fba9e443c1a0be511e193d2750dcedeb

Aone-wayticket?

MigrationinEurope

fromtheperspective

ofCEcountries

CEED

Sharedexperience,comondevelopment

A one-way ticket?

Migration in Europe from the perspective of CEE countries

PublishedbytheCentralandEasternEuropeDevelopmentInstitute

(CEDInstitute)Warsaw2015

©CENTRALANDEASTERNEUROPEDEVELOPMENTINSTITUTE2015

w.cedinstitute.org

NoreproductionofanypartofthisreportmaytakeplacewithouthewritenpermisionoftheCEDInstitute

Authors:

Prof.MaciejDuszczyk,CEDInstituteExpert,

InstituteofSocialPolicy,

CentreofMigrationResearch,UniversityofWarsaw

KamilMatuszczyk, InstituteofSocialPolicy,UniversityofWarsaw

Toquotethisreport:

DuszczykM.,MatuszczykK.(2015),Aone-wayticket?MigrationinEuropefromtheperspectiveofCEcountries,

CentralandEasternEuropeDevelopmentInstitute,Warsaw2015

ThisreporthasbenpreparedincoperationwiththeWorkService.

WorkServiceisthePoland’slargestHRcompanyprovidinginovativeworkforcesolutionsrangingfrompermanentplacement

andtemporarystafing,toutplacementandoutsourcingservicesthroughoutCentralandEasternEurope.

WorkServiceS.A.

Gwiaździsta6,53-413Wrocław,Poland

phone:(+48)71371090

e-mail:work@workservice.pl

w:workservice.com

TheCEDInstitute,foundedbyDr.JanKulczykin2010,isathink-tankwhoseaimistopromotetheachievementsand

economicpotentialtheCEcountries.Itsambitionistosuportbusinesinitiatives,aswelasdebatesonindispensable

reformsintheregion,includingmeasurestobostsustainablegrowthandinovativecapacities.TheobjectiveoftheCED

InstituteisthediseminationofideasandprojectsonhowbestoimproveficiencyandcompetitivenesoftheCEregion.

CEDInstitute

Krucza24/26,0-526Warsaw,Poland

phone:(+48)82054546

e-mail:ced@cedinstitute.org

w:cedinstitute.org

Contents

9Introduction

12 Chapter I:

12

16

17

20

23

26 Chapter II:

26

26

27

35

36

Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries – what has changed in recent years

MigrationswithintheEuropeanUnion– stabilisationbutwithsomexceptions

ForeignersinEUmemberstates– growthinthesignificanceofinternalmigrations

ImigrationtoCEcountriesfromotherEUmemberstatesandthirdcountries

– aretheyslowlybecomingimigrationstates?

ThemigrationbalanceinEUmemberstates

Mainconclusionsfromthechapter

What does a Polish emigrant think about going abroad and returning?

Researchmethodology

Demographicfeaturesoftherespondents

Discusionoftheresearchresults

Sumary


40 Chapter III: Will immigrants solve the problems of Central and Eastern Europe?

40 Migrationandemography

43 DemandforimigrantsintheEuropeanUnion

47 ImigrationatractivenesofEuropeanstates

51

Sumary

52 Mainconclusionsfromthechapter

53 Apendix

56 Chapter IV:

56

57

60

62

63

64 Conclusion

67 References

Migration scenarios for CEE countries – or what can happen in the future

Youthaboutmigrations

WhoismostmobileandwhowilbenededinlabourmarketsofCEcountries?

Migrationscenarios

Sumary


3

Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz

ThePolishMinisterofLabourandSocialPolicy

Migrationprocesesandtheirefectsareaproblem

whichconstantlyinterestsexperts,politiciansandthepublic.

Theyalsoplayanincreasingpartinmediadiscusions.

Unfortunately,manyunverifiedhypothesesandunjustified

conclusionsaredrawninthem.Inmanycasesthiscreates

afalsepicturebothofthefectsofPolesemigratingtother

EUmemberstatesandoftheinfluxoforeignersintoPoland.

Athesametime,wehavetorealisethatmigrationispartof

ourpresentreality,i.e.amodern,fre-marketandemocratic

Europe.SomePolesmakeuseofthisfredomtotrytheirluck

abroad.Afteraperiodabroad,manyofthemwilreturnto

Poland,butathesametimePolandwilbeanincreasingly

atractiveplaceforforeignerstotrytheirluckforabeter

future.Thatiswhyitisveryimportantnotospeakofmigration

asaphenomenontobeprevented,butratherintermsofhow

toexploitit.Thisrequireshonestandbalancedreportswhich

canformthebasisfordebateonthesubjectandforformulating

conclusions.Undoubtedlythelatestaswelasthearliereport

bytheCEDInstituteonmigrationarestudiesthatatempt

tohonestlypresentheproblemofmigrationinmodern-day

Polandandaskquestionstowhichwemustfindananswer.

Inthelatestreport,showingthatmanyPolesworkingabroad

donotabandontheideaofwantingtoreturntoPolandisof

particularimportance.TheirelationshiptoPolandisgeneraly

positive,whichdispelsthemythaboutexpatriatesnotwishing

toreturntotheirhomecountry.Alsoveryinterestingisthe

atemptocomeupwithanindicatorwhichwouldspecifythe

atractivenesofvariouscountrieswithrespectomigration.

Thisatempthasalowedmanyinterestingconclusionstobe

drawn.Iwouldencourageyoutoreadthereportandiscus

thepointsraisedinit.

4

Jan Kulczyk

FounderoftheCEDInstitute,

Internationalentrepreneur,

FounderofKulczykInvestments.

Imigrantshavehistoricalyprovidedoneofthe

greatestcompetitiveadvantagesandplayedamajorolein

thecountries’ growth.Today,intheglobalizedworldaquestion

ariseswhetherweshouldleavethemigrationproceseson

theirownorathertrytoadvisedlymanagethemwiththe

countriescompetingtokepandatracthehumanpotential?

ThekeyaimofthesecondCEDInstitutereportonmigrations

istoprovideacomplexpictureoftheprocesesinEurope

(CentralandEasternEuropeinparticular)andisplaythe

short-andlong-termbenefitsforalthestakeholdersinvolved.

Wewishtoshowvariouswaysmigrationsmightbe

perceivedandtrigeradebateontheirprospectiveimpact

bycreatingtheindexofmigrationatractivenesofthestates

oftheEuropeanUnion.Wealsostrivetoanswerthecompeling

questionwhethertheCEstatesareabletowithstandthe

“braindrain” competitionwiththeEU-15statesregarding

thescopeofhighlyskiledimigrantsucesfulyatracted.

Forourparentsandthegenerationspast,theirhome

wastheirentireworld.Today,theworldhasbecomeourhome.

Inthisnewreality,thepolicymakersfromouregionhaveben

facedwithanewchalengetorearangeandrefurbishour

portionoftheglobalhome.Toprovidesolutionsandcreate

oportunitiesthatwouldmakeouregionanatractivepart

oftheworldworthstayingatandreturningto.

5

Indrek Neivelt

Estonianbusinesman,

MemberoftheProgrameBoard

CEDInstitute.

MigrationprocesfromtheCEregionisamajor

economicandsocialchalengeformostoftheCEcountries.

CEDInstituteistheleadingthink-tankorganizationfocusing

onthisphenomenonandourfirstreporthadgainedsignificant

popularityamongexperts,politiciansandmedia.Thisreport

isoursecondpublicationcoveringthesametopic.Itprovides

awiderangeofupdatedinformationandalsoincludesthe

scenarioanalysis.

Wehavebenusedtohearingabouthe“Polish

plumber” – clichéwhichsymbolizesthefearofcostefective

CentralandEasternEuropeanlabourthreateningthejob

marketintheWesternEurope.Buteverycoinhasaflipside.

Itsemslikeweplacemuchlesemphasisonthelosofhuman

capitalintheCEcountries.InthesecondChapterofoureport

wecanlearnaninterestingperspectiveofaPolishemigrant

whogoesabroadandthendecidestoreturn.Thisresearch

producesmanyinterestingpiecesofinformationrelatedto

themotivationsbehindleavingandfearsandhopesconcerned

withlivingabroadaswelasplansforthefuture.Thanksto

thisreportwemaybeterunderstandthetruereasonsbehind

emigrationandthechalengeswefacewithkepingourpeople

athome.

Thefinalchapterpresentsfourscenariosfor

migrationdevelopmentinthenextfiveyears.Becauseof

migrationandageingpopulationtheseyearswilbevery

decisiveforourcountries.Iamconfidentoureportwilbe

avitalvoiceinaproductivediscusionabouthowtostimulate

economicdevelopment.Itmayalsohelpthosewhoshapethe

socialpoliciestomakebeterandmoreinformedecisions.

6

Tomasz Misiak

President

oftheManagementBoard

ofWorkServiceS.A.

PolishcompaniesandPolishcitizensparticipatein

thedevelopmentoftheEuropeanlabourmarket.Theyareable

tofrelyusethebenefitsoferedbythewealthiereconomies,

inparticularthoseofGermany,UnitedKingdomandthe

Netherlands.Themajorityofmorethan2milionmigrantPoles

workinthesecountries,thebulkofwhomhavesetledthere

permanently.Conclusionsfromtheanalysisofeconomic

migrationshouldbeutilizedwhendesigningthePolishlabour

market.Althoughin2013thenumberofpeoplewhoemigrated

fromPolandtofindajobwashigherthanbefore(acording

toestimatesoftheCentralStatisticalOficebyaprox.70,0),

westilhaveasurplusoflabouresources.Fromthisviewpoint,

wecansaythatwearenotconcernedaboutheoutflowof

workers,asunemploymentstilremainsatatwo-digitlevel.

Ontheotherhand,thegrowingshortageofworkersinselected

ocupationalgroupsisanimportantfactor.Wilingnesof

doctorsorITprofesionalstoemigrateisacauseofconcern.

Amajorchalengeistokeptheminentprofesionalsinthe

country,sincehigherearningsarethemainstimulustoleave.

UntilwecatchupwiththeWestintermsofwagesandsalaries,

agreatermarketliberalizationinhiringworkersfromtheEast

wilbenecesary.Thiswilsolvetheproblemofthetemporary

lackofprofesionalsinPoland.

7

Introduction

ThefirstreportoftheCEDInstituteaboutmigrationsinCentralandEasternEuropewasreceivedwith

greatinterestbyexperts,politiciansandthemedia.Awide-rangingdebatewasparkedbytheresultsofanalyses

demonstratingtheconsequencesofthemigrationofnationalsofCEcountriestotherEUmemberstates.

Athesametime,discusionsalsoconcernedchalengesrelatedtoimigration.Inthiscontext,solutionswere

soughthatwouldhelpCEcountriesavoidtheproblemsexperiencedbystateswithahighproportionof

foreignerswithinsociety,andwhicharerelatedtofailuretoutilisethepotentialoforeignersandtoproblems

withtheirintegration.DuringthedebateaboutmigrationfromtheperspectiveofCEcountries,theideaemerged

thathereisanedtosuplementhereportwiththeresultsofempiricalresearchconductedamongemigrants

andtocaryoutanalysesthatwouldhelpanswerthequestionwhetherCEcountriesarereadytoreceivegreater

numbersofimigrantsandhowtheycancompeteagainstbeterdevelopedstatesinatractinghighlyskiled

foreigners.Thisreportprovidesaresponsetotheseproposals.Itcomplementsthefirstreportonmigrationsin

theCEregion,whileupdatingitwiththemostrecentdatapublishedwithinthelastsixmonths.

SuchupdatesconstitutethemajorpartofChapterI.Amongotherthings,wemanagedtoupdate the

figures related to the scale of emigration and return migrations.Moreover,newdataconcerningemigration

trendsispresented.Theperiodthatelapsedsincepublicationofthefirstreportwastoshortforany

fundamentalchangestotakeplaceinthetrendsthatweseinmigrationproceses.Athesametime,theupdated

datayieldednewpiecesofinformation,whichmayberelevantfromtheviewpointofthelong-termconsequences

thatwedealwithofmigrationbothwithintheEUandfromthirdcountriestotheEU.

ChapterIdescribestheresultsofempiricalresearchperformedamongPolesworkingabroadwho

havebenrecruitedbyWorkService,oneofthebigestemploymentagencies.Thisresearchproducedmany

interestingpiecesofinformation,concerningthe motivations for leaving, fears and hopes related to living

abroad, and – what is particularly important – plans for the future.Onthebasisoftheresearch,wecalinto

question,amongotherthings,afactorindicatedinotherstudiesasinfluencingthewilingnestostayabroad

relatedtoemigrants’ negativeviewsaboutPoland.IntheresearchresultspresentedinChapterI,respondents

citedstrictlyeconomicandfamilyreasonsfortheirdecisiontostayabroadoreturnfromabroad.Politicalfactors

wereofabsolutelytertiaryrelevance.

ChapterIdescribesisuesconectedwithimigration.Itconsistsmainlyofanindex of migration

attractiveness of the member states of the European Union.Itwasdevelopedjustforthisreportwiththeaim

ofatemptingtoanswerthequestionwhetherCEstatescansucesfulycompeteagainstheEU-15states

inatractinghighlyskiledimigrants.Theindexofmigrationatractivenesofthestatesisaproposal– aproject

– whichrequiresalotofdiscusion.Iftheconceptofdevelopingsuchanindexgeneratesinterest,itwilbe

updatedandpublishedanualy,soastoenableregularstudyofchangesintheatractivenesofEuropeanstates

forimigrants.

ChapterIVisakindofrecapitulationofChaptersIandIoftheCEDInstitutereportonmigrations.

Itpresentsfour scenarios for the development of migration processes until 2020.Theyalsemlikelyand

theiremergencewildependmainlyontheactionsofthegovernmentrelatedtostimulationofeconomic

developmentandenhancingoflivingstandards.Thereisnodoubthathisisdirectlycorelatedwiththe

propensitytoemigrateandtheatractivenesofagivenstateforforeigners.Inthecaseofcountrieswherethe

mostnegativescenarioforthedevelopmentofmigrationprocesesmaterialises,wewilbedealingwiththe

declineoftheircompetitivenesand– inthelongrun– withrealimpoverishmentoftheirnationals.Butifthemost

positivescenariofordevelopmentofmigrationprocesesmaterialises,thiscouldcontributetorapidnarowing

byagivencountryofthegapseparatingitfromthebestdevelopedEUstatesandconsequentlyfordynamic

improvementofthelivingstandardsofitsresidents.

Migrationsareasocial,economicandpoliticalphenomenonthatfuelconstantdebate.Thesecond

reportoftheCEDInstituteonmigrationshastheambitiontobringorderintothisdebateandputitontheright

track.Wehopethisgoalhasbenatleastpartialyatained.

9

ChapterI

Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries

– what has changed in recent years

Chapter I

Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries

– what has changed in recent years

Theperiodthathaselapsedsincepublicationofthefirstreportaboutmigrationfromtheperspective

ofCEcountriesistoshortforthechangestakingplacetobeconsideredfundamental.Itmustbeborneinmind

thatmigrationproceses,unleswedealwithsucheventsaswarsornaturaldisasters,takeplaceslowly.

Animpulseforachangeinthescaleofmigrationcanalsocomefromsucheventsastheliftingorintroductionof

restrictionsonmovementsofpeople.Nosuchfactorswerepresentineither2013or2014.Nevertheles,the

migrationprocesestakingplaceintheEuropeanUnionremainamaterofgreatinterestobothpoliticiansand

publicopinion,whichmakesitesentialtomonitorandrawconclusionsregardingtrends.Itistobexpected

thatin2015theisueofremovementofworkersandemigrationtotheEUfromthirdcountrieswilbebackon

theEU’sagenda.ThisasumptionisuportedbythestatementmadebythenewPresidentoftheEuropean

1

Councilafterhisapointmentotheposition.

Migrations within the European Union – stabilisation but with some exceptions

AnanalysisofEurostatdatashowsthatin2013thepercentageofEUcitizensresidinginadiferent

memberstatethantheircountryoforiginwasthesameasayearearlier.Thesituationwasquitesimilarinthe

period209-2010( Chart1 ).

