing their nuclear deterrent, including new SSBNs 

and other upgrades, with as yet unclear implications for U.S. 

security commitments to those countries (and to Europe 

more broadly) and general deterrence thinking. 

The Obama administration will have its own chance to 

influence U.S. nuclear policy as it prepares for a new 2009- 

10 NPR. The review will cover the U.S. nuclear posture for 

the next five to ten years and focus on the role of nuclear 

weapons in U.S. military strategy, policy requirements for 

a safe and credible deterrent, the proper size and composition 

of the force, and a number of related issues. It 

should be submitted concurrently with the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR), which would create an opportunity 

for productive synergy. Much thinking has already gone 

into preparing for the new NPR, notably by the congressionally 

appointed Strategic Posture Review Commission 

(SPRC) and by other think tanks and organizations involving 

specialists likely to enter the new administration in 

relevant positions. 46 Parsing the results of some of these 

studies offers a glimpse of what direction the Obama administration 

might take as it seeks to orient U.S. nuclear 

policy and deterrence thinking for the next decade. 

A common theme in many of these reports is the overriding 

concern about nuclear proliferation and the potential 

negative consequences such as nuclear terrorism 

or a possible cascade of proliferation if the list of NWS 

begins to grow. The SPRC in particular emphasized this 

point, and it clearly shapes the way that the commission 

sets priorities in nuclear policy. Because the commission 

views cooperation with other nations (particularly other 

nuclear powers) as essential in fighting proliferation, 

there is an emphasis on demonstrating “by its actions” the 

U.S. commitment to “decrease the importance and role 

of nuclear weapons,” and thereby “increase our chance of 

getting the kind of cooperation we need” (Strategic Posture 

Review Commission 2008, 5). These actions could include 

further cuts in the U.S. stockpile and movements toward 

CTBT ratification, among a variety of other possible 

steps. Prompt global strike, for example, could fade into 

the background. The Obama administration is also likely 

to seek the adoption of a new comprehensive nuclear disarmament 

plan at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 

The commission’s interim report even explains extended 

deterrence as “one of [the] pillars” of U.S. non-proliferation 

strategy, in the sense that credible U.S. security guarantees 

allow key U.S. allies to forego their own nuclear deterrent 

(Strategic Posture Review Commission 2008, 8). Another 

report criticized the 2001 NPR for doing “great damage to 

America’s non-proliferation credentials” by blurring the distinction 

between conventional and nuclear forces, proposing 

new tactical nuclear weapons, and withdrawing from 

the ABM treaty without sufficient sensitivity and explanation 

(Grotto and Cirincione 2008). So, where the Bush 

administration was apparently willing to risk progress on 

non-proliferation for the sake of bolstering deterrence, it 

appears that President Obama will take a different tack 

and push harder on the non-proliferation front. 

Balancing nuclear reassurance to countries like China 

and Russia with continued Japanese confidence 

in extended deterrence will be 

delicate. On the one hand, concrete and 

coordinated steps toward global disarmament 

align well with Japan’s long-held foreign 

policy priorities, and there will be opportunities 

to work together on such an 

initiative. It might also allow for greater 

pressure to be applied on North Korea to 

denuclearize. 

On the other hand, extended deterrence 

could be weakened if Washington 

appears too eager to placate China and Russia on these issues 

in pursuit of the non-proliferation objective, and any 

significant narrowing of the U.S. nuclear advantage visà-vis 

China in particular could create unease among defense 

planners in Tokyo. Although many of these policy reports 

emphasize the need to consult extensively with other 

46 The formal title of the commission 

is the Congressional 

Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States, 

and it was established by the 

FY 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act. It is chaired 

by former defense secretaries 

William Perry and James 

Schlesinger, and its task is to 

“examine U.S. strategic posture 

and the appropriate 

role of nuclear weapons…including 

an assessment of the 

role of non-proliferation programs 

and missile defenses.” 


39


nuclear powers (the other permanent members of the UN 

Security Council) on these policy issues, it will be equally 

important to include Japan both as a non-proliferation advocate 

and as a beneficiary of extended deterrence. 

Most recent studies agree that further reductions in the 

U.S. stockpile should only be contemplated in conjunction 

with sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, 

because in this case “the hedge against weapon failure 

passes from stockpile to infrastructure” (Joint Working 

Group 2008). Few seem as enthusiastic about the RRW as 

was the Bush administration, or at least they are not convinced 

of its near-term necessity. The one notable exception 

in the Obama administration is Defense Secretary Robert 

Gates, who will likely have the most prominent voice 

when crafting the QDR and could also be a key player in 

the 2009 NPR. Gates said in late 2008, “To be blunt, there 

is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent 

and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without 

either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a 

modernization program” (Gates 2008). He then went on to 

promote the RRW as the most appropriate means of modernization. 

Still, the RRW is buffeted by some relatively 

strong political winds, so a less ambitious or less controversial 

modernization program is more likely in the next 

decade as a way to try to further reduce the U.S. stockpile. 

All of the think tank reports, task force conclusions, 

and commission findings emphasize the importance of 

reassuring and consulting with America’s allies during 

this time of critical nuclear policy debate, though at times 

these references have a perfunctory quality to them. As 

noted above, the value of extended deterrence is sometimes 

couched in terms of supporting non-proliferation 

goals, or greater weight is attached to consultation with 

other nuclear powers. The future U.S. commitment to MD 

as a core part of America’s deterrence strategy is unclear. 

So too is the future U.S. approach to pledges of no first 

use. The Strategic Posture Review Commission notes in its 

interim report that “effective deterrence (and assurance) 

requires clear declaratory policy from the United States,” 

without explaining what that means. It does mention later, 

however, that “so long as the United States maintains 

adequately strong conventional forces, it does not necessarily 

need to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the threat 

of a major conventional attack” (Strategic Posture Review 

Commission 2008, 8). The term “adequately strong” is 

subjective, of course, so this should be another important 

area of discussion between the United States and Japan. 

Overall, IFPA’s interviews with Japanese officials and 

policy specialists and its survey of government reports 

and academic literature reveal a relatively shallow understanding 

in Japan about the current deterrence and nuclear 

policy debates in Washington. This is compounded by 

the fact that Japan does not posses the technical capacity 

or access to classified information to make its own judgments 

regarding the shelf life of U.S. nuclear weapons. After 

all, even American nuclear weapons scientists and specialists 

cannot agree on how serious the current situation 

is, so how can Japan make this determination Instead, 

Japanese policy makers listen to both sides of the American 

arguments and make their own conclusions, and what 

they conclude often reflects the organizational and ideological 

bias that each individual brings to the issue. 

As respected Japanese diplomat (and 2009 candidate 

to be IAEA director general) Amano Yukiya wrote, “Many 

Japanese observers believe that the possible erosion of 

confidence in the technical reliability of the U.S. nuclear 

umbrella is far more speculative, and they point out that 

several safeguards are available to address the reliability 

question” (Amano 2002). This view fits well with Japan’s 

support of disarmament goals and its desire that the 

CTBT enter into force, which are emblematic MOFA positions. 

MOFA would also welcome further nuclear weapon 

reductions, and Amano points to the 1987 Intermediaterange 

Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty as an example of security 

being strengthened by reducing the number of nuclear 

weapons (contrary to worries that nuclear reductions 

could undermine security). Defense planners at MOD and 

other politicians and policy makers are not so convinced, 

however, and opinion at MOFA is not uniform either. 

The INF example is an interesting one because for a 

while Tokyo was concerned that the Americans might 

strike a deal with the Soviets that would leave a sizable 

number of intermediate-range missiles in Asia. Then- 

Prime Minister Nakasone pressed this point with President 

Reagan, and eventually the United States and the Soviet 

Union worked out a comprehensive agreement that 

also satisfied U.S. allies in Asia. In more recent years, Russia 

has threatened to withdraw from the INF treaty to protest 

U.S. MD plans for Europe, and possibly in response 

40 



to missile development by other nations such as North 

Korea, India, Pakistan, and China. 

Thus, we can see how all these different components of 

defense policy – conventional and nuclear strike capability, 

MD deployment, non-proliferation and arms control 

negotiations, among others – all interact in complicated 

ways to affect the security environment. Steps intended to 

calm the security environment and provide reassurance 

to allies, such as arms reductions or enhanced defenses, 

can, at a certain point, tip the other way by weakening 

deterrence or prompting other nations to build up their 

capabilities. A key challenge is the fact that perceptions 

are often more important than the physical numbers of 

missiles, tanks, or troops on the ground. Broader political 

relations between nations usually determine whether 

certain security-related moves are viewed understandingly 

or suspiciously, and so a broad, holistic view of reassurance 

and deterrence is warranted, backed by frequent and 

open communication. 

Forecasting the future credibility of extended deterrence 

for the alliance is an esoteric exercise in Japan, even 

more so than it is in the United States. Fortunately, there 

is currently no significant crisis of confidence in Japan regarding 

the bilateral relationship overall, and this general 

sense of trust and confidence is still the most important 

factor when Tokyo evaluates the strength of the alliance 

and the credibility of extended deterrence. Thus, if bilateral 

relations are solid, Japan won’t care too much exactly 

how reliable are the replacement triggers of the W88 warhead 

or how many certification waivers were authorized 

for engineering-related changes to old weapons that have 

had their life extended. Perhaps more importantly, other 

nations in the region won’t worry about those details either, 

as long as the alliance remains strong. 

Conclusion 

As we have seen in these first two chapters, the future of 

extended deterrence for Japan and the United States depends 

upon a combination of factors, some of which are 

under the allies’ control and some that are not. The allies 

cannot directly control the trajectory of China’s conventional 

or nuclear military modernization, North Korea’s political-military 

development in the post-Kim Jong-il era, the 

ultimate effectiveness of MD technologies, or broader economic 

conditions in the region and the world. The allies’ 

individual and collective response to these developments, 

however, is up to them, and their choices will undoubtedly 

influence the regional security environment. Moreover, 

the allied consultations themselves about these issues will 

also become indicators of the health of the alliance, so the 

frequency, atmosphere, and substance of these bilateral interactions 

will also be important. 

The United States will most likely continue to try to deemphasize 

the role of nuclear weapons in its national security 

and extended deterrence policies, which creates a 

need to build allied confidence in their collective conventional 

military preparation and cooperation. Deemphasizing 

the role of nuclear weapons is a welcome development, 

but it should be accompanied by an intense period 

of political, diplomatic, and strategic consultations covering 

non-proliferation policies, regional security initiatives, 

and bilateral security cooperation. This process could create 

opportunities to reshape extended deterrence for the 


the allies’ security and political relationships, which can 

underwrite stability in the region and reassure Japan as 

the United States seeks a lower nuclear profile. To help 

guide these bilateral discussions, America should better 

understand how Japan perceives its options in response 

to regional developments and what tools are available for 

the two countries as they continue to solidify their alliance 

and strengthen deterrence. 


41

chapter 3 

Japan’s (Limited) Options 

and Implications for the 

United States 

A recurring topic of discussion among policy makers in Tokyo 

is the relative health of the U.S.-Japan alliance and what 

it means for the country. Although evaluating the alliance’s 

condition is mostly a subjective exercise under changing 

circumstances, at the start of 2009 we can 

say with some confidence that relations are 

good and the alliance is about as strong as it 

has ever been. Trade frictions are minimal, compared to 

the 1980s and 1990s, and the bilateral economic relationship 

is remarkably deep and diversified, as highlighted in 

the first chapter. Alliance transformation, including the 

establishment of a replacement facility for the Futenma 

Air Station on Okinawa, continues to face some problems 

and delays, but other alliance initiatives are proceeding 

satisfactorily, among them the introduction of a new nuclear-powered 

U.S. aircraft carrier at Yokosuka, co-basing 

and joint training initiatives, and MD deployment. Further, 

the two countries cooperate closely and frequently on international 

diplomatic initiatives, and the new Obama administration 

made a point to emphasize the importance of 

the alliance by scheduling early consultations at the ministerial 

and head of state levels. Although there have been 

times in the past when the alliance has perhaps been “stronger” 

and “healthier” (the early Bush-Koizumi years come 

to mind), there have been many more periods when relations 

were weaker and their future uncertain. The alliance, 

for now, remains solid. 

47 See, for example, 

Tatsumi 2008b or Auslin 

and Griffin 2008. 

That said, this research project did reveal emerging 

cracks between the countries’ strategic priorities and 

their expectations regarding the alliance, as discussed earlier, 

and this phenomenon has been noted in other thinktank 

project reports as well. 47 A few recent opinion polls 

in Japan also suggest a declining confidence in the United 

States and the alliance relationship. According to one 

poll at the end of 2008, for example, only 34 percent said 

that U.S.-Japan relations were “good” or “very good,” which 

was the lowest since 2000 (Daily Yomiuri 2008). Similarly, 

a poll taken two months earlier by the Cabinet Office 

showed the lowest-ever confirmation of “good” or “fairly 

good” U.S.-Japan relations since the question was added 

to the poll in 1998, though the combined figure was 68.9 

percent, which is a significant difference from the Yomiuri 

survey (Japan Cabinet Office 2008a). 

In fact, diverging strategic priorities notwithstanding, 

any analysis of opinion poll results suggesting a weakening 

U.S.-Japan alliance needs to be examined carefully and 

considered in the context of Japan’s other bilateral relationships. 

The Cabinet Office survey noted above is useful 

for its consistent questioning over several years of citizens’ 

attitudes toward many different countries. Although 

the 68.9 percent figure (“good” or “fairly good” relations 

with the United States) was historically low, it is still a high 

number overall, and no other bilateral relationship comes 

close to being viewed as positively. The closest is South Korea 

(49.5 percent), followed by India (43.5 percent), China 

42 



(23.7 percent), and Russia (20.5 percent). Moreover, focusing 

just on the “good” response regarding bilateral relations, 

the public’s positive assessment of U.S.-Japan relations is 

even higher (18.1 percent to just 6.7 percent for South Korea 

or 5.5 percent for India). 

Looking at these relationships over time further underscores 

the solid nature of U.S.-Japan relations. About 

70 percent or 80 percent of Japanese consistently view 

relations with the United States as good or fairly good, 

while the evaluation of other regional relationships oscillates 

depending on current events and trends. In the late 

1980s, for example, around 70 percent of Japanese saw Japan-China 

relations in a positive light, but the gap narrowed 

to about 50/50 after the Tiananmen massacre, until 

essentially reversing by 2005. The trend line charting 

Japanese views of Japan-ROK relations looks like a roller 

coaster of positive and negative assessments, with a peak 

in 2003 at 60 percent, and the gloomiest outlook in two 

decades just three years later at 34 percent (Japan Cabinet 

Office 2008a). If the Asia-Pacific region were a school 

yard, then the United States would be not only Japan’s biggest 

friend on the playground, but also its best long-time 

friend. Nothing provides Japan with a more consistent 

and comforting sense of security than its economic and 

security relationship with the United States. 

