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Evolving Global

Nuclear

Safeguards and

Security Regimes

BY WARREN STERN, BNL

SUPPORTED BY NNSA’S NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS INITIATIVE


The Conundrum: Weapons versus

energy


Basic Message

Nuclear safeguards and security

regimes change over time;

political will changes, and

technology changes.

Synergies between Nuclear

Safeguards;

Get ready for the future


What is similar about Safeguards

and Security






OBJECTIVES:

Safeguards: Detect/Deter diversion by states

Security: Detect/Deter/Prevent diversion by non-state actors

Basic requirement for both: effective domestic nuclear

accountancy system (SSAC).

Tools: Detectors, nuclear forensics, containment

Role of the IAEA central to both

Both have evolved substantially in the past decade


What is different


State adversary (diversion of material) versus non-state adversary (theft or sabotage of material)


Safeguards have stronger legal basis (e.g., NPT Article III)



Safeguards regime is inherently international.

Security regime has historically been seen as a domestic responsibility



Verification by IAEA is inherent in Safeguards

Verification of appropriate physical protection as part of security regime is responsibility of the

State



Safeguards prevent by risk of detection

Security prevents theft and sabotage by implementation of physical protection system

(detection, delay, and response)


Evolution of safeguards regime

Early Concepts (1945-46)




Bilateral Safeguards

Safeguards Concepts embedded in IAEA Statute

IAEA INFCIRC/26 – INFCIRC/66 Safeguards

IAEA INFCIRC/153 Safeguards and the NPT (1971)



Model Protocol

What’s Next


Early Negotiations for Nuclear

Control





International Control—Acheson-Lilienthal Report: international

atomic development authority-- Baruch Plan

UN Atomic Development Authority which would exercise control

over ―all phases of the development and use of atomic energy,

starting with raw material‖

Sanctions for illegal possession of nuclear weapons or possession or

separation of nuclear materials or interfering with the Authority’ s

activities.

No veto in the UNSC


Atoms for Peace (1953) and the

creation of the IAEA (1957)

Mission:




Promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Assuring Safety

Assuring application exclusively for peaceful purposes

Safeguards




When the Agency itself provides assistance

At the request of parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement

At the request of a state


INFCIRC/26 and INFCIRC/66

Safeguards








Replaced bilateral safeguards

Applied ONLY to supplied item listed and nuclear material produced as

a result of supplied items

Safeguards principles and procedures

Replaced earlier ad-hoc arrangements

Uniform basis for application of safeguards

Extended over time to all sizes of reactors, reprocessing plants and fuel

fabrication plants

Temporary application on certain facilities

Implemented ―in a manner designed to avoid hampering a State’s

economic or technical development….‖take every precaution to protect

commercial and industrial secrets‖


NPT (1970) and INFCIRC/153

Safeguards: A New Era (1971)







Safeguards on ALL nuclear material in ALL Peaceful Activities

Under Agreements negotiated with the IAEA

A condition of supply by all NPT parties on especially designed

equipment and material in any NNWS

Ambiguity in application as it relates to undeclared material and

activities.

Requires maintenance of a State System of Accountancy and

Control

IAEA verifies State’s finding based on INDEPENDENT measurements


Goals: timeliness and significant

quantity

ELEMENT

SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY

Plutonium

8 kg

U-233 8 kg

U-235 in HEU 25 kg of contained U-235

U-235 in LEU 75 kg of contained U-235

10 t natural uranium

or

20 t depleted uranium

Thorium

20 t


Basic Concepts

Objective:

Timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear

material for nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown and

deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

Material Accountancy is of fundamental importance. Containment

and surveillance are complement measures.

Agency verifies quantities in a material balance area and the material

unaccounted for.