Chart 1

ChangesinthepercentageofEUcitizensresidinginadiferentmemberstatethantheircountryoforigin

3.0

2.5

2.1

2.0

2.4

2.5

2.5

2.6

2.8

2.8

1.5

1.0

0.5

Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroup

andcitizenship,Eurostat

0.0

207 208 209 2010 201

2012 2013

Itwouldbeamistaketodrawfar-reachingconclusionsfromananalysisofthedatacontainedinthe

chartabove.Neverthelesonecanventuretoindicatecertainrelationships.Eurostatdatasugeststhatinearly

2013thenumberofcitizensofCEcountriesresidingintheEU-15statesincreasedby14,0.Thismeansthatin

viewofthedatacontainedinChart1,adeclineinthenumberofmigratingcitizensofEU-15stateswasrecordedin

thatperiod.Athesametime,thegrowthinthenumberofcitizensofCEcountriesresidingintheEU-15inthe

analysedperiodwasverymoderateandlowerthaninprecedingyears.Onthisbasis,onecanasumethat2013

2

and2014wereyearsofstabilisationofmigrationprocesestakingplacewithintheEuropeanUnion.

1

ThestatementbyDonaldTuskduringthepresconferenceafterhisapointmentothepositionofthePresidentoftheEuropeanCouncil,anouncingfuturefortstomethe

demandsoftheUnitedKingdomrelatedtochangesintherulesgoverningmovementofworkerswithintheEU.

2

Thisconclusionisbasedonestimates.Athetimeofwriting,notalrequiredatafor2013and2014isavailable.Thelastcompletesetofdataisfor2012.

12

GrowthinthenumberofthecitizensofCEcountriesresidingintheEU-15wasrecordedinalstates

oftheregionexceptRomania,wherethenumberofcitizensofthatstateinEU-15countriesdeclinedslightly.

AlsonotableisthesignificantgrowthinthenumberofcitizensofHungaryandLatviaremaininginemigration

( Table1 ).Moreover,it must be stressed that, although small, the growth in the number of citizens of CEE

countries residing in EU-15 states continued the trend from previous years, despite expectations that the

worsening of the situation in the labour markets in EU-15 states resulting from the crisis would reduce

emigrations and increase the scale of returns. ThiswouldmeanthathenumberofthecitizensofCEcountries

stayinginemigrationshouldhavedroped,somethingthatdidnothapenin2012andperhapsneitherin2013

norin2014,foranycountryexceptRomania.

Table 1

EstimatesofthenumberofcitizensofCEcountriesresidingintheEU-15andtherelatedpercentagechange

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

TOTAL

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 2004-2012 2004-2013

(%) (%)

171,0 29,0 3,0 437,0 482,0 505,0

74,0 71,0 13,0 105,0 108,0 12,0

28,0 34,0 45,0 59,0 68,0 75,0

92,0 92,0 131,0 152,0 184,0 21,0

23,0 32,0 57,0 80,0 128,0 141,0

50,0 9,0 167,0 193,0 254,0 268,0

580,0 76,0 1,328,0 1,497,0 1,798,0 1,83,0

541,0 82,0 1,640,0 2,218,0 2,40,0 2,32,0

6,0

34,0

9,0

36,0

150,0

38,0

16,0

41,0

158,0

43,0

165,0

45,0

1,659,000 2,350,000 4,002,000 4,948,000 5,623,000 5,737,000

180

45

140

10

45

410

210

345

140

25

240

195

50

170

140

515

40

25

30

150

30

245

Source:OwncalculationbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,EurostatandD.Holandetal.,LabourmobilitywithintheEU:theimpactofenlargementandtransitional

arangements,NIESRDiscusionPaperno.379,NationalInstituteofEconomicandSocialResearch,London201.

ForalCEcountries,growthinthepercentageofemigrantswasrecorded( Table2 ).Inpercentage

terms,thisgrowthisgreaterthanwouldfolowfromthegrowthoftheoveralnumberofthecitizensofCE

countriesresidinginEU-15( Table1 ).Thisresultsfromdecliningpopulationsofthestatesoftheregion.

Forexample,Romaniasawadeclineinthenumberofemigrantsacompaniedbyariseintheirpercentageshare

3

ofthepopulation.Forseveralyears,Romaniahasrecordedpopulationdecline,andconsequentlydespitethe

reductioninthenumberofcitizensofthatcountryresidingabroad,theirpercentageshareinthetotalpopulation

hasgrown.

AsconcernsthemainstatesreceivingemigrantsfromCE

countries,nosignificantchangestokplace.

OnlyinthecaseofSlovakia,theCzechRepublicbecamethemaindestinationstate,whileGermanyremainsthe

mainrecipientofSlovaksamongEU-15states.

3

Athesametime,itmustbepointedouthatin2014Eurostatrevisedataconcerningpopulationsofmemberstates.Ifthosediferencesareveryslightforthemajorityofstates,inthe

caseofRomaniathecorectionexceds1milionpeople.

13

Table 2

EU-1citizensresidingintheEU-15on1January2013andmaindestinationcountries

Country of origin

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Lithuania

Latvia

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

Romania

Emigrants

in EU-15

Population

505,0 7,285,0

340,0 4,262,0

12,0 10,516,0

75,0 1,320,0

21,0 9,909,0

268,0 2,972,0

141,0 2,024,0

1,83,0 38,53,0

165,0 5,41,0

45,0 2,059,0

2,32,0 20,020,0

Percentage of Percentage of Main destination state

emigrants in 2012 emigrants in 2013

(%)

(%)

6.60

7.60

1.0

5.15

1.85

8.40

6.20

4.70

2.90

2.10

1.20

6.90 Spain

8.0 Germany

1.10 Germany

5.70 Finland

2.20 Germany

9.0 UnitedKingdom

7.0 UnitedKingdom

4.90 UnitedKingdom

3.0 CzechRepublic/Germany

2.20 Germany

1.60 Italy

Source:OwncalculationbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat,D.Holandetal.,LabourmobilitywithintheEU:theimpactofenlargementandtransitional

arangements,NIESRDiscusionPaperno.379,NationalInstituteofEconomicandSocialResearch,London201andOECD,InternationalMigrationOutlok2013,OECDPublishing2013

ThelimitedgrowthinthenumberofthecitizensofCEcountriesresidinginemigrationrecordedin

2012wasalsoacompaniedbyagrowth in the scale of return migrations in the case of a majority of the

states of the region.Comparedto201,morecitizensreturnedtoLatvia,Lithuania,Hungary,Poland,Romania

andSlovakia.ThegreatestincreaseinthenumberofreturningmigrantswasrecordedbyPoland(3%)and

Romania(12%).Theremainingstatesrecordedadeclineinthenumberofreturnmigrants.Estoniarecorded

adeclineof3%,Slovenia21%,theCzechRepublic20%andCroatia12%( Table3 ).

Table 3

Returnmigrantsandtheirshareintotalimigrants

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Estonia

Croatia

Latvia

Lithuania

Hungary

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

2009

return %oftotal

imigrants

21,74

1,65

521

4,821

2,312

142,348

124,936

2,903

1,205

2010

return %oftotal

imigrants

29 18,267

43

19

74

8

1,61

254

4,153

1,635

75 107,378

92 136,79

10

8

2,71

1,1

38

57

1

2011

return %oftotal

imigrants

8,141

2,034

4,720

7,373

80 14,012

6

5,504

69 101,945

91 138,397

18

8

3,318

1,078

30

5

5

72

2012

return %oftotal

imigrants

4,964

6,765

1,532

4,208

9,637

89 17,357

20 13,362

65 135,910

94 15,613

24

2

2,741

2,479

35

20

58

47

72

87

40

62

93

18

46

Source:OwncalculationbasedonImigrationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat

14

ComparisonofthedatafromTables1and3demonstratesthat2012witnesedanincreaseinthe

dynamicsofmigrationprocesesbetwenCEcountriesandEU-15states.In the majority of cases, there was

growth in the number of citizens residing abroad, despite the increased scale of return migrations, leading

to the conclusion that emigration increased as well. Thismeansthathenumberofpeoplewithmigration

experiencesisalsontherise.

In2014theEuropeanComisionpublishedareportenablingcomparisonsbetwenmemberstates

oftheEuropeanUnionintermsofmobilityratesandlengthofstayabroadofcitizensofagivenstate( Chart2 ).

ThedatasugeststhatinthemajorityofCEcountries,citizensofthosestatesremaininemigrationforupto

10years.Athesametime,thisgroupstilcontainsalargenumberofpeoplewholeftheanalysedcountriesnot

earlierthanfiveyearsago.Intheircase,thereisarealchancethatheywildecidetoreturntotheircountriesof

origin.ThesituationisquitediferentinsuchcountriesasPortugal,IrelandorSpain(so-caledoldemigration

stateswithintheEuropeanUnion).Inthesecases,mostemigrantsresideabroadformorethan10years.

Chart 2

Mobilityratesbysending

country– mobileEUcitizens

livinginanotherEUmember

state,byearsofresidence

(agegroup15-64,2013,

in%ofworking-agepopulation

ofcountryofcitizenship)

Latvia

Lithuania

Romania

Cyprus

Bulgaria

Luxembourg

Poland

Estonia

Slovakia

Hungary

Portugal

Ireland

Grece

Netherlands

Austria

Croatia

Belgium

CzechRepublic

Denmark

Italy

Finland

Morethan10years

5to10years

Lesthan5years

Spain

France

Sweden

Source:EuropeanComision,

htp:/ec.europa.eu/europe2020/

pdf/themes/27_skils_gaps_and

Germany

UnitedKingdom

_labour_mobility.pdf 0.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.0 16.0

15

Foreigners in EU member states – growth in the significance of internal migrations

ThedebatewearehavingintheEuropeanUnionleadsonetotheconclusionthatamajorityofmember

statestendtofavourestrictingimigrationfromthirdcountries.Hereargumentsabouthenegativeimpactof

imigrationonthelabourmarketandanincreaseinsocialunrestprevail.Howevermanyofthoseargumentsare

strictlypopulistinatureandarenotbasedonreliableresearchresults.

AnanalysisofEurostatdatademonstratedthat2013sawareversalofthetrendconcerninginflowof

foreignersfromthirdcountriesthathadbenobservedsince207( Chart3 ).The number of foreigners residing

in EU states dropped. Thecomingyearswilprovideananswertothequestionwhetherthisisjustaone-year

decline,asitwasin206and207,orwhetherthiswilbeamulti-yeartrend.

Chart 3

ChangesinthepopulationofthirdcountrynationalsresidinginEU-28countries,204-2013(inmilions)

25

20

16.4

17.4

19.0

18.7

19.3

20.0

20.4 20.5

20.7

20.4

15

10

5

0

204 205 2062072082092010201 2012 2013

Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat

DespiterelativestabilisationofmigrationproceseswithintheEUmanifestedinthemoderategrowth

inthenumberofthecitizensofCEcountriesresidinginEU-15statesandadeclineinthenumberofthirdcountry

nationalsintheEU-27,theEuropeanimigrationstatesrecordedariseinthepercentageoforeignersinthetotal

population.InthecaseofGermanyandtheUnitedKingdom,itwasmainlycitizensofmemberstates,chieflyfrom

CEcountries,whowereresponsibleforthisgrowth.InthecaseofFrancewecouldobserveagrowthinthe

numberofimigrantsmainlyfromthirdcountries( Table4 ).

Table 4

EUcitizensresidinginthemostpopulatedEU-28states,2012and2013(in%)

Non-nationals

Country

Germany

France

United Kingdom

Total

2012 2013

9.05 9.40

5.90 6.20

7.60 7.70

Citizens of other EU member states

2012 2013

3.40 3.70

2.10 2.15

3.70 3.85


16

Thesituationinthestateswiththegreatestpercentagesofimigrantsinthepopulationvaried

greatly.ForexampleagrowthintheproportionoforeignerswasrecordedinLuxembourg.Thisproces

concernedbothEUcitizensandthirdcountrynationals.Thepercentageoforeignersresidinginthatstate

aproaches50%.Athesametime,adeclinewasrecordedinCyprusandLatvia,butintheformeraslightincrease

inthenumberofEUcitizensresidingontheislandwasobserved( Table5 ).

Table 5

EUmemberstateswiththelargestshareoforeignersinthetotalpopulation,2012and2013(in%)

Non-nationals

Country

Luxembourg

Cyprus

Latvia

Total

2012 2013

43.8 4.5

21.0 19.6

16.3 15.6


2012 2013

37.9 38.4

12.6 13.0

0.3

0.3


Immigration to CEE countries from other EU member states and third countries – are they slowly becoming

immigration states?

TogetafulpictureofmigrationprocesestakingplacewithinCEcountries,itisalsonecesaryto

4

analyseEurostatdatapresentingindetailimigrationtothosecountries.Thisdatasugeststhatin2012

a majority of the states of the region recorded growth in the inflow of foreigners both from EU member

states and from third countries.InCroatia,theCzechRepublic,Lithuania,PolandandSlovenia,imigration

growthwasrecordedbothfromEUmemberstatesandthirdcountries.Estoniarecordedagrowthinimigration

fromEUmemberstatesandadeclinefromthirdcountries.TheopositehapenedinthecaseofHungary.Latvia

andSloveniarecordedadeclineinimigrationinthecasesofbothaforementionedgroupsofstates( Table6 and

5

Chart4 ).ThosetrendsilustratethehighlydiversifiedpictureofCEcountriesasconcernsimigration

proceses.Itmustbeasumedthathescaleofimigrationisinfluencednotonlybytheconomicsituationofa

givenstate,butalsobyimigrationpolicy.ThismayexplainanotheryearofgrowthinimigrationtoPoland,but

itsdeclineinthecaseofHungaryandSlovakia.ThesituationisimilarinLatviandEstonia,whichaverecently

decidedtomaketheiregulationsgoverningtheinflowofRusiancitizensmorestringent.

4

Thestatisticspresentedsofarhaveshowntheshareoforeignersinthepopulationofagivencountry.OnenotablexceptionisdataconcerningreturnmigrationstoCEcountries.

5

Whenthecalculationsweremade,comparabledataforBulgariandRomaniawasmising.

17

Table 6

ImigrationfromEU-27statesandfromthirdcountriestoCEcountries,201and2012

EU-27

Country

Total

% of immigrants

Main country of origin

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

2011 2012

4,136

1,052 1,342

10,706 12,075

62 70

12,451 10,358

1,085 539

503 738

13,896 24,46

3,412 3,450

1,90 2,179

3,162 2,418

2011 2012

45 Grece

28 28 Slovenia

56 4Slovakia

4 6Finland

5 51 Romania

19 15 Germany

30 30 Latvia

25 30 Germany

37 30 Italy

18 18 Croatia

84 82 Hungary

Third countries

Country

Total

% of immigrants

Main country of origin

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

2011 2012

4,989

2,758 3,409

8,265 15,495

1,612 1,036

9,854 9,981

4,687 3,127

1,170 1,748

41,16 57,070

5,864 8,151

8,75 10,102

589 52

2011 2012

5Turkey

72 72 BosniandHerzegovina

4 56 Ukraine

96 94 Rusia

45 49 Ukraine

81 85 Rusia

70 70 Rusia

75 70 Ukraine

63 70 Turkey

82 82 BosniandHerzegovina

16 18 Ukraine

Source:OwnworkbasedonImigrationbyfiveyearagegroup,sexandcitizenship,Eurostat

18

Chart 4

InflowofimigrantstoCEcountriesfromEU-27countriesandthirdcountries,205-2012

10,0

10,0

90,0

80,0

70,0

60,0

50,0

CzechRepublic

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Hungary

Poland

Slovenia

Slovakia

Romania

(since208)

40,0

30,0

20,0

10,0

0

205

206 207 208 209 2010 201

2012


AdetailedanalysisofthechangesintheshareoforeignersinthepopulationsofCEcountriesthat

tokplaceintheperiod2012-2013demonstratedthat,comparedtothepreviousyear,in2013stilthegreatest

numberoforeignersresidedinLatviandEstonia,althoughinbothcasesadeclineinthepercentageof

foreignersinthetotalpopulationswasobserved(by0.7and0.8percentagepoints(p)respectively).Hungary

alsorecordedadeclineintheshareoforeigners.AgrowthinthisharewasrecordedinSlovenia(by0.2p),

Romania(by>0.2p),Bulgaria(by0.1p).Intheremainingstates,thesituationin2013wasthesameasinthe

previousyear( Table7 ).

