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Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of chapter 9. 2007

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<strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong>Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9and AssociatedInstitutionsA report to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parliament <strong>of</strong>South Africa31 July <strong>2007</strong>Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>:Hon Pr<strong>of</strong> AK Asmal, Chairperson, (ANC), Hon MrS L Di<strong>the</strong>be, (ANC), Hon Ms C Johnson, (ANC),Hon <strong>Ad</strong>v T M Masutha, (ANC) - replaced by HonMr C V Burgess, (ANC), Hon Mrs M J JMatsomela, (ANC), Hon Dr J T Delport, (DA) –replaced by Hon S M Camerer (DA), Hon Ms MSmuts, (DA), Hon Mr J H van der Merwe, (IFP),Hon Mrs S Rajbally, (MF), Hon Mr S Simmons,(UPSA)Suggested citation: Parliament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong>South Africa (<strong>2007</strong>). <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 andAssociated Institutions. A report to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Parliament <strong>of</strong> South Africa, CapeTown, South AfricaWebsite: www.parliament.gov.zaISBN: 978-0-620-39323-2© <strong>2007</strong>, Parliament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South Africa


TABLE OF CONTENTSForewordExecutive summaryvviiiChapter 1 Context 2Introduction 3Approach and methodology 5Guiding Principles 9Conclusion 17Chapter 2 Common Issues and KeyRecommendations 18Financial matters and budget allocations 19Appointments 21Relationship with Parliament 26Institutional governance arrangements 32Accessibility 35A single human rights body 37Chapter 3 The Electoral Commission 42Background 43Constitutional and legal mandate 43Findings 45General conclusions 50Recommendations 51Chapter 4 The Financial and FiscalCommission 54Background 55Constitutional and legal mandate 55Findings 56General conclusions 63Recommendations 63Chapter 5 The Auditor-General 66Background 67Constitutional and legal mandate 68Findings 69General conclusions 77Recommendations 78Chapter 6 The Public ServiceCommission 80Background 81Constitutional and legal mandate 81Findings 84General conclusions 92Recommendations 93Chapter 7 The Public Protector 94Background 95Constitutional and legal mandate 96Findings 97General conclusions 106Recommendations 106Chapter 8 The National YouthCommission 108Background 109Constitutional and legal mandate 110ii<strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CONTENTSFindings 110General conclusions 116Recommendations 116Chapter 9 The Pan South African LanguageBoard 118Background 119Constitutional and legal mandate 119Findings 120General conclusions 129Recommendations 129Chapter 10 The Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights<strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities 132Background 133Constitutional and legal mandate 133Findings 135General conclusions 142Recommendations 143Chapter 11 The Commission forGender Equality 146Background 147Constitutional and legal mandate 148Findings 150General conclusions 162Recommendations 162Chapter 12 The Human RightsCommission 166Background 167Constitutional and legal mandate 167Findings 171General conclusions 184Recommendations 185Chapter 13 The IndependentCommunications Authority<strong>of</strong> South Africa 188Background 189Constitutional and legal mandate 192Findings 192General conclusions 202Recommendations 202Chapter 14 Conclusion 204AnnexuresSelected Constitutional provisions 206Table 1. Comparison <strong>of</strong> provisionsrelating to appointment to andremoval from <strong>of</strong>fice, as well asremuneration and conditions <strong>of</strong>service <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice bearers 219Table 2. Membership, date <strong>of</strong>appointment and expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice 228List <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and o<strong>the</strong>rstatutory institutions in which<strong>the</strong> National Assembly has a roleto play 232Terms <strong>of</strong> reference 236Questionnaire 240List <strong>of</strong> submissions andrepresentations 244<strong>Report</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Public opinion survey 248A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>iii


REPORT OF THE ad hoc COMMITTEEON THE REVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 ANDASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS


FOREWORDFOREWORDIt is an honour to present to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> an intensive, robustand comprehensive process engaged in by <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> in carrying out its assigned task.This report on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 andAssociated Institutions documents <strong>the</strong> first everparliamentary review <strong>of</strong> a set <strong>of</strong> institutionsthat are at <strong>the</strong> core <strong>of</strong> consolidating, growingand sustaining our hard-fought democracy.The individual and collective experiences andwisdom <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Members enriched and invigoratedour discussions. While maintaining <strong>the</strong>necessary respect for <strong>the</strong> independence anddignity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, Members askedprobing and sometimes difficult questions thatallowed us to present our findings and recommendationswith confidence and conviction.The work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> would have beendifficult without <strong>the</strong> team <strong>of</strong> dedicated supportstaff assigned by <strong>the</strong> Speaker. These energeticand enthusiastic pr<strong>of</strong>essionals provided secretarial,research and legal support that enabled<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> to complete its work successfullywith <strong>the</strong> minimum amount <strong>of</strong> disruption. Inparticular, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> would like to thank<strong>the</strong> core report-drafting team who werecharged with organising, processing andanalysing <strong>the</strong> large volume <strong>of</strong> informationreceived and distilling <strong>the</strong> key issues for <strong>the</strong>attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. The<strong>Committee</strong> also appreciates <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong>two external consultants in <strong>the</strong> drafting andediting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> report.The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong> report would be<strong>of</strong> interest to six main constituencies, in noorder <strong>of</strong> importance or preference:• The eleven institutions reviewed. It ishoped that <strong>the</strong> institutions will use <strong>the</strong> information,particularly <strong>the</strong> recommendations,presented in <strong>the</strong> report for <strong>the</strong> primary purpose<strong>of</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> institutions andenhancing <strong>the</strong>ir efficiency and effectiveness.• Members <strong>of</strong> Parliament. IndividualMembers <strong>of</strong> Parliament should look at <strong>the</strong>elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> report relating to ways inwhich <strong>the</strong>ir individual and collective oversightwork could be conducted more effectivelyto fur<strong>the</strong>r support and improve <strong>the</strong>institutions reviewed. In particular, <strong>the</strong>interaction <strong>of</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> Parliament withcitizens during <strong>the</strong>ir constituency workbecomes critical in increasing citizens’access to information and services <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions.• The public. The general public should takea keen and active interest in <strong>the</strong> contents <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> report because <strong>the</strong> institutions reviewedwere designed to protect, promote andenhance <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> citizens. The institutionsare expected to assist people to vindicate<strong>the</strong>ir rights. The effectiveness and efficiencywith which <strong>the</strong> institutions discharge<strong>the</strong>ir duties have a direct bearing on <strong>the</strong>quality <strong>of</strong> life <strong>of</strong> all South Africans, but particularly<strong>the</strong> poor, marginalised, rural andpreviously disenfranchised.• The Executive. The Executive initiated thisreview and <strong>the</strong>n referred it to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly. As many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendationshave direct relevance for <strong>the</strong> Executive,it is important that <strong>the</strong>re should be engagementbetween <strong>the</strong> Executive and Parliamenton <strong>the</strong> substance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendationsand <strong>the</strong> approach that Parliament wouldtake in ensuring <strong>the</strong>ir implementation andmonitoring.• The National Assembly and Parliament.The report was agreed to unanimously byA REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>v


<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> and is hereby presented to<strong>the</strong> National Assembly for its consideration.If adopted, it is respectfully suggested that<strong>the</strong> National Assembly and Parliamentshould determine a programme <strong>of</strong> action toensure <strong>the</strong> implementation and monitoring<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations as adopted. Itwould be important for Parliament toaddress <strong>the</strong> Executive in determining its programme<strong>of</strong> action, and in particular to consulton how <strong>the</strong> Executive, on its side, wishesto address <strong>the</strong> matters raised in <strong>the</strong>report.• The media. The media may be expected toplay an enormously important role not onlyin popularising <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> this report andproviding critique and analysis, but also indrawing attention to <strong>the</strong> work and <strong>the</strong> constitutionalobligations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionsreviewed (and all o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state).A historic duty rests with <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly to address <strong>the</strong> issues raised in <strong>the</strong>report. This important challenge for <strong>the</strong>National Assembly, and for Parliament, comesat <strong>the</strong> right time when <strong>the</strong>re is a high degree<strong>of</strong> interest in <strong>the</strong> institutions reviewed.The report begins with a brief introduction on<strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s brief, <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions reviewed and <strong>the</strong>approach and methodology adopted by <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>. It <strong>the</strong>n elaborates a set <strong>of</strong> principlesthat guided <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>,and discusses <strong>the</strong> issues that were consideredgeneric to all <strong>the</strong> institutions reviewed andpresents key recommendations in this regard.The report <strong>the</strong>n discusses each institution indetail and makes specific recommendations foreach institution.The <strong>Committee</strong> commends this report to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly.Hon Pr<strong>of</strong> AK Asmal, Chairperson, (ANC)Hon Mr S L Di<strong>the</strong>be, (ANC)Hon Ms C Johnson, (ANC)Hon <strong>Ad</strong>v T M Masutha, (ANC), replaced by HonMr C V Burgess, (ANC)Hon Mrs M J J Matsomela, (ANC)Hon Dr J T Delport, (DA), replaced by Hon MsSM Camerer (DA)Hon Ms M Smuts, (DA)Hon Mr J H van der Merwe, (IFP)Hon Mrs S Rajbally, (MF)Hon Mr S Simmons, (UPSA)31 July <strong>2007</strong>National Assembly, Cape Townvi<strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


FOREWORDA REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>vii


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


EXECUTIVE SUMMARYEXECUTIVE SUMMARY1. Background to reviewWith <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> democracy in South Africa in1994, a human rights culture was made <strong>the</strong>cornerstone <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new constitutional dispensationand a wide-ranging set <strong>of</strong> human rights,including socio-economic rights, was inscribedin a Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights and incorporated in <strong>the</strong>Interim Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1993 and repeated in<strong>the</strong> final Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1996.From <strong>the</strong> outset <strong>the</strong> leadership in South Africawas determined that those rights would notjust remain rights on paper, but would beactively realised, promoted and entrenched in<strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> people and particularly<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> poor and <strong>the</strong> marginalised and thosewhose human rights had been consistently violatedand abused for generations. The objectwas <strong>the</strong> complete transformation <strong>of</strong> our societyfrom a culture that was oppressive, secretiveand pr<strong>of</strong>oundly disrespectful <strong>of</strong> basic humanrights into a human rights based culture inwhich <strong>the</strong> human dignity <strong>of</strong> all is both respectedand celebrated.In order to achieve this goal, a range <strong>of</strong> institutionswere established in <strong>the</strong> Constitution itselfand in national legislation, <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong>which was to streng<strong>the</strong>n constitutional democracyin South Africa by <strong>the</strong> active promotion <strong>of</strong>a culture <strong>of</strong> human rights and <strong>the</strong> protection,development and attainment <strong>of</strong> those rights,including monitoring and assessing <strong>the</strong>ir implementationand observance. Each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionswas meant to focus on a particular sector<strong>of</strong> society where <strong>the</strong> need for transformationwas felt to be greatest. Reflecting <strong>the</strong> government’sdetermination to achieve this transformation,<strong>the</strong>se institutions uniquely were madeindependent <strong>of</strong> government so that <strong>the</strong>y couldexercise <strong>the</strong>ir powers and perform <strong>the</strong>ir vitalfunctions without fear, favour or prejudice,being accountable only and directly to <strong>the</strong> people’sdemocratically elected representatives in<strong>the</strong> National Assembly.Ten years into <strong>the</strong> new democracy, <strong>the</strong> governmentthought it was opportune to assess <strong>the</strong>extent to which society had been transformedand human rights entrenched through <strong>the</strong>operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions. Such a reviewwould identify <strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness and relevance,individually and collectively, and <strong>the</strong>requirements to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong>m fur<strong>the</strong>r toensure that <strong>the</strong>y were best able to achieve<strong>the</strong>ir objectives.2. Appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>As <strong>the</strong> institutions had specifically been madeindependent <strong>of</strong> government, <strong>the</strong> Executive feltit to be inappropriate for it to undertake such areview itself and <strong>the</strong>refore requested <strong>the</strong>National Assembly to conduct a review.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> National Assembly on 21September 2006 by resolution appointed amulti-party ad hoc committee for this purpose.The <strong>Committee</strong>, which was to report by 30 June<strong>2007</strong>, a date subsequently extended to 31 July<strong>2007</strong>, was given detailed terms <strong>of</strong> reference.It was required to review <strong>the</strong> state institutionssupporting constitutional democracy as listed inChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution (<strong>the</strong> so-calledChapter 9 institutions) as well as <strong>the</strong> PublicService Commission as established in Chapter10 for <strong>the</strong> purpose, in <strong>the</strong> first instance, <strong>of</strong>broadly assessing whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> current andintended constitutional and legal mandates <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se institutions are suitable for <strong>the</strong> SouthAfrican environment, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> consumption<strong>of</strong> resources by <strong>the</strong>m is justified in relation to<strong>the</strong>ir outputs and contribution to democracy,and whe<strong>the</strong>r a rationalisation <strong>of</strong> function, roleA REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>ix


or organisation is desirable or will diminish <strong>the</strong>focus on important areas. The <strong>Committee</strong> wasfur<strong>the</strong>r also to conduct its review with referenceto o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state <strong>of</strong> a similar naturewhose work related closely to <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>aforementioned institutions.Turning to <strong>the</strong> individual institutions, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> was also specifically tasked with –• reviewing <strong>the</strong> appropriateness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>appointment and employment arrangementsfor commissions and <strong>the</strong>ir secretariatswith a view to enhanced consistency,coherence, accountability and affordability;• reviewing institutional governance arrangementsin order to develop a model <strong>of</strong> internalaccountability and efficiency;• improving <strong>the</strong> co-ordination <strong>of</strong> workbetween <strong>the</strong> institutions covered in thisreview, as well as improving co-ordinationand co-operation with government and civilsociety;• recognising <strong>the</strong> need for a more structuredoversight role by Parliament in <strong>the</strong> context<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir independence; and• reviewing <strong>the</strong> funding models <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions,including funding derived from transfersand licences and o<strong>the</strong>r fees, with a viewto improving accountability, independenceand efficiency.3. Institutions reviewedThe <strong>Committee</strong> in accordance with its terms <strong>of</strong>reference conducted a review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9institutions, namely <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commission for<strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities,<strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission,as well as <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission.In addition, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> included in its review<strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board, <strong>the</strong>Financial and Fiscal Commission, <strong>the</strong>Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrica and <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission. All <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se, with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last-mentioned,are covered in <strong>the</strong> Constitution itself and enjoyspecial status. All eleven are in <strong>the</strong>ir differentspheres engaged in streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> fabric <strong>of</strong>our constitutional arrangements.These institutions were established at differenttimes and are at different stages <strong>of</strong> development.The <strong>Committee</strong> took this into account.4. Approach and methodologyThe approach and methodology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> are set out in detail in Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong>this report. The <strong>Committee</strong> engaged extensivelywith <strong>the</strong> relevant institutions <strong>the</strong>mselves,relevant Ministries and departments, relevantparliamentary committees and <strong>the</strong> public andcivil society. The <strong>Committee</strong> also commissioneda public opinion survey, based on aquestionnaire developed by it, to get a generalsense <strong>of</strong> public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.In order to ensure consistency in <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s approach to its work, it elaborateda range <strong>of</strong> guiding principles and criteriaagainst which <strong>the</strong> institutions were measured,namely <strong>the</strong> aspects guaranteeing <strong>the</strong>ir independence,accountability mechanisms andpractices, and <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.All <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se were examined within <strong>the</strong>x<strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


EXECUTIVE SUMMARYframework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indivisibility, interdependenceand interrelatedness <strong>of</strong> human rights.Each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions was examined inrespect <strong>of</strong> its constitutional and legal mandateand <strong>the</strong> institution’s understanding and interpretation<strong>of</strong> that mandate; its powers and functions;appointment procedures for <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers;public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution; its relationshipwith Parliament, <strong>the</strong> Executive, and(o<strong>the</strong>r) Chapter 9 and associated institutions; itsinstitutional governance arrangements; and itsfinancial arrangements. A separate <strong>chapter</strong> in<strong>the</strong> report is accordingly devoted to each institutionin which <strong>the</strong>se issues are reported on indetail, which is followed by general conclusionsand findings, and recommendations specific to<strong>the</strong> institution aimed at resolving identifiedproblems and shortcomings and generallystreng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> institution.5. Findings and recommendationson common issuesPursuant to its mandate to assess in broadterms whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> current and intended legalmandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions are suitable for <strong>the</strong>South African environment, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>ir consumption<strong>of</strong> resources is justified in relation to<strong>the</strong>ir outputs and contribution to democracyand whe<strong>the</strong>r a rationalisation <strong>of</strong> function, roleor organization is desirable or will diminish <strong>the</strong>focus on important areas, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> inChapter 2 examines a range <strong>of</strong> broad issues inrespect <strong>of</strong> which common difficulties and lack<strong>of</strong> consistency and coherence in approach wereidentified. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>n, in this allimportantChapter, makes fully motivated findingsand recommendations, which respond toits broad mandate on <strong>the</strong>se issues. The findingsand recommendations can be summarisedin outline as follows:5.1. FINANCIAL MATTERS AND BUDGETALLOCATIONSNoting that <strong>the</strong> different institutions follow differentand inconsistent funding processes andrecognising that <strong>the</strong>ir financial independence isan important indicator <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir true independence,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong>irbudgets should be contained in a separate programmein Parliament’s Budget Vote, <strong>the</strong>required processes to this end to be negotiatedwith National Treasury.5.2. APPOINTMENTSAllowing for variation depending on <strong>the</strong> differentmandates, powers and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions, a reasonable degree <strong>of</strong> consistencyin appointments is required and appointmentprocedures should be consistent with upholdingand protecting <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.Specifically –• selection criteria should be adjusted;• <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> Ministers in appointments shouldbe removed;• appointments should be staggered toenhance continuity;• chairpersons should be appointed ei<strong>the</strong>r by<strong>the</strong> institutions <strong>the</strong>mselves or by <strong>the</strong> relevantparliamentary committee; and• public involvement in appointment processesshould be enhanced.5.3. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTThe <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> institutions areaccountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, butstresses that <strong>the</strong>y also complement and aresupportive <strong>of</strong> Parliament’s oversight function.The <strong>Committee</strong> examines both aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions’ interaction with Parliament andA REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>xi


finds that Parliament’s engagement with <strong>the</strong>institutions currently is wholly inadequate.Recommendations are made to effect improvements.In particular, a unit on constitutionalinstitutions and o<strong>the</strong>r statutory bodies shouldbe set up in <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speaker to co-ordinateall interactions with <strong>the</strong>se institutions, and<strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> portfolio committees to engagewith substantive reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutionsshould be significantly enhanced.5.4. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSThe <strong>Committee</strong> finds that internal tensionshave been experienced in most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.This is <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong>clear lines <strong>of</strong> authority between <strong>the</strong> members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution, its head and <strong>the</strong> secretariat.The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that enabling legislationbe reviewed to clarify lines <strong>of</strong> authoritywhere necessary.The <strong>Committee</strong> finds fur<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>re is nouniformity concerning <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>remuneration and conditions <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions. However, section219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides for <strong>the</strong>establishment <strong>of</strong> a framework by national legislationfor determining <strong>the</strong>se. Such legislationshould be adopted urgently and be made applicableto all <strong>the</strong> affected institutions. This couldpossibly be achieved by amending <strong>the</strong>Independent Commission for <strong>the</strong> Remuneration<strong>of</strong> Public Office-Bearers Act.Present arrangements for <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> conflicts<strong>of</strong> interest differ widely between <strong>the</strong> institutions.The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong>enabling legislation should be amended to providea coherent and comprehensive frameworkis this regard.5.5. ACCESSIBILITYThe <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> institutions arelargely urban-based and recommends that <strong>the</strong>yshould be innovative to ensure <strong>the</strong>y becomemore accessible to <strong>the</strong> public, especially in ruralareas. At <strong>the</strong> same time, it could not confirm<strong>the</strong> usefulness <strong>of</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fices where suchhave been established and holds that such<strong>of</strong>fices should be established only where ademonstrable need can be shown.5.6. A SINGLE HUMAN RIGHTS BODYThe <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> multiplicity <strong>of</strong>institutions created to protect and promote <strong>the</strong>rights <strong>of</strong> specific constituencies in South Africahas in practice resulted in an uneven spread <strong>of</strong>available resources and capacities, with implicationsfor effectiveness and efficiency. Thishas created fragmentation, confounding <strong>the</strong>intention that <strong>the</strong>se institutions should support<strong>the</strong> seamless application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore proposes <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> an umbrella human rights body tobe called <strong>the</strong> South African Commission onHuman Rights and Equality, into which <strong>the</strong>National Youth Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> Cultural,Religious and Linguistic Communities (toge<strong>the</strong>rwith <strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board)and <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality shouldbe incorporated toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission.The <strong>Committee</strong> accepts that this process <strong>of</strong>amalgamation will nei<strong>the</strong>r be easy nor speedy,but it should be finalised within a reasonabletime. It <strong>the</strong>refore recommends that as a firststep a task team be set up consisting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>heads <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant institutions and a number<strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly to proxii<strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


EXECUTIVE SUMMARYduce a roadmap to guide <strong>the</strong> process, <strong>the</strong> taskteam to report to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly within12 months.6. Findings and recommendationson individual institutionsIn <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s findings andrecommendations on identified issues commonto all <strong>the</strong> institutions under review and <strong>the</strong> proposedestablishment <strong>of</strong> an umbrella humanrights commission in <strong>the</strong> medium term, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> in separate <strong>chapter</strong>s examines andmakes findings and recommendations on <strong>the</strong>individual institutions with a view to resolvingspecific problems and generally streng<strong>the</strong>ning<strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness and efficiency. These wouldbe interim and immediate measures in <strong>the</strong>case <strong>of</strong> those institutions, which would in duecourse be amalgamated into <strong>the</strong> umbrellabody.The full findings and recommendations aredetailed in <strong>the</strong> respective <strong>chapter</strong>s. For purposes<strong>of</strong> this summary a few are highlighted:1. Co-ordination and co-operation between <strong>the</strong>institutions in a revived Forum <strong>of</strong>Independent Statutory Bodies should beactively encouraged.2. Relevant institutions should publish <strong>the</strong>number, nature and outcomes <strong>of</strong> complaints<strong>the</strong>y have received. Where complaints arereferred to ano<strong>the</strong>r body, progress should betracked.3. The legal mandate for engagement in internationalwork, where applicable, should beclarified.4. Codes <strong>of</strong> conduct and registers <strong>of</strong> financialinterest should be kept and be made accessible.5. Innovative ways must be found to promotepublic awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respective institutions.6. The failure <strong>of</strong> state departments and o<strong>the</strong>rorgans <strong>of</strong> state to respond to recommendationsmade by <strong>the</strong> respective institutionsshould be pertinently brought to <strong>the</strong> attention<strong>of</strong> Parliament.7. Motivated recommendations are made toalter <strong>the</strong> composition <strong>of</strong> specified institutions.8. Formal agreements should be entered intobetween relevant institutions to prevent anypossibility <strong>of</strong> duplication or overlap <strong>of</strong> functions.<strong>9.</strong> The institutions need to develop strategiesto attract and retain staff.10.The National Youth Commission’s mandateshould be widened to encompass both childrenand <strong>the</strong> youth.11.Concerning <strong>the</strong> Pan South African LanguageBoard, its lexicography units should betransferred to <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Arts andCulture, and <strong>the</strong> Board itself should be incorporatedin <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Com-munitiesas a joint activity in a relatively shortperiod. According to legal advice this couldbe achieved without necessarily amending<strong>the</strong> Constitution.A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>xiii


12.For purposes <strong>of</strong> ensuring a smooth transitionto a consolidated body, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat a task team be set up consisting<strong>of</strong> three members <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>affected bodies toge<strong>the</strong>r with six members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, preferably from<strong>the</strong> relevant portfolio committee. The taskteam should report within 12 months.13.Regarding <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotionand Protection <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities, see <strong>the</strong> recommendationabove relating to <strong>the</strong> Pan SouthAfrican Language Board.14.The Commission on Gender Equality Act,which is out <strong>of</strong> date, should be amended assoon as possible to bring it into line with <strong>the</strong>Constitution.15.For purposes <strong>of</strong> coherence and consistency,<strong>the</strong> oversight and accountability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equality should belocated with <strong>the</strong> National Assembly component<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> onImprovement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status <strong>of</strong>Women, which should for that purpose alsobe formalised in <strong>the</strong> Assembly rules as aseparate committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Assembly.16.Concerning <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission,pending <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposedumbrella human rights commission <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment should without delay introduceamending legislation to bring <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission Act into line with<strong>the</strong> Constitution and in <strong>the</strong> process makeprovision for o<strong>the</strong>r specified issues.17.Fur<strong>the</strong>r, Parliament should initiate <strong>the</strong>speedy appointment <strong>of</strong> at least two moreCommissioners to <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission,one <strong>of</strong> whom should be designatedto deal with <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> disabled personsand <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> access toinformation.18.The Independent Communications Authority<strong>of</strong> South Africa Act should be amended tomake <strong>the</strong> President ra<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> relevantMinister responsible for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Councillors. O<strong>the</strong>r specified issues shouldalso be covered in <strong>the</strong> amending legislation.7. ConclusionThe <strong>Committee</strong> expresses <strong>the</strong> hope that <strong>the</strong>institutions that have been reviewed will use<strong>the</strong> information contained in this report, andparticularly <strong>the</strong> detailed recommendations, for<strong>the</strong> primary purpose <strong>of</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong>m andenhancing <strong>the</strong>ir efficiency and effectiveness.The <strong>Committee</strong> agreed to <strong>the</strong> report unanimously.xiv<strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


EXECUTIVE SUMMARYA REPORT TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY <strong>2007</strong>1


CHAPTER 1


CHAPTER 1CHAPTER 1CONTEXT1. IntroductionEmerging from a racially divided and oppressivepast, where basic human rights were violated in<strong>the</strong> extreme by an illegitimate government thatfailed to honour even <strong>the</strong> most basic tenets <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> rule <strong>of</strong> law, South Africa crafted a Constitutionthat is unique and far reaching in its provisions.Amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, it established an array<strong>of</strong> constitutionally protected institutions createdto streng<strong>the</strong>n democracy and to promoterespect for human rights in our society.The new, democratically elected governmentinherited a state, which was farcically bureaucratic,secretive and unresponsive to <strong>the</strong> basicneeds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> its citizens. Most <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> state institutions had little or no credibilityand were pr<strong>of</strong>oundly distrusted by <strong>the</strong> majority<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people.For some constitutional negotiators it was<strong>the</strong>refore clear that in order to transform SouthAfrican society from an intensely oppressivesociety into an open and democratic societybased on human dignity, equality and freedomwould require more than a change in <strong>the</strong> system<strong>of</strong> government. It would be necessary tocreate a set <strong>of</strong> credibly independent institutionswhose task it would be to streng<strong>the</strong>n constitutionaldemocracy.It was envisaged that <strong>the</strong>se independent institutionswould support constitutional democracybecause <strong>the</strong>y would, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, help to:1. Restore <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state and itsinstitutions in <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> itscitizens;2. Ensure that democracy and <strong>the</strong> values associatedwith human rights and democracyflourished in <strong>the</strong> new dispensation;3. Ensure <strong>the</strong> successful re-establishment <strong>of</strong>,and continued respect for, <strong>the</strong> rule <strong>of</strong> law;and4. Ensure that <strong>the</strong> state became more openand responsive to <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> its citizensand more respectful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rights;Many civil society groups who had come to distrust<strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id State and its institutionsmore broadly or who were eager to see newinstitutions emerge that would be tasked toattend to <strong>the</strong> particular concerns <strong>of</strong> constituents,strongly advocated for <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> independent institutions that wouldlook after <strong>the</strong>ir particular concerns about, forexample, language rights, gender rights orhuman rights in general.At <strong>the</strong> time, a widely shared belief emergedthat at least some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions werenecessary to enhance democracy and, moreimportantly, to empower <strong>the</strong> citizens <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrica. Many South Africans are poor and marginalisedand will not be able to enforce <strong>the</strong>irrights without assistance from independentbodies such as those established by <strong>the</strong>Constitution. These institutions are <strong>of</strong> fundamentalimportance to democracy exactlybecause <strong>the</strong>y have been empowered to act onbehalf <strong>of</strong> those who would not o<strong>the</strong>rwise gainaccess to courts or o<strong>the</strong>r mechanisms forenforcing <strong>the</strong>ir rights.To guarantee <strong>the</strong>ir independence and protectionfrom undue influence and interference, <strong>the</strong>constitutional negotiators deemed it appropriateto afford <strong>the</strong>se institutions maximum protectionby providing for <strong>the</strong>ir establishment andindependence under <strong>the</strong> Constitution. To thatend Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution establishedsix key institutions, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong>CONTEXT3


South African Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equality, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission and <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities to streng<strong>the</strong>n constitutionaldemocracy in South Africa. Our Constitutionalso makes provision for <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong>an independent authority to regulate broadcastingin Chapter <strong>9.</strong> Certain o<strong>the</strong>r related institutions,such as <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commissionand <strong>the</strong> Financial and Fiscal Commission and<strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board wereestablished in o<strong>the</strong>r Chapters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution.These institutions have come to play a vital rolein <strong>the</strong> development and consolidation <strong>of</strong>democracy in South Africa. Yet, almost as atestimony to <strong>the</strong> robustness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> developingSouth African democracy and <strong>the</strong> enormousexpectations <strong>of</strong> a liberated South African society,<strong>the</strong>se institutions have been <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong>criticism by politicians and civil society, including<strong>the</strong> media.Nine years after <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> finalConstitution and ten years after <strong>the</strong> attainment<strong>of</strong> democracy in South Africa, <strong>the</strong> Executiveconsidered it necessary to evaluate <strong>the</strong>progress made towards <strong>the</strong> consolidation <strong>of</strong>democracy and <strong>the</strong> promotion and protection<strong>of</strong> constitutional rights, values and principles inSouth Africa.As part <strong>of</strong> this national process, <strong>the</strong> Governmentrecognised <strong>the</strong> necessity to review <strong>the</strong>effectiveness and relevance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionscreated during <strong>the</strong> constitution-making processto gain a better understanding <strong>of</strong> how <strong>the</strong>ycould be fur<strong>the</strong>r assisted and supported with aview to streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong>m. Cabinet <strong>the</strong>reforetasked <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Public Service and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration in February 2005 with conductinga review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 institutions and <strong>the</strong>Public Service Commission.The correct location <strong>of</strong> this review received particularattention early in <strong>the</strong> review process,given <strong>the</strong> constitutionally guaranteed independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions. It soon becameclear that it was not <strong>the</strong> Executive but <strong>the</strong>National Assembly <strong>of</strong> Parliament, which was<strong>the</strong> appropriate body to conduct such a review.Section 181(5) specifically states “<strong>the</strong>se institutionsare accountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly,and must report on <strong>the</strong>ir activities and <strong>the</strong> performance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functions to <strong>the</strong> Assembly atleast once a year”. It was <strong>the</strong>refore appropriatethat <strong>the</strong> National Assembly should undertake<strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> reviewing <strong>the</strong>se institutions. TheConstitution in fact compels <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly to do so. Therefore on 18 July 2006<strong>the</strong> Cabinet <strong>Committee</strong> on Governance and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration recommended that Parliamentconduct <strong>the</strong> review.Section 181(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution requires allo<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state to assist and protect <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions and to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir independence,impartiality, dignity and effectiveness and <strong>the</strong>Executive initiated <strong>the</strong> review process, in part,to give effect to <strong>the</strong>se constitutional duties.As a result, on 21 September 2006, <strong>the</strong>National Assembly adopted a resolution establishingan ad hoc committee to review Stateinstitutions supporting constitutional democracy(<strong>the</strong> so-called “Chapter 9” institutions) and<strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission established inChapter 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. 1The resolutionincluded terms <strong>of</strong> reference mandating <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> to review <strong>the</strong>se institutions, for <strong>the</strong>purpose <strong>of</strong>:4 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions1 Composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong>: Members: Hon. Pr<strong>of</strong>. Kader Asmal (Chairperson), Hon. Mr S L Di<strong>the</strong>be, Hon. Ms C Johnson, Hon. <strong>Ad</strong>v T M Masutha- replaced by Hon. Mr C V Burgess, Hon. Mrs M J J Matsomela, Hon. Dr J T Delport – replaced by Hon. Ms SM Camerer, Hon. Ms M Smuts, Hon. Mr J Hvan der Merwe, Hon. Mrs S Rajbally, Hon. Mr S Simmons. Parliamentary support staff: Dr. L Gabriel, Mr. M Philander, Ms. C Silkstone, Mr. T Molukanele,<strong>Ad</strong>v A Gordon (<strong>Ad</strong>v M Vassen as alternate), Ms. T Sepanya, Ms. L Monethi, Ms. J <strong>Ad</strong>riaans, Mr T Schumann, Mr E Nevondo. <strong>Ad</strong>ditional technical supportstaff: Pr<strong>of</strong>. P De Vos (UWC), Mr. A Kamieth (intern), Mr. K Hahndiek (former Secretary to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly)


CHAPTER 11. Assessing whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> current and intendedconstitutional and legal mandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions are suitable for <strong>the</strong> South Africanenvironment, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> consumption <strong>of</strong>resources by <strong>the</strong>m is justified in relation to<strong>the</strong>ir outputs and contribution to democracy,and whe<strong>the</strong>r a rationalisation <strong>of</strong> function,role or organisation is desirable or willdiminish <strong>the</strong> focus on important areas;2. Reviewing <strong>the</strong> appropriateness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>appointment and employment arrangementsfor commissions and <strong>the</strong>ir secretariatswith a view to enhanced consistency,coherence, accountability and affordability;3. Reviewing institutional governance arrangementsin order to develop a model <strong>of</strong> internalaccountability and efficiency;4. Improving <strong>the</strong> co-ordination <strong>of</strong> work between<strong>the</strong> institutions covered in this review, as wellas improving co-ordination and co-operationwith government and civil society;5. Recognising <strong>the</strong> need for a more structuredoversight role by Parliament in <strong>the</strong> context<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir independence; and6. Reviewing <strong>the</strong> funding models <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions,including funding derived from transfersand licences and o<strong>the</strong>r fees, with a viewto improving accountability, independenceand efficiency.The <strong>Committee</strong> was also authorised to conductits review with reference to o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong>state <strong>of</strong> a similar nature whose work was closelyrelated to <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions specificallymentioned in <strong>the</strong> resolution.At its first meeting on 10 October 2006 <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore decided that in addition to<strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> South African HumanRights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities,<strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commissionreferred to in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and<strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission referred to inChapter 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution it would includein its review <strong>the</strong> Pan South African LanguageBoard established in Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,<strong>the</strong> Financial and Fiscal Commissionreferred to in Chapter 13 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,<strong>the</strong> Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong>South Africa also covered in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission. The review <strong>the</strong>refore covered 11institutions in all.For ease <strong>of</strong> reference, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> agreed tobe <strong>of</strong>ficially referred to as <strong>the</strong> ad hoc<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 andAssociated Institutions.The <strong>Committee</strong> was required to submit itsreport to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly by 30 June<strong>2007</strong>. This was subsequently extended to 31July <strong>2007</strong>. The Terms <strong>of</strong> Reference are containedin annexure 4 <strong>of</strong> this report.The <strong>Committee</strong> elected Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Kader Asmalas Chairperson.2. Approach and Methodology2.1. APPROACHGiven <strong>the</strong> national importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> review and<strong>the</strong> public interest in <strong>the</strong> institutions under review,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> placed great emphasis on devisinga methodology and approach that would maximisepublic input and awareness <strong>of</strong> its work.CONTEXT5