Thus, for a wide variety of reasons (history, geography, 

domestic law, public opinion, and a dearth of strong international 

relationships), Japan’s options for protecting 

its interests by itself are relatively limited, even though its 

needs are great in this modern era. This does not mean, 

however, that Japan is a totally passive player and resigns 

its fate to the will of others. Although some of Tokyo’s policy 

moves seem inspired to support the alliance with America, 

such as SDF missions in Iraq or the Indian Ocean, other 

steps should be seen as efforts to develop independent 

capabilities that might someday be needed if Japan’s confidence 

in the alliance weakens (hedging for substance). 

Examples on this front include Japanese establishment of 

its own spy satellite network, loosening restrictions more 

broadly on the use of space for defensive military purposes, 

and creating new military units to better handle outerisland 

defenses or deal with suspicious vessels operating 

in Japan’s territorial waters, among other legal and operational 

enhancements focused on independent or “separable” 

capabilities. Still other moves, such as introducing a 

joint command structure for the SDF and missile defenses, 

arguably support both the alliance and indigenous capabilities. 

Tokyo also pursues diplomatic initiatives that at 

least in part are intended to broaden Japan’s international 

relationships and its foreign policy options. 

As noted earlier, Japan appears comfortable with the 

current security equation overall, as the alliance remains 

strong and capable, and perceived threats are not dire or 

truly imminent. The fact that Japan has limited options 

for national security enhancement beyond the U.S. alliance 

is not a critical problem for Japanese policy makers 

at the moment, though the LDP in particular has sought 

to loosen the legal restrictions incrementally on the country’s 

defense community, and some scholars are calling for 

new, independent defense capabilities. Defense and foreign 

ministry bureaucrats have also recommended a strategy 

of diversifying Japan’s security relationships beyond 

the U.S.-Japan alliance, prompting new security cooperation 

agreements with countries like Australia in 2007 (updated 

in late 2008) and India in 2008. 48 These are all policy 

moves on the margins, however, 

and none of these steps by themselves 

would strengthen extended 

deterrence in the absence of 

a credible U.S. commitment to 

Japan’s defense. Still, U.S. policy makers should pay careful 

attention to such moves, since they signal the outcomes of 

internal policy debates in Tokyo, and they reflect how serious 

(or not) Japan’s concerns are about regional security 

trends and its faith in the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

Major policy changes in Japan on such high-profile issues 

as constitutional revision, big defense spending increases, 

deploying offensive strike capabilities, or renouncing 

one or more of the non-nuclear principles would be 

an obvious sign of recalculation by Japan regarding the 

credibility of extended deterrence in the face of regional 

threats. But Washington should understand Japan’s intentions 

in these key areas far in advance of actual shifts in 

policy, and ideally U.S. officials should pick up on clues 

to Japanese thinking before these debates even emerge 

in public, so that they can try to influence the debate in 

ways that reassure Japan and reinforce the alliance. Some 

of the defense policy adjustments mentioned earlier are 

good examples of how small levels of national security 

anxiety on the part of Japanese policy makers manifest 

48 These agreements focus on bilateral 

security cooperation in relatively benign 

areas such as disaster management, maritime 

security, PKO, counter terrorism, 

and other non-traditional security issues. 

Japan’s Limited Options 

43


themselves, and keeping track of these and other developments 

should help Washington to maintain effective extended 

deterrence. 

An often overlooked area of the extended deterrence issue 

is Japan’s own technical capacity to produce a nuclear 

deterrent, if it decided that such a paradigm shift was necessary. 

After all, the domestic 

legal and political barriers to 

nuclear weapons development 

(or introduction) will be 

the last to fall if Japan ever decided 

on such a course. If policy 

makers grew more nervous about the future and wanted 

to shorten the lead time to developing strategic nuclear 

options of their own, they could initiate interim steps under 

the radar that seek to enhance Japan’s domestic industrial 

and scientific capacity in this area. Though many 

of these steps would be extremely difficult for outsiders 

to recognize, some of them might be visible, and together 

with other telltale signs of more active hedging by Japanese 

policy makers, Washington can better evaluate what 

its ally thinks about the future of the alliance and how to 

keep it serving both countries’ interests. 

49 See, for example, Federation of American 

Scientists 2000 and Kamiya 2002, respectively. 

50 The U.S. Department of Energy’s guidance 

on the issue of using reactor-grade plutonium 

in nuclear weapons suggests that an advanced 

NWS using modern designs could produce reliable 

weapons comparable to those produced 

using weapons-grade plutonium (Miller 2002). 

Technical and scientific capacity 

If the regional security equation tilts further out of Japan’s 

favor, either because of a demonstrated North Korean 

capacity to deliver nuclear weapons on Japan or the U.S. 

mainland, Chinese deployment of aircraft carriers, or some 

similar development, Japanese policy makers are likely to 

respond by taking incremental steps toward enhancing external 

and internal balancing. If the potential for external 

balancing seems insufficient or in doubt for some reason, 

then internal balancing will take on more importance. Policies 

to support internal balancing will be relatively quiet 

and unobtrusive at first, but they will become increasingly 

obvious if the situation worsens. 

Some change is already noticeable in the area of defense-related 

science and technology R&D, but many formal 

and informal barriers still exist between the research 

and defense communities in Japan that retard the application 

of new technologies for national security purposes, especially 

anything related to nuclear weapons or offensive 

strike systems. But if U.S. policy makers are going to notice 

these incremental changes in defense industrial and 

scientific policies, especially in the nuclear area, they first 

need to establish some sort of baseline regarding Japan’s 

current technical readiness to build a nuclear bomb. 

Past studies of Japan’s nuclear options are remarkable 

in their lack of consensus about seemingly concrete details 

on this point, with some concluding that Japan is technically 

capable of developing a nuclear weapon within a year 

(some even suggest six months or less), while others argue 

that it would take at least a decade. 49 As early as 1966, a 

then-classified U.S. national intelligence estimate concluded 

that it would take about two years for Japan to produce 

and test a nuclear weapon, if it could get uranium without 

safeguards (National Security Archive 2005). One wonders 

what the official U.S. estimate might be today. 

A respected Japanese professor of nuclear engineering 

told a Japanese newspaper that “it takes at least a year to 

develop a nuclear bomb, going through the whole process 

from design, manufacture and verification to a detonation 

test,” but “several years” if the time needed to build a nuclear 

reactor ( for producing the ideal fuel) and related facilities 

are included (Daily Yomiuri 2007). As noted earlier, 

the Sankei Shimbun reported on a secret government-requested 

study in 2006 that estimated it would take “at 

least 3 to 5 years until Japan can go into trial production 

of a miniaturized warhead” (Tamura 2006). 

Most of these estimates account for the ancillary infrastructure 

necessary to build a viable nuclear weapons 

program (such as a reliable delivery system or command 

and control), but they are still artificial because they do 

not account for the domestic legal and political obstacles 

that must be overcome. Even with such caveats, however, 

we have found nothing to suggest that Japan could develop 

a safe and functioning nuclear deterrent in less than 

one year, but within two years is another story. 

Those who claim that Japan could build a nuclear arsenal 

relatively easily point first to the country’s large civilian 

nuclear energy program, the self-contained nature 

of its nuclear fuel cycle (including uranium enrichment 

and fuel reprocessing capability), and its growing stockpile 

of plutonium (over 40 tons). Even though Japan’s stock of 

plutonium is reactor grade, which is less easily converted 

for use in nuclear weapons, it nonetheless can be used for 

weapons, and this would provide Japan with the raw materials 

for hundreds of nuclear warheads. 50 Japan’s newest 

nuclear reprocessing plant (Rokkasho) produced its first 

test batch of fuel (a uranium-plutonium mixture known as 

44 


MOX) in November 2006, and when this plant is fully operational 

it is expected to produce up to 130 tons of MOX 

annually. The IAEA states that plutonium can be separated 

for nuclear weapons from MOX fuel in three weeks, and 

a group of prominent scientists and some former U.S. officials 

have argued that plutonium from Rokkasho could 

allow for the production of one thousand nuclear weapons 

each year (Johnston 2006). In addition, Japan has an 

advanced rocket science program and production facility, 

including the solid-fuel M-V rocket, which is capable of 

launching probes for interplanetary missions. For these 

and other reasons, many argue that Japan has the material, 

along with the technical and financial wherewithal, to 

produce a nuclear deterrent quickly, and some have gone 

as far as to label Japan a virtual nuclear power. 

There are, of course, counter arguments to all of these 

points, beginning with questions about the viability of reactor-grade 

plutonium as a raw material for an effective 

and reliable nuclear weapon. The president of Japan Nuclear 

Fuel Ltd. (JNFL) has stated that separating plutonium 

from MOX fuel is simply not practical or realistic (Johnston 

2006). 51 A report commissioned by Japan’s Council for 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle came to the same conclusion (Institute 

for Energy Economics 2001). No known NWS has produced 

bombs from reactor-grade plutonium. In addition, Japan’s 

import contracts for uranium supplies include language 

strictly limiting its use for peaceful purposes, suggesting 

that the country would risk shutting down its entire civilian 

nuclear energy program if it chose to break those 

agreements by using that fuel for weapons. Those who see 

a much longer nuclear development timeframe also point 

out that Japan’s rocket designs are particularly ill suited to 

make effective ballistic missiles, requiring years to redesign 

and test them, and that no other ready weapons delivery 

platforms exist (Self and Thompson 2003, 173). 52 Japan 

stopped its M-V rocket program, for example, in 2006. Other 

deficiencies include Japan’s relatively weak command 

and control infrastructure and fairly undeveloped intelligence 

gathering and analysis capabilities. So, which argument 

should we believe 

Before we examine Japan’s nuclear weapons production 

capacity any further, we should briefly outline the 

extent of Japan’s nuclear energy infrastructure so that Japan’s 

expertise in this field can be appreciated. Japan has 

fifty-three nuclear reactors producing about a third of its 


electricity, and another dozen or so reactors are planned 

or under construction. These include a variety of light-water 

reactor (LWR) designs built over the last forty years, 

and one prototype fast breeder reactor (FBR) (in Monju) 

that operated for about three months in 1995 but has been 

shut down ever since. Japan also operates eighteen research 

reactors of various designs. All of Japan’s uranium 

needs are met through imports, which amounted to nearly 

nine thousand tons in 2007 (World Nuclear Association 

2009). Japan also relies on foreign fuel conversion services, 

but otherwise it handles all of the other activities in the 

nuclear fuel cycle domestically, including uranium enrichment, 

reconversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing. 53 

The most notable aspect of Japan’s nuclear energy program, 

aside from its overall sophistication and comprehensiveness, 

is this accumulation of plutonium due to the country’s 

strategy of reusing its spent nuclear fuel in the form 

of a mixed-oxide (MOX) product 

that combines reprocessed plutonium 

and uranium dioxide. 

Simply described, Japan is trying 

to develop a degree of energy independence 

by extracting significantly 

more energy from spent 

fuel by reusing it, combined with 

the use of FBRs that can potentially 

produce more fissile material 

than they consume. This can 

51 The argument is that reactor-grade 

plutonium contains higher 

levels of the isotope Pu-240, which 

can make the weapon unreliable. 

52 For example, the M-V rocket is too 

large to be a useful medium-range missile, 

and it does not have appropriate guidance 

control or reentry systems, having never 

been designed to strike a ground target. 

53 Japan also relies heavily on foreign 

sources for enrichment services, though 

its enrichment plant at Rokkasho is 

scheduled to expand significantly its enrichment 

capacity in the next decade. 

also cut down on waste. In theory, this sounds like a sensible 

energy strategy. The problem, however, is that the 

economics and engineering behind this MOX/FBR strategy 

are simply not working, and the plutonium keeps piling 

up in the meantime. 

Using recycled nuclear fuel is more expensive than buying 

fresh fuel, and the biggest anticipated customer for the 

MOX fuel (the FBR at Monju) continues to experience engineering 

problems that prevent its restarting. In just another 

in a long series of delays, new problems with exhaust 

ducts pushed back the latest rescheduled restart date from 

early 2009 to the end of the year. Despite these setbacks, 

the government continues to throw money at the problem, 

boosting the R&D budget for FBR cycle technology by 20 

percent, to ¥34.7 billion in FY 2009, and designating it a 

“national key technology” (Atoms in Japan 2009). So, despite 

concern about Japan’s growing plutonium stockpile, 


45


the government appears unlikely to change its nuclear policies 

any time soon (if ever). 

This leads us to the different components of a theoretical 

Japanese nuclear weapons program, starting with the 

fissile material. The stockpile of plutonium stored in Japan 

was about six tones at the end of 2007 (Japan Cabinet 

Office 2008b). 54 Although reactorgrade 

plutonium would not be Japan’s 

first choice to build a nuclear weapon, 

most authorities on the issue believe 

that it can be done without an unreasonable 

amount of trouble. 55 Moreover, 

Japan would not necessarily have to 

announce to the world that it was 

going to divert plutonium toward a 

weapons program. Even though Japan’s 

whole fuel cycle is carefully monitored 

by the IAEA, “plutonium unaccounted 

for” regularly exceeds seven 

or eight kilograms each year, simply as a result of the normal 

margin for measurement error (Japan Cabinet Office 

2008b). This is a high accountability rate of about 99 percent, 

but even that 1 percent means that within ten years 

Japan could potentially stash away as much plutonium as 

North Korea currently possesses. 

Further, the Rokkasho nuclear reprocessing plant has 

sophisticated centrifuges that provide Japan with a uranium 

enrichment capability. Although it was designed to produce 

low-enriched uranium (LEU), Rokkasho could technically 

be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) to use in weapons. There are arguments about how 

long such a reconfiguration would take (a few months to a 

few years), but it would be easily detected nonetheless. Another 

conceivable path to producing weapons-grade HEU 

could be a laser isotope separation process, which Japan 

dabbled in for years before inefficiencies led to a cutback 

on implementation plans in 2001. Although laser enrichment 

is not commercially attractive, the know-how and 

equipment remain in Japan, and as we learned in the case of 

South Korea in 2004, experiments to produce HEU in small 

doses can be difficult for IAEA inspectors to detect. 56 

Finally, some analysts have pointed out that, in a pinch, 

Japan could conceivably use the forty kilograms or so of super-grade 

plutonium that accumulated in the “breeding 

blanket” of the experimental Joyo FBR during the 1980s and 

54 The other thirty-plus tones 

of plutonium are stored at facilities 

in France and England. 

55 In fact, the United States apparently 

conducted a successful 

nuclear weapon test in 1962 using 

reactor grade plutonium, producing 

a yield of less than twenty kilotons 

(U.S. Department of Energy 1994). 

