Europe's demographic future: - European Commission - Europa

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Europe's demographic future: - European Commission - Europa

Europe’s demographic future:

Facts and figures on challenges and opportunities

4

European Commission


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE:

FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

European Commission

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities

Unit E.1

Manuscript completed in October 2007


Document drawn up on the basis of COM(2006)571 final, COM(2005)94 final and SEC(2007)638.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................................................................. 7

Part 1 Europe's demographic future: facts and figures ................................................ 9

1. Introduction and executive summary .................................................................................... 11

1. Einleitung und Zusammenfassung ....................................................................................... 17

1. Introduction et résumé ..................................................................................................... 24

2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development ................................ 31

2.1. The demographic transition paradigm ........................................................................... 31

2.2. Fertility ............................................................................................................... 31

2.2.1. Trends in fertility ........................................................................................... 31

2.2.2. Drivers of fertility .......................................................................................... 33

2.2.3. Tempo and quantum effects on fertility rates ........................................................... 34

2.2.4. Results of the 2006 Eurobarometer on fertility and ageing .......................................... 35

2.3. Longevity ............................................................................................................. 37

2.3.1. Main trends in longevity .................................................................................. 37

2.3.2. Expected trends in longevity ............................................................................. 39

2.3.3. Important longevity differences between socio-economic groups .................................... 40

2.4. Migration ............................................................................................................ 41

2.4.1. Overview of migration trends ............................................................................ 41

2.4.2. Relative contribution of migration and fertility to population growth ................................ 43

2.5. Cohort effects: the baby boom .................................................................................... 44

2.6. The EU-27 population projection ................................................................................. 46

2.6.1. Changes in the population structure ..................................................................... 47

2.6.2. Projection methods ........................................................................................ 47

2.6.3. An estimate of projection uncertainty for the EU-25 ................................................... 49

2.7. The regional dimension of population change .................................................................. 49

2.8. Global demographic trends ....................................................................................... 53

2.8.1. Europe's place in the global population ................................................................ 53

2.8.2. Population trends and challenges in Europe's neighbourhood ...................................... 55

3. The economic and social impacts of demographic change .......................................................... 57

3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 57

3.2. Employment trends .................................................................................................. 57

3.2.1. Ageing of the labour force and labour market bottlenecks .......................................... 59

3.2.2. Ageing, productivity and prospects for economic growth ............................................ 61

3.2.3. The impact of ageing on future productivity ........................................................... 63

3.3. Challenges to public finances and intergenerational solidarity ............................................... 67

3.3.1. Pensions .................................................................................................... 67

3.3.2. Health and long-term care ................................................................................ 69

3.3.3. Long-term care ............................................................................................. 70

4. Opportunities for tackling demographic change ...................................................................... 75

4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 75

4.2. Demographic renewal: how much scope is there for increased fertility .................................... 75

4.2.1. Potential for more births .................................................................................. 75

4.2.2. Unlocking the potential for more births ................................................................. 77

4.2.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 85

4.3. Promoting employment in Europe ................................................................................. 85

4.3.1. Potential for more jobs of better quality ................................................................ 86

4.3.2. Unlocking the potential for increased employment .................................................... 87

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

4.4. A more productive and dynamic Europe ........................................................................ 91

4.4.1. The potential to raise productivity ....................................................................... 91

4.4.2. Unlocking the potential for productivity growth ........................................................ 92

4.4.3. Ageing consumers and the 'silver economy' ........................................................... 94

4.4.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 98

4.5. Receiving and integrating immigrants in Europe ................................................................ 99

4.5.1. The potential of migration for redressing labour market imbalances ................................ 99

4.5.2. Unlocking the potential of migration ....................................................................102

4.5.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................104

4.6. Sustainable public finances ........................................................................................104

4.6.1. Potential for tackling the demographic challenge .....................................................104

4.6.2. Unlocking the potential ...................................................................................106

4.6.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................109

5. Overall conclusion ........................................................................................................110

Annex 1. Country statistics and comments .................................................................................111

Belgium .....................................................................................................................112

Bulgaria . ....................................................................................................................113

Czech Republic . ...........................................................................................................114

Denmark . ...................................................................................................................115

Germany ....................................................................................................................116

Estonia ......................................................................................................................117

Greece ......................................................................................................................118

Spain ........................................................................................................................119

France .......................................................................................................................120

Ireland ......................................................................................................................121

Italy ..........................................................................................................................122

Cyprus ......................................................................................................................123

Latvia ........................................................................................................................124

Lithuania ....................................................................................................................125

Luxembourg ................................................................................................................126

Hungary ....................................................................................................................127

Malta ........................................................................................................................128

Netherlands ................................................................................................................129

Austria ......................................................................................................................130

Poland ......................................................................................................................131

Portugal .....................................................................................................................132

Romania ....................................................................................................................133

Slovenia ....................................................................................................................134

Slovakia ....................................................................................................................135

Finland ......................................................................................................................136

Sweden .....................................................................................................................137

United Kingdom ...........................................................................................................138

Sources and definitions ...................................................................................................139

Annex 2. European research projects on demographic change and its impacts ......................................141

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TABLE OF CONTENTS


Table of contents

Part 2 The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity ..................145

1. The ageing population in Europe: trends and outlook ................................................................147

2. Impact of the ageing population .........................................................................................149

2.1. Impact on the labour market, productivity and economic growth .............................................149

2.2. Impact on social security and public finances ...................................................................149

3. A constructive response to the demographic challenge ...............................................................151

3.1. Promoting demographic renewal in Europe .....................................................................151

3.2. Promoting employment in Europe: more jobs and longer working lives of better quality ................152

3.3. A more productive and dynamic Europe ........................................................................153

3.4. Receiving and integrating immigrants in Europe ................................................................153

3.5. Sustainable public finances in Europe:

guaranteeing adequate social security and equity between the generations ................................154

4. Conclusion: from challenge to opportunity .............................................................................155

Part 3 Green Paper ‘Confronting demographic change:

a new solidarity between the generations’ ...................................................................157

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................159

2. The challenges of European demography ..............................................................................161

2.1. The challenge of a low birth rate .................................................................................161

2.2. The possible contribution of immigration .........................................................................162

3. A new solidarity between the generations ..............................................................................163

3.1. Better integration of young people ...............................................................................163

3.2. A global approach to the ‘working life cycle’ .................................................................164

3.3. A new place for ‘elderly people’ .................................................................................164

3.4. Solidarity with the very elderly ....................................................................................165

4. Conclusion: What should the European Union’s role be ............................................................166

Annex 1 .........................................................................................................................167

Annex 2 .........................................................................................................................168

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5


FOREWORD

by Vladimir Špidla, Member of the European Commission in charge of Employment,

Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities

Over the coming decades, Europe's demographic makeup

will change dramatically. Our populations are becoming

older than ever before because of three major

trends. First, as the baby-boom generation approaches

retirement age, the share of older people will rise rapidly;

second, birth rates have remained low for several decades;

and third, we are all simply living longer and healthier

lives.

For many, the prospect of Europe's greying population is

a cause of concern, and sometimes even fear. Such

change brings huge challenges. Will an ageing society

be less dynamic and productive How will our shrinking

workforce provide adequate incomes and health and

social services not only for itself and its children, but also

for an ever larger number of old and very old people

These issues are a reality for all of Europe's Member

States, and although each Member State must find its own

solutions to suit its particular needs, there is much to be

gained from working together at the European level. This

is why in March 2005 the Commission launched an open

debate on demographic change with the Green Paper

Confronting demographic change: A new solidarity between

the generations. The Commission drew its conclusions

from this debate in the 2006 follow-up communication

The Demographic Future of Europe – From Challenge

to Opportunity. For the Commission, ageing is a positive

reflection of our social and economic success. Living longer

and being able to plan whether and when to have

children, and how many, is a big achievement.

Fortunately, demographic change does not happen overnight.

We know what to expect and I am confident that

we still have some time to prepare. In its 2006

Communication, the Commission identified five key areas

for policy action: helping people to balance work, family

and private life so that potential parents can have the

number of children they desire; improving work opportunities

for older people; increasing potentially productivity

and competitiveness by valuing the contributions of both

older and younger employees; harnessing the positive

impact of migration for the job market; and ensuring sustainable

public finances to help guarantee social protection

in the long-term.

It is clear that responsibility for action in these five areas

lies mainly with Member States. Nevertheless, there is a

strong EU dimension too, providing a common European

framework underpinned by the Lisbon strategy for growth

and jobs. As part of this strategy, the Commission will be

monitoring progress and stimulating the exchange of

knowledge and initiatives. The European demography

Forum and the newly created Group of experts on demographic

issues will assist the Commission in its efforts – in

particular in its work to produce the biennial European

demography Report*.

This is the first European demography Report and its purpose

is not only to provide a comparative statistical analysis

on trends, but also to illustrate the scope for policy

action in each area. It presents all the material that was

collected by the Commission in identifying the five key

areas for policy action. It includes, in particular, findings

from the demographic impact studies called for by the

European Parliament**.

I am confident that this publication, which also contains

the two key policy documents on demography mentioned

above, will serve as a rich and valuable resource. And I

call on researchers, policy makers and other stakeholders

in civil society to join forces and share their creative ideas

to transform the demographic challenge into an opportunity

for all Europeans.

Vladimir Špidla

* See also the website http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_situation/index_en.htm.

** Studies about the overall impact of demographic change in the European Union, following the pilot initiative proposed by Mr Walter, MEP.

FOREWORD

7


Part 1

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Europe’s demographic future:

facts and figures


1. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. Background

Demographic change is high on the European policy

agenda and, indeed, Europe has to brace itself for

profound changes in its population structure.

During the coming decade, the baby boom cohorts will

start retiring from the labour market. Young cohorts entering

the labour market will be much smaller as a result of

low fertility. In about ten years, total employment in the EU

could start to fall, in spite of rising employment rates.

Europe's potential growth rate could decline at a time

when significant additional resources will be required to

meet the needs of an increasing number of elderly people

for whom adequate pensions and health and long-term

care provision will have to be secured.

In October 2006, the Commission presented its views on

the demographic challenge and the best ways for tackling

it in the communication The demographic future of Europe

– from challenge to opportunity 1 . This communication followed

a major public debate launched by the Green

Paper Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity

between the generations 2 of March 2005 as well as discussions

at the level of heads of state and government at

the Hampton Court informal summit of October 2005.

The Commission expressed confidence in Europe's ability

to cope with the demographic challenge and presented

five key areas in which there are major opportunities for

constructive policy responses:

• Promoting demographic renewal in Europe;

• Promoting employment in Europe: more jobs and longer

working lives of better quality;

• A more productive and dynamic Europe;

• Receiving and integrating migrants in Europe;

• Sustainable public finances to guarantee adequate

social protection and equity between the generations.

As was announced in the Communication, a European

report will present an assessment of the demographic

situation every two years, reflecting the ongoing debate

and research in the EU, in conjunction with the European

Demographic Forum. This first Demographic report summarises

the extensive analytical work carried out prior to

the adoption of the communication on Europe's demographic

future. It draws extensively on the work carried out

by the Economic Policy Committee and the Commission

(Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs)

on future public expenditure trends. Furthermore, it

reviews on a series of demographic impact studies and a

Eurobarometer survey commissioned under a special budget

appropriation approved by the European Parliament

(the 'Walter' Pilot Action of 2004 and 2005, i.e. named

after its initiator, MEP Ralf Walter). These studies looked

at a variety of relevant issues including the link between

population decline/ageing and economic growth, the

impact of demographic change on the skills and qualifications

demanded by the labour market, as well as issues

related to innovation and productivity growth in Europe.

Finally, the report also reflects the hearings of leading

experts in January and March 2006 as well as the first

European Forum on demography held on 30-31 October

2006 in Brussels.

The aim of this report is to present the main facts and figures

that underpin the debate on Europe's demographic

future and appropriate policy responses. It starts by presenting

the main drivers of demographic change – fertility,

life expectancy and migration – and puts these into a

long-term and global perspective. Another chapter discusses

the economic impact of ageing and the effect this will

have on future living conditions in Europe.

A major ambition of this report is to provide facts and

figures to illustrate the potential of each of the five key

policy areas in which constructive responses to the demographic

challenge can be developed. Thus, one chapter

also reviews to what extent Member States have already

started unlocking this potential. Although it covers a wide

range of different areas, the material presented is certainly

still incomplete and the analysis must be regarded

as very preliminary. However, the chapter should provide

a useful starting point for a realistic assessment of the

European Union's preparedness for demographic

change. Country summaries based on a set of traditional

demographic indicators complete the picture.

1. COM(2006) 571, adopted on 12 October 2006.

2. COM(2005) 94, adopted on 16 March 2005.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

11


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

In the communication of October 2006 the Commission

announced its intention to hold a major European Forum

on Demography every two years. In connection with each

Forum, a report like the present one is to be published to

support an informed and constructive debate both at

European level and in the Member States. The reactions

to this first report received from the various stakeholders

who participated in the debate initiated by the Green

Paper and from the high-level group of governmental

demographic experts will serve to further improve the presentations

of the biennial Demographic Situation Report.

There are probably numerous ways in which future reports

could be improved over the present one. Comments and

suggestions would therefore be gratefully received and

should be sent to:

Unit E.1

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and

Equal Opportunities

European Commission

B-1049 Brussels

Empl-e1-courrier@ec.europa.eu

1.2. Highlights of this report

This Report on the Demographic Situation in Europe 2006

consists of three main sections corresponding to the main

subjects covered by the Communication on the

Demographic future of the EU: an overview of the drivers

of demographic change, an analysis of the main impacts

of this change and a description of the potential for responding

to the challenges posed by demographic change

within five key policy areas. This summary highlights the

main themes of the report, each of which is discussed

more extensively in the respective chapters.

Chapter 2: Demographic transition: a common

feature of social and economic development

The main drivers of demographic change are fertility, mortality

(life expectancy) and migration. In addition, the passage

of age cohorts of different sizes through the life cycle

can have significant impacts.

Regarding fertility, there are roughly two groups of

countries within the EU: those with a moderately low fertility

in the range of 1.6-1.9 births per woman and those

with very low fertility in the range of 1.5 births or less. The

average for the EU-25 is 1.5 (2005). The fertility rate needed

for a full replacement of generations is estimated by

demographers at 2.1, but given current levels of migration

and rising life expectancy, the population size will

decline only at fertility rates significantly below this replacement

rate. Currently observed fertility rates may also

underestimate long-term trends.

The indicator is constructed in such a way that postponement

of childbearing will initially lead to a lower fertility

rate until the mothers' new, higher average age at birth is

reached. This 'tempo' effect may be affecting countries

with the lowest birth rates, notably in Central and Eastern

Europe. The Eurostat population projections up to 2050

assume an increase in fertility rates, particularly in countries

with the lowest rates: for the EU-25, a slight recovery

from 1.5 to 1.6 is assumed. A Eurobarometer survey carried

out in 2006 revealed a generally positive attitude of

Europeans towards childbearing. Women would like to

have more children than they actually have. Moreover,

they would also prefer to have their children somewhat

later in life than they actually do.

Since the 19th century, gains in life expectancy have

above all been the result of reduced mortality in early

life, due to general socio-economic progress and public

health measures. More recently, mortality in mid-life has

also been reduced. While socio-economic factors such as

income and education remain important for gains in life

expectancy, the availability of modern medical treatment

is playing an increasing role, as are lifestyle changes. Life

expectancy is generally higher in the old (EU-15) Member

States (82.4 and 76.7 for women and men respectively)

than in the new (EU-10) Member States (78.7 and 70.4

for women and men). The Eurostat population projections

expect further increases in life expectancy by about six

years for men and five years for women (EU-25) between

2004 and 2050. These will have to be brought about

mainly by declining mortality at higher ages, thus contributing

to the increasing share of older and very old people

in the total population. Such progress in life expectancy

will, however, be contingent on the avoidance of

unhealthy lifestyles, including smoking, poor diet, lack of

physical exercise and excessive alcohol consumption.

Migration has become a major determinant of demographic

change in the EU. In the second half of the 20th

century, large parts of Europe witnessed a historical

change from emigration to immigration. Net migration

into the EU reached a peak of almost 2 million in

2003/2004. However, two thirds of this observed flow

concerned Italy and Spain where large numbers of illegal

migrants, the majority of whom had arrived in these countries

in previous years, were regularised and thus suddenly

appeared in the migration statistics. If immigration

is maintained at this very high level, the EU's working age

population would continue to grow until around 2030

rather than already starting to decline by the end of the

present decade, as is currently assumed in the Eurostat

population projection. However, such a perspective

would raise growing concerns about the integration of

these immigrants. Indeed, the degree of integration of

populations of immigrant origin already present in many

Member States is often seen as highly problematic.

12

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 1. Introduction and executive summary

The baby boom cohorts, born between 1945 and

1965, currently still boost the working age population.

They will start retiring soon, thereby bringing about a

major shift in the balance between the active and the retired.

About 15 to 20 years later, these cohorts will start

relying heavily on health and long-term care systems.

The combination of these trends will leave the total population

size roughly unchanged by 2050, but will transform

Europe's population structure. According to

Eurostat's baseline population projection, the median

age of the EU will increase between 2004 and 2050

from 39 to 49 years. The number of young people (aged

0-14) in the EU will continue to decline in absolute terms

from around 100 million in 1975 to some 66 million by

the year 2050. The population of working age (15-64)

will be most numerous around the year 2010 (331 million)

but will subsequently decline to about 268 million by

2050. While ageing will affect all Member States of the

EU, it will do so to varying degrees. The old-age dependency

ratio (number of people over 65 divided by the

number of people aged 15-64) will reach around 53% in

2050 for the EU-25 (up from 25% today), with the highest

rates projected for Italy and Spain (66-67%) and the

lowest for Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands

and Sweden (around 40%).

While it may still be one or two decades before the

impact of ageing becomes clearly visible at the level of an

entire country, the impact can already be observed at

regional level. In some regions, 'natural change' (difference

between births and deaths) has already become

negative. Migration may either aggravate or alleviate

these trends. Regions will increasingly have to include the

effects of long-term population trends in their regional

medium-term strategies. A number of regions have

already been active and are at the forefront of strategic

thinking and actions to tackle the demographic challenge.

A century ago some 15% of the world population lived in

the area of the current EU-25; nowadays this share is 7%

and by the year 2050 the share of the EU-25 in the

total world population is projected to be around 5%,

according to the UN population projections (2004).

While all world regions – except sub-Saharan Africa –

will experience significant ageing of their populations, the

EU is the only major world region where the total population

is projected to decline in the coming four decades.

Although declining fertility can be observed in many

developing countries, the demographic and socio-economic

contrasts between Europe and its Southern neighbours

suggest that strong migratory pressures will persist

over the coming decades.

Chapter 3: The economic and social impacts of

demographic change

Demographic change will gradually limit the scope for

future employment growth. Although the population of

working age (aged 15-64) is already expected to decline

from around 2011 onwards, total employment in the EU-25

is expected to continue growing up to around 2017 due to

rising labour force participation. Thanks to higher education

levels and greater labour force attachment of younger

cohorts of women, female employment rates are projected

to rise from just over 55% in 2004 to almost 65% by 2025.

The employment rates of older workers are also projected

to increase, from 40% in 2004 for the EU-25 to 47% by

2010 and 59% in 2025. From around 2017 onwards,

however, the shrinking working age population will lead to

stagnation and, subsequently, reduction of total employment.

Projections show that, as employment decreases and

productivity becomes the only source of future economic

growth, the annual average potential GDP growth rate

in the EU-25 will decline from 2.4% in the period 2004 to

2010 to only 1.2% in the period 2031-2050.

Declining employment at a time when the number of older

people in need of adequate pensions and health and longterm

care is rising will make it a challenge to provide sufficient

resources for social protection in a sustainable

way. The projected increase in these expenditure categories

by 2050 is about 4.5 percentage points of GDP in

the EU-25. Public and private spending on pensions, which

averaged 13% of GDP in the EU (in 2003), has ensured

that being old is no longer associated with being poor or

being dependent on one's children. However, Europe's

future ability to provide the ageing population with adequate

pensions will crucially depend on whether the effective

retirement age can be raised and the pension systems

adapted to increasing life expectancy, thereby making the

relationship between contributions and benefits transparent.

The main consumers of health and long-term care today are

elderly people, whose projected increasing numbers will

result in greater demand for these services. According to

Eurostat projections, the share of the total population over

80 will rise from 4.1% in 2005 to 6.3% in 2025 and to

11.4% in 2050. Although age in itself is not the only factor

influencing healthcare spending (though it does serve as a

proxy for a person's health status), projections illustrate that

an ageing population will bring about pressure for increased

public spending on health and long-term care.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

13


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Chapter 4: Opportunities for tackling

demographic change

The Commission's Communication on 'The demographic

future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity' identified

five key policy areas in which constructive responses

to the demographic challenge can be developed. These

include birth rates, employment levels, productivity

growth, migration and the sustainability of public finances.

If policies in these areas are formulated in an integrated

manner, synergies may be reached. For example,

policies that promote the labour market participation of

older workers will also have a positive impact on public

finances. In addition, more competitive markets will

increase the return on investment in older workers.

Promoting demographic renewal in Europe through

greater gender equality

While the choice to have or not to have (more) children is

and must remain a private one, there appears to be scope

for policies to enable families to make their choices. Indeed,

survey evidence suggests that Europeans generally would

like to have more children than they actually have.

International comparisons show that policies supportive of

those who wish to have children can have some effect in raising

birth rates. Even small changes in fertility rates will have

a strong impact on the population size and age structure in

the long run. However, an increase in fertility rates will only

translate into a larger working age population and increased

employment after 20 or more years. Therefore, it could

at best make a small contribution to tackling the challenge of

providing for the ageing baby boom cohorts. Furthermore,

the number of women of childbearing age is also projected

to fall in the coming decades.

If the aim is to enable people to have the number of children

they really wish, public policies that promote greater

gender equality and facilitate the reconciliation of work

and care seem to be most successful. It is primarily women

who adjust their career ambitions to the needs of their

families (including caring for elderly relatives), either by

dropping out of the labour market or working part-time.

Countries that have achieved the highest female labour

force participation and the most progress in terms of gender

equality (as reflected in differences in time use patterns

between men and women) today also display relatively

high fertility rates. Some 20 years ago, countries with

high female labour force participation tended to display

lower fertility than those with low female labour force participation.

Access to services (in particular affordable day

care provision of high quality), flexibility in working hours

and conditions as well as gender equality (including shared

family and domestic responsibility) are all important

factors in reconciling work and private life. In addition to

policies that promote better conditions for women and

men wishing to raise a family, it may become increasingly

important to address biological obstacles to fertility. As

potential parents postpone the moment at which they

decide to have children, infertility is becoming a more

and more frequent obstacle to the realisation of their desire

to have children. The availability of fertility treatments

may then have some impact on birth rates.

Promoting employment in Europe: more jobs and

longer working lives of better quality

The effective old-age dependency ratio, or the ratio between

people over 65 and the employed persons aged

15-64, is even higher than the demographic dependency

ratio and is projected to rise from 37 to 70 in the EU-25

by 2050. Despite a significant increase in employment

rates, the effective old-age dependency ratio is projected

to worsen significantly. Raising the EU-25 employment

rate to the level of the current three best-performing

Member States, however, would compensate for about

two-thirds of the decline in employment expected to result

from a shrinking working-age population. Such an

increase in employment rates would, of course, require

many changes in the labour market and in institutional

arrangements. A life-cycle approach aimed at enabling

people to remain much longer active and productive,

including through lifelong learning and better health protection,

is needed. The main potentials for increased

employment rates lie with women and older workers and

some other disadvantaged groups on the labour market.

In order to unlock these potentials, raising levels of educational

attainment seems to be particularly important.

Higher levels of education are associated with significantly

higher employment rates and much lower unemployment

rates. In 2005, the average employment rate

among the highly-skilled in the EU was 82.5%, for the

medium-skilled (those having completed upper secondary

education) it was 68.7%, whereas for the lowest skilled it

was only 46.4%. Both the Lisbon strategy and the

European Employment Strategy aim to increase employment

and growth and provide guidance on how to meet

demographic challenges. A higher labour force participation

of women will require better provision of affordable

high-quality childcare and care of other dependents, shared

family and domestic responsibilities between men and

women, reduced gender pay gaps, enhanced gender

equality and equal opportunities. The European Pact for

Gender Equality adopted in 2006 aims at mainstreaming

gender in all actions taken and will be a tool for increasing

the employment of women. Prolonging working lives

by providing effective incentives for later retirement is an

even more important policy to unlock the potential for

increased employment. This concerns not only pension

schemes, but also early retirement and social security schemes

(disability, unemployment, sickness) that are sometimes

used as an exit-route. Older workers are nowadays in

a much better health condition than the same category of

14

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 1. Introduction and executive summary

workers 40/50 years ago. Moreover, as today's older

workers entered the labour market at a later stage, strengthening

incentives to remain on the labour market seems

appropriate. This can be further reinforced by adopting a

life-cycle perspective. Active ageing needs to be prepared

for by a good initial education that enables workers to

participate in lifelong learning. Health promotion throughout

working life, as well as effective and efficient health

services are also important because a healthy workforce

is more productive. Ill health is a key factor in absenteeism

and early retirement. Pension reforms in the majority of

Member States are already raising the labour market exit

age and would be further underpinned by promoting the

employability of older workers, both with regard to their

skills and their health status. The labour potential of all

groups must be fully used and measures taken to better

integrate disadvantaged groups on the labour market,

such as disabled persons, ethnic minorities and people

with a migration background. A high youth unemployment

rate is also a serious concern.

A more productive and dynamic Europe

Economic growth and high living standards beyond

2017, when total employment is expected to decline, will

depend solely on increases in labour productivity. There is

a huge potential for productivity improvements in Europe

if all Member States were to catch up with the highest-performing

countries whose productivity levels are above or

close to that of the US. Indeed, even the productivity leaders

can further accelerate their growth by removing obstacles

to innovation and structural change and by boosting

research and development leading to new products

and more efficient production processes.

The key to unlocking this potential is to invest in human

capital. The example of the highest-performing Member

States shows that general education levels across the EU

can still be raised significantly. In this context, it is particularly

important to reduce the number of early school leavers,

who will face increasing difficulties in future labour

markets. In 2005, 17% of men and 13% of women aged

18-24 had not reached more than lower secondary education

and were not in further education or training.

Further improvements are also necessary with regard to

the proportion of people with an upper-secondary or tertiary

education. Spending on tertiary education in the EU-

25 represents only 1.2% of GDP, compared to 2.9% in

the US. The gap between the EU and the US is somewhat

smaller with regard to R&D spending, which is just under

2% of GDP in the EU and nearly 2.7% in the US. Europe's

future capacity for innovation and productivity growth will

depend on increased investment in top-level education

and research. This will also be crucial for successful adaptation

to the new market opportunities brought about by

the 'silver economy', i.e. new goods and services adapted

to the changing needs and demand patterns of an

ageing society.

Receiving and integrating migrants in Europe

Europe will continue to be an attractive destination for

migrants due to its prosperity and well-functioning societies.

However, it should be noted that the EU is not as successful

as the USA and Canada in attracting the highestskilled

migrants. The procedure adopted in 2005 for the

admission of third-country researchers is a first step

towards addressing this issue 3 . Such arrangements need

not come at the cost of developing countries in the form of

brain drain, but can and should be beneficial to all parties.

Around 3.7% of the EU-27 population are non-EU

nationals (5.1% in the EU-15). Migration is therefore

already responding to the needs of European labour markets,

and this need for both high- and low-skilled migrant

labour will continue.

While internal mobility of workers within the EU will not

change demographic trends for the EU as a whole, it does

represent an enormous potential for higher rates of participation

and employment as it opens up better opportunities

for people living in regions where they face poor

labour market prospects. Countries that have experienced

rapid economic growth over recent years, like Spain and

Ireland, have clearly benefited enormously from the significant

inflow of workers both from outside and from within

the European Union.

The main challenge to realising the potential of immigration

is the integration of migrants and their descendants

into European societies. The Member States of the EU

have evidently had different degrees of success with

labour market and social integration. The educational

attainment of non-nationals is generally substantially

lower than that of nationals, although in several Member

States the percentage of non-nationals with tertiary level

education is actually higher that that of nationals. At the

same time, in several Member States, the employment

rates of migrants, particularly migrant women, are very

low. Linked to this insufficient integration of migrants in

their host societies is a rather negative perception of immigration:

Eurobarometer results indicate that on average

only 4 out of 10 EU citizens feel that 'immigrants contribute

a lot to their country', while a slight majority of citizens

(52%) do not agree with this statement.

Sustainable public finances to guarantee adequate social

protection and equity between the generations

In all Member States, the ageing of the population will

increase public expenditure on pensions, health and

3. Directive 2005/71/EC.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

15


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

long-term care. Projections show that most Member States

where pensions are financed by specific contributions will

see a growing imbalance between contributions and

needs. The reserve funds established by several Member

States can alleviate future financing needs but appear to be

inadequate in most cases. In most Member States, public

finances are not sustainable in the long run under current

policies. Budgetary consolidation and further reform efforts

in pension, health and long-term care systems are required.

An increase in the number of years that people remain

active and in good health will help to reduce the financial

pressure on health and long-term care systems.

Apart from future expenditure and revenue trends, the

long-term sustainability of public finances depends on the

current deficit and debt situation, which if left unchanged

can put public finances on an unsustainable path. Interest

payments on public debt can represent more than 10% of

public revenue in some Member States. Reducing current

deficit and debt levels and avoiding unsustainable expenditure

trends are recommended policies to ensure that

Member States remain capable of meeting future

spending needs, including those arising from population

ageing. The potential for further consolidation of public

finances differs greatly across Member States.

To consolidate public finances over the long-term, it is

important to act at a time when growth prospects are still

favourable. The EU has a window of opportunity of about

10 years until employment is projected to start to fall as a

result of a shrinking working age population. Mobilising

the full potential of older workers, including making use of

the window of opportunity to reform pension and healthcare

systems and prevent the early withdrawal of the

baby boom cohorts from the labour market will be key to

tackling the challenges of ageing. This will strengthen

Member States' capacity to ensure adequate social protection

of the elderly while making sufficient investment in

younger generations and hence maintain intergenerational

solidarity.

16

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


1. EINLEITUNG UND ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

1.1. Hintergrund

Dem demografischen Wandel wird in der Europäischen

Union große Bedeutung beigemessen. Europa muss sich

in der Tat auf tiefgreifende Veränderungen in seiner

Bevölkerungsstruktur vorbereiten. Im nächsten Jahrzehnt

werden die Babyboomer allmählich ins Rentenalter kommen.

Infolge niedriger Geburtenraten werden weitaus

weniger junge Menschen in den Arbeitsmarkt eintreten. In

etwa zehn Jahren könnte die Gesamtbeschäftigung in der

EU trotz steigender Beschäftigungsquoten langsam

zurückgehen. Europas potenzielle Wachstumsrate könnte

zu einem Zeitpunkt schrumpfen, da beträchtliche zusätzliche

Ressourcen erforderlich sein werden, damit den

Bedürfnissen einer wachsenden Zahl älterer Menschen

entsprochen werden kann, für die ausreichende Renten

und eine angemessene Gesundheitsversorgung und

Langzeitpflege zu sichern sind.

In ihrer Mitteilung mit dem Titel „Die demografische

Zukunft Europas – Von der Herausforderung zur Chance“ 1

vom Oktober 2006 legte die Kommission ihren

Standpunkt zur demografischen Herausforderung dar und

schlug die am besten geeigneten Strategien vor, um den

zu erwartenden Auswirkungen zu begegnen. Die

Mitteilung schloss an die umfassende öffentliche Debatte

an, die durch das Grünbuch „Angesichts des demografischen

Wandels – eine neue Solidarität zwischen den

Generationen“ 2 vom März 2005 eingeleitet worden war,

sowie an die Diskussionen auf Ebene der Staats- und

Regierungschefs anlässlich des informellen Gipfels von

Hampton Court im Oktober 2005. Die Kommission zeigte

sich zuversichtlich, dass Europa fähig ist, die demografische

Herausforderung zu bewältigen, und skizzierte fünf

Handlungsbereiche, in denen umfangreicher Gestaltungsraum

für konstruktive Strategien gegeben ist:

• ein Europa, das die demografische Erneuerung begünstigt;

• ein Europa, das Arbeit aufwertet: mehr Beschäftigung

und ein längeres aktives Leben mit hoher Lebensqualität;

• ein produktiveres und leistungsfähigeres Europa;

• ein Europa, das auf die Aufnahme und Integration von

Migranten vorbereitet ist;

• ein Europa mit zukunftsfähigen öffentlichen Finanzen:

Garant eines angemessenen Sozialschutzes und des

Ausgleichs zwischen den Generationen.

Wie in der Mitteilung angekündigt, wird die Kommission

alle zwei Jahre einen europäischen Bericht zur Bewertung

der demografischen Lage vorlegen, der im Vorfeld des

Europäischen Demografieforum einen Überblick über die

laufende Debatte und die aktuellen Forschungsarbeiten in

der EU geben soll. Im vorliegenden ersten Demografiebericht

sind die ausführlichen Analysen zusammengefasst,

die vor der Annahme der Mitteilung über die

demografische Zukunft Europas durchgeführt wurden. Der

Bericht beruht auf auf der Arbeit des Ausschusses für

Wirtschaftspolitik und der Kommission (Generaldirektion

Wirtschaft und Finanzen) über künftige Trends bei den

öffentlichen Ausgaben. Er stellt eine Reihe von Studien zu

den Auswirkungen des demografischen Wandels und

eine Eurobarometer-Umfrage vor, die im Rahmen eines

vom Europäischen Parlament initiierten Pilotprojektes

finanziert wurden (die „Walter“-Pilotaktion von 2004 und

2005, so genannt nach ihrem Initiator, Ralf Walter –

MdEP). Die Studien befassten sich mit einer Vielzahl von

relevanten Fragen, u. a. mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen

Rückgang/Alterung der Bevölkerung und

Wirtschaftswachstum, den Auswirkungen des demografischen

Wandels auf die vom Arbeitsmarkt verlangten

Fähigkeiten und Qualifikationen sowie mit Fragen hinsichtlich

von Innovation und Produktivitätswachstum in

Europa. Schließlich wird über die Anhörungen führender

Experten im Januar und März 2006 sowie das erste

Europäische Demografieforum berichtet, das am 30.-31.

Oktober 2006 in Brüssel stattfand.

Mit dem vorliegenden Bericht sollen die wesentlichen

Fakten und Zahlen aufbereitet werden, die als Grundlage

für die Debatte über die demografische Zukunft Europas

und entsprechende Strategien dienen können. Zunächst

werden die Hauptdeterminanten des demografischen

Wandels – Fertilität, Lebenserwartung und Migration –

beschrieben und aus einer umfassenden und langfristigen

Perspektive beleuchtet. In einem weiteren Kapitel werden

die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Alterung und deren

Folgen für die Lebensbedingungen in Europa erörtert.

1. KOM(2006) 571 vom 12. Oktober 2006.

2. KOM(2005) 94 vom 16. März 2005.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

17


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Ein zentrales Anliegen des Berichts ist es, Fakten und

Zahlen zu liefern, die das Potenzial der fünf wichtigen

Strategiebereiche veranschaulichen, konstruktive

Antworten auf die demografische Herausforderung zu

geben. In einem Kapitel wird daher analysiert, inwieweit

die Mitgliedstaaten dieses Potenzial bereits ausschöpfen.

Auch wenn ein großes Spektrum unterschiedlicher

Bereiche abgedeckt wird, so ist das vorgelegte Material

doch noch unvollständig und die Analyse keineswegs

abgeschlossen. Gleichwohl dürfte das Kapitel einen nützlichen

Ansatzpunkt für eine realistische Beurteilung darüber

liefern, wie gut die Europäische Union auf den

demografischen Wandel vorbereitet ist. Spezische

Länderprofile, die auf den traditionellen demografischen

Indikatoren basieren, vervollständigen das Bild.

In ihrer Mitteilung vom Oktober 2006 teilte die

Kommission ihre Absicht mit, im Zweijahresrhythmus ein

größeres Europäisches Demografieforum zu veranstalten.

In Zusammenhang mit jedem Forum soll ein solcher

Bericht veröffentlicht werden, der als Grundlage für eine

fundierte und konstruktive Debatte auf europäischer

Ebene und in den Mitgliedstaaten dienen soll. Anhand

der Reaktionen der verschiedenen interessierten Akteure,

die sich bereits an der durch das Grünbuch ausgelösten

Aussprache beteiligten, sowie der Gruppe hochrangiger

Regierungsexperten für Demografie auf diesen ersten

Bericht sollen die Zweijahresberichte über die demografische

Zukunft verbessert werden.

Vermutlich gibt es zahlreiche Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten.

Daher würden wir uns über Kommentare und

Anregungen freuen, die Sie bitte an folgende Anschrift

richten:

Referat E.1

Generaldirektion Beschäftigung, Soziales und

Chancengleichheit

Europäische Kommission

B-1049 Brüssel

Empl-e1-courrier@ec.europa.eu

1.2. Die Kernaussagen des Berichts

Der Bericht über die demografische Zukunft Europas

2006 umfasst drei Hauptteile, die den Hauptthemen der

Mitteilung über die demografische Zukunft der EU entsprechen:

Überblick über die Determinanten des demografischen

Wandels, Analyse der wesentlichen Auswirkungen

dieses Wandels sowie Beschreibung, wie im Rahmen von

fünf politischen Schlüsselbereichen auf die Herausforderungen

des demografischen Wandels reagiert werden

kann. In dieser Zusammenfassung werden die wichtigsten

Aspekte des Berichts herausgestellt, auf die in den

jeweiligen Kapiteln ausführlich eingegangen wird.

Kapitel 2: Demografischer Übergang:

Gemeinsames Merkmal der sozialen

und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung

Die bestimmenden Faktoren des demografischen Wandels

sind Fertilität, Mortalität (Lebenserwartung) und

Migration. Zusätzlich können die Auswirkungen, die

dadurch entstehen, dass Alterskohorten unterschiedlicher

Größe den Lebenszyklus durchschreiten, von ausschlaggebender

Bedeutung sein.

Hinsichtlich der Fertilität kann grob zwischen zwei

Gruppen von Ländern in der EU unterschieden werden:

jenen mit einer relativ niedrigen Fertilitätsrate (zwischen

1,6 und 1,9 Geburten pro Frau) und jenen mit einer sehr

niedrigen Fertilitätsrate (1,5 Geburten und weniger). Der

Durchschnitt für die EU-25 liegt bei 1,5 (2005).

Demografen gehen davon aus, dass das bestandserhaltende

Niveau einer Bevölkerung bei einer Geburtenziffer

von etwa 2,1 Geburten je Frau liegt. Angesichts der derzeitigen

Migrationsströme und der steigenden

Lebenswartung ist allerdings ein Bevölkerungsrückgang

nur bei Fertilitätsraten, die signifikant unter diesem

Niveau liegen, zu erwarten. Möglicherweise unterschätzen

auch die derzeit beobachteten Fertilitätsraten

Langzeittrends.

Der Indikator zur Messung der Fertilitätsrate ist so erstellt,

dass die Verschiebung der ersten Geburt auf einen späteren

Zeitpunkt im Leben einer Frau zunächst eine niedrigere

Fertilitätsrate ergibt, bis die Frauen ein neues höheres

Durchschnittsalter bei der Geburt erreicht haben. Dieser

Tempo-Effekt könnte bei den Ländern mit den niedrigsten

Geburtenraten, insbesondere in Mittel und Osteuropa,

zum Tragen kommen. Die Bevölkerungsprojektionen

Eurostat bis zum Jahr 2050 gehen von ansteigenden

Fertilitätsraten aus, vor allem für die Länder, die derzeitig

die niedrigsten Raten aufweisen. Für die EU-25 wird eine

leichte Erholung von 1,5 auf 1,6 Geburten je Frau prognostiziert.

Laut einer Eurobarometer-Umfrage aus dem

Jahr 2006 haben die Bürger- und Bürgerinnen in der EU

grundsätzlich eine bejahende Haltung zu Kindern. Sie

hätten gerne mehr Kinder als sie tatsächlich haben und sie

würden sie gerne etwas später bekommen.

Seit dem 19. Jahrhundert ist der Zugewinn an

Lebenserwartung vor allem auf die gesunkene

Säuglings- und Kindersterblichkeit infolge allgemeiner

soziökonomischer und medizinischer Fortschritte

zurückzuführen. In jüngerer Zeit ist auch die Mortalität im

mittleren Alter zurückgegangen. Während sozioökonomische

Faktoren wie Einkommen und Bildung auch nach wie

vor wichtig sind für den Zugewinn an Lebenserwartung,

spielen die Verfügbarkeit moderner medizinischer

Behandlung und die sich ändernden Lebensweisen eine

immer größere Rolle. In der Regel ist die Lebenserwartung

in den alten Mitgliedstaaten (EU-15) höher (82,4 Jahre

18

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Teil 1 – 1. Einleitung und Zusammenfassung

bei den Frauen und 76,7 Jahre bei den Männern) als in

den neuen Mitgliedstaaten (EU-10) (78,7 bzw. 70,4).

Laut den Bevölkerungsprognosen von Eurostat ist von

einem weiteren Anstieg der Lebenserwartung um etwa

sechs Jahre für Männer und fünf Jahre für Frauen (EU-25)

im Zeitraum 2004-2050 auszugehen. Hauptgrund hierfür

ist vor allem der Rückgang der Mortalität im höheren

Alter, was zu einem zunehmenden Anteil älterer und sehr

alter Menschen an der Gesamtbevölkerung führen wird.

Diese Entwicklung der Lebenserwartung wird allerdings

von der Vermeidung einer ungesunden Lebensweise

abhängen, einschließlich Tabakkonsum, ungesunder

Ernährung, Bewegungsmangel und Alkoholmissbrauch.

Migration hat sich zu einem immer bedeutenderen

Faktor für den demografischen Wandel in der EU entwikkelt.