Engagement with <strong>the</strong> institutions <strong>the</strong>mselveswas considered to be necessary and a priority.It was considered important that <strong>the</strong>re was ashared understanding and appreciation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>terms <strong>of</strong> reference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> between<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> and <strong>the</strong> institutions underreview, amongst <strong>the</strong> institutions <strong>the</strong>mselvesand amongst <strong>the</strong> public at large. The <strong>Committee</strong>accordingly commenced its work with a meetingwith <strong>the</strong> heads <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> eleven institutions.The <strong>Committee</strong> highlighted <strong>the</strong> fact that itsreview would focus specifically on <strong>the</strong> institutionalmatters and political considerations specifiedin <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> reference. The institutionsall pledged <strong>the</strong>ir collaboration with <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> and support for <strong>the</strong> review process.In formulating an approach to its work, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> emphasised <strong>the</strong> following key considerations:1. With <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission all institutions under reviewwere products <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution-makingprocess and <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>the</strong> relevant provisions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, read toge<strong>the</strong>r with<strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> reference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>,should be <strong>the</strong> point <strong>of</strong> departure for <strong>the</strong>deliberations and recommendations.2. Given <strong>the</strong> major challenges facing <strong>the</strong> developmentalstate, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> agreed thateven thirteen years after <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>new constitutional order, <strong>the</strong> work done by<strong>the</strong> various institutions was vital for deepeningdemocracy and promoting a human rightsculture in South Africa. Emphasis would thusbe placed on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> institutions wereeffective in fulfilling <strong>the</strong>ir mandates. Where<strong>the</strong>y were not, remedial action to ensure that<strong>the</strong> laudable and important goals set for<strong>the</strong>se institutions would be achieved in acost-effective, efficient and people-centredmanner would be recommended.3. The institutions are at different stages <strong>of</strong>development due largely to <strong>the</strong>m beingestablished at different times.4. Each institution fulfilled a different functionand no two institutions could be said to haveexactly <strong>the</strong> same constitutional status. The<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore wishes to underscore<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> institutions had each to betreated according to its particular merits.5. Distinction could be drawn, for example,between institutions that streng<strong>the</strong>n constitutionaldemocracy through <strong>the</strong> promotion andprotection <strong>of</strong> human rights, and <strong>the</strong> investigationand settlement <strong>of</strong> complaints regarding<strong>the</strong> violation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se rights, such as <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor Gender Equality and <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board and those whose purposelies in occupying key democratic institutionalpositions and fulfilling fundamental democraticroles and functions, such as <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission and <strong>the</strong>Financial and Fiscal Commission.6. In crafting recommendations, a focus onstreng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> institutions should beparamount. In forwarding recommendationsfor immediate consideration, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> recognised <strong>the</strong> challenge forParliament in amending legislation. Howeversome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Acts pertaining to <strong>the</strong>institutions are out <strong>of</strong> date and do not accuratelyreflect <strong>the</strong> constitutional order.7. The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that constitutionalamendments should be avoided. Recommendationsrequiring constitutional amendmentsand/or radical institutional reorganisationshould be considered for futureimplementation.6 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 18. Public participation processes should ensureas much public access and opportunity forinput into <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> as ispossible.2.2. METHODOLOGY2.2.1. Engagement with institutions underreviewTo ensure <strong>the</strong> completeness <strong>of</strong> informationreceived from <strong>the</strong> institutions under review, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> developed a questionnaire basedon its terms <strong>of</strong> reference. The questionnaireconsisted <strong>of</strong> 25 questions organised into fivesections: <strong>the</strong> role and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions,<strong>the</strong>ir relationships with o<strong>the</strong>r bodies,institutional governance, <strong>the</strong>ir interaction with<strong>the</strong> public, and financial and o<strong>the</strong>r resourcematters. A copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questionnaire is presentedin annexure 5 <strong>of</strong> this report.On 20 October 2006 <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> met with<strong>the</strong> heads <strong>of</strong> all institutions under review toapprise <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> reference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> and to inform <strong>the</strong>m about administrativeaspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questionnaire. The<strong>Committee</strong> commends <strong>the</strong> institutions for submitting<strong>the</strong>ir responses to <strong>the</strong> questionnairewithin <strong>the</strong> stipulated deadline.Responses to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire, annual reports<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, special reports published by<strong>the</strong> institutions, media reports, public submissionsand submissions from civil society organisationsformed <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> interactionsbetween <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> and individual institutionsheld between 24 January and 14 March<strong>2007</strong>. During <strong>the</strong>se encounters, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>requested <strong>the</strong> institutions to clarify fur<strong>the</strong>r certainaspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> matters raised in <strong>the</strong>irresponses to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire since some <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> reports appeared to be too general. TheInstitutions were also afforded <strong>the</strong> opportunityto inform <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> any relevant informationthat might not in <strong>the</strong>ir view have beenadequately covered in <strong>the</strong> questionnaire.The <strong>Committee</strong> invited <strong>the</strong> institutions to makesupplementary written submissions where necessary.The <strong>Committee</strong> was pleased to note <strong>the</strong> interest<strong>of</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> Parliament in its interactions with<strong>the</strong> institutions under review. Chair-persons <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Justice andConstitutional Development, <strong>the</strong> Joint Monitoring<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong>Life and Status <strong>of</strong> Women and <strong>the</strong> JointMonitoring <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Improvement <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status <strong>of</strong> Children, Youthand Disabled Persons were present during <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s encounter with <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission. The Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General was presentand gave a presentation during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’sencounter with <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. The ActingChairperson and several members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Communications werepresent during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s encounter with<strong>the</strong> Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong>South Africa. Members <strong>of</strong> Parliament attended<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> meeting with <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor Gender Equality.2.2.2. Engagement with <strong>the</strong> public and civilsocietyDuring November and December 2006 andJanuary <strong>2007</strong>, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> advertised forsubmissions from <strong>the</strong> public in various nationaland regional newspapers. Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>public were invited to share <strong>the</strong>ir experiencesrelating to <strong>the</strong> institutions under review. The<strong>Committee</strong> received a number <strong>of</strong> submissionsfrom individuals.CONTEXT7


Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> invited nearly 150civil society organisations, including groupsfocusing on human rights, labour and business,and academic and legal institutions to makewritten submissions. After consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>written submissions, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> invitedseveral civil society organisations and researchinstitutions to make oral submissions on <strong>the</strong>institutions under review.In order to get a general sense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong>public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> commissioned a research instituteto conduct a public opinion survey. The surveywas based on a questionnaire developed by<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>. The questionnaire was administeredto 2500 respondents nationally. Theoutcomes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> survey are presented in a fullreport contained in annexure 7 <strong>of</strong> this report.2.2.3. Engagement with relevant Ministriesand DepartmentsThe <strong>Committee</strong> addressed letters to <strong>the</strong> appropriateMinisters, which were copied to <strong>the</strong> correspondingDepartments, to draw <strong>the</strong>ir attentionto <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> and toinvite written submissions on <strong>the</strong> institutionswith which <strong>the</strong>y are associated. The followingMinistries were requested for information: Artsand Culture, Communications, Education,Finance, Home Affairs, Justice and Cons-titutionalDevelopment, Minister in <strong>the</strong> Presidency,Provincial and Local Government and PublicService and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration.After consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> written submissionsreceived, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> invited <strong>the</strong> Ministers<strong>of</strong> Communications, <strong>of</strong> Finance and <strong>of</strong> Justiceand Constitutional Development to make oralsubmissions. The oral submissions to a lesseror greater extent covered matters such as <strong>the</strong>independence <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions, <strong>the</strong> proposed funding model forChapter 9 and associated institutions, <strong>the</strong> role<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> directorate responsible for Chapter 9institutions in <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development and <strong>the</strong> proposedconstitutional and legislative amendmentsrelating to <strong>the</strong> Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa.2.2.4. Engagement with relevantParliamentary <strong>Committee</strong>sLetters were also sent to a number <strong>of</strong>Chairpersons <strong>of</strong> parliamentary committees toinvite <strong>the</strong>m to submit written comment on <strong>the</strong>institutions. Information was requested from<strong>the</strong> following <strong>Committee</strong>s: Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>on Arts and Culture, Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onCommunications, Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onEducation, Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Finance,Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Home Affairs, Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment, Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Pro-vincialand Local Government, Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>on Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration, Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts, Joint Monitoring<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong>Life and Status <strong>of</strong> Children, Youth and DisabledPersons, and Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> on<strong>the</strong> Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status<strong>of</strong> Women.The Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onJustice and Constitutional Development and <strong>the</strong>Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General were invited to make oral submissionsto <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>.A full list <strong>of</strong> submissions is contained in annexure8 <strong>of</strong> this report.8 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13. Guiding PrinciplesTo ensure consistency in <strong>the</strong> approach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> to each institution, and to maintainits focus, it was necessary to identify a set <strong>of</strong>guiding principles derived from <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong>reference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong> relevant provisions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution including <strong>the</strong> authoritativeConstitutional Court interpretations <strong>of</strong>some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutional provisions and internationalliterature on related institutions.These guidelines provided <strong>the</strong> framework withinwhich <strong>the</strong> institutions were reviewed.The <strong>Committee</strong> adopted <strong>the</strong> following guidingprinciples:3.1. INDEPENDENCESections 181, 191, 196 and 220 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution guarantee <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong>most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions under review. Section181(2) fur<strong>the</strong>rmore provides that <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9institutions “must be impartial and must exercise<strong>the</strong>ir powers and perform <strong>the</strong>ir functionswithout fear, favour or prejudice”. Moreoversection 181(3) requires o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state to“assist and protect <strong>the</strong>se institutions” to ensure<strong>the</strong>ir “independence, impartiality, dignity andeffectiveness”. Section 181(4) fur<strong>the</strong>rmorestates that “no person or organ <strong>of</strong> state mayinterfere with <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions”.The Constitution also guarantees <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r institutions, such as <strong>the</strong> PublicService Commission (section 196(2), (3)), <strong>the</strong>Broadcasting Authority (section 192) and <strong>the</strong>Financial and Fiscal Commission (section 220(2)).It is noteworthy that <strong>the</strong>re is no explicit constitutionalprovision for <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Pan South African Language Board. The independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board is provided for in <strong>the</strong> Actpertaining to <strong>the</strong> Board.In <strong>the</strong> two Constitutional Court judgmentsdirectly dealing with Chapter 9 Institutions, andano<strong>the</strong>r decision dealing with <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong>independence in more general terms, <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court provided some helpfulguidelines for looking at <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions. These guidelineshave been duly factored in and arereferred to in greater detail below.3.1.1. General test for independenceThe Constitutional Court set out a general testthat could be used to judge <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> an institution in its judgement in Van Rooyenand O<strong>the</strong>rs v S and O<strong>the</strong>rs 2 . According to <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court, <strong>the</strong> determining factor iswhe<strong>the</strong>r, from <strong>the</strong> objective standpoint <strong>of</strong> areasonable and informed person, <strong>the</strong>re will bea perception that <strong>the</strong> institution enjoys <strong>the</strong>essential conditions <strong>of</strong> independence.The judgement said that in determining independenceconsideration should be given to <strong>the</strong>perception <strong>of</strong> independence by a well-informedand objective person. Such person should beguided by <strong>the</strong> social realities <strong>of</strong> South Africaand <strong>the</strong> Constitution, particularly <strong>the</strong> valuescontained in <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> differentiationit makes between <strong>the</strong> different institutions.The factors such an observer may look at todetermine whe<strong>the</strong>r an institution is independentor not are: financial independence; institutionalindependence with respect to mattersdirectly related to <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its constitutionalmandate, especially relating to <strong>the</strong> institution’scontrol over <strong>the</strong> administrative2 2002 (8) BCLR 810 (CC).CONTEXT9


decisions that bear directly and immediately on<strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its constitutional mandate;appointments procedures and security <strong>of</strong>tenure <strong>of</strong> appointed <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers.3.1.2. Not part <strong>of</strong> governmentThe Constitutional Court pointed out inIndependent Electoral Commission v LangebergMunicipality 3 that, although a Chapter 9 institutionsuch as <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission is anorgan <strong>of</strong> state as defined in section 239 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, <strong>the</strong>se institutions cannot be saidto be a department or an administration within<strong>the</strong> national sphere <strong>of</strong> government over whichCabinet exercises authority. These institutionsare state institutions and are not part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>government. Independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionrefers to independence from <strong>the</strong> government.The Court could not agree that <strong>the</strong>se institutionswould be subject to <strong>the</strong> constitutional provisions<strong>of</strong> co-operative government when <strong>the</strong>yare in fact independent from government. 4This means that Chapter 9 institutions are not(<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis) subject to <strong>the</strong> co-operativegovernment provisions set out in Chapter3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. These institutions perform<strong>the</strong>ir functions in terms <strong>of</strong> national legislation,but “are not subject to national executivecontrol”. 5They are part <strong>of</strong> governance butnot part <strong>of</strong> government.There is a need for <strong>the</strong>se institutions to “manifestlybe seen to be outside government”(<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis). The judgement laysdown that a very clear and sharp distinctionmust be drawn between <strong>the</strong>se institutions and<strong>the</strong> Executive authority and no legislative provisionor action by <strong>the</strong> Executive that would createan impression that <strong>the</strong> institution is notmanifestly outside government would be constitutionallyacceptable.The relationship between Parliament and <strong>the</strong>institutions is different since <strong>the</strong>y are accountableto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. The independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions must, however, bemaintained.3.1.3. Organs <strong>of</strong> state must assistand respectAno<strong>the</strong>r aspect <strong>of</strong> independence can be foundin section 181(3) which provides that o<strong>the</strong>rorgans <strong>of</strong> state, through legislative and o<strong>the</strong>rmeasures, must assist and protect <strong>the</strong>se institutionsto ensure <strong>the</strong> independence, impartiality,dignity and effectiveness (<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions and section 181(4)which states that no person or organ <strong>of</strong> statemay interfere (<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis) with <strong>the</strong>functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions. Similar provisionsfor <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission arecontained in section 196(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionand are made in legislation pertaining to o<strong>the</strong>rbodies such as <strong>the</strong> Independent Com-municationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa.From <strong>the</strong>se provisions a few conclusions can bedrawn. Firstly, independence is not synonymouswith impartiality. Just because a body isable to exercise its duties impartially does notnecessarily mean that its independence hasbeen safeguarded. Independence is in essencea more encompassing concept than impartiality.The specific aspects <strong>of</strong> independence areelaborated later in this <strong>chapter</strong>.Secondly, o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state have a constitutionalduty to ensure <strong>the</strong> dignity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter9 and Chapter 10 institutions. In various judgmentsdealing with dignity in o<strong>the</strong>r contexts<strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court has argued that dignitywill be impaired when action sends a signalthat <strong>the</strong> institution is not worthy <strong>of</strong> respect. Thisdoes not mean institutions should not and can-3 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC).4 Ibid. par 28-2<strong>9.</strong>5 Ibid. Par 31.10 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 1not be criticised and subjected to questioning,but such questioning should be done with dueregard to <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.Lastly, organs <strong>of</strong> state have a duty to ensure <strong>the</strong>effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions. This is doneas part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accountability and oversightmechanisms established by Parliament andwithin <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions.3.1.4. Financial independenceThe Constitutional Court affirmed <strong>the</strong> basic principlethat Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 institutionsmust have some degree <strong>of</strong> financial independencein order to function independently and tobe able to exercise <strong>the</strong>ir duties without fear,favour or prejudice. At <strong>the</strong> same time <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court made it clear that this didnot mean that <strong>the</strong>se institutions could set <strong>the</strong>irown budgets. What was required was forParliament to provide a reasonable amount <strong>of</strong>money that would enable <strong>the</strong> institutions t<strong>of</strong>ulfil <strong>the</strong>ir constitutional and legal mandates. Itis important to note that this task is clearly oneto be exercised by Parliament. As <strong>the</strong> Courtindicated: “It is for Parliament, and not <strong>the</strong>executive arm <strong>of</strong> government (<strong>Committee</strong>’semphasis), to provide for funding reasonablysufficient to enable <strong>the</strong> [Chapter 9 institutions]to carry out [<strong>the</strong>ir] constitutional mandate.” TheCourt accepted that <strong>the</strong>re would inevitably be atension between <strong>the</strong> government/Parliamenton <strong>the</strong> one side and <strong>the</strong> independent institution(s)on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r about <strong>the</strong> reasonableness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> money to be provided toensure <strong>the</strong> effective fulfillment <strong>of</strong> its constitutionalmandate. To determine <strong>the</strong> reasonableamount <strong>of</strong> money an institution requires is,however, easier said than done.It is incumbent upon <strong>the</strong> parties to make everyeffort to resolve that tension and to reach anagreement by negotiation and acting in goodfaith. This, according to <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court,would no doubt entail considerable meaningfuldiscussion, exchange <strong>of</strong> relevant information, agenuine attempt to understand <strong>the</strong> respectiveneeds and constraints and <strong>the</strong> mutual desire toreach a reasonable conclusion. 6Hence, whenParliament engages in this process it must dealwith requests rationally, in <strong>the</strong> light also <strong>of</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r national interests.This means <strong>the</strong> institutions must be afforded anadequate opportunity to defend <strong>the</strong>ir budgetaryrequirements before Parliament or its relevantcommittees. Thus “no member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>executive or <strong>the</strong> administration should have <strong>the</strong>power to stop transfers <strong>of</strong> money to any independentconstitutional body without <strong>the</strong> existence<strong>of</strong> appropriate safeguards for <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> that institution.”In <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indication in <strong>the</strong> Treasurysubmission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalTreasury’s acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> Parliamentin <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> budgets, <strong>the</strong> Com-mitteewill have to determine what mechanismsshould be put in place to ensure that <strong>the</strong> budgetprocess safeguards <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se institutions.3.1.5. <strong>Ad</strong>ministrative independenceIn <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NNP v Minister <strong>of</strong> HomeAffairs, <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court laid down that<strong>the</strong> independent bodies supporting democracyrequire more than financial independence. For<strong>the</strong>se institutions to operate independently andfor <strong>the</strong>m to fulfill <strong>the</strong>ir respective tasks withoutfear, favour or prejudice, <strong>the</strong> ConstitutionalCourt said that <strong>the</strong> administrative independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions should be safeguard-6 New National Party par 97.CONTEXT11


ed. This implies that <strong>the</strong>se institutions musthave control over those matters that are directlyconnected with <strong>the</strong>ir functions under <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> relevant legislation.No matter what arrangements Parliament or<strong>the</strong> Executive might make, it is important that<strong>the</strong> institutions retain <strong>the</strong> ability to maintainoperational control over <strong>the</strong>ir core business.What is required, <strong>the</strong>refore, is that no sucharrangements should equate to interferencewith <strong>the</strong> constitutional mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodiesto perform <strong>the</strong>ir duties impartially.In <strong>the</strong> New National Party case <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court made it clear that section181(3) requires <strong>the</strong> Executive to engage with<strong>the</strong> bodies in a manner that would ensure that<strong>the</strong> efficient functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission isnot hampered.The Constitutional Court fur<strong>the</strong>r indicated that afailure on <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive to complywith such obligations “may seriously impair <strong>the</strong>functioning and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> those Stateinstitutions supporting constitutional democracyand cannot be condoned”. This means thatnei<strong>the</strong>r Parliament nor <strong>the</strong> Executive can interferedirectly in <strong>the</strong> day-to-day running <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions, can instruct <strong>the</strong> institutions on dayto-daymatters regarding <strong>the</strong>ir programmesand implementation, or can get directlyinvolved in <strong>the</strong> employment or management <strong>of</strong>staff by <strong>the</strong>se institutions.At <strong>the</strong> same time Parliament and <strong>the</strong> Executivehave a duty to support <strong>the</strong>se institutions and, ifinstitutional problems are <strong>of</strong> such magnitude orseriousness that <strong>the</strong>y make it difficult or impossiblefor an institution to fulfill its constitutionaland legislative tasks, Parliament can - indeedmust - assist such institutions to resolve suchproblems. There was cause for such occasion inJuly 2006 when Parliament appointed an adhoc <strong>Committee</strong> to resolve operational issuesarising from an alleged dispute within <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.Such assistance must not, however, have <strong>the</strong>effect <strong>of</strong> removing control over matters directlyconnected with an institution’s functions andmust not hamper <strong>the</strong> efficient functioning <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> institution.In short, while Parliament and <strong>the</strong> Executivecan engage with <strong>the</strong>se institutions to assist<strong>the</strong>m to improve <strong>the</strong>ir performance, <strong>the</strong>y cannotdo so in a way that would remove controlover <strong>the</strong> administration from <strong>the</strong> institutions orthat would result in interference in <strong>the</strong> functioning<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.The Constitutional Court referred to <strong>the</strong> fact that<strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Home Affairs cannot tell <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission how to conduct registration,whom to employ, and so on. If <strong>the</strong> Commissionasks <strong>the</strong> government to provide personnelto assist in <strong>the</strong> registration process, governmentmust provide such assistance if it isable to do so. If not, <strong>the</strong> Commission must beprovided with adequate funds to enable it to dowhat is necessary.At present, <strong>the</strong> institutions under review displaya wide array <strong>of</strong> arrangements regarding<strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive and/or Parliamentin <strong>the</strong>ir administration. For example, <strong>the</strong>Public Protector and <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality must consult <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Financewhen appointing staff. While this might be apractical measure related to confirmation <strong>of</strong>financial resources, such arrangements shouldbe framed within <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodies. This would avoid anyperception that <strong>the</strong>se arrangements infringe on<strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.12 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 1Perhaps more serious is <strong>the</strong> example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Service Commission in respect <strong>of</strong> which<strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Public Service and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration has <strong>the</strong> power through legislationto appoint <strong>the</strong> Director General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission.The possible effect <strong>of</strong> such administrativearrangements on <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sebodies is unclear. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>considered whe<strong>the</strong>r such arrangements areappropriate and if not what o<strong>the</strong>r arrangementsshould be put in place to ensureaccountability without interfering with independence.This is discussed later in this report.3.1.6. Independence andappointments/removals proceduresThe general provisions in sections 193 and 194<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution provide for <strong>the</strong> appointmentand removal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> variousCommissions established in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution. Similar provisions are made inChapter 10 for <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commissionand in Chapter 13 for <strong>the</strong> Financial and FiscalCommission.When required to certify whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> proposedConstitution <strong>of</strong> 1996 met <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>values <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution identified in <strong>the</strong>Constitutional principles laid down in <strong>the</strong> 1993Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court found that<strong>the</strong> provision that would allow for a dismissal<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General or <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorby a simple majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly did not comply with <strong>the</strong>requirements <strong>of</strong> independence, given <strong>the</strong> factthat <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General would act as a watchdogover <strong>the</strong> government.The appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong>Public Protector and <strong>the</strong> various Commissioners(with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities)is assigned to a <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, proportionally composed <strong>of</strong> members<strong>of</strong> all parties represented in <strong>the</strong> Assembly. 7This is mainly done through <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong>s. The <strong>Committee</strong> feelsthat given <strong>the</strong> nature and composition <strong>of</strong> adhoc <strong>Committee</strong>s and <strong>the</strong> specific knowledgerequired to effectively recommend appointmentsto a Commission or o<strong>the</strong>r constitutionalbody, a more appropriate mechanism isrequired. Recommendations are made in thisregard later in this report.The general provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution insection 193 do not specify <strong>the</strong> process for <strong>the</strong>appointment. However, section 193(6) readwith section 59(1)(a) provides for <strong>the</strong> facilitation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong> civil society in <strong>the</strong>recommendation process. The <strong>Committee</strong> consideredwhe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> current practice <strong>of</strong> invitingcivil society bodies to nominate candidates issufficient or whe<strong>the</strong>r o<strong>the</strong>r practical and reasonablemechanisms should be devised toenhance <strong>the</strong> participation <strong>of</strong> civil society. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes a specific recommendationlater in this report as to how this could beachieved.Regarding removal from <strong>of</strong>fice, it is importantto note that no general authority is in fact givento <strong>the</strong> National Assembly for <strong>the</strong> removal from<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector or Commissioners. This can only bedone on objective grounds, including “misconduct,incapacity and incompetence”. 8Thismeans that <strong>the</strong>se <strong>of</strong>fice-holders cannot beremoved from <strong>of</strong>fice on any o<strong>the</strong>r ground withoutan amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.7 Section 193(5).8 Section 19(1)(a), section 196(11)(a).CONTEXT13


The Constitution does not contain any provisionsfor <strong>the</strong> appointment and dismissal <strong>of</strong>members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent BroadcastingAuthority that must be set up in terms <strong>of</strong> section192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. The Constitution,section 192, does however require this authorityto be independent and to act in <strong>the</strong> publicinterest.Applying <strong>the</strong> general principle set out by <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court, it is clear that members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Authority should have some degree <strong>of</strong> protectionagainst dismissal if, from <strong>the</strong> objectivestandpoint <strong>of</strong> a reasonable and informed person,<strong>the</strong> perception is to be supported that <strong>the</strong>institution enjoys <strong>the</strong> essential conditions <strong>of</strong>independence as described earlier. At <strong>the</strong> veryleast this should require that members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Authority should not be subject to dismissal onnon-objective grounds relating to choices <strong>the</strong>yhave made, but only on objective criteria suchas incapacity, misconduct or incompetence.The 2000 Act provides for this.It is interesting to note that in relation to <strong>the</strong>dismissals procedure <strong>the</strong> Constitution makes adistinction arising out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nature and authority<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. Regarding <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generaland <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> former requires a60% vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly for removal from <strong>of</strong>fice and <strong>the</strong> latterrequires a simple majority. The <strong>Committee</strong>feels that <strong>the</strong> same arrangements for <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General should also have been appliedto <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission.3.1.7 . Limits to independenceIn Van Rooyen and O<strong>the</strong>rs v S and O<strong>the</strong>rs (aswell as in <strong>the</strong> First Certification Case), <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court made it clear that <strong>the</strong>requirements <strong>of</strong> independence will not be <strong>the</strong>same for all bodies whose independence isbeing guaranteed. Each institution should beapproached differently. This means that,depending on <strong>the</strong> nature and mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institution; <strong>the</strong> stringency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> requirementsfor independence may differ. An institutiondealing with complaints against <strong>the</strong> legislatureand Executive such as <strong>the</strong> Public Protector willrequire more vigorous protection <strong>of</strong> its independenceto ensure <strong>the</strong> legitimacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionin <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public.Thus, some basic principles can be identified toestablish <strong>the</strong> minimum requirements for independence.As indicated earlier, <strong>the</strong>re is a constitutionalimperative for <strong>the</strong>se institutions to beseen not to be part <strong>of</strong> government. Thus, anyinvolvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive in <strong>the</strong> daily operationsor institutional arrangements <strong>of</strong> an independentinstitution would be constitutionallyunacceptable. Even where <strong>the</strong> President isgiven a role like <strong>the</strong> power to appoint members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various commissions, this is a formal role.The National Assembly is given <strong>the</strong> constitutionalauthority to deal with <strong>the</strong> independentinstitutions and has a constitutional duty tohold <strong>the</strong>se institutions to account. Again, thisexcludes any interference in <strong>the</strong> daily operationsor institutional arrangements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions. Parliament can - and indeed has aconstitutional duty in this regard - enact legislationthat will allow <strong>the</strong>se institutions to fulfill<strong>the</strong>ir constitutional mandates in an effective(<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis) manner. However,two essential requirements must be met inrespect <strong>of</strong> any intervention by Parliament or<strong>the</strong> National Assembly: First, an interventionmust not interfere with <strong>the</strong> final control over<strong>the</strong> finances or administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevantinstitution; and, second, it must not give rise toa reasonable apprehension <strong>of</strong> interferenceamongst informed individuals.14 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 1The difference in <strong>the</strong> powers and functions <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutions <strong>the</strong>reforedetermines <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and touches on <strong>the</strong>ir independence.3.2. ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSIn considering <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> accountability,distinction must be drawn between accountabilityand <strong>the</strong> interrelated concept <strong>of</strong> oversight.Often, <strong>the</strong>se concepts are used interchangeably,yet <strong>the</strong>y have very distinct and precisepurposes and functions. In a report preparedfor <strong>the</strong> Joint Rules <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> Parliament inJuly 1999, 9it is stated that accountability“implies a relationship [defined by] a hierarchyand a duty <strong>of</strong> a body to explain and justify itsconduct to ano<strong>the</strong>r body”. The Constitution isspecific regarding <strong>the</strong> accountability <strong>of</strong> Chapter9 institutions, <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commissionand <strong>the</strong> Financial and Fiscal Commission to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly or Parliament in sections181(5), 196(5) and 222 respectively.While <strong>the</strong>re is no constitutional provision foraccountability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa, <strong>the</strong> Pan-SouthAfrican Language Board and <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission, <strong>the</strong> Acts establishing <strong>the</strong>se institutionsrequire <strong>the</strong>ir annual reports to be tabledin Parliament.In terms <strong>of</strong> section 181(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,state institutions supporting constitutionaldemocracy “are accountable to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and must report on <strong>the</strong>ir activitiesand <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functions to <strong>the</strong>Assembly at least once a year’. This requiresreporting to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly on <strong>the</strong>implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mandates and expenditure<strong>of</strong> public funds. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> associatedinstitutions report to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly orParliament through <strong>the</strong>ir annual reports.Parliament, and specifically <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, must provide for mechanisms toensure such accountability. The crucial component<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accountability mechanism is <strong>the</strong>structures, systems and processes establishedby Parliament to engage effectively with <strong>the</strong>reports it receives.Oversight refers to <strong>the</strong> role played by <strong>the</strong> legislaturein assessing <strong>the</strong> performance and conduct<strong>of</strong> organs <strong>of</strong> state and recommendingaction for improvement. Section 55(2)(b) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution empowers <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly to conduct oversight over any organ<strong>of</strong> State. The interrelatedness <strong>of</strong> accountabilityand oversight is evident in <strong>the</strong> types <strong>of</strong> reportsissued by Chapter 9 and associated institutionsthat serve to inform and complementParliament’s oversight <strong>of</strong> specific matters. Such“special reports” would require differentprocesses and exposure in Parliament.While oversight is continuous, accountabilityrefers to a particular instance, incident or event.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, in <strong>the</strong> report mentioned above,reference is made to “amendatory accountability”.This refers to <strong>the</strong> duty, inherent in <strong>the</strong> concept<strong>of</strong> accountability, to rectify or make goodany shortcoming or mistake that is uncovered.As mentioned earlier, in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector, <strong>the</strong> National Assembly conducted aninquiry in 2006 at <strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector through <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speaker,arising out an alleged dispute in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Protector. It is important to note that<strong>the</strong> accountability mechanism put in place by<strong>the</strong> National Assembly in this instance assisted<strong>the</strong> Public Protector.9 Corder H, Jagwanth S, Saltau F (1999): <strong>Report</strong> on Parliamentary Oversight and AccountabilityCONTEXT15


Due consideration must be given to ensuringthat <strong>the</strong> oversight role <strong>of</strong> Parliament and <strong>the</strong>accountability mechanisms established do notinfringe on <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions.3.3. EFFECTIVENESSAssessing <strong>the</strong> effectiveness and efficiency <strong>of</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions was a criticalcomponent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> reference <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>. Effectiveness refers to more than aquantitative assessment <strong>of</strong> output, but ra<strong>the</strong>r aquantitative and qualitative assessment <strong>of</strong> outcomes.Section 181(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution compelso<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state to assist and protectChapter 9 institutions to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness.In addition, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> draws <strong>the</strong> specialattention <strong>of</strong> all bodies established by <strong>the</strong>Constitution to <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> section 237,which is headed “diligent performance <strong>of</strong> obligations”.This section states that all constitutionalobligations must be performed diligentlyand without delay. The importance <strong>of</strong> examiningeffectiveness is that it shifts <strong>the</strong> focus frominputs and outputs to an outcomes-basedassessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> projects, programmes andpolicy implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions. Theassessment <strong>the</strong>refore goes beyond concernsabout whe<strong>the</strong>r an institution is fulfilling its constitutionaland legal duties efficiently andexamines <strong>the</strong> relevance, impact and quality <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> institutions. “Relevance” would elaborateon whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> institutions address a particularneed and “impact” would assess <strong>the</strong> extent towhich <strong>the</strong> need is addressed.3.4. INDIVISIBILITY, INTERDEPENDENCEAND INTERRELATEDNESS OF HUMANRIGHTSTraditionally, a distinction was made betweencivil and political rights on <strong>the</strong> one hand andsocial and economic rights on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r. Socialand economic rights were regarded as claimsagainst <strong>the</strong> State and <strong>the</strong>refore not equal tocivil and political rights.The Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights in our Constitution containsboth civil and political rights and social andeconomic rights. It is based on <strong>the</strong> widelyaccepted idea that all rights are universal, indivisible,interdependent and interrelated asaffirmed in <strong>the</strong> Vienna Declaration andProgramme <strong>of</strong> Action <strong>of</strong> 1993. Any assessment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appropriateness and effectiveness <strong>of</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions must<strong>the</strong>refore take this into account.Given our particular history, <strong>the</strong> indivisibilityand interrelatedness between political and civilrights, on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and socio-economicrights, on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r, cannot be denied. Withoutsocio-economic rights, political and civil rightscannot exist in a meaningful way and viceversa. With due recognition to <strong>the</strong> challengesfaced by <strong>the</strong> State, our Constitution makes provisionfor <strong>the</strong> progressive realisation <strong>of</strong> socialand economic rights, with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong>basic education including basic adult education,which is peremptory.What this means in practice is that a true constitutionaldemocracy encompasses more thansimply providing people <strong>the</strong> opportunity tovote. Socio-economic rights, such as <strong>the</strong> right16 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 1to adequate housing, basic services, water andhealth care are fundamental rights in <strong>the</strong> senseas <strong>the</strong>y go <strong>the</strong> heart <strong>of</strong> vulnerable groups’ mostbasic survival needs.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, providing for both civil and politicalrights, and also socio-economic rights in <strong>the</strong>Constitution, meant giving actual substance andcontent to <strong>the</strong> notion <strong>of</strong> equality. These rightsaim to create a “minimum civic equality”,which in turn allows people to fully exercise<strong>the</strong>ir political and civil rights. For example, aperson would arguably be more willing andable to exercise <strong>the</strong>ir civil and political rights,when <strong>the</strong>ir basic needs <strong>of</strong> food, shelter, adequatehealth care and basic services have beenmet.The drafters <strong>of</strong> our Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights realised <strong>the</strong>indivisibility and interdependence <strong>of</strong> humanrights. Within <strong>the</strong> South African context, for ourConstitution to have “a meaningful place in <strong>the</strong>hearts and minds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> citizenry” it had toaddress <strong>the</strong> “pressing needs <strong>of</strong> ordinary people”.It could not be seen to “institutionaliseand guarantee only political/civil rights andignore <strong>the</strong> real survival needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people – itmust promise both bread and freedom” 10 .The <strong>Committee</strong> thus had to assess whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>current and intended constitutional and legalmandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutional bodies enhanced<strong>the</strong> promotion and protection <strong>of</strong> humanrights in general, given <strong>the</strong> interrelated nature<strong>of</strong> human rights.It could be argued that because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interdependenceand indivisibility <strong>of</strong> rights, <strong>the</strong>recould be a danger that a proliferation <strong>of</strong> humanrights bodies could result in <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> gapsin services and support to <strong>the</strong> public and fur<strong>the</strong>rmorecould create tremendous confusionregarding public access to recourse for remedialaction. Where <strong>the</strong>re are various bodies dealingwith human rights matters, well-structuredand effective co-ordination amongst <strong>the</strong> bodies,efficient record-keeping and documentmanagement and compatible systems andprocesses are vital to ensure that services to<strong>the</strong> public are accessible, comprehensive andthat duplication <strong>of</strong> work is kept to a minimum.The <strong>Committee</strong> had to assess whe<strong>the</strong>r one single“umbrella” human rights body would not bebetter suited to give content to <strong>the</strong> indivisibilityand interdependence <strong>of</strong> human rights by creatinga seamless and focused approach tohuman rights as a whole.4. ConclusionWith due regard to its terms <strong>of</strong> reference andhaving established a set <strong>of</strong> principles to guideits work, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> now turns to <strong>the</strong>review <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions. The<strong>Committee</strong> begins with distilling <strong>the</strong> commonissues and makes key recommendations in thisregard.10 Haysom 1992: 454CONTEXT17