56 In 2004, South Korean officials 

admitted to the IAEA that 

government scientists conducted 

HEU experiments in 2000 

(without authorization) using laser 

isotope separation, successfully 

producing small amounts of 

near-weapons grade uranium. 

early 1990s (Harrison 1998). Information about this supergrade 

plutonium is scarce, but some believe that Japan still 

has access to certain quantities of it. Japan reportedly does 

not use those types of blankets any more, but it could reinstall 

them if it wanted. Overall, for Japan, acquiring the fissile 

material to make nuclear weapons does not seem to be 

a difficult technical hurdle to overcome. Instead, the primary 

challenges are political, legal, and economic (when 

one considers the potential cost in lost uranium imports). 

If we assume that Japan would only pursue a nuclear deterrent 

as a last resort in the context of a dramatically changing 

security environment, it could probably utilize readily 

available fissile material as a stopgap, with temporary acquiescence 

from some of its uranium suppliers. 

Of course, none of these theoretical paths to acquiring 

weapons-grade bomb material can offset the remarkable 

announcement in December 2008 that Japan has been secretly 

transferring more than five hundred kilograms of 

HEU back to the United States in small batches since 1996 

(Japan Times 2008b). Washington provided Japan with the 

uranium in the 1960s to fuel research reactors as part of 

the Atoms for Peace plan, and Japan returned the HEU to 

the United States under the global threat reduction initiative. 

So, although we can identify possible ways for Japan 

to obtain fissile material for weapons (overtly and covertly), 

Japan has consistently demonstrated by its actions 

that it gives non-proliferation goals priority over developing 

some sort of latent or clandestine repository of fissile 

material for future nuclear weapons use. 

Less quickly available to Japan would be a means of 

targeting an enemy with a nuclear weapon in a reliable 

and survivable manner. Tactical nuclear weapons delivered 

by air or artillery are not much use to Japan, as the 

country would be most interested in a minimal deterrent 

against nuclear attack, and so the preferred vehicle would 

likely be a missile (ideally launched by a submarine, similar 

to the UK’s deterrent). Although Japan is an accomplished 

manufacturer of rockets and submarines, neither 

the government nor the private sector has made any noticeable 

attempts to develop technologies that would be 

useful in a strategic military context. 

As one study of this topic in 2003 pointed out, “Japan has 

invested heavily in rockets that would not make effective 

ballistic missiles,” and in submarine research it has always 

focused on building vessels that could dive deeply rather 

46 



than run silently on nuclear power (Self and Thompson 

2003). In addition, Japan stopped making its main solid-fueled 

rocket (the M-V) in 2006 out of cost concerns, despite 

opposition by some Diet members who believed that the 

government needed to subsidize and maintain such technology 

for its potential future military utility (interview 

2008e). 57 Still, even though the M-V rocket was discontinued, 

the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) will 

remain proficient in these technologies as it keeps up research 

on solid-propellant rockets and continues to oversee 

the manufacture of solid rocket boosters for the H-IIA 

and HII-B (heavy lift) space launch vehicles. 

Another potential means of delivery for an indigenous 

nuclear deterrent would be a sea-launched cruise missile 

(SLCM), such as the Tomahawk developed by the United 

States. President George H.W. Bush ordered the removal 

of all nuclear warheads from SLCMs in 1992, but the navy 

still has Tomahawk inventory capable of carrying a W80 

nuclear warhead. Japan does not own any such cruise missiles, 

since the government has long interpreted the possession 

of ground attack missiles as unnecessary and possibly 

exceeding its minimum defense posture (even though 

Japanese officials are careful to maintain that preemptive 

strikes on enemy bases about to attack Japan would be a 

form of defense and permissible under the constitution). 58 

So this is yet another right that Japan chooses not to exercise, 

but preserves as an option in case it changes its 

mind in the future. 

As North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs progressed 

in recent years, however, Japanese policy makers 

began considering more seriously the option of acquiring 

a ground-attack missile capability. This reached a climax 

during the drafting of the five-year NDPG in 2004, when 

the Defense Agency proposed introducing research money 

to develop long-range, surface-to-surface missile technology 

(Kyodo News 2004). But the LDP’s coalition partner, the 

New Komeito party, rejected that proposal, and so the missile 

development plan never made it into the final NDPG. 

Still, if North Korea’s missile and WMD programs continue 

unabated, debate about a ground-attack missile option 

will no doubt resurface in Japan, and purchasing Tomahawk 

cruise missiles or developing a similar technology is 

high on MOD’s wish list (Tokyo Foundation 2008). When 

it comes to a delivery platform, therefore, Japan would 

face some serious challenges if it sought a sophisticated 

submarine-based option, but developing an accurate and 

survivable ground-based missile would be more manageable 

in the interim. 59 Similar to nuclear warhead production, 

putting new missiles into operation within one year 

would be difficult, but within two years is feasible. 

Often neglected in studies about a possible latent weapons 

program in Japan are the various skills involved beyond 

the conversion of nuclear fuel or the development 

of a weapon delivery platform. Many analysts wring their 

hands about Japan’s plutonium accumulation, or point to 

the country’s rocket-manufacturing capabilities as a sign 

of latent missile capability, but what about other aspects 

of weaponization such as high-speed framing radiography, 

heavy-metal shock physics, or explosive 

shaping Knowledge in these areas does 

not reside where the plutonium is stored 

and handled, but it is instead scattered 

throughout the broader industrial and research 

community. It is not uncommon 

to see Japanese research scientists attend 

(and present at) specialized international 

conferences on shock compression or 

high-speed photonics, which are also attended 

by nuclear weapons scientists from 

the United States, Russia, and China. Does 

Japan’s knowledge base in these technical 

areas suggest that it could readily be transferred 

to a nuclear weapons program 

An advanced country like Japan would 

not confront existing nuclear powers 

with crude weapons. Culturally it would 

not be acceptable, and strategically it would be counterproductive 

to take such a weak step. A Japanese program, 

if it ever became a reality, would be based most likely on 

thermonuclear devices comparable to those of the established 

powers. This leads to consideration of infrastructure 

beyond the basic plutonium and missile industries. 

Moreover, a thermonuclear weapon requires a small and 

refined plutonium device as an ignitor, and this requires 

technical sophistication beyond the first-generation 

bomb. In order to expand the field of evaluation to the 

broader areas of infrastructure, we could consider many 

other aspects of a potential weapons program, but for the 

sake of simplicity we have selected a few to examine in the 

rest of this section. 60 

57 Solid-fueled missiles are 

more mobile and can be deployed 

far more quickly than 

those using liquid fuel. 

58 Japan does manufacture 

and deploy a series of anti-ship 

missiles, based on the 

Mitsubishi ASM-2 design. 

59 Japan would probably reconfigure 

the M-V rocket to 

be road mobile, carry a warhead, 

and feature a guidance 

system that perhaps 

draws upon its ASM-2 anti-ship 

missile experience. 

60 The author is not a specialist 

on the technical issues 

regarding nuclear weapons 

production, but he received 

valuable assistance from people 

who do work in this field. 

The author, however, is solely 

responsible for the way this 

information is presented. 


47


61 See, for example, 

Ishizaka and 

Nishihara 1996. 

Miniaturization of a plutonium device, for example, requires 

an understanding of the shock hydrodynamics in 

the explosives and heavy metal layers of an atomic ignitor 

(known as shock hydrodynamics), and it requires optimization 

of the explosives that drive the plutonium implosion 

to criticality. Radiation hydrodynamics is also important, 

since the transfer of radiation from the ignitor is 

what sets off the secondary implosion in a thermonuclear 

weapon. So we could begin by looking at where the leading-edge 

work in Japan is being conducted in these three 

areas: 1) shock hydrodynamics, 2) explosives, and 3) radiation 

hydrodynamics. 

Shock hydrodynamics research in Japan, as in other 

countries, proceeds along two related paths. One of these 

is a traditional material science path studying shocks 

generated by explosives or impacts from projectiles, typically 

shot from “gas guns.” The other is shock physics on 

the smaller scale as conducted in laser fusion laboratory 

experiments. Researchers pursuing either approach 

will develop very useful research skills, and both areas 

of research are strong in Japan. Notable contributions to 

the international field come from Osaka University’s Institute 

for Laser Engineering (ILE), which has at least a 

thirty-year history of laser fusion research. 61 Japanese researchers 

also attended in large numbers a 

highly specialized meeting sponsored by the 

American Physical Society in 1999 (known as 

Shock99), which was made up mostly of scientists from 

nuclear weapons laboratories from the United States, Russia, 

China, and the UK. Relevant papers were submitted by 

researchers from the Tokyo Institute of Technology, Kumamoto 

University, the National Institute of Material and 

Chemical Research ( funded in part by METI), Kyushu University, 

and the ILE of Osaka University. 

Japan’s explosives expertise is less well recognized 

beyond its skill with fireworks, but pockets of expertise 

do exist, such as within the Research Core for Explosion 

Safety (part of the National Institute of Advanced Industrial 

Science and Technology), which focuses a good portion 

of its research on explosions and shock waves and is 

less than an hour’s drive from the nuclear energy research 

and development facilities in O-arai and Tokai (all in Ibaraki 

Prefecture). The O-arai Engineering Center is where 

most of Japan’s FBR R&D facilities are located, and Tokai 

hosts the fuel-fabricating work of Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel 

Company. The Research Core for Explosion Safety also features 

one of the world’s higher-ranking supercomputers, 

which would be necessary for modeling hydrodynamics 

and other simulations in two and three dimensions, since 

it allows researchers to evaluate the impact of design 

changes without hundreds of test explosions. In addition, 

some of the published work by scientists demonstrates 

cross-disciplinary expertise in the fields of explosives and 

shock hydrodynamics, such as by Professor Itoh Shigeru 

of Kumamoto University (Kato et al. 2006). 

If Japan really wanted to develop a thermonuclear device, 

an important physics area would be radiation hydrodynamics. 

Some of Japan’s most advanced work in this area 

has been conducted at the ILE at Osaka University (taking 

advantage of its laser fusion program). Past research includes 

a laser-driven, radiation flow experiment that mimics 

the flow of energy from an atomic explosion to the thermonuclear 

target. This work is now largely unclassified in 

the United States, but previously it was highly controlled 

(interview 2007l). Other research at the ILE includes fast 

ignitor research and the use of shock multiplexing to boost 

thermonuclear neutron yields through laser implosion. 

None of this discussion of Japanese research activity is 

meant to suggest that these are somehow telltale signs of 

a latent nuclear weapons research program or that these 

research institutes would even form the core of such a 

program should Japan someday decide to develop an indigenous 

nuclear deterrent. This is simply an initial exploration 

of the publicly available information regarding 

Japan’s scientific and industrial capacities that could potentially 

be relevant to a theoretical nuclear program. All 

of the research noted above has very practical application 

to a wide range of non-military uses, and though there 

are certainly some policy makers in Tokyo who would like 

to foster a collaborative relationship between Japan’s scientific 

research community and the defense community, 

there remains a wide gulf between them. “The culture of 

the scientists is strong,” commented one journalist, who 

has covered these issues extensively. “Even at fairly benign 

meetings of scientists and professors who deal with national 

security issues, the scientists won’t talk about defense 

applications for fear of tarnishing their reputations 

or losing their jobs” (interview 2008f). 

There are other, more mundane, technical skills associated 

with building a nuclear weapon, but they should not 

48 



be underestimated in terms of their importance or the difficulty 

in mastering them. Forming the plutonium assembly 

itself requires knowledge and capabilities in the plutonium 

metallurgy of heavy metals. The metal must be pure 

and of the correct density. Skills in high-speed x-ray radiography 

are also necessary to image the compression behavior 

of explosively driven layers, and researchers must 

have the ability and equipment to work with toxic metals 

such as beryllium (the dust from which destroys lungs). 

Our research in the public domain (English and Japanese) 

failed to turn up any meaningful evidence of relevant 

metallurgical knowledge, which was a little surprising, 

given the work that is done at the Tokai and O-arai 

sites in manufacturing mixed-oxide plutonium/uranium 

fuels for their FBRs. Japanese scientists are forbidden by 

law from studying the technology of nuclear weapons, 

but some U.S. observers speculate that perhaps the Japan 

Atomic Energy Association (JAEA) goes further and 

rigorously forbids any work with pure plutonium (interview 

2007l). Our follow-up interviews did not reveal such 

a clear-cut policy, but Japanese scientists do apparently 

feel pressure to go out of their way to demonstrate that 

they are not engaged in questionable or sensitive research, 

and this is backed up by frequent domestic and IAEA inspections 

(interview 2008f). 

Neither does beryllium machining seem to be a practiced 

skill in Japan, although Japan does import the metal 

(mostly from the United States) for various industrial uses. 

Firms that work with the material rarely cut it or shape it, 

though Japanese scientists have studied the metallurgical 

effects of neutron bombardment of standard beryllium 

discs (Kawamura et al. 2002). Also, indirect investigations 

by our project into the prevalence of berylliosis (a disease 

associated with the handling of beryllium) in Japan indicates 

that the condition is very rare and suggests little beryllium 

machining activity. 

In contrast, Japan has had a long history of excellence 

in radiography and high-speed imaging of shocked materials, 

and it continues to present at international conferences 

in relevant areas (such as with flash x-ray generators 

of up to 300eV (electron volt) energies and in repetitive 

sub-microsecond pulses, which would be enough to do 

important shock wave research). Some of the world’s most 

accomplished high-speed scientific camera manufacturers 

also reside in Japan, such as Hamamatsu Corporation, 

which appeared on the list of suppliers 

for the Iraqi weapons program in the late 

1980s. 62 

Overall, our brief survey of select nuclear weapons-related 

technologies in Japan encountered no indications 

of an orchestrated covert program, though it did come 

across some very mature capabilities in certain areas (as 

one would expect for Japan). These capabilities could be 

just as relevant as the often-cited “plutonium stockpile,” if 

Japan ever decided to pursue a nuclear weapons program, 

in the sense that it is a resource upon which the nation 

can draw to build such a program. However, the reasons 

why these capabilities exist are driven by other practical 

considerations, and do not appear to be intended to contribute 

to a latent nuclear weapons capability. 

Moreover, we should underscore that the connections 

between the scientific and defense communities continue 

to be quite few and weak, and although policy makers 

are making efforts to foster more interaction and collaboration, 

the ideological and cultural friction between 

the two camps is deep-seated and cannot be legislated 

away. Time will tell what effect the security environment 

and the trends of the world will have on these communities 

in Japan, but the threats would have to be severe 

and be accompanied by a fundamental culture change in 

the universities to bridge this gap. Interestingly, during 

the course of this project, we learned that a senior official 

from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 

and Technology (MEXT) met with high-ranking officers 

from one of the SDF’s R&D commands “for the first time” 

in 2007 to “exchange information and seek potential areas 

of cooperation” (interview 2007n). If the meeting truly 

was a first, it demonstrates both the significance of some 

of the changes underway in Japan, as well as how much 

more change would be required if the government ever 

wanted to develop its own strategic deterrent. 