19

Table 7

TheshareoforeignersinCEcountries,2012and2013(in%)

Country

Latvia

Estonia

Slovenia

Czech Republic

Hungary

Slovakia

Croatia

Bulgaria

Romania

Poland

Total

2012 2013

16.30 15.60

15.70 14.90

4.20 4.40

4.0 4.0

2.10 1.40

1.30 1.30

0.70

0.50 0.60

0.17 0.40

0.15 0.15

Non-nationals


2012 2013

0.30 0.30

1.10 0.60

0.30 0.30

1.40 1.50

1.30 0.80

1.0 1.0

0.20

0.10 0.20

0.03 0.10

0.05 0.05


Onthebasisofthedatafromtheabovetable,oneshouldalsopointouthedeclineinthenumberofEU

citizensresidinginEstonia(by0.5p)andinHungary(by0.5p).AgrowthwasrecordedinthecaseoftheCzech

Republic(by0.1p),Bulgaria(by0.1p)andRomania(by

In2013theratewas-5.6,whilein2012itamountedto-7.6.Inthecourseofoneyear,thediferencebetwenthe

countrieswiththehighestandlowestnetmigrationrateschangedto(in2013thediferencewas3.6points,

whilein2012itwas26.5points).

TheCEcountriesthatrecordedapositivenetmigrationratein2013wereHungary(0.6),Slovakia

(0.4)andSlovenia(0.2).Otherstatesrecordedanegativenetmigrationrate,withLatviahavingthelowestrate

(-7.1).InthecaseofsuchcountriesasHungary,Romania,LatviaortheCzechRepublictherewasaperceptibly

significantdeclineinthenetmigrationrate.InthecaseofLatvia,theratewas1.3percentagepoints.Hungary

recordedadeclineof1p,whileRomaniandtheCzechRepublicsawaslumpof1.1p.Consequentlyin2013those

twostatesrecordedanegativenetmigrationrate,whereasin2012itwaspositiveinbothcases.Bothin2012and

in2013Latviahadanegativemigrationbalance.AdiferentsituationtokplaceinEstoniandLithuania.Both

thosestatesimprovedtheirnetmigrationrate:Estoniaby3.7pandLithuaniaby1.7p.Howeverboththose

statestilrecordedanegativemigrationbalance.

Thechangesinetmigrationratesinotherstateswereminimal.Forexample,inPoland,thenet

migrationratedropedby0.3percentagepointsfrom-0.2in2012to-0.5in2013,andinCroatiaby-0.3p,from

-0.9in2012to-1.2in2013.InSlovakiatherewasadeclineof0.2p,andinSlovenia0.1p.However,boththose

statesrecordedapositivemigrationbalance( ).

Chart5

Chart 5

Migrationbalance

inEU-28countries,2013

(per1,0inhabitants)

Source:Cruderateofnetmigrationplusadjustment

(Per10inhabitants),Eurostat2014 -15-10-5 05 101520

Italy

Luxembourg

Malta

Sweden

Austria

Germany

Denmark

Finland

United Kingdom

Belgium

Netherlands

France

Hungary

Slovakia

Slovenia

Czech Republic

Bulgaria

Romania

Poland

Croatia

Estonia

Portugal

Greece

Spain

Ireland

Lithuania

Latvia

Cyprus

19.7

19.0

7.6

6.9

6.6

5.8

3.8

3.3

3.1

2.3

1.2

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.2

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.5

-1.2

-2.0

-3.5

-4.7

-5.5

-5.6

-5.7

-7.1

-13.9

21

RecentlyEurostatpublishednewdata,whichelpstoshowtrendsasregardsmigrationswithintheEU

andfromthirdcountries.Ananalysisofthisdataindicatesthathe share of citizens of EU member states

among migrants is increasing while the share of third country nationals among them is declining ( Chart6 ).

Thisisapracticalconfirmationofthepoliticaldecisionsofrecentyearsaimedatrestrictingimigrationfrom

thirdcountrieswhilenotintroducinganysignificanthindrancestofremovementofworkers.Itshouldbenoted,

st

however,thatheEuropeanUnionenlargementsmadeinthe21centurychangedthestatusofcitizensofnew

memberstates.Theyhavebecomeinternalmigrants.Thiswasboundtoresultinchangesinmigrationstatistics.

Nevertheles,thedeclineintheshareofthethirdcountrynationalsamongmigrantsalsocontinuedinoenlargementyears,soitcanbeasumedthatmigrationswithintheEUtoasmalextentsubstitutefor

imigrationfromthirdcountries.Suchaconclusionmightchangeifwecouldestimatetheilegalinflowofthird

countrynationalsintotheEU.However,thisisanimposibletaskgiventhelackofdatandreliableanalytical

methodologies.

Chart 6

ShareofcitizensofEUmemberstatesandthirdcountrynationalsintheperiod2010-2012intheEU-27(in%)

70

60

61.8

60.7

59.8

50

40

38.2

39.3

40.2

30

OtherEU-27countries

20

Thirdcountries

10

0

Source:OwnworkbasedonPopulationbysex,

agegroupandcitizenship,Eurostat

201

2012 2013

Duetothelongprocesofcolectionandpublicationofcomparabledata,analysesofmigration

procesesareboundtobeperformedwithacertaindelay(usualytwoyears).Thishampers,butdoesnot

preclude,thedrawingofconclusionsandmakingofshort-termrecomendations.Astheresultsofanalyses

presentedinChapterIhaveshown,thechangesinmigrationflowswithinagivenyearareverysmal.Athesame

time,theyindicatebothmaintenanceofthexistingtrends(migrationsbetwenCEcountriesandtheEU-15)and

theshapingofnewrelationships(adeclineofimigrationfromthirdcountries).Conclusionsdrawnfromthose

analyseshouldbetakenintoacountwheneconomicandsocialstrategiesarebeingdeveloped.Failuretotake

migrationtrendsintoacountmayleadoeroneousconclusionsandtothermistakesbeingmadeonthatbasis.

Analysesofmigrationprocesesareparticularlyimportantwhendemographichangesandtheiroutcomes,

particularlyinthelabourmarket,areforecast.

2

Main conclusions from the chapter:

1

Thedatafor2012andestimatesfor2013asregardsmigrationproceses

takingplacewithintheEuropeanUnionindicatethatwe are dealing with

a stabilisation of the migration situation.ThenumberofEUcitizensresiding

inamemberstateotherthantheirstateoforiginhasremainedvirtualy

unchanged.

2

Despitethestablemigrationsituation,the number of citizens of CEE

countries in EU-15 states increased again.Growthwasrecordedinalstatesof

theregionbesidesRomania.However,the scale of return migrations also

increased in the same period.ThismeansthatmigrationflowsbetwenCE

countriesandtheEU-15increased.2012and2013provedtobethenextyears

whenexpectationsthatmigrationflowswouldiminishfailedtomaterialise.

But,athesametime,thegrowthinthenumberofthecitizensofCEcountries

residingintheEU-15islowerthaninpreviousyears.

3

The number of foreigners residing in the European Union on

1 January 2013 was lower than in 2011 and 2012. Athesametimethesituation

wasvariedinthecaseofCEcountries.InCroatia,theCzechRepublic,Lithuania,

Poland,HungaryandSlovenia,growthinthescaleofimigrationfromthird

countrieswasrecorded.Otherstatesrecordedeclines.Itshouldalsobepointed

outhathestatesreceivingthelargestnumberoforeigners,i.e.Germany,

FranceandtheUnitedKingdom,onceagainrecordedagrowthinthepercentage

oforeignersinthetotalpopulation.

4

No fundamental changes took place in the migration balance of EU

member states. Italyrecordedthegreatestgrowthwithregardtonetmigration

rate,whileCyprusrecordedthegreatestdrop.InthecaseofCEcountries,we

weredealingwithquitealargevarietyofsituations.In2013animprovementin

thenetmigrationratewasrecordedinEstoniandLithuania,whiledeterioration

wasnotedinHungary,Romania,LatviandtheCzechRepublic.Thesituation

remainedvirtualyunchangedinotherstates.

5

ComparisonofthedirectionsofmigrationstakingplacewithintheEU

showsthatin recent years we have been dealing with an increase in the share

of citizens of EU member states accompanied by a decline in the share of

third country nationals.

23

ChapterI

What does a Polish emigrant think

about going abroad and returning?

Chapter II

What does a Polish emigrant think

about going abroad and returning?

ManystudiesconductedbothinPolandandabroadhaveadresedtheisueofdefiningtheprofileof

Polishemigrants,identifyingthereasonsunderlyingtheirdecisiontoleavePolandandplansforthefuture.Dueto

theimposibilityofdefiningacolectiveprecisely,noneofthosestudieswasrepresentative,andinamajorityof

casesrespondentswereselectedusingamethodcaled“snowbalsampling”.Consequently,theresearchresults

showonlyapartofmigrationrealityandshouldnotbegeneralisedtoaplytoanentirecolectiveofemigrants.

But,athesametime,theresultsofsuchresearchaveprovidedmanyusefulpiecesofinformation,whichcould

havenotbenacquiredthroughothermethods,e.g.expertopinionsurveysoranalysesofstatisticaldata.

Therefore,itisdesirabletoconductqualitativeresearchamongemigrantsinordertodeterminetheiropinions

andnedstothegreatestposiblextent.

ThischapterpresentsresultsofqualitativeresearchcariedoutamongPolesworkingabroadwho

havebenrecruitedbyoneofthebigestemploymentagenciesinPoland,i.e.WorkServiceS.A.

Research methodology

Whentheresearchsamplewascreated,thedatabaseofWorkServicecontained2,35peoplewho

undertokworkabroadthroughtheagency.Onthisbasis,aclustersamplecontaining235personswaseventualy

established.Computer-AsistedTelephoneInterviews(CATI)wereperformedbyemployesofthecal-incentreof

WorkService.TheCATIswereperformedinlateAugustandearlySeptember2014andhadbenprecededby

apilotsurveycoveringeightrespondents.Despitethefacthathepersonsundertakingthesurveywerefaced

withanumberofrefusalsandinanumberofcasesthepersonscompletingthequestionairefailedtoprovide

answerstoalthequestions,theresearchenabledcolectionofinterestingempiricalmaterial,ananalysisof

whichispresentedinthischapter.Duetotheconstraintsinvolved,thereportonlycontainschartswith

breakdownsintosectors.Itwasdecidedthatheycontributethegreatestadedvaluetosourceliterature.

BoththequestionaireaswelasthefulreportonthisresearchareavailableonthewebsiteoftheCEDInstitute.

Demographic features of the respondents

Menoverwhelminglyprevailedamongtherespondentswhotokpartintheresearch.Women

constitutedamere12.8%ofalrespondents.Suchaselectionfolowedmainlyfromthespecificsofthemain

databaseofWorkService,wherewomenwereinadecisiveminority,andthesectorsinwhichworkersrecruitedby

theagencyaremployed.Forthatreason,inamajorityofcasesthischapterforegoesdetailedanalysesbysex.

Inamajorsimplification,onecanstatethatheresultsoftheresearchcanbecomeasourceofknowledgeabout

theopinionsofemigrantsrecruitedbyemploymentagenciesandemployedinfoursectors(industry,

construction,manufacturing,services)instatesuchasGermany,FranceandBelgium.

Athetimeofsampleselectionandperformanceoftheinterviews,incontrastosex,asignificant

diversityintheageofrespondentswasobtained.Thebestrepresentedwerepeopleaged21-25(2.4%ofthe

respondents)andaged26-30(21%).Thesmalestwasthegroupofrespondentsaged31-35(17.6%).Persons

aged36-40acountedfor20.6%,whilethoseagedover40acountedfor18.4%oftherespondents.Thiselection

ofrespondentsbyagewasimilartotheprofilesofPolishemigrantsacquiredinotherstudies.Theystrestheir

youngage(under40).Intheanalysedresearch,suchrespondentsconstitutedover80%ofthentiregroup,

i.e.adecisivemajority.

26

Moreover,thestudyobtainedagreatdiversityofrespondentsbysectorsinwhichtheyweremployed

abroad.Thebigestgroupwascomprisedbyworkersemployedinthemanufacturingsector(32.4%),whilethe

smalestconsistedofthoseworkinginindustry(15.7%).Representativesofservicesandconstructionacounted

for26.8%and25.1%respectively.

TherespondentswhoparticipatedintheresearchworkedinthreEuropeanUnionmemberstates:

Germany,BelgiumandFrance.MostofthemworkedinGermany(5.8%).France(25.5%)camesecondand

Belgiumthird(nearly18.7%).Suchgeographicaldistributionofthemploymentofemigrantsbringsasignificant

adedvaluetotheknowledgeabouthemostrecentemigrationsofPoles.Mostanalysesperformedafter204

havefocusedmainlyontheUnitedKingdom,IrelandandScandinavia(chieflyNorway),i.e.thecountriestowhich

thegreatestnumberofPoleswentaftertheacesiontotheEuropeanUnion,whileresearchdescribingthe

situationandpositionofPolesgoingtothestatesof“typical” emigrationhavebeneglected.

Discussion of the research results

Reasonsforundertakingemploymentabroad

Thereasonsunderlyingthedecisiontoundertakeworkabroadisoneoftheisuesmostfrequently

adresedinthediscusionaboutemigration.Inmanypapersitisclaimedthathemainreasonforleaving

Polandisunemployment.Butheanalysisoftheanswersofrespondentsinthistudyindicatedthatmostofthem

hadajobinPoland,butwerenotsatisfiedwiththeremunerationtheyreceived.Ineverysector,suchananswer

wasprovidedbyover70%oftherespondents.Therefore,the major factor stimulating employment migration

was the opportunity to obtain salaries higher than those available in Poland ( Chart7 ).Havingnojobin

Polandwasmostfrequentlyindicatedinthecaseofworkersemployedinindustry(over34%oftherespondents),

whileitwasleastfrequentlycitedbythoseworkingintheconstructionsector(almost12%).Athesametime,the

latergroupmostfrequentlypointedoutheywantedtotrytheirhandsatworkingabroad(35.6%)andthathey

wantedtoacquirenewqualifications(23.7%).Aproximately30%ofrespondentsworkinginmanufacturingand

servicesnamedlackofemploymentastheireasonforleavingPoland.

Chart 7

Reasonsforundertaking

employmentabroad

withabreakdown

bysector(notmore

thantwoanswers,in%)

IhadajobinPoland

butwagesweretolow

NojobinPoland

11.9

28.0

34.3

30.2

79.6

74.6

74.3

84.1

Iwantedtotrymyhands

atworkingabroad

11.4

24.0

27.0

35.6

Iwantedtobtain

newqualifications

9.3

11.4

14.3

23.7

Ireceivedaspecific 5.1

joboferabroad 16.0

8.6

11.1

Constructionsector(n=59)

Manufacturing(n=75)

Industry(n=35)

Services(n=63)

Iwasencouraged 1.7

byfamily/friends 6.7

11.4

11.1

Other

11.9

6.7

8.6

6.3

27

Ashasbenalreadypointedout,financialconsiderationswerethemostimportantreasonfor

undertakingemploymentabroad.TherespondentshadjobsinPoland,butheirsalariesweretolow.Inthe

breakdownbyagegroup,thisanswerwasmostfrequentlygivenbypersonsaged21-25(86.5%),andleast

frequentlybythoseaged31-35(72.5%).Theanswer“Iwantedtotrymyhandsatworkingabroad” wasmost

frequentlygivenbypeopleintheoldestagegroup,theover-40-year-olds(39.5%).LackofemploymentinPoland

wasmostfrequentlycitedasthereasontoleavebypeopleaged36-40(42.6%).Thisanswerwasgivenleast

frequentlybyrespondentsinthetwoyoungestagegroups.Onerespondentinfouragedover40stresedtheir

wilingnestoacquirenewqualificationsasthereasonforundertakingemploymentabroad.

Satisfactionwithundertakingemploymentabroad

Athetimetheresearchwasconducted,a decisive majority of respondents were satisfied with

their decision to undertake employment abroad.Suchananswerwasgivenby84.5%oftherespondentsinthe

constructionsector,87.7%ofthoseworkinginmanufacturing,91.7%ofthoseworkinginindustry,and91.9%of

respondentsworkinginservices( Chart8 ).