CHAPTER 2


CHAPTER 2CHAPTER 2COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONSDuring <strong>the</strong> course <strong>of</strong> its deliberations it soonbecame evident to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>reare a number <strong>of</strong> issues common to <strong>the</strong> institutionsbeing reviewed that require its attention.While <strong>the</strong> precise difficulty that <strong>the</strong>se broadissues present might differ from one institutionto <strong>the</strong> next, when viewed collectively it isapparent that a lack <strong>of</strong> consistency and coherencein approach is ultimately undermining <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir individual, and even common, efforts.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view thata number <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se arrangements merit urgentreview for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> identifying a moresystematic approach, particularly those regardingfunding and budgets, <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>commissioners, collaboration between <strong>the</strong>institutions, internal governance arrangementsand <strong>the</strong> relationship <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions withParliament.1. Financial matters andbudget allocationsAs discussed earlier in this report, financialindependence is an important indicator <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>the</strong>refore concernedat <strong>the</strong> inconsistent accounts it receivedfrom <strong>the</strong> institutions under review as to <strong>the</strong>irbudget processes. The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that<strong>the</strong> institutions follow different fundingprocesses, some institutions enjoying moreautonomy in those processes than o<strong>the</strong>rs.With <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission, which has its own Budget Vote,<strong>the</strong> budgets <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> institutions are locatedwithin <strong>the</strong> budget appropriations <strong>of</strong> variousnational government departments. For example,<strong>the</strong> budget allocations for <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality and <strong>the</strong> Public Protector can be foundin <strong>the</strong> Vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development, while <strong>the</strong> NationalYouth Commission has its budget allocationwithin <strong>the</strong> Presidency’s Vote. However, <strong>the</strong>departments do not have any authority toadjust <strong>the</strong> allocations to <strong>the</strong>se institutions, actingmerely as a conduit for <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong>monies to <strong>the</strong> relevant institutions. Most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions, however, indicated that while <strong>the</strong>ysubmit <strong>the</strong>ir budget proposals directly toNational Treasury, <strong>the</strong>y are not able to defend<strong>the</strong>ir budget submissions and seldom receive<strong>the</strong> allocations that <strong>the</strong>y request.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> institutionsreviewed expressed general unhappiness with<strong>the</strong> budget processes and in some instances<strong>the</strong>ir budget allocations.The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>budgets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions within <strong>the</strong> budgetallocations <strong>of</strong> specific government departmentsimpacts negatively on <strong>the</strong> perceived independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions and creates a falseimpression that <strong>the</strong> institutions are accountableto <strong>the</strong> respective government departments for<strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir finances. The <strong>Committee</strong>’sview in this regard is shared by NationalTreasury, who referred in its submission to <strong>the</strong>general presumption that agencies that arefunded through departmental Budget Votes areaccountable to <strong>the</strong> respective departments.While <strong>the</strong> institutions under review are notagencies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government, it appears thatthis distinction is not always apparent in practicein <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong> institutionsand government departments.Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> concludes that <strong>the</strong>budget processes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions should berevised to accomplish a greater degree <strong>of</strong> standardisationand to promote and protect <strong>the</strong>COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS19


independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions. In its evidenceto <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong> National Treasurysuggests that consideration be given to <strong>the</strong>location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budgets <strong>of</strong> certain <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodiesin <strong>the</strong> Budget Vote <strong>of</strong> Parliament in recognition<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>se bodies are accountableto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.Given that <strong>the</strong> institutions under review eachhave specific mandates and, fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, that<strong>the</strong>ir budgets and financial arrangements differ,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is in agreement with NationalTreasury that <strong>the</strong> institutions whose budgetscould be provided for in Parliament’s BudgetVote would include those institutions whosemandates require express independence from<strong>the</strong> Executive. These institutions include <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission, <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission,<strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Com-missionfor Gender Equality, <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communitiesand <strong>the</strong> Financial and Fiscal Commission. The<strong>Committee</strong> feels, however, that it is invidiousand unsatisfactory to distinguish between bodies,which, apart from <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission, are all described by legislation asindependent bodies. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforedoes not accept <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Treasury in this regard.The <strong>Committee</strong> also considers strange <strong>the</strong>National Treasury’s contention that <strong>the</strong> currentlocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalwithin <strong>the</strong> National Treasury Budget Vote is satisfactory,given <strong>the</strong> special relationshipbetween National Treasury and <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalprovides services on a cost-recovery basis.The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore recommends as follows:a) The budgets <strong>of</strong> all bodies identified by <strong>the</strong>Constitution and which are included in thisreview should be part <strong>of</strong> Parliament’sBudget Vote. This is elaborated hereunder.• Since most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions areaccountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyand Parliament maintains oversight over<strong>the</strong>m, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view thatParliament’s Budget Vote would be amore appropriate location for <strong>the</strong> budgets<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.• Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> highlights<strong>the</strong> requirement for Parliament to establishor identify appropriate structures andmechanisms to ensure an effective andefficient budget process.• The process should be negotiated withNational Treasury and should afford <strong>the</strong>institutions adequate opportunity tomotivate <strong>the</strong>ir budget submissions directlyto National Treasury before decisionson <strong>the</strong> budget allocations are taken. Ifsuch an arrangement is agreed to, <strong>the</strong>programme within Parliament’s BudgetVote for <strong>the</strong>se institutions would still fallunder <strong>the</strong> Public Finance ManagementAct and would be subject to accountabilityand audit arrangements common too<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> understands that all <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions fallwithin <strong>the</strong> purview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts. The <strong>Committee</strong><strong>the</strong>refore reiterates that <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> should exercise its jurisdictionover <strong>the</strong>se bodies more fully.20 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 22. AppointmentsThe matter <strong>of</strong> appointment procedures was <strong>the</strong>area in which <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> received <strong>the</strong>largest number <strong>of</strong> representations.The effectiveness and efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocedures are critical, especially given<strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> Parliament in this regard. The<strong>Committee</strong> considers this important becauseParliament does not sit throughout a year. Anad hoc or a portfolio committee usually makesrecommendations to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.Therefore, <strong>the</strong> procedures must fit into <strong>the</strong>agendas <strong>of</strong> committees and must be taken intoconsideration when <strong>the</strong> programme <strong>of</strong>Parliament is being worked out. The <strong>Committee</strong>makes this point because some proposalsmade in submissions to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> did notappear to take into account <strong>the</strong> sessional nature<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parliamentary timetable.There are significant differences in <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocesses <strong>of</strong> commissioners and members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutions.The appointment procedures are detailedin Annexure 2.The <strong>Committee</strong> acknowledges that <strong>the</strong> differentmandates, powers and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionsmean that <strong>the</strong>ir composition and appointmentprocedures cannot be identical and that,as such, it would be incorrect to apply a ‘onesize-fits-all’approach to appointments. Never<strong>the</strong>less,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> maintains that a reasonabledegree <strong>of</strong> consistency is required butthat <strong>the</strong>re must in fact be variation allowed.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> acknowledgesthat any appointment procedure should be consistentwith <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> upholding and protecting<strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.2.1. SELECTION CRITERIAThe Constitution makes general provisions for<strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> Commissioners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commission forGender Equality and <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission.Under section 193, certain selection criteria andprocedures are elaborated. These include <strong>the</strong>requirements that appointees to <strong>the</strong>se institutionsmust be South African citizens must be fitand proper persons to hold <strong>the</strong> particular <strong>of</strong>fice.A fur<strong>the</strong>r requirement is that <strong>the</strong> composition<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissions must reflect <strong>the</strong> race andgender composition <strong>of</strong> South Africa.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, section 193(3) stipulates thatspecialised knowledge <strong>of</strong>, or experience in,auditing, state finances and public administrationare additional requirements that must betaken into account when appointing <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General.In addition, a number <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r constitutionalprovisions are applicable:• Section 186 requires that <strong>the</strong> composition <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities must be broadlyrepresentative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main cultural, religiousand linguistic communities and must broadlyreflect <strong>the</strong> gender composition <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrica.• Section 196(10) requires that a personappointed to <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commissionmust have knowledge <strong>of</strong>, or experience in,administration, management or <strong>the</strong> provision<strong>of</strong> public services.The selection criteria for commissioners <strong>of</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r institutions are elaborated in <strong>the</strong> specificlegislation establishing <strong>the</strong> respective institu-COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS21


tions. Some inconsistencies are evident in <strong>the</strong>elaboration <strong>of</strong> appointment procedures in <strong>the</strong>respective legislation.The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that additional criteriashould include interest or a record <strong>of</strong> involvementin matters related to <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>specific body. This would apply to all bodiesreviewed, with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General.The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned about <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong>availability <strong>of</strong> sufficient people for appointmentto <strong>the</strong>se bodies. There is also insufficient representation<strong>of</strong> rural people in <strong>the</strong> Commissions.The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that it is up to Parliamentto ensure that <strong>the</strong> pool is enlarged. <strong>Ad</strong>vertisementsshould be placed in newspapers. Theseshould be supplemented by discussions onradio.In submissions received by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>,some civil society groups suggested that individualswith high political pr<strong>of</strong>iles should bedisqualified from appointment to any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 or associated bodies. These submissionspointed to <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ElectoralAct, which bars individuals with a high politicalpr<strong>of</strong>ile from appointment to <strong>the</strong> ElectoralCommission. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view,however, that, given South Africa’s political history,it would be unacceptable to place anabsolute ban on <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> individualswho had been actively involved in politics.Such restriction would disqualify many prominentand worthy candidates from possibleappointment to a Chapter 9 institution. However,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> adds two qualifications tothis view.Firstly, any individual who holds a high-levelposition in a political party or o<strong>the</strong>r politicalentity and is appointed to a Chapter 9 or associatedinstitution must resign from that post onbeing appointed.Secondly, any member <strong>of</strong> a Chapter 9 or associatedinstitution who becomes a candidate fora political party in <strong>the</strong> election for a legislature,whe<strong>the</strong>r at local, provincial or national level,should resign his or her membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 or associated institution immediately.The <strong>Committee</strong> views this as being in accordancewith <strong>the</strong> general practice in <strong>the</strong> publicservice and in o<strong>the</strong>r similar bodies such ashigher education institutions.2.2. ROLE OF PRESIDENT AND MINISTERSThe <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re is no uniformapproach to appointments. The bodies wereset up at different times and <strong>the</strong>re is no centralbody dealing with appointments. Apart from<strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities and <strong>the</strong> Financialand Fiscal Commission, <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyrecommends candidates for appointment toChapter 9 and associated institutions. Ei<strong>the</strong>r<strong>the</strong> President or <strong>the</strong> relevant Minister makesappointments.The President appoints <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers <strong>of</strong> anumber <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions under review on <strong>the</strong>recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Inthis regard, <strong>the</strong> President’s powers are non-discretionaryin <strong>the</strong> sense that provided <strong>the</strong> correctprocedure has been followed, he or shemay not refuse to make <strong>the</strong> appointment. Therecommendations to <strong>the</strong> President follow apublic process through <strong>the</strong> proceedings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. The President’s role is tocarry out <strong>the</strong> recommendations.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes, however, that <strong>the</strong>re havebeen instances where <strong>the</strong> non-discretionary22 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President’s power <strong>of</strong> appointmenthas not been fully appreciated. For example,despite <strong>the</strong> National Assembly’s recommendationthat eleven commissioners be appointed to<strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Presidentappointed only five commissioners. This hasimpacted negatively on <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission.More recently, <strong>the</strong>re was an inordinate delay ineffecting <strong>the</strong> National Assembly’s recommendationsfor <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> commissionersto <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality. TheNational Assembly’s recommendations in thisregard were communicated to <strong>the</strong> Presidencyin October 2006. The appointments, however,were made only in May <strong>2007</strong>. This delay aroseas a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President beingunable to determine <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>full-time Commissioners. The Commission forGender Equality Act requires that <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> full-time Commissioners should notexpire at <strong>the</strong> same time. The ad hoc committeedealing with recommendations was reconvenedto recommend terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice for thoseto be appointed as full-time Commissioners.The <strong>Committee</strong> is also concerned at <strong>the</strong> rolegiven to Ministers in <strong>the</strong> appointment processes<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board,<strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities and <strong>the</strong> IndependentCommunications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa.The role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant Ministers in this respectcould be seen as infringing on <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> those institutions and, as such, is in <strong>the</strong>view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> inappropriate.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends thatMinisters should play no role in <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocedures for independent institutions.2.3. CONTINUITYThe <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> simultaneousexpiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> all, oreven a large portion, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> a commissionnegatively impacts on <strong>the</strong> effectivenessand efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution. Forexample, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> found that <strong>the</strong> factthat <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality waswithout Commissioners for more than a yearhas considerably undermined its operationaleffectiveness and efficiency.The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes <strong>the</strong> general absence<strong>of</strong> mechanisms to ensure <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> knowledgefrom outgoing to newly appointed commissioners,which results in <strong>the</strong> loss <strong>of</strong> institutionalmemory. This lack <strong>of</strong> continuity is compoundedby <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> knowledge-managementstrategies and adequate documentmanagementsystems in <strong>the</strong> institutions.The <strong>Committee</strong> also raises <strong>the</strong> need for adegree <strong>of</strong> continuity in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officers who could supplant<strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commissions by becoming <strong>the</strong>focus <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutional memory.In its interactions with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>Public Service Commission, for example,expressed considerable anxiety that <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chairperson and <strong>the</strong> Commissionerswould expire at <strong>the</strong> same time. TheCommission proposed an amendment to <strong>the</strong>legislation to allow for staggering <strong>of</strong> appointmentsand expiry <strong>of</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. TheHuman Rights Commission would face a similarsituation in <strong>the</strong> future. The <strong>Committee</strong> feelsthat <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> staggering should apply toall bodies under review, except <strong>the</strong> AuditorGeneral and <strong>the</strong> Public Protector. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that this may notrequire legislative amendment if <strong>the</strong> nominat-COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS23


ing and appointing authorities are allowed tostagger appointments.In <strong>the</strong> interactions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> with <strong>the</strong>bodies, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> learnt <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong>a systematic, co-ordinated and timely processfor <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong> Commissioners onexpiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. Throughengagement with <strong>the</strong> institutions and examination<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutional and statutoryrequirements, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> concludes thatParliament must take responsibility for <strong>the</strong> inefficienciesin this regard, as it is <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly that is charged with initiating <strong>the</strong>appointment procedures in most instances. Inparticular, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>National Assembly should develop mechanismsto monitor <strong>the</strong> expiry <strong>of</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice, and toensure that <strong>the</strong> procedures to appointCommissioners are initiated well in advance, soas to prevent such large-scale or long-termvacancies that can cripple operations.The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong> proceduresset up should allow for appointments tobe made at least one month before <strong>the</strong> expiry<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outgoing commissioners.This would allow for a period <strong>of</strong> handoverand <strong>the</strong> conducting <strong>of</strong> exit interviews,<strong>the</strong>reby enhancing continuity.2.4. APPOINTMENT OF CHAIRPERSONSThe <strong>Committee</strong> notes that legislation does notprovide for a uniform method <strong>of</strong> appointing <strong>the</strong>chairpersons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various commissions underreview. For example, <strong>the</strong> relevant legislation providesthat <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South AfricanHuman Rights Commission be appointed by <strong>the</strong>members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission <strong>the</strong>mselves.However, in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission forGender Equality, it is <strong>the</strong> President who appoints<strong>the</strong> Chairperson, while <strong>the</strong> Commissionersappoint from among <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>the</strong> DeputyChairperson.There are advantages to each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> methods<strong>of</strong> appointment. Where commissioners appoint<strong>the</strong>ir own chairperson, <strong>the</strong>re is an excellentchance that he or she will enjoy <strong>the</strong> confidence<strong>of</strong> fellow commissioners. This method <strong>of</strong>appointing a chairperson could also enhance<strong>the</strong> legitimacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> body and streng<strong>the</strong>n publicperceptions about its independence.On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, as newly appointed commissionersare required to select a chairpersonat <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir term, <strong>the</strong>y may not haveadequate knowledge about fellow commissionerseligible for <strong>the</strong> chairpersonship for <strong>the</strong>irchoice to be appropriately informed. In <strong>the</strong>oryat least, <strong>the</strong> parliamentary committee chargedwith <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commissioners isin a better position to assess eligible candidatesas it will have studied <strong>the</strong>ir qualifications andwould have conducted in-depth interviews.The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore proposes that <strong>the</strong> legislationshould provide for a uniform method <strong>of</strong>appointing <strong>the</strong> chairpersons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various commissionscurrently appointed on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Thisprocess could ei<strong>the</strong>r provide for <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> a chairperson by <strong>the</strong> commission itself,or by <strong>the</strong> relevant parliamentary committee. Inany event, it should also provide, where applicable,for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> a deputy chairpersonby <strong>the</strong> commissioners <strong>the</strong>mselves.2.5. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THEAPPOINTMENT PROCESSThe Constitution, in section 193(6), provides for<strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong> civil society in <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocesses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission,24 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2<strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality and <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission. Public involvement inthis instance is at <strong>the</strong> discretion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly. In <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s investigations ingeneral, it finds that <strong>the</strong>re is public participationthrough <strong>the</strong> nomination <strong>of</strong> commissioners.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> emphasises <strong>the</strong> needfor greater and more meaningful publicinvolvement in <strong>the</strong> appointment procedures,provided that this is timely and efficient.At present, <strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong> civil society in<strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> commissioners and <strong>of</strong>ficebearersto Chapter 9 institutions is through <strong>the</strong>nomination <strong>of</strong> individuals. A parliamentarycommittee shortlists nominees for interviewand <strong>the</strong> list <strong>of</strong> recommended candidates is presentedto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly for adoption.The recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly are sent to <strong>the</strong> President for appointment.Civil society has no involvement in <strong>the</strong>processes following <strong>the</strong> nomination process.In submissions received by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>,some civil society organisations said that civilsociety must be involved from <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> process. These submissions appear toignore <strong>the</strong> fact that Parliament cannot determinewho from civil society should be asked tobe involved. The representation <strong>of</strong> civil societyis not self-evident. It would be incorrect forParliament to select representatives <strong>of</strong> civilsociety for this purpose. What <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>says is that <strong>the</strong> appointment system mustinvolve <strong>the</strong> public, to meet <strong>the</strong> Constitutionalrequirements.The <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong>civil society in <strong>the</strong> appointment procedures tobe necessary; particularly as such involvementwould enhance <strong>the</strong> transparency and overallcredibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se procedures and greater publicawareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodies.Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> National Assembly should devise appropriatemechanisms to ensure <strong>the</strong> active andmeaningful participation <strong>of</strong> civil society in thisregard. The <strong>Committee</strong> proposes that lists <strong>of</strong>short-listed candidates should be published forpublic comment before selection panels/committeesmake recommendations to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes <strong>the</strong> following generalrecommendations to improve <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocedures:a) The Acts elaborating appointment and dismissalprocedures should be reviewed toensure:• Consistency with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution;• A degree <strong>of</strong> standardisation in <strong>the</strong>appointment and dismissal proceduresacross <strong>the</strong> institutions;• That <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> Ministers is removed;• Appropriate provisions are made forParliament’s role in <strong>the</strong> appointment andremovals processes;• That selection criteria are defined includingmatters raised under section 2.1 inthis <strong>chapter</strong>;• A uniform method <strong>of</strong> appointing <strong>the</strong>chairpersons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various commissionscurrently appointed on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Thisprocess could ei<strong>the</strong>r provide for <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> a chairperson by <strong>the</strong>commission itself, or by <strong>the</strong> relevant parliamentarycommittee;COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS25


• Appointment <strong>of</strong> Deputy Chairpersons,where applicable, should be done by <strong>the</strong>Commissions <strong>the</strong>mselves.b) Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commissionshould not be restricted to youth. The wisdomand experience <strong>of</strong> older persons wouldenhance <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission.c) The portfolio committee which oversees aparticular institution, ra<strong>the</strong>r than an ad hoccommittee, should submit nominations fromwhich recommendations for appointmentare to be made by <strong>the</strong> National Assembly;d) The National Assembly should consult civilsociety and o<strong>the</strong>r role players to define andelaborate <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> civil society in <strong>the</strong> recommendationprocedures;e) The National Assembly must establishmechanisms to ensure that <strong>the</strong> proceduresfor <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong> commissioners arecarried out efficiently. This should includematters such as <strong>the</strong> staggering <strong>of</strong> appointments,exit interviews and hand-over periodsdiscussed in section 2.3 <strong>of</strong> this <strong>chapter</strong>.The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong>process should commence at least 6 monthsbefore <strong>the</strong> date <strong>of</strong> expiry. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> new commissioners shouldbe made at least 1 month before <strong>the</strong> expiry<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> outgoing commissioners.3. Relationship with ParliamentThe constitutional institutions both complementand are supportive <strong>of</strong> Parliament’s oversightfunction. They complement Parliament’s oversightrole as, toge<strong>the</strong>r with Parliament, <strong>the</strong>y actas watchdog bodies over <strong>the</strong> government andorgans <strong>of</strong> state. In addition, <strong>the</strong>se institutionssupport and aid Parliament in its oversightfunction by providing it with information that isnot derived from <strong>the</strong> Executive.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>se institutions must account toParliament. However, a distinction may bedrawn between <strong>the</strong> institutions listed in section181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission on <strong>the</strong> one hand, and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rinstitutions under review. The institutions listedin section 181 and <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission are unique in that <strong>the</strong> Constitutionguarantees <strong>the</strong>ir independence, yet explicitlystates that <strong>the</strong>y are accountable to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and must report on <strong>the</strong> performance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functions to <strong>the</strong> Assembly at least oncea year.3.1. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THENATIONAL ASSEMBLYIn terms <strong>of</strong> section 181(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,<strong>the</strong> state institutions supporting constitutionaldemocracy are accountable to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and must report on <strong>the</strong>ir activitiesand <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functions at leastonce a year. A similar provision can be found insection 196(6) with respect to <strong>the</strong> PublicService Commission. Accountability in thissense requires that <strong>the</strong> institutions report to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly on <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irfunctions, as well as on how <strong>the</strong>ir budgetswere spent. As mentioned earlier, <strong>the</strong>re is alsoano<strong>the</strong>r type <strong>of</strong> reporting to Parliament thatserves a very different purpose. This is toinform, assist and complement Parliament’soversight role.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong>re are, two interrelated but distinctways in which such institutions engagewith <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Firstly, <strong>the</strong> annual26 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions provide an account<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir respective activities, as well as how<strong>the</strong>ir budgets are spent. These must be tabledin <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, and are <strong>the</strong>n referredto <strong>the</strong> relevant portfolio committee. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes that, in addition to <strong>the</strong>ir annualreports, each year <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions are required to submit to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly <strong>the</strong>ir budgets and strategicplans. 11However, it is evident that portfoliocommittees have had minimal engagementwith <strong>the</strong> institutions under review on <strong>the</strong>se documents,despite <strong>the</strong>se being essential for effectiveoversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> performance, conduct andeffectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.The <strong>Committee</strong> suggests that <strong>the</strong> Whips shouldgive serious attention to <strong>the</strong> annual reportsbeing debated in <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, withdue regard to <strong>the</strong> exigencies <strong>of</strong> time.Secondly, some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, particularlythose concerned with human rights matters,may submit substantive reports to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly for consideration and action. Forexample, in terms <strong>of</strong> section 184(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, <strong>the</strong> South African Human RightsCommission is required regularly to submitreports to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly on <strong>the</strong> measurestaken by organs <strong>of</strong> state towards <strong>the</strong> realisation<strong>of</strong> socio-economic rights concerninghousing, health care, food, water, social security,education and <strong>the</strong> environment. Suchreports are an important source <strong>of</strong> informationand can considerably enhance Parliament’soversight <strong>of</strong> government departments. Itseems to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that not enoughattention is given to <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se reports,which require more extensive circulation andconsideration.In <strong>the</strong>ir interactions with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, all <strong>the</strong>commissions, excluding <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General,expressed <strong>the</strong>ir frustration at <strong>the</strong> unsatisfactoryopportunities for meaningful engagement with<strong>the</strong> portfolio committees. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionsindicated that <strong>the</strong>ir interactions withParliament were restricted to annual meetingswith portfolio committees <strong>of</strong> very limited duration(approximately 2-3 hours). The reasonsgiven to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> for <strong>the</strong> limited interaction<strong>of</strong> portfolio committees with <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9and associated institutions include uncertaintyon <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> committees regarding <strong>the</strong>extent <strong>of</strong> engagement required from <strong>the</strong>mgiven <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions;capacity constraints and <strong>the</strong> extensive workloads<strong>of</strong> committees. On <strong>the</strong> positive side, <strong>the</strong>institutions were all in favour <strong>of</strong> frequent andmore meaningful interaction with Parliament,calling for a review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutional arrangementsin Parliament in order to facilitate a closerrelationship. Of course, Parliament cannotbe overwhelmed with <strong>the</strong> consideration <strong>of</strong>annual reports and special reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions, but <strong>the</strong>perfunctory way in which <strong>the</strong>y are regardedmust be addressed.The <strong>Committee</strong> expresses grave concern at <strong>the</strong>inadequacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> present arrangements bymeans <strong>of</strong> which Parliament exercises its oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions. Perhaps moreimportantly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view thatParliament is not making full use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutionsto inform, assist and complement itsoversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive and to briefMembers <strong>of</strong> Parliament on <strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> matters<strong>of</strong> public interest that may be reported by <strong>the</strong>institutions.Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions put before <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir support <strong>of</strong> a proposal in a1999 report to <strong>the</strong> Joint Rules <strong>Committee</strong> inwhich it was suggested that a standing committeeon constitutional institutions be establishedto act as an accountability and an over-11 Idasa <strong>Report</strong> p 2<strong>9.</strong>COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS27


sight structure. The <strong>Committee</strong>, however,recalls and reaffirms <strong>the</strong> reasons for <strong>the</strong> rejection<strong>of</strong> this proposal by <strong>the</strong> Joint Rules<strong>Committee</strong>. These include:1. Such a committee would be impractical, duemainly to <strong>the</strong> wide-ranging and specificknowledge and experience requiredamongst <strong>the</strong> membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> committeeto engage meaningfully with all mattersreported by Chapter 9 and associated institutions;2. Membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> committee would be difficultto maintain due to commitments <strong>of</strong>Members on portfolio committees; and3. The proposed functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> committeewould result in considerable duplication <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> portfolio committees.The <strong>Committee</strong> proposes an alternativearrangement, discussed in detail later in this<strong>chapter</strong>.3.2. PARLIAMENT’S GENERALOVERSIGHT ROLEAs discussed earlier in this report, <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly has a constitutional obligation to providefor mechanisms to maintain oversight <strong>of</strong>national executive authority and any organ <strong>of</strong>state in terms <strong>of</strong> section 55(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review are able to support Parliament inits oversight role by providing it with an alternativesource <strong>of</strong> information in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> substantivereports.The content <strong>of</strong> such reports vary widely accordingto <strong>the</strong> underlying constitutional and legalmandate. For example:• The Public Protector must report to Parliamenttwice a year on <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> investigations<strong>of</strong> a serious nature, and may alsodo so at any time <strong>of</strong> his or her own volitionor if requested to do so by <strong>the</strong> Speaker <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly or <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Council <strong>of</strong> Provinces.• The Human Rights Commission must submitquarterly reports to Parliament on findingsin respect <strong>of</strong> functions and investigations <strong>of</strong>a serious nature which were performed orconducted by it, and may do so at any o<strong>the</strong>rtime it deems necessary. The Human RightsCommission also has a constitutional obligationto compile reports on how far organs <strong>of</strong>state have come in progressively realising anumber <strong>of</strong> socio-economic rights.• The Commission for Gender Equality maymake recommendations concerning genderissues and must prepare and submit anyreports to Parliament that relate to internationalconventions, covenants and charters.These substantive reports are tabled and <strong>the</strong>nreferred to <strong>the</strong> relevant parliamentary committee(s)by <strong>the</strong> Speaker or Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>respective House for consideration. Referrals <strong>of</strong>such reports are not usually accompanied byinstructions to report back or to take specificaction unless <strong>the</strong>re is a legal requirement to do soor where <strong>the</strong>re is a special request in that regard.The Rules <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and<strong>the</strong> National Council <strong>of</strong> Provinces stipulate thatcommittees are authorised to determine <strong>the</strong>irown procedures (NA Rule 138 and NCOP Rule103). Only in special circumstances, <strong>the</strong>refore,would <strong>the</strong> presiding <strong>of</strong>ficer when referring areport to a committee, instruct a committee toreport to <strong>the</strong> House. Such special circumstancesin practice include when <strong>the</strong>re is a legal28 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2requirement and when a report includes specificrecommendations directed at Parliament inpursuance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant institution’s performance<strong>of</strong> its mandate.In all o<strong>the</strong>r circumstances, it is <strong>the</strong> prerogative<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> committee to decide whe<strong>the</strong>r it needs tosubmit a special report to <strong>the</strong> House on a reportreferred to it. This approach is also written into<strong>the</strong> rules <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and <strong>the</strong>National Council <strong>of</strong> Provinces (NA Rule 305(2)and NCOP Rule 101(4)) and ensures that committeesare free to determine <strong>the</strong>ir own programmesand priorities.A committee that is instructed to report ordecides itself to submit a report on a substantivereport referred to it would <strong>the</strong>reforeengage with <strong>the</strong> substantive matters raised andcould well decide to interact with <strong>the</strong> relevantinstitution on those matters. The committeewould <strong>the</strong>n, as appropriate, make its own recommendationsto <strong>the</strong> House for considerationand possible adoption by it. If <strong>the</strong> House adoptsa committee report containing recommendations,<strong>the</strong> practice is that <strong>the</strong> presiding <strong>of</strong>ficercommunicates <strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> House inwriting to <strong>the</strong> institution concerned and to anyaffected organ <strong>of</strong> state.Whilst <strong>the</strong> Houses and <strong>the</strong>ir committees mustcontinue to control <strong>the</strong>ir own agendas and cannothave <strong>the</strong>ir agendas determined for <strong>the</strong>m,and hence cannot be expected to react to allreports received, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes thatwhenever a substantive report from an institutionis tabled and is <strong>of</strong> such a nature that itrequires a response from Parliament, whe<strong>the</strong>rthat is pertinently specified or not, it is incumbenton <strong>the</strong> relevant committee to submit areport to <strong>the</strong> House in order to give appropriateeffect to <strong>the</strong> constitutional injunction in section181(3) which requires <strong>of</strong> Parliament (as <strong>of</strong> allorgans <strong>of</strong> state) to assist <strong>the</strong>se institutions andensure <strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness.Some substantive reports received from <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions may indeed justify a House debate,particularly when <strong>the</strong> relevant committee(s) hasalso submitted a report on <strong>the</strong> substantiveissues raised. In such circumstances, <strong>the</strong> Whipsand Programme <strong>Committee</strong> should considerarranging for a debate in <strong>the</strong> House. In so doing,<strong>the</strong> House would also be performing its constitutionalfunction <strong>of</strong> debating matters <strong>of</strong> nationalimportance since <strong>the</strong>ses institutions are<strong>the</strong>mselves routinely engaged in such matters.3.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FORIMPROVEMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITYAND OVERSIGHTThe <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re have been varioussubmissions or proposals made forenhanced oversight <strong>of</strong> executive action byParliament. These include <strong>the</strong> <strong>Report</strong> onParliamentary Oversight and Accountability submittedto <strong>the</strong> Joint Rules <strong>Committee</strong> in 1999 and<strong>the</strong> Draft Oversight Model developed by <strong>the</strong>Joint Rules <strong>Committee</strong> Task Team on Oversightand Accountability in <strong>2007</strong>. These should beseen in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> roleand functions <strong>of</strong> parliamentary committees.The rationalisation <strong>of</strong> portfolio committees hasalso been mooted. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>view that this is a matter for ano<strong>the</strong>r report.The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that at this stage it isimportant to build <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> portfoliocommittees. Specific recommendations are madein this regard later in this <strong>chapter</strong>.The <strong>Committee</strong> acknowledges that <strong>the</strong> presentarrangements by which <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyexercises oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions underreview are inadequate. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong>COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS29


<strong>Committee</strong> has considered a number <strong>of</strong> mechanismsintended to improve Parliament’s interactionwith <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutions.3.3.1. Unit on Constitutional Institutionsand O<strong>the</strong>r Statutory Bodies in <strong>the</strong>Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SpeakerThe <strong>Committee</strong> considers a lack <strong>of</strong> co-ordination,<strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> systems to monitor reportsand track <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> commissionersas being among <strong>the</strong> major shortfalls in <strong>the</strong> currentparliamentary arrangements for oversightand accountability with respect to <strong>the</strong> Chapter9 and associated institutions. In its interimreport to <strong>the</strong> Speaker on 28 November 2006,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, recommended <strong>the</strong>establishment <strong>of</strong> a unit on constitutional institutionsand o<strong>the</strong>r statutory bodies appointed by<strong>the</strong> National Assembly. A list <strong>of</strong> bodies is presentedin annexure 3 <strong>of</strong> this report.The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong> following factorsshould be taken into account in considering thisunit:The unit should be located in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Speaker and always act under instruction anddirection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speaker. The <strong>Committee</strong>acknowledges that <strong>the</strong> Speaker has delegated<strong>the</strong> responsibility for Chapter 9 institutions to<strong>the</strong> Deputy Speaker. This is, however, an internalarrangement and <strong>the</strong> Speaker is still ultimatelyaccountable for <strong>the</strong> responsibilities <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly towards Chapter 9 andassociated institutions.The unit should not be subsumed under <strong>the</strong>duties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly Table. For thisintervention to be effective, <strong>the</strong> unit mustdevote focused attention to <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions.The <strong>Committee</strong> envisages that <strong>the</strong> unit will coordinateall interactions between <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and <strong>the</strong> state institutions streng<strong>the</strong>ningdemocracy (namely, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector,<strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Protection <strong>of</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities, <strong>the</strong> Commission forGender Equality, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission) and o<strong>the</strong>r independentinstitutions (namely, <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission, <strong>the</strong> Financial and FiscalCommission and <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board), who are accountable to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and/or must report to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. All o<strong>the</strong>r bodies in which<strong>the</strong> National Assembly or Parliament plays arole in appointments could also be included.The main functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> unit would be to -1. Receive and, through <strong>the</strong> Speaker, direct correspondencefrom such bodies to <strong>the</strong> appropriatestructure in <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.This would include recommendations for <strong>the</strong>most appropriate portfolio committee orgroup <strong>of</strong> portfolio committees to whichreports should be referred and draftingterms <strong>of</strong> reference for such committees inrespect <strong>of</strong> such reports, including timeframesfor reporting to <strong>the</strong> Speaker or <strong>the</strong>National Assembly;2. Co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> oversight and accountabilityfunctions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly withrespect to <strong>the</strong>se bodies to ensure that <strong>the</strong>National Assembly complies with its constitutionalduties in a consistent, efficient andfair manner;3. Co-ordinate, through <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Speaker, <strong>the</strong> timely and effective recommendationby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly for <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> commissioners and <strong>of</strong>ficebearersto <strong>the</strong> relevant bodies in accordancewith <strong>the</strong> National Assembly’s function.30 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 24. Highlight issues emanating from reportstabled in Parliament by such bodies for possibledebate in <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.5. Ensure that <strong>the</strong> National Assembly dischargesits constitutional obligations inrespect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se organisations in a systematic,coherent, comprehensive and efficientmanner.6. Ensure <strong>the</strong> timely communication <strong>of</strong> recommendationscontained in reports adopted by<strong>the</strong> National Assembly to <strong>the</strong> relevantMinisters where appropriate.7. Monitor and track <strong>the</strong> progress <strong>of</strong> recommendationscommunicated to Ministers ando<strong>the</strong>r appropriate bodies.8. Act as a clearing-house and repository <strong>of</strong>information and documentation receivedfrom <strong>the</strong> organisations.The unit should be headed by a senior <strong>of</strong>ficialat <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> Deputy Director-General, assistedby at least three senior <strong>of</strong>ficials at Chief-Director and Director levels, a librarian and adequateadministrative and secretarial staff.The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends <strong>the</strong> immediateestablishment and staffing <strong>of</strong> this unit.3.3.2. Streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong>sThe <strong>Committee</strong> recommends a number <strong>of</strong> measuresbelow aimed at streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> oversightrole <strong>of</strong> portfolio committee’s concerning <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated bodies. In this regard<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is particularly concerned that <strong>the</strong>reports that <strong>the</strong>se institutions submit toParliament should be efficiently and comprehensivelyaddressed by <strong>the</strong> relevant committee(s).1. The capacity <strong>of</strong> portfolio committees mustbe enhanced. Such measures would include<strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> specialist researchers,report writers, and administrative and secretarialstaff;2. Sufficient budgets, although <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>notes that current allocations are not alwaysfully utilised;3. Ease <strong>of</strong> access to o<strong>the</strong>r technical supportstaff as and when required;4. The development <strong>of</strong> specialist knowledgeand expertise by Members;5. The drawing up <strong>of</strong> guidelines, manuals andadvice for committee chairpersons;6. <strong>Ad</strong>equate meeting venues and facilities; and7. The establishment <strong>of</strong> subcommittees withincommittees to focus on specific mattersemanating from reports <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions. This would allow <strong>the</strong>committees to develop a wider range <strong>of</strong>expertise.3.3.3. Accountability Standards LegislationAmong <strong>the</strong> problems experienced in connectionwith <strong>the</strong> National Assembly’s oversightrole in respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutional institutionsis that <strong>the</strong>re is little to guide committees inholding <strong>the</strong> institutions to account while simultaneouslyrespecting <strong>the</strong>ir independence. As aconsequence, committees are <strong>of</strong>ten unclear onhow, or <strong>the</strong> extent to which, <strong>the</strong>y shouldrespond to <strong>the</strong> work done by <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9Institutions.The 1999 <strong>Report</strong> on Parliamentary Oversightand Accountability recommended <strong>the</strong> adoptionCOMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS31