62 Iraq bought two 

streak cameras in 1989 to 

help analyze high-explosive 

“lenses” (ISIS 2003). 

How to recognize a change in Japan’s 

strategic approach 

The fact that policy makers in Japan are trying to bring together 

the country’s science and defense communities is 

one sign of change in Japan’s overall strategic approach, 

and there are others that we can identify. The process of 

evaluating Japanese hedging behavior becomes easier now 

that we have examined how Japan establishes the boundaries 

of its defense policies. We can identify possible indi- 


49


cators that would alert us to changes in Japanese attitudes 

regarding perceived threats, the durability of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance, and the credibility of extended deterrence. 

Of course, the simplest way to monitor Japan’s thinking is 

to listen often and listen carefully to what Japan says, and 

all opportunities to strengthen the relationship through 

dialogue should be seized. U.S. policy makers will learn 

most of what they need to know through these direct conversations, 

and given the close alliance between the two 

countries, they will have plenty of opportunities. But it will 

also be useful to have an alternative 

means to gauge the seriousness 

of Japan’s concerns, which is 

sometimes made easier by looking 

at what Japan does, in addition 

to listening to what it says. 

Each indicator in and of itself will not necessarily signal 

a pending fundamental change, and there could be a variety 

of factors driving these different policy adjustments. 

Not every policy move in Tokyo is a referendum on the 

health of the alliance or extended deterrence, after all. In 

many cases, however, certain foreign policy or national security-related 

actions will represent a degree of Japanese 

hedging intended to either buttress the alliance (external 

balancing), build independent defense capabilities (internal 

balancing), or some combination of the two. In addition, 

these hedging steps will probably begin by being defensive 

or non-combative in nature, and Washington will 

know that the situation is becoming more serious when 

potentially offensive skills are acquired. These indicators 

could take the form of new policy statements, legal interpretations, 

bureaucratic reorganizations, funding shifts, 

diplomatic initiatives, or investments in new capabilities 

with military applications, among other possibilities. 

In an alliance context, Japan has a long history of taking 

incremental steps aimed at bolstering the bilateral security 

relationship and, by extension, extended deterrence. 

Such steps found the right balance between pressure from 

Washington and national security-focused Japanese politicians 

on the one hand, and domestic political acquiescence 

on the other (usually caused by some exogenous 

development that triggered a recalibration in the public 

mind regarding what is acceptable). Low-profile adjustments 

required less public consensus, such as when Japan 

took on greater responsibility for extended sea-lane 

63 For a description of the bilateral discussion 

that led to Prime Minister Suzuki’s 

statement in 1981 that Japan could 

(as part of its defensive posture) defend 

its sea lanes up to one thousand 

miles from its shores, see Auer 1996. 

defense in the 1980s in response to requests from the new 

Regan administration in 1981. There was public interest in 

the issue, of course, and some criticism by opponents, but 

it was not as if Japanese ships needed to come under attack 

from Soviet submarines to create a political environment 

that would allow for new investments in anti-submarine 

warfare and other surface ships. In this case, the 

Japanese government saw a new bilateral agreement on 

roles and missions as an appropriate and affordable way 

to strengthen the alliance and build indigenous capabilities, 

and it did not come at a significant domestic political 

cost. 63 

Bilateral discussions regarding roles, missions, and capabilities 

(RMC) continue today, and they are still a good 

low-profile indicator of Japan’s willingness to commit resources 

to the alliance. The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 

Committee (SCC) joint statement in 2007, for example, 

built upon earlier RMC announcements and highlighted 

such measures as better protecting classified military information 

in Japan and the establishment of a bilateral 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

defense working group. Although progress on the protection 

of classified information in Japan has been mixed, the 

reviews of the CBRN working group have generally been 

positive. “It’s a good way to practice interagency coordination 

in a bilateral format,” noted on MOFA official, “which 

we almost never do” (interview 2007m). The two sides began 

by explaining their respective CBRN defense capabilities, 

conducting joint threat assessments, and identifying 

near-term and long-term requirements ( for themselves 

and for the alliance). Opportunities to cooperate are explored 

for the short term, and joint R&D and co-development 

programs are possible in the long term. 

Higher-profile adjustments are difficult to make without 

a corresponding event or trend that shakes up the 

status quo. Revision of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines 

in the late 1990s, for example, was made possible by the 

growth of North Korea’s WMD and missile programs and 

the near clash between the North and the United States in 

1994. Pyongyang’s launch of a long-range missile over Japan 

in 1998 was a catalyst for initial MD cooperation, further 

solidified by the second North Korean nuclear crisis 

in 2002 and 2003. In addition, the SDF dispatch to Iraq and 

the Indian Ocean by the Koizumi administration was only 

possible in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist 

50 



attacks in the United States. One could also argue that 

passage of Japan’s basic space law in 2008, which lifted the 

long-standing ban on the military use of space assets, was 

partially a response to China’s anti-satellite test in 2007 

and other Chinese space exploration activities, as well as 

a response to the needs of MD deployment. 

Looking into the future, steady progress by Japan to 

carry out its commitments under the alliance transformation 

and base realignment roadmap (including the RMC 

initiatives) will be one way for Tokyo to demonstrate a 

desire to strengthen deterrence in the context of the alliance. 

Other meaningful low-profile indicators of heightened 

concern in Tokyo could include more significant involvement 

of MOD officials in MOFA task forces following 

the RRW issue, the 2009 NPR, or prompt global strike initiatives 

in the United States. As noted earlier, these issues 

are viewed by Tokyo primarily through a non-proliferation 

lens, but increased involvement by defense officials and 

more open discussion of possible implications for Japan’s 

national security would clearly signal a change in attitude 

and concern that Washington might be going too far. This 

does not mean that Japan would be unsupportive of U.S. 

non-proliferation initiatives (it most likely would be supportive), 

but Tokyo will also want to understand the implications 

for extended deterrence. Steps to toughen domestic 

laws and invest in better protection of classified 

information, beyond current modest efforts, would also 

send a powerful message to potential adversaries that the 

U.S.-Japan alliance is achieving new levels of intimacy and 

interoperability. 

It would probably not be feasible for Japan to make 

higher-profile adjustments without a further shift in public 

opinion regarding certain national security issues, but 

the single biggest step the Japanese government could take 

to bolster the alliance and strengthen deterrence would be 

to allow the country to exercise its right of collective selfdefense. 

Some Japanese defense specialists argue that the 

public is slowly coming around on this issue and that the 

time for change could be near (Okazaki 2009 and Tokyo 

Foundation 2008). Prime Minister Aso himself also said 

that “the government interpretation of the nation’s right 

to collective self-defense must be changed,” though he has 

not taken concrete steps toward this end. It could be that 

new anti-piracy missions by the MSDF or continued MD 

deployment will force the issue in some way, but resistance 

to change is still relatively strong, particularly in the DPJ 

and the New Komeito: a 2009 survey of likely Lower House 

candidates found only a third from all parties in favor of 

revising the interpretation of collective self-defense, with 

the DPJ and the New Komeito being most adamantly opposed 

(Mainichi Shimbun 2009). Public opinion polls also 

discourage the notion that change is imminent, 

as the percentage opposed to re- 

64 Polling by the Yomiuri 

vision has slowly increased in recent years, 

to 52 percent in 2008. 64 

Another discernible indicator would be 

a more ambiguous declaratory policy regarding 

the introduction of nuclear weapons 

within Japan’s territorial waters. Recalling 

Defense Agency Director General Kyuma’s verbal 

acrobatics on this issue following North Korea’s nuclear 

test in 2006, mentioned earlier, the Cabinet at that time 

eventually stated that Tokyo could not allow U.S. nuclear 

weapon-equipped ships to pass through Japan’s territorial 

waters under any circumstances. Even then, many Japanese 

policy makers could not understand why the government 

needed to be so emphatic about it, and some have suggested 

that at the next opportunity, a better approach would 

be to leave the option open in emergencies, or even to simply 

argue that passage of U.S. nuclear weapons through Japan’s 

territorial waters does not constitute “introduction” 

if they are related to the U.S. nuclear umbrella (interview 

2008g). Such a shift in declaratory policy would no doubt 

raise eyebrows (and perhaps a few voices) in the region, 

but at some point it could be a prudent way to demonstrate 

concern with North Korean and/or Chinese nuclear 

programs, and to do so in the context of the alliance. An 

independent report put out by influential Japanese politicians 

came to similar conclusions (Japan-U.S. Rising Leaders 

Project 2008, 22). 

Other steps that Japan might take could help to 

strengthen the alliance, but they could also help Japan 

develop certain independent capabilities. A substantive 

increase to its defense budget is one example, especially 

if spending rises above the 1 percent-of-GDP level. The 

next stage of analysis would then be to consider how this 

money is spent, either for defense of Japan needs alone, 

or perhaps for more versatile assets such as for new airlift 

capacity. This could include, for example, a few C-17 Globemaster 

cargo aircraft to complement recent purchases by 

Shimbun over the last three 

years showed that the percentage 

of citizens against any reinterpretation 

of the collective 

self-defense issue rose from 

44 percent in 2006, to 50 percent 

in 2007, and to 52 percent 

in 2008 (Mansfield Asian 

Opinion Poll Database 2008). 


51


Australia, Britain, and Canada to support international 

PKO, disaster relief, and other overseas missions. Regarding 

international missions, Japan could also make adjustments 

to allow for the SDF to protect Japanese nationals 

working abroad in dangerous circumstances. A prominent 

Japanese advisor to recent prime ministers has 

pressed this case, noting that every embassy in Baghdad 

is guarded by the armed forces of that country, except for 

Japan, which relies on local security contractors (Okamoto 

2008). 

Back on the spending side, Japan is also planning to replace 

its aging fighter aircraft for air defense, but it is not 

yet clear how many and what model the ASDF will procure. 

That decision could come in 2010. Increased money 

for space exploration would 

be another sign, especially if a 

new midair rocket launch research 

program or other joint 

U.S.-Japan projects are strongly 

supported. 65 Some Japanese 

defense analysts speculate 

that allowing MOD to put 

defense-related assets up into 

space will crowd out other investments in Japan’s zerosum 

budget process, and many fear that MD or other aerospace 

projects could suffer the most. If overall funding on 

the space and aerospace sector is not increased, then it is 

hard to say that Japan is truly concerned about the strategic 

implications of China’s programs in these areas. 

Separately, a Japanese diplomatic initiative to begin 

building modest security cooperation relationships with 

Australia, India, South Korea, and NATO could help support 

the U.S.-Japan alliance, since the Pentagon and PA- 

COM have been keen to integrate Japan more deeply and 

more often into multilateral activities. These initiatives 

could also serve as a means for Japan to hedge somewhat 

against a less robust alliance with the United States. 

There are still other steps that Japan could take that 

would signal greater emphasis on developing independent 

national security capabilities, either to supplement 

the alliance in areas where U.S. action is not expected, 

as a hedge against possible alliance disengagement in 

the future, or a bit of both. Japan’s deployment of a set 

of four information-gathering satellites over the last decade 

(against U.S. wishes) is one past example. In addition, 

65 Japan has been struggling to develop 

a cost-effective alternative to the HII rocket 

design. For years it tried to develop the GX 

rocket (by a joint venture of Ishikawajima- 

Harima Heavy Industries, Lockheed Martin, 

JAXA, and other Japanese firms). That program 

was temporarily suspended at the end 

of 2008, but the government is now reportedly 

considering backing a midair launch effort. 

66 For articles and reports supporting Japanese 

development of this capability, see Tokyo 

Foundation 2008 or Takahashi 2006. 

the defense ministry is reportedly considering new investments 

in its own early warning satellite that can detect 

ballistic missiles in their boost phase as a way to increase 

MD effectiveness, a step that might disappoint U.S. officials 

if that data is not directly connected to U.S. early 

warning systems (Japan Times 2009). The Japanese government 

is also reportedly considering funding for R&D 

for a new ultra-high-resolution information-gathering 

satellite, which U.S. officials are likely to see as a waste of 

precious resources, since the alliance already has the technology 

(albeit under U.S. control). 

A somewhat related focus of Japanese concern is the 

protection and use of its ocean resources, and for this purpose 

Japan established a headquarters for ocean policy led 

by the prime minister under its Basic Act on Ocean Policy 

of 2007. Part of the motivation behind the new law was to 

address certain maritime economic and environmental issues 

more effectively, but another key objective is to better 

protect Japan’s EEZ and defend its territorial claims. 

The ocean policy headquarters is mapping out a plan to 

enlist fishermen to act as a civilian patrol of sorts, backed 

up by Coast Guard and SDF assets (Daily Yomiuri 2009). 

Managing this effort could lead to better integration of intelligence 

gathering, reconnaissance, and command and 

control systems, which Japan might want to improve independently 

of the United States. 

Ultimately, Japan could also reconsider development 

of a preemptive strike capability, either by seeking to purchase 

Tomahawk missiles from its ally, developing its own 

surface-to-surface missile option, or procuring a new 

next-generation fighter with stealth capability. 66 Either 

of the first two options would be a significant step and 

could shorten the timeline for deployment of an indigenous 

nuclear deterrent. After all, the critical technical 

path for such deployment has more to do with building 

an effective nuclear delivery vehicle and enabling systems 

(including nuclear-powered ships or submarines), rather 

than building the weapon itself. 

As noted earlier, acquiring fissile material for a nuclear 

weapon is not a major obstacle for Japan, but pulling 

together all of the other technical and industrial components 

would be more difficult (and overcoming domestic 

political opposition would be even harder still). If the 

Japanese government really wanted to shorten the lead 

time necessary for building a nuclear deterrent, action on 

52 



those more challenging issues would be the priority (and 

therefore the areas that U.S. observers should monitor). 

The best scenario for the United States is for Japan never 

to come close to producing nuclear weapons, and the way 

to achieve that goal is to remain vigilant and attentive to 

that country’s security needs (provided, of course, that Japan 

also contributes substantially to its defense and/or 

the alliance). 

Japan is still a long way away from seriously considering 

developing its own nuclear deterrent, and the security 

environment would have to deteriorate significantly 

before that step is contemplated. In the meantime, many 

of the policy moves mentioned above would likely act as 

mile markers along the road to a different kind of alliance 

deterrence posture. As the allies travel that road, they will 

need to communicate well and work to integrate new Japanese 

policies and capabilities into the alliance framework, 

which should help to mute potentially provocative 

effects and support the shared goal of regional stability. 