In der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts vollzog

sich in weiten Teilen Europas ein historischer Umbruch von

der Auswanderung hin zur Zuwanderung. In den Jahren

2003/2004 erreichte die Nettozuwanderung in die EU

einen Spitzenwert von nahezu 2 Millionen. Allerdings

betrafen zwei Drittel dieser Migrationsbewegungen Italien

und Spanien, die eine hohe Zahl illegaler Zuwanderer

verzeichneten, von denen die Mehrzahl bereits in den

Jahren zuvor gekommen war und nach der

Regularisierung dann plötzlich in der Migrationsstatistik

auftauchte. Bei Aufrechterhaltung der Zuwanderung auf

diesem sehr hohen Niveau würde die Bevölkerung im

erwerbsfähigen Alter in der EU weiterhin bis etwa 2030

anwachsen und nicht, wie es die derzeitige

Bevölkerungsprognose von Eurostat voraussagt, bereits

Ende des jetzigen Jahrzehnts anfangen zu schrumpfen.

Allerdings würde in diesem Fall das Problem der

Integration der Zuwanderer noch dringlicher werden.

Schon heute wird die unzureichende Integration der

bereits in vielen Mitgliedstaaten lebenden Zuwanderer

häufig als problematisch angesehen.

Die Babyboomer (Jahrgänge 1945 bis 1965) stellen

nach wie vor den Großteil der Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen

Alter. Diese geburtenstarken Kohorten erreichen in

Bälde das Rentenalter, was ein zunehmendes

Ungleichgewicht zwischen der Anzahl der Erwerbstätigen

und der im Ruhestand befindlichen Personen zur Folge

hat. 15 bis 20 Jahre nach ihrem Eintritt in den Ruhestand

werden sie zu einer starken Belastung der Gesundheits

und Langzeitpflegesysteme führen.

Die Gesamtbevölkerungsgröße wird infolge dieser Trends

bis 2050 nahezu unverändert bleiben, verändern wird

sich allerdings die Bevölkerungsstruktur in Europa. Laut

Basisbevölkerungsprojektion von Eurostat wird das

Medianalter in der EU zwischen 2004 und 2050 von 39

auf 49 Jahre steigen. Die Zahl junger Menschen (0- bis14-

Jährige) in der EU wird in absoluten Zahlen von ca. 100

Millionen im Jahr 1975 weiterhin bis zum Jahr 2050 auf

etwa 66 Millionen sinken. Die Zahl der Personen im

erwerbsfähigen Alter (15- bis 64-Jährige) wird um das

Jahr 2010 ihren Höchststand erreichen (331 Millionen),

um dann bis 2050 auf 268 Millionen deutlich zurückzugehen.

Die Alterung wird alle EU-Mitgliedstaaten betreffen,

allerdings in unterschiedlichem Maße. Im Jahr 2050

wird der Altersquotient (Zahl der über 65-Jährigen geteilt

durch Zahl der 15- bis 64-Jährigen) in der EU-25 ca. 53

% betragen (derzeit liegt er bei 25 %), wobei die höchsten

Quoten für Italien und Spanien zu erwarten sind (66-

67 %), die niedrigsten für Dänemark, Luxemburg, Malta,

die Niederlande und Schweden (etwa 40 %).

Die Auswirkungen der Alterung mögen auf nationaler

Ebene erst in ein bis zwei Jahrzehnten in ihrer ganzen

Tragweite sichtbar werden, aber auf regionaler Ebene

sind sie schon jetzt erkennbar. In einigen Regionen ist

bereits ein negatives „natürliches Wachstum“ (Differenz

zwischen Geburten und Sterbefällen) zu verzeichnen.

Durch die Migration kann die Entwicklung beschleunigt

oder verlangsamt werden. Die Regionen werden die

Auswirkungen der langfristigen Bevölkerungstrends verstärkt

in ihren mittelfristigen Regionalstrategien berücksichtigen

müssen. Eine Reihe von Regionen hat bereits

reagiert und ist in einer Vorreiterrolle, was

Strategiekonzepte und praktisches Handeln zur

Bewältigung der demografischen Herausforderung anbelangt.

Vor 100 Jahren lebten ca. 15 % der Weltbevölkerung im

Gebiet der heutigen EU-25; heute macht dieser Anteil 7 %

aus und laut Bevölkerungsprognosen der UN (aus dem

Jahr 2004) wird 2050 der Anteil der EU-25 an der

Gesamtweltbevölkerung etwa 5 % betragen.

Während weltweit in allen Regionen – ausgenommen in

Afrika südlich der Sahara – eine signifikante Alterung der

Bevölkerung zu verzeichnen sein wird, ist die EU die einzige

große Weltregion, die in den nächsten vier

Jahrzehnten mit einer Verringerung der

Gesamtbevölkerung konfrontiert sein dürfte. Zwar ist in

vielen Entwicklungsländern eine rückläufige Fertilität zu

verzeichnen, aber die demografischen und sozioökonomischen

Kontraste zwischen Europa und seinen südlichen

Nachbarn legen nahe, dass der hohe Migrationsdruck in

den kommenden Jahrzehnten anhalten wird.

Kapitel 3: Wirtschaftliche und soziale

Auswirkungen des demografischen Wandels

Mit dem demografischen Wandel werden die

Möglichkeiten für künftiges Beschäftigungswachstum

nach und nach abnehmen. Obwohl davon auszugehen

ist, dass die Bevölkerung im erwerbstätigen Alter

(15- bis 64-Jährige) ab etwa 2011 schrumpfen wird, dürfte

die Gesamtbeschäftigung in der EU-25 jedoch zumindest

bis etwa 2017 aufgrund einer zunehmenden

Erwerbsbeteiligung weiterhin steigen. Dank eines höheren

Bildungsstands und einer verstärkten Erwerbsbe-

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

19


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

teiligung jüngerer Frauen dürften die Beschäftigungsquoten

für Frauen von knapp mehr als 55 % im Jahr 2004

bis zum Jahr 2025 auf nahezu 65 % ansteigen. Die

Beschäftigungsquoten für ältere Arbeitskräfte werden entsprechend

den Vorausschätzungen ebenfalls ansteigen,

von 40 % im Jahr 2004 (EU-25) auf 47 % im Jahr 2010

und 59 % im Jahr 2025. Ab 2017 wird die

Gesamtbeschäftigung jedoch aufgrund der sinkenden

Anzahl von Personen im erwerbsfähigen Alter stagnieren,

um dann abzunehmen. Da die Beschäftigung sinkt und

die Produktivität die einzige Quelle für künftiges

Wirtschaftswachstum sein wird, dürfte die durchschnittliche

potentielle Wachstumsrate des jährlichen BIPs

der EU-25 von 2,4 % im Zeitraum 2004-2010 auf nur

noch 1,2 % im Zeitraum 2031 bis 2050 zurückgehen.

Die rückläufige Beschäftigung zu einem Zeitpunkt, da die

Zahl der älteren Menschen zunimmt, die Anspruch auf

ausreichende Renten und eine angemessene

Gesundheitsversorgung und Langzeitpflege haben, stellt

eine große Herausforderung für die langfristige

Tragfähigkeit der Systeme der sozialen

Sicherung dar. Für diese Ausgabenkategorien ist voraussichtlich

bis 2050 in der EU-25 mit einem Anstieg von

4,5 Prozentpunkten des BIP zu rechnen. Öffentliche und

private Rentenausgaben, die im Durchschnitt 13 % des

BIP in der EU ausmachen (Stand 2003), haben dazu

geführt, dass Alter nicht mehr gleichbedeutend mit Armut

oder der Abhängigkeit von den eigenen Kindern ist. Ob

in Europa jedoch auch in Zukunft angemessene Renten

gewährleistet werden können, hängt in entscheidendem

Maße davon ab, dass das effektive Renteneintrittsalter

erhöht wird und die Rentensysteme an die steigende

Lebenserwartung angepasst werden, um so Transparenz

beim Verhältnis Beiträge/Leistungen zu schaffen.

Gesundheits und Langzeitpflegedienste werden heutzutage

am stärksten von älteren Menschen in Anspruch

genommen. Mit der zunehmenden Anzahl älterer

Menschen wird auch die Nachfrage nach diesen

Leistungen ansteigen. Nach Berechnungen von Eurostat

wird der Anteil der über 80-Jährigen an der

Gesamtbevölkerung von 4,1 % im Jahr 2005 auf 6,3 %

im Jahr 2025 und schließlich auf 11,4 % im Jahr 2050

ansteigen. Auch wenn das Alter an sich nicht der einzige

Faktor ist, der die Ausgaben im Gesundheitswesen beeinflusst

(allerdings dient es als Indikator für den

Gesundheitszustand einer Person), so geht aus den

Projektionen doch hervor, dass es aufgrund der alternden

Bevölkerung zu massivem Druck zur Erhöhung der öffentlichen

Ausgaben für Gesundheitsversorgung und

Langzeitpflege kommen wird.

Kapitel 4: Chancen zur Bewältigung

des demografischen Wandels

In der Mitteilung der Kommission „Die demografische

Zukunft Europas – Von der Herausforderung zur Chance“

werden fünf politische Schlüsselbereiche aufgezeigt, in

denen konstruktive Lösungen entwickelt werden können,

um der demografischen Herausforderung zu begegnen.

Zu den diesbezüglichen Schlüsselgrößen gehören

Geburtenraten, Beschäftigungsniveau, Produktivitätswachstum,

Migration und zukunftsfähige öffentliche

Finanzen. Durch eine intelligente Verknüpfung der

Maßnahmen in diesen Bereichen sind Synergieeffekte

möglich. So werden sich beispielweise Maßnahmen zur

Förderung der Beschäftigungsquote für ältere

Arbeitskräfte positiv auf die öffentlichen Finanzen auswirken.

Außerdem werden stärker wettbewerbsorientierte

Märkte die Rendite von Investitionen zugunsten älterer

Arbeitskräfte erhöhen.

Ein Europa, das die demografische Erneuerung

begünstigt, indem die Gleichstellung von Frauen

und Männern gefördert wird

Die Entscheidung gegen oder für (mehr) Kinder muss nach

wie vor Privatsache bleiben – aber es besteht Spielraum für

Maßnahmen, die den Familien eine bewusste Wahl

ermöglichen. Laut Umfragen wünschen sich die Europäer

ganz allgemein mehr Kinder als sie tatsächlich haben.

Internationale Vergleiche belegen, dass Unterstützungsmaßnahmen

zugunsten derjenigen, die Kinder haben wollen,

durchaus zu einem Ansteigen der Geburtenraten beitragen

können. Selbst geringe Änderungen in den

Fertilitätsraten werden auf lange Sicht bedeutsame

Auswirkungen auf Größe und Altersstruktur der

Bevölkerung haben. Allerdings wird sich ein Ansteigen der

Fertilitätsraten erst nach 20 oder mehr Jahren in einer größeren

Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter und in höheren

Beschäftigungsquoten niederschlagen. Insofern könnte

diese Entwicklung im Idealfall nur in begrenztem Maße zur

Lösung des Problems der Alterung der Babyboom-Kohorten

beitragen. Erschwerend hinzu kommt, dass Prognosen

zufolge die Zahl der Frauen im gebärfähigen Alter in den

kommenden Jahrzehnten zurückgehen wird.

Den erfolgversprechendsten Weg, um Männer und

Frauen in die Lage zu versetzen, sich ihre Kinderwünsche

auch tatsächlich zu erfüllen, stellen politische Maßnahmen

zur Förderung der Geschlechtergleichstellung und zur

Erleichterung der Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie dar.

Es sind in erster Linie die Frauen, die ihre Erwerbstätigkeit

und Karriere an die Bedürfnisse der Familie (einschließlich

Betreuung älterer Angehöriger) anpassen, indem sie entweder

aus dem Beruf ausscheiden oder als teilzeit arbeiten..

Die Länder, die die höchste Erwerbsbeteiligungsquote

für Frauen und die größten Fortschritte bei der

Geschlechtergleichstellung (die sich in unterschiedlichen

Mustern der Zeitverwendung bei Frauen und Männern

widerspiegeln) aufweisen, verzeichnen derzeit auch relativ

hohe Fertilitätsraten. Vor etwa 20 Jahren tendierten die

Länder mit einer hohen Erwerbsbeteiligung der Frauen zu

einer niedrigeren Fertilität als diejenigen mit einer gerin-

20

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Teil 1 – 1. Einleitung und Zusammenfassung

gen Erwerbsbeteiligung der Frauen. Wichtige Faktoren

für die Vereinbarkeit von Berufs- und Privatleben sind der

Zugang zu Dienstleistungen (vor allem Angebote für

erschwingliche und gute Tagesbetreuung), flexible

Arbeitszeiten und -bedingungen sowie die Gleichstellung

der Geschlechter (wozu auch die gleichmäßige Aufteilung

der Familien und Haushaltspflichten gehört). Parallel zu

den Strategien, die auf bessere Bedingungen für Frauen

und Männer abstellen, die eine Familie gründen wollen,

dürfte es immer wichtiger werden, sich mit den biologischen

Faktoren für verminderte Fertilität zu befassen. Da

potenzielle Eltern sich immer später für Kinder entscheiden,

bleibt ihr Kinderwunsch immer häufiger wegen

Unfruchtbarkeit unerfüllt. Insofern kann die Verfügbarkeit

von Fertilitätsbehandlungen einen Einfluss auf die Geburtenraten

haben.

Ein Europa, das Arbeit aufwertet: mehr Beschäftigung

und ein längeres aktives Leben mit hoher Lebensqualität

Der tatsächliche Altersabhängigkeitsquotient bzw. das

Verhältnis der über 65-Jährigen zu den erwerbsfähigen

Personen im Alter von 15-64 Jahren liegt sogar über dem

demografischen Abhängigkeitsquotienten und wird in der

EU-25 bis 2050 voraussichtlich von 37 auf 70 steigen.

Trotz eines signifikanten Anstiegs der Beschäftigungsquoten

dürfte sich der tatsächliche Altersquotient drastisch

verschlechtern. Würde die Beschäftigungsquote in der EU-

25 auf das Niveau der Mitgliedstaaten, die derzeit die

besten Ergebnisse erzielen, angehoben, so würden damit

etwa zwei Drittel des Beschäftigungsrückgangs ausgeglichen,

der aufgrund einer schrumpfenden Bevölkerung im

erwerbsfähigen Alter zu erwarten ist. Eine derartige

Steigerung der Beschäftigungsquoten würde natürlich

zahlreiche Veränderungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und bei

den institutionellen Mechanismen voraussetzen.

Erforderlich ist ein Lebenszyklus-Ansatz, der darauf

abstellt, dass die Arbeitskräfte länger erwerbstätig und

produktiv bleiben können, u. a. durch lebenslanges

Lernen und einen besseren Gesundheitsschutz. Die größte

Chance zur Steigerung der Beschäftigungsquoten liegt in

einer Erhöhung der Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen, älteren

Arbeitskräften und bestimmten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt

benachteiligten Gruppen.

Zur Erschließung dieses Potenzials ist eine Anhebung des

Bildungsniveaus von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung. Ein

höheres Bildungsniveau geht mit signifikant höheren

Beschäftigungsquoten und weitaus niedrigeren

Arbeitslosenquoten einher. Im Jahr 2005 betrug die

durchschnittliche Beschäftigungsquote für hochqualifizierte

Arbeitskräfte in der EU 82,5 %, für Arbeitskräfte mit

mittlerer Qualifikation (Abschluss der Sekundarstufe II)

68,7 %, für Geringqualifizierte dagegen nur 46,4 %.

Sowohl die Lissabon-Strategie als auch die europäische

Beschäftigungsstrategie legen den Schwerpunkt auf

Beschäftigung und Wachstum und stellen Leitlinien auf,

wie den demografischen Herausforderungen zu begegnen

ist. Voraussetzung für eine stärkere Erwerbsbeteiligung

von Frauen sind ein Ausbau des Angebots an

erschwinglicher, hochwertiger Betreuung für Kinder und

pflegebedürftige Angehörige, die Aufteilung der Familien

und Haushaltspflichten auf Frauen und Männer, eine

Verringerung der geschlechtsspezifischen

Lohnunterschiede sowie eine verstärkte Gleichstellung und

Chancengleichheit der Geschlechter. Der 2006 angenommene

Europäische Pakt für die Gleichstellung der

Geschlechter zielt auf die durchgängige Berücksichtigung

der Gleichstellungsperspektive ab und soll als Instrument für

die Förderung der Beschäftigung von Frauen dienen. Eine

weitere, noch wichtigere Strategie zur Erschließung des

Potenzials für eine gesteigerte Beschäftigung besteht in der

Verlängerung der Erwerbstätigkeit, indem Anreize für einen

späteren Renteneintritt geschaffen werden. Anzusetzen ist

hierbei nicht nur bei den Rentensystemen, sondern auch bei

den Frühverrentungs und Sozialversicherungsregelungen

(Arbeitsunfähigkeit, Arbeitslosigkeit, Krankheit), die mitunter

als Ausstiegsmöglichkeit in Anspruch genommen werden.

Ältere Arbeitskräfte sind heutzutage in einer weitaus

besseren gesundheitlichen Verfassung als ihre

Altersgenossen vor 40/50 Jahren. Im Übrigen erscheint es

angebracht, verstärkt Anreize für den längeren Verbleib im

Erwerbsleben zu schaffen, da die heutigen älteren

Arbeitskräfte später in den Arbeitsmarkt eingetreten sind.

Unterstützt werden kann dieser Ansatz durch eine den

gesamten Lebenszyklus umspannende Perspektive. Die

Grundlage für ein aktives Altern ist durch eine gute

Erstausbildung zu schaffen, die die Arbeitskräfte in die

Lage versetzt, sich am lebenslangen Lernen zu beteiligen.

Die Gesundheitsförderung während des gesamten

Berufslebens sowie wirksame und leistungsfähige

Gesundheitsdienste sind ebenfalls wichtig, denn gesunde

Arbeitskräfte sind produktiver. Gesundheitsstörungen

gehören zu den Hauptursachen für Fernbleiben vom

Arbeitsplatz und Frühverrentung. Die Rentenreformen in

den meisten Mitgliedstaaten sehen eine Anhebung des

Erwerbsaustrittsalters vor und würden durch eine

Verbesserung der Beschäftigungsfähigkeit älterer

Arbeitskräfte (durch Förderung ihrer Qualifikation und

ihres Gesundheitszustands) zusätzlich gestützt. Das

Arbeitspotenzial aller Gruppen muss voll und ganz

genutzt werden, und es sind Maßnahmen zu ergreifen,

um benachteiligte Gruppen, wie behinderte Menschen,

Angehörige ethnischer Minderheiten und Menschen mit

Migrationshintergrund besser in den Arbeitsmarkt zu integrieren.

Eine wichtige Zielgruppe sind auch die jungen

Menschen, für die eine hohe Arbeitslosenquote zu verzeichnen

ist.

Ein produktiveres und leistungsfähigeres Europa

Wirtschaftswachstum und hoher Lebensstandard werden

ab 2017, wenn die Gesamtbeschäftigung abnehmen

dürfte, ausschließlich von einer erhöhten Arbeitsproduk-

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

21


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

tivität abhängen. In Europa besteht ein großes Potenzial

für Produktivitätsverbesserungen, vorausgesetzt alle

Mitgliedstaaten schließen zu den Ländern mit den besten

Ergebnissen auf, deren Produktivität über dem und nahe am

Niveau der USA liegt. Selbst die Länder, die in puncto

Produktivität führend sind, können ihr Wachstum beschleunigen,

indem sie Barrieren, die der Innovation und dem strukturellen

Wandel entgegenstehen, beseitigen sowie intensiv

Forschung und Entwicklung fördern, die zu neuen Produkten

und effizienteren Produktionsverfahren führen.

Um dieses Potenzial erschießen zu können, bedarf es in

erster Linie Investitionen in das Humankapital. Das

Beispiel der leistungsfähigsten Mitgliedstaaten zeigt, dass

der Bildungsstand in der EU noch erheblich angehoben

werden kann. In diesem Kontext gilt es vor allem, die Zahl

der Schulabbrecher zu verringern, die auf den künftigen

Arbeitsmärkten mit wachsenden Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert

sein werden. 2005 verfügten 17 % der Männer und

13 % der Frauen in der Altergruppe der 18 bis 24-

Jährigen lediglich über einen Abschluss der Sekundarstufe

I und absolvierten keine weitergehende Ausbildung.

Weitere Verbesserungen drängen sich auch in Bezug auf

den Anteil der Absolventen der Sekundarstufe II und der

Hochschulbildung auf. Die Ausgaben für die tertiäre

Bildung belaufen sich in der EU-25 lediglich auf 1,2 %

des BIP, in den USA dagegen auf 2,9 %. Etwas kleiner ist

die Schere EU/USA bei den Ausgaben für Forschung und

Entwicklung (FuE), die in der EU knapp unter 2 % des BIP

und in den USA bei etwa 2,7 % liegen. Europas Fähigkeit

zu Innovation und Produktivitätswachstum in der Zukunft

wird von verstärkten Investitionen zugunsten von Bildung

und Forschung auf Spitzenniveau abhängen. Diese werden

auch von entscheidender Bedeutung sein, um die

neuen Marktchancen erfolgreich zu nutzen, die sich durch

die „Seniorenwirtschaft“ auftun, also durch neue Produkte

und Dienste, die an die sich wandelnden Bedürfnisse

einer alternden Gesellschaft und die geänderte

Nachfragestruktur angepasst sind.

Ein Europa, das auf die Aufnahme und Integration

von Migranten vorbereitet ist

Aufgrund seines Wohlstands und seiner gut funktionierenden

Gesellschaften wird Europa auch weiterhin attraktiv

für Zuwanderer sein. Es ist allerdings festzuhalten, dass

die EU nicht so erfolgreich ist wie die USA und Kanada,

wenn es darum geht, die am besten qualifizierten

Zuwanderer anzuziehen. Das 2005 verabschiedete

Zulassungsverfahren für Forscher aus Drittstaaten 3 ist ein

erster Schritt, um die Attraktivität Europas für

Hochqualifizierte zu erhöhen. Derartige Maßnahmen dürfen

nicht zu Lasten der Entwicklungsländer infolge der

Abwanderung von Spitzenkräften gehen, sondern können

und müssen für alle Seiten von Nutzen sein. Etwa 3,7 %

der Bevölkerung der EU-27 sind Staatsangehörige von

Drittländern (EU-15: 5,1 %). Somit entspricht die

Zuwanderung bereits einem Bedarf der europäischen

Arbeitsmärkte und die Nachfrage nach hoch sowie

geringqualifizierten Arbeitsmigranten wird anhalten.

Auch wenn die EU-interne Mobilität der Arbeitnehmer die

demografischen Trends für die EU insgesamt nicht beeinflussen

wird, so birgt sie doch ein enormes Potenzial für

eine Erhöhung der Erwerbsbeteiligungs und

Beschäftigungsquoten, da sie Menschen in Regionen mit

schlechten Arbeitsmarktchancen bessere Möglichkeiten

eröffnet. Länder mit einem hohen Wirtschaftswachstum in

den letzten Jahren, wie Spanien und Irland, haben immensen

Nutzen gezogen aus dem beträchtlichen Zustrom von

Arbeitnehmern sowohl aus Drittstaaten als auch aus der

Europäischen Union selbst.

Um das Potenzial der Zuwanderung nutzen zu können,

gilt es, die Herausforderung der Eingliederung der

Zuwanderer und ihrer Familienmitglieder in die europäischen

Gesellschaften zu meistern. Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten

verzeichnen offensichtlich unterschiedliche Erfolge bei der

beruflichen und sozialen Eingliederung der Zuwanderer.

In der Regel ist der Bildungsstand der Nichtstaatsangehörigen

weitaus niedriger als der der Staatsbürger

des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats, obwohl in einigen

Mitgliedstaaten der Prozentsatz der Nichtstaatsanhörigen

mit Hochschulabschluss tatsächlich höher ist als derjenige

der Staatsangehörigen. Gleichzeitig ist in verschiedenen

Mitgliedstaaten die Beschäftigungsquote der Zuwanderer,

insbesondere der Frauen, sehr niedrig. Mit dieser unzureichenden

Integration der Zuwanderer in die Gesellschaft

des Aufnahmelandes geht ein relativ negatives Bild der

Migration einher. So sind laut Eurobarometer im

Durchschnitt nur 4 von 10 Unionsbürgern der Meinung,

dass die Zuwanderer einen erheblichen Beitrag für

ihrLand leisten, während die knappe Mehrheit der Bürger

(52 %) diese Ansicht nicht teilt.

Ein Europa mit zukunftsfähigen öffentlichen Finanzen:

Garant eines angemessenen Sozialschutzes

und des Ausgleichs zwischen den Generationen

In allen Mitgliedstaaten wird die Bevölkerungsalterung zu

einem Anstieg der öffentlichen Ausgaben für Renten,

Gesundheitsversorgung und Langzeitpflege führen.

Schätzungen zufolge wird sich in den meisten

Mitgliedstaaten, in denen die Renten über Beiträge finanziert

werden, das Ungleichgewicht zwischen Beiträgen

und Bedarf vergrößern. Die von verschiedenen

Mitgliedstaaten eingerichteten Reservefonds können den

künftigen Finanzierungsbedarf abmildern, sind aber

offenbar in den meisten Fällen nicht ausreichend. In den

meisten Mitgliedstaaten sind die öffentlichen Haushalte

3. Richtlinie 2005/71/EG.

22

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Teil 1 – 1. Einleitung und Zusammenfassung

bei gleichbleibenden politischen Rahmenbedingungen

auf Dauer nicht zukunftsfähig. Erforderlich sind

Haushaltskonsolidierung und weitere Anstrengungen zur

Reform der Renten–, Gesundheits– und Langzeitpflegesysteme.

Eine Erhöhung der Anzahl von Jahren, in denen

die Arbeitskräfte ihre Erwerbstätigkeit aufrechterhalten

und bei guter Gesundheit bleiben, wird zu einer

Minderung des finanziellen Drucks auf die Gesundheitsund

Langzeitpflegesysteme beitragen.

Abgesehen von künftigen Entwicklungen bei den

Ausgaben und Einnahmen hängt die langfristige

Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen von der aktuellen

Defizit und Schuldensituation ab. Falls keine Änderungen

vorgenommen werden, besteht das Risiko, dass

die langfristige Tragfähigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen

untergraben wird. Zinszahlungen für öffentliche

Schulden können in einigen Mitgliedstaaten mehr als

10% der öffentlichen Einnahmen ausmachen.

Den Mitgliedstaaten wird nahegelegt, das derzeitige

Defizit und Schuldenniveau zu senken sowie untragbare

Ausgaben zu vermeiden, damit sie weiterhin in der

Lage sind, dem Ausgabenbedarf gerecht zu werden,

u. a. demjenigen, der sich aufgrund der Bevölkerungsalterung

ergibt. Das Potenzial für eine weitere

Konsolidierung der öffentlichen Finanzen ist in den

Mitgliedstaaten äußerst unterschiedlich.

Für eine nachhaltige Konsolidierung der öffentlichen

Finanzen ist es wichtig, zu einem Zeitpunkt zu agieren, zu

dem die Wachstumsaussichten noch günstig sind. Die EU

hat einen zeitlichen Handlungsspielraum von etwa zehn

Jahren, ehe die Beschäftigung – entsprechend den

Vorausschätzungen – infolge der schrumpfenden

Bevölkerung im erwerbstätigen Alter sinkt. Bei der

Bewältigung der Herausforderungen der Bevölkerungsalterung

kommt der Mobilisierung des vollen Potenzials

älterer Arbeitskräfte, einschließlich der Nutzung der

begrenzten Zeitspanne zur Reform der Renten und

Gesundheitssysteme und zur Vermeidung eines frühzeitigen

Ausscheidens der Babyboomer aus dem

Arbeitsmarkt, eine entscheidende Rolle zu. Zur Wahrung

der Solidarität zwischen den Generationen gilt es, eine

angemessene soziale Sicherung für die Älteren zu

gewährleisten und ausreichende Investitionen zugunsten

der jüngeren Generation zu tätigen.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

23


1. INTRODUCTION ET RÉSUMÉ

1.1. Contexte

Les changements démographiques occupent une place

d'importance dans l'agenda politique européen et, de

fait, l'Europe doit rassembler ses forces pour affronter les

profondes mutations qui s'opèrent dans la structure de sa

population. Au cours des dix prochaines années, les

cohortes du baby boom vont commencer à se retirer du

marché du travail. Les cohortes de jeunes accédant au

marché du travail seront beaucoup moins nombreuses en

raison de la faible fécondité. D'ici environ dix ans, l'emploi

total dans l'UE pourrait amorcer une chute en dépit

d'une hausse des taux d'emploi. Le taux de croissance

potentiel de l'Europe pourrait décliner au moment-même

où d'importantes ressources supplémentaires seront

nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins d'une population

croissante de personnes âgées, dont l'adéquation avec

les systèmes de retraites, de santé et de soins de longue

durée devra être assurée.

En octobre 2006, la Commission a présenté sa position à

l'égard des changements démographiques et de la

manière d'y faire face dans sa communication intitulée

L'avenir démographique de l'Europe, transformer un défi

en opportunité 1 . Cette communication a été suivie d'un

grand débat public, dans le prolongement du Livre vert

Face aux changements démographiques – une nouvelle

solidarité entre générations 2 de mars 2005 , et de discussions

au niveau des chefs d'État et de gouvernement au

sommet informel de Hampton Court en octobre 2005. La

Commission a exprimé sa confiance en l'aptitude de

l'Europe à gérer les changements démographiques et elle

a proposé cinq orientations clés offrant des possibilités

majeures d'y répondre par une politique constructive:

• une Europe qui favorise le renouveau démographique;

• une Europe qui valorise le travail: plus d'emplois et

une vie active plus longue et de qualité;

• une Europe plus productive et performante;

• une Europe organisée pour recevoir et intégrer les

migrants;

• une Europe aux finances publiques viables pour

garantir une protection sociale adéquate et l'équité

entre les générations.

Comme la communication l'annonçait, tous les deux ans,

un rapport présentera une évaluation de la situation

démographique en Europe reflétant les débats et recherches

en cours dans l'UE, en lien avec le Forum démographique

européen. Le présent rapport démographique

décrit brièvement le vaste travail d'analyse effectué avant

l'adoption de la communication sur l'avenir démographique

de l'Europe. Il s'inspire dans une large mesure des

travaux du Comité de politique économique et de la direction

générale Affaires économiques et financières de la

Commission sur l'évolution future des dépenses publiques.

En outre, il passe en revue une série d'études d'impact

démographique et une enquête Eurobaromètre réalisées

au titre d'un crédit budgétaire spécial approuvé par le

Parlement européen (l'action pilote "Walter" de 2004 et

2005, du nom de son initiateur, Ralf Walter, député européen).

Ces études s'intéressent à une diversité de questions

pertinentes, parmi lesquelles le lien entre le déclin

etou le vieillissement de la population et la croissance économique,

l'impact des changements démographiques sur

les compétences et qualifications demandées sur le marché

du travail ainsi qu'à des problèmes en rapport avec

l'innovation et la croissance de la productivité en Europe.

Enfin, le rapport rend compte aussi des auditions d'éminents

experts en janvier et mars 2006, et du Premier

Forum européen sur la démographie qui s'est tenu à

Bruxelles, les 30 et 31 octobre 2006.

Le but du présent rapport est de présenter les principaux

faits et chiffres qui alimentent le débat sur l'avenir démographique

de l'Europe et les réponses politiques appropriées

à y apporter. Le rapport commence par faire le

point sur les principaux moteurs des changements démographiques

– la fécondité, l'espérance de vie et la migration

– et les place dans une perspective globale à long

terme. Un autre chapitre examine l'impact économique du

vieillissement et ses conséquences sur les conditions de vie

futures en Europe.

Le présent rapport ambitionne de fournir des faits et des

chiffres démontrant le potentiel de chacune des cinq orientations

politiques clés dans lesquelles des réponses

1. COM(2006) 571, adopté le 12 octobre 2006.

2. COM(2005) 94, adopté le 16 mars 2005.

24

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Partie1 – 1. Introduction et résumé

constructives aux enjeux démographiques peuvent être

développées. L'un des chapitres étudie dans quelle mesure

les États membres ont déjà commencé à libérer ce potentiel.

Bien qu'il aborde un large éventail de domaines différents,

les informations fournies sont certainement encore incomplètes

et l'analyse doit être considérée comme très provisoire.

Cependant, ce chapitre devrait constituer un point de

départ utile pour une évaluation réaliste de l'état de préparation

de l'Union européenne face aux changements démographiques.

L'aperçu est complété de relevés par pays

basés sur des indicateurs démographiques traditionnels.

Dans sa communication d'octobre 2006, la Commission

a annoncé son intention d'organiser tous les deux ans un

grand Forum européen sur la démographie. Pour chaque

Forum, un rapport à l'instar de celui-ci doit être publié

pour alimenter un débat documenté et constructif, à la fois

au niveau européen et des États membres. Les réactions à

ce premier rapport reçues des diverses parties prenantes,

qui ont pris part au débat lancé par le Livre vert, et du

groupe de haut niveau d'experts démographiques gouvernementaux

serviront à améliorer le contenu du rapport

bisannuel sur la situation démographique.

Il existe sans doute de nombreuses façons d'améliorer les

rapports à venir. C'est pourquoi, tout commentaire et suggestion

seront les bienvenus et doivent être adressés à:

Unité E.1

Direction générale Emploi, affaires sociales

et égalité des chances

Commission européenne

B-1049 Bruxelles

Empl-e1-courrier@ec.europa.eu

1.2. Données essentielles de ce rapport

Le présent rapport sur la situation démographique en

Europe en 2006 consiste en trois grands chapitres correspondant

aux principaux domaines faisant l'objet de la

communication sur l'avenir démographique de l'UE: un

aperçu des moteurs des changements démographiques,

une analyse des principaux impacts de ces changements

et une description du potentiel de réaction aux enjeux

posés par les changements démographiques dans cinq

domaines politiques clés. Le présent résumé met en évidence

les grands thèmes du rapport, chacun d'eux étant

développé plus en détail dans les divers chapitres.

Chapitre 2: Transition démographique:

un facteur courant de développement social

et économique

Les principaux moteurs des changements démographiques

sont la fécondité, la mortalité (espérance de vie) et

la migration. En outre, la succession de cohortes d'âge de

différentes tailles tout au long du cycle de vie peut produire

des effets significatifs.

Concernant la fécondité, il y a deux catégories de pays

dans l'UE: ceux à fécondité modérément faible, de l'ordre

de 1,6 à 1,9 naissance par femme et ceux à très faible

fécondité, 1,5 naissance ou moins. La moyenne pour l'UE-

25 est de 1,5 (2005). Le taux de fécondité nécessaire

pour assurer un remplacement total des générations est

estimé par les démographes à 2,1, mais compte tenu des

niveaux actuels de l'immigration et de l'accroissement de

l'espérance de vie, la taille de la population ne déclinera

qu'à des taux de fécondité significativement inférieurs à

ce taux de remplacement. Il se peut aussi que les taux de

fécondité actuellement observés sous-estiment les tendances

à long terme.

L'indicateur est calculé de telle manière que le report des

naissances va d'abord conduire à réduire le taux de fécondité

jusqu'au moment où les femmes auront atteint un nouvel

âge moyen de maternité plus élevé. Cet effet "de calendrier"

peut affecter les pays aux taux de naissance les plus bas,

notamment en Europe centrale et orientale. Selon les projections

d'Eurostat jusqu'en 2050, les taux de fécondité s'accroîtront,

entre autres dans les pays aux taux les plus faibles:

pour l'UE-25, une légère reprise de 1,5 à 1,6 est prévue.

Une enquête Eurobaromètre réalisée en 2006 a montré que

les Européens ont en général une attitude positive à l'égard

de la maternité. Les femmes aimeraient avoir plus d'enfants

qu'elles n'en ont réellement. En outre, elles préfèreraient

aussi avoir leurs enfants un peu plus tard dans la vie.

Depuis le XIX e siècle, les gains d'espérance de vie

sont avant tout le résultat d'une diminution de la mortalité

aux premiers stades de la vie, grâce généralement

à des avancées socio-économiques et des mesures

de santé publique. Plus récemment, la mortalité en

milieu de vie a aussi baissé. Alors que les facteurs socioéconomiques,

comme le revenu et l'éducation, demeurent

importants pour les gains d'espérance de vie, l'existence

de traitements médicaux modernes joue un rôle

croissant, comme les nouveaux modes de vie.

L'espérance de vie est habituellement plus élevée dans

les anciens États membres (EU-15) (82,4 pour les femmes

et 76,7 pour les hommes) que dans les nouveaux États

membres (EU-10) (78,7 pour les femmes et 70,4 pour les

hommes). Selon les prévisions d'Eurostat, l'espérance de

vie devrait encore s'allonger d'environ six ans pour les

hommes et de cinq ans pour les femmes (EU-25) entre

2004 et 2050, grâce essentiellement à la baisse de la

mortalité aux âges élevés, ce qui contribuerait à augmenter

la proportion de personnes âgées et très âgées dans

la population totale. Toutefois, ces allongements de l'espérance

de vie dépendront du renoncement à des modes

de vie nocifs pour la santé, comme le tabagisme, une

mauvaise alimentation, le manque d'exercice physique et

l'abus d'alcool.

L'immigration est devenue un déterminant majeur des

changements démographiques dans l'UE. Dans le second

semestre du XX e siècle, un changement historique s'est

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

25


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

produit en de nombreux endroits d'Europe qui sont passés

de l'émigration à l'immigration. Le volume migratoire

net dans l'UE a atteint un sommet de presque 2 millions

en 2003/2004. Mais deux tiers de ce flux concernaient

l'Italie et l'Espagne où des flux importants de migrants

clandestins, la majorité desquels étant arrivés dans ces

pays dans les années précédentes, ont été régularisés et

sont donc soudain apparus dans les statistiques d'immigration.

Si le taux d'immigration se maintient à ce niveau

très élevé, la population en âge de travailler dans l'UE

continuera à croître jusqu'à environ 2030 au lieu de commencer

déjà à décliner d'ici à la fin de la présente décennie,

comme le laissent entrevoir les projections démographiques

d'Eurostat. Cependant, cette perspective rendrait

plus préoccupante encore la question de l'intégration des

immigrants. En effet, le degré d'intégration des populations

d'origine immigrée déjà présentes dans de nombreux

États membres est souvent considéré comme hautement

problématique.

Les cohortes du baby boom, c'est-à-dire les enfants

nés entre 1945 et 1965, constituent encore aujourd'hui

l'essentiel de la population en âge de travailler. Elles vont

se retirer bientôt du marché du travail, provoquant ainsi

un déséquilibre majeur entre les populations active et

retraitée. Environ 15 à 20 ans après leur départ, elles

commenceront à dépendre intensément des systèmes de

santé et des soins de longue durée.

L'association de ces évolutions ne bouleversera pas radicalement

le volume total de population d'ici à 2050, mais

transformera la structure de la population en Europe.

Selon les projections démographiques de base

d'Eurostat, l'âge moyen dans l'UE passera de 39 à 49

ans entre 2004 et 2050. Le nombre de jeunes (âgés de

0 à 14 ans) dans l'UE continuera de diminuer en termes

absolus d'environ 100 millions, niveau atteint en 1975, à

quelque 66 millions d'ici l'année 2050. La population en

âge de travailler dans la tranche d'âge de 15 à 64 ans

sera la plus nombreuse vers l'an 2010 (331 millions),

mais elle diminuera ensuite jusqu'à quelque 268 millions

d'ici à 2050. Le vieillissement concernera tous les États

membres de l'UE, mais à des degrés divers. Le taux de

dépendance vieillesse (nombre de personnes de plus de

65 ans divisé par le nombre de personnes âgées de 15

à 64 ans) atteindra environ 53% en 2050 dans l'UE-25

(contre 25% aujourd'hui), les taux les plus élevés devant

être ceux de l'Italie et de l'Espagne (66-67%) et les plus

bas, pour le Danemark, le Luxembourg, Malte, les Pays-

Bas et la Suède (environ 40%).

S'il faudra encore une ou deux décennies avant que l'impact

du vieillissement devienne clairement visible au

niveau d'un pays entier, l'impact peut déjà être observé

au niveau régional. Dans certaines régions,

l' "accroissement naturel" (variation entre les naissances

et les décès) évolue déjà négativement. Les migrations

peuvent soit accentuer soit ralentir ces tendances. Les

régions vont devoir de plus en plus tenir compte des effets

des évolutions à long terme dans leurs stratégies régionales

à moyen terme. Un certain nombre de régions ont déjà

réagi et sont à la pointe de la réflexion et de l'action en

matière de changements démographiques.

Il y a un siècle, quelque 15% de la population mondiale

vivait dans l'espace de l'actuelle UE -25; de nos jours, ce

n'est plus que 7%, et vers 2050, selon les prévisions

démographiques des Nations-Unies (2004), la population

de l'UE-25 devrait représenter environ 5% de la population

mondiale totale. Si toutes les régions du

monde – à l'exception de l'Afrique sub-saharienne – vont

connaître un vieillissement significatif de leurs populations,

l'UE est la seule grande région du monde dont la

population totale devrait se contracter au cours des quarante

prochaines années. Bien qu'une baisse de la fécondité

soit observée dans de nombreux pays en développement,

les contrastes démographiques et socio-économiques

entre l'Europe et ses voisins méridionaux laissent

penser que de fortes pressions migratoires se poursuivront

au cours des prochaines décennies.

Chapitre 3: Les impacts économiques

et sociaux des changements démographiques

Les changements démographiques limiteront progressivement

les possibilités futures de croissance de l'emploi.

Bien que la population en âge de travailler (de 15 à 64

ans) soit déjà supposée décliner à partir de 2011 environ,

l'emploi total dans l'UE-25 devrait continuer à s'accroître

jusqu'en 2017 environ en raison de l'augmentation

de la participation au marché du travail. Grâce à des

niveaux d'éducation supérieurs et à une participation

accrue au marché du travail de cohortes de femmes plus

jeunes, les taux d'emploi des femmes devraient s'élever

d'un peu plus de 55%, niveau de 2004, jusqu'à près de

65% d'ici à 2005. Les taux d'emploi des travailleurs plus

âgés devraient aussi s'accroître et passer de 40% en

2004 pour l'UE-25 à 47% d'ici à 2010 et à 59% en

2025. Mais à partir de 2017, la population en âge de

travailler ayant diminué, l'emploi total va stagner, puis se

réduire. Les prévisions montrent qu'avec la contraction de

l'emploi et la productivité devenue seule source de future

croissance économique, le taux moyen annuel de croissance

potentielle du PIB dans l'UE-25 va tomber de

2,4%, niveau entre 2004 et 2010, à seulement 1,2%

entre 2031et 2050.