<strong>of</strong> an “Accountability and Independence <strong>of</strong>Constitutional Institutions Act”. This proposalenvisaged that legislation would recognise andregulate <strong>the</strong> interrelationship between <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 bodies and Parliament’s oversightfunction while ensuring <strong>the</strong>ir independence.This proposal was never adopted byParliament. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>view that an adapted version <strong>of</strong> such legislationwould assist greatly in providing structure to<strong>the</strong> accountability and oversight work done byParliament. The <strong>Committee</strong> cautions that suchaccountability legislation will require carefulcrafting and should only be considered afterextensive consultation with <strong>the</strong> affected institutions.4. Institutional governancearrangementsThe <strong>Committee</strong> notes a number <strong>of</strong> commonproblems concerning <strong>the</strong> institutional governancearrangements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various bodiesunder review.4.1. INTERNAL TENSIONSThe <strong>Committee</strong> is aware that internal tensionsor conflicts have taken various forms. Tensionshave arisen amongst commissioners <strong>the</strong>mselves,between commissioners and <strong>the</strong> secretariatand within <strong>the</strong> secretariat. In at least onecase, this has led to immobilisation and in <strong>the</strong>case <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r commission this has led to <strong>the</strong>resignation <strong>of</strong> commissioners on at least twooccasions.For <strong>the</strong> most part <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation provideslittle assistance, and is even ambivalentor confusing, concerning <strong>the</strong> powers and functions<strong>of</strong> commissioners in relation to a chairperson,or chairpersons or commissioners in relationto <strong>the</strong> secretariat. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>enabling legislation generally does not providefor mechanisms to deal with tensions should<strong>the</strong>y arise, while internal arrangements in thisregard are typically unsatisfactory.Internal conflicts have to some degree undermined<strong>the</strong> effective operations and efficiency<strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions. The <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> clear lines <strong>of</strong>authority has exacerbated this tendency. The<strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong>re must be clearerdemarcation <strong>of</strong> functions. It is now vital thatclear lines <strong>of</strong> authority are determined within<strong>the</strong> commissions, between <strong>the</strong> commissionersand <strong>the</strong> secretariat and within <strong>the</strong> secretariat.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that section 36(2)(b) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Finance Management Act 1 <strong>of</strong> 1999requires that a Chief Executive Officer must be<strong>the</strong> accounting <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> that institution.However, <strong>the</strong> chairperson or head <strong>of</strong> a commissionor institution is ei<strong>the</strong>r explicitly or implicitlymandated to provide overall leadership anddirection for <strong>the</strong> institution. There is a lacuna in<strong>the</strong> Public Finance Management Act regarding<strong>the</strong> definition <strong>of</strong> executive authority. Because<strong>the</strong> law left out <strong>the</strong> constitutional institutions inthis definition, <strong>the</strong> National Treasury furnisheda definition by regulation. However, some <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> institutions were unaware <strong>of</strong> this and thishas contributed to tension and sometimesparalysis between Chief Executive Officers andchairpersons <strong>of</strong> commissions.The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends as follows:a) The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that, where appropriatelegislation is not clear, such legislationmust be amended to clarify <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong>authority between <strong>the</strong> chairperson <strong>of</strong> acommission or <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> an institution and<strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer as well as32 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2between chairpersons <strong>of</strong> commissions ando<strong>the</strong>r commissioners.b) Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, while this report cannot gointo detail, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> feels that a code<strong>of</strong> conduct that would apply to all Chapter 9and associated institutions is required.4.2. REMUNERATION ANDCONDITIONS OF SERVICEThere is no uniformity in <strong>the</strong> procedures fordetermining <strong>the</strong> salaries and conditions <strong>of</strong>employment <strong>of</strong> commissioners and heads <strong>of</strong>institutions. The President in consultation withCabinet, for example, determines <strong>the</strong> salaries<strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission,while <strong>the</strong> National Assembly is charged withdetermining <strong>the</strong> remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> service for <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that Parliament has notcarried out its obligation in terms <strong>of</strong> section219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution (Annexure 1). Thisexplains, to some degree, <strong>the</strong> disparities in <strong>the</strong>determination <strong>of</strong> remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> service amongst <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions. This section provides for nationallegislation, which must establish <strong>the</strong> frameworkfor determining <strong>the</strong> salaries, allowancesand benefits <strong>of</strong>, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, and members <strong>of</strong>any commission provided for in <strong>the</strong>Constitution, including <strong>the</strong> BroadcastingAuthority referred to in section 192. In thisregard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> wishes to draw attentionto <strong>the</strong> requirement <strong>of</strong> section 237 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, which states that all constitutionalobligations must be performed diligently andwithout delay.The <strong>Committee</strong> is not aware <strong>of</strong> how increasesin salaries and improvements in conditions <strong>of</strong>service are carried out. The eccentricity <strong>of</strong> thisis exemplified if one looks at <strong>the</strong> salaries andconditions <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission, which are determined by <strong>the</strong>President. The <strong>Committee</strong> draws <strong>the</strong> attention<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly to this lacuna as anurgent priority. The envisaged framework legislationwill guide <strong>the</strong> approach to all bodiesand bring about a degree <strong>of</strong> comparability.It is also not clear to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>salaries and benefits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commissioners andheads <strong>of</strong> institutions are commensurate with<strong>the</strong> nature and role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> functions that <strong>the</strong>yare required to perform.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that at present <strong>the</strong>Independent Commission for <strong>the</strong> Remuneration<strong>of</strong> Public Office-Bearers Act 92 <strong>of</strong> 1997 providesfor a Commission, appointed by <strong>the</strong> President,to recommend salaries <strong>of</strong> any member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National or Provincial Cabinets and legislatures,as well as o<strong>the</strong>r bodies such as <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong>Traditional Leaders, and members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Judiciary. This is an advisory body and <strong>the</strong>President has <strong>the</strong> discretion to accept or rejectrecommendations. The <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat consideration should be given toextending <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> this to include <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions.Although <strong>the</strong> legislation permits this body toconduct an inquiry into any matter in respect <strong>of</strong>which it is authorised by section 219 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, it does not provide <strong>the</strong> requisiteremunerative framework for <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, and o<strong>the</strong>r commissionsestablished in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,including <strong>the</strong> Broadcasting Authorityestablished in terms <strong>of</strong> section 192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> Act could be amended to include such bod-COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS33


ies within its ambit and to extend <strong>the</strong>Commission’s powers to establish <strong>the</strong> requisiteframeworks as envisaged by <strong>the</strong> Constitution.Alternatively, new legislation could be formulatedand adopted.In <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> above, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat:a) Framework legislation in terms <strong>of</strong> section219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution (Annexure 1) mustbe adopted urgently, ei<strong>the</strong>r by amendment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent Commission for <strong>the</strong>Remuneration <strong>of</strong> Public Office-Bearers Act orthrough development <strong>of</strong> new legislation.4.3. MECHANISMS FOR DISCLOSUREOF INTERESTSAll <strong>the</strong> bodies under review are public bodiesregulated in terms <strong>of</strong> national legislation andfulfilling a public function. As such, all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sebodies receive public funds and have a legalduty to spend such money in accordance with<strong>the</strong>ir mandate. The bodies are subject <strong>the</strong>Public Finance Management Act and itsaccounting <strong>of</strong>ficers have a duty to ensure <strong>the</strong>effective, efficient, economical and transparentuse <strong>of</strong> institutional resources. 12Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>se institutions exercise importantconstitutional and legal mandates and arerequired to act in an independent and impartialmanner. Without public trust, <strong>the</strong>se institutionswould lose credibility and legitimacy and thiswould hamper <strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness. It is withoutquestion that <strong>the</strong> senior leadership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions must uphold <strong>the</strong> highest standards<strong>of</strong> ethics. The <strong>Committee</strong> is, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>opinion that mechanisms must be put in placeto ensure that <strong>the</strong>re can be no conflicts <strong>of</strong> interest,and that <strong>the</strong> governance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutionsis open and transparent.Thus, it is <strong>of</strong> concern to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that for<strong>the</strong> most part <strong>the</strong>re is no systematic approachto guard against conflicts <strong>of</strong> interest. Whilesome institutions provide for <strong>the</strong> compilation <strong>of</strong>a list <strong>of</strong> members’ interests, o<strong>the</strong>rs do not.Where such a list is kept, it did not appear to<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>se lists are readily availableto <strong>the</strong> public and <strong>the</strong> media. Examples <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> consistency and confusion that predominateabound:• The Human Rights Commission has no policyas yet on disclosing and/or seeking permissionfor involvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> executivemembers in private/commercial organisations.However, in September 2006 memberswere required to submit forms todeclare <strong>the</strong>ir membership <strong>of</strong> boards <strong>of</strong>organisations. The members were alsorequested to state on <strong>the</strong> declaration formwhe<strong>the</strong>r or not <strong>the</strong>y receive financial rewardfor <strong>the</strong>ir board membership. Presently <strong>the</strong>reis no committee established to verify <strong>the</strong>submissions. The completed submissions aretaken to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chief ExecutiveOfficer for review.• The Commission for Gender Equality has asystem in terms <strong>of</strong> which a declaration <strong>of</strong>interests is made on a prescribed form. Thehuman resource <strong>of</strong>fice, where a register iskept, facilitates this process. The Commission’spolicy also provides that every giftabove R500 must be declared in <strong>the</strong> register.• The Electoral Commission Act explicitly regulatesconflicts <strong>of</strong> interest and prohibits anyfull-time Commissioner from taking up anyo<strong>the</strong>r employment or occupation or <strong>the</strong>holding <strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>fice, unless specificallyauthorised to do so by <strong>the</strong> President. TheAct fur<strong>the</strong>r prohibits Commissioners from sittingin a meeting where a conflict <strong>of</strong> interestmay arise and requires that <strong>the</strong>y disclose12 PFMA section 38(1)(b).34 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2<strong>the</strong>ir interest and recuse <strong>the</strong>mselves. Anemployee may fur<strong>the</strong>rmore not accept anygift or any o<strong>the</strong>r benefit(s) valued at R200 ormore <strong>of</strong>fered to him or her as an <strong>of</strong>ficer oremployee without prior permission from <strong>the</strong>Commission, which reserves <strong>the</strong> right toorder non-acceptance <strong>of</strong> any such gift orbenefit. For this purpose, a gift register iskept with <strong>the</strong> human resources departmentfor <strong>the</strong> declaration <strong>of</strong> such gifts or benefitsto employees valued at R200 or more<strong>of</strong>fered to <strong>the</strong>m by or on behalf <strong>of</strong> a personor organisation with whom <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas, or may enter into, a business relationship,and also any gifts or benefits that maybe interned or perceived to influence <strong>the</strong>min <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functions.The present arrangements around <strong>the</strong> regulation<strong>of</strong> conflicts <strong>of</strong> interest <strong>the</strong>refore differwidely. There is also disagreement among <strong>the</strong>various institutions about <strong>the</strong> minimumrequirements for good governance.Given <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>se institutions make use<strong>of</strong> public funds, fulfil public functions and aresubject to <strong>the</strong> Public Finance Management Act,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that:a) The enabling legislation should be amendedto provide a coherent and comprehensiveframework for <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> conflicts <strong>of</strong>interest. In order for such regulation to beeffective, it should include minimum standards<strong>of</strong> disclosure, including:i. All personnel <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and relatedbodies must be required to disclose allsubstantial gifts, benefits, and outsidefinancial interests in a public register andthis register must be easily accessible to<strong>the</strong> public;ii. Directorships and/or partnerships held bycommissioners or senior <strong>of</strong>ficials must bedisclosed and published in <strong>the</strong> annualreports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions. O<strong>the</strong>r declarations should bekept in a register that is easily accessibleto <strong>the</strong> public.iii. Each institution must adopt rules thatwould regulate actions in terms <strong>of</strong> conflicts<strong>of</strong> interest.5. AccessibilityThe <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions are largely urban-based. The<strong>Committee</strong> is mindful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that at leastforty-five percent <strong>of</strong> South Africa’s population livesin rural areas. Those who live in rural areas arefar more likely to be poor, lack access to transportand have low levels <strong>of</strong> formal education. Theseare <strong>the</strong> very marginalised and vulnerable peoplemost likely to be in need <strong>of</strong> assistance to enforce<strong>the</strong>ir rights or gain access to state grants.Therefore, it is apparent that in order to realise<strong>the</strong>ir mandates more fully, <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions must facilitate betteraccess to <strong>the</strong> public in rural areas and becomemore visibly involved in education and promotioncampaigns in rural areas. The <strong>Committee</strong>has been told that institutions lack <strong>the</strong> humanand financial resources to address this problemfully. The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong>re hasbeen a trend for Chapter 9 and associated institutionsto open provincial and/or regional<strong>of</strong>fices in an attempt to be more accessible.The <strong>Committee</strong>, however, is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion thatthis is not necessarily <strong>the</strong> most effective way todeal with <strong>the</strong> problem. Although exact figureswere not provided by many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions,it is clear that <strong>the</strong>se provincial <strong>of</strong>fices take up asizeable amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget. ProvincialCOMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS35


<strong>of</strong>fices require, at a minimum, premises, appropriateinfrastructure and staffing.Apart from <strong>the</strong> expenditure, several o<strong>the</strong>r problemsalso arise when such <strong>of</strong>fices are opened.Such problems include that <strong>of</strong> establishing clearlines <strong>of</strong> authority and accountability between<strong>the</strong> national <strong>of</strong>fice and <strong>the</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fices.Where commissioners are based in <strong>the</strong>provinces, it is also necessary to clarify <strong>the</strong>irrole in respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant provincial <strong>of</strong>fice.The <strong>Committee</strong> could not find demonstrableevidence that <strong>the</strong>se principles are consistentlyadhered to by all institutions.Where a body has <strong>the</strong> power to investigatecomplaints, uncertainty may also arise aboutwhe<strong>the</strong>r such complaints will be dealt with by<strong>the</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fice or <strong>the</strong> national <strong>of</strong>fice. Itappears to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that most complainantsprefer <strong>the</strong> national <strong>of</strong>fice. This problembecomes more acute where staff membersat provincial <strong>of</strong>fices do not have <strong>the</strong> requisiteexpertise to deal with complicated complaints.In such cases, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> danger <strong>of</strong> duplication<strong>of</strong> work as staff at <strong>the</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fice will initiallyinvestigate a complaint, and only once<strong>the</strong>y realise it is too complex refer it to <strong>the</strong>national <strong>of</strong>fice. Moreover, unnecessary duplicationmay also arise when decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>provincial <strong>of</strong>fices are made subject to vettingby <strong>the</strong> national <strong>of</strong>fice. A fur<strong>the</strong>r problem is that<strong>of</strong> unreasonable delays in finalising cases.The <strong>Committee</strong> was also informed <strong>of</strong> problemsarising from <strong>the</strong> difficulties <strong>of</strong> commissioners inoverseeing and monitoring <strong>the</strong> work done inprovincial <strong>of</strong>fices. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>was unable to confirm <strong>the</strong> usefulness <strong>of</strong>all <strong>the</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fices. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforeholds <strong>the</strong> view that provincial <strong>of</strong>ficesshould only be opened where a demonstrableneed can be shown and that, if this is done,clear lines <strong>of</strong> authority must be establishedfrom <strong>the</strong> outset. These arrangements can beperiodically reviewed to ensure that <strong>the</strong>yremain appropriate to <strong>the</strong> context.The <strong>Committee</strong> wishes to emphasise that <strong>the</strong>institutions under review should be innovativein <strong>the</strong>ir use <strong>of</strong> resources to ensure that <strong>the</strong>ybecome more accessible to <strong>the</strong> public, especiallyin rural areas. This can include <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong>existing state infrastructure as points <strong>of</strong> contactbetween <strong>the</strong> institutions and <strong>the</strong> community.Thus, information leaflets and education materialcould be distributed at such establishmentsas well as at post <strong>of</strong>fices; libraries, communitycentres and social grant pay-points. The use <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>fices <strong>of</strong> non-governmental organisations andplaces <strong>of</strong> religious worship could also be investigated.The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong> governmenthas a number <strong>of</strong> initiatives, such as <strong>the</strong>Thusong Service Centres, and CommunityDevelopment Workers, which have been set upin <strong>the</strong> rural areas <strong>of</strong> South Africa. Such centresmay be invaluable in providing <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review greater access to rural communities.Service agreements could be reached withsuch centres and safeguards can be put in placeto ensure that <strong>the</strong> bodies retain <strong>the</strong>ir independenceand impartiality.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes <strong>the</strong> following recommendationsto increase public access to <strong>the</strong>institutions and <strong>the</strong>ir work:a) Institutions should explore innovative publicoutreach and awareness mechanismsincluding:i. Use <strong>of</strong> existing government infrastructuresuch as libraries, post <strong>of</strong>fices, communitycentres and social grant pay points;36 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2Thusong Service Centres and CommunityDevelopment Workers;ii. Use <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fices <strong>of</strong> non-governmental organisationsand faith-based organisations;b) Provincial <strong>of</strong>fices should only be establishedwhere <strong>the</strong> need has been determined.Intuitions should consider sharing <strong>of</strong> facilitiesin provincial <strong>of</strong>fices where practical andappropriate.6. A single human rights bodyFor reasons peculiar to its democratic transition,South Africa is unique in <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> differentinstitutions it has established in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution and by ordinary legislation to protectand promote human rights. In addition toestablishing a national Human RightsCommission, <strong>the</strong> Constitution creates a number<strong>of</strong> specialised human rights bodies to protectand promote <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> specific constituencies.These specialised human rights institutionsinclude <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality, <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities, and <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board. Moreover, Parliament created<strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs,to promote <strong>the</strong> rights and interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>youth <strong>of</strong> South Africa.It is quite clear that <strong>the</strong> area covered by <strong>the</strong>human rights milieu is broad, requiring practicalmechanisms to ensure that it is sufficientlyencompassing, that <strong>the</strong>re are no gaps and that<strong>the</strong> core elements <strong>of</strong> investigation and protectionare maintained. A multiplicity <strong>of</strong> institutionsresults in an uneven spread <strong>of</strong> availableresources and capacities, which has unfortunateimplications for effectiveness and efficiency.The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> presentinstitutional framework has created fragmentation,confounding <strong>the</strong> intention that <strong>the</strong>se institutionswould support <strong>the</strong> seamless application<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.There are many advantages to <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> an umbrella human rights commission.Firstly, <strong>the</strong>re is avoidance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> potential forduplication <strong>of</strong> effort that can easily occur given<strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> mandates <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> institutions overlap. The present lack <strong>of</strong> collaborationand co-ordination that characterises<strong>the</strong>ir relationship with one ano<strong>the</strong>r also exacerbates<strong>the</strong> potential for duplication <strong>of</strong> activities.Secondly, given <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> ensuring thatresources are utilised most advantageously, asingle human rights commission would beadministratively more efficient. Not only would<strong>the</strong> sharing <strong>of</strong> common resources result in costsavings, but it would also permit <strong>the</strong> moreeffective use <strong>of</strong> resources and a greater abilityto deliver an effective service for a range <strong>of</strong>customers. In addition, <strong>the</strong>re would also beopportunity for a fundamental review and reallocation<strong>of</strong> resources <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existing bodies,enabling <strong>the</strong> commissioners to concentrate onissues <strong>of</strong> greatest concern.Thirdly, <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a single humanrights commission is more readily accessible to<strong>the</strong> public who, at present, must determinewhich <strong>of</strong> a multiplicity <strong>of</strong> institutions is <strong>the</strong> correctforum to approach. This can be frustratingand confusing for complainants, who may wellbe referred from one body to ano<strong>the</strong>r. A singlehuman rights commission would also provide<strong>the</strong> opportunity for a co-ordinated approach to<strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong>Rights, as well as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposedcommission to <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> ahuman rights culture in South Africa.COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS37


Human rights are interdependent and indivisibleand rights cannot be easily compartmentalised.Individuals <strong>of</strong>ten experience humanrights violations in multiple ways and may notknow how this experience would be translatedinto a rights discourse. Such individuals may<strong>the</strong>n not know which <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions toapproach or, worse, may approach <strong>the</strong> wrongorganisation, which must <strong>the</strong>n refer <strong>the</strong> complainantto ano<strong>the</strong>r body. At present <strong>the</strong> differentinstitutions are not necessarily located in<strong>the</strong> same building or even in close proximity,which creates difficulties when referring complaints.The complainant may well become discouragedby <strong>the</strong> referral or may not understand<strong>the</strong> reason for it. Creating one institution willaddress this problemFourthly, arguably <strong>the</strong> most important task <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> human rights bodies is to assist those whowould not o<strong>the</strong>rwise be able to do so, toenforce <strong>the</strong>ir rights by legal action, if necessary.Currently with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission, <strong>the</strong>se institutions are noteffectively fulfilling this task. Moreover, a combination<strong>of</strong> geography and capacity frustratesready access by <strong>the</strong> poor and marginalised individualsto <strong>the</strong>se institutions. This is an untenablesituation that could partly be addressed byan umbrella human rights commission <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrica, with <strong>of</strong>fices across <strong>the</strong> country.Lastly, <strong>the</strong> various bodies (with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission) are all accountableto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and report to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly about <strong>the</strong>ir activities. Thisprocess is not always satisfactory. By amalgamating<strong>the</strong> five bodies into one, it would simplify<strong>the</strong> oversight task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and would, in turn, enhance <strong>the</strong> level<strong>of</strong> parliamentary oversight provided. A singlebody will also be able to engage with <strong>the</strong>National Assembly in a more coherent and consistentmanner.There is <strong>the</strong> fear that o<strong>the</strong>r more powerfulinterests will swamp a particular interest group.However, <strong>the</strong> primary objective <strong>of</strong> a singlecommission is not to represent interest groupsor to give <strong>the</strong>m a voice - this is <strong>the</strong> function <strong>of</strong>civil society organisations – but ra<strong>the</strong>r to act asa vehicle to promote change and, where appropriate,assist individuals to assert <strong>the</strong>ir rights. Itis important to ensure, however, that <strong>the</strong> discreteelements are not submerged.A single human rights commission’s essentialrole will be to promote a human rights culturein its broadest sense, vindicate <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> citizens,ensure that resources are focused on <strong>the</strong>most important strategic issues and whereverpossible be involved in policies relating tohuman rights. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, having commissionerswith responsibilities for specific issues(for example, a commissioner for genderequality and a disability commissioner) will fur<strong>the</strong>rallay fears <strong>of</strong> marginalisation.A single body will bring many important benefits: 131. A single organisation will be a strong andauthoritative champion for equality andhuman rights. The new body will incorporate<strong>the</strong> expertise on specific areas <strong>of</strong> humanrights, now spread across bodies, and willthus be better able to respond to <strong>the</strong> myriadhuman rights challenges in South Africa.2. The interdependence and interrelatednature <strong>of</strong> human rights means that a singlebody is better placed to tackle barriers andinequalities affecting several groups, and toidentify and promote strategic solutions toaddress endemic human rights abuses.3. A single commission will benefit individualsseeking advice and support on all discriminationissues and will provide informationon human rights in an accessible and user-13 See also “Fairness for All: A new Commission for Equality and Human Rights”,White Paper presented to British Parliament in May 2004 pp 16-18.38 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2friendly way. Providing a single point <strong>of</strong> contactfor individuals and for <strong>the</strong> agencies andorganisations to which <strong>the</strong>y turn for advicewill deliver real benefits for everyone.4. A single commission will be able to developand implement policies and approaches thatwill better address <strong>the</strong> reality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manydimensions <strong>of</strong> oppression <strong>of</strong>ten experiencedby <strong>the</strong> same person. It will <strong>the</strong>refore be ableto tackle systemic discrimination suffered bysome people on multiple grounds.5. A single commission will be more effectiveat promoting improvements to <strong>the</strong> delivery<strong>of</strong> public services. It will provide guidanceand support on human rights good practiceand compliance, and can adopt a cross-cuttingseamless approach to <strong>the</strong> full breadth <strong>of</strong>human rights issues on a sector-by-sectorbasis with, for example, health authorities,local government and education providers.6. A single commission will also provide anopportunity to pursue a more coherentapproach to enforcing <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality and Prevention <strong>of</strong>Unfair Discrimination Act and, once <strong>the</strong>y arebrought into effect, <strong>the</strong> promotional aspects<strong>of</strong> that legislation.7. A single commission will combine <strong>the</strong>strengths <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existing commissions with<strong>the</strong> expertise from key organisations representing<strong>the</strong> new equality strands, identifyingand promoting creative responses to <strong>the</strong>challenges and opportunities it will face.8. A single commission will be better equippedto interact with civil society organisationsand to work with <strong>the</strong>m to promote and protecthuman rights.The <strong>Committee</strong> envisages that <strong>the</strong> newCommission on Human Rights and Equality willbe more than <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> its parts. It will be acentre <strong>of</strong> excellence, in research and knowledge,across <strong>the</strong> full breadth <strong>of</strong> its equality andhuman rights spectrum. It will be able to generatecross-strand learning and informationsharing, applying principles and advances inone area <strong>of</strong> human rights work to o<strong>the</strong>rs, anddelivering this in a coherent and integratedway. It will become <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> a more informalnon-court driven process to realise andprotect human rights and could play a pivotalrole in <strong>the</strong> promotion and protection <strong>of</strong> humanrights in South Africa.In order to address <strong>the</strong> challenges <strong>of</strong> a multiplicity<strong>of</strong> human rights bodies, to give effect to<strong>the</strong> principles elaborated above, and to leverage<strong>the</strong> benefits <strong>of</strong> a single human rights body,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends as follows:a) The <strong>Committee</strong> proposes <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> a streng<strong>the</strong>ned, highly organised and unitarybody, called <strong>the</strong> South AfricanCommission on Human Rights and Equalitythat will be better equipped to deal with <strong>the</strong>many challenges in promoting and protectinghuman rights in South Africa.b) This newly established Commission shouldinclude <strong>the</strong> current Human RightsCommission, <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality, <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotionand Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural,Religious and Linguistic Communities(including <strong>the</strong> Pan South African LanguageBoard) and <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission(including children’s rights). The inclusion <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se institutions is elaborated in <strong>the</strong> <strong>chapter</strong>sdealing specifically with <strong>the</strong> relevantinstitution.COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS39


c) The <strong>Committee</strong> highlights that this umbrellahuman rights commission should have dedicatedcommissioners for each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> followingareas: gender, children and youth andpeople with disabilities.d) Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>re should be a dedicatedinformation commissioner.e) This body must be well funded and must have<strong>the</strong> necessary legal power not only to promotehuman rights and address systemic violations<strong>of</strong> rights, but also to operate as an advice centrefor <strong>the</strong> millions <strong>of</strong> people in South Africawho o<strong>the</strong>rwise would not have been able tochallenge a breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rights.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> amalgamationwill nei<strong>the</strong>r be easy nor speedy.Apart from <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission,<strong>the</strong>se bodies are established by <strong>the</strong>Constitution and amalgamation thus requiressignificant constitutional amendment. In orderfor such amendment to be effected, Parliamentand <strong>the</strong> Executive must give it due consideration.complements and that any amalgamationwould have to take cognisance <strong>of</strong> this fact.However, it is in <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> all SouthAfricans that an amalgamation <strong>of</strong> institutions isfinalised within a reasonable period. To thisend <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r recommends that -f) A task team be set up to explore <strong>the</strong> modalities<strong>of</strong> an amalgamation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> five bodiesmentioned and to report to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly on its findings. The aim <strong>of</strong> thisreport must be to provide a roadmap thatwould guide amalgamation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodieswithin a reasonable period;g) This task team to consist <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> heads <strong>of</strong> all<strong>the</strong> bodies involved in <strong>the</strong> amalgamationalong with a number <strong>of</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly nominated by <strong>the</strong>Speaker and proportionally representing <strong>the</strong>various political parties;h) This task team to report to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly within 12 months after <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s report is adopted.The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>existing institutions currently employ full-timecommissioners as well as relatively large staff40 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 2COMMON ISSUES AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS41


CHAPTER 3


CHAPTER 3CHAPTER 3THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION1. BackgroundAs <strong>the</strong> interim Constitution was being discussedand debated, all parties involved in <strong>the</strong> multipartynegotiation process recognised <strong>the</strong> needfor <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> certain key institutions.There was clear recognition that <strong>the</strong> legitimacy<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new democratic order would depend on<strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first democratic elections.There was broad agreement that an independentelectoral commission was essential to conductingfree and fair elections successfully.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> Electoral Act 150 <strong>of</strong> 1993 wasenacted. Sixteen high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile individuals(eleven local and five from abroad) wereappointed as commissioners.The mandate <strong>of</strong> this Commission was to conductSouth Africa’s first fully democratic elections,at <strong>the</strong> national level for both chambers <strong>of</strong>Parliament (<strong>the</strong> Senate and <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly) and at <strong>the</strong> provincial level for <strong>the</strong>legislatures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nine new provinces.Elections were held from 26-29 April 1994under a system <strong>of</strong> proportional representationwith party lists. The newly constituted Parliamenthad a special mandate to sit as aConstitutional Assembly and draft a finalConstitution for <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South Africa.The Constitution adopted on 8 May and amendedon 11 October 1996 replaced <strong>the</strong> interimConstitution <strong>of</strong> 1993, and provided for <strong>the</strong>establishment <strong>of</strong> a new permanent ElectoralCommission as one <strong>of</strong> six state institutions supportingconstitutional democracy.When drafting <strong>the</strong> final Constitution, <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Assembly noted that mostWestern European countries have <strong>the</strong>ir electionauthority located in a government ministry,usually <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Interior. However, asSouth Africa had different democratic assumptions,<strong>the</strong> Constitutional Assembly felt that anindependent electoral commission was moreappropriate. It was imperative that SouthAfrica’s Electoral Commission should not onlybe institutionally independent but also be seento be independent and impartial. An electoralcommission that was located in a governmentdepartment would be too close to <strong>the</strong> seat <strong>of</strong>power.In addition, <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Assembly recommendedthat <strong>the</strong> electoral authority be establishedin <strong>the</strong> Constitution. However, as it wouldbe difficult to specify all requirements <strong>of</strong> anelectoral commission in a sustainable mannerand regular amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionwould not inspire confidence or stability, it wasagreed that <strong>the</strong> Constitution should provide abasic framework. Matters <strong>of</strong> detail should becovered in <strong>the</strong> general election laws (statutes,regulations and proclamations).2. Constitutional andlegal mandateSection 190(1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution sets out <strong>the</strong>functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission, whichare to manage elections <strong>of</strong> national, provincialand municipal legislative bodies in accordancewith national legislation, ensure that such electionsare free and fair and declare <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong>such elections within a period <strong>of</strong> time prescribedby national legislation but which is asshort a time as reasonably possible.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission Act 51 <strong>of</strong>1996, which came into force on 17 October1996, provides for <strong>the</strong> establishment and composition<strong>of</strong> an Electoral Commission to manageelections for all three spheres <strong>of</strong> governmentand for referendums.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION43


