Cartels & Leniency 2011 - Setterwalls

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Cartels & Leniency 2011 - Setterwalls

The International Comparative Legal Guide to:

Cartels & Leniency 2011

A practical cross-border insight

into cartels and leniency

Published by Global Legal Group, in association with CDR,

with contributions from:

Arnold Bloch Leibler

Arzinger

Banning N.V.

Borden Ladner Gervais LLP

bpv Braun Partners s.r.o.

Černejová & Hrbek, s.r.o.

Chrysses Demetriades & Co. LLC

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP

Crowell & Moring LLP

D. N. Tzouganatos & Partners

De Dios & Goyena

ELIG, Attorneys-at-Law

Elvinger, Hoss & Prussen

Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co

Goodrich, Riquelme y Asociados

Grau García Hernández & Mónaco

Hunton & Williams LLP

Khaitan & Co

King & Wood

LMR Attorneys Ltd.

Magalhães, Nery e Dias Advocacia

Marques Mendes & Associados

Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu

Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Petersen

Odvetniki Šelih & partnerji, o.p., d.n.o.

Preslmayr Rechtsanwälte OG

Russell McVeagh

Schellenberg Wittmer

Setterwalls

SJ Berwin LLP

Szecskay Attorneys at Law

UGGC & Associés

Webber Wentzel

White & Case LLP

Wiersholm, Mellbye & Bech, advokatfirma AS

WKB Wiercinski Kwiecinski Baehr

Yoon & Yang LLC


Chapter 36

Sweden

Ulf Djurberg

Setterwalls

Maria Lehmann-Horn

1 The Legislative Framework of the Cartel

Prohibition

1.1 What is the legal basis and general nature of the cartel

prohibition, e.g. is it civil and/or criminal

According to chapter 2, section 1, of the Swedish Competition Act

(SFS 2008:579) (the “Competition Act”), agreements between

undertakings are prohibited if they have as their objective, or effect,

to an appreciable extent, the prevention, restriction or distortion of

competition within the Swedish market. The provision corresponds

with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (“TFEU”).

Infringements of competition law are not criminalised in Sweden and

the regulation of cartels is therefore civil in its nature. However, in

relation to certain cartel activities it is possible for a court to order an

injunction against trading in relation to an individual who has been

involved in competition law infringements.

1.2 What are the specific substantive provisions for the cartel

prohibition

The Competition Act does not specifically mention cartels, instead

the regulation of cartels is included in the general prohibition

against anticompetitive agreements in chapter 2, section 1, of the

Competition Act.

1.3 Who enforces the cartel prohibition

The Swedish Competition Authority (the “Competition Authority”)

is the state authority that has been given the mandate to safeguard

competition in Sweden. One of the Competition Authority’s main

objectives is to initiate investigations into alleged cartels.

The Competition Authority has four competition departments

dealing with different sectors of the economy. Department 1

specialises in the building, food (incl. non-durable goods) and

agriculture sectors. Department 2 specialises in the financial

services, telecommunications, media and IT sectors. Department 3

deals with transport, energy, health care/pharmaceuticals and the

chemical-technical industry. Department 4 deals with competition

problems that arise when agencies, municipalities or county

councils operate in the same markets as private businesses. In

addition, the Legal Department is involved in court actions initiated

by the Competition Authority. Furthermore, the Competition

Authority is a support function to ministries working with economic

and legal issues.

The Competition Authority has been given the power to order an

undertaking to cease an infringement of the Competition Act. Such

order can be made under the penalty of an administrative fine (Sw:

vite). The Competition Authority can also impose interim measures

on undertakings.

Upon application by the Competition Authority, the Stockholm City

Court may impose an administrative fine (Sw.

konkurrensskadeavgift) on an undertaking that has been found

guilty of competition law infringements. If the fines are not paid,

the Competition Authority can seek recovery by turning to the

Swedish Enforcement Agency.