NATO relevance and the Nuclear Planning 

Group 

To enhance alliance communication on extended deterrence 

strategy and related issues, several Japanese scholars 

have begun advocating the establishment of an official bilateral 

forum similar to the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 

that has operated as part of NATO since 1966. 67 As noted 

earlier, the allies did initiate a bilateral dialogue on deterrence 

and nuclear issues in 2008, as an informal consultative 

mechanism in the context of developing the next 

NPR, but this was more of an ad hoc discussion that only 

began to scratch the surface of the topic, and its future is 

uncertain. 

Promoters of a U.S.-Japan NPG point out the fluid nature 

of U.S. nuclear policy, and they believe that Japan should 

be more involved in the process of this policy planning, 

inform the United States of its priorities, and consider together 

possible responses to various contingencies. Other 

NATO experiences and innovations could also prove useful 

for the U.S.-Japan alliance, or Japan could explore ways to 

become more involved in certain NATO initiatives directly, 

such as its pooling of heavy-lift assets or in other areas. We 

will begin by reviewing a bit of history regarding NATO’s 

NPG to see what might be relevant for Japan. 

The NPG is one of NATO’s key defense decision-making 

bodies. Its task is to constantly review, adapt, or modify 

NATO’s nuclear policy in light of changing international 

security challenges and new developments. It covers 

a wide range of matters, including the status of the Alliance’s 

nuclear forces, the safety, security, and survivability 

of nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy and operational 

planning, deployment measures, consultation mechanisms 

for weapons use, as well as communications and 

information systems. In addition, the NPG takes decisions 

on broader questions of common concern, such as nuclear 

arms control and nuclear proliferation. 

The NPG is chaired by the secretary general of the North 

Atlantic Alliance, and it meets twice a year at the high level 

of defense ministers of all member countries participating 

in NATO’s integrated military structure (excluding 

France). 68 The NPG provides a forum for Alliance members 

to participate in the development of nuclear policy and in 

decisions on NATO’s nuclear posture, regardless 

of whether or not they themselves 

maintain nuclear weapons. Decisions are 

agreed upon by consensus within the NPG 

and represent the common position of all 

participating states. The NPG is supported 

by the Staff Group, which meets weekly, 

and it is advised by the High Level Group, 

a body chaired by the United States and 

consists of national policy makers and experts 

from the capitals. 

Considered one of the least known but more effective 

Western institutions, the NPG was conceived in 1965 as a 

result of the debacle of the so-called Multilateral Nuclear 

Force (MLF)—the preceding initiative for nuclear sharing 

within the Alliance (Buteux 1983). The MLF proposal called 

for the creation of a NATO-assigned fleet of twenty-five surface 

warships, armed with two hundred Polaris missiles and 

owned, controlled, and manned by crews of several NATO 

nations. Any decision to fire the missiles was to be made 

jointly by the United States and the other participants in 

the force. MLF failed partly because a “hardware solution,” 

or an operational answer to the problem of nuclear control, 

was impractical. Attention subsequently turned to finding 

a more political solution, one accomplished by “mix-manning” 

the policy, rather than the hardware. This approach 

was adopted with the formation of the NPG. 

The NPG carried out its work according to what became 

known as the Athens Guidelines on consultation, which 

67 See, for example, Takahashi 

2007, Izumi and Furukawa 2007, 

Kawakami 2007, and Japan-U.S. 

Rising Leaders Project 2008. 

68 France withdrew from 

NATO’s integrated military command 

in March 1966, but remained 

a member of NATO and 

its other structures. Although 

the country rejoined the Alliance 

military structure in 1993, 

it does not currently participate 

in the Nuclear Planning Group. 


53


69 The four permanent members were 

represented by the defense ministers of the 

United States, Britain, Germany, and Italy. 

70 Some experts regard the provisional 

guidelines as a “menu of options,” rather 

than a process of contingency planning 

to guide policy makers (for example, references 

to specific numbers of TNF were 

excluded). Their adoption is thus better 

understood as a political process designed 

to involve the allies in nuclear 

planning, to give them an understanding 

of what it entails, and to reconcile the different 

views on nuclear strategy in Europe. 

71 UK Defense Secretary Healey, 

quoted in Bluth 1995. 

established norms for graduated consultations, based on 

the principle of “more risk taken, more say granted” (Smith 

2000). An essential feature of U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara’s 

original proposal was to keep the NPG small and intimate 

to ensure a more effective exchange of views and 

decision making. The United States emphasized that Alliance 

nuclear policy should be discussed at the highest level 

among a limited number of informed participants -- essentially 

those whose views on nuclear weapons would in 

fact carry weight in determining the overall strategic NATO 

posture. (Wenger et al. 2006). Thus, the formal establishment 

of the NPG created a two-tier structure to deal with 

nuclear planning and consultation. A plenary body, the Nuclear 

Defense Affairs Committee 

(NDAC) would be open to all interested 

allies and would receive 

reports from the NPG. The NPG 

itself would be the body where 

the detailed discussion of nuclear 

matters would take place and 

consisted of the defense ministers 

of four permanent members 

(granting them considerable 

weight) and three other rotating 

members. 69 

The two-tier arrangement was necessary to accommodate 

both the desire of most Alliance members to have access 

to an area of such fundamental importance, and the 

wish of the United States to keep discussions on nuclear 

planning as small and as freewheeling as possible (Buteux 

1983). In that respect, discussion in the NPG was extemporaneous, 

based on papers shared and digested in advance. 

No verbatim or summary records of the meetings were to 

be circulated, with the exception of the release of a communiqué 

and a brief description of the actions taken. As a 

further encouragement to informal ministerial deliberations, 

the number of people permitted in the conference 

room was strictly limited. 

The NPG commissioned a number of studies related to 

the use of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in different geographic 

areas. For example, the British presented on the 

use of nuclear weapons at sea, Germany on the tactical 

use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and the United 

States on the bargaining use of nuclear weapons and demonstration 

shots. According to the European ministers, 

NATO’s objective would be essentially political, and initial 

use of theater nuclear weapons would therefore be very 

selective. In their view, since deterrence was the primary 

purpose of TNF, there was no point in planning to win a 

theater nuclear war, and the question should rather focus 

on how those forces should best be organized to serve the 

deterrence function. The United States, on the other hand, 

was more concerned with the implications if deterrence 

failed and with the military utility of TNF in such circumstances 

(Bluth 1995). 

The individual NPG member reports contributed to the 

development of general political guidelines for the initial, 

and later the follow-on, use of theater nuclear weapons by 

NATO. The Americans insisted that the guidelines be considered 

provisional, because of disagreements over use in 

an extended geographic area (that is, beyond the battlefield 

and well into Warsaw Pact territory) as well as over 

follow-on use. 70 “The theory was that you had a ladder of 

escalation, but we were never able to establish the rungs 

of the ladder because we couldn’t agree on follow-on use 

and the Americans…were against saying anything about 

follow-on use…” 71 We will return later to this image of a 

“rung-less ladder,” because it is applicable to the U.S.-Japan 

case, especially in a conventional military context. 

The novel practice ( for NATO) of inviting individual 

countries to conduct studies and prepare papers on separate 

aspects of the problem paid dividends in terms of speed 

and efficiency. This method perhaps reflected a view in 

Washington that if the NPG was to succeed, the European 

members would have to be given real responsibilities, rather 

than an indication that the United States did not take 

their work and participation seriously (Smith 2000). McNamara 

also wanted to have these studies done, so that countries 

without nuclear weapons could come to grips with 

what the use of theater nuclear weapons would actually involve. 

This resulted in serious doubts among those ministers 

regarding even the possibility of using nuclear weapons 

in a war, which was partly the point. Indirectly, this dynamic 

underscored how important it was for member nations 

to fulfill their conventional military obligations, because 

not to do so would be to risk too great a gap to emerge in 

this class of weapons vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 

With the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and 

nuclear questions, risks, and challenges almost ceased to 

be a topic of public interest in most NATO countries. The 

54 



Alliance’s nuclear strategy was being increasingly politicized, 

and NATO’s subsequent strategic concepts have emphasized 

that the purpose of the allied nuclear forces is 

political, and that, while still maintained as part of the 

Alliance’s policy of deterrence, they are no longer directed 

at a specific threat. The formulation of a deterrence capability 

would therefore not depend on the identification 

of specific targets as was the case throughout the Cold 

War, when NATO strategy moved in the direction of existential 

deterrence. The NPG forum was used by its members 

during the first half of 1992 for the negotiation of a 

set of “political principles” for nuclear planning and consultation, 

which replaced the nuclear use guidelines from 

the 1960s. The new principles, however, were much more 

general, to reflect the less predictable risks facing the Alliance, 

and to provide for more time in a crisis to develop 

additional guidance for the NATO military authorities 

(Schulte 1993). 

The nuclear weapons debate within the NPG has begun 

recently to focus more specifically on concepts and 

capabilities aimed at deterring WMD acquisition and use, 

and mitigating the consequences of their potential use in 

a conflict situation. Cost has also emerged as a critical factor 

in NATO’s consideration of a new deterrent posture, 

since dual-(nuclear-) capable aircraft deployments carry 

additional costs for deploying countries, in particular with 

regard to platform maintenance, personnel training, certification, 

and overall weapons security (Perry and Davis 

2006). Some modernization of the nuclear weapons storage 

systems in Europe, the “storage vaults,” has occurred, 

and stockpile security protection has been improved 

with the consolidation of NATO nuclear storage sites. The 

NPG is at a crossroads as the Alliance keeps growing and 

changing, while at the same time nuclear weapons play a 

smaller role in the development of NATO policy and doctrine. 

Still, members are loath to give up their one avenue 

of regular consultation on these issues. 

Being part of the overall nuclear consultation process 

via the NPG and the High Level Group is particularly important 

for NATO European nations, especially the smaller 

and newer members, who feel they can have a more or 

less equal voice with the major NATO nations and nuclear 

powers through “equal weight among allies” and the 

consensus aspects of Alliance nuclear decision making. 

For the Alliance’s newest members, nuclear deterrence 

remains a critical component of the NATO Article 5 commitment, 

and it is essential vis-à-vis Russia’s vast inventory 

of tactical nuclear weapons and possible Russian revanchism. 

72 These nations see 

NATO’s nuclear role as the glue 

that holds the Alliance together, 

although their direct influence 

on NATO’s future decisions regarding nuclear forces is 

rather limited. 

Applying the NPG model to the U.S.-Japan alliance 

would at first glance seem unnecessary and perhaps unworkable. 

Certainly nothing so extensive should be required 

of a bilateral alliance, where one of the partners 

does not even allow nuclear weapons on its territory or 

within its territorial waters. What would they have to talk 

about Of course, we know from experience that Japan 

would likely be flexible on the issue of introduction, if circumstances 

warranted, and herein lies one of the potential 

topics for discussion in a formal U.S.-Japan deterrence 

dialogue. The allies could explore what kinds of scenarios 

might warrant a reevaluation by Tokyo of the non-introduction 

policy (at least temporarily), and how such a 

decision might be made and communicated within the 

alliance. They could also consider together the various 

ways that introduction could be accomplished, the relative 

merits of each approach, how to signal these steps to 

potential adversaries, and what logistical arrangements 

might be required. 

These would be controversial subjects for the alliance 

to discuss, especially from a Japanese domestic political 

perspective, but U.S. officials are no more anxious to discuss 

details about exactly when nuclear weapons might 

(or might not) be used, and what kinds of strategies would 

be employed if deterrence failed. Moreover, there is no 

pressing need for the alliance to contemplate these particular 

issues at the moment, but it can be useful to establish 

a forum that develops a familiarity and expertise on 

these issues, so that the allies will be better prepared if 

and when the need arises. Thus, even though U.S. nuclear 

doctrine would be off the table for the foreseeable future, 

a relatively broad (albeit shallow) discussion about nuclear 

weapon policies embedded within a wider dialogue on 

deterrence issues would be appropriate and useful. 

Other less sensitive issues that could be taken up by 

a bilateral deterrence dialogue in the near term include 

72 Many allies have called for an update, 

re-conceptualization, and a 

more explicit articulation of what Article 

5 and its nuclear consultation dimension 

mean in today’s world. 


55


exploring the nexus of U.S. non-proliferation initiatives 

and deterrence credibility, examining the potential impact 

on deterrence of different ratios of nuclear stockpiles 

in the United States, Russia, and China, or desired 

levels of verification capacity. 73 The allies 

could conduct joint studies on evolving deterrence 

theory and practice (particularly 

dealing with missiles, naval skirmishes, and 

cyber attacks). They could also examine the 

potential impact of global strike initiatives 

and other conventional capabilities, as well 

as technologies and strategies relevant to 

active defenses, passive defenses, and consequence 

management. This dialogue might 

at times have an academic feel to it, but it 

would always be rooted in operational realities 

and be focused on informing the RMC 

debate. The potential for and possible structure of this 

proposed U.S.-Japan deterrence dialogue is discussed further 

under “Reshaping a More Multi-faceted Extended Deterrence,” 

below. 

The NATO example offers other potential lessons for 

the U.S.-Japan alliance beyond the NPG, because despite 

all of NATO’s deficiencies, it is still the best current example 

of an “alliance transformed.” In the last two decades, 

NATO has struggled with many issues similar to the U.S.- 

Japan case, especially in terms of broadening the situational, 

functional, and geographic context of its operation. 

Even though NATO has had to balance the interests and 

politics of multiple nations in this process, it does have the 

benefit of a better-developed institutionalized capacity to 

reconcile their differences. This is important, because alliances 

do not evolve or transform in a straight line, as we 

can see, for example, by current NATO missions outside 

of Europe. The same has been true with the United States 

and Japan, as they revised their defense guidelines in the 

1990s with an eye on North Korea, only to apply them first 

in the Indian Ocean when it became the rear-area support 

theater for operation Enduring Freedom. 

In light of the challenges ahead for the United States 

and Japan, one post-Cold War NATO debate that might 

be instructive concerned how the members could become 

“separable, but not separate” in their defense posture. The 

allies will want to develop joint capabilities that can work 

efficiently together, but that can still function effectively 

73 For a recent discussion 

of this idea, see Satoh 2009. 

74 Then-Foreign Minister 

Aso of Japan attended 

a North Atlantic Council 

meeting in Brussels in 

May 2006, the first Japanese 

foreign minister ever 

to do so. In his speech to 

the council, he suggested 

that Japan and NATO 

could some day cooperate 

in operational areas 

as well as policy coordination 

(Nishihara 2006). 

75 See, for example, Utgoff 

1997 or Ifft 2007. 

on their own if the political environment makes cooperation 

difficult ( for example, in the event of a regional territorial 

dispute that Washington wants to avoid or an international 

operation to which Japan cannot contribute). 

As in the NATO case, sorting this out will take time and a 

considerable amount of effort, but it can be done. 

A separable Japanese ability to deal with extended outer-island 

defense and similar missions has the potential 

to strengthen deterrence from an alliance perspective, 

because the threshold for deployment of these independent 

capabilities would be lower in certain circumstances, 

as only one government needs to make a decision to respond. 