2.1. POWERS AND FUNCTIONSThe Commission is assigned a wide array <strong>of</strong>powers and functions that are executive,administrative, quasi-judicial, regulatory, educationaland advisory in nature. Section 190 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution sets out <strong>the</strong> Commission’s corefunctions, namely to:1. Manage elections <strong>of</strong> national, provincial andmunicipal legislative bodies in accordancewith national legislation.2. Ensure that <strong>the</strong>se elections are free and fair.3. Declare <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> such elections within<strong>the</strong> prescribed period.The Electoral Commission Act, 1996, provides<strong>the</strong> Commission with fur<strong>the</strong>r powers and functionsthat include:1. Promoting conditions conducive to free andfair elections.2. Promoting knowledge <strong>of</strong> sound and democraticelectoral processes.3. Compiling and maintaining voters’ rolls bymeans <strong>of</strong> registering eligible voters.4. Compiling and maintaining a register <strong>of</strong>political parties.5. Establishing and maintaining liaison and cooperationwith political parties.6. Undertaking and promoting research intoelectoral matters.7. Developing and promoting <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong> electoral expertise in all spheres <strong>of</strong> government.8. Continuously reviewing legislation, and proposedlegislation and making related recommendations.<strong>9.</strong> Promoting voter education.10.Promoting co-operation with and betweenpersons, institutions, governments andadministrations.11.<strong>Ad</strong>judicating disputes that are <strong>of</strong> an administrativenature relating to <strong>the</strong> holding <strong>of</strong>elections.12.Appointing appropriate public administrationsto conduct elections when necessary.Section 23 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission Act,1996, empowers <strong>the</strong> Commission to make regulations,which may prescribe penalties <strong>of</strong> afine or imprisonment not exceeding two years,regarding -1. Time limits and <strong>the</strong> manner in whichappeals and reviews may be brought to <strong>the</strong>Commission.2. The voters’ rolls.3. The registration <strong>of</strong> parties.4. The conduct <strong>of</strong> persons, parties and candidatesin so far as such conduct may promoteor inhibit <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong> a free and fair election.5. The holding <strong>of</strong> referendums.The Electoral Act 73 <strong>of</strong> 1998 regulates in detail<strong>the</strong> duties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> ChiefElectoral Officer in respect <strong>of</strong> -44 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 31. The compilation and maintenance <strong>of</strong> anational common voters’ roll.2. The proclamation and preparation for elections.3. The management <strong>of</strong> national and provincialelections, as well as <strong>the</strong> determination anddeclaration <strong>of</strong> results.4. The system <strong>of</strong> objections and appeals.Various o<strong>the</strong>r Acts are also applicable. The LocalGovernment: Municipal Structures Act 117 <strong>of</strong>1998 and <strong>the</strong> Local Government: MunicipalElectoral Act 27 <strong>of</strong> 2000 provide for <strong>the</strong> appropriateelectoral systems for local governmentelections, and <strong>the</strong>ir regulation. Section 4 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act,2000, states that <strong>the</strong> Commission must administer<strong>the</strong> Act in a manner conducive to free andfair elections. The Act also regulates <strong>the</strong> management<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two separate electoral systemsestablished for metropolitan and local municipalitieson <strong>the</strong> one hand and district municipalitieson <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand; <strong>the</strong> nomination <strong>of</strong> wardcandidates and <strong>the</strong> election procedures concerningward elections; and <strong>the</strong> election proceduresfor district councils.The Commission also participates in <strong>the</strong> delimitation<strong>of</strong> municipalities into wards. The LocalGovernment: Municipal Structures Act, 1998,requires that <strong>the</strong> Demarcation Board for <strong>the</strong>purposes <strong>of</strong> an election delimit all municipalitiesthat must have wards into wards, after consultingwith <strong>the</strong> Commission. In addition, section23 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Local Government: DemarcationAct, 2000, requires that <strong>the</strong> Commissionexpress its view on <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> a boundary redelimitationon <strong>the</strong> representation <strong>of</strong> voters in<strong>the</strong> affected councils. Depending on <strong>the</strong>Commission’s view in this regard, <strong>the</strong> delimitationmay come into effect at <strong>the</strong> next GeneralElection.In addition, in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Funding <strong>of</strong>Political Parties Act 103 <strong>of</strong> 1997, <strong>the</strong> Commissionis responsible for managing and administering<strong>the</strong> Represented Political Parties’ Fund inrespect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> parties participating in nationaland provincial legislatures.3. FindingsIn response to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire it had circulated,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> received a written submissionfrom <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission. This document,toge<strong>the</strong>r with oral and written submissions,formed <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s discussionswith <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission thattook place on 28 February <strong>2007</strong>. In addition,<strong>the</strong> Commission submitted supplementary documentation.The following findings arise from<strong>the</strong>se interactions:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) The Constitution and enabling legislationrefer to <strong>the</strong> “Electoral Commission” and not<strong>the</strong> “Independent Electoral Commission”,which was <strong>the</strong> name this institution hadunder <strong>the</strong> Interim Constitution, 1993, and<strong>the</strong> Independent Electoral Commission Act150 <strong>of</strong> 1993. Although <strong>the</strong> word “independent”was subsequently specificallyomitted in replacing legislation, it was inpopular use to describe <strong>the</strong> ElectoralCommission and <strong>the</strong> Commission decided toretain <strong>the</strong> adjective as its brand name. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that this should beregularised in subsequent legislation.b) The Electoral Commission accepts that <strong>the</strong>principles <strong>of</strong> co-operative government andTHE ELECTORAL COMMISSION45


intergovernmental relations contained insection 41(1)(h) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution apply toit (Annexure 1). However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>obtained legal opinion to <strong>the</strong> effect that <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court had held in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong>Independent Electoral Commission vLangeberg Municipality that while <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 institutions are organs <strong>of</strong> state,<strong>the</strong>y do not form part <strong>of</strong> government. 14Thisis discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong>this report. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> submitsthat relevant provisions <strong>of</strong> section41(1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution relating specificallyto co-operative government and intergovernmentalrelations do not apply to <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission (or any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rChapter 9 institutions).c) The <strong>Committee</strong> highlights that <strong>the</strong> increasinginternational demand on <strong>the</strong> servicesand advice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission is anindication <strong>of</strong> international recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>pr<strong>of</strong>essional status and credibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> congratulates<strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission accordingly.d) The Commission provides technical assistanceto a number <strong>of</strong> electoral managementbodies in o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong> Africa. For example,in support <strong>of</strong> government initiatives, and byway <strong>of</strong> bilateral agreements, <strong>the</strong>Commission has rendered technical, managerial,and logistical support to <strong>the</strong> electoralcommissions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Congo (DRC), <strong>the</strong> Comoros, and Lesotho.These activities were funded by <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs. The <strong>Committee</strong>highlights that <strong>the</strong> enabling legislationdoes not specifically empower <strong>the</strong>Commission to engage in such activities.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission had interpreted its mandate topromote democracy through electionsbroadly, so as to allow it to perform suchfunctions.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission on <strong>the</strong> African continent hasincreased, with requests coming largelyfrom <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs andfrom electoral commissions or similar bodiesin o<strong>the</strong>r African states. Although <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs funds suchactivities, <strong>the</strong> Commission acknowledgesthat undertaking such activities never<strong>the</strong>lessimpacts on its resources, particularly humanresources. The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned at<strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> discretion to refuse such requestsfrom <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that this lack <strong>of</strong>discretion may adversely affect <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission from <strong>the</strong>Executive.f) As indicated earlier, <strong>the</strong> Commission’s dutiesinclude <strong>the</strong> management <strong>of</strong> national andprovincial elections, as well as <strong>the</strong> determinationand declaration <strong>of</strong> results. After havingdeclared <strong>the</strong> results, <strong>the</strong> Commissionnominates persons from <strong>of</strong>ficial party lists asmembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant legislature. The<strong>Committee</strong> has noted, however, that innominating <strong>the</strong> new members, <strong>the</strong>Commission strictly follows <strong>the</strong> names <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> candidates in <strong>the</strong> order in which <strong>the</strong>yappear on <strong>the</strong> party lists. No attempt ismade to ascertain whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> candidatesso nominated are eligible at that time fornomination as members in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution. As a result <strong>the</strong>re have been anumber <strong>of</strong> instances where candidates uponnomination were not in fact eligible to be sonominated as <strong>the</strong>y still held o<strong>the</strong>r posts in<strong>the</strong> public domain from which <strong>the</strong>y had notyet resigned. The outcome in such caseswas that <strong>the</strong> nomination was invalid and <strong>the</strong>14 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC),46 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 3seat concerned immediately becamevacant. This inevitably causes embarrassmentin what is a very important publicprocess. The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>Commission should develop a mechanism toensure as far as possible that only thosecandidates are nominated to become members<strong>of</strong> a legislature who are constitutionallyeligible for nomination.3.2. APPOINTMENTSThe Electoral Commission Act, 1996, provides insection 5 that <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission consists<strong>of</strong> five members, one <strong>of</strong> whom must be ajudge, appointed by <strong>the</strong> President on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly bymeans <strong>of</strong> a majority resolution. Commissionersare nominated by a committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, proportionally composed <strong>of</strong> members<strong>of</strong> all parties represented in <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, from a list <strong>of</strong> no fewer than eightrecommended candidates submitted by a highpr<strong>of</strong>ile panel constituted for that purpose. Thepanel is composed as follows: The President <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court, as chairperson; a representativefrom <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission; a representative from <strong>the</strong>Commission on Gender Equality; and <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector. The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that using sucha high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile panel is cumbersome, expensiveand demanding on <strong>the</strong> panelists but that <strong>the</strong>exigencies <strong>of</strong> democracy require continuedsupport for this process.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that three <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fourpanellists are members <strong>of</strong> human rights bodies.This is a unique arrangement that is not followedby any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r institutions underreview but reflects <strong>the</strong> special requirements <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission as far as appointments areconcerned.No provision is currently made in <strong>the</strong> enablinglegislation to stagger <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> commissioners,although this would in <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s view be <strong>of</strong> great benefit to ensure<strong>the</strong> seamless functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionover time.3.3. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The Commission stated that <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> voterparticipation appears to be declining.However, <strong>the</strong> Commission contends that adecline in <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> voters is commonas democracies mature. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong>Commission has commissioned research toidentify potential areas for improvement (forexample, voters in rural areas require targeting).The <strong>Committee</strong> maintains that <strong>the</strong>Commission is not sufficiently innovative inits approach to voter registration and votereducation. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes certainspecific recommendations in this regard.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionkeeps a record <strong>of</strong> formal complaintsreceived. The <strong>Committee</strong> suggests that itwould be useful for <strong>the</strong> number, nature andoutcome <strong>of</strong> complaints to be reflected in <strong>the</strong>annual report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.3.4. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) At present, <strong>the</strong> Commission accounts to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly through its interactionswith <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on HomeAffairs. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that much <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission’s work impinges on <strong>the</strong>work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development. The <strong>Committee</strong>accordingly suggests that, as appropriate, ajoint meeting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>s <strong>of</strong>Home Affairs and Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment be held.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION47


) The Commission has engaged from time totime with <strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on PublicAccounts (SCOPA), <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>on Foreign Affairs and <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Provincial and LocalGovernment on matters relating to <strong>the</strong>irspecific mandates.c) However, as is <strong>the</strong> case with most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions under review, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>finds that <strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong> a multiplicity<strong>of</strong> portfolio committees in conducting oversightcreates an environment in which athorough understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institution is easily lost. The Commissionwas not entirely satisfied that <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong>oversight and accountability is sufficient,and proposed an integrated oversight mechanismin Parliament. The <strong>Committee</strong> makesspecific recommendations in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report in this regard.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> creation in 1998 <strong>of</strong> a voluntary body, <strong>the</strong>Forum <strong>of</strong> Independent Statutory Bodies(FISB), to –i. Liase between <strong>the</strong> various constitutionaland statutory bodies in order to fostercommon policies and practices and promoteco-operation;ii. Share information on developments in<strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> human rights, promote bestpractices, avoid duplications and ‘projecta rational, cost effective human rightsregime in <strong>the</strong> country’ that would benefit<strong>the</strong> populace; andiii. Make common representations to governmenton matters <strong>of</strong> common interest.b) In addition to <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions, <strong>the</strong>Forum included o<strong>the</strong>r statutory bodies, suchas <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission, <strong>the</strong> PanSouth African Language Board and <strong>the</strong>National Youth Commission. The Forum alsocreated a technical committee consisting <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> chief executive <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodies.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that this body isnow defunct. Unfortunately, over timealmost all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r statutory organisationshave withdrawn from <strong>the</strong> Forum, sothat only <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutionsremained. Among <strong>the</strong> reasons advanced for<strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Forum in this regard is <strong>the</strong>disparity <strong>of</strong> available resources (both humanand material) that has prevented some institutionsfrom being able to collaborate. The<strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Forum was a positive development. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes specific recommendationsfor <strong>the</strong> collaboration and co-operation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions under review. In <strong>the</strong> interim,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that this bodyshould be revived.d) It is to <strong>the</strong> credit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission that itworks extensively with various youth organisationsto promote voter registration priorto elections. The <strong>Committee</strong> believes thatsuch activities should not be confined to <strong>the</strong>period preceding an election, but should beplanned and implemented in a sustainedmanner.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEThe Commission works closely with <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Home Affairs, particularlyregarding <strong>the</strong> issuing <strong>of</strong> identification documentsand voter registration. As indicated earlier,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong> Commissioncould be more innovative in terms <strong>of</strong> voter registration.At present, we follow <strong>the</strong> Anglo-48 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 3Saxon or common law system <strong>of</strong> voluntary registration.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that<strong>the</strong>re is nothing to prevent us from exploring<strong>the</strong> civil law system <strong>of</strong> compulsory voter registrationas a means <strong>of</strong> increasing voter registration.In addition, <strong>the</strong> Commission engages continuouslywith <strong>the</strong> Executive on specific matters.For example, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong>Commission engages with <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong>Education on <strong>the</strong> Commission’s Schools Project;<strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Provincial and Local Governmenton establishing electoral units; <strong>the</strong> Ministers <strong>of</strong>Defence and Safety and Security on securityand logistics relating to elections; and <strong>the</strong>Minister <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs on <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong>technical electoral assistance to o<strong>the</strong>r parts <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> African continent and election observationin o<strong>the</strong>r countries.3.7. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The Commissioners are responsible for policy-making,supervision and monitoring,while <strong>the</strong> administration and financial managementare <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ChiefElectoral Officer. In all institutions, <strong>the</strong>re aretensions between policy and operations.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission is currently engaged in <strong>the</strong> task<strong>of</strong> defining <strong>the</strong> respective roles and responsibilities<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> ChiefElectoral Officer.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> commends <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor having developed a code <strong>of</strong> conduct forstaff and Commissioners. The <strong>Committee</strong>however stresses <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> fullcompliance with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> section9(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission Act thatrequires that <strong>the</strong> Commissioners, if appointedin a full-time capacity, serve as such to<strong>the</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r duty or obligationsor <strong>the</strong> holding <strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>fice,unless expressly authorised to do so by <strong>the</strong>President. The <strong>Committee</strong> is not convincedthat <strong>the</strong> Commission has paid sufficientattention to this legal obligation, particularlyas conflicts <strong>of</strong> interest may arise.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> is satisfied that <strong>the</strong>Commission adequately coordinates <strong>the</strong>activities <strong>of</strong> its provincial <strong>of</strong>fices. In thisregard <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that all provincial<strong>of</strong>fices submit monthly reports to HeadOffice, and <strong>the</strong> provincial managers reportdirectly to <strong>the</strong> Chief Electoral Officer. Theprovincial <strong>of</strong>fices also use information technologysystems extensively to communicatewith each o<strong>the</strong>r.3.8. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSThe Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that<strong>the</strong>re is constant interaction between it andNational Treasury regarding its budget. Thebudget allocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is locatedwithin <strong>the</strong> budget vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong>Home Affairs. As discussed elsewhere in thisreport, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> feels that this arrangementimpacts negatively on <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission from <strong>the</strong> Executive.The <strong>Committee</strong> refers to <strong>the</strong> judgement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitutional Court in New National Party vThe Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South Africaon <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions.15The judgement also spelt out <strong>the</strong> role<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive and Parliament in upholdingthat independence, particularly regarding <strong>the</strong>inadequacy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budgetary arrangements.The <strong>Committee</strong> discusses <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> independence,and <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court’s judgementin <strong>the</strong> New National Party case, in greater15 CCT 9/99THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION49


detail in Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong> this report and makesspecific recommendations regarding <strong>the</strong> budgetaryarrangements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions underreview in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that, while <strong>the</strong>Commission is funded mainly by way <strong>of</strong> directtransfer from <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Home Affairs,additional transfers are received from <strong>the</strong>African Renaissance and International Co-operationFund, which is administered by <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, for electionassistance in Africa.The Commission’s budget allocation and spendingfluctuate, but appear to increase substantiallyat <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> a general election. Forexample, in <strong>the</strong> 2005/2006 financial year <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission’s budget increasedsharply to R979 million to fund <strong>the</strong> local governmentelections that took place in March2006.Table 1 gives a financial summary for <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission for <strong>the</strong> perioda) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> currentconstitutional and legal mandate for <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission is suitable for <strong>the</strong>South African environment. However, <strong>the</strong>legal basis for <strong>the</strong> Commission’s increasinginternational role, particular in <strong>the</strong> restAfrica, should be established.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> consumption<strong>of</strong> resources by <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission iscommensurate with its roles and functions.c) At first sight it may appear inappropriate tohave special arrangements for <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> Commissioners, but after due consideration<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes it properto maintain <strong>the</strong> present arrangements. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendations toenhance consistency, coherence andaccountability in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Report</strong>.d) The institutional governance arrangements<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission require refinement,particularly regarding <strong>the</strong> delineation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> powers, roles and functions between<strong>the</strong> Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> Chief ElectoralOfficer and compliance <strong>of</strong> full-time2003/04 to 2009/10. 16 4. General ConclusionsR’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10TotalRevenue* 660 062 538 126 979 457 512 340 485 755 894 363 813 020TotalExpenses 612 914 593 876 925 626 536 443Surplus/(Deficit) 47 148 (55 750) 53 831 (24 103)* This includes <strong>the</strong> baseline parliamentary allocation, as well as o<strong>the</strong>rincome in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> interest received and sponsorship income.16 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>) Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>50 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 3Commissioners with section 9(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission Act which requiresthat Commissioners seek permission from<strong>the</strong> President to undertake outside work orto hold any o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>fice.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> highlights <strong>the</strong> need toreconstitute <strong>the</strong> Forum <strong>of</strong> IndependentStatutory Bodies to improve coordinationbetween Chapter 9 and associated institutions.f) The Electoral Commission should also developmore innovative ways to increase voterregistration and enhance voter education.g) The parliamentary mechanisms for oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission andengagement with <strong>the</strong> reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission are inadequate. Specific recommendationsfor improvement are madein this <strong>chapter</strong>. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>makes general recommendations for <strong>the</strong>improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oversight and accountabilitymechanisms that would apply to all<strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutionsunder review in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.h) Although <strong>the</strong> Commission is satisfied with<strong>the</strong> present budgetary arrangements, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> believes it necessary that <strong>the</strong>process for <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> its budgetshould follow <strong>the</strong> process identified inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.i) The discrepancy between <strong>the</strong> Commission’spreferred name <strong>of</strong> “Independent” ElectoralCommission and its actual name in law,namely <strong>the</strong> “Electoral Commission” shouldbe regularised at an appropriate time.5. RecommendationsThe <strong>Committee</strong> makes <strong>the</strong> following recommendationsto improve <strong>the</strong> effectiveness andefficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission:a) The legal mandate for <strong>the</strong> ElectoralCommission to conduct international workmust be clearly established. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, interms <strong>of</strong> its international work, <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs should givetimely notice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intended participation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission in foreign electionprocesses in order to provide <strong>the</strong>Commission with adequate time to plan forits involvement. It appears that <strong>the</strong>Commission feels compelled to accept <strong>the</strong>seinvitations. The Commission should alsohave and exercise <strong>the</strong> right to choose whichinvitations it would accept.b) The Commission should develop a mechanismto ensure as far as possible that, afterhaving declared <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> an election,<strong>the</strong> candidates it nominates from party listsfor appointment to <strong>the</strong> relevant legislatureare indeed eligible at that time to becomemembers <strong>of</strong> that legislature in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution.c) In <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> improving co-ordinationbetween Chapter 9 and associated institutions,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that, asan interim measure, <strong>the</strong> reconstitution andrevitalisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Forum <strong>of</strong> IndependentStatutory Bodies, a voluntary organization,and full participation in <strong>the</strong> forum by allChapter 9 and associated institutions shouldbe actively encouraged.d) The Electoral Commission should also developmore innovative ways to increase voterregistration and enhance voter education.THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION51


This should include consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>application <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “continental” approach tovoter registration whereby automatic registrationis integrated with registration foro<strong>the</strong>r government services such as pensions,housing, tertiary education and revenuecollection. Collaboration with <strong>the</strong> privatesector including amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, bankinginstitutions and real estate agenciesshould also be explored for this purpose.e) Mechanisms to improve <strong>the</strong> relationship andinteraction between Parliament and <strong>the</strong>Commission should be clearly established.The oversight and accountability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Electoral Commission should be conductedby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly through <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Home Affairs, as is<strong>the</strong> current situation. The role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposedUnit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speaker <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly discussed in Chapter2 <strong>of</strong> this report should also be considered inthis regard.f) The budget process and location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget allocation should berevised in accordance with <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report.g) The Commission should publish <strong>the</strong> number,nature and outcomes <strong>of</strong> complaintsreceived, as well as any recommendationsmade to Parliament and <strong>the</strong>ir outcomes aspart <strong>of</strong> its annual report.h) The Commission should speed up <strong>the</strong>process <strong>of</strong> defining <strong>the</strong> roles, powers andfunctions <strong>of</strong> Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> ChiefElectoral Officer.i) The Commission should ensure stringentcompliance with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> section9(1)(b) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission Act 51<strong>of</strong> 1996 requiring that Commissioners seekpermission from <strong>the</strong> President to hold anoutside <strong>of</strong>fice or perform any o<strong>the</strong>r extraneousobligation or duty. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>directorships, partnerships and consultancies<strong>of</strong> Commissioners and senior <strong>of</strong>ficials mustbe disclosed in a special annual publication.In addition, <strong>the</strong> disclosures <strong>of</strong> pecuniary ando<strong>the</strong>r interests <strong>of</strong> Commissioners and staffmembers must be kept available in a registerand an indication must be made in <strong>the</strong>annual report <strong>of</strong> where such information isavailable. General recommendations aremade in this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.j) In common with all <strong>the</strong> proposals, <strong>the</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> Commissioners should be staggered.This is also a very small Commission.As a result, it may be necessary to increase<strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.k) The discrepancy between <strong>the</strong> name <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission preferred by <strong>the</strong> Commissionitself and its actual name in law should beregularised in subsequent legislation.52 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 3THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION53


CHAPTER 4


CHAPTER 4CHAPTER 4THE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION1. BackgroundThe Financial and Fiscal Commission is auniquely South African contribution to governance.South Africa is a unitary state with threespheres <strong>of</strong> government: local, provincial andnational. These three spheres must operatewithin an existing tax (and public expenditure)regime that has been designed so that <strong>the</strong> bulk<strong>of</strong> revenue collection occurs at <strong>the</strong> nationallevel. The Constitution requires that a systembe put in place to ensure an equitable andtransparent division <strong>of</strong> revenue between differentspheres <strong>of</strong> government.Certain revenues may be generated at <strong>the</strong>provincial and local levels. While <strong>the</strong> nationalsphere <strong>of</strong> government raises <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> revenues,its expenditure responsibilities are lowerthan those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincial and local spheres<strong>of</strong> government, located closer to <strong>the</strong> recipients<strong>of</strong> services. This mismatch between revenueraised and expenditure responsibilities isknown as vertical fiscal imbalance.Financial imbalances exist between <strong>the</strong>provinces, and also between localities withinprovinces. Such differences in expenditureresponsibilities and existing (and potential) revenuesources among <strong>the</strong> different provinces arecommonly referred to as horizontal fiscal imbalance.A system <strong>of</strong> intergovernmental fiscal relationshas <strong>the</strong> potential for political manipulation,unless it is based on equity, which in turn isinformed by sensible, reasonable, objective andquantifiable criteria. In addition, it is highlydesirable to have an impartial and independentinstitution to ensure that <strong>the</strong> system that isdeveloped and implemented contains <strong>the</strong>secharacteristics.There was agreement among <strong>the</strong> constitutionalnegotiators to create a Financial and FiscalCommission to assist with <strong>the</strong> revenue-sharingprocess between <strong>the</strong> different spheres <strong>of</strong> government.The Financial and Fiscal Commissionwas, <strong>the</strong>refore, created to make recommendationsto all legislative authorities and o<strong>the</strong>rentities regarding <strong>the</strong> financial and fiscalrequirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> three spheres <strong>of</strong> governmentconcerning matters such as revenue sharing,financial allocations, taxation, borrowingand criteria to be considered in determining fiscalallocations.The <strong>Committee</strong> accepts that <strong>the</strong> Commission isan important advisory body that streng<strong>the</strong>ns<strong>the</strong> fabric <strong>of</strong> our constitutional arrangements.Although <strong>the</strong> Commission is not a Chapter 9institution, it is entrenched in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution and, <strong>the</strong>refore, enjoys status andprotection under <strong>the</strong> Constitution.The Commission plays an important part in <strong>the</strong>strategic evolution <strong>of</strong> intergovernmental fiscalrelations, as well as in assisting in maintaining<strong>the</strong> balance between fiscal decentralisation and<strong>the</strong> unitary state. The Commission sees itself asnot only having a role in influencing <strong>the</strong> fiscalsystem, but also in facilitating its long-termsustainability.2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe 1993 Constitution established a Financialand Fiscal Commission, and provided that <strong>the</strong>first appointment <strong>of</strong> members to <strong>the</strong>Commission had to be effected within 120 days<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> passing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Accordingly,on 25 August 1994, <strong>the</strong> President announced<strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first such Commission.The Commission’s objectives and functions asTHE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION55


contained in <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution were toapprise itself <strong>of</strong> all financial and fiscal informationrelevant to national, provincial and localgovernment, administration and developmentand, on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> such information, to renderadvice and make recommendations to <strong>the</strong> relevantlegislative authorities regarding <strong>the</strong>financial and fiscal requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> threespheres <strong>of</strong> government, including -a) Financial and fiscal policies,b) Equitable financial and fiscal allocations to<strong>the</strong> national, provincial and local governmentsfrom revenue collected at <strong>the</strong> nationallevel,c) Taxes, levies, imposts and surcharges that aprovincial government intends to levy,d) The raising <strong>of</strong> loans by a provincial or localgovernment and <strong>the</strong> financial norms applicable,ande) Criteria for <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> financial and fiscalresources.The 1993 Constitution did not describe <strong>the</strong>Commission as independent in quite <strong>the</strong> samemanner as is found in <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution.Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution requiredthat Commissioners performed <strong>the</strong>ir duties fairly,impartially and independently, and it was an<strong>of</strong>fence to influence a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission to act o<strong>the</strong>rwise. Commissionerswere also protected from removal from <strong>of</strong>ficeon arbitrary grounds. Only <strong>the</strong> President waspermitted to remove commissioners, and onlyon <strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong> misconduct, incapacity orincompetence.Sections 220, 221 and 222 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution confirm <strong>the</strong> Commission’s continuedexistence as an independent and impartialbody subject only to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong>law. Unlike <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution, <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution does not set out detailed provisionsrelating to <strong>the</strong> Commission’s objectivesand functions, instead providing for <strong>the</strong> promulgation<strong>of</strong> national legislation to deal with suchmatters.The Financial and Fiscal Commission Act 99 <strong>of</strong>1997, which brought <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation inline with <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution, providesamong o<strong>the</strong>r matters for <strong>the</strong> Commission’s status,powers and functions, its composition andits operating procedures. In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislation,<strong>the</strong> Commission is empowered to act asa consultative body for, and make recommendationsand give advice to, organs <strong>of</strong> state in<strong>the</strong> national, provincial and local spheres <strong>of</strong>government on financial and fiscal matters. Theenabling legislation empowers <strong>the</strong> Commissionto perform its functions ei<strong>the</strong>r on its own initiativeor on <strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> an organ <strong>of</strong> state.The legislation also restates <strong>the</strong> constitutionalprovisions relating to <strong>the</strong> Commission’s independentstatus. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> enabling legislationprovides that <strong>the</strong> Commission is independentand subject only to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong>law, and must be impartial; no person or organ<strong>of</strong> state may interfere with its functioning; andorgans <strong>of</strong> state are required to assist <strong>the</strong>Commission in performing its functions effectively.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> met with <strong>the</strong> Commission on 2February <strong>2007</strong>. The discussions were informedby <strong>the</strong> Commission’s written response to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s questionnaire. The Commissionsupplemented its response to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire56 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 4with additional information as requested by <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>. From <strong>the</strong>se discussions, as well as<strong>the</strong> submissions received, <strong>the</strong> followingemerged:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISSection 220(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution guaranteesthat <strong>the</strong> Commission is independent and is subjectonly to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law andrequires it to act in an impartial manner. TheConstitution also requires that <strong>the</strong> Commissionreport regularly to Parliament and to <strong>the</strong>provincial legislatures. These provisions arerepeated in <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation. Therefore,while <strong>the</strong> Commission is not a Chapter 9 institution,its constitutional and legal position issimilar to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 bodies.3.2. UNDERSTANDING ANDINTERPRETATION OF MANDATEa) The Commission’s understanding <strong>of</strong> its mandateis that, in essence, it exists to makerecommendations concerning intergovernmentalfiscal relations, both in South Africaand elsewhere on <strong>the</strong> African continent.The Commission stated that a proper interpretation<strong>of</strong> its mandate requires that itfocus on -i. <strong>Ad</strong>opting an independent research agenda,with a strong emphasis on proactiveresearch,ii. Streng<strong>the</strong>ning its focus on <strong>the</strong> financialimpact <strong>of</strong> meeting presidential targets at<strong>the</strong> present service delivery rates,iii. Conducting institutional analysesbetween <strong>the</strong> spheres <strong>of</strong> government,especially where <strong>the</strong>re may be a lack <strong>of</strong>organisational or institutional capacity,iv. Developing funding formulas for highereducation, andv. Offering advisory services on a costrecovery basis.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes, however, that <strong>the</strong>re isno explicit legal authority that permits <strong>the</strong>Commission to perform a role in shapingintergovernmental relations outside SouthAfrica. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes fur<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>demand for <strong>the</strong> Commission’s expertiseelsewhere on <strong>the</strong> African continent appearsto be increasing. The <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong>re would be no problem with<strong>the</strong> Commission performing such a role on<strong>the</strong> African continent, provided that it doesnot detract from its primary responsibilitiesnationally. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat <strong>the</strong> legal mandate to performsuch activities be clarified by legislation.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> is not satisfied that <strong>the</strong>Commission’s mandate permits it to provideadvisory services on a cost recovery basis.Again, while <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> understands<strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> such a revenue streamfor <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> legal mandate forsuch work must be clarified by legislation.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> Commission’s manyinvaluable contributions to <strong>the</strong> shaping <strong>of</strong>financial and fiscal relations in South Africa.For example, <strong>the</strong> Commission originally proposeda framework for intergovernmental fiscalrelations. The Commission also recommendedthat social security grants be anational responsibility, administered through<strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national social securityagency to improve efficiency in <strong>the</strong> registration<strong>of</strong> beneficiaries and <strong>the</strong> administration<strong>of</strong> grants. A fur<strong>the</strong>r example is that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>THE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION57


costed norms approach to <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong>provincial equitable shares based on <strong>the</strong> costing<strong>of</strong> services that provinces are obliged todeliver in terms <strong>of</strong> national policy, legislationand <strong>the</strong> Constitution as an alternative to <strong>the</strong>present transfer system that does not takeinto account all relevant factors in determiningnormative expenditure. While <strong>the</strong> proposalwas not accepted, it led to widespreaddebate.e) The enabling legislation is very clear as to<strong>the</strong> Commission’s advisory role. Section 3(1)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Financial and Fiscal Commission Actrefers to <strong>the</strong> Commission as a consultativebody. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Executive is not boundto accept its recommendations.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission’srecommendations enjoy a high degree <strong>of</strong>acceptance. The <strong>Committee</strong> has beeninformed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s recommendations and notesthat, according to <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong>National Treasury accepts approximately 70%<strong>of</strong> its recommendations. While <strong>the</strong> Executiveis not bound to accept <strong>the</strong> Commission’sadvice or recommendations, unlike <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rinstitutions under review, <strong>the</strong>re is a specialprovision that requires that <strong>the</strong> Executive,through <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Finance, must respondto <strong>the</strong> Commission’s annual submission <strong>of</strong> recommendationson <strong>the</strong> division <strong>of</strong> revenue ando<strong>the</strong>r intergovernmental fiscal matters andprovide reasons for deviations or non-acceptance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s recommendations.3.3. APPOINTMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re have beena number <strong>of</strong> constitutional and legislativeamendments to <strong>the</strong> composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission and <strong>the</strong> appointments processfor its Commissioners:b) Section 200(1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution providedfor a Commission composed <strong>of</strong> achairperson and a deputy chairperson, aperson designated by each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincialexecutive councils, as well as sevenCommissioners appointed by <strong>the</strong> Presidenton <strong>the</strong> advice <strong>of</strong> Cabinet.c) Initially, section 221 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitutionmade provision for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> 22Commissioners by <strong>the</strong> President. As <strong>the</strong> size<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission was cumbersome, in2001 a constitutional amendment reduced<strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> Commissioners from 22 to <strong>9.</strong>The President appoints all Commissioners.d) The Commission is now composed <strong>of</strong> achairperson and deputy chairperson, threepersons selected after consultation with <strong>the</strong>Premiers, two persons selected after consultingwith organised local government andtwo o<strong>the</strong>r persons.e) The procedures to select and appoint commissionersto <strong>the</strong> Commission provide yetano<strong>the</strong>r instance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enormous variationthat <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> encountered regardingappointments. At present, Parliament playsno role in <strong>the</strong> selection and appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners to <strong>the</strong> Commission.f) While <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> acknowledges that <strong>the</strong>specificities <strong>of</strong> different institutions mayrequire different appointment procedures,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> considers that <strong>the</strong>re is meritin applying a similar approach to <strong>the</strong>appointments <strong>of</strong> commissioners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions, particularlysince <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appointmentsprocedures relate directly to <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.58 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 4g) Regarding <strong>the</strong> appointment procedures pertainingto <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>finds <strong>the</strong> selection and appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners solely by <strong>the</strong> Executive, aswell as a total lack <strong>of</strong> parliamentary involvement,inconsistent with <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong>independence.h) In this regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes andaccepts <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission that<strong>the</strong> appointment process should be similarto that for Chapter 9 institutions, in terms <strong>of</strong>which <strong>the</strong> President appoints commissioners,and does so on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly.i) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Chairpersonand Deputy Chairperson are appointed asfull-time Commissioners, while <strong>the</strong> remainingCommissioners are appointed on a parttimebasis. The legislation is silent as towhe<strong>the</strong>r Commissioners are appointed aspart-time or full-time Commissioners. Itseems to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re shouldbe clarity on this point.j) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that, given <strong>the</strong> largelyadvisory nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s work,its present composition is too large. In thisregard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> three to five full-timeCommissioners would create a less cumbersomestructure, and would considerablyease decision-making and, <strong>the</strong>refore,increase efficiency.k) On <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> provincial representation,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> Commissioncan take <strong>the</strong> voice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provinces intoaccount more systematically by going toeach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provinces and presenting itsreports. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, dedicated commissionerscan be allocated <strong>the</strong> task <strong>of</strong> facilitatingrelations with <strong>the</strong> provinces and withlocal government.l) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that such a change to<strong>the</strong> appointment and composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission will require constitutionalamendment.3.4. PUBLIC AWARENESSDuring its interaction with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that itwas still debating on how to engage meaningfullywith <strong>the</strong> public, as it did not want to beperceived as being a campaigning organisation.This lack <strong>of</strong> an external communications strategyis regrettable. The <strong>Committee</strong> considers itimportant that <strong>the</strong> Commission establish mechanismsfor public engagement and input into itsrecommendations. This would facilitate <strong>the</strong>inclusion <strong>of</strong> civil society perspectives in developingrecommendations for <strong>the</strong> expenditurepriorities and would enhance <strong>the</strong> Commission’scredibility and legitimacy. A visible public presencemay also lend additional weight in <strong>the</strong>eyes <strong>of</strong> policymakers to <strong>the</strong> Commission’s recommendations.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that, as is <strong>the</strong> casewith some o<strong>the</strong>r constitutional bodies, <strong>the</strong>Commission is not specifically required toaccount to Parliament, but has a constitutionaland statutory obligation to report regularlyto both Houses <strong>of</strong> Parliament and to<strong>the</strong> provincial legislatures.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission established an <strong>of</strong>fice in CapeTown to facilitate its relationship withParliament. Since 2003 <strong>the</strong> DeputyChairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission regularlyTHE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION59


attends relevant parliamentary committeemeetings.c) However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes thatParliament’s engagement with <strong>the</strong> Commissionis still inadequate. In order to facilitateits relationship with Parliament, <strong>the</strong> Commissionsuggested <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> aspecial not parliamentary oversight mechanism.The absence <strong>of</strong> formal protocols alsomakes <strong>the</strong> relationship with Parliament difficult.The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong>Commission has prepared such protocols buthas not identified someone in Parliament tochampion this initiative on its behalf.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> accepts that <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong>a parliamentary mechanism able to facilitateand co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> Commission’s interactionswith Parliament creates difficulties.e) The Commission’s reports on <strong>the</strong> Division <strong>of</strong>Revenue Bill are referred to both Houses <strong>of</strong>Parliament and <strong>the</strong>n to <strong>the</strong> Select andPortfolio <strong>Committee</strong>s on Finance, as well asto <strong>the</strong> Joint Budget <strong>Committee</strong>. However, itsrecommendations are potentially <strong>of</strong> relevanceto a multiplicity <strong>of</strong> parliamentarycommittees from both Houses <strong>of</strong> Parliament,depending on <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations.The Commission is called tobrief <strong>the</strong> specified <strong>Committee</strong>s individuallyon its recommendations, which is enormouslytime consuming.f) In this regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> viewthat <strong>the</strong> proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Speaker could greatly assist with co-ordinating<strong>the</strong> interactions between <strong>the</strong> Commissionand parliamentary committees. Thisproposal is discussed more fully and recommendationsare made in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEThe <strong>Committee</strong> has learnt that <strong>the</strong> Executiveaccepts a high proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’srecommendations, which is indicative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>existence <strong>of</strong> an effective and co-operative relationship.The effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’swork has been explored more fully earlier inthis <strong>chapter</strong>.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROVINCESa) The <strong>Committee</strong> has been informed that <strong>the</strong>Commission has a close working relationshipwith <strong>the</strong> provinces. The Commission hasobserver status at <strong>the</strong> Budget Council, inwhich it becomes aware <strong>of</strong> issues emanatingfrom <strong>the</strong> provinces. The provinces alsoconsult with <strong>the</strong> Commission on specificmatters. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Commission visitsall <strong>the</strong> provinces to inform <strong>the</strong>m <strong>of</strong> its annualrecommendations, and some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> workthat it undertakes emanates from <strong>the</strong> questionsraised by provinces.b) It has been said that <strong>the</strong>re may be somepotential for tension as <strong>the</strong> Commission istasked with making recommendations onpolicy but is not responsible for <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> its recommendations. Thepotential for tension arises when provincesconsider that <strong>the</strong> recommendations shouldhave a higher status. In this regard, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> believes that it is for <strong>the</strong>Commission to make it quite clear that it isan advisory body.60 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 43.8. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> anyformal relationships between <strong>the</strong> Commissionand any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions,although <strong>the</strong> Commission has established aninformal relationship with <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission.b) The Commission expressed <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong>re is no overlap between it and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rconstitutional institutions being reviewed, asit is <strong>the</strong> sole institution that advises on intergovernmentalfiscal relations in South Africa.However, as <strong>the</strong> Commission is increasinglyinvolved in service delivery issues as <strong>the</strong>serelate to <strong>the</strong> expenditure responsibilities andbudget requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various spheres<strong>of</strong> government, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>view that <strong>the</strong>re is potential for increased cooperationand collaboration between it and<strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and related constitutionalinstitutions, particularly <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission. General recommendations toimprove collaboration and co-ordination <strong>of</strong>activities between <strong>the</strong> various Chapter 9 andassociated institutions are made in Chapter2 <strong>of</strong> this report.3.<strong>9.</strong> INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> current systemwhereby <strong>the</strong> President determines <strong>the</strong>remuneration, conditions <strong>of</strong> employmentand o<strong>the</strong>r benefits <strong>of</strong> Commissioners takinginto account, among o<strong>the</strong>r factors, <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Finance,requires revision.b) At present, <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> salaries is alengthy process and is <strong>the</strong> cause <strong>of</strong> somedissatisfaction among <strong>the</strong> Commissioners.In this regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> directs attentionto section 219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionthat requires <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> framework legislationto determine <strong>the</strong> salaries,allowances, and benefits <strong>of</strong> judges, <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, andmembers <strong>of</strong> any commission provided for in<strong>the</strong> Constitution. This legislative frameworkhas not yet been enacted. The recommendations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in this regard arecontained in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Chairperson<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is also its Chief ExecutiveOfficer. While <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission considersthis satisfactory, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>believes that this creates significant challengesfor sound institutional governance,since <strong>the</strong> directing authority and <strong>the</strong> implementingauthority are vested in <strong>the</strong> sameperson.d) The Commission has a high staff turnover.The <strong>Committee</strong> understands that this is aconsequence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> specialist nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s work, which makes <strong>the</strong>Commission’s staff members highly desirableto o<strong>the</strong>r government departments.Low salary levels for specialist staff also contributeto staff turnover. Although <strong>the</strong>Commission is aware <strong>of</strong> this problem, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> notes that it does not have astaff retention policy and strategy in place tostem <strong>the</strong> losses.e) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that <strong>the</strong>re have been few significant internalconflicts. Although <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> learntthat <strong>the</strong> powers, roles and responsibilities <strong>of</strong>full-time and part-time Commissioners haveTHE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION61