In cases where the Competition Authority is of the opinion that the

facts of the case are clear it may, instead of a court action, suggest

that the undertaking pays a fine (Sw. avgiftsföreläggande). If the

fine is not approved by the undertaking within the set time limit the

Competition Authority may instead initiate a court action. If the

undertaking approves the fine the Competition Authority is barred

from initiating a court action.

Decisions by the Stockholm City Court may be appealed to the

Swedish Market Court (leave to appeal is required).

1.4 What are the basic procedural steps between the opening

of an investigation and the imposition of sanctions

The Competition Authority can initiate an investigation ex officio or

on the basis of a leniency application or a third party complaint.

The Competition Authority starts by carrying out a preliminary

assessment and if such assessment results in the Competition

Authority pursuing the case, the authority starts collecting evidence.

As will be described in detail below, the Competition Authority has

far reaching powers to conduct dawn raids, order companies and

individuals to furnish documents and other information, carry out

interviews etc. for this purpose.

The Competition Authority’s fact finding results in a Statement of

Objections. The concerned undertakings have the possibility to

comment upon this document.

The settlement procedure that was introduced in 2008 has been used

in two cases so far. If an undertaking accepts the fine calculated by

the Competition Authority, no court action can be taken. In this

case the Competition Authority thus has the power to impose fines

on its own.

If a case is not settled, or in cases in which this possibility does not

exist, the Competition Authority must initiate a court action in the

Stockholm City Court in order for the court to impose fines on an

undertaking. The court’s decision can be appealed to the Swedish

Market Court, which is the last instance.

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1.5 Are there any sector-specific offences or exemptions

The Competition Act does not contain any sector-specific offences

as such. There are sector-specific exemptions relating to taxi

services and the agricultural sector. Furthermore, all EU Block

Exemptions have been implemented into Swedish law through

various acts.

1.6 Is cartel conduct outside Sweden covered by the

prohibition

Cartel conduct outside Sweden is only covered by the Competition

Act to the extent that the cartel conduct has an effect on the Swedish

market or parts of it. Thus, the cartel activities may take place

abroad and the participating companies may be foreign. However,

the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is restricted by public

international law and unless the Competition Authority is able to

enforce an action against foreign companies it is unlikely to take

such action.

2 Investigative Powers

2.1 Summary of general investigatory powers.

Table of General Investigatory Powers

Please Note: * indicates that the investigatory measure requires the

authorisation by a Court or another body independent of the

competition authority.

2.2 Please list specific or unusual features of the

investigatory powers referred to in the summary table.

None.

Investigatory power Civil / administrative Criminal

Order the production of specific documents

or information

Carry out compulsory interviews with

individuals

Carry out an unannounced search of

business premises

Carry out an unannounced search of

residential premises

Right to ‘image’ computer hard drives

using forensic IT tools

2.3 Are there general surveillance powers (e.g. bugging)

No, surveillance powers may only be used in investigations

concerning criminal offences. Hence, since competition law

infringements are not criminal in nature there are no general

surveillance powers available.

Yes

Yes

Yes*

Yes*

Yes*

Right to retain original documents No No

Right to require an explanation of

documents or information supplied

Right to secure premises overnight (e.g.

by seal)

Yes

Yes*

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

2.4 Are there any other significant powers of investigation

In order to be able to fulfil its tasks under the Competition Act, the

Competition Authority may order an undertaking to furnish

documents and information. Furthermore, the Competition

Authority may order an individual who is believed to be able to

provide information concerning the matter to appear for questioning

at a certain time and place. The orders may be imposed under the

penalty of an administrative fine. The Swedish Enforcement

Agency (only) has the power to e.g. access locked premises and to

seal premises.

2.5 Who will carry out searches of business and/or residential

premises and will they wait for legal advisors to arrive

The searches are carried out by Competition Authority officials,

often accompanied with IT-specialists and staff from the Swedish

Enforcement Agency. The Competition Authority has the power to

search residential premises but this has so far never been done. The

undertaking is entitled to have legal advisors present and the

Competition Authority is required to wait until legal advisors arrive.