Comme l'emploi décline à un moment où s'accroit le nombre

de personnes vieillissantes nécessitant à due proportion

des retraites, des prestations de santé et des soins de

longue durée, il sera difficile d'assurer de manière durable

des ressources suffisantes pour la protection

sociale. La hausse prévue de ces catégories de dépenses

d'ici à 2050 est d'environ 4,5 points de pourcentage

26 Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Partie1 – 1. Introduction et résumé

du PIB dans l'UE-25. Les dépenses publiques et privées au

titre des retraites, représentant en moyenne 13% du PIB

dans l'UE (en 2003), ont permis que le vieillissement ne

soit plus synonyme de pauvreté ou de dépendance vis-àvis

de ses enfants. Cependant, la capacité future de

l'Europe à offrir à la population vieillissante des niveaux

de retraite satisfaisants dépendra essentiellement de la

possibilité ou non de retarder l'âge de la retraite et

d'adapter les systèmes de financement de celle-ci à l'allongement

de l'espérance de vie, rendant ainsi transparente

la relation entre les cotisations et les prestations. Les

principaux bénéficiaires des prestations de santé et des

soins de longue durée sont les personnes âgées, que les

prévisions donnent en augmentation et qui seront davantage

en demande de ces services. Selon les projections

d'Eurostat, la proportion de la population totale de plus

de 80 ans augmentera de 4,1% en 2005 à 6,3% en

2025 et à 11,4% en 2050. Bien que l'âge en soi ne soit

pas le seul facteur déterminant des dépenses de santé

(même s'il donne une estimation de l'état de santé d'une

personne), les prévisions montrent qu'un vieillissement de

la population occasionnera une augmentation des dépenses

publiques de santé et de soins de longue durée.

Chapitre 4: Possibilités de faire face

aux changements démographiques

La communication de la Commission sur L'avenir démographique

de l'Europe – transformer un défi en opportunité

a recensé cinq domaines clés dans lesquels des

réponses constructives au défi démographique peuvent

être développées. Il s'agit des taux de natalité, des

niveaux d'emploi, de la croissance de la productivité, des

migrations et de la viabilité des finances publiques. Des

synergies pourront être obtenues si les politiques dans ces

domaines sont élaborées de manière intégrée. Par exemple,

les politiques qui encouragent la participation au

marché du travail des travailleurs vieillissants auront aussi

un impact positif sur les finances publiques. En outre, des

marchés plus compétitifs gonfleront le rendement des

investissements dans les travailleurs vieillissants.

Promouvoir le renouveau démographique en Europe

par une égalité accrue entre les genres

Si le choix d'avoir ou non des enfants (ou plus d'enfants)

est et doit rester une affaire privée, les politiques semblent

pouvoir aider les familles à faire leur choix. De fait, une

enquête révèle que les Européens aimeraient généralement

avoir plus d'enfants qu'ils n'en ont réellement. Les

études comparatives internationales montrent que les politiques

aidant les personnes qui le souhaitent à avoir des

enfants peuvent exercer quelque influence pour relever les

taux de natalité. Même de petits changements dans les

taux de fécondité produiront un impact majeur sur la

taille de la population et sa structure d'âge à long terme.

Cependant, un accroissement des taux de fécondité ne se

traduira en une augmentation de la population en âge de

travailler et en une hausse du taux d'emploi qu'au-delà de

20 ans ou plus. C'est pourquoi, au mieux, il ne pourra

apporter qu'une faible contribution à la résolution du problème

du vieillissement des cohortes du baby boom. Du

reste, le nombre de femmes en âge de procréer devrait

aussi chuter au cours des dix prochaines années.

Si le but est de permettre aux personnes d'avoir le nombre

d'enfants qu'elles souhaitent, les politiques qui semblent

le mieux réussir sont celles qui favorisent une plus

grande égalité entre les sexes et facilitent la conciliation

de la vie professionnelle et la prise en charge des enfants

et personnes dépendantes. Ce sont essentiellement les

femmes qui adaptent leurs projets de carrière aux besoins

de leurs familles (y compris la prise en charge des parents

âgés), soit en quittant le marché du travail, soit en travaillant

à temps partiel. Les pays dans lesquels la participation

des femmes au marché du travail est la plus élevée et

dans lesquels les progrès en matière d'égalité entre les

hommes et les femmes sont les plus notoires (comme en

témoignent les pratiques de répartition du temps entre les

hommes et les femmes) sont aussi ceux qui aujourd'hui

affichent des taux de fécondité relativement élevés. Il y a

une vingtaine d'années, les pays à haute participation

féminine au marché du travail avaient tendance à enregistrer

une fécondité inférieure à celle des pays à faible participation

des femmes au marché du travail. L'accès à des

services (en particulier des crèches à prix abordable de

haute qualité), la flexibilité des horaires et conditions de

travail, et l'égalité entre hommes et femmes (dont le partage

des responsabilités familiales et domestiques) sont

autant de facteurs importants de la conciliation de la vie

professionnelle et de la vie privée. Parallèlement aux politiques

destinées à offrir de meilleures conditions aux femmes

et aux hommes qui souhaitent fonder une famille, il

peut être de plus en plus important de s'intéresser aux

obstacles biologiques à la fécondité. Étant donné que les

parents potentiels reportent le moment de la décision

d'avoir des enfants, la stérilité est devenue un obstacle de

plus en plus fréquent à la réalisation de leur désir de procréer.

Le recours à des traitements de fécondité peut alors

influer sur les taux de natalité.

Promouvoir l'emploi en Europe: plus d'emplois et des vies

professionnelles plus longues de meilleure qualité

Le taux réel de dépendance vieillesse, c'est-à-dire le rapport

entre le nombre de personnes de plus de 65 ans et

celui des personnes en emploi âgées de 15 à 64 ans, est

encore supérieur au taux de dépendance démographique

et devrait passer de 37 à 70 dans l'UE-25 d'ici à 2050.

En dépit d'une augmentation considérable des taux d'emploi,

le taux de dépendance vieillesse devrait se dégrader

d'une manière importante. Mais deux tiers environ du

déclin de l'emploi attendu d'une contraction de la population

en âge de travailler pourraient être compensés par

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

27


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

une élévation du taux d'emploi dans l'UE-25 au niveau de

celui des trois États membres actuellement les plus performants.

Certes, une telle élévation des taux d'emploi exigerait

de nombreux changements sur le marché du travail et

dans les mécanismes institutionnels. Il faut adopter une

approche fondée sur le cycle de vie visant à permettre

aux personnes de rester plus longtemps actives et productives,

notamment en leur offrant des possibilités d'éducation

et de formation tout au long de la vie et de meilleures

protections de la santé. Les principales chances d'augmenter

les taux d'emploi tiennent à la participation au

marché du travail des femmes, des travailleurs vieillissants

et de quelques groupes de personnes handicapées.

Pour réaliser ces potentiels, il semble particulièrement

important de relever les niveaux d'éducation. Il y a une

corrélation entre des niveaux d'éducation élevés et des

taux significativement plus élevés en matière d'emploi et

beaucoup plus faibles en matière de chômage. En 2005,

le taux d'emploi moyen parmi les personnes hautement

qualifiées dans l'UE était de 82,5%, de 68,7% pour les

personnes moyennement qualifiées (celles ayant fréquenté

l'enseignement secondaire supérieur), tandis qu'il n'était

que de 46,4% pour les moins qualifiées. La stratégie de

Lisbonne, comme la stratégie européenne de l'emploi,

cherchent à accroître l'emploi et la croissance et à donner

des lignes directrices sur la manière de réagir aux enjeux

démographiques. Pour que les femmes participent davantage

au marché du travail, il faudra mettre en place des

structures abordables et de qualité pour la garde d'enfants

et la prise en charge des personnes dépendantes,

partager plus équitablement les responsabilités familiales

et domestiques entre les femmes et les hommes, réduire

les écarts de salaire entre hommes et femmes, promouvoir

l'égalité entre les genres et l'égalité des chances. Le pacte

européen pour l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes,

adopté en 2006, vise à intégrer la dimension de genre

dans toutes les actions entreprises et sera un instrument

d'accroissement de l'emploi des femmes. Une autre

mesure politique encore plus importante pour libérer les

potentialités d'accroissement de l'emploi consiste à prolonger

la durée de vie active en proposant des incitations

à retarder la date de départ à la retraite. Il s'agit non seulement

des régimes de retraite, mais aussi des dispositifs

de préretraite et des régimes de sécurité sociale (handicap,

chômage, maladie) qui sont parfois utilisés comme

voies de sortie. Aujourd'hui, les travailleurs âgés sont

dans un bien meilleur état de santé que leurs semblables

d'il y a 40 ou 50 ans. En outre, comme les travailleurs

âgés accèdent aujourd'hui plus tardivement au marché du

travail, il semble approprié de prendre des mesures incitatives

à rester au travail plus longtemps. Un impact plus

marqué peut encore être obtenu en adoptant une perspective

tout au long du cycle de vie. Le vieillissement actif

exige d'y être préparé par un bon niveau d'éducation initiale

qui permette aux travailleurs de participer à des programmes

d'éducation et de formation tout au long de la

vie. Il importe aussi de promouvoir la santé tout au long

de la vie professionnelle et de proposer des services de

santé efficaces et performants parce qu'une main d'œuvre

en bonne santé est plus productive. Une cause essentielle

d'absentéisme et de départ anticipé à la retraite est

la maladie. Les réformes des régimes de retraite engagées

dans la plupart des États membres retardent déjà

l'âge de la sortie du marché du travail et bénéficieraient

d'un appui supplémentaire si la capacité d'emploi des travailleurs

âgés était développée, tant au regard de leurs

qualifications que de leur état de santé. Le potentiel de travail

de toutes les catégories de population doit être pleinement

exploité et des mesures doivent être prises pour

mieux intégrer les groupes défavorisés sur le marché du

travail, comme les personnes handicapées, les minorités

ethniques et les personnes issues de l'immigration. Un

autre problème sérieux est celui du taux de chômage des

jeunes.

Une Europe plus productive et dynamique

La croissance économique et l'élévation des niveaux de

vie après 2017, alors que l'emploi total devrait être en

déclin, dépendront uniquement des accroissements de

productivité du travail. L'Europe possède un potentiel

considérable d'amélioration de la productivité sous

réserve que tous les États membres rattrapent les pays les

plus performants, dont les niveaux de productivité sont

supérieurs à ceux des Etats-Unis ou s'en approchent. En

effet, même les chefs de file en matière de productivité

peuvent encore accélérer leur croissance en éliminant les

obstacles à l'innovation et au changement structurel et en

dynamisant la recherche et le développement, sources de

nouveaux produits et de processus de production plus efficaces.

La solution première pour mobiliser ce potentiel est l'investissement

en capital humain. L'exemple des États membres

les plus performants montre que les niveaux généraux

d'éducation dans l'ensemble de l'UE peuvent encore être

considérablement relevés. Dans ce contexte, il est particulièrement

important de réduire le nombre d' abandons

prématurés de scolarité, qui vont conduire à des difficultés

croissantes sur les marchés du travail de demain. En

2005, 17% d'hommes et 13% de femmes âgés de 18 à

24 ans n'avaient pas été au-delà du premier niveau de

l'enseignement secondaire et n'avaient pas bénéficié

d'une éducation ou formation ultérieure. D'autres améliorations

sont aussi nécessaires au regard de la proportion

de personnes ayant reçu une éducation secondaire de

deuxième niveau ou tertiaire. Les dépenses pour l'enseignement

tertiaire dans l'UE-25 ne représentent que 1,2%

du PIB, contre 2,9% aux États-Unis. L'écart entre l'UE et les

États-Unis est quelque peu réduit en ce qui concerne l'investissement

en R&D, un peu moins de 2% du PIB dans

l'UE et près de 2,7% aux États-Unis. La capacité future de

l'Europe à innover et à accroître sa productivité sera fonc-

28 Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Partie1 – 1. Introduction et résumé

tion de l'intensification des investissements dans l'éducation

et la recherche de haut niveau. Cela sera aussi d'une

importance capitale pour que réussisse l'adaptation aux

nouvelles opportunités du marché offertes par "l'économie

des seniors", c'est-à-dire de nouveaux biens et services

adaptés aux nouveaux besoins et modèles de

demande d'une société vieillissante.

Accueillir et intégrer les migrants en Europe

L'Europe continuera d'être une destination attrayante pour

les migrants en raison de sa prospérité et du bon fonctionnement

de ses sociétés. Toutefois, il est à noter que l'UE

ne réussit pas autant que les USA et le Canada à attirer

les immigrants les plus qualifiés. La procédure adoptée en

2005 pour l'admission de chercheurs de pays tiers est

une première étape vers la résolution de ce problème 3 .

Les mesures prises dans ce sens ne doivent pas l'être au

détriment des pays en développement sous la forme d'une

fuite des cerveaux, mais peuvent et doivent bénéficier à

toutes les parties. Près de 3,7% de la population de l'UE-

27 sont constitués de ressortissants extérieurs à l'UE

(5,1% dans l'UE-15). Le système de l'immigration est donc

déjà adapté aux besoins des marchés du travail européens,

et cette nécessité de disposer d'une main d'œuvre

immigrée de composantes à la fois très qualifiée et peu

qualifiée se poursuivra.

Si la mobilité interne des travailleurs à l'intérieur de l'UE

ne changera pas les tendances démographiques de l'ensemble

de l'UE, elle représente un énorme potentiel de

taux supérieurs de participation et d'emploi parce qu'elle

ouvre la perspective de meilleures opportunités pour les

personnes qui vivent dans des régions où les opportunités

du marché du travail sont restreintes. Les pays qui ont

enregistré une croissance économique rapide au cours

des dernières années, comme l'Espagne et l'Irlande, ont

clairement tiré profit de l'afflux significatif de travailleurs

à la fois de l'extérieur et de l'intérieur de l'Union européenne.

Le défi principal pour réaliser le potentiel de l'immigration

est représenté par l'intégration des migrants et de leurs

descendants dans les sociétés européennes. Les États

membres de l'UE ont bien évidemment enregistré des

niveaux de succès différents sur le plan du marché du travail

et de l'intégration sociale. Le niveau d'éducation des

ressortissants étrangers est généralement largement inférieur

à celui des nationaux, bien que dans plusieurs États

membres, le pourcentage d'étrangers ayant reçu une formation

tertiaire soit réellement supérieur à celui des nationaux.

Dans le même temps, dans plusieurs États membres,

les taux d'emploi des immigrés, notamment des femmes

migrantes, sont très faibles. À cette intégration insuffisante

des immigrés dans leurs sociétés d'accueil s'ajoute une

perception négative de l'immigration; selon une enquête

Eurobaromètre, seuls 4 citoyens communautaires sur 10

en moyenne estiment que "les immigrés contribuent beaucoup

à leur pays", tandis qu'une légère majorité de

citoyens (52%) ne partagent pas ce sentiment.

Un financement public viable pour garantir une protection

sociale adéquate et l'équité entre les générations

Dans tous les États membres, le vieillissement de la population

grèvera les dépenses publiques au regard des

retraites, de la santé et des soins de longue durée. Les

projections montrent que la plupart des États membres où

les retraites sont financées par des cotisations spécifiques

vont connaître un déséquilibre croissant entre les contributions

et les besoins de financement. Les réserves financières

constituées par plusieurs États membres peuvent soulager

les futurs besoins de financement mais ne semblent

pas à la hauteur dans la plupart des cas. Dans la majorité

des États membres, les finances publiques ne tiendront

pas dans la durée compte tenu des politiques actuelles. Il

faut assurer l'assainissement budgétaire et d'autres réformes

des systèmes de retraite, de santé et de soins de longue

durée. Une augmentation du nombre d'années pendant

lesquelles les personnes restent en activité et en

bonne santé contribuera à réduire la pression financière

qui pèse sur les systèmes de santé et de soins de longue

durée.

Hormis l'évolution des dépenses et revenus futurs, la viabilité

à long terme des finances publiques dépend du déficit

et de l'endettement actuel qui, s'il reste inchangé, peut

amener les finances publiques sur la voie de la non-viabilité.

Les intérêts relatifs à l'endettement public peuvent

représenter plus de 10% des recettes publiques dans certains

États membres. Il est recommandé de réduire le déficit

actuel et le niveau d'endettement et d'éviter les dépenses

non viables pour s'assurer que les États membres restent

en mesure de satisfaire aux futurs besoins de dépenses,

notamment les dépenses liées au vieillissement de la

population. La capacité d'assainissement des finances

publiques diffère largement d'un État membre à l'autre.

Pour assainir les finances publiques sur le long terme, il

importe d'agir au moment où les perspectives de croissance

sont encore favorables. L'UE dispose d'une fenêtre

d'opportunité d'une dizaine d'années avant que l'emploi,

selon les prévisions, ne commence à baisser sous l'effet

de la contraction de la population en âge de travailler. Le

moyen fondamental pour faire face aux enjeux du vieillissement

consiste à mobiliser le plein potentiel de travailleurs

âgés, et notamment à utiliser la marge de manœuvre,

pour réformer les systèmes de retraite et de soins de

3. Directive 2005/71/CE.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

29


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

santé, et à prévenir le retrait anticipé des cohortes du

baby boom du marché du travail. Tout cela renforcera la

capacité des États membres à assurer une protection

sociale adéquate des personnes âgées tout en investissant

suffisamment dans les générations plus jeunes et, dès lors,

à maintenir la solidarité entre les générations.

30

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


2. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION: A COMMON FEATURE OF

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2.1. The demographic transition paradigm

Explanations and projections of population trends in

different parts of the world have been generally guided

by the paradigm of demographic transition. This

term was first used by the American demographer

Warren Thompson in 1929 4 to label the changes – or

transitions – he observed in birth and death rates in industrialised

societies over the past two hundred years. There

always appears to be a common pattern: after an initial

decline in death rates, birth rates also start to fall, albeit

with a certain lag. During this time lag, birth rates will be

much higher than mortality rates, resulting in a rapidly

growing population. The paradigm fits well with the

remarkable mortality and fertility changes that happened

first in Europe in the 19th century and in much of the rest

of the world during the 20th century. The transition can be

broken down into four different phases.

Stage one corresponds to pre-modern-times and is characterised

by the absence of a clear population trend. During

the second stage there is a dramatic rise in population

caused by a decline in the death rate while the birth rate

remains high. The decline in the death rate is due to

improvements in food supply thanks to higher yields in

agriculture and to improvements in public health 5 (water

and food handling, hygienic conditions) which result in a

particularly pronounced decrease in childhood mortality.

The increasing survival of children leads to a younger

population structure. The trend is amplified as the larger

surviving cohorts start to have children of their own at the

same high fertility rate as their parents. During stage three

the birth rate declines, which moves the population back

towards stability (in most Northern European countries

such a decline in birth rates already started at the end of

the 19th century). Towards the end of stage three the fertility

rate falls to replacement levels, but as a result of

population momentum (i.e. the large number of young

people), the population continues to grow. Finally, stage

four is characterised once again by stability with the

population no longer growing and the population age

structure has become much older.

Such a demographic transition seems to be a common

feature of development across the world, although there

are important differences in timing between the various

regions. In the 1950s, the birth rates in Europe were

almost twice as high as the death rates, which resulted in

significant population growth. It was during the 1990s

that Europe entered stage four, when the gap between

birth and death rates closed. Europe then started to have

a birth deficit resulting in negative natural growth.

Consequently, any further population growth has been the

result of net immigration. Less developed regions of the

world are by and large still in stage three of their demographic

transition – death rates have already declined

significantly and birth rates are now also coming down,

albeit from a very high level. India is expected to complete

its demographic transition by the middle of this century.

The only region in the world where birth rates have

not yet come down is Sub-Saharan Africa, which still

appears to be in stage two of the demographic transition.

Here the population is growing fast even though the

decrease in death rates has recently slowed (due to the

fact that in several African countries mortality has actually

increased as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic).

2.2. Fertility

Europe's demographic past is well described by the

demographic transition paradigm. However, the very low

fertility rates observed over the past decades raise the

question whether the assumption of a return to a stable

population size, as foreseen for the fourth stage of the

demographic transition, is a good guide to the future.

2.2.1. Trends in fertility

The most commonly used indicator for fertility is the Total

Fertility Rate (TFR). It gives the average number of children

per woman, assuming that all women are going to give birth

according to age specific fertility rates observed for a given

period. All EU Member States have now TFR levels below

2.1, the level needed for the replacement of generations.

4. Thompson Warren S. 1929, Population, American Sociological Review 34(6), pp. 959-975.

5. Readers of the British Medical Journal chose the 'sanitary revolution' as the biggest advance in healthcare since 1840,

see http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/334/suppl_1/s17eaf.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

31


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Within the EU there are roughly two groups of countries:

those with a moderately low fertility (in the range of 1.6-

1.9 births per woman) and those with very low fertility (in

the range of 1.5 births or less). The difference may

appear small at first glance. However, it has major implications

for a country's long-term demographic future. The

Australian demographer Peter McDonald 6 has warned

that: 'In a stable population with a fertility rate of 1.3

births per woman, the population falls at the rate of 1.5%

per annum. Such a population, in 100 years, would (all

other things remaining equal) fall to less than a quarter of

its original size. In contrast, with a fertility of 1.9, the rate

of decline in a stable population is only 0.2% and the

population size after 100 years would be 82% of its original

size.' McDonald concludes that 'it is an error to

convey the impression that in the long run of history a fertility

rate of 1.3 and a fertility rate of 1.9 is much the same

thing. Fertility falls from 1.9 to 1.3 through 60% of all

women having one fewer child!' On the basis of this argument

a distinction is made between countries with a dangerously

low fertility rate of below 1.6 and countries with

a comfortably low fertility rate. The latter countries can still

expect to offset their natural population decline with a reasonable

level of immigration.

Table 2.1 Total (period) fertility rates (increases compared to previous column shaded)

1960/1964 1970/1974 1980/1984 1990/1994 2000/2003 2004/2005* 2050**

EU-25 2.64 2.23 1.79 1.56 1.47 1.50 1.60

EU-15 2.67 2.23 1.72 1.50 1.50 1.55 1.61

NMS-10 2.47 2.21 2.19 1.87 1.30 1.25 1.58

BE 2.64 2.07 1.61 1.62 1.63 1.64 1.70

CZ 2.22 2.14 2.01 1.72 1.16 1.23 1.50

DK 2.58 1.97 1.44 1.73 1.75 1.78 1.80

DE 2.46 1.77 1.48 1.32 1.35 1.37 1.45

EE : 2.13 2.12 1.67 1.35 1.40 1.60

EL 2.25 2.33 2.02 1.37 1.27 1.29 1.50

ES 2.86 2.87 1.94 1.30 1.26 1.32 1.40

FR 2.83 2.36 1.88 1.72 1.89 1.90 1.85

IE 3.91 3.84 2.92 1.99 1.95 1.99 1.80

IT 2.50 2.37 1.55 1.28 1.26 1.33 1.40

CY 3.47 2.38 2.46 2.35 1.54 1.49 1.50

LV : 2.01 2.01 1.70 1.24 1.24 1.60

LT 2.57 2.28 2.04 1.86 1.30 1.26 1.60

LU 2.33 1.77 .48 1.65 1.67 1.70 1.80

HU 1.88 2.01 .82 1.77 1.31 1.28 1.60

MT 3.16 2.21 .98 2.02 1.58 1.37 1.60

NL 3.17 2.15 .52 1.59 1.72 1.73 1.75

AT 2.78 2.08 .61 1.49 1.37 1.42 1.45

PL 2.76 2.24 2.33 1.93 1.28 1.23 1.60

PT 3.16 2.71 2.05 1.53 1.48 1.42 1.60

SI 2.25 2.14 1.91 1.38 1.23 1.22 1.50

SK 2.93 2.50 2.29 1.94 1.22 1.25 1.60

FI 2.68 1.64 1.68 1.82 1.74 1.80 1.80

SE 2.30 1.90 1.64 2.04 1.62 1.75 1.85

UK 2.86 2.20 1.81 1.78 1.66 1.74 1.75

BG 2.23 2.16 2.01 1.57 1.25 1.29 1.50

RO 2.10 2.65 2.18 1.55 1.28 1.29 1.50

HR 2.12 1.93 1.90 1.55 1.34 1.35 1.85 ***

TR 6.18 5.68 4.36 2.99 2.42 2.20 1.85 ***

Source: Eurostat.

* Preliminary or most recent.

** According to EUROPOP2004, Baseline, data for France refer to metropolitan France only.

*** UN data.

6. McDonald, P., 'Gender equity, social institutions and the future of fertility', Journal of Population Research, No 17(1), 2000, pp. 1-16.

32

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

Table 2.1 shows that since the 1970s, all Member States

have experienced fertility decline, sometimes very substantial

and at a fast speed. In Ireland, for instance, the TFR

has declined since the 1960s by almost 50%. In several

of the new Member States, such as Poland, the drop was

even larger than 50%. Fertility declines were less abrupt

in some of the Western and Northern Member States.

Currently, women in the EU-25 have on average 1.5 children

(1.55 in the old Member States and 1.25 in the new

Member States). Despite the fertility decline in Ireland,

however, this Member State still has one of the highest fertility

rates in Europe, together with France and Finland,

while the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia

have the lowest rates.

2.2.2. Drivers of fertility

The literature offers basically two types of explanations for

the decline in fertility 7 . Economists have proposed a rational

choice approach while sociologists have concentrated

on changes in cultural and individual values.

The rational choice approach focuses on various mechanisms.

Gary Becker 8 argued that as women become

more educated, raising children involves much higher

opportunity costs – assuming that mothers have to

reduce their labour force participation. Richard Easterlin

highlighted the importance of a positive economic outlook:

'If the couple's potential earning power is high in

relation to aspirations, they will have an optimistic outlook

and will feel freer to marry and have children. If

their outlook is poor relative to aspirations, the couple

will feel pessimistic and, consequently, will be hesitant to

marry and have children 9 '. A third major rational choice

fertility theory proposed by David Friedman focuses on

the economic value of children. The idea here is that

people have a larger number of children to reduce

uncertainty in their future lives. Social protection arrangements,

however, limit uncertainty and reduce the economic

rationale for having a large number of children,

which we still see in many non-European countries

where population-wide social protection systems do not

function properly.

Sociologists have often challenged or complemented the

rational choice approach to fertility. Dirk van de Kaa and

Ronald Lesthaeghe have proposed complementing the

rational approach by paying more attention to the dramatic

changes in individual values and behaviour that have

taken place since the 1960s. Only by understanding the

newly acquired autonomy of the individual can one comprehend

current family formation decisions 10 . Van de Kaa

and Lesthaeghe postulate a Second Demographic

Transition (SDT) characterised by new patterns of behaviour

in terms of living arrangements (single living, preand

post-marital cohabitation, delayed fertility, high prevalence

of non-marital fertility and high rates of divorce)

and new individual values with respect to family and fertility

behaviour. Table 2.2 illustrates how these values

have changed in Western Europe in the process of

moving from the first to the second demographic transition

in Table 2.2.

7. See also Liefbroer, A. C., 'The impact of perceived cost and rewards of childbearing and entry in parenthood: evidence from a panel study',

European Journal of Population, 2005.

8. Becker, G.S., A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1981.

9. Easterlin, R.A., Birth and Fortune: The impact of numbers on personal welfare, Basic Books, New York, 1980.

10. Van de Kaa, D. J., 'Europe's second demographic transition', Population Bulletin, No 42, 1987, pp. 1-57.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

33


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 2.2 Overview of demographic and societal characteristics related to FDT and SDT in Western Europe

FDT

• Rise in proportions marrying, declining age at first

marriage

• Low or reduced cohabitation

• Low Divorce

• High remarriage

• Decline in marital fertility via reductions at older

ages, lowering mean ages at first parenthood

• Deficient contraception, parity failures

• Declining illegitimate fertility

• Low definitive childlessness among married couples

A. Marriage

B. Fertility

C. Societal background

SDT

• Fall in proportions married, rise in age at first

marriage

• Rise in cohabitation (pre- & post-marital)

• Rise in divorce, earlier divorce

• Decline of remarriage following both divorce and

widowhood

• Further decline in fertility via postponement,

increasing mean age at first parenthood, structural

subreplacement fertility

• Efficient contraception (exceptions in specific social

groups)

• Rising extra-marital fertility, parenthood within

cohabitation

• Rising definitive childlessness in unions

• Preoccupations with basic material needs: income,

work conditions, housing, health, schooling, social

security. Solidarity prime value

• Rising memberships of political, civic and

community oriented networks. Strengthening of

social cohesion

• Strong normative regulation by State and Churches.

First secularisation wave, political and social

'pillarisation'

• Segregated gender roles, familistic policies,

'embourgeoisement', promotion of breadwinner

family model

• Ordered life course transitions, prudent marriage

and dominance of one single family model

• Rise of 'higher order' needs: individual autonomy,

self-actualisation, expressive work and socialisation

values, grass-roots democracy recognition.

Tolerance prime value.

• Disengagement from civic and community oriented

networks, social capital shifts to expressive and

affective types. Weakening of social cohesion

• Retreat of the State, second secularisation wave,

sexual revolution, refusal of authority, political

'dépillarisation'

• Rising symmetry in gender roles, female economic

autonomy

• Flexible life course organisation, multiple lifestyles,

open future

Source: Lesthaeghe R and Surkyn J, 2007, 'When history moves on: the foundation and diffusion of a second demographic

transition', forthcoming in Jayakodi, R.; Thornton, A.; Axinn, W. (Eds), International Family Change – Ideational Perspectives.

Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Earlbaum & Associates.

It is far too early to tell whether the second demographic

transition will be as universal as the first demographic

transition. If it is mainly driven by changes in values, it

could be less permanent and more specific to individual

countries. However, birth rates far below replacement

levels have also been observed in the most developed

Asian countries.

2.2.3. Tempo and quantum effects on fertility rates

The most common used period indicator for fertility is the

Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is based on age specific

fertility rates in a particular year. The TFR indicator has to

be regarded as an estimate or a projection to the extent

that it is based on the assumed future fertility pattern of

younger women as derived from the probability of giving

birth observed among current older cohorts of women.

The effects of changes in current fertility patterns on future

fertility probabilities are not taken into account. Thus,

when more and more women are postponing births, the

TFR will inevitably go down initially (tempo effect), even

though the likelihood of having children at a later age

would go up if these women still wished to have the same

34

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

number of children (quantum effect). Once the general

process of postponement in a country has stopped, the

TFR will go up again. The sensitivity of the TFR to postponement

(and the opposite catching-up effect) causes the

TFR to be a volatile and unstable indicator.

In most EU countries, however, the postponement of childbearing

does appear to result in reduced average fertility

for the cohort as a whole. The share of children without

siblings appears to be increasing, and childlessness among

women in their 30s and 40s is becoming more frequent.

Cohort fertility rates, which are known only at the end of

a cohort's fertile life span, are a more stable indicator of

long-term trends as they are not affected by differences in

the timing of children (postponement). Cohort fertility turns

out to be only slightly higher than the period rates, which

suggests that postponement is still reducing TFR. However,

an obvious problem in using cohort rates is that they are

not available for (younger) cohorts that have not yet reached

the end of their fertile life span, so do not allow a

timely observation of fertility trends. The latest available

average cohort fertility rates for the generations of women

born in 1955 and 1965 in the EU-25 – 1.94 and 1.77,

respectively – also confirm that fertility has now dropped

below the replacement level.

In the EU, the fertility rates of women aged younger than

30 years have declined since the 1970s, while the fertility

rates of women over 30 have risen since the 1980s,

which is a clear indication of postponement. Since 1980

the average TFR has declined by 0.4 children per woman.

During the same period the mean age at childbearing has

risen by 2 years to 29 years. In recent years the decline

in fertility rates at young ages appears to have slowed

down in many Member States and even stopped in several

countries. As a consequence, the decline in the total

fertility rate (TFR) has also slowed down or even turned

into a slight increase. In some countries, the rise in fertility

at older ages has slowed down, suggesting that in these

countries the 'catching-up phase' is near its end, but in

most countries a strong increase in fertility at ages 30 or

more is still going on, suggesting that the TFR in these

countries may increase in the coming years. Fertility is therefore

likely to recover in Member States where it is below

average (due to the tempo effect), particularly in the new

Member States 11 .

While a reversal in TFR trends can be expected in a number

of Member States, there is nevertheless concern that

very low fertility rates could persist. Lutz, Skirbekk and

Testa warn in a recent paper 12 of a low fertility trap resulting

from a self-reinforcing mechanism. Their low fertility

trap hypothesis (LFTH) has three components: a demographic

one based on the negative population momentum,

i.e. the fact that fewer potential mothers in the future will

result in fewer births; a sociological one saying that the

ideal family size for the younger cohorts is declining as a

consequence of the lower actual fertility observed among

previous cohorts; and an economic one based partly on

Easterlin's relative earnings power hypothesis, saying that

the aspirations of young people are increasing while their

expected income may be declining as a consequence of

the rising cost of population ageing.

Together, these three factors could trigger a downward

spiral, particularly in those countries where the TFR currently

lies significantly below 1.5 births per woman.

2.2.4. Results of the 2006 Eurobarometer on fertility

and ageing 13

Both the SDT and the LFTH suggest that people now have

different values and life styles and have become less

interested in having children. A Eurobarometer (EB) survey

carried out in 2006 checked whether Europeans

have indeed become less interested in children. The survey

confirmed the generally positive attitude of

Europeans towards childbearing that was first found in

the 2002 EB survey. The two-child family remains the

most common aspiration of Europeans. The mean ideal

number of children is 2 or slightly higher, both for men

and women as well as for each age group. Austria and

Romania are the only European countries with ideals

below the replacement level among young female and

male cohorts. This picture remains largely unchanged

when we look at the ideals that people have for their

own family size, rather than general ideals., As is normal,

however, ideals are somewhat removed from reality:

when one adds up the number of children already

born and the number people still intend to have, for

women in the prime reproductive ages, several countries

have averages of less than 2 (Austria, Romania, Spain,

Italy, Slovakia, Germany, Malta, and the Czech

Republic) – see Figures 2.1 and 2.2.

Women would not only like to have more children than

they actually have, they would also prefer to have their

children somewhat later in life than they actually do (half a

year later on average). This confirms that the tempo effect

could still be relevant. The age indicated as the latest ages

to start having children is 41 for a woman and 46 for a

11. De Beer, P., An assessment of the tempo effect for future fertility in the EU, European Observatory on the Social Situation, the demography network

(forthcoming), 2006.

12. Lutz, W., Skirbekk V. and M. R. Testa, 'The low-fertility trap hypothesis: forces that may lead to further postponement and fewer births in Europe',

Vienna Institute for Demography (VID) research paper, No 4, 2005.

13. Testa M. R. 'Childbearing preferences and family size issues in Europe', VID Report on the special Eurobarometer, No 253, wave 65.1 and

65.31, TNS Opinion & Social for the EC, 2006.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

35


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 2.1 Childless women, and childless women not intending to have any children, by country, ages 25-39

CC 10

EU 25

EU 15

2AC+2CC

AT

BE

LU

DE(W)

DE

IT

SK

DK

FI

DE(E)

NL

TR

ES

FR

LV

UK

RO

IE

MT

PT

SE

EE

CY

EL

CZ

SI

PL

HU

LT

BG

HR

0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0

Childless women not intending to have a child

Childless women still considering having a child

Source: 'Childbearing preferences and family size issues in Europe' by M.R. Testa, results of the 2006 Euro Barometer on

fertility and ageing.

Note: Own adaptation of Figure 21 in the report.

Figure 2.2 Mean actual and ideal number of children, by country. Women aged 25 to 39

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

TR

CY

LU

IE

FR

UK

FI

HU

EE

BE

DE (W)

SE

CZ

DE

NL

MT

BG

LV

SK

LT

PL

DE (E)

PT

HR

EL

SI

DK

RO

ES

AT

IT

EU15

NMS10

EU25

2 CC + 2 AC

Mean ideal family size

Mean actual family size

Source: 'Childbearing preferences and family size issues in Europe' by M.R. Testa, results of the 2006 Euro Barometer on

fertility and ageing.

36

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

man, despite the fact that female biological fertility, on average,

starts to decline rapidly after the age of 35 14 .

The most relevant conditions considered as a prerequisite

for having children are the health of the two partners

(75% for the mother's health and 68% the father's health

among men, and 77% for the mother's health and 66%

the father's health among women), the presence of a supportive

partner (72% overall), a good working situation of

the father (61% and 62% among female and male respondents,

respectively), the financial situation (60% overall),

and the availability of appropriate housing conditions

(55% among men and 59% among women).

The importance of the role of both partners for a good

family life and particularly for raising children is recognised,

but the role of mothers is still considered more crucial.

The predominant opinion is that men and women should

both contribute to the household income, although fathers

should not concentrate too much on their jobs according to

almost 80% of respondents of childbearing age in the EU-

25. Half of respondents also believe that mothers should

not work too much, fearing that family life would suffer if

they have a full-time job, while more than half of the respondents

are convinced that children of pre-school age

would suffer if their mother went out to work. A large majority

of Europeans (around 70%) feel, however, that a working

mother is able to establish just as warm a relationship

with her children as a non-working mother.

2.3. Longevity

2.3.1. Main trends in longevity

Decreasing mortality at more advanced ages has become

an important driver behind population ageing. Table 2.3

presents an overview of the trend in life expectancy at

birth for men and women in the EU-27 plus Croatia and

Turkey. Declining mortality results in the extension of life

span, measured as the average life expectancy at birth,

which is the number of years newborn babies may expect

to live after going through the different stages of the life

cycle at the currently prevailing mortality rates for each of

these stages.

Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that on average for the EU-25,

European women may expect to live 81.8 years while the

life expectancy for men is 75.6 years. Life expectancy is

generally higher in the old Member States (82.4 and

76.7 for women and men, respectively) than in the new

Member States (78.7 and 70.4 for women and men). The

Baltic States report the lowest life expectancies along with

very large gender differences (around 77 years for

women and 65 for men). Relatively large gender differences

are also reported for France and Spain (7-8 years).

BOX 2.1

Towards a better understanding of fertility determinants: A major new survey

The Eurobarometer is a very useful instrument to monitor public opinion but its rather small sample size (only 1000

respondents per Member State) makes it unsuitable for a more rigorous scientific analysis of fertility. A few years

ago the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) took the initiative of collecting a new major

international data set with a sample size of around 10.000 persons per country to allow for a more structural and

in-depth analysis of fertility. The project is called the Generations and Gender Project (GGP) 15 and will be used

to study relationships between parents and children (generation) and between adults (gender). Participation is

voluntary, but already 17 EU Member States have signed up or are thinking of participating in the near future.

14. On average female fertility begins to decline slightly at 30, the decline becoming very strong after 35 and infertility usually setting in at 41. See

Te Velde, E.R. and P.L. Pearson, 'The variability of female reproductive ageing', Human Reproduction Update, 8th year, 2002, pp. 141-154.

15. See for more information http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/Welcome.html.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

37


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 2.3 Life expectancy, men

1960/1964 1970/1974 1980/1984 1990/1994 2000/2003 2004* 2050**

EU-25 67.3 68.5 70.3 72.1 74.7 75.6 81.8

EU-15 67.6 68.9 71.0 73.2 75.8 76.7 82.3

NMS-10 65.6 66.4 66.4 66.2 69.4 70.4 78.7

BE 67.7 67.8 70.0 73.0 75.1 75.9 82.3

CZ 67.5 66.6 67.1 68.6 72.0 72.6 79.7

DK 70.4 70.7 71.2 72.5 74.7 75.2 80.9

DE 66.9 67.3 69.6 72.5 75.4 75.7 82.0

EE 64.3 65.8 64.4 63.3 65.3 66.0 74.9

EL 67.3 70.1 72.2 74.8 75.4 76.6 80.3

ES 67.4 69.2 72.5 73.7 76.1 77.2 81.4

FR 66.9 68.4 70.2 73.2 75.6 76.7 82.7

IE 68.1 68.8 70.1 72.5 74.8 75.8 82.4

IT 67.2 69.0 70.6 74.0 76.8 76.8 83.6

CY : 70.0 72.3 74.4 76.1 77.0 81.9

LV 66.1 65.4 64.0 62.1 65.0 65.5 74.3

LT 66.6 66.9 65.7 64.5 66.4 66.4 75.5

LU 66.5 67.1 69.1 72.3 75.0 75.0 81.6

HU 66.4 66.5 65.4 64.8 68.1 68.6 78.1

MT 67.1 68.5 69.7 74.0 76.1 76.7 81.8

NL 71.5 70.7 72.7 74.1 75.9 76.4 80.2

AT 66.2 66.5 69.4 72.6 75.6 76.4 83.6

PL 65.1 67.0 67.0 66.9 70.2 70.2 79.1

PT 61.2 64.2 67.7 70.8 73.6 74.2 80.4

SI 65.6 65.9 67.2 69.6 72.4 72.6 79.8

SK 68.4 66.8 66.8 67.5 69.7 70.3 77.7

FI 65.5 66.5 69.2 70.8 74.7 75.3 81.9

SE 71.5 72.1 73.0 75.3 77.7 78.4 83.3

UK 67.9 68.7 70.2 73.4 75.9 76.2 82.9

BG 68.5 69.3 68.9 68.1 68.6 68.9 78.2

RO 65.1 66.5 66.8 66.2 67.6 67.7 77.6

HR 64.3 65.7 66.6 68.6 71.0 72.0 77.8***

TR 50.3*** 55.0*** 59.0*** 64.0*** 66.4 68.8 75 2***

Source: Eurostat.

* Preliminary or most recent.