een determined, <strong>the</strong>se are recorded in <strong>the</strong>minutes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inaugural meeting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s steering committee in July1996.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that a more formaldelineation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> powers, roles and responsibilities<strong>of</strong> Commissioners is required.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong>re is no code<strong>of</strong> conduct for Commissioners and staff.However, <strong>the</strong> Commission has mechanismsin place to govern <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> disclosure<strong>of</strong> financial and o<strong>the</strong>r interests,including <strong>the</strong> disclosure on an annual basis(or whenever circumstances may change)by Commissioners <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir business interestswith <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.Such business interests include membership<strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r commissions or boards, any businessactivities or involvements, as well asinvolvements with any trusts or any o<strong>the</strong>rorganisation. The disclosure extends to o<strong>the</strong>rmembers <strong>of</strong> a Commissioner’s family.However, <strong>the</strong>se disclosures are not readilyaccessible. General recommendations aremade in this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.h) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that Commissionersare not permitted to take part in particularactivities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission if <strong>the</strong>y, <strong>the</strong>irfamilies, life partners or business associateshave a financial interest in those activities.3.10. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> understands that, although<strong>the</strong> Commission does not have a separatebudget vote (its budget falls under <strong>the</strong> votefor National Treasury), <strong>the</strong> Commission hasalways obtained <strong>the</strong> funds it has requested.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is, however, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s budgetallocation within <strong>the</strong> budget allocation for<strong>the</strong> National Treasury could impact negativelyon <strong>the</strong> perceived independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. It would be important toensure a budget process that enhances <strong>the</strong>independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. The<strong>Committee</strong>’s recommendations, detailedearlier in this report, regarding <strong>the</strong> financialarrangements for all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions under review should beconsidered in this regard.c) The Commission’s budget allocation for <strong>the</strong>period 2003/04 to 2009/2010 is summarisedin <strong>the</strong> table below, as well as itsexpenditure from 2003/04 to 2005/06. TheCommission exceeded its budget allocationin 2003/04, but underspent in 2004/05 and2005/06.Table1 : Summary <strong>of</strong> allocations and operatingexpenses, as well as <strong>the</strong> allocationsunder <strong>the</strong> Medium Term ExpenditureFramework 17R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Allocationsfrom NationalTreasury 12 679 17 869 19 660 21 705 20 178 21 125 22 156Totaloperatingexpenses 14 955 16 716 19 019Surplus/(Deficit) (2 485) 1 552 1 06017 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>) Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>62 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 44. General conclusionsa) The <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> thisCommission to be very valuable for transparentfinancial relations between centralgovernment, <strong>the</strong> provinces and local government.Its relevance may also increase infuture.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocedures for Commissioners to be inappropriate.General recommendations aremade to enhance consistency, coherenceand accountability in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport. In addition, specific recommendationsrelating to <strong>the</strong> Commission are madebelow.c) The efficiency and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutioncould be enhanced if certain institutionalarrangements are addressed. Theseare elaborated in <strong>the</strong> recommendations.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that public awareness<strong>of</strong>, and engagement with, <strong>the</strong> Commission’swork is inadequate and makes recommendationsin this regard.e) The parliamentary mechanisms for oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and engagementwith <strong>the</strong> reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionare inadequate. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes generalrecommendations for <strong>the</strong> improvement<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oversight and accountability mechanismsthat would apply to all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9and associated institutions under review inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.f) The budget process and funding model <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission adversely affects itsaccountability and independence. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report for <strong>the</strong>improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget process thatwould apply to all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions under review.5. Recommendationsa) There is a strong argument for <strong>the</strong>Commission’s continued existence. TheCommission performs an important functionin influencing <strong>the</strong> fair and equitable verticaland horizontal distribution <strong>of</strong> resourcesamong <strong>the</strong> spheres <strong>of</strong> government. This isan invaluable service, which <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas performed commendably, particularly in<strong>the</strong> early years <strong>of</strong> our democracy.b) While, at present, intergovernmental relationsin South Africa are stable, in a differentpolitical environment tension between <strong>the</strong>different spheres <strong>of</strong> government about <strong>the</strong>equitable distribution <strong>of</strong> funds may wellemerge. As such, <strong>the</strong> Commission may berequired to perform a stabilising role, which itis uniquely positioned to do, as <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission’s recommendations musttake into account <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> all spheres<strong>of</strong> government. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> viewthat <strong>the</strong> Commission should be retained t<strong>of</strong>ulfil its current role, with <strong>the</strong> institutionalimprovements recommended below.c) The efficiency and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission could be fur<strong>the</strong>r improved byimplementing <strong>the</strong> following recommendations:d) The appointments procedure and budgetarrangements should be reviewed to supportfur<strong>the</strong>r and assert <strong>the</strong> Commission’sindependence. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes specificproposals in this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report.THE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION63


e) More specifically, regarding appointments <strong>of</strong>Commissioners:i. Commissioners should be appointed by<strong>the</strong> President on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong>Parliament.ii. The present number <strong>of</strong> nineCommissioners should be reduced tothree to five full-time Commissioners.iii. In <strong>the</strong> meanwhile, <strong>the</strong>re should be clarityconcerning whe<strong>the</strong>r Commissioners areappointed on a part-time or full-timebasis.f) The legislative framework envisaged in section219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution to determine<strong>the</strong> salaries, allowances, and benefits <strong>of</strong>judges, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, and members <strong>of</strong> any commissionprovided for in <strong>the</strong> Constitution must beenacted. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes proposalsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.g) Certain institutional governance matters,such as a conflict resolution policy andmechanisms, a staff retention policy andstrategy and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s governancemodel should be addressed to improve itsefficiency and effectiveness.h) Details <strong>of</strong> directorships, partnerships andconsultancies must be disclosed in <strong>the</strong>Commission’s annual reports. The pecuniaryand o<strong>the</strong>r interests <strong>of</strong> Commissioners andsenior <strong>of</strong>ficials should be disclosed in a register,and mention should be made in <strong>the</strong>annual report <strong>of</strong> where such information isavailable.i) The legal mandate for <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission in shaping intergovernmentalrelations in <strong>the</strong> rest <strong>of</strong> Africa, as well as <strong>the</strong>initiation <strong>of</strong> cost recovery advisory services,should be clarified.j) There is room for increased collaborativeand co-operative relations with relevantChapter 9 and related constitutional bodies.In <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a formalised mechanismto facilitate such relations, and as an interimmeasure, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that<strong>the</strong> reconstitution and revitalisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Forum <strong>of</strong> Independent Statutory Bodies (avoluntary forum which <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>understands to be at present defunct)should be encouraged.k) Mechanisms for meaningful public involvementand for promoting public awareness <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission’s work should be established.The Commission should develop anexternal communications policy and strategyto guide <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> such mechanisms.l) Mechanisms to improve <strong>the</strong> relationship andinteraction between Parliament and <strong>the</strong>Commission should be developed. The role<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly discussedin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report should be consideredin this regard.m)The budget process and location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget allocation should berevised in accordance with <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report.64 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 4THE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION65


CHAPTER 5


CHAPTER 5CHAPTER 5THE AUDITOR-GENERAL1. BackgroundThe remit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is extremelywide. In South Africa, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalaudits <strong>the</strong> accounts <strong>of</strong> every public authorityand any o<strong>the</strong>r body that <strong>the</strong> law prescribes. Theindependent government audit is an importantpart <strong>of</strong> a democratic system <strong>of</strong> transparent andaccountable governance. In general terms <strong>the</strong>audit is intended to reveal deviations fromaccepted standards and violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principles<strong>of</strong> legality, efficiency, effectiveness andeconomy <strong>of</strong> financial management earlyenough to allow for corrective action, to makethose accountable accept responsibility, and totake steps to prevent such breaches or at leastmake <strong>the</strong>m more difficult. 18In short, ‘withoutaudit, no accountability; without accountability,no control; and if <strong>the</strong>re is no control, where is<strong>the</strong> seat <strong>of</strong> power?’ 19Therefore, <strong>the</strong> justification for an independentpublic auditor lies in <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> publicaccountability. Accounting <strong>of</strong>ficers must annuallysubmit an account to Parliament or <strong>the</strong> relevantlegislative authority on what has happenedin <strong>the</strong>ir departments, or institutions, in<strong>the</strong> preceding financial year. Typically thisinvolves some form <strong>of</strong> audit. The task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General in this process is to provide anindependent investigation and evaluation <strong>of</strong>, aswell as public reporting on, <strong>the</strong> financial administration<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> executive authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicsector. It is this information that will assistParliament or any o<strong>the</strong>r legislative body inexercising its oversight function.Both here and internationally it is acceptedpractice that Auditors-General can only accomplish<strong>the</strong>ir task effectively and objectively if<strong>the</strong>y are independent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> body <strong>the</strong>y aretasked with auditing, and are protected againstoutside influence. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General must not only be independent butmust be seen to be independent. Such independenceis necessary given that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is tasked primarily with auditing <strong>the</strong>executive branch <strong>of</strong> government, and must befree to report objectively on any shortcomingsin <strong>the</strong> financial administration <strong>of</strong> any executiveauthority. Given <strong>the</strong> power that is concentratedwithin <strong>the</strong> Executive, <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong> accompanyingthreat that this power will be used to interferewith or o<strong>the</strong>rwise adversely influence <strong>the</strong>activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General.Never<strong>the</strong>less, despite <strong>the</strong> inherent tension that<strong>the</strong> struggle for independence from Executiveinfluence presents, a degree <strong>of</strong> co-operation isboth normal and in <strong>the</strong> best interests <strong>of</strong> making<strong>the</strong> most efficient use <strong>of</strong> public funds. Thepractical implementation <strong>of</strong> any recommendationsemanating from an audit is best achievedwith <strong>the</strong> active participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive.The relationship between national audit institutionsand Parliament is generally co-operativeand complementary, as both ultimately pursue<strong>the</strong> same goal. Typically, Parliament has <strong>the</strong>power to appropriate budgets but does nothave <strong>the</strong> necessary resources actively to monitorand assess budget implementation.National audit institutions provide independentreports on government’s use <strong>of</strong> public funds,<strong>the</strong>reby enhancing parliamentary oversight <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Executive.The Auditor-General as a national audit institutionhas a long history. It was only in 1989,however, that legislation made separate provisionfor <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and his or her staff.The great defect <strong>of</strong> this legislation was that <strong>the</strong>Executive retained <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> veto on certainadministrative matters relating to <strong>the</strong> audit<strong>of</strong>fice, a situation that was contrary to <strong>the</strong> internationallyaccepted principle <strong>of</strong> an independent18 De Loor, J. The Role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. In J. Gildenhuys (ed) Ethics and <strong>the</strong> Public Sector. Speeches and Papers presented at <strong>the</strong> SecondWinelands Conference held at <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> Stellenbosch, 198<strong>9.</strong>19 De Loor, J. 1989, p 80THE AUDITOR-GENERAL67


audit institution being required for properaccountability. This placed <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalin <strong>the</strong> unenviable position <strong>of</strong> having to reporton <strong>the</strong> financial affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> executive authoritywithout fear or favour, while being dependenton <strong>the</strong> goodwill and co-operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> latterfor <strong>the</strong> procurement <strong>of</strong> essential resourcesfor carrying out it’s <strong>the</strong> assigned task.Therefore, concerning <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, its independencewas not recognised, nor was its jurisdictioncomprehensive.With <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a democracy imminent,<strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id regime passed <strong>the</strong> AuditArrangements Act 122 <strong>of</strong> 1992 establishing an<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> Auditor-General outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicservice and creating for it its own revenue fund.This Act also provided for <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> overallsupervision to an oversight body known as <strong>the</strong>Audit Commission, which was composed mainly<strong>of</strong> Members <strong>of</strong> Parliament.The Auditor-General Act 12 <strong>of</strong> 1995 brought <strong>the</strong>legislation in line with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1993 Constitution. The Public Audit Act 25 <strong>of</strong>2004 has now replaced both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se Acts,ensuring alignment with <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitutionand enhancing <strong>the</strong> financial and administrativearrangements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, includingthose concerning accountability to Parliament.2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe 1996 Constitution and <strong>the</strong> Public Audit Act25 <strong>of</strong> 2004 provide <strong>the</strong> applicable legal frameworkfor <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. Section 181 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution affirms <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’sconstitutional status, locating <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice among<strong>the</strong> State Institutions Streng<strong>the</strong>ningConstitutional Democracy found in Chapter <strong>9.</strong>The Public Audit Act came into operation in2004, repealing <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General Act <strong>of</strong>1995 in its entirety. The Public Audit Act, 2004,provides that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is <strong>the</strong>supreme audit institution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic, andrestates <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> section 181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, confirming that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is independent and subject only to <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law, must be impartial andact without fear, favour or prejudice and isaccountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.Section 188 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides that<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General must audit and report on<strong>the</strong> accounts, financial statements and financialmanagement <strong>of</strong> all national and provincialstate departments and administrations, allmunicipalities, and any o<strong>the</strong>r institution oraccounting entity that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General isrequired to audit in terms <strong>of</strong> legislation. Inaddition, <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General with <strong>the</strong> discretionary power to auditand report on <strong>the</strong> accounts, financial statementsand financial management <strong>of</strong> any institutionfunded from <strong>the</strong> National or ProvincialRevenue Fund or by a municipality, or any o<strong>the</strong>rinstitution that is authorised by law to receivemoney for a public purpose.The Public Audit Act distinguishes between <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s constitutional and o<strong>the</strong>r functions.The Auditor-General’s constitutional functionsrequire that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General performannual mandatory audits <strong>of</strong> governmentdepartments, administrations, Parliament and<strong>the</strong> provincial legislatures, constitutional institutions,municipalities, municipal entities and certainconsolidated financial statements.In addition to <strong>the</strong>se mandatory audits, section4(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act furnishes <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalwith <strong>the</strong> discretion to audit and report on <strong>the</strong>accounts, financial statements and financial68 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 5management <strong>of</strong> public entities and o<strong>the</strong>r institutionsthat meet certain criteria.The legislation also sets out <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’s o<strong>the</strong>r functions. Section 5 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Actempowers <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General to provide variousaudit-related services commonly performedby a supreme audit institution; give advice andsupport to a legislature outside <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s normal audit and reportingfunctions; comment on a response by an auditeeto a legislature’s review <strong>of</strong> an audit report;carry out an investigation or special audit <strong>of</strong>any specified institution if <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalconsiders it to be in <strong>the</strong> public interest or onreceipt <strong>of</strong> a complaint or request.In addition, <strong>the</strong> legislation provides that <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General may co-operate with persons,institutions and associations, nationally andinternationally; appoint advisory structuresexternal to <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice toprovide specialised advice; and do any o<strong>the</strong>rthing necessary to fulfil his or her role effectively.The Auditor-General provides reliable informationconcerning what is described as <strong>the</strong> management<strong>of</strong> public funds. While <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General <strong>of</strong>fers a range <strong>of</strong> audit services (includingregularity audits and audits <strong>of</strong> performanceinformation, performance audits, special investigationsand sustainable development audits),regularity audits that attest to <strong>the</strong> quality andreliability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> financial information presentedby government departments are performedmost frequently. It appears to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that generally <strong>the</strong> present unreadiness <strong>of</strong> publicsector departments and entities hamstrings<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’s ability to report on performanceor non-financial information.Increasingly, however, this is an area <strong>of</strong> reportingthat has potential for growth and for providinginformation regarding <strong>the</strong> extent to whichpublic sector institutions are providing servicesin a cost effective way. The focus areas <strong>of</strong> suchperformance audits are increasingly based on<strong>the</strong> strategic service delivery areas <strong>of</strong> government.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> received written submissionsfrom <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General in response to <strong>the</strong>questionnaire that was circulated. This document,supplemented by various submissions,formed <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> discussions that tookplace between <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> and <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General on 14 March <strong>2007</strong>. The Auditor-General also supplied fur<strong>the</strong>r supplementaryinformation at <strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>.From <strong>the</strong>se <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds as follows:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS3.1.1. Independencea) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Constitutionand <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation provide <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General with <strong>the</strong> requisite legal protectionfrom external interference. Section181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution guarantees <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s independence, while <strong>the</strong>Public Audit Act, 2004, restates <strong>the</strong> constitutionalprovisions concerning independence.In addition, <strong>the</strong> constitutional and statutoryframework contains provisions that areaccepted markers <strong>of</strong> independence. TheConstitution sets out special procedures tosafeguard <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’s tenure andmakes his or her dismissal only possible on<strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong> misconduct, incapacity orincompetence.THE AUDITOR-GENERAL69


) The Constitution also stipulates specialmajorities for both <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’sappointment and removal from <strong>of</strong>fice. Theappointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General requiresapproval by <strong>the</strong> National Assembly by a resolutionadopted with a supporting vote <strong>of</strong> atleast 60 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. In order to dismiss <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General from <strong>of</strong>fice, a resolutionadopted with a supporting vote <strong>of</strong> at leasttwo-thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly is required.c) Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, as <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General finances its operations through auditfees, it is financially independent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Executive.d) As power can never be wholly unfettered,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Constitutionand <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation charge certainbodies with internal and external oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General:i. Internal oversight is achieved through anaudit committee, established by section40 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Audit Act, 2004. Themembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> audit committee areappointed by <strong>the</strong> Deputy Auditor-Generalin consultation with <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General.The audit committee must consist <strong>of</strong> atleast three persons, <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong>whom are not in <strong>the</strong> employ <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> chairperson<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> audit committee must notbe employed by <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General andmust be independent, knowledgeable <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> position, have <strong>the</strong> requisitebusiness, financial and leadershipskills, and must not be a political <strong>of</strong>ficebearer.The audit committee has key financialoversight responsibilities that typicallyaccrue to audit committees, includingthat <strong>of</strong> commenting in <strong>the</strong> annual reporton <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> internal control,as well as evaluating <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’s annual financial statements. Itcan make recommendations to <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General, to <strong>the</strong> external auditorand to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly’s Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, ifnecessary.ii. In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is accountable to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly. The Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General was established interms <strong>of</strong> section 10(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public AuditAct as a parliamentary oversight mechanismfor <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. ThisStanding <strong>Committee</strong> replaces <strong>the</strong> previousAudit Commission, and is a multipartycommittee that exercises oversightresponsibilities that focus on performance,appointments and <strong>the</strong> nature andscope <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> audits performed by <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General, including consultationon its fee structure. In collaboration with<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> is currently reviewing <strong>the</strong>Office’s governance model, as well asconsidering <strong>the</strong> remuneration, benefitsand conditions <strong>of</strong> service for <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. The Standing <strong>Committee</strong> reportsto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.3.1.2. Appointmentsa) As identified earlier in this report, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong>re is no uniformprocedure for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficebearersto <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions.70 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 5In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong>President appoints <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General on<strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly with a supporting vote <strong>of</strong> at least60 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly. The Public Audit Act tasks <strong>the</strong>Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly with initiating<strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> appointing <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General as contemplated in section 193 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution. A committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly nominates a candidatefor appointment and makes recommendationson <strong>the</strong> conditions <strong>of</strong> employment.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that section 193<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides criteria forappointment as Auditor-General: The incumbentmust be a man or a woman who is aSouth African citizen, and is fit and proper tohold that <strong>of</strong>fice. In addition, due regardmust be given to specialised knowledge <strong>of</strong>or experience in auditing, state finances andpublic administration.c) The Auditor-General is appointed for a fixednon-renewable term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> betweenfive and ten years in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionboth <strong>the</strong> previous and present Auditors-General were appointed for seven years.d) Given <strong>the</strong> enormously important role thatthis Office plays in enhancing <strong>the</strong> financialaccountability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public sector, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> finds that it is essential to ensurethat appointments occur in a timely fashionso as to ensure continuity, as well as toallow for <strong>the</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> institutional memory.While <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> a dedicatedStanding <strong>Committee</strong> will obviously assist inthis regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speakerwill be well placed to initiate and oversee<strong>the</strong> practicalities that accompany thisprocess.3.2. INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTION-AL AND LEGAL MANDATEa) As previously mentioned, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>notes that at present <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalperforms mostly regularity audits, whichentails reporting on whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> financialstatements fairly represent, in all materialaspects, <strong>the</strong> financial position and <strong>the</strong>results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operations for a given financialyear. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> public sector auditsrequires <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General to report moreextensively than <strong>the</strong> private sector on <strong>the</strong>detail and nature <strong>of</strong> financial managementshortcomings, and <strong>the</strong> root causes <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>,in order to enable stakeholders to managepublic resources better.b) In common with <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter9 bodies, <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation does notgive <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General authority to makebinding decisions. Thus, to some extent <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General must rely on <strong>the</strong> co-operation<strong>of</strong> government departments to acceptand act on recommendations contained in<strong>the</strong> audit reports. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is also assisted by <strong>the</strong> oversightfunction <strong>of</strong> parliamentary committees, particularly<strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on PublicAccounts (SCOPA). The <strong>Committee</strong> notesthat <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General regularly submitsreports addressing recommendations toParliament. However, <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations containedin <strong>the</strong>se reports by affected departmentsis a cause for concern. The<strong>Committee</strong> was made aware that some governmentdepartments have received qualifiedaudits for a number <strong>of</strong> years. The<strong>Committee</strong> suggests that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General should make special reports toParliament in such circumstances, whichshould result in debates in Parliament. TheTHE AUDITOR-GENERAL71


<strong>Committee</strong> believes in publicity as a means<strong>of</strong> enforcement.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re are a number<strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r audit services that <strong>the</strong> AuditorGeneral can provide, including particularlyperformance auditing, which entails evaluatinghow economically resources were procured,as well as <strong>the</strong> efficiency with which<strong>the</strong>y were used.d) Although at present <strong>the</strong> procedures and systems<strong>of</strong> most government departments arenot sufficiently developed to allow for performanceaudits, <strong>the</strong> auditing <strong>of</strong> performanceinformation is being phased-in in somedepartments. Given that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalintends eventually to conduct performanceaudits for all government departments, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> highlights <strong>the</strong> need to build <strong>the</strong>capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalfor this purpose. This will require a systematicreview <strong>of</strong> resources, including personnel.The <strong>Committee</strong> is also aware that <strong>the</strong>most effective use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> information containedin <strong>the</strong> performance audits will requirethat <strong>the</strong> report provided to parliamentarycommittees is timely.e) Moreover, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> emphasises thatParliament should establish mechanisms toensure <strong>the</strong> systematic, comprehensive andefficient processing <strong>of</strong> performance auditreports. These would be very different to <strong>the</strong>present regularity reports, and <strong>the</strong> capacity<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on PublicAccounts and <strong>the</strong> relevant portfolio committeeswill require streng<strong>the</strong>ning in order todeal with <strong>the</strong>se reports effectively.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General performs extensive audit services <strong>of</strong>an international nature. For example, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General is involved in developingfinancial management and accountabilitymodels in <strong>the</strong> public sector in parts <strong>of</strong> Africa.In addition, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has audited<strong>the</strong> World Health Organisation and <strong>the</strong>United Nations Industrial DevelopmentOrganisation, and is presently auditor to <strong>the</strong>United Nations Organisation itself. Thesecontracts have been obtained competitivelyand are evidence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’sgood standing and pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism.g) Never<strong>the</strong>less, it is cause for concern that <strong>the</strong>enabling legislation does not specificallyallow <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General to do this kind <strong>of</strong>work. At present <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General relieson section 5(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Audit Act as<strong>the</strong> legal basis for its international work.The section, which is referred to earlier, providesthat <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General may for a feeand without compromising <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General as an independent auditor,provide audit related services to an auditeeor o<strong>the</strong>r body, which is commonly performedby a supreme audit institution.h) The <strong>Committee</strong> is not satisfied that internationalaudit work can be regarded as workcommonly performed by a supreme auditinstitution established for a national purpose.i) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that only 5% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s resources are allocated to<strong>the</strong>se international services. This is a figurethat <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has determinedwill not compromise its efficiency or put astrain on resources. The <strong>Committee</strong> acceptedthat <strong>the</strong>se international services also createopportunities or incentives that attracttrainees and experts, who might o<strong>the</strong>rwisechoose to work within <strong>the</strong> private sector.While <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> internationalwork <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General does not72 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 5negatively affect its national responsibilitiesand provides <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice with a number <strong>of</strong>important benefits, <strong>the</strong> present lack <strong>of</strong> alegal mandate to perform such work isunsatisfactory and should be clarified.3.3. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) Many South Africans, including those inpositions <strong>of</strong> leadership, are not fully aware<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> important work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that an unacceptablesituation. The <strong>Committee</strong> notesthat <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General hasidentified <strong>the</strong> need to inform <strong>the</strong> public <strong>of</strong>its work as a priority and has begun toengage with <strong>the</strong> media and with civil societyin this regard. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> civil society,fostering such relationships may becomeincreasingly important, particularly withregard to issues <strong>of</strong> corruption.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has implemented a complaintsmechanism to deal with complaints against<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. The <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong> mechanism is not intendedas a general complaints or reporting hotline,but ra<strong>the</strong>r for complaints pertaining to <strong>the</strong>exercise <strong>of</strong> powers and <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong>duties by, and <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong>institution when performing audits.c) Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds <strong>the</strong> complaintsmachinery to be overly complex,requiring that <strong>the</strong> complaint be in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong>an affidavit or affirmation properly commissionedby a commissioner <strong>of</strong> oaths. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that complaintsmechanisms should generally entail a moreaccessible procedure if <strong>the</strong>y are to be effective.3.4. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has a close working relationshipwith National Treasury. For some years <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General and National Treasury haveheld quarterly meetings on areas <strong>of</strong> mutualinterest, and hold meetings <strong>of</strong> a technicalnature on an informal basis. The <strong>Committee</strong>accepts that, given <strong>the</strong> technical nature <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong>kinds <strong>of</strong> audit information required, <strong>the</strong> continuedclose working relationship withnational and provincial treasuries is necessaryfor <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General to conduct hisor her work effectively and efficiently.b) The Auditor-General has also informed <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice enjoys friendlyand pr<strong>of</strong>essional relations with all governmentdepartments, Parliament and publicentities in obtaining information. Since <strong>the</strong>reis a keen understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General, bodies being audited alsoappreciate <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> providing <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General with adequate and relevantinformation to facilitate a reliable audit outcome.c) As has been indicated earlier in this Chapter,<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General cannot make enforceabledecisions and must <strong>the</strong>refore rely on<strong>the</strong> co-operation <strong>of</strong> government departmentsto implement any recommendationsthat are made in audit reports. In <strong>the</strong> circumstances,<strong>the</strong> extent to which departmentsfail to implement such recommendationshas been noted as a matter for concern.THE AUDITOR-GENERAL73


3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has a highly structured relationshipwith Parliament. The Auditor-Generalaccounts to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly through<strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> AuditorGeneral, which was established in May 2006as a dedicated committee for this purpose.Despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> has only recently been formed, ithas already engaged with <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General on its strategic plan and budget for<strong>the</strong> next three years, as well as its latestannual report. This is similar to <strong>the</strong> oversightwork <strong>of</strong> a portfolio committee in relationto a government department. TheAuditor-General and <strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong>are in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> fleshing out <strong>the</strong>irgovernance relationship. This process is duefor completion by July <strong>2007</strong>.b) In addition, <strong>the</strong>re is a special parliamentarycommittee that oversees <strong>the</strong> accounts <strong>of</strong> allgovernment departments and public entities.The Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on PublicAccounts considers <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’sreports and recommendations when exercisingparliamentary oversight over expenditureby government and public entities.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General provides technical support and secretarialassistance to <strong>the</strong> Association <strong>of</strong>Public Accounts <strong>Committee</strong>s, which is anorganisation that aims to empower <strong>the</strong>Public Accounts <strong>Committee</strong>s in all ten legislaturesto discharge <strong>the</strong>ir oversight dutieseffectively.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts is in manyways provided with direct assistance in itsfunctioning by <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. While this is commendable andclearly beneficial for as long as Parliamentcontinues to grapple with capacity problems,particularly in relation to its committees,both Parliament and <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General should exercise care toobserve <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>the</strong>m to remain atarms length in <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutionalindependence <strong>of</strong> each. The Auditor-General is after all as an <strong>of</strong>fice itselfaccountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly andrelevant committees as occasion demands,and such accountability should not be compromisedby <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day-to-dayco-operation between <strong>the</strong>m.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> potential for overlapbetween <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.The Public Protector is mandated to investigateany conduct in state affairs or in publicadministration in any sphere <strong>of</strong> governmentthat is alleged or suspected to be improperor to result in impropriety or prejudice, while<strong>the</strong> Public Audit Act empowers <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General to investigate any body, institution,or entity using public funds if <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General considers that such an investigationwould be in <strong>the</strong> public interest, or on receipt<strong>of</strong> a complaint or request.b) It was put to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General does not regard <strong>the</strong> conduct<strong>of</strong> special investigations as a core function.The Auditor-General does also refer mattersfor investigation to <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.There is, however, no formal understandingbetween <strong>the</strong>se two institutions regulating<strong>the</strong>ir working relationship.74 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 5c) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> aformal memorandum <strong>of</strong> understanding andmechanisms to track and monitor progress<strong>of</strong> referred matters is <strong>of</strong> deep concern. The<strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong>re shouldbe a note in <strong>the</strong> annual report <strong>of</strong> each institutionon matters referred to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r aswell as <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> such cases.d) When audit work is undertaken, it appearsto <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that areas such as conditions<strong>of</strong> service, human resource management,and codes <strong>of</strong> conduct create <strong>the</strong>potential for overlap between <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission. The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission have co-operated successfullyin a number <strong>of</strong> instances, such as <strong>the</strong> audit<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> public <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers andsenior public servants in <strong>the</strong> public service.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that a formal memorandum<strong>of</strong> understanding exists between<strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission and <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. The specific purpose<strong>of</strong> this memorandum <strong>of</strong> understanding is toenhance co-operation, efficiency and effectivenessand to avoid duplication <strong>of</strong> functionsperformed by <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and<strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission. The agreementidentifies areas <strong>of</strong> collaboration suchas <strong>the</strong> sharing <strong>of</strong> information generally,training, <strong>the</strong> sharing information on bestpractices and methodologies, <strong>the</strong> co-ordination<strong>of</strong> audits and special investigations, ando<strong>the</strong>r projects. The memorandum identifies<strong>the</strong> procedures to be followed for purposes<strong>of</strong> structuring <strong>the</strong>se interactions and providesfor contact persons within <strong>the</strong> respectiveinstitutions to facilitate such co-operationand collaboration.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong>re is immensepotential for enhanced co-operation and collaborationbetween <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions,particularly as <strong>the</strong> scope <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s work broadens to includeperformance auditing. Since performanceaudits will include <strong>the</strong> efficiency and economy<strong>of</strong> service delivery measured againstagreed standards and outcomes containedin strategic and business plans <strong>of</strong> departments,<strong>the</strong> potential for overlap with <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission, <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commissionand <strong>the</strong> Financial and Fiscal Commissionbecomes obvious. Recommendations aimedat ensuring effective co-operation and collaborationare made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.3.7. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that, while <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General is in overall control <strong>of</strong>, and isaccountable for, <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> his orher <strong>of</strong>fice, <strong>the</strong> internal governance arrangementsinclude a number <strong>of</strong> checks and balances.b) In addition to <strong>the</strong> audit committee referredto previously, <strong>the</strong> Deputy Auditor-General ishead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> administration and is responsiblefor <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, despite <strong>the</strong> fact that under <strong>the</strong>legislation <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is <strong>the</strong> solerepository <strong>of</strong> legal authority and power, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General is empowered to appoint anadvisory committee to assist him or her.c) The Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has providedfor <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> interests <strong>of</strong> both<strong>of</strong>fice-bearers and staff. The <strong>Committee</strong>notes that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and all staffTHE AUDITOR-GENERAL75


are required by <strong>the</strong> Code <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>essionalConduct and Ethics to disclose any direct orindirect relationship or interest that may beregarded as incompatible with, or adverselyinfluencing or impairing, <strong>the</strong> values andprinciples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Code. A central register iskept <strong>of</strong> all reported interests and relationships.The Auditor-General is not allowed toperform outside remunerative work or to siton <strong>the</strong> boards <strong>of</strong> companies. Staff membersare required to obtain permission to performoutside work and must disclose any involvementas directors. The <strong>Committee</strong>, however,is not satisfied that this register is sufficientlyaccessible to <strong>the</strong> public. This issue is discussedmore fully in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.d) The Auditor-General identified staff recruitmentand retention as a constraint. There isa limited pool <strong>of</strong> chartered accountantsavailable. In addition, <strong>the</strong> focus on publicsector auditing, toge<strong>the</strong>r with employmentequity requirements, have placed fur<strong>the</strong>rconstraints on <strong>the</strong> potential number <strong>of</strong> charteredaccountants available for employment.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General has initiated a traineeaccountant scheme to increase <strong>the</strong> pool <strong>of</strong>chartered accountants, including a full-timebursary scheme, with <strong>the</strong> object thattrainees, once qualified, will work for <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’s international work is a means <strong>of</strong>attracting and retaining staff.eAs in o<strong>the</strong>r areas, <strong>the</strong> recruitment andappointment <strong>of</strong> staff are determined by <strong>the</strong>policies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution, which follow <strong>the</strong>provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant legislation concerningrepresentivity. In this regard, <strong>the</strong>issue <strong>of</strong> representivity is enormously importantand special care must be taken in makingappointments, especially at senior level.3.8 FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) Although <strong>the</strong> legislation provides for <strong>the</strong>possibility <strong>of</strong> Parliament appropriatingmonies for <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General,since 1993 no parliamentary appropriationhas been necessary. The Auditor-General isable to generate its own income throughaudit fees.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that, among <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General isunique in this regard. However, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> non-payment orlate payment <strong>of</strong> monthly invoices by auditeescan result in difficulties with cash flowmanagement.c) The table below summarises <strong>the</strong> revenueand expenditure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-Generalsince 2003/04.Table 1: Revenue and Expenditure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General 20R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Revenue 583 446 613 322 764 204 875 466 1 013 229 1 062 773 1 110 056Expenditure 547 138 613 367 784 130Surplus/(Deficit) 36 308 (45) (19926)20 Auditor-General, Annual <strong>Report</strong> 2004/05, 2005/06 and supplementary submissions to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>76 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 54. General conclusionsThe following general observations may bedrawn from <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s findings:a) The present configuration and operations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Auditor-General are suitable for <strong>the</strong> currentSouth African environment. The effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General will beenhanced when government departmentsacquire a sufficient level <strong>of</strong> readiness for <strong>the</strong>conduct <strong>of</strong> performance audits. This, however,may prove a challenge in terms <strong>of</strong>human resource capacity, particularly given<strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General has alreadyidentified shortage <strong>of</strong> skills as a constrainingfactor. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> parliamentarymechanisms to process <strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>of</strong>performance audits would need to bestreng<strong>the</strong>ned.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General expresses a good understanding <strong>of</strong>his mandate and applies it effectively andefficiently. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believesthat <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General is incorrect in relyingon section 5(1)(a) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Audit Actto provide <strong>the</strong> necessary legislative mandateto perform international work. The<strong>Committee</strong> understands <strong>the</strong> necessity for<strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> external work, especiallyfor <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> attracting and retainingstaff, provided that <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong>such work does not detract from <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s primary obligations. Theabsence <strong>of</strong> a legislative mandate is unsatisfactoryand should be corrected.c) A disregard by government departments ando<strong>the</strong>r public institutions <strong>of</strong> recommendationsmade by <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General in audit reportsis a cause for concern. Instances <strong>of</strong> persistentdisregard can however be taken up by<strong>the</strong> National Assembly with <strong>the</strong> affectedexecutive authority. In that regard <strong>the</strong>National Assembly acts in partnership with<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and should assist toensure <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> had an oral presentationfrom <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. Regrettablythis was not possible in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts,although <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> received a writtensubmission from that <strong>Committee</strong>. Based on<strong>the</strong>se inputs, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong> interactions between <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and Parliament are generally satisfactory.The Auditor-General accounts toParliament through a dedicated, multi-partyStanding <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor General,while <strong>the</strong> Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on PublicAccounts deals with <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’ssubstantive reports.e) The structured nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> interactionsbetween <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong>sestanding committees permits effective oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General on <strong>the</strong> one handand provides <strong>the</strong> vehicle for parliamentaryengagement with <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’sreports and recommendations on <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r.f) The Auditor General has adequate institutionalarrangements, including conflict resolutionmechanisms and a code <strong>of</strong> conduct forstaff and disclosure <strong>of</strong> interests, to ensureefficiency and effectiveness.g) At present, collaboration and co-ordination<strong>of</strong> activities with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 andassociated institutions needs attention.h) There is insufficient public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General’s work.THE AUDITOR-GENERAL77