However, this obligation does not apply if there is a risk that the

search would be undermined if delayed. In general, the

Competition Authority does indeed not wait for the undertaking’s

legal advisors to arrive.

2.6 Is in-house legal advice protected by the rules of

privilege

No, in-house legal advice is not protected by the Swedish rules of

privilege.

2.7 Please list other material limitations of the investigatory

powers to safeguard the rights of defence of companies

and/or individuals under investigation.

A person who could be the subject of an injunction against trading

will before examination be informed that information provided can

be of importance for the Competition Authority’s decision whether

an injunction against trading will be imposed or not.

2.8 Are there sanctions for the obstruction of investigations

If so, have these ever been used Has the authorities’

approach to this changed, e.g. become stricter, recently

Court orders concerning searches of premises (dawn raids), and

orders by the Competition Authority concerning furnishing of

documents or appearing for questioning may be imposed under the

penalty of an administrative fine. Obstruction of the investigation

or breaking of a seal constitutes a criminal offence which can result

in fines or imprisonment for a period of maximum one year.

Sanctions for the obstruction of an investigation have not been used

so far, no change in approach can thus be noted.

3 Sanctions on Companies and Individuals

3.1 What are the sanctions for companies

An undertaking may be ordered by the Stockholm City Court, upon

application by the Competition Authority, to pay a fine of up to 10

per cent of the undertaking’s annual turnover for the preceding

financial year.

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The starting point for the Competition Authority when calculating

the fines is the sales value on the relevant market. Factors such as

the seriousness and the duration of the cartel are taken into account.

Furthermore, if the company has forced another undertaking to

participate in the cartel or if it has played a leading role in the cartel

this is recognised as an aggravating circumstance. On the other

hand, if the undertaking has only taken limited part of the cartel this

is regarded as a mitigating circumstance. Factors that are not taken

into account are whether a company was forced by another

undertaking to participate in the cartel or if the cartel was

detrimental to the undertaking. Finally, factors not referable to the

case at hand can be taken into account. A previous infringement of

chapter 2, section 1, of the Competition Act or Article 101(1) of the

TFEU can thus be regarded as an aggravating circumstance. The

undertaking’s financial situation may also be taken into account,

either as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.

Competition Authority’s application commencing proceedings in

court has been served on the party concerned within ten years from

termination of the infringement.

3.5 Can a company pay the legal costs and/or financial

penalties imposed on a former or current employee

Apart from an injunction against trading, no personal liability exists

for cartel infringements under Swedish law. In general, a company

can pay the legal costs imposed on a former or current employee in

connection to a cartel proceeding.

3.6 Can an implicated employee be held liable by his/her

employer for the legal costs and/or financial penalties

imposed on the employer

Sweden

3.2 What are the sanctions for individuals

Yes, in general there is a possibility to sue an employee for costs

and/or financial penalties imposed on the employer.

There are no criminal sanctions on individuals in Sweden.

However, the new Competition Act, which entered into force on 1

November 2008, introduced the possibility to order an injunction

against trading for a period of three to ten years for an individual

who has been involved in certain competition law infringements.

Only certain horizontal cooperation such as price-fixing, market

sharing or controlling of production can lead to an injunction

against trading. The prohibition can be imposed on e.g. partners,

board members, managing directors or any person who in fact has

conducted the management of a business.

In order to facilitate whistle blowers, no injunction is imposed on a

person who could be the subject of such injunction if he or she has

substantially contributed to facilitate the Competition Authority’s

cartel investigation.

If the individual’s employer receives immunity or reduction of the

fine, the individual is automatically exempted from sanction.

Provisions with regard to injunctions against trading in cartel cases

are found in the Competition Authority’s regulation KKVFS

2010:1.

3.3 Can fines be reduced on the basis of ‘financial hardship’

or ‘inability to pay’ grounds If so, by how much

When calculating the fines, the financial situation of the company

may be taken into account. A reduction of the fine because of

financial hardship or inability to pay the fine has not been an issue

in Sweden so far but according to the Competition Authority the

authority is likely to follow the policy of the European Commission

in this regard when calculating the fine. Fines are imposed by the

Stockholm City Court (or the Swedish Market Court upon appeal)

and once a final judgment on the fines is in place the Competition

Authority has no possibility reduce the fine.