** According to EUROPOP 2004, Baseline, data for France refer to metropolitan France only.

*** UN Data.

38

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

Table 2.4 Life expectancy, women

1960/1964 1970/1974 1980/1984 1990/1994 2000/2003 2004** 2050**

EU-25 73.0 75.0 77.2 79.1 81.0 81.8 86.9

EU-15 73.2 75.3 77.7 79.8 81.6 82.4 87.4

NMS-10 71.6 73.4 74.7 75.3 78.1 78.7 84.1

BE 73.5 74.2 76.8 79.8 81.2 81.7 88.3

CZ 73.4 73.5 74.3 76.0 78.5 79.0 84.1

DK 74.4 75.9 77.3 77.9 79.4 79.9 83.7

DE 72.4 73.6 76.1 79.0 81.2 81.4 86.8

EE 71.6 74.6 74.4 74.4 76.7 76.9 83.1

EL 72.4 73.8 76.8 79.8 80.7 81.4 85.1

ES 72.2 74.8 78.6 80.8 83.2 83.8 87.9

FR 73.6 75.9 78.4 81.3 82.9 83.8 89.1

IE 71.9 73.5 75.6 78.1 79.9 80.7 86.9

IT 72.3 74.9 77.4 80.5 82.4 82.5 88.8

CY : 72.9 77.0 78.9 81.0 81.4 85.1

LV 73.1 74.7 74.4 73.9 76.2 77.2 82.5

LT 77.1 75.5 75.6 75.6 77.5 77.8 83.7

LU 72.2 73.4 75.9 79.0 80.9 81.0 86.7

HU 70.8 72.3 73.0 73.8 76.4 76.9 83.4

MT 70.7 72.6 73.7 78.4 80.7 80.7 85.0

NL 75.3 76.5 79.3 80.3 80.7 81.1 83.6

AT 72.7 73.4 76.5 79.1 81.5 82.1 87.7

PL 71.0 73.9 75.2 75.9 78.5 79.2 84.4

PT 66.8 70.8 75.2 77.9 80.3 80.5 86.6

SI 72.0 73.4 75.2 77.4 80.1 80.4 85.2

SK 73.0 73.4 74.6 76.0 77.7 77.8 83.4

FI 72.5 75.0 77.6 79.4 81.5 82.3 86.5

SE 75.4 77.5 79.1 80.8 82.2 82.7 86.5

UK 73.7 75.0 76.2 78.9 80.5 80.7 86.6

BG 72.2 73.7 74.3 74.9 75.4 76.0 82.6

RO 69.1 71.0 72.3 73.2 74.8 75.1 82.0

HR 69.0 72.3 74.2 76.0 78.1 79.0 83.3***

TR 54.0**** 592**** 63.2**** 68.5**** 71.0 71.1 80.1****

Source: Eurostat.

* Period average.

** Preliminary or most recent.

*** According to EUROPOP 2004, Baseline, data for France refer to metropolitan France only.

**** UN data.

Overall, gender differences in mortality are nevertheless

declining in the EU-25, as male mortality rates are falling

to the levels observed for women.

2.3.2. Expected trends in longevity

Future increases in life expectancy will depend mostly on

declining mortality at higher ages. This translates into

increasing life expectancy aged 60. Current mortality

rates imply that a European man at age 60 has an additional

15 years to live, which is 20% of his total life span.

A 60 year-old European woman may expect to live an

additional 20 years which is 25% of her total life span.

A major question is whether the future increase in life

expectancy will consist of years in good health. This

would allow older people to remain active on the labour

market longer and reduce the period of dependency at

the end of the life cycle. Healthy life expectancy adjusts

life expectancy for time spent in poor health. It should be

noted that this indicator is estimated on the basis of selfreporting.

Cultural differences between countries can

make inter-country comparisons misleading. Table 2.5

provides an overview of health life expectancy at birth in

a number of EU countries.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

39


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 2.5 Healthy Life Years – 2003

Males

Females

EU-15 64.5 (e) 66.0 (e)

Euro area : :

BE 67.4 (e) 69.2 (e)

CZ : :

DK 63.0 (e) 60.9 (e)

DE 65.0 (e) 64.7 (e)

EL 66.7 (e) 68.4 (e)

ES 66.8 (e) 70.2 (e)

FR 60.6 (e) 63.9 (e)

IE 63.4 (e) 65.4 (e)

IT 70.9 (e) 74.4 (e)

CY 68.4 69.6

HU 53.5 (p) 57.8 (p)

MT : :

NL 61.7 (e) 58.8 (e)

AT 66.2 (e) 69.6 (e)

PL : :

PT 59.8 (e) 61.8 (e)

FI 57.3 (e) 56.5 (e)

SE 62.5 (e) 62.2 (e)

UK 61.5 (e) 60.9 (e)

HR : :

IS : :

NO 66.3 (p) 64.2 (p)

Source: Eurostat New Cronos.

(:) Not available.

(e) Estimated value.

(p) Provisional value.

Since 1980 the average annual increase in life expectancy

at birth in the EU-25 countries has been slightly

under 2.5 months. There is general agreement among

demographers that life expectancy will continue to rise,

but there is no agreement on how fast and to what level 16 .

Some experts expect that life expectancy will continue to

rise by 2 years per decade. They see no reason why this

linear increase should ever stop. Others expect that the

increase will slow down once a biological limit is reached.

In addition, public health problems could also slow

down or even reverse the trend towards a higher life

expectancy. In several EU Member States, the average

annual increase in life expectancy has been lower in

recent years than in the previous decades. Another relevant

issue is whether or not differences in life expectancy

across European countries will become smaller. The latest

population projection of Eurostat assumes that by 2050

life expectancy in the EU-10 will converge towards the

level of the EU-15, but a considerable gap of 3 to 4 years

is projected to remain.

One important factor explaining the increase in life expectancy

during the last decades has been the strong

decrease in mortality from cardiovascular diseases at late

middle age. With most people now surviving to old age,

any further substantial increases in life expectancy can

only be achieved through a major reduction in mortality

at advanced ages. Death at advanced age often cannot

be attributed to one single disease, but rather to a general

state of frailty leading to what is termed 'co-morbidity'.

Medical advances in the treatment of one disease may

therefore lead to only a limited gain in lifespan as very

old patients may die from another disease.

Moreover, whereas medical progress and improved living

conditions have led, and probably will continue to lead,

to an increase in life expectancy, it is much more uncertain

what the effect of lifestyle (smoking, diet, physical

exercise, use of alcohol) will be. The decline in smoking

since the 1970s and 1980s has had a favourable impact

on life expectancy but the current increase in the prevalence

of obesity may well have an adverse effect. Thus,

even though medical advances may contribute to a further

rise in life expectancy, unhealthy behaviour may have the

opposite effect. Moreover, the effect of accumulating environmental

risks is difficult to take into account. The latest

2005 figures from Latvia and Lithuania showed a drop in

life expectancy. This shows that a downturn in life expectancy

is still a real risk in some Member States.

2.3.3. Important longevity differences between

socio-economic groups 17

The clearest and most striking difference in life expectancy

is between men and women. In 2004, men in the EU-25

had a life expectancy 6 years shorter than that of women.

By 2050 this gap is expected to have the narrowed by

one year but the motto that 'men die quicker but women

are sicker' continues to apply as women have lower mortality

risks but higher risks of disability when growing

older.

The main causes of death of persons over 65 are cancer

and cardiovascular disease, together accounting for three

quarters of all deaths in almost every European country.

Given that the incidence of most chronic conditions rises

with age, older people often suffer from several chronic

conditions at the same time, requiring complicated and

labour-intensive long-term care solutions. A still largely

underestimated chronic condition affecting 10-15% of

persons over 65 in Europe is depression. Older people

suffering from depression are more likely to have multiple

chronic illnesses and more likely to face limitations in their

daily living. Depression is also a major cause of suicide

among older Europeans.

16. This section is based on: ‘Future trends in mortality and life expectancies in the European Union’, 2006, a policy brief prepared by Paul de

Beer of the DEMO network of the SSO (forthcoming)..

17. This section summarises some of the conclusions that can be found in the 'The State of ageing and health in the EU' by the International Longevity

Centre-UK and The Merck Company Foundation, June 2006.

40

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

A large part of the observed differences in life expectancy

between EU-15 and EU-10 countries is due to preventable

mortality (from causes that can be avoided by effective

intervention, e.g. lifestyle factors or accidents) or treatable

mortality (caused by conditions for which effective medical

treatments are available). Persons with a lower socioeconomic

status and/or education have on average a

lower life expectancy which to a large extent can be

explained by the basis of structural factors such as a more

stressful life and an unhealthier lifestyle. Good health in

old age is the result of genetic predisposition as well as

lifestyle factors such as healthy diet, refraining from smoking,

engaging in physical exercise and avoiding excessive

alcohol use.

2.4. Migration

2.4.1. Overview of migration trends

large parts of Europe witnessed a historical change from

emigration to immigration. The exact number of migrants

residing in Europe is unknown, partly due to the fact that

many European countries collect data on nationality

rather than the place or country of birth, thus making it

impossible to identify first-generation immigrants after they

have obtained the citizenship of their host country.

For the year 2005, the United Nations has estimated that

there are about 40 million migrants in the EU-27 Member

States – see Table 2.6. About 3% of these migrants are

refugees. Europe has a much higher share of migrants

(8.8%) in its total population of 728 million than is generally

found in the less developed regions of the world

(1.4%) while the opposite is true for refugees. In 10 EU

Member States, the share of the foreign-born population

is estimated to be higher than 10%.

The third main driver of demographic change – and in our

developed societies also the most volatile one – is international

migration. In the second half of the 20th century,

Table 2.6 International Migration

Migrant Stock 2005 Refugees 2004 Net Migration Average

2000-2005

Number x 1000 % of population Number x 1000 Number x 1000 % of population

Developed regions 115 397 9.5 2 701 2 622 2.2

Less developed regions 75 237 1.4 10 768 - 2 622 - 0.5

EU-27 39 593 8.3 1 663 1 155 2.4

BE 719 6.9 14 13 1.3

CZ 453 4.4 1 10 1.0

DK 389 7.2 65 12 2.3

DE 10 144 12.3 877 220 2.7

EE 202 15.2 0 - 2 - 1.5

EL 974 8.8 2 36 3.2

ES 4 790 11.1 6 405 9.7

FR 6 471 10.7 140 60 1.0

IE 585 14.1 7 39 9.8

IT 2 519 4.3 16 120 2.1

CY : : : : :

LV 449 19.5 0 - 2 - 1.0

LT 165 4.8 0 - 4 - 1.2

LU 174 37.4 2 4 8.7

HU 316 3.1 8 10 1.0

MT 11 2.7 2 1 2.8

NL 1 638 10.1 127 30 1.9

AT 1 234 15.1 18 20 2.5

PL 703 1.8 3 - 16 - 0.4

PT 764 7.3 0 50 4.8

SI 167 8.5 0 2 1.0

SK 124 2.3 0 1 0.2

FI 156 3.0 11 8 1.6

SE 1 117 12.4 73 31 3.5

UK 5 408 9.1 289 137 2.3

BG 104 1.3 5 - 10 - 1.3

RO 133 0.6 2 - 30 - 1.4

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2006.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

41


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 2.3 shows that net migration into the EU reached

a peak of almost 2 million in 2003/2004. Figure 2.4

shows the main destinations of the migration flows. The

flows for Italy and Spain, which accounted for almost two

thirds of the total, were heavily impacted by decisions to

regularise illegal migrants. If immigration were to remain

at this high level, then the EU's working age population

would continue to grow until around 2030, rather than

already starting to decline in 2011, as is currently assumed

in the baseline scenario of the Eurostat population

projection.

Movement of persons inside the EU could potentially also

affect demographic development in individual Member

States. The recent enlargements of the European Union

have led to a short-term increase in migration from the

new Member States in particular towards the UK and

Ireland (see section 4.5 for more discussion of this topic).

Figure 2.3 Net migration into the EU-25 (projected from 2005)

2 000 000

1 500 000

1 000 000

500 000

0

- 500 000

- 1 000 000

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

2026

2028

2030

2032

2034

2036

2038

2040

2042

2044

2046

2048

2050

Source: Eurostat, National data.

Note: Net migration is defined as the population change not attributable to births and deaths. Direct observations of immigration

or emigration flows are not available or not sufficiently precise. Corrections to population figures are included in this indicator.

Figure 2.4 Annual Crude Net Migration Rate (Average 2001-2004, in thousands)

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

LT

LV

PL

EE

SK

CZ

HU

Source: Eurostat, National data.

FI

NL

DK

SI

FR

DE

UK

SE

EL

BE

EU-15

MT

LU

AT

PT

IT

IE

CY

ES

42

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

The ageing of the population also entails the ageing of the

workforce, as well as an imminent decline in both the

workforce and the population. According to the latest

Eurostat population projection, the population aged 15-

64 is going to decrease by one million annually after

2010. These trends are likely to generate major labour

market bottlenecks and skills shortages, which will act as

a major pull factor for international migration into the

European Union. At the same time, the continuing high

population growth in Europe's neighbourhood, especially

in Africa, combined with poor economic performance

and political instability, could act as a strong push factor.

Figures from the year 2000 show a total GDP for the EU

almost 10 times greater than the combined GDP of sub-

Saharan Africa. In comparison, GDP for North America

was approximately 3 times larger than that of Central and

South America.

More migration is also likely to follow as a result of globalisation

and the creation of trans-national communities.

Interestingly, the gender imbalance in international labour

migration seems to be shifting, with male domination

(around two thirds) falling in most countries, signalling the

pull effect of the increasing feminisation of labour markets

in the developed world.

2.4.2. Relative contribution of migration and fertility to

population growth

Although international migration may play a crucial role

in solving future labour market shortages, its impact on

population ageing is likely to be small. Scenario calculations

by the United Nations have shown that to halt, let

alone reverse, population ageing, truly massive and

increasing flows of young migrants would be required 18 .

For example, to keep the age structure in Germany

unchanged, over 3 million migrants per year would have

to be admitted. Clearly, increased immigration cannot

prevent ageing, but it can realistically contribute to alleviating

labour market bottlenecks. Furthermore, a comparison

between the natural rate of population growth and

the migration rate in Figure 2.5 shows that in several

Member States, immigration has already been helpful in

postponing population decline.

Figure 2.5 Net Migration and Natural Population Growth (average 2001-2004))

20

Net crude migration rate

Natural increase

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

LV

EE

HU

LT

CZ

DE

SI

IT

PL

EL

SK

AT

SE

PT

BE

EU-15

DK

ES

UK

FI

MT

LU

NL

FR

CY

IE

Source: Eurostat 2005.

Note: Figures exclude intra-EU flows and include regularisations of previously undeclared migrants.

18. 'Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing populations', UN population division, New York, 2000,

www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm.

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43


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Scenario calculations that compare the outcomes for different

assumptions show the relative importance of changes

in fertility versus migration for the future changes in the

population. For example, Eckart Bomsdorf and Bernard

Babel have conducted an interesting sensitivity analysis

for Germany 19 . They find that a total extra increase in the

German population of 2.5 million by 2050, as compared

to the baseline scenario, which assumes a decline of 12

million with other factors remaining unchanged, could be

achieved in any of the following three ways 20 :

• An increase in the TFR by 0.1 (which in 2003 stood at

1.35);

• An increase in life expectancy by 2.67 years (which in

2003 stood at 75.3 and 81.3 for men and women respectively);

• An increase in annual net migration by 45.000 persons

(which in 2003 stood at 150.000).

Table 2.7 compares the results for fertility and migration

in a comparative way.

Table 2.7 Change in the German population by 2050 (in 1000 persons) compared to the baseline projection,

due to a 10% or 20% change in fertility and in net migration

Change in % - 20% - 10% 10% 20%

- in the Fertility rate - 6 117 - 3 122 3 248 6 623

- in the Net migration -1 688 - 844 844 1 688

Source: Bombsdorf and Babel, see footnote 19.

These scenario calculations forcefully illustrate that, over

several decades, even small changes in fertility can have

a sizeable impact on future demographic development.

2.5. Cohort effects: the baby boom

Demographic developments are also strongly influenced by

variations in cohort sizes. The large cohorts that were born

between 1945 and 1965, in what is known as the 'baby

boom', form a large bulge in the population that is gradually

working its way through the overall age structure. At

present, the baby boom cohorts are still part of the working

age population, which, as a result, currently represents a

large proportion of the total population. The share of the

European population in working age is expected to peak at

67% by the end of 2010. The fact that large cohorts boost

the working age population has been described as a demo-

Figure 2.6a Difference between the growth rate of the working age and total populations, 1951-2050 22

1.5

Austria Germany Netherlands Luxembourg Belgium France

1.0

0.5

0.0

- 0.5

- 1.0

- 1.5

1951 1957 1963 1969 1975 1981 1987 1993 1999 2005 2011 2017 2023 2029 2035 2041 2047

19. Bomsdorf E. and B. Babel, 'Wie viel Fertilität und Migranten braucht Deutschland', HWWA, 85th year, Vol. 6, June 2005.

20. For reasons of simplicity the effect of the change in base ('Sockel') migration was ignored. This effect is relatively small and results from the average

age of emigrants being higher than those of immigrants.

44

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

Figure 2.6b Difference between the growth rate of the working age and total populations, 1951-2050 22

1.5

Italy

Greece Portugal Spain

1.0

0.5

0.0

- 0.5

- 1.0

- 1.5

- 2.0

1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046

Figure 2.6c Difference between the growth rate of the working age and total populations, 1951-2050 22

1.5

Ireland Denmark UK Finland Sweden

1.0

0.5

0.0

- 0.5

- 1.0

- 1.5

1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046

Source: A. Prskawetz, 2006, see footnote 22.

graphic dividend 21 . The retirement of the baby boomers will

compound the increase in the old-age dependency ratio

(i.e. the number of persons over 65 divided by the number

of people aged between 15 and 64) which results from

rising life expectancy and low fertility rates. Figures 2.6 present

the differences in the annual growth rates of the total

population and the population of working age for a number

of European countries. After 2010 the difference in

most countries will turn negative, signalling the end of the

demographic dividend. The baby boom in Southern Europe

emerged later than in Northern and Western Europe as a

result of which the boost in the working age population was

delayed. In all three parts of Europe it is expected that the

difference in growth rates will turn negative after 2010. The

baby boom effect in the Central European Member States

has come later and been somewhat more subdued.

21. See also the VID/IFS 'Walter' demographic impact study.

22. Prskawetz, A., Th. Lind et al. 'The relationship between demographic change and economic growth in the EU', VID and IFS (Institute for Future

Studies), 'Walter' demographic impact study, forthcoming, 2006.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

2.6. The EU-27 population projection

The results of the latest Eurostat population projection for

the EU-27 are based on a series of assumptions about

future trends in fertility, mortality and migration. The total

population for the EU-27 is projected to shrink from

486.3 million in 2004 to 472.2 million in 2050. Figure

2.7 23 shows how the form of the age pyramid is expected

to change as the bulge representing the baby-boom

cohorts becomes older.

Figure 2.7 Age pyramids for the EU-25 population in 2004 and 2050

89

85

81

77

73

69

65

61

57

53

49

45

41

37

33

29

25

21

17

13

9

5

1

2004

Males

Females

4 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000

2050

Males

Females

89

85

81

77

73

69

65

61

57

53

49

45

41

37

33

29

25

21

17

13

9

5

1

4 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission, population in 2050 according to the Ageing Working Group

Scenario (2006).

23. Aggregate projections were originally only presented for the EU-25, but will be adjusted to the EU-27 to the extent feasible.

46

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

Table 2.8 Population in three age groups, absolute numbers (millions)

1975 2005 2050 2050/1975

0-14 years

EU-15 82.8 61.5 58.2 0.70

EU-25 98.9 73.4 66.5 0.67

NMS-10 16.1 11.9 8.3 0.52

15-64 years

EU-15 220.2 256.5 218.3 0.99

EU-25 265.8 308.9 253.4 0.95

NMS-10 45.6 52.4 35.1 0.77

65+ years

EU-15 45.5 66.8 110.7 2.43

EU-25 52.9 77.0 129.1 2.44

NMS-10 7.4 10.2 18.4 2.49

Source: 2005 Demographic monitor of the SSO.

Fertility rates in the baseline scenario are assumed to

rise from 1.5 in 2004 to 1.6 by 2030 and to stay

constant around that level until 2050. Fewer births eventually

translate into smaller cohorts of young persons entering

the labour market, especially when compared with

the much larger older cohorts leaving for retirement.

Life expectancy at birth has increased by 8 years since

1960 and is assumed in the projections to rise by 6.3

years for males to 81.7 and by 5.1 years for females to

86.8 between 2004 and 2050. Moreover, longer life

expectancy will dramatically increase the numbers of persons

reaching very old ages (80+) from 18 million in

2004 to nearly 50 million in 2050. By 2050 the differences

in life expectancy between the old Member States

(87.3 and 82.3 for women and men respectively) and the

new Member States (84.1 and 78.6 respectively) are predicted

to become smaller, especially for men.

Net migration inflows are assumed on average to fall

from an estimated 1.3 million people in 2004 24 to some

800.000 people annually between 2015 and 2050 (an

annual net migration rate of 0.2% of the population).

Although net inflows of migrants are projected to accumulate

to some 40 million people between 2004 and 2050,

they are insufficient to prevent population decline, let

alone stabilise the age structure of the population. These

demographic forces will cause the total population in the

EU-27 in 2050 to be slightly smaller and much older.

2.6.1. Changes in the population structure

According to the baseline projection the median age in

the EU will increase from 39 to 49 years between 2004

and 2050. The number of young people (age 0-14) in the

European Union will continue to decline in absolute terms

from around 100 million in 1975 to some 66 million by

the year 2050. Their share relative to the working-age

population (the young-age dependency rate) will, however,

rise slightly from currently 24% to 26% in the EU-25.

The population of working age (15-64) will be most numerous

around the year 2010 (331 million) and will subsequently

decline to about 268 million by 2050. The population

aged 65 and over will continuously increase from

currently 86 million to 141 million by 2050. Its size relative

to the working age population in the EU-25 (the oldage

dependency rate) has increased from 20% in 1975

to currently 25%. It is projected to double to 51% by

2050. This means that the EU will move from having four

to only two persons between 15 and 64 for every citizen

aged 65 or above. See also Table 2.8.

Ageing is not going to affect the Member States of the EU

in a uniform way. Figure 2.8 shows that there are relatively

young and old Member States. Moreover, a ranking

of Member States by the old-age dependency ratio, as in

Figure 2.8, reveals significant changes reflecting in particular

the differences in assumed fertility rates.

The relative share of the population aged 80 and over to

the working age population will increase even more sharply:

from the current 6% in the EU-25 to 20% by 2050.

2.6.2. Projection methods 25

Currently the most popular way of handling uncertainty is

to present alternative variants (e.g. high and low fertility)

around a baseline scenario or benchmark projection. This

scenario approach was also used by Eurostat for its latest

EU population projection in 2004. One can then study a

given policy problem under each variant.

24. Actual realised net migration into the EU was almost 2 million due to large regularisations in Spain and Italy.

25. See the 'Walter' demographic impact study by ETLA on population projections.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

47


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 2.8 Projected old-age dependency ratio by Member State for selected years,

'baseline' variant of the Trend scenario

80

2004

2025

2050

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

LU NL DK MT SE EE CY LV LT IE UK FI FR BE HU SL PL RO EU-25 EU-15 AT CZ SI DE PT EL BG IT ES

It is, a priori, hard to determine what aspects of future

demographics should be varied and by how much.

Alternative scenarios should be based on clearly distinct

and plausible ‘storylines’. This would force the user of a

projection to choose the picture of the future that is considered

to be the most plausible. When several parameters

are used for projections, however, the number of alternative

scenarios can become very large and it may not be

possible to determine which scenario is the most meaningful.

Some researchers therefore advocate another

approach to demographic projections which takes uncertainty

about the future more explicitly into account.

BOX 2.2

Base year data problems and

high-quality population data

During the first 20 years of the projection period,

projections are quite reliable, in particular for the

working age population, provided no major mistakes

are made in the starting or base year. In the previous

projection, such mistakes were made in the Spanish

base year migration data, which made the projection

go off the mark within only a few years. This

shows that the availability of recent high-quality

population data is essential for reliable population

projections. Population registers that cover all the

population and are continuously updated by legally

controlled administrative procedures provide the best

basis for such population data. Countries relying on

censuses are in a weaker position due to errors in

both registration and the census itself. The main problem

in most EU population systems is the recording

of 'out-migration'. Because being registered is frequently

a precondition for the opening of bank

accounts, entitlement to subsidised or low-cost social

and health services, etc., there are incentives for

incoming migrants to register in their new

country/region/municipality. In most cases, however,

there are no incentives to deregister at the old

place of stay. One solution would be to have details

of all 'in-migration' records in the population registers

of destination countries/regions/municipalities

sent back to the registers of the original place of stay.

Such a system has been in use within and between

the Nordic countries and functions well.

The idea is to do stochastic or probabilistic projections to

produce a realistic range of different population paths that

fall within a meaningful confidence interval. Stochastic

projections are, however, computationally more demanding

and for the user more difficult to comprehend.

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

Figure 2.9 Uncertainty intervals of a probabilistic population projection for the EU-25 in 2050

Age

EU-25, 2050

Period of birth

males

females

2945

2950

2955

2960

2965

2970

2975

2980

2985

2990

2995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

5

2045

0

2050

4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0

105

100

95

90

85

80

75

70

65

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

Population (millions)

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission, population in 2050 according to the Ageing Working

Group Scenario (2006).

2.6.3. An estimate of projection uncertainty for the EU-25

How large the uncertainty of a population projection may

become after 20 years is shown in Figure 2.9. This is

taken from an interesting example of a stochastic projection

for the EU-25 prepared by IIASA and the VID 26 . The

dark segment indicates the confidence interval in 2020,

the middle-shade segment that in 2030 and the light

shade segment the one in 2050. The population pyramid

of 2050 indicates that the projections for the number of

persons below 30 and over 70 are much more uncertain

than for the number of persons of intermediate age. The

future size of the intermediate age groups is to a large

extent, apart from migration, determined by the population

momentum of those already born. The number of middle-aged

persons is less vulnerable to mistakes made in

fertility and mortality assumptions.

2.7. The regional dimension

of population change

While it may still be one or two decades before the

impact of ageing becomes clearly visible at the level of

an entire country, the impact of ageing and population

decline (notably due to migration) can already be

observed at regional level. The main recent trends identified

by Eurostat 27 at regional level can be summarised

as follows:

• In the north-east of the European Union the population

is decreasing. Most affected by this decline are eastern

Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia

and Hungary, the three Baltic States and parts of

Sweden and Finland.

• Many EU regions have been experiencing a negative

'natural population change' since the beginning of the

decade (i.e. more people have died than have been

born). This negative pattern predominates in Germany,

the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and

adjacent regions, as well as in the Baltic States and

Sweden to the north and Greece in the south.

• Ireland, France, the three Benelux countries and

Denmark are mostly experiencing a 'natural increase'

in the population.

• In some regions, a negative natural change has been

offset by positive net migration. This is most conspicuous

in western Germany, eastern Austria, the north

of Italy, Slovenia, as well as the south of Sweden and

regions in Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom.

• The opposite is much rarer: in only a few regions

(namely in the north of Poland), has a positive 'natural

change' been offset by negative net migration.

Figures 2.10 and 2.11 present, respectively, the change

in population between 2000 and 2030 at regional

NUTS 2 level for Europe and a breakdown of this

change.

26. Scherbov, S. and M. Mamolo, 'Probabilistic population projections for the EU-25', VID European Demographic Research Papers, No 1, 2006.

27. Eurostat Statistical Yearbook Regions, 2006.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 2.10 Relative change in population 2004-2031

50

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

Figure 2.11 Components of population change 2004-2030

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Demographic ageing is especially evident in the predominantly

rural regions of some Member States, notably

Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, Germany and France,

where the proportion of people over 65 is high.Moreover

in Germany, the Nordic and Baltic countries and in

Southern Europe, strong rural-urban migration of females

in the economically active age groups results in a high

degree of ‘masculinisation’ of the rural population 28 .

The increasing importance of regional and local public

authorities as policy initiators and service providers will

compel regions to include the effects of long-term population

trends in their regional medium-term strategies. A

number of regions have already been active and are at

the forefront of strategic thinking and actions in relation to

the demographic challenge 29 .

The Union's Cohesion Policy provides a valuable tool for

Member States to adapt their regional and national economies

to the challenges of ageing. The Structural Fund

programmes and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural

Development (EAFRD) have already supported many projects

addressing aspects of demographic change. These

include successful initiatives to cope with depopulation in

urban, rural and sparsely populated areas, initiatives to

encourage migration to depopulated areas, fighting discrimination

and promoting gender equality and making

regions more attractive places to live in. Regions which

expect their population to decline are encouraged to work

with support from the Structural Funds on policies to mitigate

the effects of this anticipated trend and secure the

quality of life of the remaining population.

BOX 2.3

The impact of demographic

change on a region: the case of

the Free State of Saxony

(Germany) 30

A very impressive example of a regional response

was given by Georg Milbradt, Prime Minister of

Saxony, at the First European Demography Forum.

The population of Saxony has been shrinking since

1967. In 1950, it had 5.7 million inhabitants; in

2005 this number had fallen to 4.3 million. The projection

for the year 2020 is 3.8 million. After

German reunification in 1989, the number of births

fell by more than 50% and a few years later nursery

schools, kindergartens and primary schools had to

be closed because of a lack of children. These small

cohorts have now reached the secondary and vocational

school age and universities will be affected

next. Although birth rates have since recovered, they

have not regained their old level.

The initial drop in birth rates will in the future be compounded

by the exodus of young people. Many highskilled

young people, in particular women, are leaving

Saxony to study or work elsewhere in Germany.

The working age population will shrink approximately

twice as much as the overall population and firms

in Saxony are already having problems finding sufficient

numbers of qualified young professionals to

replace retiring staff. The shortage of qualified staff is

going to get worse during the next three or four years

when the large baby boomer cohorts start to retire.

The shortage of qualified labour will hamper

Saxony's economic growth prospects.

The population decline has led to decreasing utilisation

of the region's infrastructure. Already more than

400.000 housing units are permanently empty, out

of a total of 2.3 million. Water and sewage systems

are used far below their normal capacity, resulting in

hygiene problems and increasing costs per capita.

The number of elderly persons in institutional care is

growing rapidly resulting in a sharp increase in

health and nursing expenditure. At the same time,

budget revenue will decrease by nearly a quarter up

to 2020. Even though Saxony does not intend to

take on any new debt from 2007 onwards, public

debt per capita is expected to increase.

However, Saxony has anticipated the negative consequences

of ageing and emigration and has started to

adapt. Mr Milbradt gave two examples. Saxony has

started to reconstruct its cities by demolishing 50.000

empty housing units, with a target of 250.000 units by

2015. Local authorities are required to adjust their

urban planning to a shrinking population. Saxony has

also begun to downsize its administrative structures.

Saxony needs to ensure that it remains an attractive

place for business and to make sure that 'nobody will

fall behind'. The main challenge, as Mr Milbradt sees

28. See 'Study on Employment in Rural Areas' (SERA) at http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/reports/ruralemployment/sera_report.pdf.

29. See also the Joint Declaration of European regions 'Facing demographic change as a regional challenge' presented at the 2006 Forum to

Commissioner Spidla, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/events/2006/demog/position_paper_eu_regions_en.pdf.

30. Based on the presentation of the Prime Minister of Saxony Prof. Georg Milbradt at the First European Demography Forum in 2006, see

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/events/event_en.cfmid=625.

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Part 1 – 2. Demographic transition: a common feature of social and economic development

it 'is to ensure access to education and healthcare all

over Saxony (...) without producing any additional

debts.'

Mr Milbradt pleaded for a new way of thinking in

which the universal growth paradigm is replaced by

a limited number of strong local growth centres

against the backdrop of an otherwise shrinking periphery.

Only with such a strategy will it be possible to

focus the limited available resources. Saxony has

started to apply a demographic test to all its laws

and funding programmes. In spite of its shrinking

population Saxony hopes to remain one of the most

dynamic regions in Germany, and, so far, it has

been able to maintain its economic growth.

2.8. Global demographic trends

2.8.1. Europe's place in the global population

According to the United Nations, the world's population

increased during the 20th century from 1.6 to 6.4 billion.

In the next half century the UN expects a further increase

to 9.1 billion 31 . Demographic shifts will not change the

ranking of the major world regions according to population

size. The EU-25 with 456 million inhabitants currently

ranks third after China (1.3 billion inhabitants) and India

(1.1 billion), followed by the United States with 300 million

inhabitants. In 2050, the EU-25 will still be in third

place with 450 million, after India (1.6 billion) and China

(1.4 billion) and before the United States with 395 million

inhabitants. But the EU is the only major world region

where the total population is projected to decline in the

coming four decades. In many developing countries,

population growth rates are still very high due to birth

rates well above the replacement level and a very young

age structure. For this reason, the population in these

countries is likely to double over the coming decades,

which explains why the world population is expected to

increase from its current 6.4 billion to 9.1 billion by

2050. There are, however, more and more countries in

which birth rates have now fallen well below the replacement

level and where the population is ageing rapidly.

For these countries a future of even more rapid population

ageing and, in many cases, a shrinking total population

size is expected. Because of these significantly different

trends between various parts of the world, there is still

simultaneously concern about the negative consequences

of rapid population growth and, in other parts of the

world, about the negative implications of rapid population

aging.

The demographic divide does not always coincide with

the traditional split between industrialised and developing

countries. Some developing countries have recently seen

very rapid fertility declines, and the number of poor countries

with sub-replacement fertility is increasing. China is

the most prominent example: fertility has recently fallen to

an (uncertain) level between 1.4 and 1.8 32 . Over the next

two decades China will see both significant further growth

and the beginning of significant population ageing, i.e.

doubling the present low old-age dependency ratio to

15%. However, it is expected to grow by another 200 million

people due to the momentum caused by the very

young age structure, which will lead to a further increase

in the number of women of reproductive age. At the same

time, the one-child family policy can be expected to result

in a rapidly increasing share of older people in the total

population.

During the first part of this century a significant number of

countries will simultaneously experience population

growth and aging. This will be the case with the USA

which, unlike Europe, is expected to continue to grow

significantly thanks to high immigration and higher birth

rates than in Europe.

Figure 2.12 illustrates these trends in population growth

rates for different parts of the world from 1950 to 2050,

based on UN data estimates and projections. It shows

that Europe consistently has the lowest annual population

growth rate of all continents, falling from 1% per year in

1950 to zero growth at the moment and shrinking at an

expected rate of 0.5% by 2050. The figure also shows

that even Africa is beyond its peak in growth rates. North

America, which saw fairly stable population growth of

around 1% from 1965 to the present, is expected to

decline only moderately in the future. By 2050 the UN

expects North America to have a higher population

growth than Latin America, and higher than the world

average.

31. Based on the 2003 UN world population projection. The 2004 update published in 2005 led to only small changes.

32. See also the presentation of Mr Juwei Zhang of the Chinese Institute of Population and Labour Economics at the recent Demography Forum

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/events/2006/demog/zhang_slides_en.pdf.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 2.12 Average annual population growth rates of selected world regions, 1950-2050

3.5

Africa Eastern 2008 South Central Asia Western Asia

Europe Latin America Caribbean Northern America World

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

1950-1955

1955-1960

1960-1965

1965-1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

1685-1990

1990-1995

1995-2000

2000-2005

2005-2010

2010-2015

2015-2020

2020-2025

2025-2030

2030-2035

2035-2040

2040-2045

2045-2050

Source: United Nations (2003) (medium variant).

Table 2.9 gives an overview of trends in mortality and

fertility in the main regions of the world. Over the past

half century, life expectancy has increased considerably

in all parts of the world. Only in Africa has the HIV/AIDS

epidemic in particular slowed down the improvement in

life expectancy. In some of the hardest hit countries there

has even been population decline. The UN assumes for

the future a recovery in Africa, along with a continued

increase in life expectancy in all parts of the world.

Fertility rates have also declined considerably in all world

regions. The European region has the lowest TFR at 1.4;

Africa is at the other extreme with an average rate still

close to 4.9. For the coming decades, the UN assumes a

continued decline in fertility for the whole world with the

exception of Europe, where at least a partial recovery is

expected from the projections.

Table 2.9 Life expectancy at birth and total fertility rates for selected world regions (1950-2050)

Source: United Nations (2003) (medium variant).

Life Expectancy at Birth (both sexes)

Total Fertility Rate

Region 1950- 1975- 2000- 2025- 2045- 1950- 1975- 2000- 2025- 2045-

1955 1980 2005 2030 2050 1955 1980 2005 2030 2050

Africa 37.8 48.2 48.9 57.1 64.9 6.74 6.59 4.91 3.23 2.40

Eastern Asia 42.9 66.4 72.1 75.0 77.7 5.68 3.13 1.78 1.83 1.85

South-central Asia 39.4 52.6 63.2 69.1 74.0 6.08 5.09 3.25 2.18 1.91

Western Asia 45.2 60.6 69.1 75.2 78.0 6.46 5.30 3.45 2.57 2.19

Europe 65.6 71.5 74.2 78.1 80.5 2.66 1.97 1.38 1.63 1.84

Latin America & 51.4 63.0 70.4 75.5 78.5 5.89 4.48 2.53 1.98 1.86

Caribbean

Northern America 68.8 73.3 77.4 79.7 81.8 3.47 1.78 2.05 1.96 1.85

WORLD 46.5 59.8 65.4 70.2 74.3 5.02 3.90 2.69 2.25 2.02

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2.8.2. Population trends and challenges in Europe's

neighbourhood 33

The Mediterranean Sea represents one of the sharpest

demographic divides in the world. Greece, Italy and

Spain, which have among the lowest fertility rates, are

ageing rapidly and will see their populations shrink, while

the countries on the southern rim have some of the most

rapidly growing populations. Although fertility rates have

been falling in Northern Africa, its population is still growing

fast due to the population momentum generated by

the very young age structure.

A comparison of population trends in Italy and Egypt over

a 100-year period is very striking. In 1950 Egypt had less

than half the population size of Italy, but the population

grew so fast that by the early 1990s both countries were

of equal size. Over the coming decades Italy is expected

to start shrinking, while Egypt will continue its rapid population

growth. The fertility decline in Egypt seems to have

slowed (or even stalled) at a level above three children

per woman. But even if the decline continues, Egypt's

population may still double so that by 2050 it is likely to

be about three times that of Italy's.

On the Eastern border of the EU the situation is very different

(see Table 2.10). There are huge income differences

compared with the EU but the demographic trends are

quite similar. In most eastern European countries, the political

and economic transition since 1990 has caused a

very rapid decline in fertility to levels that are even lower

than in the new Member States. In addition, these countries

are confronted with net migration losses, which

means that they face the prospect of significant shrinking

and ageing of their populations.

The demographic contrasts between Europe and its southern

neighbours strongly suggest that strong migratory

pressures will persist over the coming decades. The differences

in expected population growth combined with

huge differences in standards of living constitute a strong

push factor for emigration towards the EU. In the Eastern

European countries a comparable demographic push factor

does not exist, but significant migration flows could

result from dissatisfaction with economic and political

conditions.

Table 2.10 Main demographic indicators in neighbouring countries of the EU

Total Population TFR Life Expectancy Percentage Percentage aged

(1 000) at Birth aged 0-14 60 and above

2000 2030 1995- 2025- 1995- 2025- 2000 2030 2000 2030

2000 2030 2000 2030

The Eastern Neighbours

Russian Federation 145 612 119 713 1.25 1.49 66.1 70.9 18.0 12.8 18.5 28.0

Turkey 68 281 91 920 2.70 1.85 69.0 75.9 31.7 20.1 8.0 15.7

Ukraine 49 688 38 925 1.25 1.50 68.1 75.1 17.8 12.5 20.6 28.0

The Southern Neighbours

Algeria 30 245 44 120 3.15 1.85 67.9 75.2 35.1 19.8 6.0 13.2

Egypt 67 789 109 111 6.70 2.16 67.0 74.9 36.3 25.0 6.8 11.4

Morocco 29 108 42 505 6.60 2.07 66.6 74.8 33.0 22.7 6.5 13.4

Syrian Arab Republic 16 560 28 750 3.82 2.11 70.5 76.7 39.9 24.9 4.5 9.7

Tunisia 9 519 12 351 5.50 1.85 71.7 77.4 30.3 19.4 8.4 17.0

Source: United Nations Population Projections of 2003 (medium variant).

33. Wilson, Ch., 'La transition démographique en Europe et en Méditerranée.' In Paul Sant Cassia et Thierry Fabre (eds), Les Défis et les Peurs:

entre Europe et Méditerranée, Actes Sud/MMSH, November 2005, pp. 21-48.

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55


3. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

3.1. Introduction

At present, the baby boom cohorts are still of working

age, but within a few years they will start retiring.

This will lead to a decline in the population of working

age and a rapid increase in the number of pensioners.

As the baby boomers grow older, they will also require

more health and long-term care. Ageing will thus lead to

increasing demands on social protection systems (pensions

and health/long-term care) while the potential labour force

will be declining. The impact on public finances of these

trends has been examined for the EU-25 Member States by

the European Commission and the Economic Policy

Committee (EPC) in a comprehensive projections exercise

based on the latest EUROSTAT population projections 34 .

3.2. Employment trends

Although the population of working age (aged 15-64) is

already expected to decline from 2011 onwards, total

employment in the EU-25 is expected to grow up to 2017

thanks to rising labour force participation. According to

the projection, which is based on current policies, the

overall employment rate of the EU-25 would rise from

63% in 2004 to 67% by 2010 and to 70% by 2020: the

EU would thus reach the overall Lisbon employment

target, but ten years behind schedule, see Figure 3.1.

The projected increase in the employment rate will occur

for two main reasons:

1. Female employment rates are projected to rise from

just over 55% in 2004 to almost 65% by 2025,

remaining stable thereafter. The increase will come for

the most part from cohort effects: older women with

low participation rates will be replaced by younger

women with a higher educational attainment and consequently

a stronger attachment to the labour market;

furthermore, policies to increase the availability of

child care and other family-friendly measures will also

have a positive effect;

2. The employment rates of older workers are projected

to increase massively from 40% in 2004 for the EU-25

to 47% by 2010 and 59% in 2025. This increase in

the employment rate of older workers, observed since

2000, marks a significant reversal of the decades-long

trend towards earlier withdrawal from the labour

force. Older workers have accounted for three-quarters

of all employment growth in the EU in recent

years, and about half of the projected increase is due

to the positive effects of recent pension reforms that

have curtailed access to early retirement schemes and

improved financial incentives for older workers to

remain in the labour market.

34. See 'The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education

and unemployment transfers (2004-2050)', European Economy, Special Report, No 1, 2006.

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2006/eespecialreport0106_en.htm.

For the assumptions underlying the projection, see 'The 2005 EPC projections of age-related expenditure (2004-2050) for the EU-25 Member

States: underlying assumptions and projection methodologies', European Economy Special Report, No 4, 2005:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eesp405en.pdf.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 3.1 Projected employment rates and Lisbon targets

80

Total

Female

Older workers

Lisbon target

70

60

50

40

30

2000

2004

2010 (p)

2020 (p)

2050 (p)

2000

2004

2010 (p)

2020 (p)

2050 (p)

2000

2004

2010 (p)

2020 (p)

2050 (p)

Source: European Commission.