5. RecommendationsThe <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General consistent with its terms <strong>of</strong> referenceconcerning efficiency. In addition, <strong>the</strong>international recognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> standardsestablished by <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General reflects wellon <strong>the</strong> Office and its personnel.In order to streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> efficiency and effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office fur<strong>the</strong>r, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>makes <strong>the</strong> following recommendations:a) The legal mandate for <strong>the</strong> international workperformed by <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General should beclarified by legislation.b) The Auditor-General should continue todevelop its capacity to conduct performanceaudits <strong>of</strong> all national and provincial governmentdepartments and municipalities.c) The Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> Standing<strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts should bringpersistent disregard for <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’srecommendations by government departmentsand o<strong>the</strong>r public institutions to <strong>the</strong>special attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.d) The Auditor-General should continue in itsefforts at increasing public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office.e) There should be a formal agreement with<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutions to deal withany possibility <strong>of</strong> duplication or overlap <strong>of</strong>function. This is particularly necessary where<strong>the</strong>re is referral <strong>of</strong> cases or complaints toano<strong>the</strong>r body. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>recommends that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General formalisesits relationship with <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector and establishes mechanisms totrack and monitor referred matters. In addition,<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General should includedetails <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> complaints investigated,outcomes and referrals in its annualreport.78 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 5THE AUDITOR-GENERAL79


CHAPTER 6


CHAPTER 6CHAPTER 6THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION1. BackgroundA body was established in 1912 with <strong>the</strong> broadresponsibilities <strong>of</strong> a traditional centralised personnelinstitution for <strong>the</strong> public service. Underapar<strong>the</strong>id, <strong>the</strong> public service became a tool <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> regime, geared towards serving <strong>the</strong> materialneeds and political interests <strong>of</strong> a minority at<strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> SouthAfricans.Until 1994, no independent body existed tomonitor and evaluate <strong>the</strong> operations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>public service and to advise on policy.Consequently, when negotiating <strong>the</strong> adoption<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new constitution and its principles, <strong>the</strong>establishment <strong>of</strong> an independent and impartialPublic Service Commission was regarded ascrucial if <strong>the</strong> public service was to be transformedin order that it might attend to <strong>the</strong> concerns<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people as a whole and contributeto <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> a new society.From <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> democracy, <strong>the</strong> promotion<strong>of</strong> growth and development has been a priorityfor South Africa. Higher levels <strong>of</strong> growthdeepen <strong>the</strong> country’s transformation and safeguard<strong>the</strong> stability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political transition,while development relates to an improvementin <strong>the</strong> well-being <strong>of</strong> people, as a result <strong>of</strong> arange <strong>of</strong> targeted social, political and economicprocesses. South Africa’s approach to developmentis one that values growth, sustainabledevelopment, equity, democratisation and <strong>the</strong>protection <strong>of</strong> basic human rights.The public service is considered to be an importantinstrument in <strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> suchgrowth and development objectives. This is sobecause <strong>the</strong> services that <strong>the</strong> public service<strong>of</strong>fers are frequently <strong>the</strong> only hope that peoplehave to better <strong>the</strong>ir lives. In order that growthand development might happen, it is imperativethat <strong>the</strong> public service is supported bysound monitoring and evaluation systems,which provide timely information on <strong>the</strong> effectiveness,or o<strong>the</strong>rwise, <strong>of</strong> programmes.Although <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission isestablished in Chapter 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,like <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions its purpose is toprotect and support democracy. As such, it ischarged with safeguarding <strong>the</strong> public interestthrough <strong>the</strong> effective monitoring and evaluation<strong>of</strong> government practices. More specifically,<strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission is vested withoversight responsibilities for <strong>the</strong> public service,and monitors, evaluates and investigates publicadministration practices. It is also charged withpromoting <strong>the</strong> values and principles governingpublic administration contained in section 195<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, including pr<strong>of</strong>essionalethics, efficiency, representivity and impartiality.A full list <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se values and principles canbe found in Appendix 1.2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe Public Service Commission is <strong>the</strong> only institutionestablished in terms <strong>of</strong> Chapter 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution.The history <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> firstever democratic Public Service Commission isinteresting. The 1993 Constitution made provisionfor an independent and impartial PublicService Commission, composed <strong>of</strong> betweenthree and five commissioners. The 1993Constitution mandated <strong>the</strong> Commission tomake recommendations, give directions, andconduct enquiries regarding <strong>the</strong> organisation,administration, conditions <strong>of</strong> service, personneladministration, efficiency, effectiveness andcomportment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service. TheTHE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION81


Commission was also assigned a capacitybuildingand human resource developmentfunction through its responsibility for <strong>the</strong> SouthAfrican Management and DevelopmentInstitute (SAMDI). Provincial commissions in allnine provinces performed similar functions tothat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national Public Service Commission.However, concern had arisen around <strong>the</strong> potentialfor conflict <strong>of</strong> interest regarding <strong>the</strong>Commission’s role and function in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1993 Constitution: The Commission was vestedwith executive and decision-making powersand, consequently, played a key role in <strong>the</strong>functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service.Therefore, a new model for <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission was devised, which confines itsrole primarily to monitoring and advising onmerit and equity, promoting <strong>the</strong> values andprinciples <strong>of</strong> sound public administration in <strong>the</strong>public service, including a high standard <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalethics, and promoting efficiency. Interms <strong>of</strong> its constitutional and legal framework,this restructured Commission is a singleCommission (<strong>the</strong> provincial commissions wereabolished), which is much larger than <strong>the</strong> onethat existed under <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution.Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reconstituted Commissionwere appointed in January 1999, but delaysprevented <strong>the</strong> Commission from beginning itsoperations until July 199<strong>9.</strong>Although <strong>the</strong> Commission is not a Chapter 9institution, section 196 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitutionaffirms <strong>the</strong> Commission’s independence andrequires that it be impartial, performing itsfunctions without fear, favour or prejudice in<strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> maintenance <strong>of</strong> effectiveand efficient public administration and a highstandard <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional ethics in <strong>the</strong> publicservice.O<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state must assist and protect<strong>the</strong> Commission to ensure its independence,impartiality, dignity and effectiveness and noorgan <strong>of</strong> state or person may interfere with <strong>the</strong>Commission’s functioning.The Commission is accountable to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and must report to it at least once ayear. The Constitution also states that in respect<strong>of</strong> its activities in a province, <strong>the</strong> Commissionmust report to <strong>the</strong> relevant provincial legislature.(It is noteworthy that <strong>the</strong>se provisions aresimilar to those relating to <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions).As already mentioned, <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandateis to maintain effective and efficient publicadministration and a high standard <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalethics in <strong>the</strong> public service. Section196(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution sets out <strong>the</strong>Commission’s powers and functions, which areto -a) Promote <strong>the</strong> values and principles set out insection 195 throughout <strong>the</strong> public service;b) Investigate, monitor and evaluate <strong>the</strong> organisation,administration and personnel practices<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service;c) Propose measures to ensure effective andefficient performance within <strong>the</strong> public service;d) Give directions aimed at ensuring that personnelprocedures relating to recruitment,transfers, promotions and dismissals complywith <strong>the</strong> values and principles set out in section195;e) <strong>Report</strong> in respect <strong>of</strong> its activities and <strong>the</strong>performance <strong>of</strong> its functions, including anyfinding it may make and directives and82 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 6advice it may give, and to provide an evaluation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> values andprinciples set out in section 195 are beingcomplied with; andf) Ei<strong>the</strong>r on its own accord or on receipt <strong>of</strong> acomplaint –i. Investigate and evaluate <strong>the</strong> application<strong>of</strong> personnel and administration practices;ii. Investigate grievances <strong>of</strong> employees in<strong>the</strong> public service and recommend appropriateremedies;iii. Monitor and investigate adherence toapplicable procedures in <strong>the</strong> public service;andiv. <strong>Ad</strong>vise national and provincial organs <strong>of</strong>state regarding personnel practices in <strong>the</strong>public service, including those relating to<strong>the</strong> recruitment, appointment, transfer,discharge and o<strong>the</strong>r aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>careers <strong>of</strong> employees in <strong>the</strong> public service.As indicated, section 195 is set out in full inappendix 1 this report. Broadly, however, <strong>the</strong>values and principles provided for in section195 include:a) A high standard <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional ethics;b) The efficient and effective use <strong>of</strong> resources;c) The need for a development-orientated publicadministration;d) Impartiality, fairness, equity and <strong>the</strong> absence<strong>of</strong> bias in providing services;e) Responsiveness to <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> peopleand <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> encouraging participationin policy-making;f) Transparency;g) The maximisation <strong>of</strong> human potential;h) Representivity; andi) Employment and personnel practices thatare based on ability, objectivity, fairness and<strong>the</strong> need to redress <strong>the</strong> imbalances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>past.In addition, <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission Act46 <strong>of</strong> 1997 empowers <strong>the</strong> Commission to performinspections, conduct inquiries and makerules in relation to <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicservice. In particular, <strong>the</strong> Commission may -21a) Inspect departments and o<strong>the</strong>r organisationalcomponents in <strong>the</strong> public service. TheCommission is provided with access to <strong>the</strong>necessary <strong>of</strong>ficial documents and informationfor it to perform its functions;b) Conduct an inquiry into any matter that it isauthorised to do by <strong>the</strong> Constitution. For <strong>the</strong>purpose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> inquiry, <strong>the</strong> Commission isempowered to summons any person whomay be able to provide information <strong>of</strong> materialimportance to <strong>the</strong> inquiry; andc) Make rules as to <strong>the</strong> investigation, monitoringand evaluation <strong>of</strong> those matters towhich section 196(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionrelates; as to <strong>the</strong> powers and duties <strong>of</strong>Commissioners, including delegated powersand duties; and as to <strong>the</strong> manner in whichmeetings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission will be convened.21 Sections 9, 10 and 11, Public Service Commission Act 46 <strong>of</strong> 1997THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION83


3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> met with <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission on 26 January <strong>2007</strong>. The discussionsat <strong>the</strong> meeting were informed by <strong>the</strong>written submission received from <strong>the</strong>Commission in reply to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire circulatedby <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> beforehand. In addition,at <strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>Commission supplied it with supplementaryinformation. From <strong>the</strong>se <strong>the</strong> followingemerged:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) Since 1993, <strong>the</strong> Commission has performedits functions more than adequately. It hasseen its duties as an important contributionnot only to <strong>the</strong> public service but also to <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.b) Without wishing to detract from <strong>the</strong> excellentwork performed by <strong>the</strong> Commissionover <strong>the</strong> years, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> feels thatincreasingly <strong>the</strong> need is for a body that has,as its sole focus, broader strategic issuesrelating to <strong>the</strong> setting and monitoring <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>regulatory framework, as well as longertermissues <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional standards andcommitment. The Commission has nowreached a stage where <strong>the</strong> demands placedon it are such that it can no longer sustainservice delivery within its current approvedestablishment. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that simply increasing <strong>the</strong>Commission’s staff establishment is not necessarily<strong>the</strong> solution, as it does not address<strong>the</strong> underlying problems, which relate to <strong>the</strong>breadth <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandate and<strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public administration. The<strong>Committee</strong> also recognises that <strong>the</strong> proposedestablishment <strong>of</strong> a single public servicewith a greater role for departments anda more active role for <strong>the</strong> Minister for <strong>the</strong>Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration introducesnew dynamics.c) In its deliberations, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> noted<strong>the</strong> recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PresidentialReview Commission, also known as <strong>the</strong>Maphai Commission. 22 The MaphaiCommission found that <strong>the</strong>re was a need fora small body, ’radically and appropriatelystructured so that it is capable <strong>of</strong> carryingout [its] functions more efficiently, effectivelyand cost effectively’. 23d) A major recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MaphaiCommission was that a less elaborate andpr<strong>of</strong>essionally managed body be appointed.Although <strong>the</strong> body would remain independent,reporting to <strong>the</strong> President as well as toParliament, <strong>the</strong> Maphai Commission recommendedthat such a central public servicemonitoring and inspection unit be located in<strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President, led by three senior,experienced commissioners (ra<strong>the</strong>r than<strong>the</strong> fourteen commissioners provided for in<strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution). The unit, which itproposed be called <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicService Commission, would be responsiblefor monitoring, inspecting, reviewing,assessing and advising <strong>the</strong> President about<strong>the</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> policy decisions andactions, and would recommend changesbased on its findings and conclusions. Theproposed Office should have a small butexpert staff, as well as <strong>the</strong> power to contractout some <strong>of</strong> its monitoring and inspectionfunctions to accredited service providers.The Maphai Commission made similar recommendationswith regard to <strong>the</strong> provincialcommissions.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> studied <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Maphai Commission but feels22 Presidential Review Commission. Developing a Culture <strong>of</strong> Good Governance, 27 February 1998.23 Presidential Review Commission on <strong>the</strong> Reform and Transformation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Service in South Africa. Developing a Culture <strong>of</strong> GoodGovernance, presented on 27 February 1998.84 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 6that <strong>the</strong>y are not appropriate at this time.The proposed single public service will bringabout root-and-branch change in <strong>the</strong> publicservice. In all likelihood this will create enormoustensions at a time when service deliveryneeds to be developed fur<strong>the</strong>r, and <strong>the</strong>infusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> batho pelerequires a concerted effort.f) Regarding <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> presentcomposition <strong>of</strong> fourteen Commissioners istoo large, creating an unwieldy and cumbersomestructure that does not allow forspeedy decision-making, creates logisticaldifficulties in arranging meetings and is notcost effective.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhad conducted an institutional assessmentin 2002, which concluded that <strong>the</strong> presentstructure is a large one that has led to <strong>the</strong>Commission experiencing <strong>the</strong> difficultiesdescribed above. The assessment proposedtwo options: <strong>the</strong> first that <strong>the</strong> Commissionbe streamlined to consist <strong>of</strong> three full-timeand eleven part-time commissioners; and<strong>the</strong> second that <strong>the</strong> Commission be reducedin size from fourteen to three full-time commissioners.The second option would requirethat <strong>the</strong> Constitution be amended,h) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes, however, that <strong>the</strong>context has changed since 2002. There hasbeen increasing demand for acceleratedquality service from <strong>the</strong> public administration.This requires a responsive and readilyaccessible Public Service Commission.Therefore, any considerations around <strong>the</strong>size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission must take intoaccount <strong>the</strong> current context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicservice, <strong>the</strong> demands placed on a developmentalstate, its broad mandate and <strong>the</strong> factthat its work encompasses <strong>the</strong> public serviceat both national and provincial levels. The<strong>Committee</strong> believes that between five andseven commissioners will meet <strong>the</strong> newneeds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution.i) The <strong>Committee</strong> understands that, at present,<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fourteen Commissioners, nine areallocated to <strong>the</strong> provinces. This is a nationalCommission and, as such, “deployment”might affect <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se “provincial”Commissioners. The <strong>Committee</strong> believesthat, in fact, <strong>the</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fices should be<strong>the</strong> conduits <strong>of</strong> information to <strong>the</strong> national<strong>of</strong>fice.3.2. INDEPENDENCEa) The Constitution and <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission Act provide <strong>the</strong> legal basis for<strong>the</strong> Commission to perform its functionsindependently, without fear, favour or prejudice.However, <strong>the</strong> Commission is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>view that its independence is not simply amatter that can be regulated in law. TheCommission is mindful that it operates in <strong>the</strong>context <strong>of</strong> a developmental state where<strong>the</strong>re is a major focus on <strong>the</strong> transformation<strong>of</strong> society and also <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public serviceitself. The Commission cannot afford to holditself alo<strong>of</strong> when exercising its independence.The Commission submitted that for it‘independence is about <strong>the</strong> direct or indirectinterference with <strong>the</strong> programme and decisions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution and not about issues<strong>of</strong> location and participation in governmentactivities’.b) The practical implications <strong>of</strong> this approachare demonstrated where <strong>the</strong> Executive hasrequested that <strong>the</strong> Commission intervene innational and provincial departments to conductinvestigations and to provide advice.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION85


For example, <strong>the</strong> Commission was requestedto intervene in <strong>the</strong> Eastern Cape andKwaZulu-Natal provincial administrations.The intervention was designed to tackleservice delivery challenges, specifically in<strong>the</strong> areas <strong>of</strong> health, education, roads, publicworks and social development and toimprove turn-around times. The Commissionwas also involved in an intervention in <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Correctional Services in 2001.In this intervention, a senior <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission was deployed to form part <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> management team <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department<strong>of</strong> Correctional Services for a period <strong>of</strong> sixmonths. There have been o<strong>the</strong>r occasionsfor such interventions.c) The nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se interventions hasrequired that <strong>the</strong> Commission engage dailywith executive functions, and has shownthat <strong>the</strong> Commission has performed regulatoryand executive functions, ra<strong>the</strong>r thansimply advisory functions.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s work creates a tension thatmakes <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> independence verydifficult. The Commission must strike a balancebetween <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its independenceand <strong>the</strong> expectations <strong>of</strong> governmentdepartments that it provide <strong>the</strong>m with support,as well as direct calls for involvementin <strong>the</strong> executive functions <strong>of</strong> government.By its own admission, <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicservice are such that <strong>the</strong> Commissioncannot afford to hold itself alo<strong>of</strong> when it actsindependently and, on occasion, this hasresulted in it getting its hands dirty as isdemonstrated by <strong>the</strong> fact that it has exercisedexecutive functions when it has intervenedin government departments at <strong>the</strong>request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive.e) An interesting development occurred while<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> was deliberating. The PublicService Amendment Bill, 2006, proposes <strong>the</strong>assignment <strong>of</strong> investigative powers to <strong>the</strong>Minister that are similar to those conferredon <strong>the</strong> Commission by <strong>the</strong> Constitution, andwill vest <strong>the</strong> Minister with oversight responsibilitiesand powers. In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposedamendment, <strong>the</strong> Minister can makebinding decisions emanating from investigations.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission has problems with <strong>the</strong> proposedamendment. In this regard, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is concerned that <strong>the</strong> overlap <strong>of</strong>functions might in effect make <strong>the</strong>Commission all but redundant.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Minister for<strong>the</strong> Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministrationappoints <strong>the</strong> Director-General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. It appears to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that <strong>the</strong> explanation for such an approachwas rooted in <strong>the</strong> time when <strong>the</strong> predecessors<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission formed part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Ad</strong>ministration. The <strong>Committee</strong> finds it surprising,however, that this arrangement hascontinued and it should be corrected.3.3. UNDERSTANDING ANDINTERPRETATION OF MANDATEa) The Commission’s work is informed by its constitutionalimperatives. Given its broad mandate,which covers all areas <strong>of</strong> public administrationand a public service with in excess <strong>of</strong>one million employees, <strong>the</strong> Commission hasstructured its work into six key performanceareas, namely monitoring and evaluation;service delivery and quality assurance; leadershipand performance improvement; publicadministration investigations; pr<strong>of</strong>essionalethics and strategic human resource reviews;and labour relations improvement.86 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 6b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission’smandate is confined to <strong>the</strong> public service.Although <strong>the</strong> principles enunciated in section195 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution apply to alladministration in every sphere <strong>of</strong> government,organs <strong>of</strong> state, and public enterprises,at present <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandaterefers only to <strong>the</strong> administrations in <strong>the</strong>national and provincial spheres <strong>of</strong> government.In this regard, <strong>the</strong> proposed singlepublic service will increase <strong>the</strong> Commission’sworkload.c) The Commission has produced very valuabledocuments and carried out important initiatives.Apart from its Annual <strong>Report</strong> on <strong>the</strong>State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Service, its outputsinclude conducting citizen-satisfaction surveysin various government sectors; developingand piloting citizen forums (as well asdeveloping a related toolkit); <strong>the</strong> drawing upand implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> framework for<strong>the</strong> evaluation <strong>of</strong> heads <strong>of</strong> departments;developing rules for <strong>the</strong> lodging <strong>of</strong> complaintsrelating to maladministration, corruption,standards <strong>of</strong> service provided, dishonestyor improper dealings with regards tomoney and <strong>the</strong> behaviour, competency orattitude <strong>of</strong> staff; managing <strong>the</strong> national anticorruptionhotline, as well as developing acode <strong>of</strong> conduct for public servants; developingand managing <strong>the</strong> financial disclosureframework for managers; and developingrules for <strong>the</strong> management <strong>of</strong> grievances.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> commends <strong>the</strong> Commissionon developing various tracking mechanismsto see whe<strong>the</strong>r departments implement itsrecommendations. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is dismayed that <strong>the</strong> Executivedoes not enforce many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’srecommendations, and that <strong>the</strong>y are not discussedin Parliament.e) The net result is that <strong>the</strong> improvements inpublic administration recommended by <strong>the</strong>Commission may not be implemented. TheCommission stated that <strong>the</strong>re is a need forpowers <strong>of</strong> enforcement similar to those itenjoyed under <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong>Commission has in fact considerable powers(including <strong>the</strong> power to summons and to calldepartments to account), but that it doesnot use its powers in this regard strategically.For example, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that<strong>the</strong> Commission had, in fact, used its powersto summons Directors-General but <strong>the</strong>y didnot publicise such summons, <strong>the</strong>reby foregoing<strong>the</strong> persuasive power that knowledge<strong>of</strong> such a precedent can bring in ensuringco-operation from departments.f) The Commission provided details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>number <strong>of</strong> complaints or cases that it dealswith, as well as <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> referralswhere it lacks <strong>the</strong> necessary jurisdiction toconsider a matter itself.g) In terms <strong>of</strong> section 196(4)(f)(ii) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Commission is empoweredto investigate grievances <strong>of</strong> public servants.Table 1 below sets out <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> grievanceslodged by public servants in terms <strong>of</strong>section 35 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Service Act, 1994,dealt with by <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong> pastfive financial years:THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION87


Table 1: Number <strong>of</strong> grievances lodged by public servants, and number <strong>of</strong> referralsFinancial year Number <strong>of</strong> grievances Number <strong>of</strong> referrals2001/2002 93 1322002/2003 29 342003/2004 29 292004/2005 37 2202005/2006 42 3642006/<strong>2007</strong> (up until31 December 2006) 156 262In <strong>the</strong> past financial year (2006/07), <strong>the</strong> nature<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> grievances commonly related to salaryincreases or adjustments, performance assessments,unfair treatment, filling <strong>of</strong> posts, <strong>the</strong>undermining <strong>of</strong> authority, <strong>the</strong> refusal toapprove an application and disciplinary matters.Between 1 September 2004 and 31 December2006, 4 182 corruption and service deliverycases were received via <strong>the</strong> National Anti-Corruption Hotline (which is managed by <strong>the</strong>Commission). Of <strong>the</strong>se, 2 296 cases were relatedto corruption and corruption-related acts.These cases were referred to <strong>the</strong> relevantdepartments for investigation. In addition, in<strong>the</strong> same period <strong>the</strong> Hotline has received morethan 20 000 abusive calls or calls that were notrelated to substantive allegations. Table 2,below, sets out <strong>the</strong> relevant statistics.Table 2: National Anti-Corruption Hotline -cases reported from 1 September 2004 to 31December 20063.4. APPOINTMENTSa) At present, <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commissionconsists <strong>of</strong> fourteen Commissioners. TheNational Assembly approves five <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commissioners, while <strong>the</strong> Premiers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>provinces each nominates one Commissioner.In both <strong>the</strong>se cases, <strong>the</strong> President appoints<strong>the</strong> Commissioners. The President is alsoresponsible for designating one Commissioneras Chairperson and ano<strong>the</strong>r as DeputyChairperson.b) The process for nomination is as follows.Whenever <strong>the</strong> President is required toappoint a Commissioner who must beapproved by <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, <strong>the</strong>President must address a request in writingto <strong>the</strong> Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assemblythat <strong>the</strong> National Assembly approves a fitand proper person for appointment. ACommissioner so appointed must be recommendedby a committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, and approved by <strong>the</strong> Assembly bymeans <strong>of</strong> a majority resolution.Corruption and corruption related cases 2 296Service delivery complaints 1 105Information related cases 108Frivolous cases 507Outside <strong>the</strong> Commission’s jurisdiction 166Total 4 18288 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 6c) A Commissioner nominated by <strong>the</strong> Premier<strong>of</strong> a province must be recommended by acommittee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincial legislature andapproved by that legislature by way <strong>of</strong> amajority resolution.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> has learnt with dismay that<strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> all Commissioners willexpire in 2008. In this regard, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>re is urgentneed to amend <strong>the</strong> relevant legislation toensure that appointments are staggered.The issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> staggering <strong>of</strong> appointments<strong>of</strong> commissioners is also discussed morefully in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.3.5. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that public awareness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and its work is poor. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission hasdeliberately adopted a constrained approachto marketing itself as it does not have <strong>the</strong>capacity to cope with <strong>the</strong> influx <strong>of</strong> complaintsand queries that increased awarenessand publicity brings. However, <strong>the</strong>Commission conceded that it should domore.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> leant that <strong>the</strong> Commissiondoes provide a box at all its <strong>of</strong>fices where<strong>the</strong> public can lodge complaints.Complainants are informed <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> outcome<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir complaint.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTAND THE PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURESa) The Commission is accountable to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and must report to it onan annual basis. The Commission interactsprimarily with <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onPublic Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration, <strong>the</strong> Select<strong>Committee</strong> on Local Government and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration and, occasionally, with <strong>the</strong>Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts.Parliament (both <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and<strong>the</strong> National Council <strong>of</strong> Provinces) is seen asa key stakeholder.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> researchundertaken by <strong>the</strong> Commission is evidencebased,involving <strong>the</strong> ga<strong>the</strong>ring and collation<strong>of</strong> qualitative and quantitative data. The provision<strong>of</strong> useful and relevant research onpublic administration streng<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>the</strong> potentialpolitical oversight role <strong>of</strong> bothParliament and <strong>the</strong> provincial legislatures.c) Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Commission voiced itsfrustration with <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> parliamentaryoversight. While <strong>the</strong> interactionbetween <strong>the</strong> Commission and parliamentarycommittees has been useful, <strong>the</strong>Commission is concerned that <strong>the</strong> informationthat it generates is not being utilised aseffectively as it could be. In <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission, a great deal turns on <strong>the</strong> interest<strong>of</strong> committees <strong>of</strong> Parliament.d) It is also a concern that <strong>the</strong> Commission hasextremely limited interaction with <strong>the</strong>provincial legislatures, although it submits<strong>the</strong> same reports to <strong>the</strong> provincial legislaturesas it does to Parliament. In this regard,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> Commission’sefforts to monitor <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> its interactionswith a view to improving <strong>the</strong> presentsituation. The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>Commission should continue with its effortsby working closely with Premiers.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The Commission entered into a formalmemorandum <strong>of</strong> understanding with <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficeTHE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION89


<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector in 2002 to enhanceco-operation, efficiency and effectivenessand to avoid <strong>the</strong> duplication <strong>of</strong> resources.b) In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> understanding with <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Public ServiceCommission is to investigate complaintsfrom public servants while <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector is to investigate complaints from<strong>the</strong> general public. These referrals arise fromcomplaints lodged with <strong>the</strong> Commission bymembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaintsrules. Complaints lodged with <strong>the</strong>National Anti-Corruption Hotline are notreferred to <strong>the</strong> Public Protector as its casemanagement system requires that callersare given feedback as soon as possible. Thereferral system would not facilitate feedbackwith <strong>the</strong> requisite urgency.c) The Commission provided <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>with <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> complaints that it hasreferred to <strong>the</strong> Public Protector. In thisregard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that although<strong>the</strong> Public Protector acknowledges receipt <strong>of</strong>all complaints that <strong>the</strong> Commission refers toit, <strong>the</strong> Commission does not receive feedbackon <strong>the</strong> outcome <strong>of</strong> investigations.Table 3: Complaints lodged in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>complaints rules and referred to <strong>the</strong> PublicProtectord) The Commission also has an informal relationshipwith <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commissionin terms <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong>y exchange informationobtained through research conductedinto <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong>Access to Information Act, 2000.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>re are o<strong>the</strong>rgrounds for forming relationships withChapter 9 and associated institutions. The<strong>Committee</strong> is surprised that <strong>the</strong> Commissiondoes not liase with, or maintain a relationshipwith, <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality as gender-related issues abound in<strong>the</strong> public service.3.8. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) The Commission has a close and interactiverelationship with <strong>the</strong> Executive that extendsfar beyond that provided for in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>legislation. Thus, <strong>the</strong> Director-General <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission is<strong>the</strong> co-chair <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Governance and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration cluster <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Forum <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrican Directors-General.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is informed that <strong>the</strong>Commission, through <strong>the</strong> Minister for <strong>the</strong>Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration, can submitmemorandums to Cabinet to obtain approvalfor initiatives and to inform Cabinet <strong>of</strong> strategicissues emanating from its investigationsand monitoring and evaluation work. The<strong>Committee</strong> believes this to be improper.Financial yearNumber <strong>of</strong> cases referred to <strong>the</strong>Public Protector2004/2005 32005/2006 232006/<strong>2007</strong> (up until 31 December 2006) 5090 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 6c) In addition, <strong>the</strong> Commission is on occasionrequested by <strong>the</strong> Executive to participate ininterventions, to conduct investigations andto provide advice. The research reports generatedby <strong>the</strong> Commission are circulated toall executing authorities. The Commissionalso provides inputs annually for <strong>the</strong>President’s State <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nation <strong>Ad</strong>dress, aswell as for <strong>the</strong> Budget Vote speech <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Minister.d) Regarding <strong>the</strong> Commission’s interaction with<strong>the</strong> provincial administrations, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is informed that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas frequent interaction with heads <strong>of</strong>departments regarding <strong>the</strong> Commission’srole and function and how it can add valueto <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincial administrations.However, <strong>the</strong> capacity in <strong>the</strong>Commission’s provincial <strong>of</strong>fices is inadequate,with <strong>the</strong> result that it is unable to domonitoring and evaluation for each departmentannually, which calls into question <strong>the</strong>usefulness <strong>of</strong> such provincial <strong>of</strong>fices.3.<strong>9.</strong> INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) Commissioners do disclose <strong>the</strong>ir financialinterests. The disclosure takes place through<strong>the</strong> Director-General in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>President and includes outside remunerationand all o<strong>the</strong>r financial interests. However, incommon with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r constitutional bodies,Commissioners should disclose directorshipsand similar interests in <strong>the</strong> annualreport. General recommendations pertainingto disclosure are made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.b) The Commission has regional <strong>of</strong>fices in allprovinces. These serve as a base forCommissioners in <strong>the</strong> provinces and areadministered by regional directors and astaff complement <strong>of</strong> five. The <strong>Committee</strong>expressed its concern regarding <strong>the</strong> effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regional <strong>of</strong>fices. In addition,as mentioned earlier, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is concernedthat <strong>the</strong> “deployment” <strong>of</strong>Commissioners to regional or provincial<strong>of</strong>fices may affect <strong>the</strong>ir role in what is a singlenational Commission.c) There is a clear allocation <strong>of</strong> roles and responsibilitiesto Commissioners individually and tocommittees <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. The<strong>Committee</strong> was informed that under governancerules determined by <strong>the</strong> Commission allstructures within <strong>the</strong> Commission have mechanismsto deal with conflict. With regard toemployees, <strong>the</strong> Rules for Dealing withGrievances <strong>of</strong> Employees in <strong>the</strong> Public Service(2003) apply. In addition, in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Performance Management and DevelopmentSystem for <strong>the</strong> Senior Management Service,senior managers must enter into performanceagreements in which dispute resolutionmechanisms are stipulated.d) Human resource capacity, and staff retention,particularly at <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> middle management,are matters for concern.3.10. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that although<strong>the</strong> Commission’s budget has grown, it is notcommensurate with <strong>the</strong> increased demands<strong>of</strong> its mandate. For example, <strong>the</strong> NationalAnti-Corruption Hotline requires resourcesthat go far beyond those originally budgetedfor. An unintended result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Hotline isthat it receives service delivery complaintsabout government departments, which haveto be processed. O<strong>the</strong>r areas affected byinadequate funding include <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong>THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION91