Chart 8

Satisfactionwithundertakingemploymentabroadwithabreakdownbysector(in%)

Satisfied

84.5

87.7

91.6

91.9


Manufacturing(n=73)

Industry(n=36)

Services(n=62)

Disatisfied 5.2

4.1

0.0

0.0

Hardtosay

10.3

8.2

8.4

8.1

ThedatacontainedinChart8sugeststhatanswersunambiguouslyindicatingdisatisfactionwith

undertakingofemploymentabroadweregivenextremelyrarely.Inthecaseofindustryandservices,notasingle

respondentgavesuchanswer.However,otheresearchresultsugesthatalargegroupofPolesarenotsatisfied

withworkingabroad.Thepositiveanswersobtainedinthistudycanresultfromseveralcircumstances.First,

personswhoagredtoprovideanswersweresatisfiedwhilethosehavingdiferentopinionsimplyrefusedto

takepartinthesurvey.Second,peoplehiredthroughemploymentagenciescanbefrequentlysatisfiedsimply

becausetheyhadtodovirtualynothingtobtainemploymentabroad.Andlastbutnotleast,thosepeoplewere

employedinGermany,FranceandBelgium,wherestandardsconcerningobservanceofemployerightsarevery

stringentandemployesareveryrarelyexploited.

Theanalysisoftheanswerstothequestionconcerningsatisfactionwithundertakingofemployment

abroadindicatedabroadconsensusintermsoftheageofrespondents.Diferencesinanswerswereminimal.

Themostsatisfiedweretherespondentsaged36-40(almost91.5%weresatisfied),whiletheleastsatisfiedwere

personsaged26-30(almost86%weresatisfied).

28

Ashasalreadybenindicated,financial considerations were the main reason for going abroad.

Therefore,toevaluatethedecisiontoleavePoland,itisesentialtodeterminewhethertherehasbenareal

improvementinthefinancialsituationofagivenrespondent.Over90%oftherespondentsdeclaredthatworking

abroadimprovedtheirfinancialsituation.Suchanswersweremostfrequentlygivenbypeopleworkingin

manufacturing(98.6%).Athesametimealmostalrespondentsoftheoldestandyoungestagegroupsanswered

thatworkingabroadimprovedtheirfinancialsituation( Chart9 ).

Chart 9

Impactofundertakingemploymentabroadonlivesofemigrantswithabreakdownbysector(anynumberofanswers,in%)

Improvement

ofinancialsituation

91.0

98.6

94.4

95.0

Improvement

ofself-estem

(Isucededabroad)

30.1

39.3

44.4

49.2

Acquiringnew

qualifications

Disapointment 8.9

withemployment 2.7

conditions 0.0

3.3

16.7

26.8

32.9

32.8


Manufacturing(n=73)

Industry(n=36)

Services(n=61)

Familyproblems 8.9

6.8

5.5

1.6

Other 3.6

4.1

8.3

1.6

Amongotherpositivefactorsrelatedtomigration,respondentsindicatedimproved self-esteem.

Forexample,nearlyhalftherespondentsworkinginservicescitedthisfactor.Suchanswerwasgivenalsoby

4.4%oftherespondentsworkinginindustry,39.3%ofthoseintheconstructionsectorand30.1%ofthose

employedinmanufacturing.

OneinthrerespondentsworkinginmanufacturingandservicespointedouthatleavingPoland

enabledthemtoacquirenewqualifications,whichtheywiluseaftereturningtoPoland.

29

Fearsrelatedtogoingabroad

Amongalrespondentsthe most important fear related to going abroad was the fear of being

cheated.Itwastickedby35%ofalrespondents.Notmuchles,namely31%,indicatedfamily-relatedfearsuch

aslongingorfearofamilyproblemscausedbythedeparture.10%statedtheyfearedtheirskilswouldproveto

porandtheywouldlosetheirjobfast.

Ananalysisoftheanswersoftherespondentswithabreakdownintothesectorsinwhichtheywere

employedindicatedaveryhighlevelofconvergence( Chart10 ).Thelargestgroup,almost60%oftherespondents

workinginmanufacturing,fearedtheywouldbecheatedabroad(e.g.theywouldnotreceivetheagred-upon

remuneration).Suchanswersweregivenalsoby38%oftherespondentsworkinginservices,32%ofthe

respondentsintheconstructionsectorand17.6%ofthoseworkinginindustry.Thismeansthatheisueofthe

reliabilityofemployers,particularlyinthemanufacturingsector,likelyleavesmuchtobedesired.Itshouldbe

asumedthatrespondentseitherthemselvesexperiencedsituationswhereremunerationwasnotpaidor

obtainedsuchinformationfromcrediblesources.Thenumberofanswerstronglypointsouthathereisa

problemofailuretopaywagesorofwagesforperformedworkbeingsubstandard.Butherewerealsoisues

conectedwithfamily.Mostfrequently(38%),problemsconectedwithfamilyrelationsinthecontextof

undertakingemploymentabroadwereindicatedbyworkersintheconstructionsector,andleastfrequentlyby

thoseworkinginindustry(23.5%).Otherproblemswereindicatedmuchmorerarely,withanswersnot

exceding10%.

Chart 10

Fearsrelatedtogoingabroadwithabreakdownbysector(anynumberofanswers, in% )

Iwilbecheated(e.g.Iwilnotreceive

theagredremuneration,Iwilnot

getajobandwilhavetoreturn

tothehomecountry)

17.6

32.0

38.0

57.4

Fearsrelatedtothefamily

(e.g.longingorfearofamilyproblems

causedbygoingabroad)

Myskils/competenceswilprove

toporandIwilose

thejobfast

27.8

23.5

32.0

24.0

20.4

23.5

18.0

38.0

Dificultieswithadjustment

20.0

20.4

20.0

29.4

FearofaversiontoPoles

amongresidentsofthecountry

whereIwilwork 0.0

10.0

18.0

20.4


Manufacturing(n=54)

Industry(n=17)

Services(n=50)

Iwilbecomeil

andwilhaveto

returntoPoland 0.0

Noneoftheabove

11.1

10.0

16.0

18.5

24.0

28.0

35.3

30

Fearsrelatedtobeingcheatedabroad(e.g.notreceivingtheagreduponremuneration)were

expresedmostfrequentlybyrespondentsaged26-30(57.1%).Suchfearswerexpresedbyamuchsmaler

percentageofpersonsaged36-40(2.6%).

Theanalysisofanswerstothequestionsconcerningfearsrelatedtogoingabroadindicatesthat

problemswithpaymentofremunerationaremostfearedbypersonsaged26-30employedinthemanufacturing

sector.Thisisaveryimportantpieceofinformation,requiringin-depthqualitativeresearch,whichwouldhelp

explainwhypeopleinthisagegroupemployedinmanufacturingmuchmorefrequentlythanothersindicatethe

posibilityofbeingcheatedwhentheyundertakemploymentabroad.

Over30%oftherespondentsofthegroupagedover26pointedoutofearsrelatedtofamily.Inthe

youngestagegroup,oneinfourespondentsgavesuchananswer.Ontheotherhand,31.4%oftherespondents

aged26-30fearedbeforegoingabroadthatheirskilswouldprovetobetoporandthatheywouldhave

problemswithadjustment.Morethan40%oftherespondentsaged36-40and28%ofrespondentsfromthe

oldestandtheyoungestagegroup,respectively,didnotexpresanyoftheaforementionedfears.

Despitethereservationspointedoutabove,itsemsimportantoanalysetheanswersbythesexof

therespondents.Familyisuesasnegativeconsequencesofemploymentemigrationweremorefrequentlycited

bywomen.Suchisueswerecitedbynearly41%ofemalerespondentsandonly30%ofmalerespondents.This

showsthatemigrationentailsgreateremotionalcostsforwomenthanformen.Generaly,itindicatesthathere

areaditionalchalengesconectedwiththephenomenonofso-caledfeminisationofmigration,i.e.slowly

progresingdominationofwomeninmigrationproceses,notonlyinPolandandEurope,butalsoglobaly.

Plansforthefuture

Amajorityoftherespondentsare planning in the near future to extend their employment abroad

or to go abroad again ( Chart1 ).Respondentsworkinginthemanufacturingsectorwereabsolutelycertainthat

theywouldcontinueworkingabroad(97.3%oftherespondents).Itisinterestingthatheymadesuchdeclarations

despitetheirfearsofnotreceivingtheirdueremuneration,whichwasidentifiedintheanalysisofanswerstothe

previousquestions.Respondentsemployedinindustrywerenotmuchlesresolved(89%).Inthecaseofthose

employedintheconstructionsectorandservices,thepercentageofrespondentscertaintocontinuemployment

abroadwasignificantlylower,althoughintheircaseaswelpositiveanswersdefinitelydominate– 80.7%ofthe

respondentsintheconstructionsectorand73.8%ofthosemployedinservices,respectively.

Chart 11

Declarationsoftherespondentsconcerningplanstocontinuemploymentabroadwithabreakdownbysector(in%)

Yes

80.7

97.2

89.0

73.8


Manufacturing(n=73)

Industry(n=36)

Services(n=61)

No 10.5

1.4

5.5

11.5

Idon’tknow 8.8

1.4

5.5

14.7

Thelargestpercentageoftherespondentsinterestedinextendingtheiremploymentabroadorgoing

abroadagainconsistedofpeopleaged26-30(91.5%.)andagedover40(92.9%).Peopleoftheyoungestagegroup

displayedthelowestlevelofinterestinextendingemploymentabroad(73.1%).

31

Declarationsregardingcontinuationofemploymentabroadshouldbecomparedwiththewilingnes

ofrespondentstoremainpermanentlyinemigration.Asonecaneasilyimagine,plans to remain abroad

permanently are much more rarely stated than the willingness to continue employment emigration for

some more time ( Chart12 ).Amongtherespondents,awilingnestostayabroadwasmostfrequentlyexpresed

bythoseworkinginindustry(61.1%),folowedcloselybypersonsworkinginthemanufacturingsector(54.8%).

Amongrespondentsworkinginservices,only37.7%statedthatweregivingseriousconsiderationtoremaining

abroadpermanently.Evenlesfrequentlyweresuchplanstatedbythosemployedintheconstructionsector

(31.6%).Inthecaseofthelatersector,thepercentageofrespondentsrulingoutstayingabroadwashigherthan

thosedeclaringawilingnestoremainabroadpermanently.

Chart 12

Declarationoftherespondentsconcerningwilingnestostayabroadpermanentlywithabreakdownbysector(in%)

Yes

31.6

37.7

54.8

61.1


Manufacturing(n=73)

Industry(n=36)

Services(n=61)

No

Idon’tknow

16.4

13.9

31.1

26.3

28.8

25.0

31.2

42.1

Significantdiferencesregardingdeclarationsaboutplansforthefuturewereidentifiedbytheageof

therespondents.Respondentsaged26-30mostfrequentlyplantostayabroadpermanently(61.7%).Inthecase

ofotheragegroups,thepercentageofthosewilingtoremainabroadoesnotexced50%.Intheyoungestage

group(21-25),46.2%considerstayingabroadpermanently,while8percentfewerespondentstildonotknow

whatdecisiontheywilmake.Intheoldestagegroup,onlyslightlymorethan35%oftherespondentsareplaning

tostayabroad.Intheircase,declarationsononlytemporaryemploymentabroadominated,whichtranslates

intoawilingnestoreturntoPoland.

Ananalysisofanswersgiventothequestionaboutplansforthefuturewithabreakdownbyage

indicatesthatgeneralyspeakingelderly,morexperiencedpersonslesfrequentlydeclareawilingnestostay

abroadpermanently.Youngpeople,whosesituationinthePolishlabourmarketisparticularlydificult,are

determinednotonlytocontinuemploymentabroad,butalsotostaytherepermanently.Thisisaverynegative

trendrequiringactionbythePolishgovernment.

Themostimportantreasonunderlyingthe willingness to stay abroad is the conviction that this

will lead to improvement of living conditions.Suchananswerwasgivenby30%oftherespondentsdeclaring

awilingnestostayinemigrationpermanently.Overone-fourth(26%)answeredthatheyhavepermanent

employmenthere,and16%indicatedfinancialmaters.

32

Themostoptimisticaboutheirprospectsinthelabourmarketsofthereceivingstatesaremployes

workingintheconstructionsector,whiletheleastoptimisticarethosemployedinmanufacturingandservices

( Chart13 ).Over70%oftherespondentsemployedintheconstructionsectorstatedthatheyhadapermanentjob

abroadorgodchancesofgetingone.Nearlyhalf(46.1%)oftherespondentsalsoansweredtheyfeltmore

secureabroadwithregardtothelabourmarket.Amongtherespondentsworkinginthemanufacturingsector,

“only” 56.4%answeredthatheyconsideredstayingabroadbecausetheyhadapermanentjobthere,and53.8%

thoughtheirlivingconditionswouldimprovethere.

Forpeopleworkinginindustry,themostimportantargumentinfavourofstayingabroadwasthefact

theyhadapermanentjob.Thiswasindicatedby68%oftherespondentsinthatgroup.Athesametime,56%of

therespondentsemployedinthisectornamedtheoportunitytoimprovetheirlivingconditionsasthemain

reasonunderlyingtheirwilingnestostayabroad.Thisargumentwasalsoindicatedbythebigestgroupfrom

amongthosemployedinservices,namely61.5%.Equalyimportantforthemwashavingapermanentjob

(57.7%).

Chart 13

Reasonsforstayingabroad

withabreakdownbysector

(anynumberofanswers,

in%)

Ihaveapermanentjob

abroadorgodchances

ofobtainingone

Ifelmoresecureabroad

regardinglabourmarket

(evenifIloseajob

Iwilgetitbackfast)

35.9

47.1

46.1

56.4

57.7

70.6

68.0

68.0

Iwilbeabletotakeadvantage

ofthebenefitsthatare

misinginPoland

10.3

20.0

26.9

52.9

Iwilimprovemyliving

conditionsabroad

64.7

53.8

56.0

61.5


Manufacturing(n=39)

Industry(n=25)

Services(n=26)

Myfamily

wantstoleave

Inolongerwant

toliveinPoland

4.0

3.8

11.8

12.8

29.4

28.2

34.6

44.0

Ascanbeinferedfromtheprovidedanswers,security in labour market is the decisive factor in

declarations to stay abroad.Thelevelofwagesislesimportant.Thisprobablymeansthatdeclarationsabout

stayingabroadwouldchangeifthePolishlabourmarketoferedmorestablemploymentconditions.

Nevertheles,itshouldbepointedouthatfactorsmentionedinsomeotherstudiesrelatedtobadperceptionsof

PolandasoneofthemajoreasonsunderlyingthedecisiontoleavePolandandeclarationsonstayingabroad

havenotbenconfirmedbythistudy.

Isuesrelatedtothelabourmarketwerealsodominantamongthereasonsforstayingabroadwithin

certainagegroups.Thefactofhavingapermanentjobabroadorprospectsforobtainingoneasthefactorbehind

thedecisiontostayinemigrationpermanentlywasmostfrequentlyindicatedbypeopleaged36-40(6.7%),

whileitwascitedleastfrequentlybyrespondentsintheoldestagegroup(52.8%).Hereagaintheisueofdiversity

ofanswersbyagehasurfaced.Anoportunitytoimprovelivingconditionsbystayingabroadismostfrequently

perceivedbypeopleagedover40(76.9%),andleastfrequentlybyrespondentsaged31-35(40%).Over60%of

21-25year-oldsand36-40year-oldsfelmoresecureabroadwithregardtothelabourmarket.Fortheoldest

respondents,theposibilityoftakingadvantageofbenefitsthataremisinginPolandismuchmoreimportant

thanforyoungerespondents.

3

IfthemainreasonsunderlyingthedecisionsofPolestogoabroadandthewilingnestostayabroad

revealedinthistudywerefinancialfactorsandthoserelatedtosecurityinthelabourmarket,thenthe decisions

to return to Poland are mainly motivated by family factors.Almost40%oftherespondentsnamed

opositionfromfamiliesagainstcontinuationofthestayabroadasthemainfactorstimulatingthedecisionto

return.Inthecaseof27.3%oftherespondents,themainreasonunderlyingdeclarationsonreturningwasthe

beliefintheposibilityofobtainingemploymentinPolandorthefactofalreadyhavingajob.Ontheotherhand,

15.2%oftherespondentscouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutsidePolandand9.1%statedtheycanusetheir

qualificationsbeterinPoland.

Definitely,familyreasonswerenamedmostfrequently(almost70%)asthereasonunderlyingthe

decisiontoreturntothehomecountrybyrespondentsintheconstructionsector( Chart14 ).Almosthalfofthem

answeredtheycouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutsidePoland,and36.4%statedthatheyhaveajobin

Polandorachanceofobtainingone.Similarargumentswerenamedbypersonsemployedinindustry.Among

employesofthemanufacturingsector,54.5%answeredthatheirfamiliesoposedtheirstayabroadforlonger,

and45.5%hadajobinPoland,sotheydidnotwantoleavePolandpermanently.Almosthalfofthoseworkingin

servicescouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutsidePoland,and43.5%hadajobinPolandorachanceof

findingone.