In Figure 3.2 three phases can be distinguished:

1. Between 2004 and 2011, there is scope for significant

employment and economic growth as both the

population of working age and employment rates are

expected to increase.

2. Between 2012 and 2017, rising employment rates

can offset the decline in the size of the working-age

population brought about by the baby boom generation

entering retirement and being replaced by much

smaller younger cohorts (due to the decline in fertility).

The overall number of persons employed in the EU will

continue to increase, albeit at a slower pace, and this

period could be characterised by tightening labour

market conditions.

3. After 2018, the ageing effect will dominate. By then,

the cohort trend towards higher female employment

rates will broadly have come to an end putting an

even higher pressure on active measures to increase

employment among women In the absence of further

reforms to increase the labour force participation of

older workers (and raise the effective retirement age),

no significant further increases in the employment of

older workers can be expected either. Consequently,

the declining size of the working age population must

be expected to translate into declining total employment

and reduced growth prospects. Having increased

by some 20 million between 2004 and 2017,

employment during this last period is projected to

contract gradually by almost 30 million until 2050.

The demographic dividend of the baby boom (i.e. the fact

that these large cohorts are of working age) combined

with the current positive employment rate trends constitute

a 'window of opportunity' lasting until about 2017, in

which structural reforms to prepare for the longer-term

impact of ageing can be pursued under relatively favourable

growth conditions.

At the same time, differences in employment rates between

urban and rural areas will remain vital and significant.

This especially concerns the participation of women

and young people in the labour markets. The continued

modernisation and restructuring of Europe's agricultural

sector will place a heavy burden on many rural areas and

will create challenges to their development, such as the

risk of exclusion associated with lack of skills and low

incomes and the management of the restructuring process.

58

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

Figure 3.2 Projected working age population and total employment, EU-25

Total employment

Working-age population

Employment rate (right scale)

320

72

300

70

280

260

240

Period 2003-2011:

rising employment

but slow growth in

working-age

population

Period

2012-2017:

rising employment

despite

the decline in

working-age

population

From 2018 onwards: employment and working-age population both declining

68

66

64

220

62

200

60

180

58

2003 2008 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048

Source: European Commission.

3.2.1. Ageing of the labour force and labour market

bottlenecks

A recent study 35 for the Commission looked at possible

imbalances in the labour market during the next decade

given the expected slow growth or even decline in the

working age population and the ageing of the workforce.

The focus was on the demand for labour by

education/skill level and by sector and on the supply of

labour to meet this demand. Future labour demand and

supply in 2014 were projected assuming that the trends

observed between 1994 and 2004 will continue.

The study finds that labour demand will increase relative

to supply for the more highly educated people, especially

in the EU-10. At the same time there will also be considerable

replacement demand for less skilled people, especially

in EU-15 countries. See also Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

The study underlines that policy needs to focus on expanding

the number of persons with tertiary education not just

in the new Member States but also in states where

demand is projected to run ahead of supply (for example

Denmark, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland

and Sweden). The study also highlights that policy must

focus on ensuring that employment rates are increased

among women and those over 50. Moreover, higher

employment rates among women and older workers need

to be supported by ensuring lifelong access to suitable

training and by providing support in the form of childcare

and elderly care to make it possible for people to work.

Given that low-skilled jobs are not going to disappear

there could be future bottlenecks in the commercial services

and in the health and long-term care sectors. This

could perhaps be avoided by improving the attractiveness

of less qualified jobs, not only in terms of pay but also in

terms of general working conditions. In the UK for instance,

the employment rate of low-skilled women is (surprisingly)

lower than the EU average even though the average

employment rate for women in the UK is above the

EU average. This is probably caused by a lack of affordable

child care for women in this category. This evidence

of the need to improve the attractiveness of low-skilled

jobs confirms the present direction of the European

Employment Strategy, which is as much concerned with

job quality as with getting more people into work. The

expected demand for less-skilled workers may also imply

a need to reconsider immigration policy.

35. The implication of demographic trends for employment and jobs, 'Walter' demographic impact study by Alphametrics Ltd for the European

Commission, November 2005, see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_situation/studies_en.htm.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 3.3 Projected required increase in employment rates among those with tertiary education in

the EU-15 and NM-7 in 2014

% of population in each age group

2004 2014

100

100

90

90

80

80

70

70

60

60

50

50

40

40

30

30

20

20

Men,

Women,

Men,

Women,

Men,

Women,

Men,

Women,

25-49

25-49

50-64

50-64

25-49

25-49

50-64

50-64

EU-15

Source: Alphametrics 2005, see footnote 35, country-level results are presented in an annex to this chapter.

NM-7

Figure 3.4 Projected required increase in employment rates among those with low education in

the EU-15 and NM-7 in 2014

% of population in each age group

2004 2014

100

100

90

90

80

80

70

70

60

60

50

50

40

40

30

30

20

Men,

Women,

Men,

Women,

Men,

Women,

Men,

Women,

20

25-49

25-49

50-64

50-64

25-49

25-49

50-64

50-64

EU-15

NM-7

Source: Alphametrics 2005, see footnote 35, country-level results are presented in an annex to this chapter.

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

BOX 3.1 Public preferences for how to best tackle potential labour force shortages

The 2006 Eurobarometer on fertility and ageing 36

contained a question concerning possible solutions to

the future problem of shortages in the workforce due to

population ageing. The most popular solutions in the

EU-25 are a switch from part-time to full-time working

(around 15% of the answers) and raising the labour

force participation of women (14% and 20% of responses

among men and women, respectively).

The idea that a higher number of children per family

will ease the problem of shortages in the workforce also

receives relatively strong support (15%). An increase in

the number of working hours per week receives the

fewest mentions (5%). In addition, increasing the legal

retirement age or the number of immigrants from non-

EU countries is not very popular either (slightly more

than 5% of respondents chose these options).

Which of the following suggestions aimed at solving potential shortages in

the workforce do you agree with most

(% of respondents in the EU agreeing with the suggestions, maximum of two choices)

Discouraging early retirement

Raising the legal retirement age

Encouraging people to have more children

Encouraging immigration of workers from ouside the EU

Encouraging part-time workers to change to full-time work

Increasing the number of legal weekly working hours

Encouraging non-working women to participate in the labour market

None

Other

DK

Women

Men

0 5 10 15 20 25

Source: Eurobarometer 2006.

3.2.2. Ageing, productivity and prospects for economic

growth

Falling employment levels as a result of a shrinking working-age

population will act as a drag on economic

growth. Using prudent assumptions for the evolution of

productivity based on trends observed in recent decades,

the Economic Policy Committee and the European

Commission project that the EU-25 will see a decline in

the annual average potential GDP growth rate from 2.4%

in the period 2004 to 2010 to only 1.2% in the period

2031-2050. For the EU-10, the decline is much steeper,

in part due to their less favourable demographic prospects.

For the EU-15, labour productivity is on average

projected to be 1.7% for the period 2010 up to 2050. A

higher productivity rate is projected for the EU-10 countries:

on average 3.1% for the period 2011-30 and 1.9%

between 2031 and 2050, thus allowing them to converge

towards the level of economic performance in the EU-15

Member States.

Bringing together the labour force projections and the

assumptions about future productivity growth allows for

a projection of future GDP growth rates (see also Figure

3.5). For the EU-15, annual average potential GDP

growth rate is projected to decline from 2.3% in the

36. Testa M. R. 'Childbearing preferences and family size issues in Europe', VID Report on the special Eurobarometer, No 253, wave 65.1 and

65.31, TNS Opinion & Social for the EC, 2006.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

period 2004-2010 to 1.3% between 2031 and 2050.

For Euro area countries such as Germany, Greece,

Spain, Italy, Austria, Italy and Portugal, potential

annual growth rates are expected to drop to only 1%.

An even steeper decline is foreseen in the EU-10, from

4.3% in the period 2004-2010 to 0.9% between 2031

and 2050, reflecting their less favourable demographic

prospects.

Figure 3.5 Projected (annual average) GDP growth rates in the EU-15 and EU-10 and their determinants

(employment/productivity)

Labour productivity growth and Employment growth

5

4

3

2

1

0

- 1

EU-15

5

4

3

2

1

0

- 1

GDP growth

2004-10 2011-30 2031-50

2004

EU-10

Labour productivity growth and Employment growth

5

4

3

2

1

0

- 1

2004-10 2011-30 2031-50

5

4

3

2

1

0

- 1

GDP growth

Labour productivity growth

GDP growth

Employment growth

GDP per capita growth

Source: European Commission.

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

3.2.3. The impact of ageing on future productivity

Once employment has stopped growing (due to a shrinking

working age population and employment rates levelling

out), the only source of GDP growth will be productivity.

Several commentators have suggested that an individual's

productivity may decline with age, and that consequently

a rising share of older workers in the labour force

would automatically reduce overall labour productivity in

the economy. It is also feared that older workers may be

less likely to embrace innovation, more resistant to the

introduction of new technologies and that ageing societies

may also be less inclined to make long-term investments,

notably in education and R&D.

Recent simulation analysis carried out as preparatory work

for the joint European Commission – Economic Policy

Committee projections shows that the negative effect of a

change in the age structure of the population on productivity

is likely to be fairly limited. While it is accepted that

an individual's labour productivity is expected to decline

after the age of 55, a very strong fall in the productivity of

older workers compared with that of prime-age workers

would be required to significantly depress total labour productivity.

On the basis of the current evidence, such an outcome

appears rather unlikely. Macro-simulations show that

to get a 5% decline compared with the baseline productivity

level (i.e. a 0.1 percentage point decline in annual

average productivity growth rates) one would need to

assume that the productivity of those aged 50-54 and 55-

64 respectively is only 70% and 50% of that of prime-age

workers, which is obviously very pessimistic.

It is important to recognise that productivity is much more

than a simple property calculated by summing up individual

inputs: it is rather a system attribute that cannot be

separated from its social context. Changes in the educational

and age composition of the workforce are the central

explanatory factors for productivity growth.

Ultimately, it is the composition of human capital in combination

with technology that determines the growth

potential of an economy.

This macro-finding of the European Commission,

Directorate-general for Economic and Financial Affairs is

more or less confirmed in a recent micro-productivity study

that was carried out for the European Commission 37 . The

study found an inverted U-shaped relationship between

individual productivity and age and also found, for most

workers but not for all, significant decreases in productivity

after the age of 50. The reason for this is likely to be

age-related reductions in cognitive abilities, while experience

can boost productivity up to a point beyond which

additional tenure has little effect. Older persons become

less quick (dexterity) and may experience a decline in

their memory and reasoning abilities, see Table 3.1. In

addition, senior workers may also find it more difficult to

adjust to new ways of working.

Table 3.1 Average ability measured as deviation and scaled by standard deviation from ability levels

of 25-34-year-olds

Age Numerical ability Managerial ability Clerical perception Finger dexterity Manual dexterity Experience

- 19 - 0.30 - 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.16 - 0.40

20-24 - 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.35 - 0.40

25-34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

35-44 - 0.39 0.00 - 0.28 - 0.40 0.05 0.27

45-54 - 0.63 0.00 - 0.55 - 0.92 - 0.49 0.27

55-65 - 0.85 0.00 - 0.80 - 1.42 - 0.94 0.27

Source: Bombsdorf and Babel, see footnote 37.

Educational attainment clearly has a strong effect on productivity

and could very well compensate for the negative

effects of ageing on productivity in the longer run. The

study found that an extra year of education could increase

productivity by 20%, which is larger than the 8-10% that

is typically found in the literature.

On the basis of mining and manufacturing data from

Sweden, the study found that in some local labour markets

the productivity of 50-59-year-old workers was in fact

continuing to increase. The older workers were not as productive

as prime-aged workers but they were clearly more

productive than the youngest workers. These older workers

were experienced and highly skilled and they were

working with modern capital equipment. This is potentially

an important result because it indicates that the proper

matching of available skills through well-functioning

labour markets may be as important as education for

maintaining the productivity of an ageing workforce. A

labour market with a young labour force is usually charac-

37. This section is based on 'The Impact of Population Ageing on Innovation and Productivity Growth in Europe', 'Walter' demographic impact

study by VID and IFS, November 2005, see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_situation/studies_en.htm.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

terised by high job turnover, which is also costly and reduces

value added per employee. A labour market with an

old labour force no longer needs such high turnover provided

the older workers have been well matched. In

purely quantitative terms, industrial restructuring and reallocation

of labour are likely to be much more important

for future productivity than the age composition of the

labour force.

If the result found above for Swedish industrial workers

has a more general validity, then past policies encouraging

early retirement could have lowered aggregate productivity

in many European firms. Moreover, even if older

workers have a lower productivity than the prime workforce,

raising their participation rates would still increase

per capita income simply because more older workers

would be able to earn their own living to a larger extent.

With the help of the microeconomic results found for

Sweden, the study is able to draw country-specific

conclusions with respect to future income growth prospects.

These prospects could still be fairly good over the

next 20 years. The study estimates that between 2005

and 2025 projected growth rates of labour productivity

may rise from slightly below 1% to over 2% as participation

rates converge to those of the best performing countries.

The expected rise in participation will automatically

generate an increase in the average level of educational

attainment of the workforce. After 2025, however, there

is a risk due to declining productivity growth in the

absence of further improvements in participation rates

and education enrolment rates. To maintain fast productivity

growth beyond 2025 requires an extra effort to

make sure that educational achievement levels throughout

the EU reach the levels of today's best performing

countries.

This implies that future income trends for individual

Member States will depend very much on their actual participation

rates, educational attainment and age structure.

For instance, in Sweden (see Figure 3.6), the automatic

increase in educational levels will help to increase GDP

per capita over the coming years but this may not be

enough for a continued increase. Labour force participation

rates are already high in Sweden and the growth

potential available through increased labour force participation

will therefore be more difficult to achieve. On the

other extreme is Austria, see Figure 3.7, which has a very

high educational level but whose labour force participation

rates for older workers are among the lowest in the

EU. The growth potential of labour market reforms aimed

at increasing these participation rates is therefore high for

Austria. For Italy, see Figure 3.8, both policies (increasing

educational levels and labour force participation) appear

appropriate and would help to increase GDP per capita

over the coming decades.

Figure 3.6 Sweden, GDP per capita

29 000

Convergence participation/enrolment

Constant participation/covering enrolment

Constant participation/enrolment

28 500

28 000

Euro (constant 1995)

27 500

27 000

26 500

26 000

25 500

25 000

24 500

24 000

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Source: Impact of population ageing on innovation and productivity growth in Europe, see footnote 37.

64

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

Figure 3.7 Italy, GDP per capita

Convergence participation/enrolment

Constant participation/covering enrolment

Constant participation/enrolment

35 000

30 000

Euro (constant 1995) Euro (constant 1995)

25 000

20 000

15 000

10 000

5 000

0

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Source: Impact of population ageing on innovation and productivity growth in Europe, see footnote 37.

50 000

45 000

40 000

35 000

30 000

25 000

20 000

15 000

10 000

Convergence participation/enrolment

Constant participation/covering enrolment

Constant participation/enrolment

Figure 3.8 Austria, GDP per capita

5 000

0

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Source: Impact of population ageing on innovation and productivity growth in Europe, see footnote 37.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

65


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The problem of an ageing workforce for future productivity

often appears to be exaggerated. The negative

effects of ageing per se are not particularly strong and

can be more than offset by higher education levels,

although this can only be achieved over relatively long

time spans. Instead of focussing on whether productivity

declines with age, a more relevant question is how to

adapt education and lifelong learning policies in the

context of an ageing society. Ageing should actually

increase the economic returns to education, as the benefits

of higher productive potential can be exploited over

a longer time horizon, provided skills are updated throughout

working life.

The discussion of the demographic dividend has shown

that changes in relative cohort size are likely to exert an

important impact on economic growth. The simulation

results in the box below indicate the order of magnitude

of these age-related effects for the future. The general

conclusion is that it will be hard to avoid a decline in

GDP growth rates, but that this decline will be more

severe in demographic scenarios that imply slow or even

negative rates of workforce growth. Policies aimed at

ensuring an expansion, or at least non-negative growth,

of the working age population can thus be recommended.

Preferably, such policies should both encourage

immigration and aim to restore fertility rates to nearreplacement

level. The projections imply negative, but

not catastrophic effects of population ageing on per

capita GDP growth rates. Moreover, analysis of the

growth forecasts based on different population scenarios

shows that the forecast outcomes are not very sensitive to

different demographic assumptions. Restricting immigration,

though, would come at the price of somewhat lower

per capita income growth.

BOX 3.2 The effect of future demographic change on economic growth in the EU 38

The researchers estimated a separate growth model for

each of the EU-25 countries in which a major part of

past economic growth could be explained by change

over time in the relative size of the various cohorts that

make up the working age population. In a next step,

this model was fed with the latest Eurostat population

projections and used to generate future GDP growth

rates. The results were calculated for five different

Eurostat variants: 1) the base line scenario; 2) the baseline

scenario with zero migration to analyse the effect

of migration; 3) the baseline scenario with a high fertility

assumption to analyse the effect of higher fertility; 4)

the high scenario with low life expectancy to maximise

the number of young, and 5) an old scenario which

combines low fertility with high life expectancy to maximise

the number of old. Figure 3.10 presents the aggregate

results for the EU 39 for the five different scenarios.

The general long-term trend in growth rates is downward,

primarily because of the negative effect of an

increasing share of the older population. More people

over 65 implies a lower growth rate in GDP per worker

and has a depressing effect on GDP per capita due to

the declining share of the working age population.

The high fertility variant leads to a growth rate after

2030 that is 0.2% larger than the original base line.

The variant with the maximum number of young arrives

at a 0.3% higher growth rate. The zero migration

variant leads to a 0.4% lower growth rate whereas the

variant with the maximum number of elderly generates

a 0.5% lower growth rate. In general the negative

effects of more ageing and/or less migration are larger

than the positive effects of higher fertility and lower life

expectancy.

These are ceteris paribus results assuming that increased

life expectancy has no effect on the economic behaviour

of individuals. However, recent research suggests that

such an assumption is probably unwarranted. Instead,

longer life expectancy can result in increased investment

in education, increased savings rates and, possibly, a

higher optimal rate of retirement. Thus, the negative

effects on GDP growth rates should perhaps be seen as

the outcome of a scenario where such adaptations to

higher life expectancy are impeded by bad policies. The

zero migration scenario 40 has a relatively strong negative

effect on the per capita income growth rate for countries

that today have positive net migration.

38. 'The relationship between demographic change and economic growth in the EU' by A. Prskawetz, Th. Fent, W. Barthel of Vienna Institute for

Demography, J. Crespo-Cuaresma of Vienna University and Th. Lindh, B. Malmberg, M. Halvarsson of the Institute for Future Studies, 'Walter'

demographic impact study 2006, forthcoming.

39. Luxembourg and Cyprus had to be excluded due to the lack of demographic and initial income data respectively.

40. The Eurostat baseline projection makes very different assumptions about trends in net migration for different countries. For instance, in 13 of

the EU-15 countries, Eurostat assumes declining net migration, the exceptions being NL and FI.

66

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

GDP growth rates for the EU-25 according to various population scenarios

Baseline

High

Zero

Old

High fertility

3,5%

3,0%

2,5%

2,0%

1,5%

1,0%

0,5%

0,0%

2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045

Source: Eurobarometer 2006.

3.3. Challenges to public finances and

intergenerational solidarity

The challenge of demographic ageing not only consists in

ensuring that Europe's economy can continue to grow

thanks to higher labour force participation and strong productivity

growth. The issue of a declining working age

population may be less difficult to tackle than the problem

of providing adequate resources for an increasing number

of older people who need adequate pensions and

health and long-term care. The changes in demography

therefore constitute a major challenge for public finances

and social cohesion, which is illustrated by the fact that in

2050 there will be two working-age people per elderly

citizen as opposed to the current ratio of four to one.

The long-term projections carried out by the Economic

Policy Committee and the European Commission show

that the pension, health and long-term care costs linked to

the ageing population will lead to significant increases in

public spending in most Member States by 2050. Many

Member States have already carried out reforms which

put them on the path to greater sustainability, but substantially

increased expenditure on pensions is still projected

for some countries. On the basis of current policies, total

age-related public expenditure is projected to increase by

3.4 percentage points of GDP, while expenditure on pensions,

health and long-term care alone is projected to

increase by 4.4 percentage points for the EU-25 and up

to 10 percentage points in some Member States 41 .

3.3.1. Pensions

The trends for pensions are presented in Table 3.2.

Public and private spending on pensions, which in 2003

averaged 13% of GDP in the EU , has ensured that being

old is no longer associated with being poor or dependent

on one's children (see Table 3.2). This has mainly been

achieved through the provision of public pensions (amounting

to about 10% of GDP). Public spending on pensions is

projected to increase in most countries; in some, it is projected

to decrease because a part of it is being shifted into private

pension savings. Despite this shift to private provision,

and the need to ensure well functioning, competitive and

open pension and retirement markets, the adequacy of retirement

income will continue to be a public responsibility.

However, there are significant differences across Member

States as far as the fight against poverty in old age is

concerned and poverty risks among older people generally

remain somewhat higher than for the rest of the population

(see also Figure 3.9 on poverty risks).

41. See Economic Policy Committee/European Commission: 'The impact of ageing populations on public spending on pensions, health and longterm

care, education and unemployment benefits for the elderly', February 2006, available under:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/epc/epc_sustainability_ageing_en.htm.

The focus of these projections is forward-looking and they are not directly comparable with ESSPROS figures as they do not include occupational

private expenditure and private healthcare.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 3.2 Projected change in spending on public

pensions (in % of GDP)

2004 2030 2050

Level Change from 2004

BE 10.4 4.3 5.1

CZ 8.5 1.1 5.6

DK 9.5 3.3 3.3

DE 11.4 0.9 1.7

EE 6.7 - 1.9 - 2.5

EL : : :

ES 8.6 3.3 7.1

FR 12.8 1.5 2.0

IE 4.7 3.1 6.4

IT 14.2 0.8 0.4

CY 6.9 5.3 12.9

LV 6.8 -1.2 - 1.2

LT 6.7 1.2 1.8

LU 10.0 5.0 7.4

HU 10.4 3.1 6.7

MT 7.4 1.7 - 0.4

NL 7.7 2.9 3.5

AT 13.4 0.6 - 1.2

PL 13.9 - 4.7 - 5.9

PT 11.1 4.9 9.7

SI 11.0 3.4 7.3

SK 7.2 0.5 1.8

FI 10.7 3.3 3.1

SE 10.6 0.4 0.6

UK 6.6 1.3 2.0

EU-25 10.6 1.3 2.2

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European

Commission.

Pension systems aim not only to ensure that older people

do not have to live in poverty, but also provide arrangements

to allow them to maintain a living standard after

retirement that is not too far off from what they enjoyed

during their working lives. Earnings related pensions are

essential in this respect and in future will continue to be

the main source of pension income for retired people.

Thanks to pension entitlements that generally provide 60-

70% of an individual's income upon retirement, older

people enjoy living standards relatively close to that of the

general population, generally ranging between 75% and

90% of that of the 0-64 population. However, there are

significant differences between men and women as a

result of differences in past earnings due to different

employment histories. In some countries, credits have

been introduced for periods devoted to care.

Future levels of pensions in relation to earnings (income

replacement levels) will depend firstly on the pace of

accrual of pension entitlements, which is linked to developments

in the labour market, and on the maturation of

pension schemes. On the whole, pension schemes (in particular

statutory schemes) currently manage to ensure adequate

income replacement levels after a full career in most

Member States. In certain cases, however, current average

pension levels turn out to be low compared to current

earnings, reflecting low coverage or low income

replacement under statutory schemes, as well as maturing

pension systems and incomplete careers or under-declaration

of earnings in the past.

The work carried out on future replacement rates by the

Indicators' Sub-Group of the Social Protection

Committee 42 suggests that reforms of statutory schemes

may reduce replacement rates at given retirement ages.

Pensions are generally indexed to prices, which means

that they generally lag behind the evolution of wages.

This can translate into significant reductions in theoretical

replacement rates upon retirement. On the other hand,

rising female labour force participation and longer working

lives in all Member States will result in higher average

pensions. In southern and eastern Member States,

economic modernisation and corresponding employment

changes will also lead to better pension outcomes in the

future. These structural developments could offset the

trend towards less generous benefit rules to a significant

extent. However, other factors could also work in the

opposite direction, for example further postponement of

entrance to the labour market or an increase of periods

of unemployment.

Several countries have extended – or are in the process of

extending – the period of earnings history used for calculating

the pension entitlement. Thus, instead of using the

years of highest earnings towards the end of the career,

earnings over a much longer period or even the entire

career are taken into account (i.e. going from a final

wage system to an average wage system). This will

usually lead to lower pension levels, particularly if past

earnings are not fully adjusted for (nominal) wage

growth. Pension levels can also be lowered by adjustments

to the formula used to calculate benefits. One significant

development has been the introduction of a demographic

adjustment factor as in the Swedish scheme

where rising life expectancy will lower the replacement

rate unless people postpone their retirement. Mechanisms

to take into account the ratio between the employed and

retired are also being developed. Such reforms provide

strong incentives for people to postpone retirement in line

with rising life expectancy until they can get an adequate

pension.

42. See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/docs/2006/sec_2006_304_horizontalanalysis_en.pdf.

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

Figure 3.9 Risk of poverty amongst older people (ceiling at 60% of the median)

Total

65+

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

BE BG CZ DK DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK

Source: HBS for BG and RO, EU-SILC for others. Income reference year 2004.

Notes: At-risk-of-poverty rates are defined as the share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below an at-riskof-poverty

threshold. Equivalised disposable income is defined as the household's total disposable income divided by its

'equivalent size' to take account of its size and composition. The at-risk-of poverty threshold is set at 60% of the national

median equivalised disposable income. It must be noted that income generated from owner-occupied housing or housing

at below market rents – i.e. imputed rent – is not included in the definition of income. Inclusion of this element of income

could make a significant difference in the measurement of risk-of-poverty rates.

Europe's future ability to provide adequate pensions to the

ageing baby boom cohorts will crucially depend on whether

the effective retirement age can be raised again.

Pension systems must also make the relationship between

contributions and benefits more transparent and be adapted

to increasing life expectancy. While in the 1960s it

was normal to retire well after 60, workers left the labour

markets increasingly earlier during the 1970s and 1980s

and, although this trend now seems to have reversed, the

average ages upon leaving the labour market are still

below the levels of the late 1960s. Moreover, the employment

phase of the life-cycle has been compressed by longer

periods spent in education.

While the number of years in employment has declined

since the 1960s, life expectancy at 60 increased within

the EU-25 by around 4 years between 1960 and 2000

(from 15.8 years to 19.3 years for men and from 19

years to 23.6 years for women). The most recent Eurostat

projections are based on a further increase of four years

in life expectancy at 65 between 2004 to 2050 (an additional

4.4 years for men and 3.9 years for women) 43 .

In short, contribution years have decreased over the past

decades while the years in receipt of benefits have increased

and could continue to increase. Pension reforms that

restore the balance between contribution years and years

of benefit receipt will make a major contribution towards

preventing poverty in old age at a time when the number

of pensioners will be much larger than today.

3.3.2. Health and long-term care

The probability of needing health and long-term care

increases with age, with most care needs concentrated

during the final years of life. The main consumers of

health and long-term care are therefore people over 80

whose share in the total population according to the

Eurostat population projection will rise from 4.1% in

2005 to 6.3% in 2025 and to 11.4% in 2050, mainly

due to further increases in life expectancy, falls in fertility

rates and the effect of the baby boom generation reaching

old age. The number of the 80+ in the EU-25 is projected

to grow by 58% between 2005 and 2025 (see

also Figure 3.10).

43. Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion, 2006. See

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/docs/2006/cs2006_7294_en.pdf.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Although not age but rather the health status of a person

is the main factor behind healthcare spending , the

Economic Policy Committee projections illustrate that an

ageing population would increase the pressure for more

public spending in healthcare. It could push up healthcare

spending by between 1% and 2% of GDP in most

Member States, i.e. an increase of approximately 25%

over current spending (see also Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Projected change in public spending on

healthcare (in % of GDP)

2004 2030 2050

Level Change from 2004

BE 6.2 0.9 1.4

CZ 6.4 1.4 2.0

DK 6.9 0.8 1.0

DE 6.0 0.9 1.2

EE 5.4 0.8 1.1

EL 5.1 0.8 1.7

ES 6.1 1.2 2.2

FR 7.7 1.2 1.8

IE 5.3 1.2 2.0

IT 5.8 0.9 1.3

CY 2.9 0.7 1.1

LV 5.1 0.8 1.1

LT 3.7 0.7 0.9

LU 5.1 0.8 1.2

HU 5.5 0.8 1.0

MT 4.2 1.3 1.8

NL 6.1 1.0 1.3

AT 5.3 1.0 1.6

PL 4.1 1.0 1.4

PT 6.7 - 0.1 0.5

SI 6.4 1.2 1.6

SK 4.4 1.3 1.9

FI 5.6 1.1 1.4

SE 6.7 0.7 1.0

UK 6.7 0.7 1.0

EU-25 6.4 1.0 1.6

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European

Commission.

in incorporating other important drivers of spending,

mainly on the supply side, into the projection model.

Stylised scenarios (see Figure 3.11) indicate that the projected

increase in public spending on healthcare is very

sensitive to the assumptions regarding the evolution of unit

costs and the income elasticity of demand. Healthcare

spending around the world is generally already rising at

a faster rate than economic growth 44 . Spending on health

as a share of GDP could increase rapidly if unit costs

(wages, pharmaceutical prices, spending on technologies)

grow faster than their equivalents in the economy as

a whole, on account of public policies aiming to improve

access to health or improve quality (by reducing waiting

lists, increasing choice, etc.), or if rising per capita

income levels and rising death-related costs lead to

increased demand for healthcare services.

The pure ageing scenario ageing scenario assumes that

age-specific health spending per capita remains constant

over time. The constant health scenario captures the

potential impact of improvements in the health of the

elderly. The death-related costs scenario combines an

increase in healthy life with the fact that most healthcare

costs are incurred in the final years of a person's life. The

income elasticity scenario assumes that the income elasticity

of demand for healthcare exceeds unity. Finally, the

Ageing Working Group (AWG) reference scenario shows

the impact of a balanced combination of the factors affecting

healthcare spending.

3.3.3. Long-term care

An ageing population will place a strong upward pressure

on public spending for long-term care as frailty and

disability rise sharply at older ages, especially amongst

the very old (aged 80+). According to the 'AWG reference

scenario' based on current policy settings, public

spending on long-term care is projected to increase by

between 0.1 percentage points and 1.8 percentage

points of GDP between 2004 and 2050 (see also Table

3.4). However, this range reflects very different approaches

to the provision and/or financing of formal care. The

projections are based on the current institutional setting

and assume no change in public provision policy.

Improvements in the health status of the elderly are projected

to have a large effect on health spending, moderating

the projected increase in spending on healthcare due to

ageing. If healthy life expectancy would evolve broadly in

line with the change in life expectancy, then the projected

increase in spending on healthcare due to ageing could

be halved. In comparison, less progress has been made

44. Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States and OECD Countries, January 2007

http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm010307oth.cfm.

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Figure 3.10 Increase of population 80+ vs. increase of the proportion of the population 80+ in the total

population between 2005 and 2025

Increase of pop 80+ Increase of the proportion of the population 80+

4%

1.20

4%

1.00

3%

3%

0.80

2%

0.60

2%

0.40

1%

1%

0.20

0%

DE IT SI GR LV AT LT EU-25 PT FI BG ES HU EE CZ BE CY MT FX PL RO LU DK UK SK NL IE SE

Source: European Commission.

Note: Increase of the proportion of the population 80+ on right axis.

0.00

Figure 3.11 Projected change in healthcare expenditure between 2004 and 2050 (in % of GDP, EU-25) 45

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

Pure ageing GDP

per capita

Constant health Death related cost Income elasticity AWG reference

sceanrio

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission.

45. European Economy Special Report, No 1, 2006, pp. 108-112.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 3.4 Projected public spending on long-term care (as % of GDP)

2004 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2004-2050

BE 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 0.9

DK 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.1

DE 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.0

EL : : : : : : :

ES 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.2

FR

IE 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.6

IT 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.2 0.7

LU 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 0.6

NL 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.6

AT 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.9

PT : : : : : : :

FI 1.7 1.9 2.1 3.0 3.4 3.5 1.8

SE 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 1.7

UK 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 0.8

CY : : : : : : :

CZ 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4

EE : : : : : : :

HU : : : : : : :

LT 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.4

LV 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.3

MT 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.2

PL 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1

SK 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 0.6

SI 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.2 1.2

EU-25 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 0.6

EU-15 0.9 0.9 LO 1.1 1.3 1.5 0.7

EU-1O 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2

Source: European Commission.

Note: EU-25, EU-15 and EU-10 – average weighted by GDP.

The projections show that an ageing population may lead

to a growing gap between the number of elderly persons

with a disability who are in need of care (which will more

than double by 2050) and the actual supply of formal

care services. Countries with very low projected increases

in public spending currently have very low levels of formal

care. If these countries would respond to the growing

need for professional care by increasing the supply of formal

care services, their spending rates may increase

much more dramatically. The results for the different longterm

care scenarios are presented in Figure 3.12.

The Economic Policy Committee/European Commission

study has also prepared an estimate of the number of

dependent elderly people for those countries for which both

data from SHARE 46 on disability rates and data from national

sources on the numbers of people living in institutions

are available 47 (see Table 3.5). In most countries, around

20% of the population aged 65+ has some form of disability.

For men, this ranges from 12% in the Netherlands to

27% in the UK, and for women from 19% in Denmark, the

Netherlands and Austria to 33% in the UK.

According to SHARE, 'Older people are often at the centre

of a complex exchange network within a family where

they both give and receive support. Many persons between

50 and 65 are involved with personal care for their

parents and later on for their spouses. There appears to

be a strong North/South divide in Europe; a higher proportion

of older people are involved in family support in

northern and continental countries, where as in southern

countries help and support tends to be confined to a few

individuals within the family who are more intensely involved

as either the givers or receivers of care. As a consequence

older people living alone are more likely to be

given support in northern countries.'

Table 3.6, taken from SHARE, provides detailed information

on the living situation and the type of care received

by the 80+ in the SHARE countries.

46. SHARE: Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe, Editor A. Boersch-Supan, 2005.

47. European Economy Special Report, No 1, 2006, p. 141.

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Part 1 – 3. The economic and Social Impacts of Demographic Change

Table 3.5 Estimated elderly dependent population in 2004 for 8 EU Member States (in thousands)

65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ Total As % of

dependent population total population

aged 65+ aged 65+

Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women

DK 11 16 5 10 11 11 27 49 54 86 16 19

DE 191 183 117 340 174 414 390 980 873 1 917 15 22

ES 67 83 109 150 115 189 189 546 480 968 16 23

IT 113 124 128 310 201 337 299 702 741 1 473 16 23

NL 23 24 14 34 23 44 51 150 111 251 12 19

AT 9 19 11 22 20 27 12 77 52 145 11 19

SE 9 13 16 15 17 36 62 154 104 218 16 25

UK 230 285 266 329 231 356 361 841 1 088 1 811 27 33

Source: SHARE, 1+ ADLs, AWG population scenario reported in the Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2005a).

Note: Estimates of the number of people in institutions by age have been made for Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands and

Sweden.

Table 3.6 Living situation and type of care of persons 80+ who are not living in an institution

SE DK NL DE FR AT CH ES IT EL TOTAL

Mean age in years 84.8 84.3 83.7 84.2 83.9 84.0 84.5 84.7 84.0 84.7 84.3

Living alone in % 66.3 64.4 62.7 64.9 53.4 66.7 53.3 39.2 50.7 65.7 56.2

Living as couple in % 31.1 29.8 34.3 26.7 37.1 20.0 39.5 24.0 27.8 26.6 27.4

Living with family in % 2.6 5.8 3.0 8.4 9.4 13.3 7.2 36.8 21.6 7.7 16.4

Personal care from

HH in % 16.9 21.5 10.5 31.2 25.5 43.6 11.9 37.8 38.2 34.0 33.3

Personal care from HH

or PCG in % 9.9 24.0 15.1 22.1 32.6 22.8 5.2 31.5 23.2 10.4 22.5

Practical help or personal

care (HH or PCG) in % 36.7 60.0 48.7 28.0 54.5 32.7 6.3 41.7 29.2 11.1 32.3

Getting help from

children in % 39.4 28.9 30.9 43.6 40.0 28.6 19.5 20.6 14.9 50.5 30.4

Source: SHARE 2005.

Note: HH = household, PCG = professional care giver.

The share of very old persons living alone is between

50% and 70%; only in Spain is this share lower at 39%.

There are larger differences when it comes to living with

family. It appears that this arrangement is much more common

in southern than in northern Europe, e.g. 37% in

Spain and 22% in Italy compared to only 3% in Sweden

and the Netherlands. In terms of the type of care received

within the household, from a professional care giver or

from one's own children, the situation is rather diverse.

For instance, there does not appear to be a trade-off between

professional care and getting help from children.

SHARE concludes that 'A mixture of public, voluntary and

personal care does not erode family support. Instead

family members are freed from the more arduous tasks of

intensive personal care (undertaken by professional services)

and are able to devote more time to other family relationships.'

The Economic Policy Committee/European Commission

has also constructed a number of different long-term care

scenarios to explore the sensitivity of future public expenditure

under various assumptions 48 . The first scenario is

once more the pure ageing scenario assuming constant

disability rates. The 'constant' disability scenario assumes

an improvement in general disability status. The cost/GDP

per capita scenario assumes that unit costs evolve in line

with GDP per capita. The increased formal care scenario

assumes a change in policy, where formal care services

are provided to a growing share of the elderly population

(the prevalence of receiving formal care increases in all

countries by 1% per year during the period 2004-2020.

Finally the Ageing Working Group reference scenario

combines these scenarios in a prudent way (see Figure

3.12). The analysis shows that the main risk with an

ageing population would be an increase in the demand

48. European Economy Special Report, No 1, 2006, p. 135.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

for formal long-term care. There may be less informal care

available within households on account of trends in family

size and the projected increase in the participation of

women in the labour market. For countries currently with

less developed formal care systems, the headline projected

increase in public spending on long-term care may not

fully capture the pressure on public finances, as policy

changes in favour of more formal care provision may be

needed in future.

Future healthcare needs will depend not only on ageingrelated

developments (including healthy ageing trends).

Future expenditure will also depend on new technological

developments (which may increase expenditure by

making new forms of treatment and care available or

reduce it by replacing expensive with cheaper treatments).

The provision of (formal) long-term care is a highly

labour intensive activity with relatively little room for technology-driven

productivity increases. Long-term care

needs will be very much influenced by the expectations of

patients, who normally prefer to be cared for at home

care, as well as by the capacity and willingness of families

to provide informal care (which is likely to depend on

the geographic proximity of relatives or the employment

status of potential carers).

As reflected in the Joint Report on Social Protection and

Social Inclusion 2007 49 , the National Reports from the

Member States highlight other significant areas essential

for the sustainability of long-term care systems. These

include developing more formalised care for the elderly

and disabled and attaching a higher priority to home

care services and the introduction of new technology (e.g.

independent living systems) which can enable people to

live in their own homes for as long as possible. And, in

addition, Member States also stress the importance of

rehabilitation, which in turn helps dependents return to an

active life.

Figure 3.12 Change in long-term care expenditure (in % of GDP, EU-25)

1.6

1.4

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

Pure ageing GDP

per capita

Constant disability Cost – GDP per worker Increased formal care AWG reference

sceanrio

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission.

49. COM(2007) 13 final.

74

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


4. OPPORTUNITIES FOR TACKLING DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

4.1. Introduction

In its Communication on 'The demographic future of

Europe – from challenge to opportunity', the Commission

presented a constructive response to the demographic

challenge and highlighted five policy areas in which the

Member States can take measures to tackle this challenge.

The areas are:

• 'demographic renewal', i.e. lifting the obstacles to a

return to higher fertility rates;

• raising employment levels, which will result in a better

balance between active and inactive people;

• boosting productivity growth and hence the economy's

ability to meet the needs of an ageing population;

• receiving and integrating immigrants so as to avoid

future labour shortages;

• and ensuring the sustainability of public finances and

thus securing the ability to maintain adequate social

protection and public services in the future.

This chapter examines how much scope there is for

improvement in each of these five areas and provides

some indications as to the obstacles that need to be overcome

to unlock the potential for tackling the demographic

challenge.

Clearly, combinations of measures in several of these

areas are needed, but each Member State has different

potentials in each of these areas and will therefore require

its own specific policy mix. The data presented in this

chapter should allow each Member State to identify the

areas with the greatest scope for improvement and to

define policy priorities accordingly.

they actually have. That a policy response to low birth

rates is realistic is demonstrated by international comparisons

underlining the effectiveness of policies to support

those who wish to have children.

4.2.1. Potential for more births

In all EU Member States the fertility rate has declined to a

level below the replacement level of 2.1 and the EU average

is just below 1.5 (see Figure 4.1). This means

roughly that every generation is replaced by a generation

that is 25% smaller. At the same time, there are large differences

in fertility levels between Member States.

Two groups can be distinguished. On the one hand, there

are countries with fertility rates above 1.6 (e.g. FR, UK,

NL, BE, DK and SE), which, given rising life expectancy

and continuing migration, will prevent population decline.

In most other Member States, however, fertility rates do

not exceed 1.5, implying that population decline seems

inevitable.

A return to higher fertility rates would not prevent the

accelerated ageing resulting from the baby boom cohorts

growing old. Moreover, with rising life expectancy, a

constant old-age dependency ratio could only be achieved

by fertility rates well above the replacement level –

and this would mean continuous population growth.

Higher fertility will eventually result in a larger labour

force, but this takes about 20 years, i.e. the time it takes

for these cohorts to go through the education system and

enter the labour market.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the long-term effects of higher fertility

on the working age population. It compares the size of the

potential labour force in 2030, 2040 and 2050 under

the baseline scenario and a high fertility scenario.

