Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

26. The public receives only fragmented information on intelligence activity to detect
and prevent terrorism. Yet, even from the little that is available, it is clear that in
spite of the fact that the achievements of intelligence organizations in providing
early warning of terrorist acts are impressive, gathering information on terrorist
groups is much more difficult than gathering information on regular army
movements, where there are permanent facilities, weapon systems that cannot be
hidden, and detectable communications traffic.
27. See 96 th Congress, 2 nd Session, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. Hearings
on the Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy Process (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1980).
28. T. Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets (1981).
29. U.S. Senate/Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Analysis and the
Oil Issue, 1973-1974, Staff Report of the Sub-Committee on Collection,
Production, and Quality, 95 th Congress, 1 st Session (December 1977).
30. T. L. Hughes, The Fate of Facts in the World of Men, p. 24. (1976).
31. On deception see: B. Whaley, Codeword Barbarosa (1973). D. Daniel and K.
Hering (Eds.), Strategic Military Deception (1982). Charles Cruickshank,
Deception in World War II (1979). J. C. Masterman, The Double Cross System
(1972). R. J. Heuer, Jr., “Strategic deceptioin: A psychological perspective”
(1981). M. Handel, “Intelligence and deception” (1982).
32. J. March and H. Simon, Organizations (1958).
T. G. Fain, The intelligence Community: History, Organization and Issues
(1977).