Chart 14

Mainreasonsunderlyingdecisionstoreturnwithabreakdownbysector(anynumberofanswers,in%)

Myfamily

isagainstleaving

30.4

54.5

69.7

71.4

Icanotimagine

livingpermanently

outsidePoland

36.4

45.4

47.8

71.4

IhaveajobinPoland

orgodchances

ofobtainingone

28.6

36.4

45.4

43.5

InPolandIcanuse

myqualificationsbeter

24.2

18.2

28.6

30.4


Manufacturing(n=1)

Industry(n=7)

Services(n=23)

Idon'tfel

secureabroad

Idon'tlike

socialrelations

abroad

21.2

27.3

14.3

21.7

15.1

18.2

13.0

28.6

TheanalysisofthefactorsunderlyingdecisionsaboutreturningtoPolandafterthendof

employmentindicatedthatitwaspersonsaged31orolderwhomostfrequentlyindicatedanaversiononthepart

oftheirfamiliestotheirstayingabroadasanargumentforgivingupemigration.Thisismostlikelybecausealarge

numberofyoungerpersonshavenotstartedtheirownfamilyet,sopositionfromaspousedoesnotaplyin

theircase.Athesametime,57.1%oftherespondentsaged26-30canotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutside

Poland,oralternativelyhaveajobinPolandorachanceofobtainingone.Onerespondentinthreintheyoungest

agegroupansweredtheywouldnotstayabroadbecausetheycouldnotimaginelivingpermanentlyoutside

Poland.

34

Summary

Thepost-acesionemigrationsofPolesarethetopicofmanystudies,academicpapersaswel

ascriticalarticlesinewspapers.Thisismainlyduetothedesiretofindanswerstoquestionsabouthecauses

andefectsofprocesesthatprovedtobefarmoresignificanthanhadbenearlierexpected.Itisalsoesential

toidentifythefactorsthatarecurentlydecisivefordeclarationsbyemigrantsoftheirwilingnestostayabroad

ortoreturntoPoland.Ashasbenalreadyindicatedintheintroduction,althoughunrepresentative,thistudy

producedmanyinterestingresultsthatexpandourknowledgeofthemostrecentemigrationsofPoles.Thisis

atributablefirstandforemostothefacthatheresearchwasconductedamongaspecificgroupofPolish

workersemployedabroad,namelythoserecruitedbyoneofthedominantemploymentagenciesinthePolish

market,andbythefacthatheyundertokemploymentinthosestatesthathavehardlybencoveredbyrecent

studies.ThisconcernsGermanyinparticular,acountrythatdidnotopenupitslabourmarketuntil201,i.e.seven

yearsaftertheUnitedKingdomandIreland,whichavedominatedmigrationanalysesperformedbybothPolish

andforeignresearchersinrecentyears.Aparticularlyvaluableaspectofthisresearchisthededicationofalotof

spacetotheisueofactorsinfluencingspecificmigrationdecisionsofPoles.Theopinionsoftherespondents

presentedinthisreportdefinitelyconstituteabasisfordrawingconclusionsandevelopingprogramesand

instrumentsthatmightinfluencedecisionstoemigrate,stayabroadoreturntoPoland.Let’shopetherewilbe

asmanyreturnsinthenearfutureasposible.

35


1

Financial issues remain the main reasons underlying employment

emigration of Poles. Unemploymentisofmuchleserimportance.Adecisive

majorityofrespondentshadajobinPoland,butheremunerationtheyreceived

wasunsatisfactoryforthemandthereforetheymadethedecisiontoemigrate.

Hence,onecanstatethatitisthelevelofremuneration,nothelevelof

unemployment,whereoneshouldlokforasolutiontotheisueofemployment

emigrationofPoles.

2

Polesemployedabroadwhotokpartintheresearchare

overwhelmingly satisfied with employment abroad.Nosignificant

diferenceshavebenidentifiedregardingrespondents’ sectorsofemployment

orage.Butheresearchresultsaredefinitelyafectedbythefacthathe

respondentswererecruitedbyemploymentagenciesandsentdirectlyto

employersandbythefacthatheyworkedinBelgium,FranceandGermany,

becausebothwagesandemploymentstandardsinthosecountriesareamong

thebestintheworld.

3

Asaresultofundertakingemploymentabroad,therespondents

improved their financial situation.Over90%oftherespondentswereofthis

opinion.Manyofthem,intherangeof30-50%,dependingonthesector,also

improvedtheirself-estem.Thisisbecausetheysucededabroad.

4

Themostfrequentfearelated to going abroad is the fear of not

receiving due remuneration.Itmustbestresedthathisfearwasuniversal

(e.g.over57%ofthosemployedinthemanufacturingsectorexpresedsuch

afear)despitethefacthatherespondentsweremployedthroughanagency

registeredinPoland,i.e.oneoferingreatercertaintyofremunerationthanis

thecasewhenjob-sekersfindemploymentontheirown.Thismeansthathe

isueofemployerscheatingmigrantworkersistilaproblemdespitethefact

thatmigrationtakesplaceundertheframeworkofremovementofpersons.

5

Adecisivemajorityoftherespondentsdeclared a willingness to

continue working abroad,butathesametimeamuch smaller group was

certain that such employment would turn into permanent emigration.

Thismeansthatrespondentstreatemploymentabroadasatemporary

oportunitytoenhancetheiremuneration.Themostscepticalasconcerns

stayingabroadpermanentlywererespondentsemployedintheconstruction

sector,whilethemostwilingtomoveabroadpermanentlyweremployesof

theindustrialsector.

36

6

Themostimportantreasonfordeclarationsaboutstayingabroadwas

the conviction that such a decision would lead to improvement of living

conditions and having a permanent job in the state of employment.

Therefore,financialfactorsandthoserelatedtosecurityinthelabourmarket

againprovetobetheprimarypro-emigrationfactorsunderlyingdecisionsto

stayabroadpermanently.

7

Themainfactorsbehind return to the home country are familyrelated.Respondentstatedthatopositionoftheirfamilytocontinuationof

employmentabroadledtothedecisiontoreturn.Athesametime,overonefourthoftherespondentspointedouthathefactofhavingajobinPolandis

veryimportantforthemasafactorinfavourofreturning.Thishowsagainthat

therespondentswerequiteoptimisticabouttheirchancesoffinding

employmentinPoland,whilethelevelofremunerationwasaproblem.

8

Thisresearchdid not confirm theopinion,basedonotherstudies,that

aversion to Poland as a country is both a pro-emigration factor andonethat

matersfordecisionstostayabroadpermanently.

37

ChapterI

Will immigrants solve the problems

of Central and Eastern Europe?

Chapter III

Will immigrants solve the problems

of Central and Eastern Europe?

InthefirstreportoftheCEDInstituteonmigrationsinCentralandEasternEurope,alotofatention

wasdevotedtotheisueofthetransformationofCEcountriesfromtypicalemigrationintoemigrationimigrationstates,i.e.onesharingmigration-relatedfeatureswithamajorityofEuropeanUnionmember

states.Thisreportcontinuesthosedeliberations,butinsteadofocusingonpresentationofthescaleand

directionsoftheinflowoforeignersintoCEcountries,itdemonstratesthefactorsthatshouldbetakeninto

considerationwhendecisionsconcerningimigrationpolicyaremade.Wewilalsoatemptoanswerthe

questionofwhetherCEcountriescanbeatractivetoemploymentimigrantsandconsequentlycompete

againstheEU-15statesinatractingthoseforeignersthatbringthegreatestbenefitstotheireconomies.

Migration and demography

Inthevastmajorityofpapersdescribingthepotentialconsequencesoftheinflowoforeignersinto

agivenstate,demographic issues are mentioned first.Foreignerswhodecidetostayinthereceivingstatemay

contributetovaryingdegrestolimitingtheadverseoutcomesofadecliningpopulationandanageingsociety.

However,thereisaconsensusthatgiventhepaceofthesechanges,theinflowoforeignerswilnotbyitselfsolve

theseproblems,butcanbecomeanelementofawiderpackageofmeasures.Despitefrequentanti-imigration

rhetoric,imigrationistiltreatedbythoseinpowerasaninstrumentforcopingwithdemographichalenges.

ThisaproachshouldalsobetakenbyCEcountries.However,onereservationmustbemadeinitialy.

Itisnothesizeofthepopulationpersethatisproblematic,

butitstructure(sharesofocupationalyactiveandpasive

peopleinthepopulationstructureofagivenstate).

Therearemanyexamplesofstates,which,althoughnotverypopulousorlargeinarea,areneverthelesamong

thebestdevelopedcountriesintheworld.Thisisatributabletoaverygodpopulationstructureandadoptionof

amodeloptimisingtheuseofthepotentialoftheirpeople.Givensuchanaproach,iturnsouthatheroleof

imigrantscanbefargreaterinresolvingdemographicproblemsthanisrecognisedinmanyanalysesofthe

6

impactofimigrationonpopulationsize.Thefactisthathepopulationstructureoforeignersresidinginthe

EU-28statesisdefinitelybeterthanthatofindigenes.Chart15sugeststhatforeigners are definitely

younger than indigenes.Thegreatestdiferencesinpopulationstructuresarefoundbetwenagegroupswith

thegreatestocupationalactivity,i.e.20-4year-olds( Chart15 ).Thismeansthatwithoutimigrationthe

populationstructureintheEU-28wouldbemuchworsethanitisnow.

6

Theseanalyses,forexample,demonstratetheimpactofimigrationonthetotalfertilityrate.Womenimigrantsaresuposedtohavehighertotalfertilityrates,whichwould

positivelycounterthefectsofthedecliningpopulationsizeofagivenstate.

40

Chart 15

Agepyramidwithabreakdownintonon-nationalsandnationals.DatafortheEU-28(in%)

Females

age

Males

Nationals

Non-nationals

Source:Owncalculationsonthebasisof:

Populationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship

(migr_pop1ctz),Populationbysex,age

andbroadgroupofcitizenship(migr_pop2ctz),

Eurostat

95-9

90-94

85-89

80-84

75-79

70-74

65-69

60-64

5-59

50-54

45-49

40-4

35-39

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

1412108 6 42 0 02 46 81012 14

41

WefindasimilarsituationifweseparatedataforCEcountriesfromthedataforthentireEU-28.

In the case of CEE countries as well, foreigners living there are younger than indigenes, but the differences

are smaller than in the case of all EU-28 states ( Chart16 ).ThismeansthatwithintheEuropeanUnionitis

the EU-15 states that are greatly improving their population structure,whichpositivelytranslatesinto

competitivenesandtheabilitytocopewithdemographichalenges.

Chart 16

Agepyramidwithabreakdownintonon-nationalsandnationals.DatafortheEU-1(in%)

Females

age

Males

Nationals

Non-nationals

Source:Owncalculationsonthebasisof:

Populationbysex,agegroupandcitizenship

(migr_pop1ctz),Populationbysex,age

andbroadgroupofcitizenship(migr_pop2ctz),

Eurostat

95-9

90-94

85-89

80-84

75-79

70-74

65-69

60-64

5-59

50-54

45-49

40-4

35-39

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12

42

Onemoremajorconclusionfolowsfromcomparisonofthetwoagepyramids.Thegeneraldataforthe

EU-28sugeststhatbothinthecaseofemaleandmaleforeigners,theirimpacton“rejuvenation” ofthe

populationofthereceivingstatesiscomparable.ButwhenweanalysetheagepyramidfortheEU-1,itisclearly

visiblethatmalescontributetoamuchgreaterextentoimprovementofthepopulationstructuresofthose

states.ThisprobablymeansthatCEE countries are at an early stage of transformation towards the

emigration-immigration model.Giventhisituationandespitetheprocesesofeminisationofmigration,we

aredealingratherwithimigrationofmales,whonlyaftersometimebringtheirfamiliesin(familyreunion

proces).Butheymustmakesurethathedecisiontoimigrateistherightone.Bigdiferencesintheage

pyramidsbetwenfemaleforeignersandmaleforeignersintheEU-1countriesmayresultfromstilimited

scaleofdecisionsonfamilyreunions,whichavealreadybecomeapartofthexperiencesoftheEU-15states.

Demand for immigrants in the European Union

Inthepreviousectionitwashownthatheinflowofimigrantsisextremelyimportantfordealing

withdemographicproblemsrelatedtodisturbancesinpopulationstructure.Athesametime,itshouldbe

pointedouthathedemandforforeignersisnothesameinspecificlabourmarketsegments.Mostfrequently

thegreatestdemandforforeignersfromemployersisintheprofesionswherethereisashortageofindigenous

workers,andconcernsbothighlyskiledworkers,inwhosecasesalariesareofminorimportancebecausethese

individualshaveuniqueskils,andthoseworkerswhoselowerequirementsregardingremunerationareofthe

greatestimportance.Thelatersituationcanleadtorivalrybetwenimigrantsandnationals.Onecanasume

thatindigenesarereadytoundertakemploymentinagivenprofesionorsector,butforahigheremuneration

thanimigrants.Howeveremployersareoftenotwilingtometheirexpectationsbecausetheyhavecheaper

workersavailablefromabroad.Inthiscase,itistheroleofthegovernmentsofparticularstatestoconsider

whethertoblockacestothelabourmarketforforeignersandconsequentlystimulatesalaryrises,risking

howeveranexpansionofthegreyeconomyorelocationofeconomicactivitytowhereverlabourcostsarelower.

ResearchbyaninternationalcompanyManpowerGroupsugeststhatin the vast majority of

European Economic Area (EEA) member states there are significant shortages of highly skilled employees

with unique skills (comonlycaledtalents).ButhegreatestshortageoftalentsisfoundinCEcountries– in

HungaryandBulgaria( Chart17 ).

Chart 17

TalentshortageinselectedEAmemberstates,2014(in%)

50

45

45

40

44

42 42

40 40

35

34

33 33 33

30

25

20

22

21

20

19

15

10

5

Hungary

0

Bulgaria

Austria

Grece

Germany

Romania

Italy

Finland

Poland

Sweden

Slovakia

France

Norway

Slovenia

13

Belgium

12

UnitedKingdom

11

CzechRepublic

5

Netherlands

3

Spain

2

Ireland

Source:TheTalentShortageContinues:HowtheEverChangingRoleofHRCanBridgetheGap,ManpowerGroup2014,p.4

43

ThedatacontainedinChart17showsthataninflowofevenasignificantnumberoforeigners

characterisedbyuniqueskilswouldnotresultindeteriorationofthesituationinthelabourmarket,orin

enhancedcompetitionbetwenforeignersandindigenes.Inthiscontext,theproblemratheristofindthe

instrumentsthatwouldstimulateinflowofthiscategoryoforeignersthantorestrictheirinflow.Thereforethe

vastmajorityofEUmemberstatespursueapolicyofremovingobstaclestothemigrationofhighlyskiledworkers

ratherthanimposingrestrictionsonthem.

Acquisition of highly skilled workers by EU member states

Inrecentyearswehavewitnesedatleastadozeninitiativesaimedatincreasingtheinflow

ofhighlyskiledforeignersintotheEuropeanUnion.Forexample,intheyear20,German

ChancelorGerhardSchröderanouncedestablishmentofadedicatedprogrametargeted

atforeignersemployedintheITsectorwhowouldliketoundertakemploymentin

Germany.20,0“grencards” wereoferedtothesetypesofimigrants.Theprograme

wasonlymoderatelysucesful,becauseslightlymorethan17,0ofthe“grencards”

weredistributed,whichmeansthequotawasnotmet.In204theprogramecametoan

end.AsimilarconceptwasputforwardbytheEuropeanComision,whichanounced

introductionofadirectiveontheso-caledBlueCardtargetedathighlyskiledforeigners.

Afterlongnegotiations,thedirectiveintroducingtheBlueCardenteredintoforcein209,

butitprovedafailure.Withinfiveyearsofthedirective’simplementation,onlyafew

thousandBlueCardswereisuedinalmemberstates.Moreover,theUnitedKingdom

introducedascoringsystemthatgrantedmanyprivilegestohighlyskiledworkers.Among

CEcountries,theCzechRepublichaditsownprogrametargetinghighlyskiledworkers.

Thexamplesaboveshowthatatractinghighlyskiledworkerstogivenstatesisan

extremelydificultaskandonewithahighriskofailure.