4.2. Demographic renewal: how much scope

is there for increased fertility

The Commission's communication on the demographic

future of Europe stressed that Member States can respond

to low birth rates and that such reactions are both necessary

and realistic. The necessity stems from the fact that

people generally would like to have more children than

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 4.1 Total Fertility Rates in 2005

2.1

1.9

1.7

1.5

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.7

0.5

PL

SK

SI

LT

CZ

EL

BG

LV

HU

RO

DE

ES

IT

MT

PT

AT

CY

EU-25

EE

LU

BE

NL

SE

DK

FI

UK

IE

FR

Source: Eurostat.

Figure 4.2 Difference in the size of the 20-64 working age population for the High Fertility Scenario and

the Baseline Scenario (in % of baseline labour force)

0.12

2030 2040 2050

0.10

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.00

EU-

25

EU- NMS- EA BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FX IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK

15 10

Source: Eurostat New Cronos and own calculations 50 .

The baseline scenario assumes continuing low fertility

rates in the EU-25, albeit at a somewhat higher level than

today in the low fertility countries. In 2050 the highest

total fertility rates are expected in Sweden and France

(1.85), compared to TFRs of 1.4 or 1.45 in countries such

as Spain, Italy, Germany and Austria, which are expected

50. EUROPOP 2004 population projection, the difference between the baseline scenario and a high fertility scenario.

76

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

to have the lowest fertility rates. For the EU as a whole,

the TFR in 2030 is assumed to be 1.62.

Under the high fertility scenario, it is assumed that the fertility

rate in 2035 will have stabilised at 1.93 per woman,

relative to the baseline value. Figure 4.2 shows that the

higher fertility scenario will have hardly any impact on the

population of working age in 2030; the effect will only

start to be noticeable from 2040 onwards.

In spite of the fact that increased fertility rates will only

produce positive economic impacts after a very long time

lag, many countries consider low fertility rates as a public

policy issue. According to the UN population perception

surveys, 18 out of 29 European countries considered their

fertility level as 'satisfactory' in 1976. By 2005 a majority

of 28 out of 43 perceived the fertility level as 'too

low' 51 . Only two of the EU-10 and six of the EU-15

Member States believed that no intervention was called

for to raise fertility levels 52 . The replies of the Member

States to the Commission's Green Paper on demography

confirmed that majority of Member States now tend to see

the current low fertility rate as a matter of public concern.

In the long run, higher fertility rates would prevent population

decline and, while not reversing demographic

ageing, would contribute to a more balanced mix of younger

and older people in society. However, it is a highly

personal choice whether to have children or not and the

only way governments in a free society can influence fertility

rates is by removing obstacles that prevent those who

would like to have children from actually having them.

Apparently, there are several constraints preventing

Europeans from realising their desire to have children, see

also the previous discussion in section 2.2.4. The problems

include a lack of jobs and housing for young people

wanting to start a family, the difficulty of reconciling

paid work with family life and perhaps also a general

lack of confidence in the future 53 . All these factors may

have a negative impact on young people thinking about

starting a family and on the likelihood of existing families

having an extra child.

Greater gender equality and a better work/life balance

seem to be conducive to increasing both female labour

force participation and fertility. In fact there has been a

reversal in the sign of the correlation between fertility and

female labour force participation among OECD countries

since the middle of the 1980s. This cross-country correlation

switched from – 0.54 in 1970 to 0.68 in 1996 54 .

Today, countries where many women are in paid employment,

often supported by effective instruments to reconcile

work with private and family responsibilities for both men

and women, tend to have higher fertility rates than countries

where fewer women work. Countries where it has

remained difficult to reconcile employment and having a

family tend to have experienced a large decline in births

combined with only a modest increase in female labour

force participation. In Italy, for example, female force participation

went from about 34% in 1975 to just about

51% in 2004, a fairly low figure when compared to the

75% in Sweden. The TFR in Italy and Sweden stood at 2.5

and 2.3 during the first half of the 1960s, but in 2004

was 1.3 and 1.8, respectively. The availability of childcare

helps to combine work and family and appears to

have a particular effect on the probability of working for

highly educated women.

4.2.2. Unlocking the potential for more births

Public policy matters when trying to understand differences

in fertility. It can create better conditions for founding

a family, raising children, reconciling work and family life

as well as sharing family and domestic responsibilities

between women and men. Clearly, some Member States

have already found relatively successful policy mixes.

BOX 4.1

Different family policy mixes in

Europe

At the 2005 Green Paper conference 'Confronting

demographic change: a new solidarity between the

generations', one of the experts, Linda Hantrais 55 ,

summed up the current situation across the EU as follows:

'Some countries would appear to be more successful

(the Nordic states) in achieving relatively high

employment rates for women in combination with a

widespread level of social acceptance of working

motherhood, measured in terms of attitudes and practices

and the legitimacy of public policy intervention.

They do so through a high tax economy and heavy

reliance on the public sector. Southern European

countries are at the other end of the spectrum, low

female employment rates (except Portugal) combine

with heavy reliance on intergenerational support networks,

which are, however, increasingly being called

into question. In between are two contrasting models.

The Anglo-Saxon countries depend on highly flexible

51. Various UN Population Perception Surveys held between 1979 and 2005. In these surveys governments are asked whether countries consider

their level of fertility 'too low, satisfactory or too high'.

52. On fertility policy the question asked is: 'Should one raise, maintain or lower policy intervention or should there be no policy intervention'

53. Survey realized near 34.000 Europeans aged 18-75 old living in 14 countries in the period from 1999 to 2003. Population Policy

Acceptance Study Dialog, produced by the Federal Institute for Population Research for the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

54. De Laat, J. and A. Sevilla Sanz, 'Working women, men's home time and lowest-low fertility', Essex University ISER, Working Paper, No 23, 2006.

55. See http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/events/event_en.cfmid=5

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

labour markets, small public sectors, a low-wage household

service sector and a welfare-to-work ethos. The

corporatist countries (Austria, Germany and the

Netherlands) have remained closer to the traditional

male breadwinner model, with less public support for

families and greater reliance on collective labour

agreements and on women prioritising their role as

mothers at home rather than working mothers. The

Central and East European countries present a rather

different configuration: they combine traditionally

high female activity rates, although both male and

female rates have been falling, with a strong commitment

to mothers as workers, not however for reasons

of gender equality. Here, cutbacks in the provision of

public services and the shrinking public sector have

hit women hardest and have forced families to

become more self-reliant.'

All Member States support families in one form or another,

the main types of support being:

4.2.2.1. Financial support (including tax breaks) to reduce

the financial inequality between people with and

without children

Children are costly in terms of both direct costs and foregone

earnings. These costs create considerable income

differences between otherwise comparable couples with

and without children. Social protection benefits compensate

for the direct and indirect costs of having children.

According to Eurostat data on social protection expenditure

(ESSPROS – which do not include tax benefits

or spending on education), about three quarters of

social protection benefits targeted at families take the

form of benefits in cash. In 2004, they amounted to

some 1.5% of GDP for the EU-25, ranging from 0.4% in

Spain to more than 3% in Luxembourg (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Social protection benefits targeted at family support in the EU

2004

Share of Support intensity Total family Support Support

population corrected for the TFR support in cash in kind

between 0-19 in % share of the young* In % of GDP

EU-25 22.5 9.32 1.51 2.1 e 1.5 e 0.6 e

EU-15 22.2 9.46 : 2.1 e 1.5 e 0.6 e

EA-12 21.6 9.71 1.51 2.1 p 1.5 p 0.5 p

BE 23.2 8.63 1.68 2 1.6 0.4

CZ 21.7 7.36 1.23 1.6 p 1.4 p 0.2 p

DK 24.3 16.04 1.78 3.9 1.6 2.3

DE 20.5 14.65 1.37 3 p 2.2 p 0.7 p

EE 23.9 7.11 1.47 1.7 1.6 0.1

IE 28.4 8.81 1.99 2.5 2.3 0.3

EL 20.2 8.41 1.31 1.7 1.2 0.5

ES 20.1 3.48 1.33 0.7 p 0.4 p 0.3 p

FR 25.1 9.98 1.92 2.5 p 2 p 0.5 p

IT 19.2 5.73 1.33 1.1 p 0.7 p 0.5 p

CY 27.8 7.21 1.49 2 1.9 0.1

LV 23.4 5.55 1.24 1.3 p 1 p 0.2 p

LT 25.7 4.28 1.26 1.1 p 0.7 p 0.4 p

LU 24.5 15.52 1.70 3.8 p 3.3 p 0.6 p

HU 22.2 11.26 1.28 2.5 1.9 0.6

MT 25.3 3.95 1.37 1 0.9 0.1

NL 24.5 5.30 1.73 1.3 p 0.7 p 0.5 p

AT 22.2 13.49 1.42 3 2.5 0.5

PL 25.4 3.55 1.23 09 p 0.9 p :

PT 21.6 5.55 1.40 1.2 p 0.8 p 0.5 p

SI 21.1 9.50 1.25 2 p 1.4 p 0.6 p

SK 25.5 7.06 1.24 1.8 p 1.6 p 0.1 p

FI 23.8 12.63 1.80 3 1.6 1.3

SE 24.0 12.51 1.75 3 p 1.6 p 1.5 p

UK 24.8 6.87 1.77 1.7 e 1.3 e 0.4 e

Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS.

* support in % of GDP divided by the share of the young (0-19) in the population.

** e = estimated value, p = provisional value.

The data collected by the OECD are not directly comparable. However, they do illustrate the value of tax breaks to families, which

again display a wide variation across countries (see Figure 4.3).

78

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Figure 4.3 Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures, 2003 (in % of GDP)

4.5

Cash Services Tax breaks towards family OECD-24 (2.4%)

4.5

4.0

4.0

3.5

3.5

3.0

3.0

2.5

2.5

2.0

2.0

1.5

1.5

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0

0.0

Luxembourg

Denmark

France

Norway

Sweden

Hungary

Australia

United

Belgium

Iceland

Austria

Finland

Source: OECD data base on family policies, 2006:

http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,2340,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_1,00.html.

Germany

Ireland

Slovak

Czech

New

Netherlands

Portugal

Poland

Switzerland

United

Greece

Italy

Japan

Canada

Spain

Mexico

Korea

Turkey

Benefits in kind amounted to 0.6% of GDP with an even

larger variation across countries. The differences become

larger when one corrects for the fact that the share of

young people differs between countries.

In spite of the support for families, households with children

remain exposed to a slightly higher risk of poverty

than the population as a whole (see Table 4.2). The risk

of poverty is likely to have an impact on young couples

thinking about starting a family of their own. This was

confirmed by the replies to the 2006 Eurobarometer survey,

which in particular mention adequate working, financial

and housing conditions as prerequisites for having

children (see chapter 2.2.4).

Table 4.2 At-risk-of-poverty after social transfers, 2004 (in %)

With children

Total

BE 18 15

CZ 15 8

DK 9 11

DE 20 16

EE 20 18

EL 20 20

ES 24 20

FR 14 14

IE 22 21

IT 26 19

CY 11 15

LV 19 16

LT 17 15

LU 18 11

HU 17 12

MT 21 15

NL 18 12

AT 15 13

PL 23 17

PT 23 21

SI 9 10

SK 30 21

FI 10 11

SE 11 11

UK 22 18

EU-25 20 16

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC and national data.

Note: Risk-of-poverty defined as income below 60% of the

median income.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Country Childcare coverage rate Childcare coverage rate Public expenditure

0-3 years 3-compulsory school age on formal day care

Target = 33% Target = 90% as a % of GDP

BE (Flanders) 81% 100% 0.1%

BE (Wallonia) 33% 98%

CZ 8% 85% 0.0%

DK 56% 93% 1.7%

DE 7% 89% 0.4%

EE 22% 79%

EL 7% 60% 0.4%

ES 10% 98% 0.1%

FR 43% 100% 0.7%

IE : : 0.2%

CY : : :

IT 6% 93% :

LV 16% 75% :

LT 18% 60% :

LU 14% 80% :

HU 6% 86% :

MT : : :

NL 35% 100% 0.2%

AT 9% 82% 0.4%

PL 2% 60%

PT 19% 75% 0.2%

SI 27% 59%

SK 70% 0.1%

FI 21% 70% 1.2%

SE 41% 90% 1.3%

BG 7% 74% :

Source: Plantenga and Remery, 2005, see footnote 56.

Table 4.3 Provision of childcare in European countries in 2003

4.2.2.2. Access to services

Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3 show that family support in the

form of services (or benefits in kind) plays a major role in

a number of countries, in particular the Nordic countries

and France. Given its importance for reconciling professional

and private life – and hence for achieving high

employment rates – the Barcelona summit of 2002 set two

targets for the availability of childcare, namely to provide,

by the year 2010, childcare for at least 33% of children

aged 0-3 and for 90% of children between the age of 3

and mandatory school age. Table 4.3 56 gives an overview

of the progress achieved by 2003.

With the exception of a few countries, the level of coverage

for the older children is already quite high. Ten countries

meet the 90% target. By contrast, the provision of

child care for the youngest age group is below 10% in

several countries. Most child care services are partly subsidised.

According to Plantenga and Remery, parents pay

on average only 25-35% of the cost. They find that, besides

affordability, cultural norms about motherhood and

the proper way to care for (young) children also limit the

use of crèches. In the case of young children, leave arrangements

and care provided by relatives (especially grandparents)

are often preferred by many parents.

The presence of children combined with the lack of services

also has a clear impact on the employment situation

of women. Table 4.4 shows that everywhere in the EU,

except in Slovenia and Portugal, the employment rate of

women caring for young children is lower than that of

women without children.

56. Plantenga J. and C. Remery, Reconciliation of work and private life: a comparative review of 30 European countries, European Commission,

Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, 2005.

80

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Table 4.4 Employment impact of parenthood for women*

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

EU-25 14.2 14.1 13.6 13.6 14.3

EU-15 12.6 12.7 12.2 12.5 13.3

EU-10 22.0 20.2 20.0 18.7 19.5

BE 1.7 3.1 6.6 1.7 2.1

CZ 43.6 41.8 38.9 41.0 39.2

DK : 3.6 2.9 1.6 1.6

DE 21.9 21.4 19.7 20.3 26.5

EE 30.2 31.7 28.8 31.3 30.0

EL 4.8 5.5 6.0 6.6 3.5

ES 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.2 7.5

FR 11.9 11.5 9.9 11.4 10.2

IE 16.5 16.2 : 18.9 18.2

IT 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.9 6.8

CY 5.6 4.5 8.0 8.0 3.4

LV 12.8 12.8 19.1 17.6 18.0

LT 0.0 3.4 4.0 5.1 2.8

LU 9.2 5.4 10.9 8.2 7.0

HU 35.0 35.1 37.1 34.1 35.3

MT 26.2 18.6 22.6 15.7 17.2

NL 12.0 11.5 11.1 9.7 9.4

AT 6.8 8.8 6.2 11.2 14.4

PL 13.6 12.5 12.0 9.6 11.1

PT - 2.4 - 1.2 - 2.3 - 3.7 - 3.8

SI - 5.9 - 5.1 - 7.9 - 5.1 - 1.5

SK 27.8 29.7 30.2 29.5 34.5

Fl : : 12.9 15.7 15.7

UK 21.9 23.2 24.1 23.0 21.2

* Difference in employment rates for women with children under 6 and women without children (age group 20-50).

Source: EU Labour Force Survey – Spring data, LU 2003, 2004 and 2005: Annual average data, data not available for SE.

Notes: Data may lack comparability due to changes in certain survey characteristics: between 2002 and 2003 for FR and LU, between

2003 and 2004 for IT and AT, between 2004 and 2005 for DE and ES. : means no data available.

4.2.2.3. Flexibility in working hours and work

organisation

Part-time work has become a widely used option to reconcile

work and family life. Table 4.5 shows that part-time

work is much more prevalent amongst women than men.

In 2005, 33% of women in the EU had part-time jobs as

compared to 7% of men. This high prevalence of part-time

working among women relative to men shows again that

it is mainly women who adapt their employment patterns

and careers to the needs of family life.

Flexible working-time arrangements, such as flexitime

systems or teleworking, may offer both mothers and

fathers alternative opportunities for reconciliation.

According to the Fourth Working Conditions Survey of

the European Foundation for Improvement in Living and

Working Conditions 57 , more and more Europeans are

making use of flexible working-time arrangements (see

Figure 4.4). In the surveyed countries, 48% of establishments

offer some form of working time flexibility but only

25% allow extended flexibility (i.e. the possibility to

accumulate hours for a day off or longer periods of

leave). The use of flexitime is lower in Southern

European countries and the new Member States than in

the rest of Europe.

The survey also confirms that parental leave is mostly

taken up by women and that, even in a country like

Sweden, men still take up only 17% of total parental

leave. The take-up of parental leave, in particular by men,

increases with the level of the replacement income.

57. For the report see http://www.eurofound.eu.int/ewco/surveys/EWCS2005/index.htm. At the 2006 Forum on the Demographic Future of Europe,

John Hurley of the Dublin Foundation summarised the results working time arrangements, see

http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/events/2006/demog/hurley_en.pdf

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81


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 4.5 Share of part-time work 2004-2005 (in %)

Women

Men

BE 41 7

CZ 8 2

DK 33 13

DE 44 8

EE 10 5

EL 9 2

ES 25 5

FR 31 6

IE 32 6

IT 26 5

CY 14 5

LV 12 8

LT 9 5

LU 38 3

HU 6 3

MT 19 5

NL 75 23

AT 39 6

PL 14 8

PT 17 7

SI 11 7

SK 4 1

FI 19 9

SE 40 12

UK 43 11

EU-25 33 7

Source: Eurostat EU-SILC and national data.

Note: Risk-of-poverty defined as income below 60% of the

median income.

Figure 4.5 summarises the possibilities for workers to

influence their daily working hours across Europe. Over

half of all workers (56%) have their working time arrangements

set by the company with no possibility of change,

9% of workers can choose between several fixed working

schedules, 17% can adapt their working hours within certain

limits (i.e. flexitime); and, in 18% of cases, it is the

worker who decides on individual working hours (e.g.

self-employed workers). Around 50% of workers in northern

European countries can adapt their working time (to

a certain extent) to their particular needs. In contrast,

fewer than 25% of workers in southern and Eastern

Europe are able to do this.

A key factor influencing work/life balance found in the

survey is the length of the working week. Over 40% of

those who work long hours say they are dissatisfied with

their work/life balance; by contrast, 85% of those who

work less than 30 hours per week are happy with their

work/life balance. Regular long working days (of over 10

hours in length) also have a negative impact. In particular

working fathers report more dissatisfaction with their

work/life balance than women. The Dublin Foundation

suggests that the dissatisfaction of working fathers could

be related to their inability and/or frustration to meet the

changing social expectations regarding a father's domestic

role. This would suggest that there is potential for

change among working fathers.

Figure 4.4 Incidence of different forms of flexible working time arrangements, by country (%)

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

LV

SE

FI

UK

PL

IE

CZ

AT

DE

DK

EU-21

FR

LU

NL

ES

IT

SI

BE

HU

EL

PT

CY

Possibility to vary the start and end of daily work, but no accumulation of hours

Possibility to use accumulated hours for full days off

Possibility to accumulate hours, but no compensation by full days off

Possibility to use accumulated hours for longer

periods of leave

Base: All establishments (management interviews).

Source: European Foundation for Living and Working Conditions in Dublin, 2004-2005.

82

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Figure 4.5 Working time discretion by country (%)

100

80

60

40

20

0

SE NL DK AT FI FR IT UK DE BE IE LU EL SI PL EE ES CZ SK LV HU LT PT MT CY BG

Your working hours are entirely determined by yourself

You can adapt your working hours within certain limits

You can choose between several fixed working schedules

They are set by the company with no possibility for changes

Source: Fourth Working Conditions Survey of the Dublin Foundation, 2005.

Women still carry a disproportionate share of the negative

impact of children on labour market participation.

This is reflected in lower employment rates of women, a

higher incidence of part-time working and the gender pay

gap (see Table 4.6). Indeed, female labour force participation

is 15 percentage points below that of men, while

part-time working is four to five times more prevalent

among women. In addition, there is a large gap in the

hourly pay earned by women and by men. In 2004,

women's average gross hourly earnings were 15% less

than men's across the EU, though with wide variations

across Member States.

The empirical evidence suggests that promoting the reconciliation

of a professional career with a fulfilling private life will

result in higher employment rates, in particular for women,

and higher fertility rates. But having a family will always

bring additional work and responsibilities, which are currently

to a large extent assumed by women and forces them

to sacrifice professional career opportunities. Progress

towards greater equality between women and men will therefore

also require a more equal sharing of household and

family work. Table 4.7 illustrates how large the differences

between women and men still are. Time use survey data

show that women spend much more time than men doing

domestic work and that they have less free time. The differences

between women and men tend to be larger in southern

and Eastern Europe. The Dublin Foundation's Working

Conditions Survey showed that part-time working women

actually worked longer hours than full-time working men

when counting both paid and unpaid work.

Table 4.6 Employment rate of women/men and

Gender pay gap for 2004-2005 (in %)

Women Men 2004-2005

BE 54 68 6

CZ 56 73 19

DK 72 80 17

DE 60 71 23

EE 62 67 24

EL 46 74 10

ES 51 75 15

FR 58 69 12

IE 58 77 11

IT 45 70 7

CY 58 79 25

LV 59 68 15

LT 59 66 16

LU 54 73 14

HU 51 63 11

MT 34 74 4

NL 66 80 19

AT 62 75 18

PL 47 59 10

PT 62 73 5

SI 61 70 9

SK 51 55 24

FI 67 70 20

SE 70 74 17

UK 66 78 22

EU-25 56 71 15

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 4.7 Allocation of daily time for women and men aged 20 to 74 in Europe

Hours and minutes per day

Women

BE DE EE ES FR IT LV LT HU PL SI FI SE UK NO

Gainful work, study 2:07 2:05 2:33 2:26 2:31 2:06 3:41 3:41 2:32 2:29 2:59 2:49 3:12 2:33 2:53

Domestic work 4:32 4:11 5:02 4:55 4:30 5:20 3:56 4:29 4:58 4:45 4:58 3:56 3:42 4:15 3:47

Travel 1:19 1:18 1:06 1:05 0:54 1:14 1:20 1:04 0:51 1:06 1:02 1:07 1:23 1:25 1:11

Sleep 8:29 8:19 8:35 8:32 8:55 8:19 8:44 8:35 8:42 8:35 8:24 8:32 8:11 8:27 8:10

Meals, personal care 2:43 2:43 2:08 2:33 3:02 2:53 2:10 2:22 2:19 2:29 2:08 2:06 2:28 2:16 2:08

Free time 4:50 5:24 4:36 4:29 4:08 4:08 4:09 3:49 4:38 4:36 4:29 5:30 5:04 5:04 5:51

Total 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24

Hours and minutes per day

Men

BE DE EE ES FR IT LV LT HU PL SI FI SE UK NO

Gainful work, study 3:30 3:35 3:40 4:39 4:03 4:26 5:09 4:55 3:46 4:15 4:07 4:01 4:25 4:18 4:16

Domestic work 2:38 2:21 2:48 1:37 2:22 1:35 1:50 2:09 2:40 2:22 2:40 2:16 2:29 2:18 2:22

Travel 1:35 1:27 1:17 1:16 1:03 1:35 1:28 1:13 1:03 1:13 1:09 1:12 1:30 1:30 1:20

Sleep 8:15 8:12 8:32 8:36 8:45 8:17 8:35 8:28 8:31 8:21 8:17 8:22 8:01 8:18 7:57

Meals, personal care2:40 2:33 2:15 2:35 3:01 2:59 2:10 2:25 2:31 2:23 2:13 2:01 2:11 2:04 2:02

Free time 5:22 5:52 5:28 5:17 4:46 5:08 4:48 4:50 5:29 5:25 5:34 6:08 5:24 5:32 6:03

Total 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24

Source: Eurostat – National Time Use Surveys conducted between 1998 and 2004 by national statistical agencies and

research institutes.

Notes: Unspecified time use is included in 'Free time'.

FR: In France, long periods spent on rest were coded as 'Sleep' and in the other countries as 'Rest', included here in 'Free time'.

NO: encouraged reporting conversation as a main activity by diary instruction (coded as 'Socialising', which is part of 'Free time').

National data were rounded, which may result in small discrepancies.

Cross-country differences in gender equality at home

appear to be linked to differences in fertility. In Northern

European countries the increased labour force participation

of women has been followed by an increase in men's

contribution to household work. Less egalitarian attitudes

in Southern Europe may have acted as a brake on female

labour force participation, as women often have to

choose between raising children and paid work. A recent

econometric study by De Laat and Sevilla Sanz 58 found

that the difference in an egalitarian attitudes score between

the most and the least egalitarian country in their

sample (Norway and Spain, respectively) explains a difference

in fertility of up to 0.87 children.

There is strong evidence that policies to support families

and to promote gender equality do matter and that they

can raise fertility rates. The highest birth rates in Europe

can indeed be observed in those countries that have the

most generous family policies and which also have made

most progress in gender equality. A study by the OECD 59

has tried to simulate the effects of different policies on

total fertility rates. The results presented in Box 4.2 should

not be regarded as predictions of the most likely outcomes,

but as an indication of the likely effects on fertility

rates of various policies based on a very simplified set of

assumptions. The policies considered are taxes and transfers

that lower the direct costs of children, greater availability

of part-time employment for women, longer periods

of parental leave, and greater availability of formal childcare

for preschool children. Despite the obvious limitations,

the results suggest that these policies can help

parents overcome the obstacles that prevent them from

having the number of children they want.

In addition to policies that promote better conditions for

women and men wishing to raise a family, it may become

increasingly important to address biological obstacles to

fertility. As potential parents postpone the moment at which

they decide to have children, fertility problems are becoming

a more and more frequent obstacle to the realisation

of their desire. The availability of Artificial Reproduction

Techniques (ART), such as in vitro fertilisation, may also

have an impact on a country's total fertility rate. A recent

study conducted by RAND 60 suggests that, if the UK adopted

the same policy regime concerning the availability of

ART as is currently practised in Denmark, its fertility rate

58. De Laat, J. and A. Sevilla Sanz, 'Working women, men's home time and lowest-low fertility', Essex University ISER, Working Paper, No 23, 2006.

59. D'Addio A. C. and M. Mira d'Ercole, 'Trends and determinants of fertility rates and the role of policies', OECD Social Policy Division, see

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/33/35304751.pdf.

60. Grant, J. and others, 'Should ART be part of the population mix', RAND Europe, paper prepared for the 2006 meeting of the European

Association of Human Reproduction and Embryology in Prague.

84

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

could go up by 0.07. This may not seem very much but

would still have a sizeable impact on population growth in

the long run. In fact, the size of the effect is comparable to

the effects on fertility of policies considered in the abovementioned

OECD study. More research, taking account of

possible deadweight effects and involving more countries,

is needed to confirm this result.

4.2.3. Conclusion

There is convincing evidence that better conditions for families,

increased gender equality, higher female employment

and more support for those who would like to start a family

would have a positive impact on fertility rates in the EU.

However, it should also be clear that the imminent challenge

of demographic ageing cannot be addressed by raising

fertility rates. Higher fertility rates will affect the

balance between active and retired people only after two

decades at least – before that, significant investment in the

education of these additional children will be required.

However, helping people to achieve their goal of starting a

family and raising children is now recognised as an important

policy goal. The Barcelona target of access to childcare,

the Commission's Gender equality Roadmap and the

Member States' European Pact for Gender Equality specifically

address the need to further support gender equality

policies, including better work/life balance measures, to

help meet the demographic challenge.

4.3. Promoting employment in Europe

The second strand of the constructive response to the demographic

challenge presented by the Commission in its communication

on the demographic future of Europe is the need

to raise employment rates. Demographic ageing will

reduce the population of working age (generally defined as

people aged 15-64 years) while the number of people over

65 (generally assumed to be retired) will increase. The oldage

dependency ratio, i.e. the number of people over 65

relative to the population of working age, will become less

BOX 4.2

Policy simulation of the effect on fertility

Potential Impact of various policy reforms on total fertility rates

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

ES DE SE DK BE AT IT CZ CA JP FI UK FR EL IE NL US PT KR

Lower direct costs of children

Increase in length of parental leave

Increase in formal chilcare for pre-school children

Increase in availability of part-time employment

Current level

Notes: Countries are ranked in increasing order of the total fertility rates that could be achieved as a result of four sets of policies:

i) a reduction in the direct costs of children (measured as the difference between the equivalised disposable income of a

two-earner couple without children and that of a two-earner couple with 2 children, where the principal earner earns 67% of the

earnings of an APW (Average Productive Wage), and the spouse 33%; ii) an increase in the availability of part-time employment

to the level achieved in the three OECD countries where it is highest (Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom); iii)

an increase in the availability of formal childcare (the share of children below 3 years of age attending formal childcare) to the

levels of the three countries where it is highest (Denmark, Sweden and the United States); and iv) an increase in the length of

leave (both maternity and parental) to the levels of the four countries where it is the highest (Germany, France, Spain and

Finland). The simulations allow for the possibility of substitution between longer parental leave and greater childcare availability.

The combined effect of these policies, e.g. in the case of Japan, is an increase of the total fertility rate from a level of 1.3 in

1999 to around 2.0.

Source: OECD, see footnote 59.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

favourable and the active population will have to shoulder

a heavier burden of providing for the elderly. However,

what matters with regard to the production and distribution

of resources is not the ratio between these two age groups

but the ratio between people actually in employment and

people receiving benefits. Raising employment rates, improving

integration within the labour market – especially for

young people and disadvantaged groups such as the disabled,

ethnic minorities and immigrants – and encouraging

older workers to stay longer on the labour market can help

maintain a good balance between the active and the retired

in a context of demographic ageing. Indeed many

Member States have considerable scope for raising their

employment and economic performance levels through

higher labour force participation.

4.3.1. Potential for more jobs of better quality

As the baby boom cohorts reach retirement age and smaller

young cohorts enter the labour market, the balance between

the inactive and active segments of the population could

worsen significantly. However, Europe has a huge potential

to compensate for this demographic effect by raising levels

of employment. The European Council decisions of Lisbon

and Stockholm which set targets for overall employment, as

well as rates for women and older workers, are indicative of

the labour market potential inherent in Europe. In 2005 the

overall, female and older people's employment rates were

respectively around 6.4 and 7.5 percentage points below

the Lisbon and Stockholm employment targets for 2010 61 .

Rates for older workers aged 55-64 actually improved most

in the period 2000-2005, rising by approximately 6 percentage

points (see Figure 4.7).

If individual Member States were to bring up employment

rates on the whole, and for women and 55-64-year-olds

in particular, to the levels of the current three best-performing

countries, this would make a major contribution to

tackling the demographic deficit. As shown in the chart

below, the greatest improvements would have to be made

in securing higher employment rates for older workers.

The next greatest challenge lies in raising rates for

women, while the best overall employment rates are

somewhat more within reach.

Translated into absolute numbers of jobs that need to be

created, improving labour market performance in these

areas has a substantial potential for making up the job

deficit foreseen in 2050 as compared to 2010 levels

(second column in Table 4.8). However, calculating the

contribution of a 25% increase in employment rates for

65-69-year-olds reveals that the potential employment

contribution that can be expected from this group is likely

to be rather modest.

Figure 4.6 Potential gap in employment rate (female, senior) in the EU (in %)*

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

SE DK UK EE FI PT CY IE LV LT NL CZ EU-

15

DE ES EU-

25

EL EA FX RO BG NMS- MT HU IT LU BE SI AT SK PL

10

Female employment Employment 55-64

Source: Eurostat.

* Calculated with respect to the three best performing countries.

61. Employment in Europe 2006, European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.

86

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Table 4.8 Main employment results from the demographic projections, in thousands

I II III IV V VI VII

Estimated employment

in 2050 for

20-64 year-olds

(1)

Decline in

comparison with

2010 (2)

Increase in

female employment

rate (3)

Increase in ER

(4)

Decrease in UR

(5)

Increase in ER

for 55-64 yearolds

(6)

Increase of

25% in ER

for 65-69

year-olds (7)

EU-25 157 828 33 963 15 281 21 090 6 562 11 858 1 434

EU-15 136 669 25 979 12 193 15 561 4 394 9 171 1 176

NMS-10 21 558 7 726 3 001 5 131 1 986 2 800 258

EURO 104 612 23 930 11 177 14 685 4 007 8 639 936

BE 3 755 404 436 632 128 417 31

BG 1 557 1 299 213 428 110 222 21

CZ 3 250 1 355 266 303 108 238 32

DK 2 295 218 - 5 - 29 21 10 14

DE 26 780 7 749 1 924 3 049 1 264 1 982 240

EE 436 142 18 37 21 15 4

IE 2 058 - 173 169 148 - 1 79 17

EL 3 459 1 010 635 683 173 299 37

ES 13 623 4 696 2 197 2 389 716 1 035 140

FR 23 242 1 674 1 697 2 646 1 087 1 833 183

IT 16 006 5 848 3 116 3 939 452 2 009 164

CY 408 - 39 23 9 114 17 4

LV 708 262 40 75 39 38 7

LT 1 092 334 62 121 71 65 11

LU 242 - 44 29 32 1 23 2

HU 2 949 929 413 690 39 363 28

MT 164 - 9 54 53 3 21 2

NL 7 168 458 270 166 2 347 47

AT 3 068 517 191 253 6 355 26

PL 10 246 3 865 1 910 3 457 1 494 1 779 144

PT 3 657 1 105 164 203 72 138 34

RO 5 820 2 871 692 1 204 182 630 66

SI 691 227 35 61 11 81 7

SK 1 611 632 201 327 217 254 19

FI 1 978 327 40 121 84 71 16

SE 4 261 - 105 - 71 - 42 72 - 94 28

UK 25 849 1 501 774 598 32 468 198

Notes: (I) Employment in 2050 is estimated as the current employment rate multiplied by the expected population of 20-64-year-olds

based on Eurostat's 'central variant' scenario.

(II) Difference between the estimated number of jobs in 2010 and in 2050.

(III) – (VI) For each case, estimated number of jobs gained if the corresponding rate reaches the current average level of the 3 best-performing

EU-25 countries.

(VII) Estimated number of jobs gained if the employment rate for 65-69-year-olds is increased by 25% in each country.

ER = employment rate; UR = unemployment rate.

Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat population projections and Labour Force Survey data.

The high prevalence of part-time work amongst women

also represents an untapped potential for raising the number

of hours worked in Europe.

4.3.2. Unlocking the potential for increased employment

Raising levels of educational attainment is one of the keys

to unlocking the potential for increased employment in

Europe 62 . Skill levels are significantly related to employment

rates, with employment generally being higher the

62. The revised Employment Guidelines adopted by the European Council in their decision of 12th July 2005 (2005/600/EC) specifically cover this

area: Guideline 23, which calls for expanding and improving investment in human capital through specified measures including lifelong learning

strategies, and Guideline 24, which calls on Member States to adapt education and training systems in response to new competence requirements.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 4.9 Employment (ER), unemployment (UR) and activity rates (AR) by education levels in 2005

(age group 15-64, in %)

Total, irrespective High education Medium education Low education

of education level level level level

ER UR AR ER UR AR ER UR AR ER UR AR

BE 61.0 8.1 66.4 83.6 3.8 86.9 66.0 8.2 71.9 40.0 13.7 46.3

CZ 64.7 7.8 70.2 85.0 2.1 86.8 72.0 7.1 77.4 21.3 27.3 29.3

DK 75.5 4.9 79.4 85.7 3.6 88.9 78.3 4.8 82.3 58.3 7.1 62.8

DE 65.3 11.4 73.7 82.7 5.8 87.8 69.2 11.5 78.2 42.1 19.0 52.0

EE 64.9 8.3 70.8 82.6 3.2 85.3 69.9 10.1 77.7 28.3 15.2 33.3

EL 60.3 9.8 66.8 81.4 7.7 88.2 61.0 11.5 68.9 50.5 9.0 55.4

ES 63.2 9.4 69.7 80.4 6.6 86.1 66.0 9.1 72.6 55.3 11.4 62.5

FR 62.8 9.3 69.3 76.9 6.6 82.3 68.7 8.2 74.9 47.2 13.6 54.6

IE 67.1 4.3 70.2 85.7 2.3 87.8 72.4 3.7 75.2 48.9 7.4 52.7

IT 57.8 7.6 62.5 79.5 6.0 84.6 67.6 6.6 72.4 45.8 9.2 50.4

CY 68.7 5.5 72.6 85.9 4.0 89.5 73.1 5.5 77.4 52.2 6.9 56.1

LV 63.0 9.2 69.4 85.6 3.9 89.1 68.9 8.9 75.6 33.1 18.6 40.7

LT 62.6 8.6 68.5 87.5 3.8 91.0 67.6 9.7 74.9 25.1 16.0 29.9

LU 63.6 4.5 66.6 82.5 3.5 85.5 63.0 4.2 65.8 50.5 6.2 53.8

HU 56.8 7.1 61.2 82.6 2.5 84.8 64.9 6.9 69.7 28.1 14.2 32.7

MT 53.6 7.9 58.2 82.7 2.7 84.9 76.0 3.7 78.9 44.5 10.6 49.8

NL 73.2 4.8 76.9 85.6 2.9 88.2 77.5 4.3 81.0 58.2 7.7 63.0

AT 67.6 5.3 71.3 83.6 3.1 86.4 72.5 4.5 76.0 45.1 10.4 50.3

PL 52.2 18.3 63.9 81.1 6.8 87.0 56.4 19.4 70.0 22.9 30.1 32.7

PT 67.6 7.7 73.2 87.5 4.4 91.5 63.5 7.5 68.7 65.5 8.3 71.5

SI 66.0 5.9 70.1 86.5 3.1 89.2 70.7 6.0 75.2 40.7 9.1 44.7

SK 57.4 16.3 68.6 83.4 5.2 88.0 66.6 14.4 77.8 13.1 53.1 28.0

FI 69.2 9.7 76.6 84.1 4.6 88.1 72.8 9.5 80.5 47.0 18.5 57.7

SE 72.6 8.8 79.6 86.0 4.7 90.2 78.7 7.8 85.3 52.0 17.1 62.8

UK 71.5 4.6 74.9 87.4 2.5 89.7 76.1 4.8 80.0 49.2 9.2 54.1

EU-25

Total 63.6 9.1 70.0 82.5 5.0 86.9 68.7 9.3 75.8 46.4 12.9 53.2

Men 71.1 8.5 77.7 85.9 4.6 90.1 75.1 8.7 82.3 56.8 11.7 64.4

Women 56.2 9.9 62.4 79.1 5.5 83.7 62.2 10.0 69.1 36.3 14.5 42.5

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey, spring results.

greater the educational attainment level. In 2005 the average

employment rate was 82.5% among the high-skilled

in the EU and 68.7% for the medium-skilled (those having

completed upper secondary education), whereas for the

low-skilled it was only 46.4% 63 (see Table 4.9).

Fortunately, the level of educational attainment among the

EU-25 working age population continues to rise, contributing

to a more employable and adaptable workforce and

in turn to increased employment and participation rates.

In 2005, the high-skilled (i.e. those having completed tertiary

education) represented close to 20% of the working

age population, while the low-skilled (those with only

lower secondary education or below) represented just

under 33% 64 . This compares with shares of 17.6% and

36.2% respectively in 2000 and reflects the ongoing

improvements in the level of human capital in the EU. This

has mainly been the result of improvements in the skill

composition of the female working age population, where

the high-skilled share has increased 3 percentage points

and that of the low-skilled fallen by 4.3 percentage points,

compared to changes of 1.7 and -2.5 percentage points

respectively for men. However, present levels of education

still show that there is great potential for increasing

employment by raising these levels even more.

Women have accounted for the greatest growth in

employment in recent years 65 , both in relative and absolute

terms. Indeed, the overall increase in female employment

has been more than twice that for men. This reflects

63. Employment in Europe 2006, European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

88

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

the recent trend of rising labour market participation for

women, among whom activity rates increased from 60%

to 62.5% between 2000 and 2005 against an increase

in the male rate of only 0.4 percentage points.

In many Member States, however, especially those in the

north of Europe, a disproportionate number of women

who combine employment with having children work in

part-time jobs. In 2005, almost 40% of women with children,

whether under 6 or older, worked part-time (i.e. for

less than 30 hours a week), while around 10% worked

under 15 hours a week 66 (see Figure 4.7). Both figures are

around twice the rates for women without children. Such

jobs not only yield less income than full-time ones but are

often inferior in terms of their status and the responsibilities

they involve, aspects which equally need to be taken

into account when assessing the opportunity cost to

women of having children.

Figure 4.7 Average hours worked per week by women and men (aged 20-49) with or

without children (aged 0-6) in EU Member States, 2004

0 children one or more children

50

45

Women

40

Hours

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

50

45

EU-

25

BE CZ DE EE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI UK

Men

40

35

30

Hours

25

20

15

10

5

0

EU- BE CZ DE EE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI UK

Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey, 2004.

Note: Data are not available for DK, IE and SE.

66. 'Is the pressure on parents of young children too heavy' Policy brief prepared for the European Commission's Directorate-General for Employment,

Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities by the Social Situation Observatory, Social Inclusion and Income Distribution Network.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Having children has a more pronounced effect on the

employment of women with low education (no qualifications

beyond compulsory schooling) than those with

higher levels. In the EU-25 as a whole in 2004, the proportion

in employment of women aged 25-49 with low

education and children under 6 was 20 percentage

points lower than for women with the same level of education

without children, which averaged just under 40%.

For women with children aged 6-11, the proportion was

over 7 percentage points lower. By contrast, for women

with tertiary education, the difference in employment rates

between those with children under 6 and those without

young children was 12 percentage points and for those

with children aged 6-11 less than 2 percentage points.

Prolonging working lives by promoting the postponement

of retirement is another key to unlocking the potential for

increased employment. Pension reforms in the majority of

Member States are already raising the labour market exit

age, but much can still be achieved in this area.

The statutory retirement age in most Member States is currently

65. In France, however, the statutory retirement age

is 60 and in several other countries including Belgium,

Italy, Austria and the United Kingdom, there is a separate

lower age for women. The average exit age in 2005 for

the EU-25 was estimated to be 60.4 years (see Figure

4.8). Employment amongst 55-64-year-olds increased by

almost a quarter in the period 2000 to 2005 67 , indicating

that pension reforms and other incentives put in place by

Member States are having a clear effect.