3.4 What are the applicable limitation periods

A fine for competition law infringements may only be imposed in

cases where the Competition Authority’s application commencing

proceedings in court has been served on the party concerned within

five years from termination of the infringement. However, if the

party within this time period has been notified of a search order or

has been given the opportunity to comment upon the Competition

Authority’s draft application commencing proceedings the time is

instead calculated from that day. In such cases a fine for

competition law infringements may only be imposed where the

4 Leniency for Companies

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4.1 Is there a leniency programme for companies If so,

please provide brief details.

Sweden operates a leniency programme. The general framework is

provided in chapter 3, sections 12 to 15, in the Competition Act.

Under these provisions an undertaking can receive immunity or a

reduction of the fine if it discloses its participation in an

infringement of chapter 2, section 1, of the Competition Act or

Article 101(1) of the TFEU. The Competition Authority has also

issued a regulation with regard to the reduction and immunity from

fines which further shed light on how the Competition Authority

interprets and applies the provisions in the Competition Act

(KKVFS 2009:2).

Only one company can be granted immunity from fines. A decision

by the Competition Authority to grant immunity is binding for the

Competition Authority and the courts in the court proceedings,

provided that the company cooperates with the Competition

Authority and fulfils its obligations during the whole process.

Immunity cannot be granted if the undertaking has played the

leading role in the infringement. Whether or not the undertaking

has played the leading role will be decided on a case-by-case basis

reviewing factors such as whether the undertaking has initiated the

cartel, forced other undertakings to participate in the cartel, etc.

There are three possibilities for granting immunity. In the first

situation, the Competition Authority does not have sufficient

evidence to take action against the infringement. An undertaking

may then be granted immunity if it is the first to notify the

infringement to the Competition Authority and the information

provided gives the Competition Authority enough evidence to take

action against the cartel. The two other possibilities for immunity

concern situations where the Competition Authority already has

sufficient evidence to take action against the infringement, but the

undertaking either provides evidence or information of crucial

importance to the investigation or otherwise facilitates an

investigation in a very significant manner.

If the undertaking cannot fulfil the criteria for immunity, it may still

get a reduction of the fine if it offers assistance of significant

importance and it adds considerable value to the investigation. The

first undertaking that fulfils the requirements for leniency gets a

reduction of the fine of 30 to 50 per cent, the second undertaking

gets a reduction of 20 to 30 per cent, and the following undertakings

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get a reduction of up to 20 per cent each.

To be able to get immunity or reduction of fines, the undertaking

must (i) provide the Competition Authority with all information and

evidence to which the undertaking has access concerning the

infringement, (ii) actively cooperate with the Competition

Authority during the entire investigation of the infringement

including proceedings in court, (iii) not destroy evidence or in

another way obstruct the ongoing or any future investigation, and

(iv) cease or immediately after its notification cease to participate in

the infringement.

4.2 Is there a ‘marker’ system and, if so, what is required to

obtain a marker

No. Despite the fact that the Competition Authority would prefer a

marker system, such system was not introduced in the current

Competition Act which entered into force on 1 November 2008.

However, a company that considers applying for leniency can

contact the Competition Authority on a no-names basis and describe

the cartel in hypothetical terms. Based on the information given,

the Competition Authority can inform the company whether the

information is enough to fulfil the criteria for immunity.

4.3 Can applications be made orally (to minimise any

subsequent disclosure risks in the context of civil

damages follow-on litigation)

According to the Competition Authority’s regulation (KKVFS

2009:2) applications can be made orally or in writing. However,

public records are taken of all oral statements and form part of the

Competition Authority’s file. The file is kept confidential during

the Competition Authority’s investigation until proceedings in court

are initiated (see also question 4.4 below).