Tokyo and Washington would have to coordinate 

their policies and actions closely, however, since any escalation 

of conflict could drag in the United States against 

its wishes. This could be particularly difficult to manage 

if Japan ever developed its own long-range strike capability, 

ostensibly to support this outer-island defense mission 

or to deter missile launches by North Korea against Japan. 

Fortunately, we are not currently in a situation where 

such considerations are imminent, and so the two allies 

can use this time to explore together how NATO manages 

these types of challenges and what lessons might apply to 

their situation. 

Finally, NATO is relevant because it is the best example 

of an alliance that effectively promotes collective security 

or, in a sense, collective deterrence. NATO’s history and 

circumstances are unique, to be sure, but we can point to 

certain modest U.S. and Japanese foreign policy initiatives 

that are aimed at stitching together loose security cooperation 

coalitions in East Asia for the purpose of promoting 

regional stability and, in a way, collective security. Most 

of these initiatives – signing security cooperation agreements 

with Australia and India, participating in multilateral 

exercises, and even exploring a “global partnership” 

with NATO itself – focus on non-traditional security cooperation 

such as disaster relief, maritime search and rescue, 

and UN PKO missions. 74 By discussing and practicing 

these useful but benign security activities, the nations’ defense 

communities learn more about each other, promote 

cooperation, and, it is hoped, feel more secure. In addition, 

the process of community building can also deter aggressive 

behavior by putting at stake a nation’s membership in 

this emerging group, in what has sometimes been referred 

to as collective deterrence. 75 

56 


Reshaping a more multi-faceted extended 

deterrence 

For decades, extended deterrence was characterized predominately 

by robust U.S. security commitments to its 

allies overseas, underwritten most dramatically by the 

provision of a nuclear umbrella to deter war. In the case 

of Japan, the U.S. government was making a remarkable 

commitment to an ally that was not even returning the favor 

by pledging to come to America’s defense. The United 

States took it upon itself to convince potential adversaries 

armed with nuclear weapons that it would risk a nuclear 

retaliatory strike on its own territory, if that was necessary 

to defend America’s allies abroad. Regardless of how unlikely 

it was that Washington would be forced to make that 

fateful decision “to sacrifice New York to save Tokyo,” the 

nuclear umbrella became the ultimate symbol of America’s 

promise to maintain extended deterrence. The substance 

of extended deterrence, however, has always been more 

mundane than such images as international game theory 

exercises using thermonuclear weapons might suggest. For 

this reason, deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in 

extended deterrence should not be problematic, provided 

we work proactively to shore up the multiple other components 

of deterrence. 

First and foremost, extended deterrence has been supported 

by a consistently strong U.S.-Japan political and 

economic relationship. Combine that solid relationship 

with relatively little in the way of direct external threats, 

and the credibility of extended deterrence was hardly in 

doubt. As we have explained throughout this report, some 

in Japan believe that both of these main components are 

moving in unfavorable directions. Potential threats from 

North Korea and China are increasing, and the U.S. commitment 

to Japan is perhaps more ambiguous than before. 

The nuclear umbrella may have served as a principal 

icon of the alliance in the past, but that was more by default 

than anything else. After all, it is difficult to portray 

the “strength of the alliance” in another succinct symbolic 

fashion, except perhaps when the personalities and policies 

of the nations’ top leaders correlate well with each 

other, as was arguably the case between Reagan and Nakasone, 

or George W. Bush and Koizumi. Drawing too much 

attention to U.S. forces based in Japan or Japan’s host nation 

support is not desired politically, with the possible 

exception of the forward-deployed U.S. carrier, which is 

often perceived by the public to be less of an imposition. 


So even if the nuclear umbrella was a major symbol of the 

alliance, deterrence was best served by close bilateral political 

and economic relations. 

Reshaping extended deterrence for the future requires 

continued emphasis on the political and economic relationship, 

but it also includes developing new habits of 

scenario-based defense planning and building specific 

capabilities and patterns of cooperation to counter the 

expanding array of potential threats. These new capabilities 

will have both a political and an operational function 

in the shoring up of extended deterrence. The fact that 

the new U.S. secretary of state, Hilary Clinton, visited Japan 

first in early 2009, as part of her initial tour through 

the region, was a good sign on the political front. It was 

an important symbolic gesture by the new administration, 

and there will always be opportunities to reinforce this 

sense of commitment and solidarity, but increasingly the 

strength of the alliance will be judged more by what the 

two allies do together than by such symbols or what they 

say to each other. This will take effort by both sides, as neither 

can strengthen the relationship or bolster deterrence 

on its own, and the encouraging news is that both allies 

claim to be committed to this task. 

A recent example of Japan’s relatively proactive approach 

was the release in January 2009 of a MOFA advisory 

panel report recommending several new measures 

to step up bilateral economic policy coordination to address 

global problems. The panel’s report was notable for 

its concrete proposals regarding “five pillars of the ‘new 

Japan-U.S. economic relationship’” and suggesting stronger 

inter-ministerial policy coordination and creating a 

new bilateral “global issue dialogue” (Advisory Panel for 

the Coming Global Economy and the Japan-U.S. Economic 

Relationship 2009). The report correctly points out the 

importance of bilateral cooperation to address such issues 

as climate change, global financial recovery, poverty 

alleviation, and improving foreign aid and assistance 

programs. 

The purpose of pursuing such cooperation is not necessarily 

to strengthen bilateral relations and extended deterrence, 

but we cannot overlook the indirect benefit that 

productive bilateral policy coordination at the regional and 

global level would have on bolstering deterrence. Promoting 

an image of the United States and Japan standing shoulder-to-shoulder 

to aggressively address global problems 

would be the most benign and perhaps even one of the 


57


more effective ways to maintain credible extended deterrence. 

There is a limit, however, to how much global partnering 

and solid political ties 

can buttress deterrence, and so 

any U.S. strategy to strengthen 

U.S.-Japan extended deterrence 

in Northeast Asia must also address 

specific security concerns 

and take into account new capabilities 

developed by potential 

adversaries. Some of these measures 

will likely pay political and 

psychological dividends for the 

alliance, but they are primarily 

based on strategic and operational 

considerations. 

The first step is to complete the work initiated during 

(and between) successive SCC meetings throughout the 

Bush administration, particularly starting from the SCC 

joint statement in February 2005 that outlined common 

strategic objectives. This was followed by an SCC document 

in October 2005 that approved recommendations 

for: 1) force posture realignment (such as the collocation 

of air command and control units and acceleration of the 

Futenma Marine Corps Air Station relocation), and 2) socalled 

alliance transformation (including examples of bilateral 

security cooperation to be improved under the 

RMC banner). In 2006, the SCC unveiled its “roadmap for 

realignment implementation,” which explained the plan 

to move about eight thousand Marines from Okinawa to 

Guam and replace Futenma with a new facility off Camp 

Schwab in Okinawa, among other adjustments. The most 

recent SCC joint statement, issued in May 2007 (see appendix 

A), reviewed progress and the remaining work 

to be done on the RMC dialogue and the realignment 

roadmap. 

76 The February 2005 SCC joint statement 

noted that, as consultations on 

U.S. force realignment proceeded, 

“both sides confirmed their commitment 

to maintaining deterrence and capabilities 

of U.S. forces in Japan while 

reducing the burden on local communities, 

including those in Okinawa.” 

77 The units assigned to relocate from 

Okinawa (Futenma) to Guam include 

the III MEF Command Element, 3 rd Marine 

Division Headquarters, 3 rd Marine 

Logistics Group, the 1 st Marine Air Wing 

Headquarters, and the 12 th Marine Regiment 

Headquarters. The Marine Air- 

Ground Task Force elements and combat 

service support will remain in Okinawa. 

The Bush administration’s effort at alliance transformation 

with Japan was a well-reasoned and well-intentioned 

initiative. It can boast some notable achievements 

in the areas of force posture realignment, MD deployment, 

and operational cooperation, but it did not achieve 

its primary goals before Bush’s final term ended, namely 

a more sustainable forward-deployed posture that maintains 

deterrence and transfers new roles and responsibilities 

to Japan. 76 The idea of a “more sustainable” posture 

reflects Japan’s desire to reduce the “burden” placed on 

Okinawa and other Japanese communities by hosting U.S. 

forces, and as long as Washington was repositioning other 

troops and bases elsewhere around the region, policy 

makers saw an opportunity to reduce the U.S. footprint 

in Japan in meaningful ways. Maintaining deterrence was 

to be achieved in part by deploying new U.S. assets in the 

region (as discussed in chapter 1), but also by a more integrated 

and substantive alliance role for Japan. As Deputy 

Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless described it at 

the time, “Japan in effect has agreed to transform the alliance 

with us and assume more responsibility for the alliance 

– more responsibility for roles, missions and capabilities” 

(Reuters 2006c). 

There is a roadmap in place to complete the realignment 

program, and it will be important to carry this 

through, not only because it should achieve important (if 

somewhat modest) reductions in the U.S. footprint, but 

also because failure to fully implement realignment could 

undermine bilateral trust. But realignment alone does not 

address the deterrence issues raised in this report, since it 

will not eliminate future base-related frictions or alliance 

management headaches, and dividing up the III Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) arguably degrades readiness 

to some degree. 77 If the allies are serious about maintaining 

and strengthening deterrence for the future, then they 

should move resolutely to carry out the key components 

The Road to Alliance Transformation 

Summary of key Security Consultative Committee (SCC or “2+2”) meetings during the Bush administration 

December 16, 2002 

February 19, 2005 

October 29, 2005 

May 1, 2006 

May 1, 2007 

Directed the Security Subcommittee (SSC) to consult on various alliance issues including bilateral roles and missions, force 

structures, cooperation to face regional and global challenges, and issues related to U.S. facilities in Japan. This became the 

Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) 

SCC Joint Statement released outlining the alliance’s “common strategic objectives” 

SCC document released “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” Explains the basic concepts 

of RMC, strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, and force posture realignment. 

Release of “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.” Finalizes the realignment initiatives including a Futenma 

replacement facility, U.S. force reductions and relocation to Guam, training relocations, establishing a joint operations 

coordination center at Yokota Air Base, among other changes. 

Release of “Alliance Transformation: Advancing U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation.” Reports on progress and 

next steps regarding realignment and alliance transformation (RMC and MD and operational cooperation). 

58 


of alliance transformation, which include co-basing, operational 

cooperation, and other RMC initiatives. This can 

ultimately cover a wide range of issues not generally associated 

with extended deterrence, such as intelligence 

sharing, protecting classified information, PKO cooperation, 

and other means to develop a closer alliance. As the 

final political and logistical hurdles regarding realignment 

are slowly overcome, additional time and leadership need 

to be invested by both sides in the RMC debate. 

Strengthening deterrence has less to do with going 

through the motions of implementing RMC initiatives 

and more to do with the spirit and sense of purpose in 

which they are carried out. How does the CBRN Defense 

Working Group evolve, for example, since it was highlighted 

as a sign of RMC progress in the 2007 SCC joint statement 

Does it become a low-level bureaucratic habit dealing 

with a limited set of esoteric CBRN questions, or does 

it instead serve as a catalyst for broader inter-ministry/interagency 

defense cooperation that incorporates new policy 

making or intelligence components and possibly leads 

to cooperation with other partners such as South Korea, 

Australia, or even NATO A new bilateral joint operations 

coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota AFB is another 

example, as a trial version of this initiative proved effective 

at coordinating the allies’ surveillance and tracking of 

North Korea’s missile tests in 2006. The BJOCC is scheduled 

to become a permanent alliance asset in 2010, but it 

remains to be seen how extensively it becomes involved in 

coordinating bilateral exercises, whether after-action reviews 

will be fed back into the policy making and planning 

process jointly or independently, and if the BJOCC model 

can be applied to maritime operations. 

The October 2005 SCC document listed several specific 

areas for improving cooperation, including MD and 

air defense (by most accounts, proceeding relatively well), 

as well as maritime interdiction, maritime traffic security, 

counter-proliferation operations, reconstruction assistance 

operations, PKO, and the use of seaport and airport 

facilities in Japan during emergency situations (none 

of which have proceeded very far). Part of the problem 

stems from the unfulfilled promise of the February 2005 

SCC joint statement and its articulation of common strategic 

objectives. These common objectives were divided 

into two sections (regional and global), and they were intended 

to orient subsequent discussions on realignment 


and RMC issues. But as explained at the beginning of this 

report, the allies’ divergent security priorities led each to 

focus on its own section of interest (Tokyo on regional, 

Washington on global), and the fact that Japan has had 

four prime ministers in the four years since the articulation 

of those common objectives has limited Japan’s ability 

to move proactively on a legislative agenda to support 

significant RMC changes. 

A perfect example of this situation is Japan’s inability 

to pass a generic SDF dispatch law that would clarify and 

facilitate the potential use of SDF assets in certain overseas 

missions or emergencies. High-level bureaucrats at 

Japan’s Cabinet Secretariat proposed such a law (the Ippan 

Ho) back in 2003 and expected to move the bill forward 

in 2004, and every year since an influential group 

of politicians and officials have pushed for its passage. 

With such a law, Japan would have been able to respond 

promptly and confidently to the scourge of piracy off the 

coast of Somalia peaking in 2008, but instead the government 

was bogged down by internal debate about the modalities 

for and restrictions on participating in a multilateral 

task force already formed in January 2009. These 

are understandably big challenges for Japan’s government 

to address, but they have been well understood for years, 

and these kinds of missions are unlikely to go away. The 

outlook for the Ippan Ho is still uncertain. Neither has 

Japan made progress on loosening self-imposed restrictions 

on the exercise of collective self-defense, which will 

be critical to pursuing many of the common global strategic 

objectives (as well as a few regional ones). 

Moreover, the potential for continued LDP weakness, 

political gridlock, or even historic political change in Japan 

with a possible DPJ lower house victory election in 2009 

means that these issues are even more unsettled. On the 

one hand, DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro has suggested in the 

past that Japan could participate more aggressively and 

“normally” in international PKO missions officially approved 

by the UN, possibly dispatching to places like Afghanistan 

and Sudan, and operating under more robust rules of engagement. 

On the other hand, the DPJ strongly criticized 

other international missions, such as the MSDF refueling 

operation in the Indian Ocean, it has argued against the 

realignment roadmap, and in early 2009 Ozawa remarked 

that Japanese investments in its own defense could render 

unnecessary a reliance on U.S. forward deployed forces 


59


outside of the 7th Fleet (Yomiuri Shimbum 2009). So a DPJ 

government could perhaps become a more reliable international 

partner, a more adamant abstainer from ad hoc 

coalitions, or a more independent ally focused on national 

defense. U.S. officials are not sure what to expect. 