Achieving longer working lives also involves addressing

the causes of early retirement. Data available on the reasons

given for their inactivity by 55-64-year-olds indicate

that many individuals were already retired. However, as

the figures in Table 4.10 show, many were inactive due to

disability or the onset of illness. According to this table,

the differences across countries are striking and to a great

degree probably reflect different institutional arrangements

rather than differences in health status.

Figure 4.8 Healthy life expectancy, life expectancy and average exit age from

the labour market in the EU-15, 2003

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Males

Females

Life expectancy

Healthy life expectancy

Average exit age

Source: Eurostat.

67. Employment in Europe 2006, European Commission.

90

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Table 4.10 Percentage of population and causes of inactivity for inactive persons aged 50-64, 2005 (in %)

Percentage of inactive individuals

Ageing and Personal/ Retirement Illness/ Believe job Other Inactive

the labour family disability not available reasons as % of total

market reasons population

BE 21 45 12 6 15 52

CZ 1 71 24 1 3 38

DK 4 50 41 : 3 29

DE 13 56 11 4 15 36

EE : 52 33 9 : 32

EL 21 39 7 1 32 47

ES 39 18 23 4 15 45

FR : 45 0 0 54 44

IE : 1 1 : 96 39

IT 9 43 7 6 35 55

CY 59 20 17 : 3 38

LV 7 57 20 8 6 35

LT 3 52 33 6 4 36

LU 43 41 14 0 1 51

HU 3 67 22 4 4 51

MT 46 27 11 : 13 58

NL 9 39 32 3 17 40

AT 16 70 6 1 6 51

PL 6 41 36 6 11 54

PT 21 47 16 : 16 37

SI 9 61 23 3 4 50

SK 1 72 23 1 2 44

FI 3 33 44 5 14 33

SE 2 25 60 2 11 23

UK 5 38 16 0 40 34

EU-25 11 44 16 3 25 43

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey.

Note: Other reasons include education and volunteer work.

The fact remains however, that Europeans are living longer

in good health than ever before in history (see Figure

4.9). The increase in healthy life expectancy signals the

potential for greater labour market participation amongst

those members of society who are currently retiring well

before statutory retirement age.

4.4. A more productive and dynamic Europe

The third response to the demographic challenge identified

by the Communication on the demographic future of

Europe is the improvement of productivity. Once the population

of working age has started declining and no further

improvements in employment rates can be expected,

Europe's economic growth will depend on rising productivity

alone. This has to be boosted by structural reforms to

allow the less productive countries to catch up with the

more advanced countries. Reforms will foster the development

and uptake of new technologies as well as structural

change in response to a changing environment. One driving

factor behind this structural change will be the rising

demand of older people for goods and services that are

well-adapted to their specific needs. This 'silver economy'

will create new business opportunities and markets.

4.4.1. The potential to raise productivity

The decline in the working age population of the EU as a

whole is already expected to start in 2010, but further

increases in employment rates could ensure further

employment growth up to 2017. Thereafter, economic

growth and improvements in living standards will become

dependent on increases in productivity. In fact, labour productivity

gains already account for two-thirds of the average

economic growth recorded in the EU-25 between

2000 and 2005.

The most obvious indication of the scope for productivity

growth is the productivity gap between the highest performing

countries and the rest. Table 4.11 presents producti-

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

vity per hour in 2004 relative to the EU-15 average.

Leaving aside Luxembourg, the EU Member States with

the highest productivity per hour worked are Belgium,

Ireland and the Netherlands, all exceeding the EU-15 average

by about 20% (nearly 30% in the case of Belgium).

Productivity in the US is close to the level of the EU productivity

leaders. Catching up with the productivity leaders

represents a considerable potential for accelerated

growth in most Member States, in particular those that

have joined the EU since 2004.

Figure 4.9 Life expectancy in good health in 2003

FI

HU

NL

DK

UK

PT

SE

FR

DE

IE

GR

BE

CY

AT

ES

IT

40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80

Females

Males

Source: Eurostat.

Note: Provisional value for PT, all others estimated with the exception of CY.

Even the productivity leaders can accelerate their growth

by further raising general education levels, removing obstacles

to innovation and structural change, and boosting

research and development leading to new products and

more efficient production processes. However, the potential

to move the production frontier is harder to quantify

than the catch-up potentials.

4.4.2. Unlocking the potential for productivity growth

Labour productivity depends to a large extent on previous

investment in human capital. Table 4.12 shows that in

2005 around 15% of all young people in the EU-25, 6 million

persons aged 18 to 24, came under the category of

early school-leavers 68 . The Lisbon target agreed to by the

Member States for this category is to reduce early schoolleaving

to below 10%. The proportion of early school-leavers

was particularly high among men and in some

Member States more than one third of young men had

dropped out of school. These early school-leavers will have

poor employment prospects, their risk of being unemployed

will be much higher than average and if they do find work,

it will tend to be low-productivity and low-quality jobs.

Another important indicator of educational attainment is

the upper-secondary education completion rate among

20-24-year-olds. Upper secondary education is the phase

when the majority of young people prepare for transition

into the labour market. This rate has stagnated at around

77% since 2000 (74% for men, 79% for women), as

against the Lisbon target agreed by the Member States of

at least 85%. Table 4.13 shows that in 2005 only five

Member States had reached this target for men. Among

22-year-olds, a larger share of women had completed

upper secondary education than men. This is reflected not

only in the EU average but also in the figures for almost

every single Member State. The young cohorts are on average

achieving a higher level of educational than earlier

68. Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training.

92

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Table 4.11 Productivity per hour relative

to the EU-15 average

1995 2000 2004

EU-15 100.0 100.0 100.0

EA 105.6 104.3 101.6

EA13 : 102.5 101.4

EA12 103.9 102.8 101.6

BE 131.3 e 126.4 e 131.4 e

CZ 44.2 e 45.3 52.1

DK 105.1 104.8 101.1

DE 109.0 106.6 109.7

EE : 34.0 41.1

IE 96.9 e 112.0 e 120.3 e

EL 60.6 64.9 71.6

ES 93.7 87.5 88.5

FR 116.1 119.1 117.4 f

IT 103.3 100.5 91.0 f

LV : 30.6 e 35.4 e

LT 29.9 e 34.4 43.8

LU 145.4 e 150.7 e 157.7 e

MT : 76.6 e 71.5 e

NL 113.7 e 115.7 e 118.6

AT 100.0 100.1 99.1

PL : 41.4 e 45.6 e

PT 60.2 e 66.0 e 59.5 f

SI : 61.0 e 67.9 e

SK 38.7 e 46.7 56.0

FI 93.7 98.3 95.3

SE 99.3 101.8 101.9

UK 90.0 e 94.3 e 99.7 e

US 109.5 111.4 115.3

JP 76.4 e 77.2 e 80.8 f

Source: Eurostat.

Note: (e) = estimated value, (f) = forecast.

Table 4.12 Early school-leavers in %,

2005

Women

Men

BE 11 15

CZ 7 6

DK 8 9

DE 14 14

EE 11 17

EL 9 18

ES 25 36

FR 11 15

IE 10 15

IT 18 26

CY 11 27

LV 8 16

LT 6 12

LU 10 17

HU 11 14

MT 39 43

NL 11 16

AT 9 9

PL 4 7

PT 30 47

SI 3 6

SK 6 6

FI 7 11

SE 8 9

UK 13 15

EU-25 13 17

Source: Eurostat.

cohorts. The share of the total population having completed

secondary education in Member States ranges from

26% up to 90% and is generally lower than that of

women and men aged 22.

A good initial education provides the basis for lifelong

learning which is vital for keeping skills up-to-date and

remaining employable. Lifelong learning can be measured

by looking at participation in training of people aged

25-64. For this group the Lisbon target agreed to by the

Member States is 12.5%. Table 4.14 shows that in southern

European countries and in most new Member States

the likelihood of having recently participated in training is

lowest and often hardly exceeds half the EU-15 average.

Generally, older workers tend to be less likely to participate

in training in all Member States 69 .

As regards the gender dimension, in most countries

women participated more in lifelong learning than men,

independently of their educational attainment levels.

Persons with higher initial educational attainment levels

and younger generations also do more training: highly

educated people participate seven times more in lifelong

learning those with a low level of education, while participation

decreases after the age of 34.

In order to compete successfully in the knowledge economy,

tertiary education is becoming increasingly important.

The development of new technologies and their transformation

into new products and services and better production

methods requires highly skilled graduates. Yet, at

present the EU invests approximately 1.2% of GDP in tertiary

education compared to nearly 2.9% in the US.

A lack of top-level graduates may limit the scope for raising

the overall level of investment in research and development.

But inadequate funding of research may also

lead to a brain drain with many highly qualified resear-

69. A more extensive discussion on education can be found in the Commission paper ‘Progress towards the Lisbon Objectives in Education and

Training’, http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/progressreport06.pdf.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

chers moving to centres of excellence elsewhere. Figure

4.10 shows that there are large differences between the

Member States in the amount of money spent on R&D.

Sweden and Finland are the two best ranked countries with

around 3.5% of GDP. The EU average is below 2% while

R&D spending in the US represents close to 2.7% of GDP.

4.4.3. Ageing consumers and the 'silver economy'

Europe, together with Japan, will be the first region in the

world to experience rapid population ageing. This will

result in major shifts in demand patterns towards goods

and services adapted to the needs of the elderly. Europe

has the opportunity to become a world leader in these

new markets for older consumers.

The size of these new markets will depend on the number

of older consumers and on their purchasing power, which

is more difficult to assess. According to the AARP (the

American Association of Older People), consumers over

the age of 45 were already responsible for more than half

(52%) of total consumer spending in the United States in

2001, up from 47% in 1984. Between 1984 and 2001,

the total average annual expenditure of older consumers

in the US increased at a greater rate (+ 8%) than that for

all consumers (+ 6%), largely reflecting the ageing of the

baby boomers. Given that the average retirement incomes

of many pensioners in the EU are comparable or even better

than those in the US, thanks to higher replacement

rates, a similar rise in the purchasing power of older persons

as a group can be expected in the EU 70 .

Table 4.13 Educational attainment in 2005

(% completing secondary education)*

Women Men Total population

aged 20-24

BE 85 76 66

CZ 90 91 90

DK 78 75 81

DE 72 70 83

EE 87 75 89

EL 89 79 60

ES 68 55 48

FR 84 81 66

IE 89 83 65

IT 78 68 50

CY 89 72 65

LV 87 77 84

LT 90 81 87

LU 76 67 66

HU 85 81 76

MT 52 45 26

NL 79 71 72

AT 88 84 80

PL 92 88 85

PT 57 40 26

SI 94 88 81

SK 92 91 88

FI 87 83 79

SE 89 87 83

UK 77 78 71

EU-25 80 74 69

* Percentage of those aged 20-24 and total population who

have successfully completed at least upper-secondary education

(ICED3).

Source: Eurostat.

Table 4.14 Life Long Learning: % of workers between

25-64 having participated in some form of training

during the last 4 weeks

2005 Total Men Women

EU-27 9.7 8.9 10.4

EU-25 10.2 9.4 11

EU-15 11.2 10.4 12.1

EU-10 5.3 4.6 6

EU-12 10.5 9.8 11.3

BE 8.3 8.2 8.5

BG 1.3 1.3 1.2

CZ 5.6 5.2 5.9

DK 27.4 23.6 31.2

DE 7.7 8 7.4

EE 5.9 4.3 7.3

IE 7.4 6.2 8.6

EL 1.9 1.9 1.8

ES 10.5 9.7 11.4

FR 7.1 6.9 7.2

IT 5.8 5.4 6.2

CY 5.9 5.4 6.3

LV 7.9 5 10.6

LT 6 4.2 7.7

LU 8.5 8.5 8.5

HU 3.9 3.2 4.6

MT 5.3 6.1 4.5

NL 15.9 15.6 16.1

AT 12.9 12.3 13.5

PL 4.9 4.3 5.4

PT 4.1 4 4.2

RO 1.6 1.5 1.6

SI 15.3 13.6 17.2

SK 4.6 4.3 5

FI 22.5 19 26.1

SE 32.1 27.9 36.5

UK 27.5 23 32

Source: Eurostat New Cronos.

70. Gaberlavage, G., 'Beyond 50.04: A Report to the Nation on Consumers in the Marketplace', Research Report, AARP Public Policy Institute,

May 2004.

94

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Figure 4.10 R&D Intensity (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as % of GDP)

Situation 2005 (1) Target 2010 (2)

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

SE FI DE DK AT FR BE NL UK LU SI CZ IE ES IT EE HU PT LT PL EL LV MT SL CY

EU-25

Notes:

(1) EL: 2003; BE, IT, MT, NL, SI, UK: 2004.

(2) PL: 2008; IE: 2013; UK: 2014.

(3) IE: The target is 2.50% of GNP in 2013.

(4) EU-25: The EU-25 R&D intensity for 2005 was estimated by DG Research.

EU-25: The EU-25 R&D intensity for 2010 results from the aggregation of the targets set by the Member States (including

estimated targets for IE, PL and the UK).

(5) Member States have been ranked according to the current level of R&D intensity from left to right.

Taken from the annex to the 2006 Annual Lisbon Progress Report: Macro-economic, micro-economic and employment

issues, European Commission.

In a recent study, the Deutsches Institut for Wirtschaft

(DIW) has confirmed the increasing importance of the

older generation for the economy. Persons over 60 are

already responsible for almost one third of total private

consumption in Germany. This share is expected to

increase on purely demographic grounds to more than

40% in 2050. Total consumer spending in Germany is

expected to decrease 6% by 2050 compared to 2003.

This decrease is likely to affect all age categories except

persons older than 75. Demographic ageing will lead to a

reduction in consumer spending on all goods and services

except for health and long-term care. Ageing has already

started to influence consumer spending in Germany. Over

the last 10 years, persons over 75 have almost doubled

their consumer spending from 43 to 80 billion.

The DIW 71 study predicts that the growing size of this age

group will lead to another doubling of their spending to

¤168 billion by 2050.

The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs has recently published

a report on the future income situation of older Dutch citizens

72 . Figure 4.11 shows the average disposable income

for 60 000 households in 2006 according to age.

Disposable income peaks at the age of 40. Thereafter it

starts to decline as a result of decreasing labour force participation

and stagnating career profiles. At the official

retirement age of 65 there is a slight increase. Pension

income at the age of 80 is lower than at the age of 65,

as there were in the past fewer opportunities to accumulate

a second-pillar pension.

71. Buslei, H., E. Schulz and V. Steiner, Auswirkungen des demographischen Wandels auf die private Nachfrage nach Gütern und Dienstleistungen in

Deutschland bis 2050, DIW Berlin, 2006, commissioned by the 'Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend'.

72. 'Future income of older people', Working document, Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, 2006, in Dutch see

http://docs.szw.nl/pdf/129/2006/129_2006_3_10147.pdf.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 4.11 Disposable household income according to age, 2006

35000

Disposable household income

Standardized income

30000

25000

Disposable income

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90

Source: Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 2006, MICROS.

Figure 4.11 also displays equivalised income (correcting

for differences in household composition). Equivalised

income remains almost flat from the mid-20s to 80 years

of age. The report thus concludes that older people enjoy

income levels that are similar to those of people between

30 and 64 years of age. However, it should be noted that

the relative income situation of older people in the

Netherlands is very good compared to that of some other

Member States.

The information on income gives an incomplete picture of

purchasing power. Wealth tends to be concentrated in the

hands of older people, notably in the form of home

ownership, which, for many households, represents their

most important private asset, with the possible exception

of private pension entitlements. Financial instruments such

as reverse mortgages may allow older people to use housing

wealth for consumption purposes, which could boost

the purchasing power of the elderly.

The combination of good supply conditions (high levels of

education, R&D, responsive and flexible markets) and the

growing purchasing power of older consumers offers a

huge new potential for economic growth, sometimes referred

to as the 'silver economy'. There is no precise definition

of this concept, so there are no statistics measuring

the progress towards the 'silver economy'. This is not a

single new sector of the economy, but rather a wide range

of age-related products and services in many existing sectors,

including information and communication technologies,

financial services, housing, transport, energy, tourism,

culture, infrastructures, and local services as well as

long-term care.

BOX 4.3

European network to promote

the 'silver economy'

An interesting illustration of what may be possible

under the heading of the Silver Economy is provided

by the SEN@R network 73 . This network brings together

12 EU regions, representing 6 countries and 53

million inhabitants, with the aim to develop new

ageing-related goods and services opportunities.

Within the network, special interest groups have been

set up around themes such as financial services, culture

and tourism, health and life style, and independent

living. In 2006 the network held a second large

Silver Economy conference in Kerkrade (NL), at which

many interesting examples were presented 74 .

73. www.silvereconomy-europe.org.

74. www.silvereconomy2006.nl.

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

The European Central Bank has recently presented an overview

of the consequences of ageing in the banking sector 75 .

Banks may face a decrease in business as a result of lower

interest income and a declining demand for traditional services

such as personal credit and mortgages. On the other

hand, they could increase their business in other areas by

offering new products tailored to senior customers (e.g.

reverse mortgages), thus compensating for the decreasing

demand for credit and mortgages among younger customers.

There will also be a growing demand for asset management

and advisory services. Banks will also have to adjust

to new risks (i.e. longevity risk) which are linked to some of

the new products such as annuities. Furthermore, the traditional

boundaries between banks, insurance companies and

investment companies are likely to become blurred.

Older people also represent an important demand factor

as the main consumers of health and long-term care services.

The increased demand for these services is going to

create many new jobs. At the same time, available public

resources have to be used in a rational way to ensure

financial sustainability. One way to limit the need for

expensive institutional care is to enable older people to

remain in their homes as long as possible. Information

and Communication Technologies (ICT) in combination

with both formal and informal care may make this feasible

for much larger groups of older people than is currently

the case. Even many frail elderly people suffering

from chronic diseases could, thanks to the right technologies,

continue to live independently.

BOX 4.4 Products and services for independent living based on new technologies 76

Older people are more likely to suffer from functional

limitations in areas such as mobility, vision, hearing

and in some aspects of cognitive performance.

Specifically designed ICT-based assistive technologies

can be of great benefit. In particular, the design-for-all

approach appears very promising for the development

of new products. There are three domains where ICT

applications may particularly benefit older persons with

limitations.

- In the assistive technology domain, ICT-based products

are designed to compensate for motor, sensory and

cognitive difficulties frequently experienced by older

adults. For instance, speech technology has been

deployed in assistive technology applications during

recent years. Portable devices have been developed to

detect lost objects like a key, to support people with

light to moderate memory loss. Also personalised route

guidance systems for travelling or use at home have

been developed for elderly persons with impaired

mobility. In the longer run, more powerful devices are

expected, including robots designed to support dependent

people in carrying out a variety of tasks such as

navigating and manipulating every day objects without

any human support.

In the assistive technology domain more than 20 000

products (not all involving an ICT component) have

become available during the last decade.

Unfortunately, most are produced in small series and

therefore at a very high price. There is also much latent

demand in that people in need of an assistive technology

are not aware that a product is on the market.

- In the smart home domain, support for the independence

of older people can be provided by adding ‘intelligence

networks’ to the immediate home environment.

ICT is used to integrate various home appliances, devices

and services to enable residents to control and monitor

their living space from any location within the home. This

may encompass relatively simple home automation functions,

such as turning lights on and off, smoke alarms or

access control; it can also involve of fully automated electrical

systems. Despite a considerable research effort to

exploit smart home technology, actual take-up is still largely

confined to experimental settings and demonstrators.

The lack of technical standards inhibits the creation

of the right conditions for a mass market for smart home

applications. However, recent activities in the consumer

electronics industry may lead to the emergence of a commercial

value chain along which home networking products

and services may soon flow to the consumer.

- In the tele-care/tele-medicine domain, the focus is on

applications utilizing ICT to enable the remote provision

of support by parties that usually interact with older people

in a care-related context. Applications include for instance

alarm systems addressing security-related needs,

e.g. getting help in an emergency, and the remote monitoring

of vital data for medical purposes. Psycho-social

needs can also be catered for with the help of video-telephony

to provide social support and reassurance.

75. Maddoni, A. and others, 'Macro economic implications of demographic developments in the Euro area', ECB occasional paper series, No 51,

August 2006.

76. Impacts of New Technologies and Information Society, 'Walter' demographic impact study by Empirica and the Work Research Centre, 2005 available

at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_situation/studies_en.htm.

See also the Joint Research Plan on the basis of Article 169 of the Treaty on Ambient Assisted Living.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Some alarm systems are location-independent, allowing

users to initiate an alarm whenever and wherever

they need to. Alarm systems are by now the most

widely used Independent Living Technology application,

although actual take-up varies considerably across

countries. In the EU-15 Member States, on average

some 4% of the 50+ population have such alarms.

While 'active' alarm systems require the client to actively

call for help when an emergency arises, 'passive'

systems are triggered by the absence of a particular

event. The simplest passive alarm system consists of

monitoring agreed regular telephone calls made by the

individual to a service centre and triggering an alarm

if a call is not made. More recent passive alarm systems

have been automated and often combined with the

monitoring of particular health parameters such as

blood pressure or temperature.

Market potentials will dramatically rise due to demographic

development, particularly among the very old.

For instance, the potential demand for tele-care applications

capable of addressing the needs of people

being treated for heart diseases is likely to nearly triple

between 2005 and 2050, from 4 million to 11 million.

The Independent Living Technology (ILT) domain has not

yet matured; only few applications such as community

alarms and assistive technology devices are widely

available today. Many ILT implementations still exist

only in experimental settings.

In conclusion it can be stated that only a minority of

older people are currently benefiting from ILT applications

that have a high potential utility for them. Market

forces alone will not ensure that ICT developments in

response to demographic ageing will be optimal for

older people and for European society as a whole.

Public policy will be required to help shape developments

in the ways needed to exploit the positive potential

and reduce the likelihood of negative impacts.

Policy simulation of the effect on fertility

16.0

14.0

13.5

12.0

10.0

8.0

7.4

6.0

4.0

2.0

4.8

3.7

1.9

1.0

2.5

1.8

3.8

5.8

5.6

2.7

0.3

2.2

5.5

4.4

0.0

BE DK DE IE EL ES FR IT LU NL AT PT FI SE UK EU-15

Source: Empirica – WRC 2005.

4.4.4. Conclusion

There is considerable scope for productivity growth in the

EU, both in catching up with the productivity leaders and

by investing in human capital as well as research and in

development, thereby boosting Europe's innovation potential

and capacity to adapt to a changing economic environment.

Older people, in particular the retired have still

very low levels of ICT skills and a below-average use of

the internet 77 . This will also strengthen the ability of

European businesses and workers to seize the new economic

opportunities arising from the 'silver economy', i.e.

new goods and services responding to the needs of an

ageing population 78 .

77. See also the Commission's second annual progress report on the Information Society (IP/07/453),

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/annual_report/index_en.htm

and the forthcoming communication on ICT and Ageing Well in the Information Society.

78. There is also a supply side aspect to ageing as social services may also benefit from a larger proportion of elderly due to their involvement in

volunteer activities. See http://www.iccr-international.org/activage.

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Figure 4.12 Net migration 1980-2005

2 500

USA

EU-27

2 000

1 500

1 000

500

0

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

- 500

Source: Eurostat, OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics.

Notes: Net migration is measured as the difference between the total population on 1 January and 31 December for a

given calendar year, minus the difference between births and deaths (or natural increase). The figures reflect large-scale

regularisations in some Member States.

4.5. Receiving and integrating immigrants

in Europe

The Communication on the demographic future of Europe

emphasised the importance of continued immigration.

This will be necessary to meet the needs of the European

labour market, both for qualified and unskilled labour.

Europe's prosperity and political stability, along with the

dynamic population growth in neighbouring countries,

will ensure that immigration can at least partly offset the

decline in Europe's potential labour force due to large

cohorts retiring from the labour market and small young

cohorts entering it. However, the Communication also

stressed the importance of integrating immigrants and respecting

the needs of their countries of origin.

4.5.1. The potential of migration for redressing

labour market imbalances

For more than two centuries, most countries of Europe

have primarily been countries of emigration, but the last

60 years have seen all countries of Western Europe gradually

become destinations for international migrants and

asylum seekers. Today, all western European countries

and several central European Member States of the

European Union have a positive migration balance. Over

recent years, net migration into the enlarged EU appears

to have exceeded migration into other traditional recipient

nations such as the United States of America.

In some Member States, the number of deaths already

exceeds the number of births ('natural population

decrease'), but positive net migration prevents the population

from actually shrinking.

Over the coming years, more and more countries will

experience a natural population decrease, so immigration

might become increasingly important. Table 4.15 compares

the projected decline in the working age population

with the expected cumulative total inflow of migrants. It

also shows the share of the gross fall (i.e. without migration)

likely to be offset by projected numbers of immigrants

(column IV). These are simplified assumptions, but

the calculation gives a rough indication of the contribution

of continued immigration in the years to come.

Around 56 million persons entering the country and finding

jobs would be needed to compensate for the projected

reduction in the population of working age for the EU-

27. Some countries, typically those with the highest projected

fertility rates such as Ireland, would not need additional

labour in order to maintain current job levels. Other

Member States would require quite dramatic numbers of

immigrants (Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland). All in all,

net migration well above the European levels of recent

decades would be necessary to compensate for the

decline in the working age population.

However, migrant inflows have varied dramatically in

recent years across Member States, with countries bordering

the Mediterranean receiving vastly greater influxes of

migrants in absolute terms than other areas of the EU.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Non-EU Projected decline Immigration

immigrants in the population assumed under III/(II + III)

as % of pop. of working age the baseline scenario

2000-2004 2010-2050 2050

I (%) II (thous.) III (thous.) IV

BE 0.35 616.0 921.1 0.60

BG 0.32 2 160.6 - 295.6 - 0.16

CZ 0.32 1 932.6 473.1 0.20

DK 0.40 281.5 281.4 0.50

DE 0.55 11 263.5 7 442.7 0.40

EE 0.08 201.0 19.1 0.09

IE 0.38 - 242.3 431.5 2.28

EL 0.09 1 577.8 1 047.1 0.40

ES 0.98 7 202.0 4 178.7 0.37

FR 0.09 2 433.6 2 347.2 0.49

IT 0.41 9 508.7 4 672.4 0.33

CY 1.00 - 52.6 164.1 1.47

LV 0.04 378.7 28.5 0.07

LT 0.07 483.5 37.6 0.07

LU 0.59 - 64.6 133.9 1.93

HU 0.16 1 495.3 515.2 0.26

MT 0.07 - 16.4 84.9 1.24

NL 0.37 611.6 1 491.7 0.71

AT 0.76 730.1 957.2 0.57

PL : 6 745.1 417.5 0.06

PT 0.12 1 521.6 522.4 0.26

RO 0.02 4 521.7 - 368.3 - 0.09

SI 0.37 322.8 189.0 0.37

SK 0.05 991.5 91.9 0.08

FI 0.15 452.6 198.6 0.31

SE 0.37 - 136.0 961.8 1.16

UK 0.43 2 003.8 4 697.6 0.70

Source: Eurostat population projections.

Table 4.15 Population of working age and migration, 2004-2050

Figure 4.13 Non-EU migration inflows, 5-year averages (%)

1.2

1990

1995 2000

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

LV SK MT LT PT FI HU CZ BE SI SE NL IE DK IT UK DE LU AT ES CY EE EL FR

Source: Eurostat.

Note: Years indicate first year of period. Rates are calculated as the number of non-EU migrants per year divided by total

population.

100

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

Figure 4.14 International migration by category of entry, selected OECD countries, 2004, harmonised data,

% of total inflows

Portugal

Denmark

Switzerland

United Kingdom

Finland

Australia

Italy

Netherlands

New Zealand

Canada

Austria

Japan

Germany

Sweden

France

United States

Norway

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Work Accompanying family of workers Family reunification or formation and accompanying family

Humanitarian and accompagnying family

Other (ancestry-based, pensioners, etc.)

Source: OECD.

Note: OECD harmonised statistics, for details of sources see: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/7/37035672.pdf.

Not only the magnitude but also the nature of migration

flows differs greatly across the EU. Figure 4.14 shows

figures for a number of OECD countries. Illegal migration

has been a major cause for concern in EU countries bordering

the Mediterranean and Spain, Italy and Greece

have all regularised the status of large numbers of illegal

migrants within recent years 79 .

To the extent that employment opportunities are unevenly

distributed across the EU, the internal mobility of workers

in the EU also represents an enormous potential for higher

rates of participation and employment on the labour market.

The full potential of intra-EU mobility is, however, not

yet harnessed, as transitional arrangements still restrict the

mobility of citizens from the Member States that have joined

the EU since 2004 80 .

Table 4.16 shows that currently the percentage of non-EU

nationals in EU-15 Member States is significantly higher

than the percentage of EU-10 nationals. Labour market

data show that employment rates among EU-10 nationals

residing in other EU countries are comparable to the rates

for nationals of those countries and other EU-15 nationals.

Moreover, they are generally higher than for non-EU nationals.

In Ireland, Spain and the UK, EU-10 nationals even

have higher employment rates than local nationals. This

Table 4.16 Resident population by nationality, 2005

National EU-15 EU-10 non-EU

BE 91.3 5.8 0.2 2.8

DK 96.4 1.1 : 2.4

DE 89.5 2.8 0.7 7.0

EL 94.0 0.3 0.4 5.3

ES 90.5 1.2 0.2 8.1

FR 94.4 1.9 0.1 3.6

IE 92.3 3.0 2.0 2.8

LU 57.9 37.6 0.3 4.2

NL 95.7 1.4 0.1 2.8

AT 89.2 1.9 1.4 7.5

PT 97.0 0.4 : 2.6

FI 98.3 0.4 0.3 1.0

SE 94.8 2.3 0.2 2.7

UK 93.8 1.7 0.4 4.1

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, 2005 Q1, Ireland

2005 Q2 for working age population, population statistics

for net migration.

Notes: ':' signifies data not reliable due to small sample

size. Italy is excluded, since it does not disaggregate by

nationality. EU-15 and EU-25 aggregates without Italy. EU-

10 aggregate without Poland.

shows that EU-10 nationals positively contribute to overall

labour market performance, to sustained economic growth

and to the state of public finances in their host countries 81 .

79. The European Council and the European Commission have taken a wide range of initiatives aimed at dealing with the challenges posed by this

issue, see COM(2005) 621, COM(2006) 402 and COM(2006) 735.

80. See COM(2006) 48.

81. Ibid.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 4.17 Contribution of immigration to increased employment, 2000-2005

Country Total change in From indigenous From migrants From employment

employment population rate increase

IE 261 876 34 134 175 102 52 640

ES 3 333 463 -53 196 1 656 768 1 729 891

Source: Eurostat Labour Force survey and population projections.

Note: Migrants and indigenous residents are assumed to have same employment rate in 2005. It is also assumed that the improvement

in the employment rate applies to the 2000 population.

Two Euro-area countries that experienced growth appreciably

above the Euro-area average during the period 1999-

2005, namely Ireland and Spain, illustrate the importance

of migration. Neither of the two countries could have achieved

such strong economic and employment growth without

the massive inflow of foreign workers; estimates of the natural

growth in population and the number of migrants entering

these two countries (see Table 4.17) show that immigration

has made a substantial contribution to the increased

number of employed, although this contribution has been

more modest in the case of Spain than for Ireland. While

Spain has mainly had immigration from outside the EU,

Ireland has benefited strongly from immigration from other

Member States, particularly the EU-10.

4.5.2. Unlocking the potential of migration

The great challenges of international migration for receiving

countries are centred on integration and social cohesion.

The Member States of the EU have evidently had different

degrees of success with labour market and social

integration. Table 4.18 shows that the average educational

attainment of non-nationals is generally substantially

lower than that of nationals. It is noteworthy that in several

countries, thanks to the presence of high-skilled

migrants, the situation is reversed for tertiary education.

Migrants are often, irrespective of their qualifications, pushed

into low-end jobs. As a result, emigration countries

are losing high-skilled workers while in the EU these skills

remain untapped.

Figure 4.15 shows that foreign-born individuals are often

less well integrated into the labour market, although this

differs across countries. Thus, in eight of the EU-25 countries,

employment rates for locally born individuals outstrip

those of both migrants born in the EU, and, to an even

greater degree, of individuals born outside the EU. There

is a dramatic contrast between the two employment gaps

in Poland, although relatively few persons from other EU

countries reside here.

Table 4.18 Distribution of foreign and national population (aged 25 to 64 years) by level of education

(2002-2003)

Less than upper secondary Upper secondary Tertiary level

Foreigners Nationals Foreigners Nationals Foreigners Nationals

BE 52.3 37.8 25.7 33.5 22 28.7

DK 30.7 27.6 41.7 46.7 27.5 25.7

DE 47.1 13.6 38.2 62.4 14.7 24

EL 42.1 46.8 40.9 35.3 17 17.9

ES 43.3 58.3 28.5 17.2 28.2 24.6

FR 63.9 33.5 20.6 42.5 15.5 23.9

IRL 21.3 40.1 28.6 35.4 50.1 24.5

LU 43.8 27.5 38 56.7 18.2 15.8

NL 43.7 31.9 31.5 43.3 24.8 24.9

AT 42.9 19.3 43.4 63.7 13.7 17

PT 55.4 79.1 28.1 11.1 16.6 9.8

FI 29.1 24.8 46 42.4 24.9 32.8

SE 23.7 18 45.4 55.5 30.9 26.5

UK 30.9 17.4 25.5 53.1 43.6 26.2

CZ 25.9 11.7 52.5 76.6 21.5 11.7

HU 20.2 27.4 52.6 58 27.2 14.5

SK 13.2 13.8 67.8 75 19 11.2

Source: OECD/Sopemi, 2005.

Note: For DK and NL 2002 data. 7.4%, 13%, 6% and 43.4% of the foreign population did not respond to the question on education

attainment in Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the UK, respectively.

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BOX 4.5 Migration and Integration – Topics at the European Demographic Forum

The Demographic Forum on in Brussels 30-31 of

October 2006 was marked by keynote speeches that

also touched upon the issue of migration. A strong case

was made for the creation of a quota system designed

to attract highly qualified immigrants with a minimum of

bureaucratic difficulty, giving these migrants access to

all EU Member States (the so-called Blue Card

scheme) 82 . A better mix of both high- and low-skilled

immigrants may exert a positive influence on the public

perception of immigration and may help overcome the

reluctance to welcome further immigration. In addition,

as part of a workshop aimed at presenting examples of

initiatives to meet the challenges of successful migration

and integration, especially at local and national level,

speakers stressed the considerable extent and importance

of migration in Europe and the need for a truly

European response. Other interventions highlighted

examples of policies implemented at national level, of

advocacy on behalf of minorities and of integration programmes

at local level.

Participants were told of the comprehensive initiatives

launched in Portugal for the reception and integration

of migrants under the aegis of that country's High

Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities 83 .

The Portuguese approach is multifaceted, involving

the distribution of information (both for immigrants

and the indigenous population), the consolidation of

the institutions involved in a one-stop-shop philosophy,

evidence gathering, support for advocacy initiatives

and measures to raise public awareness and combat

discrimination.

Figure 4.15 Employment rates 2006 (in %)

Other EU Outside EU Native

80

75

70

65

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

BE CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey.

Note: 2005 data for IE, LU, and IT; data by nationality for DE.

Migrant women face particular problems in the labour

market, often in the form of dual discrimination, i.e. discrimination

on the basis of both their gender and ethnic origin.

The differences in employment rates between natives

and non-natives are remarkably large in some countries.

In some countries that have recently experienced large

inflows of migrants such as Spain and Greece, employment

rates amongst non-EU women are in fact higher than

those for native women, which suggests that these countries

have attracted female workers in particular (e.g. to

work in the hotel and catering sectors as well as caring

for the sick and elderly).

Unsuccessful integration may be the result of unwelcoming

attitudes to immigration and migrants which may in turn

be reinforced by the social problems linked to the poor

82. 'Welcome to Europe', Bruegel Policy Brief No 3, 2006, see http://www.bruegel.org.

83. For more information visit http://www.acime.gov.pt.

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Figure 4.16 Employment rates for women in 2006 (in %)

Native

Non-EU-25

BE

CZ

DK

DE

EE

EL

ES

FR

CY

LU

HU

NL

AT

PL

PT

SI

FI

SE

UK

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey.

integration of migrants. This may make it politically unacceptable

to receive more immigrants. Eurobarometer survey

results indicate that on average only 4 out of 10 EU

citizens feel that immigrants contribute a lot to their country

while a majority of citizens (52%) do not agree with

this statement. However, there are significant differences

between countries. While fully 79% of Swedes have a

positive opinion of the contribution of immigrants to

society, only 12% of Slovaks hold this view.

4.5.3. Conclusion

Europe has much left to do in the areas of managing

migration and integration. There is a need for more highskilled

immigration to complement the influx of low-skilled

labour, for which there is also likely to be much demand.

However, immigration is only helpful if immigrants and

their descendants have equal opportunities for successful

integration within the economy and society of their host

country. Resentful attitudes towards immigration and a

lack of understanding of the character and effects of immigration

could well be the main obstacles to Europe

making full use of this major opportunity to tackle the

demographic challenge.

4.6. Sustainable public finances

The Communication on the demographic future of Europe

stressed that, in most Member States, public finances are

not sustainable under current policies. This lack of sustainability

can be the result of large debt and deficit levels today

or of projected future expenditure trends not matched by

resources available to governments in the form of tax revenues

or accumulated reserves. In the worst cases, already

unsound public finances are compounded by unsustainable

expenditure trends linked to demographic ageing.

Countries in such a situation will not be able to meet the

needs of an ageing population and offer their elderly adequate

pensions and/or health and long-term care.

4.6.1. Potential for tackling the demographic challenge

Long-term fiscal sustainability can be assessed on the basis

of the 'sustainability gap'. This measures the size of the permanent

budgetary adjustment (e.g. a constant reduction in

public expenditure as a share of GDP or a constant increase

in public revenue as a share of GDP) needed for a government

to meet its 'inter-temporal budget constraint', thus ensuring

sustainable public finances 84 . The sustainability gap can

be broken down into two components: the initial budgetary

position which illustrates whether public finances are sustainable

in terms of only the current budgetary position (i.e. the

primary balance and the level of debt), and the long-term

budgetary impact of ageing, i.e. the impact of the projected

change in age-related public expenditure. This decomposition

of the sustainability gap provides estimates of the extent

to which the gap is due to the present (i.e. 2005) structural

position and to the long-run budgetary impact of ageing.

The results are presented in Table 4.19, where a low value

indicates a favourable situation.

84. See European Economy, No 4, 2006, 'The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU'.

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Nine Member States (BE, EL, ES, IE, CY, LU, HU, PT, and

SI ) face a permanent sustainability gap in excess of five

percentage points of GDP due to projected increases in

age-related expenditure. A second group of ten countries

can expect a more limited budgetary impact from ageing

under current policies, with a gap ranging from two to

five percentage points of GDP. A third group of seven

countries face a moderate gap of less than two percentage

points. In three countries the projected decline in

public expenditure would turn the gap positive i.e. projected

revenues would exceed projected expenditure (notably

Poland where the decline is mainly due to a projected

decrease in the benefit ratio).

Sound public finances can be seriously undermined by the

level of interest payments as a percentage of total government

revenue (see Table 4.20). Too high a level of interest

payments due to past mistakes in budget policy is an

additional challenge that needs to be overcome in order

to arrive at long-term sustainability. In the mid-1990s, Italy

used more than a quarter of government revenue to service

its public debt, and Greece one third. Since then,

interest payments have gone down considerably, albeit

not primarily as a result of debt reduction but rather

thanks to the lower interest rates made possible by the

introduction of the Euro. In 2005, Italy and Greece spent

11% and 13%, respectively, of their public revenue on

interest payments. This is still a large amount of money

that would otherwise go a long way towards meeting

future ageing-related needs or could be used for investing

in education, research and development, better support

for families or new infrastructure, thereby laying the foundations

for future growth.

With an overall government deficit of 2.3% of GDP in

2005, the (then) EU-25 Member States had clearly not

been extending their financial room for manoeuvre to prepare

for an ageing society. However, they did run a small

primary budget surplus (i.e. the government balance after

deduction of interest payments), indicating a move

towards consolidation. Total government debt for the EU-

25 rose between 2002 and 2005 by almost three percentage

points of GDP to above the Treaty reference value of

60% of GDP for the EU-25 and nine Member States in

particular, which had to channel at least 5% of their revenue

into interest payments. These Member States face

significant challenges in consolidating their public finances

before the impact of ageing starts to materialise.

Large projected increases in ageing-related spending,

possibly combined with an unfavourable initial budgetary

position, expose a number of Member States to serious

financial risks. Based on indicators such as the sustainability

gap, the Commission has made an overall risk assessment.

Six countries are assessed as a high-risk, ten as a

medium-risk and nine as a low-risk in terms of the future

sustainability of public finances 85 . The high-risk countries

(CZ, EL, CY, HU, PT and SI) are characterised by a very

significant rise in age-related expenditure, indicating a

strong need to curb future spending trends.

Figure 4.17 Citizens who feel that immigrants contribute a lot to their country (in %)

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT HU LU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK

Source: Standard Eurobarometer, fall 2006.

85. 'The short-term sustainability of public finances in the EU', Communication from the Commission, COM (2006) 574.

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Table 4.19 The 'S2' sustainability gap indicator (in % of GDP)

Total Initial budgetary position Long-term budgetary impact of ageing

BE 1.8 - 3.5 5.3

CZ 5.5 0.7 4.8

DK - 2.2 - 6.1 3.9

DE 4.4 1.6 2.8

EE - 3.4 - 1.8 - 1.7

EL 3.0 2.2 0.9

ES 3.2 - 2.7 5.9

FR 4.0 1.4 2.6

IE 2.9 - 3.1 6.0

IT 3.1 1.3 1.8

CY 8.5 0.2 8.3

LV 0.8 - 0.4 1.2

LT 1.8 0.5 1.3

LU 9.5 1.2 8.3

HU 9.8 4.8 5.1

MT - 0.3 - 0.1 - 0.1

NL 1.3 - 3.1 4.4

AT 0.3 - 0.8 1.1

PL - 0.2 2.6 - 2.8

PT 10.5 3.8 6.7

SI 7.3 0.2 7.1

SK 3.0 0.9 2.1

FI - 0.9 - 5.1 4.2

SE - 1.1 - 3.1 2.0

UK 3.5 0.2 3.3

EU-25* 3.4 0.3 3.0

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission.

* The rise in age-related expenditure for Greece is underestimated due to the lack of pension projections. The aggregate EU result excludes

Greece.