Basic Technical Elements of

Safeguards


Nuclear material accounting

Some difficult to measure

Some created and destroyed

MBA

MUF

Containment/Surveillance

physical containment, seals, cameras, radiation (gamma and

neutron counting systems), motion sensors, environmental sampling


Equipment


Types of Inspection




Ad hoc—To verify state’s initial declaration, changes since initial

declaration and before transfer out or into State

Routine---

Verify reports are consistent with records

Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all subject

nuclear material

Verify causes of material unaccounted for

Special Inspections

If the Agency considers that information made available by the state is

not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities.


Special Inspections




Theory: whenever information available to it ―is not adequate for

the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities‖

Combines with the ―anytime, anywhere‖ provisions in the statute

Rarely requested: DPRK, Romania, not Syria.

INFCIRC/153

SPECIAL INSPECTIONS

73. The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make special inspections …

if the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including

explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is

not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement.


Further evolution after Iraq: The

Model Protocol





UNSCR 687—Unlimited

Access, but focus on specific

sites

Environmental sampling

Fuel cycle activities not

required by INFCIRC/153

Lessons from South Africa,

DPRK, Libya, Iran, Syria


Improvements leading to Model

Protocol


Early provision of design information-

60/90 days before nuclear material introduced decision to build

(1992)

New interpretation/modification of subsidiary arrangement (1993)



Board re-affirmation of Special Inspection right and application to

nuclear activities anywhere: ―correctness and completeness‖ (1992,

1995)

Clarification that safeguards to provide ―credible assurance of the

absence of undeclared nuclear material‖ in State (1994-95)

Technical improvements, Programme 93+2


Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540):

―Sharper teeth‖-1997








Grants the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites to provide

assurances about declared and possible undeclared activities

State provision of information about all parts of State’s nuclear fuel cycle.


Includes uranium mines and thorium concentration plants

State provision of information about its nuclear fuel cycle related R&D

Environmental sampling at locations not covered by INFCIRC/153



Location specific versus wide area

Wide area only after approval by Board

State provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive

nuclear-related technologies.

Complementary access

Administrative rights expanded (multi entry visas, etc.)


State-level Concept






Focused ―smarter safeguards‖

Looks at the State as a whole

New risk assessment framework based more on proliferation

concerns

Less focused on nuclear material quantities and facility types

Driven by

New access to broad information on State’s nuclear activities (AP)

New techniques (e.g., environmental sampling, remote monitoring)

Advanced information collection and analysis (open sources and

others)

Lessons from the past.


Moving Forward:






Is the Model Protocol the norm (117 countries)

What is the next phase

What is missing from the regime Rights, resource

What will spark the next fundamental shift in safeguards

How will the State-level concept develop


Nuclear Security Regime: Also

moving forward, but slowly




Much earlier stage than safeguards verification

IAEA arranges IPPAS missions when states have requested such a

mission.

Security still generally recognized as primarily domestic responsibility

Little external verification

Basic obligations evolving with fundamental shift since 9/11



What is security The security regime and requirements are now

more clearly defined in INFCIRC/225/Revision 5

Physical Protection or ―Prevention, Detection, Delay and Response‖


Basic Obligations

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials,

Amended


INFIRC 225 Guidelines

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear

Terrorism.




Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

and its supplementary, Guidance on the Import and Export of

Radioactive Sources of 2004.

The 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls on states to

take "adequate and effective" measures to prevent terrorism and

proliferation

Bilateral obligations and NSG condition of supply


Post 9/11 (cont.)






UNSCR 1540 adopted

Massive increase in assistance programs, in particular through IAEA

Nuclear Security Fund

INFCIRC/225 updated

IAEA Nuclear Security Series initiated. Formal process for approval

recently adopted.

Very little has changed in terms of inspections, though IAEA has

pursued limited number of voluntary security reviews


Physical Protection Convention





1979 text only required physical protection measures on material in

international transport

Amendment obligates States Parties to protect facilities and

materials in peaceful use, storage and transport.