4.4 To what extent will a leniency application be treated

confidentially and for how long

The confidentiality rules are found in the Swedish Public Access to

Information and Secrecy Act (SFS 2009:400). Under these rules

any information with regard to the Competition Authority’s

planning and preparation phase can be kept confidential.

Furthermore, information related to the Competition Authority’s

investigation is kept strictly confidential if it is exceptionally

important that the information is not disclosed. If the Competition

Authority decides to initiate court proceedings an application is

submitted to the Stockholm City Court. This application contains

information on the leniency applicants and reasons for why

immunity and/or leniency was granted. The application is public

apart from such information that would lead to the undertaking

suffering substantial damage or other substantial detriment if the

information is revealed. Risk for civil damages is not regarded as a

substantial detriment to the undertaking.

Court proceedings are generally open to the public. A leniency

applicant can however request limiting the access to a hearing.

4.6 Is there a ‘leniency plus’ or ‘penalty plus’ policy

No. There is neither a leniency plus nor penalty plus policy.

However, when the fines are being calculated the Competition

Authority can take into account as an aggravating circumstance

whether an undertaking has previously infringed chapter 2, section

1, of the Competition Act or Article 101(1) of the TFEU.

5 Whistle-blowing Procedures for Individuals

5.1 Are there procedures for individuals to report cartel

conduct independently of their employer If so, please

specify.

Individuals may anonymously report cartel conduct to the

Competition Authority. There is no leniency available for

individuals since individuals are not subject to fines. In cases where

an individual may be subject to an injunction against trading, the

Competition Authority can refrain from such injunction if the

individual has contributed substantially to facilitate the

Competition Authority’s investigation (see question 3.2).

6 Plea Bargaining Arrangements

6.1 Are there any early resolution, settlement or plea

bargaining procedures (other than leniency) Has the

competition authorities’ approach to settlements changed

in recent years

A settlement procedure was introduced in the Competition Act of 1

November 2008. In cases where the Competition Authority is of the

opinion that the facts of the infringement case are clear it may,

instead of a court action, suggest that the undertaking pays a fine.

If the undertaking approves of the suggested fine within a time limit

set by the Competition Authority, the authority is barred from

initiating a court action.

The Competition Authority has made use of this process twice. In

July 2009 the Competition Authority imposed a fine of 2 million

SEK (approx. EUR 200,000) on a company which had colluded

with a competitor in the procurement of power-line poles. (The

other company involved in the cartel received immunity after

having submitted a leniency application.) In June 2010 the

Competition Authority imposed a fine of 41,000 SEK (approx. EUR

4,100), 143,000 SEK (approx. EUR 14,300) and 301,000 SEK

(approx. EUR 30,100) respectively on three undertakers for their

participation in a cartel regarding price levels for the transportation

of deceased.

The settlement procedure is rather new in Sweden and a change in

the Competition Authority’s approach to settlements can thus not be

noted. Whether the procedure can be used will always be a question

of whether the facts of the infringement case are clear. In the two

reported cases the companies admitted to the allegations of

infringing the competition rules.

4.5 At what point does the ‘continuous cooperation’

requirement cease to apply

The undertaking must continuously co-operate with the

Competition Authority during the investigation as well as during the

proceedings in court. The cooperation does thus not cease to apply.

7 Appeal Process

7.1 What is the appeal process

A cease-and-desist order by the Competition Authority can be

appealed to the Swedish Market Court.

As previously explained under question 1.4, the Competition

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Authority must initiate proceedings in the Stockholm City Court in

order to impose fines on any cartel member. A judgment by the

Stockholm City Court may be appealed to the Market Court. The

decisions of the Market Court are final.

Private enforcement actions follow the general procedural rules for

damage claims. The law suit is filed where the defendant has its

legal seat or in the Stockholm City Court, which always has

jurisdiction over damage claims under the Competition Act. A

decision by a City Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeal

(leave to appeal is required), which decision in turn may be

appealed to the Supreme Court (leave to appeal is required).

b) An organisation action may be instituted by a non-profit

association that protects consumer or wage-earner interest in

disputes between consumers and a business operator.

c) A public group action may be instituted by an authority that

is suitable to represent the members of the group. The

Government decides which authorities are allowed to

institute public group actions. A public class action is

intended for cases where a litigation process is of interest for

the public.

