Fundamental Surprises Zvi Lanir Decision Research 1201 Oak ...

the surprise. Nor was it restricted to Israel public opinion, which might have been
heavily influenced by strong and sometimes indirect impressions, was made in a long
series of academic studies, so that it represents not only the national, juridical, and social
consensus, but also the scientific one.
Following the established academic concept of surprise, which identifies surprise
with a failure to provide early warning, Israel academic studies of the Yom Kippur War
attributed he Yom Kippur surprise to warning failure. These studies viewed the IDF as
utterly surprised, blaming the enemy’s initial achievements on failure to warn. 6
To examine how this explanation fits the evidence, it is first necessary to examine
the precise definition of “early warning.” It is well accepted among strategic surprise
scholars that early warning is a relative concept. “Early warning” is usually held to be
achieved when intelligence discerns “signals” and transfers them to the decision makers
within a period of time that enables implementation of predetermined measures for
counteracting potential enemy advantages originating in surprise. 7
If success or failure of early warning should be judged according to criteria set in
advance, the crucial questions become: How did the Israel General Staff view the risks
involved in an Arab surprise attack What steps were considered adequate to deal with a
surprise attack What military plans were actually made In order to answer these
questions we look at Israel’s military guidelines, contingency plans, and operational
preparations, as well as at the implicit conceptions prevailing in the General Staff and
political circles. 8
B. Warning in Israel War Plans on the Eve of the Yom Kippur War
In early August 1972, a war game—“Iron Ram”—was executed in the IDF’s
Southern Command. Its purpose was to test the IDF’s plans for a possible full-scale war
on the Egyptian assault that achieved initial territorial achievements east of the Suez
Canal, as part of an overall attempt to conquer the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.
Insert Map about here
The “war” began at 0500. At daybreak, the Egyptians set up three bridgeheads
along the canal (one in the north in the Kantara area, the second in the center in the
Firdan Bridge area, and the third in the south in the Kubrit area). Achieving initial
success, four infantry divisions, accompanied by about 380 tanks, bridged and crossed