Also provides for expanded cooperation between States regarding

measures to locate and recover, mitigate radiological

consequences of sabotage and combat related offenses

Revision discussion began in 1998, but no real support until after

9/11.

Diplomatic Conference in 2005


Amendment not yet in force, need 2/3 of state-parties


Convention on the Suppression of

Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

Began in 1996 with Russian support, but not concluded until 2006.





Only legal multilateral legal obligation to protect nuclear material in

domestic use

Requires states to criminalize certain activities related to nuclear

theft/terrorism

Requires states to cooperate in preventing nuclear terrorism and

notify

Requires states to cooperate in responding


INFCIRC/225 Evolution

First published in 1975,1977,1989,1993, 1998 and 2011

Rev 5

includes guidance for the rapid recovery of missing nuclear material and the

minimization and mitigation of sabotage

introduces the concept of a physical protection “regime” and strengthens

performance testing to include force-on-force exercises.

introduces a graded approach to physical protection that takes into account the

threat, the relative attractiveness of the material, and the potential

consequences associated with theft or sabotage.

INFCIRC/225/Rev 5 Provides clearer physical protection guidance with

increased requirements for all states currently using or contemplating using

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.


Prior to 9/11


Physical Protection Convention

Only applied to material in international transport

No obligation to protect material in domestic use

No appetite for change, even among closest allies


Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism

Slow progress in NY, not taken seriously


Radioactive source control focused on ―safety‖


Post 9/11


Fundamental change in approach

Physical Protection Convention amendment accepted

Finally an obligation to protect nuclear materials domestically

Conceptual link to guidelines (INFCIRC 225)

Still trying to bring Amendment into Force

Convention on Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism adopted

Obligation to protect materials and criminalize nuclear terrorism

Code of Conduct and export controls on radioactive sources adopted


Change: Regimes have changed,

what about technology An

example


Challenges of Nuclear Detection

Radiation Emitted

by Material

Some materials

self-shield their

emitted radiation

Radiation

Transmitted

through

Intervening

Materials

Background

Background + Source

Background + 4*Source (or Half

Distance)

Radiation

Propagates

through

Environment

Sensor

Detects

source 150 ft from the

Can greatly impact a systems False Alarm Rate detector

and Minimum Detectable Source Activity

In urban

environment

s local

variations

can be

large

Gross Counts x

10 4

Energy

Spectra

Background

Radiation

• Black: natural background

radiation

• Green : 1 mCi Cesium-137

source at 300 ft from the

detector

• Red: 1 mCi Cesium-137


Revolution in technology & gamma spectroscopy

―Electronics‖ for a 1964 gamma ray spectrometer

32

And an even more 26,000 capable bytes in version 1964 today

―Output‖ device for 1964 gamma ray spectrometer

And an even more capable version today

32,000,000,000 bytes

today


Technical change has brought

revolution in the way we use

detectors





CBP: 1468 RPMs; 1631 RIIDS; 19432 PRDs


60 mRPMS or mobile systems

USCG: 6,065 PRDs; 922 Handheld RIIDs





240 Wide-Area Search Backpacks (RADPACKs),

8 Advanced RIIDs,

36 Handheld Radiation Monitors (HRMs),

12 Linear Radiation Monitors (LRMs)

TSA-VIPR: 275 PRDs; 75 RIIDs; 50 Backpacks

NYPD-6,000 detectors


Conclusion








Technology and regimes change over time

Substantial change in both safeguards and security regimes over the past decades

Both have the objective of ensuring non-diversion of nuclear material


Security has additional objectives for preventing theft or sabotage of nuclear material by

non-state actors

Some similar technologies used in both relative to nuclear material accountancy and

control (detectors, forensics)Both based on materials accountancy and control

Both based on the protection of nuclear material, however with additional threat

based objectives for security

Security at an earlier stage, with limited IAEA verification

Will security and safeguards regimes move closer together Will the international

community take advantage of synergies in safeguards and security efforts

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