8.3 What are the applicable limitation periods

Sweden

7.2 Does an appeal suspend a company’s requirement to pay

the fine

Yes, it does.

7.3 Does the appeal process allow for the cross-examination

of witnesses

If witnesses are to give oral testimony in the appealed case, crossexamination

is allowed. However, it should be noted that witnesses

do not always testify on appeal, instead a video recording of the

initial oral testimony may be shown.

When giving his/her oral statement in court a witness may be

confronted with his/her statement to the Competition Authority (if

the witness previously has been called in for questioning) if the

witness on the witness stand deviates from his/her statement to the

Competition Authority.

8 Damages Actions

8.1 What are the procedures for civil damages actions for

loss suffered as a result of cartel conduct Is the position

different (e.g. easier) for ‘follow on’ actions as opposed to

‘stand alone’ actions

A company that intentionally or negligently infringes chapter 2,

section 1, of the Competition Act, or Article 101(1) of the TFEU is

liable for damages.

The procedure for civil damages actions for loss suffered as a result

of cartel conduct does not differ from other civil damages actions.

A suit can be filed to the ordinary district courts; typically a law suit

is filed where the defendant has its legal seat. The Stockholm City

Court always has jurisdiction over damage claims for infringements

of the Competition Act. Appeals are made to the relevant court of

appeal (leave to appeal is required), which in turn may be appealed

to the Supreme Court (leave to appeal is required).

Only single damages are available in Sweden.

Follow-on actions are easier than stand alone actions since a final

judgment that a breach of the competition rules has occurred can be

used as proof of the infringement. The claimant of course still

needs to prove causality between the loss and the infringement.

8.2 Do your procedural rules allow for class-action or

representative claims

According to chapter 3, section 25, paragraph 2 of the Competition

Act, the right to damages lapses if no action is brought within ten

years form the date when the damage was caused. The ten-year

limitation period entered into force on 1 August 2005. A limitation

period of five years applies to claims that arose before 1 August

2005.

8.4 Does the law recognise a “passing on” defence in civil

damages claims

Yes. The general rule in Swedish law on damages is that only the

loss suffered can be awarded.

8.5 What are the cost rules for civil damages follow-on claims

in cartel cases

The general rule in the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure stating

that the losing party shall reimburse the opposing party for litigation

costs also applies to civil damages follow-on claims.

8.6 Have there been any successful follow-on or stand alone

civil damages claims for cartel conduct If there have not

been many cases decided in court, have there been any

substantial out of court settlements

There have not been any judgments with regard to follow-on or

stand alone civil damages claims for cartel conduct in Sweden.

Follow-on civil damages claims were filed by several Swedish

municipalities in relation to the so-called asphalt cartel (final

judgment by the Swedish Market Court on 28 May 2009). In July

2010 three of the fined companies, NCC, Skanska and the Swedish

Transport Administration, settled with eight of the nine

municipalities that had sued for damages. The three companies

agreed to pay the municipalities 21 million SEK (approx. EUR 2

million).

9 Miscellaneous

9.1 Please provide brief details of significant recent or

imminent statutory or other developments in the field of

cartels, leniency and/or cartel damages claims.

In March 2010 the Competition Authority issued a regulation on the

injunction against trading in connection with infringements of the

competition rules (KKVFS 2010:1).

Yes. There are three forms of class actions set out in the Swedish

Group Proceedings Act (SFS 2002:599):

a) A private group action may be instituted by a natural or legal

person that has a claim which is subject to the action.