The question creeping into Washington’s mind is 

whether or not Japan is prepared to do what it takes to aggressively 

pursue the common strategic objectives articulated 

in February 2005, and this is why the allies should revisit 

that joint statement as they seek to advance the RMC 

initiatives. The allies need to do a better job of identifying 

common priorities amongst their strategic objectives, 

if they are going to invigorate the RMC debate and give 

meaning to efforts at improving bilateral security cooperation. 

In a sense, they must realign their priorities as well 

as their forces. For example, among the “essential steps” to 

strengthen defense cooperation outlined in October 2005 

was bilateral contingency planning to take “full account 

of the changing security environment.” Most officials we 

talked to, however, report being underwhelmed with the 

progress of contingency planning beyond certain North 

Korean scenarios. In fact, scenario-based planning has 

been underutilized by the alliance, and this is an area that 

needs improvement. 

After all, as North Korea and China develop and deploy 

new military capabilities, the number of possible scenarios 

and different kinds of contingencies multiply, each 

with different operational and political implications. It 

might be appropriate that extended deterrence, as underwritten 

by the United States, relies less on U.S. strategic 

nuclear forces than before, given the importance of nonproliferation 

and enhanced conventional capabilities. But 

then this raises the question, with what will the nuclear 

component be replaced To remain credible, extended deterrence 

will need to become more conventional, 

more flexible, and more operational 

compared to the past, and this will require 

close cooperation by the allies focused initially 

on common priorities (not just common 

objectives). On this point, U.S. officials 

might need to temper their expectations, 

because it seems clear that their top priorities 

do not overlap conveniently with Japan’s (Afghanistan 

is a case in point), but it should be possible to identify either 

shared priorities amongst the common objectives or 

78 The SSC began as a 

vice-ministerial dialogue, 

but later was carried out 

at the assistant secretary/ 

director-general level. 

79 For a description of 

these committees in action 

during the 1990s, see Blaker, 

Giarra, and Vogel 2002. 

work out a trade in which they each address a role or mission 

of importance to the other. 

One way to integrate the discussion about common 

objectives and priorities with RMC issues and scenariobased 

planning is to establish a bilateral forum at the 

policy level dedicated to deterrence issues, not unlike 

NATO’s NPG mentioned above, but with a broader agenda. 

We could call it a Deterrence Policy Group (DPG) for 

now, since nuclear issues are only a small component, and 

it is not really a planning body. This U.S.-Japan DPG could 

address a wide range of issues, but the group should have 

a clear purpose focused on jointly establishing the policy 

underpinnings necessary to maintain credible deterrence 

in the face of a changing security environment. At times, 

the group might be informed by SCC decisions and documents, 

trying to bridge the bilateral policy gap, for example, 

between broad SCC statements on the one hand, and 

planning or implementation at the operational level on 

the other. In addition, it might explore particular issues 

on behalf of the SCC or jointly develop threat assessments 

and scenarios for later planning purposes. 

We do not make this recommendation of a DPG lightly, 

since we understand the extensive array of bilateral 

committees, working groups, task forces, and Track 2 dialogues 

that already exist within the alliance (and which 

keep most officials and military officers working twelvehour 

days as it is). Many of these modes of bilateral communication 

and coordination operate as part of the socalled 

Comprehensive Mechanism, and they have gone a 

long way in improving bilateral communication and cooperation 

compared to the days when direct communication 

between the Pentagon and the JDA was almost nonexistent. 

But it is true that many subcommittees and bilateral 

initiatives have come and gone (and come back again) 

over the years, depending on the needs of the times, so 

perhaps a new deterrence dialogue could simply utilize 

one of these underused consultative mechanisms. However 

this dialogue is carried forward, it ought to be oriented 

around the issue of deterrence, in all of its forms. 

One example of an underutilized forum is the directorgeneral-level 

Security Sub-Committee (SSC), which saw 

action in the 1980s, 1990s, the early 2000s during periods 

of intense bilateral consultations and negotiations. 78 There 

were even frequent “mini-SSC” meetings held at the deputy 

level to support the SSC. 79 Another similar forum called 

60 



the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), which 

officially assists the SCC, was used extensively when the 

Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation were developed 

in the 1970s (and revised in the 1990s), but it fell by 

the wayside each time after the guidelines were approved. 

As a former JDA vice-minister lamented, “Because of its 

purpose, I felt that the SDC would now take on many discussion 

topics, but…after the ‘Guidelines’ were approved 

by mutual consent…the SDC was only rarely used. I am 

dissatisfied…that as the people involved changed, they 

refused to use this forum in the way that it was intended” 

(Maruyama 1996). 

Whether the allies use the SSC, the SDC, or create a 

new DPG, the important point is to invest time and place 

a special emphasis on a deterrence dialogue that incorporates 

more detailed analysis about potential threats, common 

objectives, and the implications for roles, missions, 

and capabilities. Nuclear issues could be one agenda item, 

addressing some of the issues mentioned before with regard 

to U.S. nuclear policy, non-proliferation initiatives, or 

potential introduction scenarios, but the DPG would also 

consider a wider array of deterrence components, perhaps 

even including joint studies of the efficacy of signaling 

economic sanctions or diplomatic steps to deter unwanted 

action. More thought needs to be given to deterring 

lower threshold conflicts including cyberattacks, missile 

launches, and maritime skirmishes. The allies could consider 

what “separable, but not separate” might consist of, 

and what are the potential advantages or drawbacks of Japan 

developing a long-range strike capability. 

This brings us back to the issue of a “rung-less” conflict-escalation 

ladder, mentioned above in the NATO discussion, 

and this could be one of the candidate topics for 

discussion in a new U.S.-Japan DPG. The United States and 

Japan have developed a concept of operations when an 

armed attack against Japan takes place, and this is broken 

down into different types of operations based on the nature 

of the hypothetical attack (such as attack by sea or attack 

by air). Similarly, bilateral cooperation in “situations 

in areas surrounding Japan” are also outlined to some degree, 

but the allies have not used sufficiently corresponding 

scenario-based planning to map out in detail how a 

potential conflict might unfold and how they would respond 

(jointly and independently). As deterrence in East 

Asia becomes more complex and multi-dimensional, then 

U.S.-Japan Alliance: a notional conflict escalation ladder 

large-scale conventional 

and/or nuclear retaliation 

pre-emptive conventional strike 

how many rungs 

show of naval force 

introduction of new 

military capabilities 

coordinated diplomatic 

statements 

increase intelligence activity 

developing a more coherent and common understanding 

of a possible escalation ladder (and how and when to signal 

to adversaries) becomes increasingly important. Our 

project research revealed surprisingly little agreement 

among defense planners and policy makers in both countries 

regarding what different conflict-escalation ladders 

might look like, how they might be controlled, or even 

how tall (or short) they are. Some assumed that conflicts 

would escalate rather quickly, while others perceived 

a longer series of rungs that the allies could potentially 

climb up or down. The allies need to develop a clearer 

common picture in this regard. 

Some highly respected foreign policy scholars in Japan, 

for example, have identified ballistic missiles as “the 

most imminent military threat against Japan,” 

and they claim that missiles repre- 

80 Professors Kitaoka Shinsent 

“the highest priority issue” for defense 

planners (Tokyo Foundation 2008). 80 They 

note that the “deterrence power of denial by the MD system 

ichi and Tanaka Akihiko from 

the University of Tokyo led the 

project that issued this report. 


61


alone is not sufficient,” and that it “must be supplemented 

by the deterrent of punitive measures,” which is supplied 

by the United States. The allies have rarely discussed, however, 

precisely how these two components of deterrence 

would actually complement each other in various scenarios, 

nor have they clarified how threats of escalation can 

(or should) be conveyed to potential adversaries. 

If North Korea were caught preparing for a missile 

launch with ambiguous intent, for example, how might the 

allies signal their possible response (understanding that 

any response could involve a combination of diplomatic, 

economic, and military measures) If a North Korean missile 

did cause damage or loss of life in Japan or in the Sea 

of Japan, would the allies retaliate, and if so, how Would 

the retaliation be proportionate or purposefully disproportionate, 

so as to discourage future attacks What kind 

of response would they expect in return, and how might 

China or South Korea react These are just some of the 

questions that could be studied in a DPG forum. 

The purpose of a DPG forum would be to strengthen 

alliance confidence, to reinvigorate RMC discussions in a 

way that better supports extended deterrence objectives, 

and most importantly to promote regional stability by reducing 

the likelihood of miscalculation and promoting 

the resolution of disputes by peaceful means. Efforts to 

strengthen deterrence, therefore, should go hand in hand 

with other regional security initiatives (be they bilateral, 

trilateral, or multilateral). This should be done thoughtfully 

and carefully, because the allies will want to avoid 

the appearance of trying to contain China. The best way 

to do that is to actually avoid containing China in substance. 

Deterrence, after all, is not containment, as the 

fundamental policy objectives (and their instruments) are 

different between the two. 

China does not deserve to be contained. It has not 

demonstrated a tendency toward expansionist behavior, 

nor does it consider the United States or its allies to be 

irreconcilable adversaries. The allies and China have extensive 

economic ties and they cooperate constructively 

on various initiatives throughout the world (including security 

initiatives). That does not mean that they agree on 

all issues, or that some Chinese policies don’t undermine 

U.S. and Japanese national and security interests at times, 

but it is not a situation that requires containment. Instead, 

this is a relationship that should be explored and nurtured, 

with great potential benefit to the nations involved, the 

region, and the world. Steps by the allies to strengthen 

deterrence, therefore, should be aimed at promoting regional 

stability and try to avoid contributing to a security 

dilemma. 

Still, it would be foolish to think that China will never 

seek economic and strategic advantage where it can, or 

that North Korea will not try to advance its interests at the 

expense of others if it feels protected by expanding missile 

and WMD programs. The security situation could become 

tenser still if accompanied by an extended global recession 

and environmental degradation or climate change. 

Deterrence remains important because it prevents other 

nations from being tempted to exploit perceived advantages. 

Weak deterrence can be just as destabilizing as “too 

much” deterrence, if not more so. Carried out effectively, 

deterrence can provide security without provocation, 

and it can actually promote cooperation and compromise 

by demonstrating clearly that those are the only means 

by which disputes will be resolved. Because striking this 

balance can be particularly difficult, close consultations 

among the allies will be important. 

In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, extended deterrence 

was the early foundation of bilateral security cooperation 

codified almost fifty years ago (in 1960), but a 

lot has changed since that time. Today East Asia is much 

wealthier than before and more technologically advanced, 

the region and the world are more interdependent, and 

Japan’s role within the alliance has expanded and grown. 

The role of nuclear weapons as a prominent feature of deterrence 

is diminishing, but the need for deterrence has 

not gone away, and in many ways it is today a subtler and 

more complex challenge than it has ever been. Addressing 

this challenge presents an opportunity for the alliance, an 

opportunity to reshape extended deterrence for the twenty-first 

century in ways that strengthen and diversify the 

bilateral relationship, and ultimately contribute to regional 

stability and prosperity. This is both the challenge and 

the promise of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

62 


Appendix A 

May 2007 Joint Statement of the 

Security Consultative Committee 

Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee 

Alliance Transformation: Advancing U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation 

May 1, 2007 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 

Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso 

Minister of Defense Fumio Kyuma 

I. Overview 

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is the bedrock of Japan’s 

defense and the keystone of peace and security in the 

Asia-Pacific region. The members of the Security Consultative 

Committee (SCC) welcomed recent advances in bilateral 

security and defense cooperation, consistent with the 

vision laid out in SCC meetings and statements over the 

past two years. The North Korean provocations, including 

missile launches in July and a nuclear test in October 2006, 

serve as stark reminders of the importance of transforming 

the U.S.-Japan Alliance to ensure its continued effectiveness 

in the ever-changing security environment. 

The SCC members recognized that, just as today’s expanding 

U.S.-Japan cooperation was enabled by previous 

efforts to update and consolidate the alliance that began 

years ago, so too will investments that the two countries 

make in the alliance today enable and ensure effective 

alliance responses to future challenges to peace and 

security. 

Additionally, the SCC members stressed the importance 

of the traditional role of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 

and Security, which has enabled a life-of-thealliance 

presence for U.S. forces in Japan while providing 

U.S. security assurances to the Government of Japan. U.S. 

extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and 

regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range 

of U.S. military capabilities -both nuclear and non-nuclear 

strike forces and defensive capabilities-form the core 

of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to 

the defense of Japan. 

In this context, the SCC members emphasized the 

need to expand and deepen bilateral intelligence cooperation 

and information sharing in order to respond more 

effectively to emerging security challenges. They also decided 

to strengthen mechanisms to protect classified 

materials. 

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Shinzo 

Abe met on November 18, 2006 and called for a review 

of U.S.-Japan bilateral security cooperation, especially in 

the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD), reiterating 

its importance during their April 27, 2007 summit meeting. 

The SCC members focused on this agenda today in 

the context of common strategic objectives and alliance 

transformation. 

The SCC Members also welcomed the elevation of Japan’s 

defense organization from agency to ministry status 

and the redefinition of the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) 

international peace cooperation activities as part of their 

primary missions. 

II. Common Strategic Objectives 

The U.S. and Japan are committed to promoting fundamental 

values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the 

rule of law in the international community. On February 

19, 2005, the SCC members identified common strategic 

objectives that provide a broad basis for advancing bilateral 

cooperation. 


app:1


At today’s meeting, the SCC members reconfirmed 

their commitment to these common strategic objectives, 

taking the current international security environment 

into account. In this context, they welcomed the “Initial 

Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” 

adopted at the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks on February 

13, 2007, and urged North Korea to expeditiously meet 

its commitments described in the statement. 

During their discussions, the SCC members highlighted 

the following strategic objectives that advance the interests 

of both countries: 

• Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula 

through the Six-Party Talks and fully implementing 

the Joint Statement of September 

19, 2005, which envisions progress in other areas, 

including: the normalization of relations between 

North Korea and the United States and 

Japan, respectively; resolution of humanitarian 

issues, such as the matter of abductions; and 

commitment by all Six Parties to join efforts for 

lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. 

• Achieving swift and full implementation of United 

Nations Security Council Resolution (UN- 

SCR) 1718, noting that all United Nations Member 

States remain obliged to comply with the 

provisions of that Chapter VII resolution. 

• Recognizing the importance of China’s contributions 

to regional and global security, further encouraging 

China to conduct itself as a responsible 

international stakeholder, improve transparency 

in its military affairs, and maintain consistency 

between its stated policies and actions. 

• Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia- 

Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 

as the pre-eminent regional economic forum, 

recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, 

security, and prosperity in the region. 

• Supporting efforts made by the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote 

democratic values, good governance, 

the rule of law, human rights, fundamental 

freedoms, and a unified market economy in 

Southeast Asia, and building regional capacity 

and cooperation on critical non-traditional 

and transnational security issues bilaterally 

and through the ASEAN Regional Forum. 