Ashasbenalreadymentioned,highlyskiledworkerscontributealotothecompetitivenesofthe

stateswheretheyaremployed.Internationalcomparisonshowthathe US is by far the state that derives the

greatest benefits from the immigration of highly skilled workers ( Table8 ).ItisfolowedbyCanada,butwith

muchporeresults.TwoEuropeancountriesthathavebenstrivingforyearstoacquirehighlyskiledworkers,

i.e.GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom,camethirdandfourth,respectively.AmongCEcountries,Polandand

Hungarywerecoveredintheranking,butheycameoutinthegroupofstatesatheverybotomoftheranking.

ThismeansthatCEE states definitely lose out in the competition for highly qualified immigrants,which

adverselyimpactstheirdevelopmentprospects.

4

Table 8

Significantcontribution

ofhighlyskiled

imigrantstoeconomies

(207GDPatP)

Source:StimulatingEconomies

throughForecastingTalentMobility,

WorldEconomicForum,2010,p.1

Host

country

USA

Canada

Germany

United Kingdom

Australia

France

United Arab Emirates

Spain

Switzerland

Netherlands

Belgium

Austria

Ireland

Portugal

Sweden

New Zeland

Greece

Mexico

Luxembourg

Norway

Denmark

Poland

Hungary

Finland

Average contribution of highly skilled

immigrants to GDP

Share of highly skilled migrants

in highly skilled workforce

(US$bilions)

(%)

1,61

274

254

27

197

184

128

73

60

5

35

31

28

27

27

25

23

18

16

14

9

8

7

4

12

2

9

1

26

9

87

5

20

9

9

10

15

12

8

2

7

1

39

5

5

1

4

2

Thedemandforforeignersisgeneratedbothinthefirst,moreatractive,andthesecondlabour

7

marketsegments.Theanalysesofdemandinthelabourmarketdemonstratethatdemandforthelaterismuch

greater! Thisismainlybecausesectorsrequiringuniqueskilsemploymuchfewerworkersthanlabour-intensive

onesdo.Thesituationisagravatedbythegrowingdemandforhighlyskiledworkersinthehomecaresector,

whichistheresultofdemographictransformations.Whilethosepersonsdonotnedtohaveuniqueskils,theydo

nedtobehighskiledinprovisionofcare.

7

Labourmarketisdividedintotwosegments.Thefirstsegmentcontainswel-paid,highlyprestigiousjobs,withalotofpotentialforpursuingcarerpath.Thesecondsegmentincludes

porlypaidjobswithlowprestige,oferingverylimitedcarerdevelopmentpotential.Sotoreceiveahigheremunerationandobtainanoportunitytocontinuecarerdevelopment

path,onenedstochangeaprofesionandtransitfromthefirstintothesecondlabourmarketsegment.Amajorityofemploymentimigrantsfindjobsinthesecondlabourmarket

segment.

45

Table 9

Unemploymentrateasumptions

(age15-64,in%)

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

ES

FI

FR

GR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

NO

EU-12

EU-15

EU-27

2010

2020

2025

2030

4.5 4.1 4.1 4.1

8.4 7.6 7.4 7.4

10.5 8.2 7.7 7.5

6.8 5.3 4.9 4.7

7.3 6.4 6.3 6.2

7.2 6.1 6.1 6.1

7.5 4.8 4.8 4.8

17.2 14.0 10.9 8.2

20.2 17.2 12.6 8.9

8.6 6.6 6.6 6.6

9.4 8.0

7.7 7.5

12.8 10.6 8.9 8.1

1.3 1.4 9.5 7.8

13.7 13.4 10 .0 7.1

8.5 7.3 7.3 7.3

18.1 16.7 12.4 8.6

4.4 4.5 4.3 4.3

19 .0 18.3 13.3 8.8

6.9 6.8 6.7 6.7

4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5

9.8 7.6 7.5 7.4

1.4 1.6 9.6 8.0

7.6 6.9 6.8 6.7

8.5 6.6 6.6 6.5

7.4 8.3 7.1 6.0

14.4 13.1 10.4 8.1

8.0

6.9 6.3 5.9

3.6 3.4 3.4 3.3

10 .0 8.8 8.0

7.3

9.7 8.3 7.5 6.8

9.7 8.4 7.5 6.9

Theresultsofananalysisofjoboferspostedon

aEuropeanjobmobilityportalconfirmthefacthatdemandfor

employesisparticularlyfrequentinthesecondsegmentofthe

labourmarket.Theprofesionswiththegreatestshortagesinclude:

housekepingandrestaurantservicesworkers(Austria,Cyprus,

CzechRepublic,Grece,Finland,France,Portugal)andfinancial

andsalesasociateprofesionals(CzechRepublic,Germany,Spain,

Finland,Ireland,Italy,Luxembourg,Sweden).Otherprofesionsfor

whichemployersfromEUmemberstatesfrequentlylokfor

employesthroughEURESare:

• Shopsalespersonsandemonstrators(Austria,

Grece,Estonia)

• Domesticandrelatedhelpers,cleanersand

launderers(Cyprus,Estonia,Malta)

• Metalmoulders,welders,shetmetalworkers

(Lithuania,Latvia,Slovakia)

• Buildingframeandrelatedtradesworkers:

(Liechtenstein,Poland,Slovenia)

Altheaboveprofesionscanbedemedascharacteristicofthe

secondsegmentofthelabourmarket.

Oneofthemainfearsrelatedtothegrowinginflowof

foreignersisdeteriorationofthelabourmarketsituation,which

mayresultfromenhancedrivalrybetwenationalsandnonnationals.Inthereportpub-lishedseveralmonthsago,weshowed

thatsuchsituationsarerareandlimitedtojustafewemployment

sectors.Tocomplementhisthesis,onecancitetheargumenthat

anincreaseinunemploymentinreceivingstatesatributabletoan

inflowoforeignersinthecomingyearsisevenleslikelythan

today.Thisisbecauseofdemographichangeandshrinkinglabour

resources.AforecastdevelopedbytheEuropeanComision

clearlyshowsthatin all EU member states, including CEE

countries, the unemployment rate will decline despite the

expected increase in the inflow of foreigners entering the

labour market ( Table9 ).

Source:The2012AgeingReport:UnderlyingAsumptions

andProjectionMethodology,EuropeanEconomy,201,p.319

46

Theaforementionedemographichangesareforcingparticularstatestotakemeasuresthatare

intendedtometheforesenchalenges.Quitecertainlytheincreasedinflowofimigrants,althoughunableto

solvedemographicproblems,maybecomeone of the factors contributing to maintenance of a population

structure that is optimal for economic and social development.DatapublishedbytheWorldBanksugests

thatCEcountrieswilbeafectedbydemographichangetoahighdegreandconsequentlytheyshouldbe

interestedingetinganinflowoforeigners.Forexample,Polandshouldalowthentryofnearly80,0

imigrantsby2020.Thiswouldenablemaintenanceofthecurentratiosbetwenactiveandpasivepersonsin

thelabourmarket.InthecaseoftheCzechRepublic,thenedednumberofimigrantsisnearly50,0,andin

thecaseofBulgaria– nearly120,0( Table10 ).

Table 10

Resultsofprojectionexercise

toestimatenetmigrationeds

by2020inthrecountries

Estimation

WAP needed in 2020 to keep

LF/Pop constant

Poland Bulgaria Czech Republic

26,42,0 4,726,0 7,030,0

WAP=workingagepopulation

LF/Pop=ratioflabourforcetopopulation

Number of migrants needed using

ILO projection

789,0

19,0

491,0

Source:DemographicChangeandLaborMarkets,p.85,htp:/siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/publications/454763-181939083693/chaw_073-16_ch02.pdf

(acesedon:19.10.2014)

Nevertheles,thefigurescontainedinTable10shouldnotbedemedveryrealistic.Onecanhardly

expectstatesuchasPolandortheCzechRepublictobeabletoaceptand,crucialy,tointegrateintothelabour

marketsuchahighnumberofimigrants,particularlyastheywouldhavetocomefromcountriesofdiferent

cultures.ThedataoftheWorldBankhasveryclearlydemonstratedthechalengesfacedbyCEcountries.

Immigration attractiveness of European states

Migrationprocesesintheworldtakeplacealonghistoricalyshapedpaths.Onlyinveryfewcasesdo

theyleadthroughCEcountries.Onecanindicatehere,amongotherthings,theinflowofUkrainianstoPoland

andtheCzechRepublic,wheretheyundertakemainlyshort-termemployment.Inthisconection,wehaveasked

ourselvesinthisreportwhetherinthecomingyearsomenewpathscanbetraced,agreaterproportionofwhich

willeadtoCEcountriesthantoday?Toanswerthisquestion,an index will be created showing the

attractiveness of particular CEE countries for immigrants.Itwasbuilthroughidentificationoftheindicators

thatsemtobedecisiveforforeignerswhoundertakemigrationandareinterestedinfindingemployment

outsidetheircountryoforigin.Theindexofatractivenesforimigrantstakesintoacountneithermigration

networksnormigrationpolicy.Thereforewefocusedonobjectivesocio-economicriteria.Theindexwas

developedwiththeuseofthesameindicatorseparatelyforCEcountriesandEU-15states,andthentheresults

forbothsampleswerecomparedtoshowthecompetitionbothwithinCEcountriesandEU-15states,butalso

withinthentireEU.ThestudyleavesoutonlyMaltandCyprusinrecognitionthatheirsituationisdiferentfrom

thatoftheotherstates.This,however,doesnotinfluencetheconclusionsdrawnonthebasisoftheperformed

analyses.

Theselectionoftheindicatorsusedtocreatetheindexwasbasedonthecriteriaofuniversality,

availabilityandrelativetransparency(adescriptionoftheindicatorscanbefoundintheapendix).Therankingof

stateswasbasedonratingsacordingtothevalueofagivenindicator.So,astatewiththebestvalueforagiven

indicatorwasasignedascoreof1points(forCEcountries)orof15points(forEU-15states),whileastatewith

theporestvalueforagivenindicatorwasasignedascoreof1point.Forexample,thestatewiththelowest

unemploymentlevelamongCEcountrieswasasigned1points,whiletheonewiththehighestunemployment

levelreceived1point.Consequently,arankinglistofstateswascreatedforeachindicator.Theasignedscores

wereaded,whichenabledevelopmentofarankinglistintermsofatractivenesforimigrantsandofthe

index.Thestatewiththehighestscore(EU-1andEU-15)wasdemedtobethemostatractiveforimigration.

Thestatewiththelowestscorewasconsideredtobetheleastatractiveforforeigners.Athesametime,CE

countriesandEU-15stateswerecompared.Thestatewiththebestresultunderagivenindicatoreceived26

points,whiletheonewiththeworstresultreceived1point.

47

MigrationatractivenesofCEcountries

AnanalysisoftheindicatorsusedtocreatetheindexofatractivenesofEuropeanstatesfor

imigrantshowedthatamong CEE countries, the Czech Republic is likely to be the most attractive for

foreigners ( Table1 ).Sloveniawasratedsecond,whileEstoniawasthird.RomaniandBulgariaprovedtobethe

leastatractiveforforeigners.Theperformedanalysisugeststhatalthoughthedegreofeconomic

development(measuredasGDPpercapita)isasignificantvariableandgreatlyinfluencestheatractivenes

ofagivencountryforimigrants,theCzechRepublic,whichleadstheranking,isworsedevelopedthan

Slovenia,butstilitspositionisatributabletoitslowunemploymentlevelandthreatofpoverty.Similarly,

PolandisratedhigherthanSlovakia( Table1 ),althoughincomepercapitaismuchlowerthere.

Table 11

AtractivenesofCEcountriesforimigrants(thebestresultforagivenindicator– 1points,theworstresult– 1point)

Country

Place

Points

Unemployment rate

GDP per capita

Activity rate

At risk of poverty rate after social transfer

Index of Economic Freedom

Median – equivalised net income in PPS

Severe material deprivation rate

Happy Planet Index

Wealth

Social unrest

*

Positive impact of immigration

Global Peace Index

Czech Republic

1

111

7.0 19,845 73.3 8.6 72.2 10,649 6.6 39.4 36,201 Low 23% #1

Slovenia

2

100

10.1 23,289 70.1 14.5 62.7 14,286 6.7 40.2 52,039 Medium 41% #14

Estonia

3

90

8.6 18,783 74.9 18.6 75.9 8,56 7.6 34.3 26,562 Medium 38% #31

Poland

4

89

10.3 13,648 67.4 17.3 67.0 9,12 1.9 42.6 20,803 Low 57% #23

Slovakia

5

87

14.2 18,047 69.8 12.8 6.4 9,568 10.2 40.1 21,579 Low 37% #19

Hungary

6

68

10.2 13,481 65.7 14.3 67.0 7,512 26.8 37.4 2,657 Medium 31% #21

Lithuania

7

65

1.8 15,538 72.7 20.6 73.0 7,352 16.0 34.6 18,64 Medium 45% #46

Latvia

8

57

1.9 15,375 73.8 19.4 68.7 6,615 24.0 34.9 19,605 Medium 19% #39

Croatia

9

51

*

17.3 13,608 64.1 19.5 60.4 7,258 14.7 40.6 21,169 High 41% #26

Romania

10

46

7.1 9,49 64.3 2.4 65.5 3,737 28.5 42.2 1,191 High 50% #35

Bulgaria

11

31

13.0 7,49 68.6 21.0 65.7 6,056 43.0 34.1 13,693 High 37% #32

* estimatebythereport’sauthors

* thefolowingscoreswereasigned:low– 1points,medium– 6points,high– 1point

Source:SeApendix,page53

48

MigrationatractivenesofEU-15states

Ashasbenalreadymentioned,ananalysiswasperformedforEU-15statesimilartotheonedonefor

CEcountries.Itdemonstratedthathe most attractive state for immigrants is Sweden ( Table12 ).

Luxembourgcameinsecond,whileDenmarkwasratedthird.PortugalandGreceprovedtobetheleast

atractiveforimigrantsamongtheEU-15states.AsinthecaseofCEcountries,theafluenceofagivenstate

wasrelevantfortheratingofthatstate,buthisvariablewasnothedecisivefactor.

Table 12

MigrationatractivenesofEU-15states(thebestresultforagivenindicator– 15points,theworstresult– 1point)

Country

Place

Points

Unemployment rate

GDP per capita

Activity rate

At risk of poverty rate after social transfer

Index of Economic Freedom

Median – equivalised net income in PPS

Severe material deprivation rate

Happy Planet Index

Wealth

Social unrest

*

Positive impact of immigration

Global Peace Index

Sweden

1

144

8.0 60,430 80.5 14.8 73.1 20,527 1.4 46.2 232,106 Low 81% #1

Luxembourg

2

138

5.9 10,697 70.6 15.9 74.2 27,26 1.8 29.0 241,695 Verylow 72% #7

Denmark

3

133

7.0 59,832 7.3 12.3 76.1 19,108 3.8 36.6 194,032 Verylow 64% #2

Austria

4

132

4.9 50,547 76.3 14.4 72.4 20,925 4.2 47.1 163,382 Verylow 47% #3

Netherlands

5

129

6.7 50,793 79.7 10.4 74.2 19,35 2.5 43.1 142,521 Medium 67% #20

Finland

6

117

8.2 49,147 73.7 1.8 73.4 19,16 2.5 42.7 13,485 Low 6% #6

Germany

7

114

5.2 46,269 7.8 16.1 73.4 19,34 5.4 47.2 157,82 Low 63% #17

United Kingdom

8

100

7.6 41,787 76.6 15.9 74.9 16,469 8.3 47.9 186,768 Medium 5% #47

France

9

94

10.3 42,503 71.2 13.7 63.5 19,380 5.1 46.5 24,523 Medium 51% #48

Belgium

10

91

8.4 46,878 67.4 15.1 69.9 19.791 5.1 37.1 198,253 Medium 46% #9

Ireland

11

86

* * *

13.1 50,503 69.8 15.7 76.2 16,18 9.8 42.4 134,235 Medium 5% #13

Italy

12

59

12.2 35,926 63.9 19.1 60.9 15,342 12.4 46.4 195,925 Medium 47% #34

Spain

12

59

26.1 29,863 74.3 20.4 67.2 14.238 6.2 4.1 9,214 High

5% #26

Portugal

14

51

16.4 21,73 73.4 18.7 63.5 9,508 10.9 38.7 71,193 High 65% #18

Greece

15

19

27.5 21,956 67.2 23.1 5.7 9,093 20.3 40.5 83,42 Veryhigh 32% #86

* datafor2012

* thefolowingscoreswereasigned:verylow– 15points,low– 1points,medium– 8points,high– 4points,veryhigh– 1point

Source:SeApendix,page53

49

Table 13

Recapitulationofmigrationatractivenes

ofEUstates(thebestresultforagiven

indicator– 26points,theworstresult

– 1point;under‘socialunrest’ category

thescoresareasfolows:verylow26points,

–

low19points,medium13points,

– –

8

high7points,veryhigh1points)

– –

Sweden

Austria

Denmark

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Finland

Germany

United Kingdom

Belgium

France

Ireland

Czech Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Estonia

Poland

Italy

Slovakia

Portugal

Hungary

Lithuania

Latvia

Romania

Croatia

Greece

Bulgaria

Place

1

2

2

4

4

6

7

8

9

10

10

12

13

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2

23

24

25

26

Points

26

257

257

250

250

240

236

204

191

18

18

178

152

152

140

136

135

134

132

105

98

87

80

75

65

5

AtractivenesofCEcountriesagainsthebackground

oftheEU-15

Comparisonoftheresultsofanalysesperformedfor

CEcountriesandEU-15statesshowedthatin terms of

migration attractiveness this division is already partially

outdated ( Table13 ).Althoughthefirstelevenplacesweretaken

byEU-15states,theCzechRepublicwasratedtwelfth.Right

behindthemcameSloveniandEstonia,whichbeteredItaly,

amongothers.ThelastpositionbutonewastakenbyGrece,but

thismaybeduetothehugeconomicproblemstilexperienced

bythecountryasaresultoftheconomicrisis.Athesametime,

itmustbepointedouthatdiferencesbetwensomestatesare

minimalandtherankingresultsmaychangegreatlyinthe

comingyears.