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9.2 Please mention any other issues of particular interest in

Sweden not covered by the above

On 28 May 2009, the Swedish Market Court issued its judgment

(final) in the asphalt cartel, the largest cartel case ruled upon in

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Sweden. The total amount of the fines amounted to 500 million

SEK (approx. EUR 50 million). In addition, the Swedish Market

Court increased the original fine imposed on the company which

had had the leading role in the cartel from 150 million SEK (approx.

EUR 15 million) to 200 million SEK (approx. EUR 20 million). In

the aftermath of the asphalt cartel nine municipalities which had

suffered from the cartel sued for damages in court. In July 2010

three companies, NCC, Skanska and the Swedish Transport

Administration, settled with eight of the municipalities. The

companies agreed to pay the municipalities 21 million SEK

(approx. EUR 2.1 million). This should be compared to the 57

million SEK (approx. EUR 5.7 million) that the municipalities had

sued for. One of the municipalities did not settle as it did not find

the amount offered being proportionate to the damages suffered.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank their colleague Fredrik Olsson for

his contribution to this chapter.

Ulf Djurberg

Setterwalls

Arsenalsgatan 6, P.O. Box 1050

SE-101 39 Stockholm

Sweden

Tel: +46 8 598 890 17

Fax: +46 8 598 890 90

Email: ulf.djurberg@setterwalls.se

URL: www.setterwalls.se

Ulf Djurberg is a partner and the head of Setterwalls’ EU &

Competition group. Ulf specialises in Swedish and European

competition law as well as public procurement and state aid. Ulf

has wide experience in advising companies on competition

matters before the competition authorities as well as litigation in

court including the Court of Justice of the European Union. He

regularly advices clients on anti-trust matters including

compliance programmes, dawn raids and the structuring of

cooperation agreements and joint ventures. In addition, Ulf

devotes a lot of his time to public procurement proceedings in

Swedish Courts and merger control cases before the Swedish

Competition Authority and the European Commission.

Maria Lehmann-Horn

Setterwalls

Arsenalsgatan 6, P.O. Box 1050

SE-101 39 Stockholm

Sweden

Tel: +46 8 598 891 11

Fax: +46 8 598 890 90

Email: maria.lehmann-horn@setterwalls.se

URL: www.setterwalls.se

Maria Lehmann-Horn is a senior associate in Setterwalls EU &

Competition group. Previous to joining Setterwalls, Maria worked

with leading law firms in Munich and Brussels. She specialises in

Swedish and European competition law and has been deeply

involved in a number of complicated cases covering all aspects of

competition law. She focuses on representing clients in cartel

investigations, in preparing compliance programmes and in

carrying out internal competition audits. In addition, Maria has

wide experience in preparing merger notifications to the Swedish

Competition Authority and the European Commission as well as

coordinating multi-jurisdictional filings.

Setterwalls is one of Sweden’s leading commercial law firms. We have a workforce of approximately 260, of which 170 are

lawyers, working from offices in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmoe.

We offer legal advice within all branches of commercial law. Setterwalls’ EU & Competition department is an important part of the

firm’s full-service practice. 19 lawyers in our three offices provide legal advice in all areas of EU law including anti-trust, merger

control, public procurement, state aid, regulatory and general advice on other areas of EU law such as trade and free movement

of goods.

The EU & Competition department has wide experience in cartel investigations and represents clients in front of the competition

authorities and during dawn raids. The group advises on all aspects with regard to cartels such as compliance programmes,

internal audits, leniency applications and actions for damages.

Please contact your nearest office for more information.

240

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ICLG TO: CARTELS AND LENIENCY 2011

© Published and reproduced with kind permission by Global Legal Group Ltd, London


The International Comparative Legal Guide to:

Cartels & Leniency 2011

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Class and Group Actions

Commodities and Trade Law

Competition Litigation

Corporate Governance

Corporate Recovery & Insolvency

Corporate Tax

Dominance

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Environment Law

Gas Regulation

International Arbitration

Litigation & Dispute Resolution

Merger Control

Mergers & Acquisitions

Patents

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Pharmaceutical Advertising

Product Liability

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Real Estate

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Telecommunication Laws and Regulations

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