The medium-risk countries (BE, DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, MT,

SK and UK) can be split into two groups. On the one

hand, there are countries that can expect significant

ageing costs, but have a strong budgetary position (ES, EI

and LU). These countries have preserved some room for

manoeuvre which could allow them to accommodate to

some extent future ageing-related needs. The second

group of medium-risk countries are characterised by

moderate projected expenditure increases as a result of

reforms that have already been undertaken, but some

budget consolidation nevertheless remains necessary (SK,

IT, DE, FR, UK and MT).

Finally, the low-risk countries (DK, EE, LV, LT, NL AT, PL, FI

and SE) have established both a solid budgetary position

today (running large primary surpluses, reducing debt

and/or accumulating assets) and have curbed future

ageing-related expenditure increases thanks in particular

to reforms of their pension systems.

4.6.2. Unlocking the potential

The analysis of the two components of the sustainability

gap highlights that more than half of the Member States

face a significant challenge to consolidate their public

finances in order to prepare for the impact of demographic

ageing. Clearly, the best time for doing so is over the

next ten years, during which most Member States should

still be able to achieve significant employment growth.

The risk with a rapid consolidation of public finances is of

course that this might reduce a country's future growth

potential, for instance, if spending on education, research

and development or infrastructure (including social services

such as childcare) is curtailed. The key to the successful

exploitation of the window of opportunity is to adjust

both the current and medium-term public finance position

through the mobilisation of the full potential of the baby

boom cohorts and reforms in pension and healthcare systems.

The next ten years will determine to what extent the

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Part 1 – 4. Opportunities for tacking demographic change

considerable economic potential of this large and still

active and healthy age group will be used and hence

contribute to GDP, or whether most of the people in these

cohorts will prematurely become dependent on benefits,

as has been the case until now, due to early labour market

exit. Moreover, there is still some time left to promote

healthy ageing among these cohorts so that the need for

costly health and long-term care can be reduced or at

least postponed.

The report by the Economic Policy Committee and the

European Commission on the impact of ageing on

public expenditure (2004-2050) 86 analyses the effect of

changes in the labour force participation of older workers

and additional productivity growth on future pensions

expenditure (see Table 4.21). The calculations

show that an increase of five percentage points in the

employment rate of older workers would have only a

modest impact on future pension expenditure in terms of

percentage points of GDP (i.e. – 0.2 percentage points

in the EU-10 and – 0.1 percentage points in the EU-15).

This is due to the fact that people working longer will

accrue additional pension rights and thus receive higher

pensions when they retire. In some countries, annual

pension adjustments also take into account the development

in aggregate employment levels, allowing higher

increases in pensions when employment is higher (as is

the case in DE).

Share of total government General Primary General

revenue devoted to government budget government

paying interest on deficit(-)/surplus(+) deficit(-)/surplus(+) gross debt

government debt as % of GDP as % of GDP as % of GDP

1995 2000 2005 2005 2005 2005

BE 18 13 9 - 2.3 1.9 93.2

CZ 3 2 3 - 3.6 - 2.5 30.4

DK 11 7 4 4.9 6.7 35.9

DE 8 7 7 - 3.2 - 0.5 67.9

EE 0 1 1 2.3 2.5 4.5

EL 33 19 13 - 5.2 - 0.4 107.5

ES 14 8 5 1.1 2.9 43.1

FR 7 6 5 - 2.9 - 0.2 66.6

IE 15 6 4 1.1 2.1 27.4

CY : 10 9 - 2.3 1.1 69.2

LV 3 3 2 0.1 0.7 12.1

LT 1 5 3 - 0.5 0.3 18.7

IT 26 14 11 - 4.1 0.5 106.6

LU 1 1 0 - 1.0 - 0.8 6.0

HU : 12 9 - 6.5 - 2.6 57.7

MT : 10 10 - 3.2 0.8 74.2

NL 13 8 5 - 0.3 2.1 52.7

AT 8 8 6 - 1.5 1.3 63.4

PL 13 8 6 - 2.5 0.1 42.0

PT 17 8 7 - 6.0 - 3.3 64.0

SI : 6 4 - 1.4 0.3 28.0

SK 4 8 5 - 3.1 - 1.4 34.5

FI 7 5 3 2.7 4.1 41.3

SE 11 7 3 3.0 4.6 50.4

UK 10 7 5 - 3.3 - 1.1 42.4

EU-12 12 9 7 - 2.4 0.5 :

EU-25 : 8 6 - 2.3 0.4 63.2

Source: European Commission.

Table 4.20 Public finances today

86. The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and

unemployment transfers (2004-2050); Report prepared by the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission, Directorate-General for

Economic and Financial Affairs, published as European Economy Special Report No 1/2006.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Table 4.21 also shows, however, that faster productivity

growth can have a strong impact on future pension expenditure

as a percentage of GDP. This illustrates the importance

of maintaining sufficient public spending on education,

lifelong learning and research and development. The

Financial Services Committee (FSC) has stressed the need

for further monitoring of market innovation and a level

playing field in order to promote the development of a

Single Market for retirement products 87 .

The projections of the Economic Policy Committee for

healthcare spending also illustrate that the increase in

healthcare spending could be limited if the projected

increase in life expectancy were accompanied by an

increase in healthy life years and an improvement in

health status. Ageing is however not the only factor determining

future healthcare expenditure. There are several

non-demographic factors that drive up healthcare expenditure

such as institutional arrangements, health status,

income elasticity of demand, unit cost developments in the

healthcare sector or technological change. The latter can,

on the one hand, reduce unit costs (as existing expensive

treatments are replaced by less costly treatments) and thus

expenditure, but may, on the other hand, yield new and

more expensive treatments and drugs, leading to increasing

expenditure. Many of these factors can be influenced

by changes in public policies resulting in very different

expenditure trends. While improvements in the health status

of elderly citizens could reduce the projected increase

in healthcare expenditure, increased demand or improved

quality of services could offset this impact.

Table 4.21 Changes in gross public pension expenditure increases as a share of GDP between 2004 and 2050

Baseline change, Employment rate of Annual labour productivity

2004-2050 older workers increased growth increased

by 5 percentage points by 0.25 percentage points

Difference relative to the baseline projection

BE 5.1 - 0.3 - 0.4

CZ 5.5 - 0.3 - 0.3

DK 3.3 - 0.3 0.0

DE 1.7 0.0 0.0

EE - 2.5 - 0.4 - 0.2

EL : : :

ES 7.1 - 0.1 - 0.9

FR 2.0 - 0.4 - 0.4

IE 6.4 - 0.1 0.0

IT 0.4 0.2 - 0.5

CY 12.9 : - 1.4

LV - 1.2 0.0 - 0.1

LT 1.8 - 0.3 - 0.3

LU 7.4 : - 0.1

HU 6.7 - 1.1 - 0.4

MT - 0.4 0.0 - 0.7

NL 3.5 - 0.1 - 0.1

AT - 1.2 - 0.4 - 0.8

PL - 5.9 0.0 - 0.4

PT 9.7 - 0.2 - 1.2

SI 7.3 - 0.9 - 0.1

SK 1.8 0.1 - 0.2

FI 3.1 - 0.2 - 0.4

SE 0.6 : - 0.2

UK 2.0 - 0.1 - 0.4

EU-15 2.3 - 0.1 - 0.3

EU-10 0.3 - 0.7 - 0.4

EU-25 2.2 - 0.1 - 0.3

Source: Economic Policy Committee and European Commission.

87. See Doc. 8797/06 EF 9 ECOFIN 140 and FSC 4162/07 REV 1.

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The third main ageing-related public spending category is

long-term care. There is great variation in current public

provision for long-term care in the EU (which ranges today

from 0.1% of GDP in Poland to 3.8% of GDP in SE). The

projected increase in spending is 0.6 percentage points

of GDP for the EU-25. This is based on the assumption of

no policy change, i.e. countries currently relying mainly

on informal care will not develop formal care systems.

However, the projected rapid increase in the number of

very old people and increased female labour force participation

are more than likely to lead to more demand for

formal care. In this sense, the great differences between

Member States in the projected long-term care expenditure

should be interpreted rather as revealing gaps in the

provision of long-term care services than as being realistic

projections for actual expenditure. As in the area of

healthcare, there is scope for influencing future needs

through prevention policies and by making care systems

more cost-efficient, in particular by ensuring that the

elderly can stay longer in their own homes.

4.6.3. Conclusion

The ageing population and in particular the imminent retirement

of the baby boom cohorts will have a determining

influence on the future sustainability of public finances

and hence society's ability to provide adequate pensions,

health and long-term care without jeopardising investment

in future generations. Making the best possible use of the

potential of the window of opportunity, through a mobilisation

of the full potential of the baby boom cohorts by

encouraging them to stay longer on the labour market,

will be the key to ensuring adequate living standards for

the elderly without jeopardising the life chances of younger

generations. In addition, people can be encouraged

to reduce their future need for health and long-term care

by adopting a healthy lifestyle that helps prevent chronic

disease and dependency. And finally, full use should be

made of the scope for making pension, health and longterm

care systems more efficient and putting them on a

sound financial footing.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

5. OVERALL CONCLUSION

This report has highlighted how much potential there

is for tackling the demographic challenge in five key

areas and which obstacles need to be overcome to

unlock this potential. Action in one field alone is unlikely

to be sufficient and a mix of policies will be required.

While this report mainly focuses on mitigating the impact

of the challenge through increasing the overall size of the

workforce, a wide range of other issues are also relevant

to meeting the demographic challenge and seizing opportunities.

For instance one important issue not dealt with in

this report is the impact of demographic change on the

environment. Further analysis is also required of ageing

and the need to improve the European market for longterm

savings products. The effects of migration would also

deserve further analysis. Subsequent reports, to be published

in connection with each future European

Demography Forum, will touch in more detail on these

and other subjects so as to support an informed and constructive

debate both at European level and in the

Member States.

Nevertheless, the very cursory analysis presented above

confirms the confident tone of the Commission regarding

the demographic future of Europe: it is possible to tackle

the demographic challenge provided the window of

opportunity of the next ten years is used. This is a period

during which Europe can still count on the active involvement

of the baby boom cohorts and other factors such as

rising employment amongst women. A spirit of inter-generational

solidarity and the advancement of equal opportunities

will therefore be crucial elements in exploiting this

opportunity.

Each Member State faces different opportunities and will

therefore want to set different priorities according to its

specific circumstances. The country summaries in the

annex to this report contain some key data, both on demographic

trends and on the opportunities for responding to

them. The summaries are not an attempt at cross-country

comparisons but simply aim to provide an accessible

overview for each Member State of the state of play in

relevant areas, as an aid to setting country-specific priorities

in preparing for demographic ageing.

110 Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


ANNEX 1

COUNTRY STATISTICS AND COMMENTS

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

BELGIUM

Belgium

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 9 10 10 11 11 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.7 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 74 77 82 87 88 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 68 70 76 80 82 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 24 19 19 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth : 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 34 36 29 26 25 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 54 50 54 49 47 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 16 16 18 24 22 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 3 4 7 11 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 18 22 26 41 48 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 54/68 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 6 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 41/7 33/7

Childcare availability for children 63/100 :/:

( 0-3 / 3-compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 15/16 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 22/42 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 17 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 3 8

Average exit age from the labour market 59 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 12 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 58/12 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 11/15 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 85/76 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 66 69

Lifelong learning 8.2/8.5 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.9 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 129 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 8 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 62 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 35 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 8 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 34 17

Low education of nationals in % 43 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 56 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 93.3 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 49.3 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 10.4 14.7 15.5 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 6.2 7.1 11.3 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.9 1.3 1.9 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Belgium's fertility rate is slightly above the European average and population

ageing is projected to be less pronounced than in the EU as a

whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

While childcare availability lies above the EU average it could be extended

for very young children. The gender pay gap is one of the lowest in the EU.

Nevertheless, there is scope for women's employment rates to catch up with

men's; moreover a large proportion of women works part-time.

Employment rates of older workers, in particular women, are very low

and they represent an important labour force reserve.

Major gains are also possible with regard to the integration of minorities

and third country nationals into labour markets and education systems.

Finally, the reduction of public debt would enhance the ability to meet

future social protection needs linked to ageing.

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BULGARIA

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Bulgaria

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 8 9 8 6 5 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 74 76 81 83 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 68 68 69 76 78 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands - 16 2 3 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 26 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 41 36 28 20 20 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 52 52 55 54 47 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 10 14 20 26 32 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 7 10 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 11 18 25 40 61 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 52/60 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 16 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 3/2 33/7

Childcare availability for children 7/74 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 15/18 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 26/46 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 17 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 5 8

Average exit age from the labour market 60 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) : 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % : 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 21/20 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 76/77 79/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 73 69

Lifelong learning 1.3/1.2 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.5 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 32 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % : 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 56 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % : 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 10 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % : 17

Low education of nationals in % : 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % : 50

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 38.8 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 41.1 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 9.1 7.3 7.9 10.6 11.90 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 4.8 5.8 6.4 6.4 7.40 8

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP : : : 0.9 1.10 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

The total population of Bulgaria is expected to decline significantly by

2050 as a result of low birth rates, high adult mortality and a high current

level of net emigration. Fertility rates are expected to recover from

the current low level while net emigration should come to a halt. Life

expectancy, for both men and women, is currently low and significant

progress is expected. The old-age dependency ratio, currently at the

European average, is expected to rise to a much higher level than for

the EU as a whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

Low employment rates mean that there is a major potential for employment

growth.

Productivity is only one third of the EU average, so there is an enormous

catching-up potential. Reducing the number of early school leavers and

increasing the investment in research and investment would contribute

to realising this productivity growth potential.

Current and projected public spending on health and long-term care is

significantly below the EU average, however, there may be pressures

for increased spending.

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EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 10 10 10 10 9 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 73 74 79 83 84 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 67 72 78 80 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 4 22 20 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 28 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 39 37 28 23 22 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 52 50 58 54 48 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 13 15 17 23 29 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 7 9 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 13 21 20 37 55 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 56/73 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 19 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 8/2 33/7

Childcare availability for children 8/85 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 10/14 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 31/60 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 22 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 8 8

Average exit age from the labour market 60 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 24 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 32/2 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 7/6 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 90/91 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 90 69

Lifelong learning 5.2/5.9 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.3 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 50 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 3 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 65 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 72 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 8 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 7 17

Low education of nationals in % 20 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 22 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 30.5 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 42.5 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 8.5 9.6 14.1 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 6.4 7.8 8.4 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

The Czech Republic currently has one of the lowest fertility rates in the

EU, but this may be partly the effect of a transition to women having children

later in life; a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections.

These projections indicate a shrinking population and, in spite

of below-average life expectancy, a strong rise in the old-age dependency

ratio.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates could rise significantly and the gender pay

gap remains large. Households with children face a higher poverty risk

than households without children.

Employment rates for older workers are close to the European average,

which means that there is much room for increasing the size of the

labour force.

While educational attainment is already high, productivity levels can

still be raised considerably.

Public debt is currently low, but a large ageing-related increase in

public pensions expenditure is expected.

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Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


DENMARK

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Denmark

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 5 5 5 6 5 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.6 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 74 77 80 83 84 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 70 71 75 79 81 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 8 7 7 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 30 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 40 36 30 27 27 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 49 50 55 50 48 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 14 17 17 23 21 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 3 4 7 9 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 17 22 23 37 40 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 72/80 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 17 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 33/13 33/7

Childcare availability for children 56/93 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 12/9 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 54/65 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 37 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 14 8

Average exit age from the labour market 62 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 41 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 77/30 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 8/9 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 78/75 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 81 69

Lifelong learning 23.6/31.2 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 2.6 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 103 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 5 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 77 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 53 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 5 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 14 17

Low education of nationals in % 30 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 42 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 35.8 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 55.5 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 9.5 12.8 12.8 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 6.9 7.7 7.9 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 1.1 1.7 2.2 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Denmark has currently one of the highest fertility rates in the EU while

life expectancies for both men and women are below the EU average.

The projected increase in the old-age dependency ratio is much smaller

than for the EU as a whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

Denmark has already achieved high female employment rates,

although the gender pay gap remains significant and women are much

more likely to work part-time than men.

The employment rate of older workers is also far above the EU average,

but could still rise in the over-60 age group if health and disability issues

as causes for early labour market exit can be tackled.

There also appears to be scope for a better integration of third country

nationals into labour markets and education systems.

Public debt is low compared to the EU average. The projected ageingrelated

increase in public protection spending is slightly above the EU

average.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

115


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

GERMANY

Germany

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 73 78 83 81 75 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 76 82 85 87 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 70 76 80 82 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 211 181 179 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 29 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 37 35 26 22 21 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 52 50 55 50 47 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 16 17 21 28 25 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 3 4 8 14 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 17 24 28 46 56 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 60/71 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 23 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 44/8 33/7

Childcare availability for children 7/89 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 20/16 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 38/54 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 28 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 6 8

Average exit age from the labour market 61 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 11 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 65/20 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 14/14 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 72/70 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 83 69

Lifelong learning 8/7.4 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 2.5 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 106 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 9 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 67 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 47 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 10 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 25 17

Low education of nationals in % 26 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 56 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 67.7 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 42.3 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 11.4 12.3 13.1 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 6.0 6.9 7.2 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 1.0 1.4 2.0 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

In Germany, below-average fertility rates and life expectancies that

match the EU average are expected to translate into a shrinking population.

Germany currently has the highest old-age dependency ratio in the

EU and is expected to stay above the EU average in this regard.

… opportunities for tackling them

Labour market opportunities for women could be promoted through better

childcare provision and access to full-time employment and a reduced

pay gap.

Employment rates of older workers are slightly above the EU average

and could increase further.

The integration of third country nationals into labour markets and education

systems could also be further improved.

The public debt lies above the EU average; fiscal consolidation could

contribute to the sustainability of public finances. The expected ageingrelated

increase in public social protection spending is slightly below

the EU average.

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Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


ESTONIA

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Estonia

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 1.9 2.1 1.4 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 73 75 77 81 83 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 65 65 66 72 75 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 1 2 2 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 28 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 38 37 31 27 24 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 51 51 53 52 50 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 14 14 19 22 26 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 2 3 6 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 16 19 24 33 43 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 62/67 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 24 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 10/5 33/7

Childcare availability for children 22/79 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 18/18 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 54/59 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 44 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 18 8

Average exit age from the labour market 62 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 33 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 59/10 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 11/17 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 87/75 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 89 69

Lifelong learning 4.3/7.3 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.8 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 39 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 19 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 65 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 62 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 6 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 15 17

Low education of nationals in % 23 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 21 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 4.8 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 42.4 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 6.7 4.8 4.2 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.4 6.2 6.5 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP : : : 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Estonia's fertility rate is currently below the EU average, but this may

partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life;

a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life

expectancy is significantly lower than the EU average, particularly for

men, and this gap is expected to remain large until the end of the projection

period (2050). The result would be a relatively low old-age

dependency ratio.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are high and most women work full-time.

However, their pay is significantly lower than men's, indicating scope

for a qualitative improvement of female employment.

A high proportion of people in their 50s and 60s are still in employment.

There is room to capitalize on this fact and further reinforce active

labour market policies through focus on lifelong learning.

There is much catch-up potential for productivity growth which could

build on the high level of educational achievement and on efforts to

ensure that R&D results are translated into innovative services and products.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

117


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

GREECE

Greece

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 8 10 11 11 11 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.3 2.0 1.3 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 77 81 84 85 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 72 76 79 80 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 43 35 35 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 30 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 43 38 27 23 21 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 49 49 55 53 46 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 11 15 20 26 28 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 7 10 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 13 20 27 39 59 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 46/74 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 10 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 9/2 33/7

Childcare availability for children 7/60 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 20/21 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 26/59 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 31 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 9 8

Average exit age from the labour market 60 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 7 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 22/1 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 9/18 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 89/79 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 60 69

Lifelong learning 6.2/8.6 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.6 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 71 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 8 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 60 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 71 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 10 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 8 17

Low education of nationals in % 50 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 52 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 107.5 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 38.3 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP : : : 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.1 5.9 6.8 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP : : : 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

The fertility rate is one of the lowest in the EU while life expectancy is

close to the EU average. Greece's old-age dependency ratio is projected

to rise to several points above the EU average.

… opportunities for tackling them

The employment rates of both women and older workers could rise

significantly. Productivity levels might benefit from further improving the

business environment and the climate for R&D and innovation. Raising

percentages of the population completing higher education and facilitating

movement between training/ education and the labour market

could also bring benefits. According to the employment statistics, third

country nationals seem to be well integrated into the labour market, but

this may be due to the fact that most of them have come fairly recently,

in search of work. Facilitating their entrance into the regular labour market

might strengthen social protection and public finances.

Public debt is large; its reduction could help meet future social protection

needs.

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Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


SPAIN

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Spain

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 30 38 42 45 43 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.9 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 75 83 87 88 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 73 77 80 81 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 508 105 102 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 31 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 43 43 27 22 20 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 49 47 56 53 45 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 11 13 17 25 29 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 4 7 13 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 13 17 25 39 67 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 51/75 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 15 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 25/5 33/7

Childcare availability for children 10/98 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 20/21 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 27/60 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 32 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 4 8

Average exit age from the labour market 62 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 23 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 44/4 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 25/36 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 68/55 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 48 69

Lifelong learning 1.9/1.8 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.1 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 88 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 8 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 63 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 70 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 9 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 12 17

Low education of nationals in % 60 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 50 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 43.2 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 39.2 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 8.6 11.9 15.7 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 6.1 7.3 8.3 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Spain's current fertility rate is among the lowest in the EU and women

tend to have their first child relatively late in life. Life expectancy is above

the EU average. The projections assume that fertility will recover slightly

and that life expectancies will roughly evolve in line with the EU average.

This would result in the highest old-age dependency ratio in the EU

in 2050. Over recent years, Spain has attracted large numbers of immigrants,

many of whom were regularised, boosting the official population

and employment of Spain.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates could rise, but this might require a more extensive

provision of childcare for the youngest children.

Employment rates of older workers are above the EU average, but could

also be further increased.

Educational attainment can be improved and early school leaving reduced;

this could help Spain to narrow the productivity gap to the EU average.

Third country nationals seem to be well integrated into the labour market,

but this may be due to the fact that immigration is relatively recent, with most

people coming in search for work (rather than to join family members who

arrived earlier).

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

119


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

FRANCE

France

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 47 54 60 65 66 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 74 78 83 88 89 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 70 76 81 83 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 64 59 59 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 30 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 39 38 31 28 27 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 50 48 52 48 46 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 15 14 16 23 22 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 3 5 8 11 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 19 22 25 41 48 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 58/69 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 12 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 31/6 33/7

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

Childcare availability for children 43/100 :/:

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 13/13 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 35/41 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 13 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 3 8

Average exit age from the labour market 59 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 0.4 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % :/: 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 11/15 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 84/81 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 66 69

Lifelong learning 9.7/11.4 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 2.2 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 117 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 6 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 64 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 44 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 9 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 25 17

Low education of nationals in % 42 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 65 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 66.8 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 49.1 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 12.8 14.3 14.8 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 7.7 8.9 9.5 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP : : : 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

France has one of the highest fertility rates in the EU and the population

projections assume that this will not change. Life expectancy is assumed

to rise above the EU average. The total population is expected to grow

while the old-age dependency ratio could evolve more favourably than

for the EU as a whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

Employment opportunities for women are relatively well developed

thanks to extensive childcare provision, and the gender pay gap is

below the EU average.

By contrast, there is much scope for increasing the labour force participation

of older workers. A more modern employment protection combined

with lifelong learning would increase labour market flexibility.

Another area which would generate employment growth is the integration

of third country nationals whose employment rates and educational

attainment are particularly low.

Public debt is slightly above the EU average and the projected increase

in public social protection expenditure is also roughly in line with the

EU as a whole.

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Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


IRELAND

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Ireland

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 3 3 4 5 5 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 4.0 2.9 2.0 1.8 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 76 81 85 87 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 68 70 76 80 82 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 16 13 12 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 31 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 45 48 36 30 26 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 44 41 53 52 48 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 14 13 13 20 24 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 2 3 5 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 19 18 16 28 45 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 58/77 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 11 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 32/6 33/7

Childcare availability for children :/: :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 20/19 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 37/66 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 43 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 15 8

Average exit age from the labour market 63 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 1.2 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 37/8 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 10/15 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 89/83 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 65 69

Lifelong learning 6.9/7.2 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.2 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 120 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

SShare of non nationals in the population in % 6 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 67 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 57 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 4 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 7 17

Low education of nationals in % 44 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 19 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 27.6 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 33.9 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 4.7 7.8 11.1 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.3 6.5 7.3 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Ireland currently has the highest fertility rate in the EU and the proportion

of young people in the population is also high. Life expectancy matches

the EU average. The projections assume that fertility rates will

remain high and that life expectancy will stay close to the EU average.

The old-age dependency ratio could more than double, but would

remain significantly below the EU average by 2050.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female labour force participation is already relatively high, but there

remains scope for improvement with an employment rate gap between

men and women of almost 20 percentage points and about one-third of

women working part-time. Labour market opportunities for women

could benefit from more accessible childcare. The gender pay gap is

below the EU average.

An increase in public spending on R&D and a reduction of early school

leaving would help to raise future productivity. Although employment

rates of older workers are above the EU average, potential still exists

for improvement.

Public debt is low, but a large ageing-related increase in public social

protection expenditure is projected.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

121


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

ITALY

Italy

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 50 56 58 57 53 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 77 83 87 89 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 71 77 82 84 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 330 114 114 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 31 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 40 38 25 21 20 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 50 49 56 51 45 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 12 15 20 27 27 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 5 9 14 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 14 20 29 45 66 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 45/70 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 7 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 26/5 33/7

Childcare availability for children 6/93 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 19/22 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 21/43 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 18 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 7 8

Average exit age from the labour market 61 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 7.1 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 34/4 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 18/26 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 78/68 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 50 69

Lifelong learning 5.4/6.2 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.1 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 92 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 4.1 6

Employment rate of nationals in % : 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % : 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % : 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % : 17

Low education of nationals in % : 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % : 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 106.4 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 44.0 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 14.2 15.0 14.6 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.8 6.7 7.1 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 1.5 1.7 2.2 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Italy currently has the highest old-age dependency ratio in the EU. With

a low fertility rate and high life expectancy – both being expected to

continue – the old-age dependency ratio could rise to almost two-thirds

(2 persons aged 65+ for every 3 persons of working age) and the total

population could shrink by about five million. In recent years, a significant

number of migrants has arrived in Italy.

… opportunities for tackling them

There is significant scope for promoting the labour force participation

of women. This would also help in reducing the risk of poverty for households

with children.

Employment rates for older workers are also comparatively low.

There is scope for raising productivity, notably by raising educational

attainment levels, combating early school leaving and boosting R&D

spending.

Reducing public debt would enhance Italy's ability to meet future social

protection needs, even if the projected ageing-related increase in public

expenditure is comparatively small.

122

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


CYPRUS

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Cyprus

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 3.4 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 71 75 81 84 85 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 68 73 76 80 82 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 6 5 5 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 29 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 53 44 35 26 23 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 41 46 53 53 51 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 9 12 14 21 25 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 5 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 10 16 18 33 43 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 58/79 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 25 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 14/5 33/7

Childcare availability for children 12/82 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 16/11 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 32/71 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 38 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 20 8

Average exit age from the labour market 63 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 17 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 31/4 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 11/27 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 89/72 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 65 69

Lifelong learning 5.4/6.3 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.4 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % : 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 13 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 68 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 79 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 5 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 4 17

Low education of nationals in % 42 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 41 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 70.3 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 39.5 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 6.9 12.2 19.8 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 2.9 3.6 4.0 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP : : : 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Life expectancy in Cyprus is close to the EU average and fertility slightly

below. This is assumed to continue over the next decades. Nevertheless,

thanks to migration, Cyprus' population is expected to grow significantly,

and the increase in the old-age dependency ratio could be moderate

compared to the EU average by 2050.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are already comparatively high, but the gender

pay gap is very large.

Labour force participation of older men is high, even in the higher age

groups (65-69).

Third country nationals appear to be well integrated into the market.

Public debt is higher than the EU average, and the ageing-related projected

increase in public pensions expenditure is very large.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

123


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

LATVIA

Latvia

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 1.9 2 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 74 74 76 80 83 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 66 65 65 71 74 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands - 2 3 3 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 27 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 38 36 30 26 24 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 51 51 53 52 50 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 13 14 19 22 26 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 2 3 6 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 16 20 24 33 44 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 59/68 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 15 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 12/8 33/7

Childcare availability for children 16/75 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 19/19 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 45/55 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 32 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 19 8

Average exit age from the labour market 63 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 20 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 42/4 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 8/16 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 87/77 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 84 69

Lifelong learning 5/10.6 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.4 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 34 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 21 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 63 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 61 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 9 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 18 17

Low education of nationals in % 27 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 10 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 11.9 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 34.4 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 6.8 5.6 5.6 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.1 5.9 6.2 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Latvia's fertility rate is currently below the EU average, but this may

partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life;

a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life

expectancy is significantly below the EU average, particularly for men,

and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As

a result the population is expected to shrink and the old-age dependency

ratio will increase much less than for the EU as a whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are above the EU average and most women

work full-time. A better availability of child care, particularly for the

youngest children, might allow further increases.

The employment rates of older workers are also above the EU average,

but could grow further.

Latvia has a huge potential for catching up in terms of productivity and

can build on a high level of educational attainment. There is also scope

for more proactive education and labour market integration policies for

third country nationals.

Public finances are sound and public social protection expenditure is

not expected to rise significantly over the coming decades.

124

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


LITHUANIA

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Lithuania

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 2.8 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.9 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.4 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 74 76 78 82 84 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 66 67 72 76 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands - 6 5 4 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 27.1 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 44 40 33 25 23 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 48 48 52 54 50 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 11 12 17 22 25 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 5 9 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 12 17 23 33 45 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 59/66 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 16 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 9/5 33/7

Childcare availability for children 18/60 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 21/23 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 42/59 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 37 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 8 8

Average exit age from the labour market 61 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 34 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 34/2 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 6/12 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 90/81 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 87 69

Lifelong learning 4.2/7.7 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.7 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 42 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 1 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 63 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 68 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 8 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 9 17

Low education of nationals in % 30 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 15 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 18.7 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 32.0 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 6.7 7.9 8.5 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 3.7 4.4 4.6 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Lithuania's fertility rate is currently below the EU average, but this may

partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life;

a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life

expectancy is significantly below the EU average, particularly for men,

and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As

a result, the population is expected to shrink and the old-age dependency

ratio will increase much less than for the EU as a whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are above the EU average and most women

work full-time. A better availability of childcare might still allow for further

improvements.

The employment rates of older workers are also above the EU average,

but could still grow, particularly if health and disability issues are tackled.

Lithuania has great potential for catching up in terms of productivity and

can build on a high level of educational attainment.

Public finances are sound and public social protection expenditure is

expected to rise moderately over the coming decades.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

125


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

LUXEMBOURG

Luxembourg

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 72 76 81 85 87 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 69 75 80 82 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 3 3 3 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 30 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 35 35 30 28 28 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 55 52 56 52 50 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 15 16 16 21 19 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 2 3 5 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 16 20 21 32 36 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 54/73 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 14 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 38/3 33/7

Childcare availability for children 14/80 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 13/17 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 25/38 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 13 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % : 8

Average exit age from the labour market 58 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 14 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 69/26 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 10/17 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 76/67 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 66 69

Lifelong learning 8.5/8.5 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.7 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 154 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 39 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 61 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 56 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 3 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 12 17

Low education of nationals in % 33 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 31 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 6.2 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 42.2 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 10.0 15.0 17.4 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.1 5.9 6.3 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Luxembourg's fertility rate is above the EU average while life expectancy

is close to the EU level. This is projected to continue. Thanks to immigration,

the population is expected to grow significantly. The old-age dependency

ratio is projected to be the lowest in the EU by 2050.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment could grow, reducing the current 20-percentage

point gap between male and female employment rates. A large proportion

of women work part-time. The expansion in childcare facilities will

certainly help in this respect.

Another important labour force reserve are older workers whose

employment rates are significantly below the EU average.

Productivity levels are very high which could allow the country to attract

more migrant workers.

Public debt is at a very low level, but the projected ageing-related

increase in public pensions expenditure is large.

126

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


HUNGARY

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Hungary

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 10 11 10 9 9 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 71 73 77 82 83 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 66 65 69 75 78 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 15 21 20 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 28 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 40 35 29 24 24 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 51 51 56 53 48 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 13 15 18 22 26 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 6 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 14 21 23 35 48 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 51/63 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 11 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 6/3 33/7

Childcare availability for children 6/86 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 13/17 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 27/41 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 15 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 4 8

Average exit age from the labour market 61 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 22 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 37/5 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 11/14 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 85/81 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 76 69

Lifelong learning 3.2/4.6 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.9 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % : 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 1 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 57 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 64 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 7 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 4 17

Low education of nationals in % 34 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 23 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 58.4 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 45.2 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 10.4 13.5 17.1 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.5 6.3 6.5 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP : : : 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Hungary's fertility rate is currently below the EU average, but this may

partly be the effect of a transition to women having children later in life;

a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population projections. Life

expectancy is significantly below the EU average, particularly for men,

and the gap is expected to remain large over the projection period. As

a result, the population is expected to shrink and the old-age dependency

ratio will increase less than for the EU as a whole.

… opportunities for tackling them

Hungary has significant scope for increasing employment through

higher labour force participation of women and of older workers.

Productivity levels can also catch up, building on a high level of educational

attainment of the population.

More R&D investment could also help to boost productivity.

Public debt is close to the EU average but public spending on pensions

is expected to rise significantly.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

127


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

MALTA

Malta

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 3.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 71 76 81 84 85 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 67 71 76 80 82 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 3 2 3 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth : 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 53 41 32 26 25 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 40 49 54 51 50 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 10 12 15 21 24 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 6 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 13 15 19 36 41 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 34/74 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 4 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 19/5 33/7

Childcare availability for children :/: :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 15/18 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 12/51 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 16 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % : 8

Average exit age from the labour market 58 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 11 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % :/: 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 39/43 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 52/45 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 26 69

Lifelong learning 6.1/4.5 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.3 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 69 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 3 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 54 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 60 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 7 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 5 17

Low education of nationals in % 76 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 61 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 74.7 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 41.6 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 7.4 9.1 7.0 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 4.2 5.5 6.0 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Life expectancy in Malta is slightly below the EU average and fertility

slightly above (but expected to fall slightly). Thanks to migration, the

population is expected to grow, and the increase in the old-age dependency

ratio could be moderate compared to the EU average by 2050.

… opportunities for tackling them

There is considerable scope for increasing female employment; the gap

between male and female employment rates currently stands at 40 percentage

points. Older workers represent another much underused

labour force potential.

Productivity levels are still significantly below the EU average and to

close the gap educational attainment levels need to be improved and

R&D spending boosted.

Public debt is above the EU average, but the ageing-related increase in

public social protection expenditure is expected to be moderate.

128

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


THE NETHERLANDS

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

The Netherlands

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 11 14 16 18 17 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 3.2 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 75 79 81 83 84 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 72 73 76 79 80 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 21 32 31 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 30 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 45 40 30 27 28 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 46 49 56 50 49 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 12 13 16 24 21 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 6 8 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 15 17 21 37 39 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 66/80 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 19 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 75/23 33/7

Childcare availability for children 35/100 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 11/13 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 35/57 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 25 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 10 8

Average exit age from the labour market 61 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 32 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 79/34 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 11/16 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 79/71 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 72 69

Lifelong learning 15.6/16.1 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 1.8 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 117 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 4 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 74 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 42 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 4 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 18 17

Low education of nationals in % 37 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 48 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 52.9 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 43.8 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 7.7 10.6 11.2 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 6.1 7.1 7.4 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Fertility in the Netherlands is at a relatively high level and has recovered

from a much lower level in the 1980s. Life expectancy is slightly below

the EU average. Projections are based on the assumption that fertility will

remain high and that life expectancy will grow slower than for the EU as

a whole. These trends combined with significant immigration will result

in a growing population and one of the lowest old-age dependency

ratios in the EU by 2050.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female labour force participation is high, but the contribution of women

to the economy could improve if women worked more hours and the

gender pay gap was reduced. Better childcare provision could help in

this respect.

Employment could also grow through higher labour force participation

of older workers and improved access of minorities and third country

nationals to the labour market and education systems.

Public debt is below the EU average. Public social protection expenditure

is expected to rise faster than for the EU as a whole, albeit to a

level that would remain below the EU average.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

129


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

AUSTRIA

Austria

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 7 8 8 9 8 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.8 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 73 76 82 86 88 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 66 69 76 81 84 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 25 19 20 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 29 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 37 37 28 23 22 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 51 48 56 52 48 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 16 16 18 25 24 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 2 3 4 7 13 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 18 24 24 41 53 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 62/75 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 18 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 39/6 33/7

Childcare availability for children 9/82 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 12/13 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 23/41 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 14 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 5 8

Average exit age from the labour market 59 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 6 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 55/8 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 9/9 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 88/84 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 80 69

Lifelong learning 12.3/13.5 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 2.2 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 98 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 10 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 70 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 59 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 4 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 13 17

Low education of nationals in % 28 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 50 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 62.9 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 46.7 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 13.4 14.0 12.2 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 5.3 6.3 6.9 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.6 0.9 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Fertility in Austria lies below the EU average and only a moderate recovery

is expected. Thanks to life expectancy rising above the EU average

and significant immigration, the population could continue to grow up

to 2030. The old-age dependency ratio is expected to evolve in line with

the EU-25 level.

… opportunities for tackling them

Female employment rates are high, but many women only work part-time

and their hourly pay is significantly lower than men's.

Older workers represent a significant potential for increasing employment

as their employment rates are well below the EU average. Employment

rates might also benefit from improved access of third country nationals

to the labour maket and education systems.

Public debt is close to the EU average and public social protection expenditure

is expected to rise only moderately over the coming decades.

130

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES


POLAND

Part 1 – Annex 1. Country statistics and comments

Poland

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 30 36 38 37 34 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 2.7 2.3 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 71 75 79 83 84 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 66 67 71 77 79 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands - 28 36 34 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 28 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 48 41 33 24 22 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 47 49 54 53 48 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 9 12 15 23 28 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 2 3 5 9 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 10 15 19 36 51 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 47/59 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 10 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 14/8 33/7

Childcare availability for children ( 2/60 :/:

0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 21/25 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 20/36 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 18 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 10 8

Average exit age from the labour market 58 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 36 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 35/3 51/12

Education, R&D and Productivity 2004/5 2004/5

Early school leavers women/men in % 4/7 13/17

Youth educational attainment levels women/men in % 92/88 80/74

Total population having at least completed secondary edu. in % 85 69

Lifelong learning 4.3/5.4 9.4/11

R&D share in % GDP 0.5 1.9

Productivity per hour relative to EU-15 in % 48 100

Migration and Integration 2004/5 2004/5

Share of non nationals in the population in % 2 6

Employment rate of nationals in % 53 65

Employment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 49 55

Unemployment rate of nationals in % 18 9

Unemployment rate of non EU-25 nationals in % 10 17

Low education of nationals in % 28 35

Low education non EU-25 nationals in % 9 49

Sustainability of Public Finances and Social Protection 2004/5 2030 2050 2004/5 2040 2050

Government debt as % of GDP 42.5 63.4

% of government revenue in GDP 40.5 43.7

% of public expenditure on pensions in GDP 13.9 9.2 8.0 10.6 11.9 12.8

% of public expenditure on health care in GDP 4.1 5.1 5.5 6.4 7.4 8.0

% of public expenditure on long term care in GDP 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.9 1.1 1.5

Demographic challenges and …

Poland's fertility rate has dropped to one of the lowest levels in the

EU, but this may partly be the effect of a transition to women having

children later in life; a recovery of fertility is assumed for the population

projections. Life expectancy is significantly below the EU average

and it is not expected that the gap will be closed over the projection

period. Over recent years, Poland experienced significant emigration,

but a reversal of this trend is expected. Altogether, this will lead

to a shrinking population and a rise of the old-age dependency ratio

to close to the EU average.

… opportunities for tackling them

Employment rates of both men and women are far below the EU average,

leaving much scope for future employment growth. Promoting the

labour force activation of women might also reduce the risk of poverty,

which is higher for households with children. The employment rate gap

between Poland and the EU average is particularly large for older workers.

There is a large potential for productivity growth which could build on

a high level of educational attainment.

Public debt is below the EU average and public pensions expenditure

is even expected to fall significantly over the coming decades.

Part 1 – EUROPE'S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES

131


EUROPE’S DEMOGRAPHIC FUTURE: FACTS AND FIGURES ON CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

PORTUGAL

Portugal

EU-25

Demographic Trends 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050 1960 1980 2004/5 2030 2050

Population in Millions 9 10 10 11 10 378 426 457 469 450

Total Fertility Rate (number of children per women) 3.1 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.6

Life expectancy at birth for women in years 67 75 81 85 87 73 76 80 84 86

Life expectancy at birth for men in years 61 68 74 79 80 67 69 74 78 81

Net migration in the population in thousands 42 15 15 1 464 835 822

Mean age of women at childbirth 29 29

Population share of persons under 25 in % 45 44 28 24 22 40 38 29 24 23

Population share of persons aged 25-64 in % 47 46 55 52 46 50 49 54 51 47

Population share of persons aged 60-79 in % 11 13 18 25 27 13 15 18 25 25

Population share of very old persons 80+ in % 1 1 4 7 11 1 2 4 7 11

Old age dependency ratio (15-64) in % 13 17 25 39 58 15 21 25 40 53

Gender Equality and Family situation 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rate women/men in % 62/74 56/71

Gender pay gap in % 5 15

Share of part time work among women/men in % 17/7 33/7

Childcare availability for children 19/75 :/:

( 0-3 / 3 – compulsory school age) in %

At-risk-of-poverty after social transfer in total/children in % 20/21 17/20

Ageing and the Labour Market 2004/5 2004/5

Employment rates for persons aged 55-64 women/men in % 44/58 34/52

Employment rates for persons aged 60-64 in % 41 27

Employment rates for persons aged 65-69 in % 28 8

Average exit age from the labour market 62 61

Inactive for health reasons in % of inactive (aged 50-64) 16 16

Internet use total/people 65-74 in % 32/2 51/12

Educa