WithintheEuropeanUnion,memberstateshave

limitedfredomtoshapevisandasylumpolicies,butheyhave

stilhavesovereigntywithregardtothepursuitofpoliciesinthe

contextofemploymentmigration.Thismeansthatheycan

createandimplementinstrumentswhichmaybothstimulateand

hinderemploymentimigration.Thoseactionsshouldbe

corelatedwiththeatractivenesofagivenstateforimigrants.

Themoreatractivestatesnedtodoverylitlebecausetheywil

bethedestinationsofsignificantimigrationanyway.

Thesituationisdiferentinthecaseofstateswithpor

atractivenesforimigrants.Intheircaseitsemsthathey

shouldtakepoliticalactiontoliberalisetheiraproachto

migrationsoastobecomemoreatractiveandconsequently

competesucesfulywithotherstatesintheregion.

Torecapitulatetheimigrationatractivenesof

EU-1andEU-15states,itcanbestatedthatCEE countries

should definitely rethink their immigration policy, because

at present they lag behind a majority of EU-15 states in terms

of attractiveness for immigrants despiteregular

improvementsintheirsituation.Thefacthathefirsteleven

placesintherankingofmigrationatractivenesaretaken

byEU-15statesleavesnodoubtinthisrespect.Unlesthey

introduceveryintensivemigrationpoliciesaimedatatracting

foreigners,formanymoreyearstocomeCEcountrieswilose

theracetoatracthoseimigrantswhocanmakethegreatest

contributiontoeconomicompetitivenesandcanpositively

contributetoresolutionofdemographicproblems.

8

BecauseitwasnecesarytoconverthescorestoabletocreatearankingforalEU-26states,certainsmalchangesofthepositionsintherankingbetwenparticularcountriesare

posiblecomparedtotherankingdrawnupseparatelyforEU-1andEU-15.Asanexample,intherankingdrawnupforEU-1states,PolandandSlovakiawereratedinthesameplace,

whileintherankingforalEU-26statesSlovakiaisratedhigherthanPoland,buthediferencesareverysmalingeneral.

50

Summary

Theprojectedemographicproblemsthatwewilbedealingwithinthecomingyearsandthensuing

changesinlabourmarketsmakeitnecesarytogiveseriousconsiderationtotheimpactofemployment

imigrationoncopingwithsuchchalenges.However,publicopinioninmemberstatesemscepticalabouthe

benefitstobederivedfromtheinflowofmoreforeigners.Thismeansthatwewilbehavingadebateabout

imigrationaswelasearchingforsolutionsthatwilhelpatractnewimigrantswithoutagravatingthe

opositionofthepublic.ThescenarioutlinedhereledustoreflectonthedemandforimigrationinCE

countries,andinvestigatetheatractivenesofthosecountriesforimigrants.WerecognisedthatwithintheEU

competitionforthoseimigrants(inthefirstandsecondlabourmarketsegments)whobringthegreatestaded

valuetotheconomiesandsocietiesofreceivingstateswilbeincreasing.Unfortunately,theresultsofthose

analysesdonotgivegroundsforoptimismaboutCEcountries.Itsemsthatunlestheyundertakeactionsinthe

fieldofimigrationpolicyandmovetowardsgreateropenestoimigrationandintegration,withveryfew

exceptionstheywiloseoutothebeterdevelopedEUmemberstates.

51


1

Ananalysisofdemographicpyramidswithabreakdownintononnationalsandnationalsdemonstratedthatimmigrants

comprise a younger

social group than indigenes.Thismeansthatheyexertapositiveimpacton

populationstructuresofparticularstates– bygreatlyrejuvenatingthem.

However,thispositivefectisbetervisibleinEU-15statesthaninEU-1ones.

2

Thelabourmarketsofmemberstatesare generating a demand for

workers in both the first and second segments of the labour market.But,

ifwelokatabsolutenumbers,demandismuchgreaterinthesecondthaninthe

firstsegment.Nevertheles,itshouldbepointedouthatahighlyskiled

imigrantwhosepotentialisproperlyusedbringsmuchmoreadedvaluetothe

economythananon-nationalemployedinthesecondlabourmarketsegment.

Thereforethe rivalry of particular states to acquire highly skilled

immigrants is definitely greater than in the case of immigrants with

average and poor skills.

3

Duetothescopeofthedemographicprocesesandtheirimportancefor

thelabourmarket,the inflow of additional immigrants, particularly into the

first labour market segment, does not translate into unemployment

growth.Imigrantsmaybenecesaryforedresingthelabourshortagesthat

wilariseinthecomingyears.

4

CEE countries are losing out to EU-15 states in terms of

attractiveness to foreigners. TheCzechRepublic,SloveniandEstoniarethe

mostatractiveamongthem.Thismeansthatifthosecountrieswantoenterthe

competitionforforeignerswhowilpositivelycontributetotheircompetitivenes,theymustundertakeaditionalactionsinthefieldofimigrationpolicy,

i.e.aplyinstrumentstimulatingtheinflowofthiscategoryoforeigners.Athe

sametime,itmustbestresedthatheEuropeanUnionasawholeislosingthe

raceagainstheUnitedStates,CanadandAustraliawithregardtothepowerto

atractforeignershavingthehighestskils.

52

Apendix:

Indicators used for the creation of the index of the attractiveness

of European states for immigrants

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Unemployment rate – Eurostat(Unemploymentratebysexandagegroups,anualaverage),

basedonquarterlyresultsoftheEULabourForceSurvey,2013.

GDP per capita – WorldBank,inUSD,2013.

Activity rate – Eurostat(Employedandjob-sekersasapercentageofthepopulationaged15-64),

2013Q4.

At risk of poverty after social exclusion – Eurostat(At-risk-ofpovertyaftersocialexclusion),

thepercentageofthepopulationwithincomesbelow60%ofthenationalaverage,2013.

Index of Economic Freedom – publishedbyTheWalStretJournalandTheHeritageFoundation;using

independentvariables(50)dividedinto10categories,itdescribesthescopeandegreofrestrictionsand

limitationsapliedintheconomicspherein186states(including:taxes,wagesandprices,property

rightsandtradepolicy).Thelowestscoredenotesthegreateststateinterventionintheconomyandleast

th

economicfredom;HongKongisratedfirst(90.1points),NorthKoreacomesinlastat178place

(1.0point),2014.

Median equivalised net income in PPS – Eurostat(Meanandmedianequivalisednetincome),2013.

Severe material deprivation rate – Eurostat(severematerialdeprivationrate,EU-SILC),percentage

ofthepopulationthatisunabletosatisfyatleast4outof9neds,2013.

Happy Planet Index – anindexlaunchedin206bytheNewEconomicsFoundationformeasurement

ofwelfare(in151countries),2014.

Wealth per capita – CreditSuiseGlobalWealthDatabok,inUSD,2013.

Social unrest – EconomistInteligenceUnit;itmeasuresinstitutionalandpoliticalweaknesesinagiven

state,including:democraticrisis,weakgovernment,incomeinequalities,lowsocialsecurityleveland

ethnictensions,2014.

Positive impact of immigration – thepercentageofrespondentswhowholyagrewiththestatement

thatimigration“enriches” theircountryineconomicandculturalterms(AwarenesofHomeAfairs,

Eurobarometer,2012.p.34).

Global Peace Index – InstituteForEconomicsandPeace;theindexhasmeasuredthedegreofharmony,

peaceandsecurityin162countriesince207;ituses2indicators,including:incidenceofactsofteror,

relationswithneighbouringcountries,percentageofrefuges,politicalstabilityandhomiciderates,2014.

53

ChapterIV

Migration scenarios for CEE countries

– or what can happen in the future

Chapter IV

Migration scenarios for CEE countries

– or what can happen in the future

Thechalengesrelatedtomigrationsandananalysisofthepropensitytoemigrateandstayabroad

amongnationalsofCEcountriesaswelastheatractivenesofthosestatesforpotentialimigrants,which

werepresentedinpreviouschapters,urgeustoreflectonposiblescenariosforthefuture.Certainlyany

scenariosregardingthedevelopmentofthemigrationsituationarejustprojectionsandonothaveto

materialise,butathesametimedesigningsuchscenariosishighlyrelevantfordecision-makingconcerning

policiesthatmightinfluencethescaleofemigrationfromandimigrationintoagivenstate.Butbeforeweput

forwardspecificscenarios,itsemsadvisabletopresentsomeaditionaldatacontributingtotheshapingupthe

saidscenarios.

Youth about migrations

Inouranalysesofarwehaveadresedtheviewsofyouthonmigrationonlytoasmalextent,whileit

ismainlyoungpersons,frequentlyimediatelyaftercompletingtheireducation,whodecidetoemigrate.

Thereforegetingtoknowtheirviewsisimportantforthebuildingofmigrationscenarios.Table14sugests

thatemigration related to acquisition of new qualifications or undertaking of employment abroad is

a universal alternative for youth from CEE countries.OnlyoungpeoplefromtheCzechRepublicandPoland

morerarelythantheEU-28averagedeclareawilingnestogoabroadinthecomingyears.Apropensityfor

temporaryemigrationismostfrequentlydisplayedbyoungpeoplefromSlovenia,Croatia,EstoniandRomania

( Table14 ).

Table 14

PropensityofyouthfromCEcountriestogoabroad(in%)

ForeachofthefolowingstatementsregardingmobilitywithintheEuropeanUnion,pleasetelmewhetheritapliestoyou:

You have already studied,

undergone training or worked

in an EU country other than

(OUR COUNTRY),

or you are currently doing it

You want to study, undergo

training or work in an EU

country other than

(OUR COUNTRY)

Because of the crisis, you feel

competent to study, undergo

training or work in an EU

country other than

(OUR COUNTRY)

Yes

No

Don't know

Yes

No

Don't know

Yes

No

Don't know

Bulgaria

21 79

0

58 39

3

46 53

1

Croatia

595

0

63 35

2

53 46

1

Czech Republic

13 87

0

40 56

4

15 83

2

Estonia

21 79

0

61 34

5

24 74

2

Hungary

16 84

0

53 45

2

454

2

Latvia

25 75

0

49 51

0

23

7

0

Lithuania

27 73

0

57 41

2

23 74

3

Poland

16 84

0

43 52

5

542

3

Romania

25 75

0

60 37

3

54 46

0

Slovakia

30 70

0

53 41

6

51 46

3

Slovenia

21 79

0

64 34

2

43 56

1

EU-28

13 87

0

43 54

3

26 73

1

Source:EuropeanYouthin2014,Eurobarometer,p.21

56

Athesametime,comparativeresearchsugeststhatitistheoportunityto obtain better salaries

that most frequently motivates people to emigrate.Thisisconfirmedbyresultsofresearchpresentedin

ChapterIofthisreport.InalCEcountrieswageswereindicatedasthemainstimulustoemigrateby70-80%of

therespondents( Table15 ).

Table 15

Mainreasonsbehindthedecisiontogotoworkabroad(in%)

WhatwouldbethemainreasonswhyouwouldconsiderworkinginanotherEUmemberstate?

(Onlytheitemsmentionedbyatleast10%ofrespondentsatEUlevelareshown-multipleanswersareposible)

To get a better salary

You cannot find a job in (OUR COUNTRY)

Professional development or career

opportunities are better for your

profession in other EU member states

To benefit from working conditions

other than salary

You would like to live or work in

a different country even if economic

conditions are not much better there

For family or personal reasons

BG HR CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU-27

89 80 73 79 70 78 82 78 85 80 81 50

26 30 20 15 19 19 29 24 25 31 20 26

18 24 28 28 17 18 16 14 15 30 30 28

31 31 23 24 224

40 23 35 35 19 2

98

1 12 67

96

99

817

81

12 13 16 14 910

13 1 816

To pay lower taxes

1

781

64

20 98

17 813

There are better social guarantees for

employees in other EU member states

15 18 17 21 17 27 16 14 17 26 25 10

Other

01

64

1

2 1

3241

6

None

00

1

1

1 00

00

00

1

Don't know

200

1

1 00

01

00

0

Source:InternalMarketSpecialEurobarometer398,October2013,p.58

Who is most mobile and who will be needed in labour markets of CEE countries?

Aswehaveshowninthepreviouschapter,emigrationandimigrationprocesesconcernemployes

fromboththefirstandthesecondlabourmarketsegments.Athesametime,professions requiring high-level

skills, for which there is a demand in the labour markets, are considered to be the most mobile ones.Thisis

confirmedbyanalysesbytheEuropeanComision,whoseresultshowthathemostmobileprofesionsare

thoseinmedicine(doctorsofmedicine,dentalpractitioners,andnurses)andtechnicalprofesions(drivers,

electriciansetc.).Interestingly,teachersarealsoconsideredtobemobile( Table16 ).

57

9

Thedatacontainedinthistableshouldbeinterpretedasfolows:thehostcountryunderagivenprofesioninacountrycolumnmeansthatpeoplefromthecountrywhosenameis

containedinthecolumn’sheaderinthatprofesionmostfrequentlygotothatparticularhostcountrytowork.

Table 16

Themostmobileprofesions

inCEcountries

9

(203/204-2014)

Host country

Profession

DoctorofMedicine

Nurse

SecondaryScholTeacher

DentalPractitioner

Physiotherapist

DoctorofMedicine


Nurse

Physiotherapist

DentalPractitioner

DoctorofMedicine

Nurse


DentalPractitioner

VeterinarySurgeon

DoctorofMedicine


Nurse

DentalPractitioner

Physiotherapist

DoctorofMedicine


Nurse

DentalPractitioner

Pharmacist


DoctorofMedicine

Nurse

AirlinePilot

DentalPractitioner


Nurse

DoctorofMedicine

Physiotherapist

Mason/Bricklayer

Nurse

DoctorofMedicine


DentalPractitioner

Physiotherapist

Nurse

DoctorofMedicine


Physiotherapist

MasterBuilder

Second-levelNurse

Nurse

DoctorofMedicine


VeterinarySurgeon

Bulgaria (2007-2014)

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania (2007-2014)

Slovakia

Slovenia

Germany

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Germany

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Germany

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Finland

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Finland

Germany

UnitedKingdom

Austria

UnitedKingdom

Austria

UnitedKingdom

Germany

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Latvia

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Belgium

Italy

Germany

UnitedKingdom

UnitedKingdom

Italy

CzechRepublic

CzechRepublic

UnitedKingdom

CzechRepublic

Austria

Austria

Austria

UnitedKingdom

Germany

UnitedKingdom

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Source:Developedbytheauthorusingdatafrom:htp:/ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=stat_ranking&b_services=false

58

Nevertheles,whenanalysingthedatafromthetableabove,onehastobeawarethatplacementof

agivenprofesiononthelistofthemostmobileonesdoesnotmeanthathegreatestnumberofpeoplewho

migratedwithintheEUwereunderthatcategory.Onthecontrary,thegreatestmobilityisfoundamong

employeswithporskilsandgraduatesoftertiaryeducationalfacilitieswhofailedtobtainemploymentinthe

labourmarketoftheirstateoforigin.PersonsintheprofesionslistedinTable15havenormousoportunitiesto

obtainemploymentabroad,butheycompriseasmalgroupintotalmigrationflows.