• Further strengthening trilateral cooperation 

among the United States, Japan, and Australia 

in the region and around the world, including 

in the areas of security and defense, based 

on shared democratic values and interests. 

• Continuing to build upon partnerships with India 

to advance areas of common interests and 

increase cooperation, recognizing that India’s 

continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, 

freedom, and security of the region. 

• Ensuring Afghanistan’s successful economic reconstruction 

and political stabilization, which 

is essential to securing broader regional security 

and to defeating terrorism. To that end, the 

United States and Japan are both committed to 

supporting Afghanistan’s transition, which requires 

reconstruction, development, and security. 

• Contributing to building a united, democratic Iraq 

capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, 

while remaining an ally in the War on Terror. 

• Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 

1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance 

with its International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) requirements. Noting the international 

community’s continuing concerns regarding Iran’s 

activities in the Middle East, both countries share 

the view that Iran must play a more positive role 

in the international community by demonstrating 

responsible behavior on the issue of terrorism. 

• Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) cooperation, recognizing that 

NATO’s global contributions to peace and security 

and the common strategic objectives of the U.S.- 

Japan Alliance are consistent and complementary. 

III. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities 

On October 29, 2005, the SCC approved the document, “U.S.- 

Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the 

Future,” which outlined initiatives on roles, missions, and 

capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces. Following through 

on the security agenda laid out in that SCC document is imperative 

to the alliance’s ability to respond to diverse challenges 

in the contemporary security environment. 

app:2 


The SCC members reviewed progress in updating roles, 

missions, and capabilities in line with this alliance transformation 

vision and highlighted: 

• The redefinition of the SDF’s primary mission to 

include international peace keeping operations, 

international disaster relief operations, and responses 

to situations in areas surrounding Japan, 

which reflects growing attention to the importance 

of Japan’s contributions to improving the international 

security environment. In this context, 

the SCC members discussed SDF’s assistance for 

Iraq’s reconstruction efforts as well as its support 

to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean. 

• Sustained progress in developing more specific 

planning to reflect the evolving security environment 

and to better posture our two forces 

to operate together in a regional crisis. Because 

such planning requires further coordination in 

a wide range of functions and fields, active participation 

of relevant ministries and agencies in 

the bilateral planning process will remain vital. 

• Substantive agreement between the two governments 

concerning security measures for the 

protection of classified military information, 

also known as a General Security of Military Information 

Agreement (GSOMIA). The GSOMIA 

will facilitate information exchange and establish 

a common basis of information security 

contributing to sharing of intelligence and defense 

program and operational information. 

• Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense 

Working Group to make steady progress in improving 

readiness and interoperability of U.S. and 

Japanese forces against CBRN weapons, ensuring 

sustained operational capability in the event 

of an attack by weapons of mass destruction. 

• Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency 

coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, 

operational, intelligence, and public affairs 

positions before and during crisis situations. 

• Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises 

to strengthen interoperability and advance 

alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. 


The SCC members, recognizing the growing importance 

of the U.S. force presence to Japanese and regional 

security, stressed the requirement for appropriate 

resources to ensure the success of the alliance transformation 

agenda. Both allies will also make best efforts to 

secure resources to improve alliance capabilities and to 

sustain the presence of U.S. forces in Japan. 

IV. Implementation of the Realignment 

Roadmap 

The SCC members reaffirmed their resolve to steadily implement 

the realignment initiatives described in the May 

2006 SCC document, “United States-Japan Roadmap for 

Realignment Implementation.” These initiatives, when implemented, 

will enhance U.S. and Japanese public support 

for the security alliance. 

The SCC members reviewed and appreciated the progress 

made thus far with the initiatives described in the 

“Roadmap” including: 

• The creation of a bilateral coordination mechanism 

in June 2006 providing implementation 

oversight for the realignment initiatives; 

• Japanese Diet action on legislation and 

funding required to facilitate early implementation 

of realignment initiatives; 

• Elaboration of the engineering and technical 

design for the Futenma Replacement Facility 

and the initiation of surveys in the water 

areas offshore of Camp Schwab; 

• Significant cooperation toward relocation 

of the III Marine Expeditionary Force 

(MEF) personnel and their dependents from 

Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including: 

»» The U.S. creation and funding of a Joint Guam 

Program Office to oversee planning and development 

of the facilities in Guam; 

»» The launch of the U.S. environmental impact 

assessment process, including Notice of Intent 

to prepare an Environmental Impact 

Statement, for the relocation of U.S. Marine 

Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam; and 

»» Submission of the above-mentioned legislation 

to the Japanese Diet authorizing the Japan 

Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) 

to take appropriate measures under the direction 

of the Japanese government to fulfill a 

appendix 

app:3


portion of Japan’s financial commitments related 

to the relocation of III MEF personnel 

and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam. 

• Commencement of the aircraft training 

relocation program in March 2007; 

• Implementation of flexible-use of Yokota airspace 

measures in September 2006 and agreement in 

October 2006 for return of portions of Yokota airspace 

to Japanese control by September 2008 and 

for collocation of SDF controllers at the Yokota 

radar approach control (RAPCON). These measures 

will help facilitate the movement of civilian 

aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying 

military operational requirements; and 

• October 2006 launching of the Study Group 

on the specific conditions and modalities 

for possible civil-military dual-use of Yokota 

Air Base, as specified in the “Roadmap.” 

The SCC members reaffirmed that completion of the 

Futenma Replacement Facility, in accordance with the 

“Roadmap” by the target date of 2014, is the key to successful 

and timely implementation of the overall realignment 

plan for Okinawa, including the III MEF relocation 

to Guam and subsequent consolidation of remaining facilities 

and areas on Okinawa. The SCC members acknowledged 

the significant progress on a detailed consolidation 

plan and directed their staffs to continue close consultations 

toward its completion. 

The SCC members also appreciated continued progress 

in implementation of commitments under the 1996 

Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) final report, 

including return of the Senaha Communications Facility 

in September 2006, and the Sobe Communications 

Facility and the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in December 

2006, totaling more than 300 hectares/750 acres. 

V. Strengthening BMD and Operational 

Cooperation 

Alliance BMD capabilities, which contribute to the Alliance’s 

overall deterrence posture, are strengthened to the 

extent that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together 

effectively. The SCC members confirmed that, as both countries 

develop and deploy capabilities, every effort must be 

made to ensure tactical, operational, and strategic coordination. 

In that light, the United States and Japan will take 

appropriate measures, in close coordination, in response 

to ballistic missile threats against alliance interests. 

In this context, the SCC members highlighted the following 

areas of operational cooperation: 

• To strengthen operational cooperation, bilateral 

planning efforts must take into account missile 

defense capabilities, today and in the foreseeable 

future. To that end, the two sides’ forces 

will clarify concepts, roles, and missions for each 

side in the conduct of missile defense and related 

operations in response to ballistic missile 

threats. At the same time, a policy-level forum 

will ensure that policy guidance for BMD 

operations is unambiguous and current. 

• On October 29, 2005, the SCC directed the creation 

of a bilateral joint operations coordination 

center (BJOCC). During the North Korean 

missile provocations of June-July 2006, the United 

States and Japan exchanged information in 

a timely manner, including through an interim 

coordination facility at Yokota Air Base with 

SDF liaisons. The success of this facility in ensuring 

that both sides had a common awareness of 

the evolving situation validated the importance 

of continuous enhancement of bilateral policy/ 

operational coordination including through establishment 

of the BJOCC at Yokota Air Base. 

• Recognizing the importance of improving the 

situational awareness of U.S. forces and the SDF, 

the two sides are committed to the routine sharing 

of BMD and related operational information 

directly with each other on a real-time, continuous 

basis. The two sides will also develop a 

bilateral common operational picture (COP). 

• The two sides will establish a comprehensive information-sharing 

roadmap to identify broader operational 

information and data to be shared in support 

of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities. 

VI. Enhancing BMD System Capabilities 

The SCC members noted with satisfaction that past alliance 

decisions about missile defense, coupled with recent 

accelerated cooperation, have strengthened BMD capabilities 

in the region. 

They highlighted key advances, including: 

app:4 



• The operational deployment of a U.S. X-Band radar 

system to Air SDF Shariki Base, Japan, with associated 

U.S. delivery of radar data to Japanese forces. 

• The operational deployment of a U.S. PAC-3 

battalion to Kadena Air Base, Japan. 

• The recent and continuing addition of Standard 

Missile (SM-3) defense capabilities to the forwarddeployed 

naval forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. 

• Japan’s decision to accelerate modification of 

its Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities. Japan 

will complete modification of DDG Kongo by 

the end of 2007, and will expedite modification 

of DDGs Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima. 

• Japan’s decision to expedite the deployment of 

PAC-3, which resulted in deployment of the first 

PAC-3 fire unit in March 2007 and its goal to deploy 

16 PAC-3 capable fire units by early 2010. 

• Priority focus on U.S.-Japan cooperative development 

of the next generation SM-3 interceptor. 

The basic agreement on a framework for technology 

transfer reached by the two sides will facilitate 

progress on this project as well as in future 

U.S.-Japan technology cooperation projects. 

The SCC members confirmed that advancing the alliance 

transformation agenda for security and defense cooperation 

will contribute to regional and global peace and 

security. 

appendix 

app:5

Appendix B 

Abbreviations, Acronyms, 

and Initialisms 

ABM 

AEW&C 

AFB 

APEC 

ASAT 

ASDF 

ASEAN 

BJOCC 

BMD 

CBRN 

COP 

CTBT 

DMZ 

DPG 

DPJ 

DPRK 

EEZ 

FBR 

GDP 

GPR 

GPS 

GSOMIA 

HEU 

HNS 

IAEA 

ICBM 

IFPA 

ILE 

INF 

IRBM 

JAEA 

JAXA 

JBIC 

JDA 

JETRO 

JNFL 

LCS 

LDP 

LEU 

LPH 

LWR 

MaRV 

MD 

Anti-Ballistic Missile 

airborne early warning and control 

Air Force Base 

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 

anti-satellite 

Air Self-Defense Force 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

bilateral joint operations coordination center 

ballistic missile defense 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

common operational picture 

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 

demilitarized zone 

Deterrence Policy Group 

Democratic Party of Japan 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

exclusive economic zone 

fast breeder reactor 

gross domestic product 

Global Posture Review 

Global Positioning System 

General Security of Military Information Agreement 

highly enriched uranium 

host-nation support 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

intercontinental-range ballistic missile 

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 

Institute for Laser Engineering 

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

intermediate-range missile 

Japan Atomic Energy Agency 

Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 

Japan Bank for International Cooperation 

Japan Defense Agency 

Japan External Trade Organization 

Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. 

littoral combat ship 

Liberal Democratic Party 

low-enriched uranium 

amphibious landing and transport vessel 

light-water reactor 

maneuvering re-entry vehicle 

missile defense 

app:6 


MEF 

METI 

MEXT 

MIRV 

MLF 

MOD 

MOFA 

MOX 

MRBM 

MSDF 

MTW 

NATO 

NDAC 

NDPG 

NGO 

NNWS 

NPG 

NPR 

NPT 

NWS 

OEF 

PACOM 

PGS 

PKO 

PLA 

PLAAF 

PLAN 

PSI 

QDR 

R&D 

RAPCON 

RMC 

ROK 

RRW 

SACO 

SAM 

SCC 

SDC 

SDF 

SEAD 

SLBM 

SLCM 

SLOCs 

SPRC 

SRBM 

SSBN 

SSC 

SSGN 

SSN 

TNF 

UAV 

UK 

UN 

UNSCR 

USFJ 

WMDs 

Marine Expeditionary Force 

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 

multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle 

Multilateral Nuclear Force 

Japan Ministry of Defense 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

mixed-oxide 

medium-range ballistic missile 

Maritime Self-Defense Forces 

major theater war 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee 

National Defense Program Guideline 

nongovernmental organization 

non-nuclear weapon state 

Nuclear Planning Group 

Nuclear Posture Review 

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 

nuclear weapon state 

operation Enduring Freedom 

U.S. Pacific Command 

prompt global strike 

peacekeeping operation 

People’s Liberation Army 

PLA Air Force 

PLA Navy 

Proliferation Security Initiative 

Quadrennial Defense Review 

research and development 

radar approach control 

roles, missions, and capabilities 

Republic of Korea 

reliable replacement nuclear warhead 

Special Action Committee on Okinawa 

surface-to-air missile 

Security Consultative Committee 

Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation 

Self-Defense Force 

suppression of enemy air defenses 

submarine-launched ballistic missile 

sea-launched cruise missile 

sea lines of communication 

Strategic Posture Review Commission 

short-range missile 

ballistic missile submarine 

Security Sub-Committee 

conventional guided missile submarine 

nuclear-powered attack submarine 

theater nuclear forces 

unmanned aerial vehicle 

United Kingdom 

United Nations 

United Nations Security Council Resolution 

U.S. Forces Japan 

weapons of mass destruction 


appendix 

app:7

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app:16 


About the Author and 

the Institute for Foreign 

Policy Analysis 

James L. Schoff is associate-director of Asia-Pacific Studies 

at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, where he 

specializes in East Asian security and non-proliferation issues, 

international crisis management, and U.S. alliance 

relations in the region. Mr. Schoff has spent twenty years 

working both in the private sector and the foreign policy 

research community on Asia-related issues, including five 

years living in Japan. He joined IFPA in 2003, after serving as 

the program officer in charge of policy studies at the United 

States-Japan Foundation. Recent publications include 

Nuclear Matters in North Korea: Building a Multilateral Response 

for Future Stability in Northeast Asia (Potomac Books, 

2008) (co-author); Political Fences & Bad Neighbors: North 

Korea Policy Making in Japan & Implications for the United 

States (IFPA, 2006); Tools for Trilateralism: Improving U.S.- 

Japan-Korea Cooperation to Manage Complex Contingencies 

(Potomac Books, 2005); and Alliance Diversification and the 

Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship (Potomac 

Books, 2004) (co-author). Mr. Schoff graduated from Duke 

University and earned an M.A. in international relations at 

the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International 

Studies (SAIS). He also studied for one year at International 

Christian University (ICU) in Tokyo, Japan. 

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) is an independent, 

nonpartisan and not-for-profit (501(c)(3)) research 

organization that conducts research, publishes 

studies, convenes seminars and conferences, promotes education, 

and trains policy analysts in the fields of foreign 

policy and national security affairs. The institute maintains 

a staff of specialists at its offices in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 

and Washington, D.C. IFPA is associated with the 

Fletcher School, Tufts University. Since its founding in 1976, 

IFPA has provided a forum for the examination of political, 

economic, security, and defense-industrial issues confronting 

the United States in a rapidly changing world. 


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