Previousyearshaveshownthatdynamichangesaretakingplaceinlabourmarketsregarding

demandforgivenprofesions.Thebankingsectoristhebestexampleofthosechanges.Theintroductionof

electronicbankinghasdefinitelychangedthedemandinspecificprofesions.Itgeneratesnewjobsinelectronic

bankingsuportwhilereducingthenumberofjobsintraditionalbanking.Theforecastsofchangesindemandfor

diferentypesofworkersthatwiltakeplaceinthecomingyearsindicatethatdemandforhighlyskiledworkers

wilrise,whiledemandforporlyskiledoneswilfal.AmongCEcountries,thedemandforhighlyskiled

employeswilgrowathefastestrateinPoland,theCzechRepublicandSlovakia(

).Thesecountrieswil

facethegreatestchalengesintermsofhowtorespondtothedemandfromthelabourmarketandwhetherthe

educationsystemwilcopewiththischalenge,and-ifnot-thenhowcantheyenterthecompetitiontoatractof

imigrantsofthistype.

Table17

Table 17

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

EU-28

LabourforcebyqualificationinCEcountries2013-2025

-6.4

0.2

3.1

-6.2

1.6

0.1

1.4

-1.1

-2.1

2.0

-1.5

1.3

Source:Cedefop,2014

TOTAL

2013

-2025

(%)

3,171

1,720

5,439

653

4,413

1,087

1,545

17,435

9,745

2,73

94

246,516

2025

(0s)

3,38

1,717

5,27

696

4,34

1,086

1,524

17,630

9,951

2,719

1,09

243,254

2013

(0s)

-31.0

-43

-17.5

13

-26.8

19.2

-4.3

-3.9

1.4

-18

-46.3

-29.3

.0

.0

.0

LOW

2013

-2025

(%)

374

178

326

87

429

143

89

1,386

2,208

164

80

41,413

2025

(0s)

542

312

395

7

586

120

93

2,097

2,17

20

149

53,54

2013

(0s)

-10.3

5.9

-1.2

-23.7

-13.2

-26.0

-23.3

-3.5

-27.8

-13.6

-8.1

-3.9

MEDIUM

2013

-2025

(%)

1,604

1,013

3,258

258

2,141

436

60

6,261

3,692

1,58

487

109,37

2025

(0s)

1,78

957

3,67

38

2,467

589

782

9,412

5,1

1,839

530

13,751

2013

(0s)

12.8

18.6

52.7

9.6

42.8

34.1

31.7

60.0

4.4

50.3

29.4

20.6

HIGH

2013

-2025

(%)

1,193

530

1,85

308

1,843

507

856

9,789

3,845

1,02

427

95,726

2025

(0s)

1,058

47

1,215

281

1,291

378

650

6,120

2,63

680

30

75,959

2013

(0s)

59

Migration scenarios

TheanalysesperformedbothinthefirstreportoftheCEDInstituteonmigrationandinthisecond

partenableustodesignseveralalternativescenarios,whichmayprovidethenecesaryknowledgefortaking

migrationpolicymeasures.Onthebasisofthedatacolectedinbothreports,weproposefourscenariosforthe

developmentofthemigrationsituationinCEcountries.Theyaremedium-termones– until2020.The

descriptionsofthescenariosareofageneralnature,giventhenecesitytotakeintoacountalCEcountriesin

thosescenarios,despitethesignificantdiferencesbetwenthem.

Scenario I:

Scenario II:

Scenario III:

Sustainable emigration and restricted foreigner inflow

Thiscenarioasumesthathetrendsinitiatedin204,whenemigrationfromCEcountriesto

otherEuropeanUnionmemberstatestartedtoincrease,wilbesustainedandacompaniedby

aplicationofaratherestrictiveimigrationpolicy.Underthiscenario,therewilbeafurther

depopulationofthemajorityofCEcountries(perhapsexceptheCzechRepublicandSlovenia)

andagrowingshortageinthelabourmarketscausedbyincreasedemandforworkersfrom

employersandgrowingdificultiesinfindingthem.Thiswilresultfromdemographicproceses

(e.g.thexitofnumerousage-groupfromthelabourmarkets)andfromemigrationproceseson

theonehand,andfromthelowscaleoftheinflowoforeigners,ontheother,withthelater

precludingtheredresingoflabourmarketshortages.Thiscenariosemsthemostworyingone,

resultingindeteriorationofthecompetitivenesofthestatesoftheregionandpreventingtheir

catchingupwiththedevelopmentlevelofthemajorityofEU-15states.But,athesametime,itis

averyrealisticscenario.

Sustainable emigration and a definite growth in immigration

TheforecastsconcerningemigrationareparaleltothoseunderScenarioI.Thefundamental

diferenceliesinthefocusofthestatesoftheregiononcompensatingimigration,i.e.redresing

oflabourmarketshortagesemergingasaresultofemigrationandemographicproceses.This

wouldentailtheposibility– dependingonthestate– ofanualyreceivingfromseveralthousand

(Balticstates)totensofthousands(Poland,Romania)ofimigrantsanualy.Ahigher

imigrationscaleisveryunlikely.Thiswouldhelptoslowdownthepaceofdepopulationand

relievelabourmarketshortages.Whileitwouldbeimposibletoreversethenegativetrendsand

makeupforthelosesthathavetakenplacesince204,aninflowoforeignerswouldenable

improvementofthepopulationstructureandconsequentlywouldleadtoapotentialypositive

outcomeforthelabourmarket.Underthiscenario,by2020thesocio-economicsituationofthe

statesoftheregionwouldnotchangefundamentaly.ThedevelopmentgapbetwentheCE

countriesandthebestdevelopedEUmemberstateswouldremain,withthepotentialforaslight

bridgingofthegap.Italsohastobeasumedthathiscenarioisthemostlikelyoneforcountries

suchasPoland,Slovenia,theCzechRepublicandSlovakia,andtheleastlikelyfortheBalticstates,

BulgariandRomania.TheBalticstates,inhabitedbyaRusianminority,pursueaveryrestrictive

imigrationpolicy,whileBulgariandRomaniarethestatesleastatractiveforimigration.

Increased scale of returns and restricted inflow of foreigners

Underthiscenario,thetrendsinemigrationproceseswouldbereversed.Thiswouldtranslate

intoareducednumberofpeoplegoingabroadandanincreasednumberofthosereturning.

Asaresult,thepopulationsizesofthestatesoftheregionwouldbemaintained,whilereturn

migrationswouldreducelabourmarketshortages.Moreover,itmustbeasumedthathe

diferencebetwenemigrationsandreturnmigrationswouldnotbegreat.InthecaseoftheBaltic

states,itwouldamountoseveralthousandpeople,whileinthecaseofPolandandRomaniait

wouldbeintherangeof10,0to30,0peopleanualy.Thiswouldofsethemigrationloses

wehavexperiencedsince204.Athesametime,thepresentimigrationpolicywouldbe

upheld,whichwouldtranslateintoaveryrestrictedinflowoforeignersintothestatesofthe

region(asinScenarioI).Asaresultoftheprocesesoutlinedhere,depopulationwouldbereduced

(buthisefectwouldbeweakerthanunderScenarioI),butitwouldnotbeposibletoensurean

adequatenumberofworkersinresponsetothedemandfromemployers.

60

Scenario IV:

Ontheonehand,thediferencebetwenemigrationsandreturnswouldbetosmaltofsethe

losesrelatedtodemographicproceses,while,ontheother,returnmigrantswouldbemployed

insectorswithrelativelyhighwages(otherwisetheywouldnotreturn),sotherewouldstilbegaps

inthesecondlabourmarketsegment,whereforeignersmayundertakemploymentunderthe

complementarityprinciple.Underthiscenario– asinScenarioI– adevelopmentgapbetwen

CEcountriesandthebestdevelopedEU-15stateswouldbemaintained.Onlyaslightnarowingof

thisgapislikely.ThiscenariomustbedemedasthemostlikelyforcountriesuchasPolandor

Bulgaria,whileitishardlylikelyfortheCzechRepublicorSlovenia,whichavenotrecordedany

significantemigrationlevelsinrecentyears,soconsequentlylarge-scalereturnmigrationsare

virtualyoutofthequestion.

Growth in the scale of return migrations and an increased inflow of foreigners

Thiscenarioasumesthathetrendsbothinemigrationandimigrationproceseswilbe

reversed.Ontheonehand,thegrowthinthescaleofreturnmigrationsacompaniedbyrestriction

ofemigrationandinflowoforeignerswouldresultinthegrowthofthepopulationofthestatesof

theregionandredresingoflabourmarketshortages,butontheotherhand,thiswouldentail

absorbingasignificantnumberofneworkersintothelabourmarketsofparticularstates.

However,asumingthatmigrationproceseswilacelerateinthecomingyears,whilethescaleof

returnmigrationsandinflowoforeignerswilnotbeverylarge,integrationofthosepeople

shouldnotbeproblematic.Moreover,itmustbeasumedthathecoincidenceoftwoproceses,

i.e.growthinthescaleofreturnsandofimigration,wouldtranslateintogodevelopment

prospectsforCEcountriesandthepotentialfornarowingthedevelopmentgapseparatingthem

fromEU-15statesfasterthanbefore.Wewouldbedealingwithasituationwherethenumberof

economicalyactivecitizensincreases,whichpositivelyinfluencescompetitivenesand

developmentprospects.Butitcanotbeasumedthathegapwouldbecompletelyclosedby

2020.Buthiscenarioishighlyunlikely,becauseitwouldentailtheintroductionofar-reaching

changesinboththeconomicandmigrationpoliciesofCEstates.

61

Summary

Thefourscenariospresentedabovesemtobetheonlyfeasibleonesintheperspectiveof2020.

Wecanhardlyasumetherewilbelarge-scalereturnsfromemigrationoraninflowofthousandsoforeigners.

Athesametime,variouscenariosmayunfoldinparticularCEcountries.The states closest to Scenario IV

should be able to cope best both with demographic challenges and with challenges concerning socioeconomic

development.Ontheotherhand,thestatesthatfailtoavoidScenario I will lose their position and

will continue to significantly lag behind other EU member states.Thisisparticularlyimportantinthetime

perspectiveoftheyear2020,whenstructuralfundscurentlyusedbyCEcountrieswilprobablybegreatly

reduced.Thecountriesthatakeadvantageofthecomingyearswilhaveanoportunitytomakeanother

civilisationaleapforward,whilethosethatwastethistimewilremainonthemarginsoftheEuropeanUnionfor

manydecadestocome.Quitecertainly,propermigrationmanagementwilbeanindispensable– although

probablynotheonly– preconditionforsuchaleaptotakeplace.

62


1

CEcountriesare still at risk of outflows of workers to other EU

member states.Thisisevidencedbythestatementsofyoungpeople,whose

oportunitiestosatisfytheirnedsthroughemigration.Athesametime,the

mostmobileprofesionsarethosewhoserepresentativesarehighlyskiled.This

canconstituteanaditionalchalengetothestatesoftheregion,whichwilbe

relatedtotheoutflowofworkerswhobringthegreatestadedvaluetothe

economy.

2

Inthecomingyears,the demand for workers both in the first and

second labour market segments will grow in CEE countries.Thiswilfolow

fromsustainedemigrationprocesesandthedynamicsofdemographichanges.

Aparticularlylargenumberofshortageswilapearinprofesionsrequiring

highskils.Athesametime,itmustbeasumedthatheducationsystemwil

notbeabletoprepareadequatenumbersofwel-educatedgraduates,who

wouldbeabletorespondtothedemandfromemployers.

3

RegardingthedevelopmentofthemigrationsituationintheCEregion,

fourscenariosareposible.Theydiferbothintermsofthescaleofemigration

proceses,returnmigrationsandinflowoforeigners.Themostalarmingis

Scenario I, which assumes both a sustained surplus of emigration over

returns and a restricted inflow of foreigners.Themostoptimistic– butathe

sametimetheleastprobable– isScenario IV, which assumes a surplus of

returns over emigration and a moderate, but constant inflow of foreigners,

whorelievethemerginglabourmarketshortages.

4

ThestatesthatareclosestoScenarioIVshouldbe able to improve

their position within the EU.ThestateswhereScenarioIunfoldswilbeunable

tobridgethedevelopmentgapseparatingthemfromthemajorityofEU-15

states.

63

Conclusion

th

The20centurywasdubedtheageofmigration.Manyresearchersand

st

politicianswonderwhetherthisdescriptionalsoapliestothe21century.Thefirstyears

oftheneweradonotsuporthisview.Itsemsthatheideaofremigrationiscurently

incrisis.Thisisevidencedbythefacthatmanypeoplearecalingintoquestionthe

benefitsofmigrationandblamingmigrantsfordeclininglivingstandardsinthebest

developedsocietiesoftheworld.

Butwecanhardlyimaginethecontemporaryworldwithoutmigrationproceses.

Areturntothedaysofulborderchecks,restrictedacestolabourmarketswithintheEU,

andrefusalstograntrefugestatustoforeignerswhoselifeorhealthisthreatenedintheir

statesoforiginistilaverydistantprospect,butitcanotbecompletelyruledout.Soare

weinforadebateonintroductionofrestrictionsinsteadofliftingtheminthecoming

years?

Thisreportrejectsuchaviewandtriestoshowmigrationsfromadiferent

perspective.It focuses on describing migration processes in Europe, with a particular

stress on CEE countries. Itdemonstratesthebenefitsderivedbybothsendingstatesand

receivingstates,butathesametimeitdoesnotrytoavoidansweringdificultquestions

concerning,forexample,competitioninthelabourmarketbetwenforeignersand

migrants.Bycreatingtheindexofmigrationatractivenesofstatesandscenariosfor

developmentofmigrationprocesesinthecomingyears,italsoshowshowecanthink

aboutmigrationsandconductadebateaboutheirefects.

Theanalysespresentedsugesthatrestricting migrations would be a huge

mistake, and the outcomes of such decisions are very difficult to envisage now.

Migrationshavebecomeapermanentandindispensablelementofthecontemporary

world.Butitisesentialtofindanewparadigm,which– asumingmigrationsarenot

restricted– wilhelpbothsendingandreceivingstatesderivebenefitsfromthem.

TheroleofCEcountriesisveryspecialherebecausetheyconstitutethelargest

regionintheworldtobechangingitstatusfromanemigrationtoanemigrationimigrationregion.Consequentlytheystilfacethe

challenge of large-scale departures

of their nationals, who seek their fortunes abroad, but at the same time are

destinations for the nationals of many states, who hope for a prosperous future in

them.

Thispaper,beingthesecondpartofthereportoftheCEDInstituteon

migrations,atemptstocontributetothepresentdebateaboutmigrationsandanswer

manyfundamentalquestions,butinsuchawaythatthedebateaboutrestricting

migrationsrecedesintothebackgroundandisreplacedbyadebateabouthereal

oportunitiesandchalengeswearedealingwithcurently.TheperspectiveofCE

countriesmayprovetobeofcentralimportanceinthiscontext.Ontheonehand,thestates

oftheregionbearthecostsofliberalisationofmigrationwithintheEU,butathesame

timetheyderivemanybenefitsfromit.Moreoverseveralofthemarebecoming

increasinglyatractivetoimigrants,whichalowsthemtostarthinkingaboutcompeting

againsthebestdevelopedcountriesoftheworldinatractinghighlyskiledimigrants.

Thisischangingthewaytheregionisperceivedonthemigrationmapoftheworld.Weare

convincedthatasolidpresentationofthemigrationsituationintheregion,andrawingof

conclusionsonthisbasis,wilhelputhediscusionaboutmigrationsbackontheright

trackandavoidlimitingitmainlytopopulistslogansaimedatderivingshort-termbenefits

inthecomingelections.

64

Thereport’sauthorsbelieveitisesentialto have a discussion about the index

of migration attractiveness of European states presented in Chapter III and the

scenarios for development of migration processes presented in Chapter IV.Wehope

thathisdiscusionwilbeasheatedastheonethatfolowedthepublicationofthefirst

reportoftheCEDInstituteonmigration.

Weinviteyoutojointhediscusion!

65

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