Citizens’ Forums, <strong>the</strong> Commission’s monitoringand evaluation function and strategic4. General conclusionshuman resource reviews, as well as itsprovincial <strong>of</strong>fices.b) The Commission’s budget is a discrete andseparate item in <strong>the</strong> annual appropriation.However, <strong>the</strong> conduit <strong>of</strong> information toTreasury is through <strong>the</strong> Ministry for <strong>the</strong>Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration. TheCommission stated that as it does not sit on<strong>the</strong> Ministerial <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Budget(MINCOMBUD), it is unable to influence it,nor can it ask <strong>the</strong> Minister to do so on itsbehalf. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>re is a perceptionthat <strong>the</strong> Commission falls under <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Public Service and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration, as <strong>the</strong> Minister presents <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget to Parliament.c) Table 4 below sets out <strong>the</strong> allocations andexpenditure since 2003/04, as well as <strong>the</strong>Commission’s allocation in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Medium Term Expenditure Framework. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> NationalTreasury has taken into account <strong>the</strong> importance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s work. TheCommission’s allocation has increased fromR64 million in 2003/04 to R97 million in2006/07, and in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Medium TermExpenditure Framework, <strong>the</strong> Commission’sallocation will continue to increase to R116million in 2009/10.Table 4: Income and expenditure 2003/04 –2009/10 24a) The present constitutional and legal mandate<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is suited to <strong>the</strong> currentSouth African environment. Very importantchanges are being prepared in <strong>the</strong> publicservice, and it is a great pity that all <strong>the</strong> presentmembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission will retirenext year. The proposed changes to <strong>the</strong> publicservice will have a very big impact on <strong>the</strong>efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new Commission.b) The Commission is acutely aware that it operatesin <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> a developmental statein which a key focus is <strong>the</strong> transformation <strong>of</strong>society and also <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service itself.Accordingly, it has adopted a useful approachto <strong>the</strong> constitutional and statutory provisionsrelating to its independence in that it guardsagainst direct or indirect interference with <strong>the</strong>programmes and decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution,but it does not hold itself alo<strong>of</strong> from governmentactivities. The <strong>Committee</strong> believes thatthis is a very sensitive area, which <strong>the</strong>Commission has handled well.c) The Commission reveals a good understandingand application <strong>of</strong> its mandate, powersand functions. However, <strong>the</strong> Commission’scapacity to fulfil its mandate is severely tested,particularly in terms <strong>of</strong> its financial andhuman resource capacity. This is likely to bestrained fur<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> introduction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>proposed single public service with <strong>the</strong>accompanying changes.d) The present arrangements concerning <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissioners are unsatis-R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10BudgetAllocation 64 215 73 081 86 106 97 003 105 357 110 506 116 965<strong>Ad</strong>ditionalfunding 2 000 3 500 7 000Expenditure 64 145 71 128 84 725Surplus/(Deficit) 2 070 5 463 8 38124 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>92 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 6factory, in particular those relating to <strong>the</strong>Commission’s size and <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re isno staggering <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners. General recommendationsin this regard are made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport, while specific recommendations aremade below.e) The outcome <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s interactionswith Parliament and <strong>the</strong> provincial legislaturesis unsatisfactory. Recommendationsare made in this regard.f) The Commission has adequate institutionalarrangements, including conflict resolutionmechanisms, a code <strong>of</strong> conduct for staff anddisclosure <strong>of</strong> interests, to ensure efficiencyand effectiveness. Never<strong>the</strong>less, generalrecommendations are made in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.g) At present, collaboration and co-ordination<strong>of</strong> activities with <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions is unsatisfactory. General recommendationsare made in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> report.h) Public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s workis insufficient.i) The Commission contends that <strong>the</strong> increasedallocation for <strong>the</strong> National Anti-CorruptionHotline has not adequately taken into account<strong>the</strong> increased workload that has resultedfrom service delivery complaints. The<strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> present budgetaryarrangements are satisfactory. However,general recommendations relating to budgetaryarrangements for <strong>the</strong> institutions underreview are made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.5. RecommendationsTo enhance <strong>the</strong> Commission’s efficiency andeffectiveness, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat -a) The process <strong>of</strong> selecting and appointing newCommissioners must take into account <strong>the</strong>need for staggering, so as to avoid institutionalmemory loss. This is a particular concerngiven that <strong>the</strong> present Commissioners’terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice come to an end next year.General recommendations are made in thisregard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.b) The number <strong>of</strong> Commissioners appointedshould be reduced from fourteen to betweenfive and seven Commissioners. With <strong>the</strong>increased role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister and a propersystem being in place, <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>between five and seven Commissioners willmeet <strong>the</strong> new needs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office.c) In <strong>the</strong> meantime, until changes in <strong>the</strong> compositionare made, Commissioners located in<strong>the</strong> provinces must play a greater advocacyrole by actively promoting <strong>the</strong> Commission’swork in <strong>the</strong> provincial legislatures. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,<strong>the</strong> Commission should seek toincrease <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong> its reports to <strong>the</strong>provincial legislatures by providing informationthat is pertinent to <strong>the</strong> provinces.d) Until <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s principle recommendationconcerning Parliament’s role in <strong>the</strong>budget process is effected, <strong>the</strong>re must be aclear statement <strong>of</strong> understanding when <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget is presented toParliament, to which <strong>the</strong> Minister for <strong>the</strong>Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration contributes,that <strong>the</strong> Commission and its budgetdo not form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> PublicService and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration.e) The Commission should include informationin its annual report that reflects <strong>the</strong> outcome<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations it has made toParliament and <strong>the</strong> provincial legislatures.f) The Commission should actively promotepublic awareness <strong>of</strong> its role and activities.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION93


CHAPTER 7


CHAPTER 7CHAPTER 7THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR1. BackgroundDemocratic governments worldwide areentrusted with <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> protectingand enhancing <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir citizens.However, governments are not infallible. Inorder to promote and ensure effective government,different forms <strong>of</strong> supervision and oversight<strong>of</strong> state functionaries have been identified.This is to ensure that citizens enjoy somedegree <strong>of</strong> protection if <strong>the</strong>ir rights arebreached, in particular in <strong>the</strong> event <strong>of</strong> administrativeimpropriety. However, litigation tends tobe formal, expensive and dilatory to <strong>the</strong> pointwhere <strong>the</strong> ordinary person is deterred fromusing it to assert or enforce his or her rights.Therefore, most democracies have an institutionthat is similar to that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector, although <strong>the</strong>y go by a variety <strong>of</strong>names, including that <strong>of</strong> ombudsman, mediatorand commissioner. In broad terms, <strong>the</strong>se institutionswill assist in maintaining and establishingefficient and proper public administration,as <strong>the</strong>y are able to insist that <strong>the</strong> administrationacts within democratic principles.Therefore an institution such as <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector is an important addition to <strong>the</strong>armory <strong>of</strong> mechanisms that are employed tocreate <strong>the</strong> substance <strong>of</strong> fair and stable constitutionalgovernment. In fur<strong>the</strong>rance <strong>of</strong> this ideal,appointments to this <strong>of</strong>fice require an experiencedpublic <strong>of</strong>ficer to monitor <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> policy and <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> services toensure administrative justice and fair treatment<strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> people.The idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ombudsman originatedin Sweden, spreading at first to <strong>the</strong>Scandinavian countries and <strong>the</strong>n later to variousCommonwealth and o<strong>the</strong>r European countries.In particular, <strong>the</strong> transition to democracy andgrowth in democratic structures <strong>of</strong> governancein <strong>the</strong> past few decades have led to <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> many more such <strong>of</strong>fices in recenttimes.During <strong>the</strong> negotiating process in South Africa,it was unanimously agreed that <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> an independent and impartial ombudsmanwith substantially expanded powers toinvestigate and review <strong>the</strong> regularity and legality<strong>of</strong> administrative actions was vital for <strong>the</strong>protection and enforcement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights thatwere to be contained in <strong>the</strong> transitionalConstitution.However, <strong>the</strong> term Public Protector was preferredbecause <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gender connotations concerning<strong>the</strong> word ‘ombudsman’. Therefore, <strong>the</strong>1993 Constitution provided for <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, and Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1996 confirms <strong>the</strong> continuedexistence <strong>of</strong> this <strong>of</strong>fice as a State InstitutionSupporting Constitutional Democracy.The <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector came intobeing on 1 October 1995. As a historical aside,prior to <strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> democracy, <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>idregime established <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ad</strong>vocate-General, which was not established in <strong>the</strong> context<strong>of</strong> a democratic state and fell far short <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> prerequisites for an ombudsman.In contrast, <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorwas established for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> ensuringgovernment accountability and providing remediesfor maladministration and abuse <strong>of</strong> authority.It is up to <strong>the</strong> Public Protector to use his orher powers to investigate, report on and suggestremedial action for a wide range <strong>of</strong> improprietiesin <strong>the</strong> public administration, includingmaladministration, <strong>the</strong> abuse or unjustifiableuse <strong>of</strong> power, corruption, unlawful enrichment,and acts that unlawfully prejudice a citizen.THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR95


2. Constitutional andlegal mandateSection 112 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution created anindependent and impartial Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector. The Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1996 provides for<strong>the</strong> continued existence <strong>of</strong> an independent andimpartial Public Protector as a state institutionsupporting constitutional democracy. ThePublic Protector is mandated to investigate anyconduct in state affairs or in <strong>the</strong> public administrationin any sphere <strong>of</strong> government that isalleged or suspected to be improper or to resultin any impropriety or prejudice, to report on <strong>the</strong>alleged or suspected conduct, and to proposeappropriate remedial action.The operational requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice areprovided for under <strong>the</strong> Public Protector Act 23<strong>of</strong> 1994, as amended.2.1. INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITYThe Constitution contains <strong>the</strong> following provisionsthat aim to protect <strong>the</strong> independence andimpartiality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector:a) Section 181 lists <strong>the</strong> Public Protector as astate institution streng<strong>the</strong>ning constitutionaldemocracy, declaring it independent, andsubject only to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law.It also requires <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice to be impartial,and to exercise its powers and perform itsfunctions without fear, favour or prejudice.b) In terms <strong>of</strong> section 181(5), <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector is accountable to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, and must report to <strong>the</strong> Assemblyat least once a year on <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice and <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> its functions.In addition, section 8 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public ProtectorAct, 1994, was amended in 1998 by providingthat <strong>the</strong> Public Protector may submitspecial reports when necessary.c) Section 181(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution directso<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state, through legislativeand o<strong>the</strong>r measures, to assist and protect<strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector to ensureits independence, impartiality, dignity andeffectiveness.d) Section 181(4) prohibits any person or organ<strong>of</strong> state from interfering with <strong>the</strong> functioning<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.The governing legislation streng<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>the</strong>se constitutionalprinciples. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, section 5(3)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector Act, as amended, indemnifies<strong>the</strong> Public Protector and any member <strong>of</strong>his or her <strong>of</strong>fice against liability in respect <strong>of</strong>anything reflected in any report, finding, point <strong>of</strong>view or recommendation made or expressed ingood faith and submitted to Parliament in terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act or <strong>the</strong> Constitution.2.2. POWERS AND FUNCTIONSSection 182(1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution assigns to<strong>the</strong> Public Protector <strong>the</strong> power to investigateany conduct in state affairs, or in <strong>the</strong> publicadministration in any sphere <strong>of</strong> government,that is alleged or suspected to be improper orto result in any impropriety or prejudice, toreport on that conduct and to take appropriateremedial action.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, section 6(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public ProtectorAct provides <strong>the</strong> Public Protector with additionalpowers to investigate, whe<strong>the</strong>r on own initiativeor on receipt <strong>of</strong> a complaint, any alleged -a) Maladministration in connection with <strong>the</strong>affairs <strong>of</strong> government and any allegedabuse <strong>of</strong> power or o<strong>the</strong>r improper conductby a person performing a public function;b) Improper or dishonest act or omission or<strong>of</strong>fences; and96 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 7c) Improper or unlawful enrichment or receipt<strong>of</strong> any advantage or promise <strong>of</strong> such enrichmentor advantage by a person as a result<strong>of</strong> an act or omission in <strong>the</strong> public administrationor in connection with <strong>the</strong> affairs <strong>of</strong>government at any level or <strong>of</strong> a person performinga public function.Section 6(4) and (5) deal with <strong>the</strong> power toinvestigate ei<strong>the</strong>r an alleged act or any attemptto commit such an act.The Public Protector Act gives <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector special powers to assist him or her inconducting an investigation. The PublicProtector may direct any person to appearbefore him or her to give evidence or producea document in his or her possession or underhis or her control. The Public Protector may alsorequest <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong> any person at anylevel <strong>of</strong> government or anyone who performs apublic function, to assist <strong>the</strong> Public Protector inperforming his or her duties with regard to aspecial investigation.Section 182(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution specificallyprovides that <strong>the</strong> Public Protector may notinvestigate court decisions.It is very important though ra<strong>the</strong>r unusual that<strong>the</strong> Constitution provides that <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector must be accessible to all persons andcommunities, and that <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorshould ensure transparency and openness,especially in reporting, unless exceptional circumstancesas determined by national legislationrequire o<strong>the</strong>rwise.The Executive Members’ Ethics Act, 1998,enables <strong>the</strong> Public Protector to investigate anycomplaint received from <strong>the</strong> President, aMember <strong>of</strong> Parliament or Premier or member <strong>of</strong>a provincial legislature <strong>of</strong> an alleged breach <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> code <strong>of</strong> ethics governing <strong>the</strong> conduct <strong>of</strong>Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cabinet, Deputy Ministers andMembers <strong>of</strong> Executive Councils <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provinces.3. FindingsThe Public Protector responded in writing to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s questionnaire. This documentformed <strong>the</strong> basis for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s discussionswith <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, which took place on 7February <strong>2007</strong>. The <strong>Committee</strong>’s findings werealso informed by fur<strong>the</strong>r submissions from <strong>the</strong>Public Protector and from <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Justiceand Constitutional Development, as well as anumber <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r submissions. From <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> finds as follows:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) The Public Protector accepts that <strong>the</strong> principles<strong>of</strong> co-operative government and intergovernmentalrelations as set out in section41(1) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution apply to his <strong>of</strong>fice.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> has obtained legalopinion that refutes this. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Independent Electoral Commission vLangeberg Municipality, 25 <strong>the</strong> ConstitutionalCourt had occasion to consider this matter.The Court held that while Chapter 9 institutionsare organs <strong>of</strong> state, <strong>the</strong>y do not formpart <strong>of</strong> government. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>reiterates that <strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> co-operativegovernment do not apply to <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector, and that none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9institutions are bound by <strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong>co-operative government.b) The Public Protector Act provides that <strong>the</strong>remuneration and o<strong>the</strong>r terms and conditions<strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector and<strong>the</strong> Deputy Public Protector are determinedby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly on <strong>the</strong> advice <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> parliamentary committee to which <strong>the</strong>matter is referred.25 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC)THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR97


c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that, while thisstreng<strong>the</strong>ns <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice,in practice <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> remunerationhas created difficulties, particularly withregard to periodic adjustments or increases.d) In his submission to <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong>on Operational Problems in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector set up by <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly originally in 2006, <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector objected to not being consulted asa public <strong>of</strong>fice-bearer prior to <strong>the</strong> publication<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IndependentCommission for <strong>the</strong> Remuneration <strong>of</strong> PublicOffice-Bearers. This Commission makes recommendationsregarding <strong>the</strong> salaries <strong>of</strong>public <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers, including judges. Interms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector’s salary is benchmarked againstthat <strong>of</strong> a Judge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Supreme Court <strong>of</strong>Appeal. As such, <strong>the</strong> recommendations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission, once endorsed by <strong>the</strong>President, will impact on <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector.e) In <strong>the</strong> same submission, <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorcomplained that <strong>the</strong> present budgetaryarrangements undermine his independence.In particular, <strong>the</strong> budgetary arrangementsallow for a situation where, in fact, NationalTreasury and <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development decide his pay.The Deputy Public Protector’s salary and conditions<strong>of</strong> service are dependent on <strong>the</strong> publicservice scales.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> regrets that section 219(5)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, which requires <strong>the</strong>enactment <strong>of</strong> framework legislation todetermine <strong>the</strong> remuneration for <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various constitutional institutions(including <strong>the</strong> Public Protector), has not yetbeen enacted. This matter is discussed ingreater detail and general recommendationsare made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.3.2 INTERPRETATION ANDUNDERSTANDING OF MANDATEa) As previously mentioned, <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector is mandated to investigate anyconduct in state affairs, or in public administrationin any sphere <strong>of</strong> government, that isalleged or suspected to be improper or toresult in any impropriety or prejudice, toreport on that conduct and to take appropriateremedial action.b) A number <strong>of</strong> submissions made to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> brought to its attention criticism<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector for narrowly interpretinghis mandate. Of course this wouldrelate to his mandate in investigating anysphere <strong>of</strong> government. It appears that <strong>the</strong>criticism is linked to cases involving highlevelpeople in public life. While <strong>the</strong>re is thisview, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is in no position toestablish <strong>the</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se perceptions.This is a matter for <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector to respond to. The <strong>Committee</strong>does, however, in that regard draw attentionto <strong>the</strong> constitutional provision relating to <strong>the</strong>Public Protector’s dignity.c) A very important element in <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector’s work is <strong>the</strong> response <strong>of</strong> governmentdepartments following requests forinformation. Such information must be suppliedin order for <strong>the</strong> Public Protector toinvestigate complaints. The Public Protectorhas extensive powers to demand public informationbut has only had to resort to subpoenason two occasions to obtain <strong>the</strong> necessaryinformation. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>notes that investigations are <strong>of</strong>ten delayed by<strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> departments or public entitiesto co-operate in a timely fashion.98 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 7d) The <strong>Committee</strong> spent considerable timeenquiring about <strong>the</strong> time taken to settlecases. Table 1 in subparagraph (f) belowprovides details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> new casesreceived, cases finalised and cases carriedforward since 199<strong>9.</strong>The <strong>Committee</strong> also asked about <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong>acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector’s recommendations.The Public Protector informed itthat acceptance <strong>of</strong> recommendations is veryhigh.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> more commontypes <strong>of</strong> cases investigated include:i. Insufficient or no reasons given for adecision;ii. The interpretation <strong>of</strong> criteria, standards,guidelines, regulations, laws, informationor evidence was wrong;iii. Processes, policies or guidelines were notfollowed or were not applied in a consistentmanner;iv. <strong>Ad</strong>verse impact <strong>of</strong> a decision or policy onan individual or group;v. Failure to provide sufficient or propernotice;vii. A public service was not provided to allindividuals equitably; andviii. Denial <strong>of</strong> access to information.f) The Public Protector deals with an enormousworkload. The Public Protector informed <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that, despite a slight decrease innew cases, <strong>the</strong> workload has actuallyincreased with <strong>the</strong> focus on systemic problems.The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned that <strong>the</strong> backlogin cases has increased from 1999, butunderstands that <strong>the</strong>re is a strategy toaddress <strong>the</strong> backlog.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that<strong>the</strong>re appears to be a problem with <strong>the</strong>Public Protector’s data system, which as aresult is not operational, making it difficultor cumbersome for <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice to provide <strong>the</strong>necessary statistics, as <strong>the</strong>se all need to becompiled manually.Table 1 below provides statistics <strong>of</strong> casescarried forward, new cases received andcases finalised.Table 1: Summary <strong>of</strong> cases carried forward,new cases received and cases finalisedvi. Due process denied;Cases carried forward New Cases Cases finalised Cases carried overfrom previous yearto following year1999 10 884 9 085 6 993 12 9762000/01 13 326 10 442 9 649 14 1202001/02 13 427 12 174 12 202 13 3992002/03 13 399 15 674 21 705 7 3682003/04 7 520 17 295 15 946 8 8692004/05 9 292 22 350 7 539 14 1032005/06 14 103 17 415 17 619 13 899(Note that <strong>the</strong>re appear to be discrepancies between cases carried forward from aprevious year and cases carried over to a following year)THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR99


g) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector has conducted very few proactiveor own-initiative investigations. The<strong>Committee</strong> was able to establish that <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice had in fact initiated only 10 such casesin 2006/07, 7 cases were finalised and atotal <strong>of</strong> 18 cases have been carried forward to<strong>the</strong> present financial year. Again, <strong>the</strong> steadilyincreasing number <strong>of</strong> cases carried forwardeach year is a cause for concern to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>. In cases where a matter is one <strong>of</strong>great public importance, <strong>the</strong> public wouldexpect <strong>the</strong> Public Protector to act. Table 2below provides <strong>the</strong> relevant statistics.Table 2: Own initiative investigations:Cases initiated and finalised 2002/03 –2006/073.3. APPOINTMENTSa) The Public Protector and <strong>the</strong> Deputy PublicProtector are appointed by <strong>the</strong> President on<strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly for a non-renewable period <strong>of</strong>seven years. The resolution recommending<strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protectormust enjoy <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> at least 60% <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly,while that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Deputy Public Protectorrequires a simple majority.b) As far as qualifications are concerned, <strong>the</strong>criteria laid down for appointment areextensive and broad and do not comparewith those for o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutions.The criteria have, in any event not reallybeen applied. In practice, appointment turnslargely on having legal qualifications, orexperience in <strong>the</strong> administration <strong>of</strong> justice.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes for example, that aMember <strong>of</strong> Parliament with ten years experienceis also eligible for appointment.c) The qualifications require revisiting. Generalrecommendations in this regard are made inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.Cases Cases Cases carriedinitiated finalised forward2002/03 6 1 6 (1 case had been brought forward from 2001/02)2003/04 2 5 32004/05 16 3 162005/06 7 8 152006/07 10 7 18Total 41 24 18100 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 73.4. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The Constitution requires that <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector be accessible to all persons andcommunities. Similarly, <strong>the</strong> Public ProtectorAct requires that <strong>the</strong> Public Protector mustmake his or her <strong>of</strong>fice accessible to <strong>the</strong> public.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector has a national head <strong>of</strong>fice, nineprovincial <strong>of</strong>fices, and six regional <strong>of</strong>fices,and is in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> creating two moreregional <strong>of</strong>fices in <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn and EasternCape. In addition, <strong>the</strong>re are 73 visiting pointslocated mostly in rural areas. The PublicProtector has an outreach programmeinvolving each <strong>of</strong> its regional <strong>of</strong>fices. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes from submissions made toit that in general <strong>the</strong>re appears to be a higherdegree <strong>of</strong> satisfaction with <strong>the</strong> head<strong>of</strong>fice as opposed to regional and/or provincial<strong>of</strong>fices. The issue <strong>of</strong> provincial andregional <strong>of</strong>fices is explored in greater detailin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector should actively exploreways and means <strong>of</strong> interacting with community-basedorganisations in order to gainaccess to <strong>the</strong> most disadvantaged and poor,especially in rural areas. In addition, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendations elsewhereregarding <strong>the</strong> innovative use <strong>of</strong> existinggovernment initiatives to increase publicawareness.d) Submissions were made to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that <strong>the</strong> public is not aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector, despite its outreach activities and<strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> provincial and regional<strong>of</strong>fices. These submissions are fortified by<strong>the</strong> findings in a Cabinet document that overhalf <strong>of</strong> respondents had never heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> South African HumanRights Commission and <strong>the</strong> Commission onGender Equality and <strong>the</strong>refore did notunderstand <strong>the</strong>ir functions. 26This is confirmedby a survey undertaken by <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>, which indicated that only 42%<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> reiterates that where <strong>the</strong>functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions under reviewoverlap, <strong>the</strong>re should be concerted jointefforts. These are not bodies that areephemeral or private institutions. They areconstitutional bodies and should be widelyaccessible, especially in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> humanrights.f) As mentioned above, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> findsthat <strong>the</strong> institutional capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Protector to deal with complaintsin a timely fashion requires streng<strong>the</strong>ning.The inability to finalise cases speedily maydissuade <strong>the</strong> public from utilising <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector as an alternative dispute resolutionmechanism, <strong>the</strong>reby undermining <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice’s effectiveness. The <strong>Committee</strong>believes that delays in arriving at recommendationsleads to dissatisfaction and disillusionmentin <strong>the</strong> whole system. On thispoint, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> believes that backlogsshould be dealt with as a priority, and that<strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reduction in <strong>the</strong> backlogrests with <strong>the</strong> Public Protector,3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The <strong>Committee</strong>’s terms <strong>of</strong> reference include<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> collaboration between <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review. The <strong>Committee</strong> haslearnt that -26 Government <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South Africa, Macro-social Trends in South Africa. Discussiondocument produced by <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Presidency. 2006.THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR101


i. To avoid <strong>the</strong> potential for duplication <strong>of</strong>functions, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector has amemorandum <strong>of</strong> understanding with <strong>the</strong>Public Service Commission concerning<strong>the</strong> referral <strong>of</strong> complaints to each o<strong>the</strong>r.Nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Public Protector nor <strong>the</strong>Public Service Commission were able toinform <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong>referrals and <strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>the</strong>re<strong>of</strong>.Recommendations regarding <strong>the</strong> referral<strong>of</strong> cases are made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.ii. Where a matter involves <strong>the</strong> promotion,monitoring and assessment <strong>of</strong> humanrights and an abuse <strong>of</strong> those rights, <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector will refer itto <strong>the</strong> appropriate commission. Forexample, <strong>the</strong> practice <strong>of</strong> creating “gatedcommunities” by closing <strong>of</strong>f public accessto neighbourhoods for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong>crime prevention was referred to <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> systematiccollaboration between <strong>the</strong> variousChapter 9 and associated institutions. In evidencebefore <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> reference wasmade to <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> respective strengthsand capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions is not <strong>the</strong>same, making collaboration even more complicated.For example, in <strong>the</strong> past <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector had more <strong>of</strong>fices in <strong>the</strong> provincesthan <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality,which made it very difficult if not impossibleto refer cases from <strong>the</strong> Public Protector to <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equality.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> views this as a serious matter.That <strong>the</strong>re are disparities in capacity andresources should not result in a lack <strong>of</strong> liaison.Mandatory meetings are necessary toestablish a culture <strong>of</strong> co-ordination. Jointactivities may have budget implications,requiring planning and a special budget forimplementation. The issue <strong>of</strong> co-ordinationand collaboration is discussed more fully inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> concludes that <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9institutions have adopted a reactiveapproach to collaboration in terms <strong>of</strong> which<strong>the</strong>ir working toge<strong>the</strong>r occurs on an informalbasis. The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that a morepurposive strategy towards <strong>the</strong>ir workingtoge<strong>the</strong>r would be far more effective andefficient, especially in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protection<strong>of</strong> human rights in respect <strong>of</strong> which<strong>the</strong>re is a very loose and informal interactionbetween <strong>the</strong>m.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH CIVIL SOCIETYa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that a key ingredientin <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> forming such a relationshipis <strong>the</strong> public’s knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rights andhow to act on any violation <strong>of</strong> such rights.Promoting knowledge <strong>of</strong> human rights is ashared responsibility <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Protector and civil society. In thisregard, a sustained and structured relationshipwould be advantageous. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes, however, that in reality<strong>the</strong> relationship with civil society is reflectedas weak, as well as being informal andintermittent.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> enabling legislationdoes not require <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorto have contact or establish meaningful liaisonwith civil society, which is in contrast to<strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality.c) However, civil society organisations are<strong>of</strong>ten <strong>the</strong> first port <strong>of</strong> call for distressed individualsor groups in need <strong>of</strong> redress.102 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 7Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, civil society organisations are avaluable network for access to communitiesand residents, particularly at <strong>the</strong> local levelor in far-flung rural communities and residences.d) A submission made to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>emphasised <strong>the</strong> need to reach out to <strong>the</strong>poor, marginalised and vulnerable. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> relationshipwith civil society is crucial to enhancing<strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. In this regard,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector has stated that ‘co-operationwith civil society organisations is <strong>of</strong>high importance to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector as <strong>the</strong>se organisations are <strong>of</strong>ten<strong>the</strong> eyes and ears <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorwhere individuals are unable to access <strong>the</strong>Public Protector or did not know about <strong>the</strong>Public Protector’.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> relationshipwith civil society needs to be firmed upin <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> submissions made by civilsociety that have questioned <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector’s operations and effectiveness.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> highlights <strong>the</strong> need forincreased attention to and allocation <strong>of</strong>resources towards building healthy relationswith civil society. Such encounters are ameans <strong>of</strong> informing civil society <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, and <strong>of</strong> human rightsissues <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> day.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) At present <strong>the</strong> Public Protector is accountableto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly through <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Justice andConstitutional Development. In his submission,<strong>the</strong> Public Protector advocated greaterinteraction and better relations with <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>.b) In addition, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector proposed<strong>the</strong> need for a mechanism within Parliamentto facilitate a more systematic interactionbetween it and <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and relatedbodies.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> agrees that <strong>the</strong>re should bemore systematic engagement and co-ordination<strong>of</strong> activities, and makes recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.3.8. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) The Public Protector has criticised <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment and <strong>the</strong> National Treasury in<strong>the</strong> financial arrangements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice,which impacts on its internal operations andalso on its staff appointments.b) The Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment is unique in having a specialdirectorate with a large staff complement todeal with <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions. ThisDirectorate has wide terms <strong>of</strong> reference todeal with budgetary processes; promoteproposals emanating from <strong>the</strong> reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 institutions; evaluate and investigate<strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions founding legislation;and promote and promulgate legislationto enhance <strong>the</strong> institutions’ effectiveness.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendations inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report concerning <strong>the</strong>appropriate financial arrangements for <strong>the</strong>institutions under review and in relation tostaffing.THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR103


d) In addition, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> highlights <strong>the</strong>recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong>on Operational Problems in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector concerning <strong>the</strong> need tomaintain <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> authority and accountabilitybetween <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector and o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state. In <strong>the</strong>light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sentiments expressed by <strong>the</strong>Public Protector as reflected in <strong>the</strong> previousparagraph, it is especially important thatclear lines <strong>of</strong> authority are observedbetween <strong>the</strong> Public Protector and <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment so as to protect <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.3.<strong>9.</strong> INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> regrets <strong>the</strong> recent public discordbetween <strong>the</strong> Public Protector and <strong>the</strong>Deputy Public Protector, highlighting thatsuch disputes tarnish <strong>the</strong> image <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficeand undermine its credibility. In this regard,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adhoc <strong>Committee</strong> on Operational Problems in<strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector appointedby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly in 2006 at <strong>the</strong>request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector to investigate<strong>the</strong> operational problems in that <strong>the</strong> ad hoc<strong>Committee</strong> found that <strong>the</strong> dispute had notonly been aggravated by inadequate internalsystems but also had negatively impactedon <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. This<strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong>made several general recommendations tobring about stability in <strong>the</strong> internal operations,and in particular highlighted <strong>the</strong> needto fill senior posts.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong> internalgovernance arrangements. Too manysenior posts remained unfilled for too long atime. A number <strong>of</strong> key vacancies, includingthat <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> chief financial <strong>of</strong>ficer and ChiefExecutive Officer, have only recently beenfilled as a result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong>. Whatever <strong>the</strong> difficultiesin filling <strong>the</strong>se posts, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>believes that <strong>the</strong>se vacancies seriouslyimpinged on <strong>the</strong> operations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Office.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> representivityin appointments within <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Protector, and within its provincial<strong>of</strong>fices, which must be corrected.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> North WestProvince has a staff complement that ismore than double that <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rprovincial <strong>of</strong>fices. The reason for this is historicalas <strong>the</strong> North West Province <strong>of</strong>fice wasan inherited structure from <strong>the</strong> formerBophuthatswana homeland, which had fiveombudsman <strong>of</strong>fices.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> accepts <strong>the</strong> explanation butbelieves that this has lasted too long. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> present situation isnei<strong>the</strong>r an efficient nor effective use <strong>of</strong>resources.f) It emerged in evidence that <strong>the</strong>re is urgentneed for a case management system. Sucha system allows for <strong>the</strong> tracking <strong>of</strong> casesfrom <strong>the</strong> beginning to <strong>the</strong>ir conclusion,<strong>the</strong>reby enabling progress to be monitored.At present, <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice simply does not haveaccess to <strong>the</strong> necessary data. The <strong>of</strong>fice haspaid for a system but it is not operational.Presently statistics are compiled manuallyand, as <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> has noted earlier, <strong>the</strong>absence <strong>of</strong> a case management system createsdifficulties in compiling statistics and inmonitoring <strong>the</strong> progress with cases.g) With regard to policies on disclosure <strong>of</strong> out-104 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 7side interests, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector informed<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re were no policiesin any form in place until 2003. The PublicProtector is not permitted to perform o<strong>the</strong>rremunerative work. Presently, all seniormanagers declare <strong>the</strong>ir interests informallyto <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, but a task team hasbeen established to attend to this.h) As is <strong>the</strong> case with all <strong>the</strong> bodies itreviewed, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds <strong>the</strong> arrangementsconcerning <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> interestsunsatisfactory. The issue is discussed morefully and recommendations are made inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.i) The Public Protector Act provides that <strong>the</strong>National Assembly must determine <strong>the</strong>remuneration and o<strong>the</strong>r terms and conditions<strong>of</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.The <strong>Committee</strong> has dealt with this earlier in<strong>the</strong> <strong>chapter</strong>. It is clear to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that<strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a legislative framework interms <strong>of</strong> section 219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionto determine <strong>the</strong> remuneration <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficebearersfor <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedconstitutional institutions is cause for enormousdissatisfaction and frustration.j) The Public Protector Act makes provision for<strong>the</strong> tabling in Parliament <strong>of</strong> a document settingout <strong>the</strong> remuneration, allowances ando<strong>the</strong>r conditions <strong>of</strong> employment in appointingnew staff. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>last occasion on which such a document wastabled was in 2002.3.10. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) Table 3 below gives a financial summary for<strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector for <strong>the</strong> period2003/04 to 2009/10. With <strong>the</strong> exception<strong>of</strong> 2004/05, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector has underspenteach year in <strong>the</strong> period under review.This is <strong>of</strong> concern to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, given<strong>the</strong> dissatisfaction that <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorexpressed concerning budgetary constraints.b) It is noted that <strong>the</strong> budgetary allocations willhave more than doubled between 2003/04and 2009/10.c) Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that ithas insufficient information to draw anyconclusions with regard to cost effectiveness.Table 3: Revenue and Expenditure – Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Protector 27 .R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Totalrevenue 44 628 50 063 59 258 67 784 78 722 86 475 95 099Totalexpenditure 41 001 53 201 58 230Surplus/(Deficit) 2 627 (3 138) 1 02827 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Public Protector’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR105


4. General conclusionsa) The present configuration and operations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector is suitablefor <strong>the</strong> current South African environment.b) In light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adhoc <strong>Committee</strong> on Operational Problems in<strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, it is necessarythat internal mechanisms are set up todeal with breakdowns in relations.c) The appointments and budget arrangementsare unsatisfactory. Recommendations toenhance consistency, coherence, accountabilityand affordability are made in Chapter 2<strong>of</strong> this report.d) The National Assembly’s oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector is unsatisfactory.Recommendations are made in thisregard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.e) The Public Protector’s institutional arrangements,particularly <strong>the</strong> arrangements concerningdisclosure <strong>of</strong> interests, are inadequate.e) At present, <strong>the</strong> collaboration and co-ordination<strong>of</strong> activities with <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions are effectively nonexistent.f) Public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Public Protector and its work is insufficient.5. RecommendationsThe <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that -a) The <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector continuewithout substantive change to ei<strong>the</strong>r its mandateor to its <strong>the</strong> powers and functions.b) The Public Protector should be proactive inincreasing public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> activities<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. In this regard <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>refers to <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc<strong>Committee</strong> on Operational Problems in <strong>the</strong>Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, namely that<strong>the</strong>re is need for an effective communicationstrategy to allow <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice to keep <strong>the</strong> publicadequately informed <strong>of</strong> its work and <strong>of</strong>progress with cases, thus avoiding any misunderstanding.c) The Public Protector should participate in <strong>the</strong>proposed formal collaborative structure to beformed between <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions to ensure co-ordinated activitiesand <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> joint projects.d) There should be a formal agreement with relevantinstitutions to prevent any possibility <strong>of</strong>duplication or overlap <strong>of</strong> functions. This is particularlynecessary where <strong>the</strong>re is referral <strong>of</strong>cases or complaints to ano<strong>the</strong>r body.Specifically, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that<strong>the</strong> Public Protector formalises its relationshipwith <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, <strong>the</strong> Commission forGender Equality and <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission and establishes mechanisms totrack and monitor referred matters.e) The Public Protector needs to develop a staffretention strategy to address staff turnover,particularly at a senior level.f) Mechanisms should be developed to improve106 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 7<strong>the</strong> relationship and interaction between <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.The role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly discussedin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report would behelpful.g) The appointments procedures in respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector and <strong>the</strong> Deputy PublicProtector should be reviewed. The <strong>Committee</strong>makes general proposals in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.h) The budget process and location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector’s budget allocation should be revisedin accordance with <strong>the</strong> recommendations <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.i) The directorships, partnerships and consultancies<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector and <strong>the</strong> DeputyPublic Protector and senior <strong>of</strong>ficials must bedisclosed in <strong>the</strong> annual report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice. Inaddition, <strong>the</strong> disclosures <strong>of</strong> pecuniary ando<strong>the</strong>r interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers and staffmembers must be kept available in a registerand an indication must be made in <strong>the</strong> annualreport <strong>of</strong> where such information is available.General recommendations in this regardare made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> report.j) The appropriate lines <strong>of</strong> authority and accountabilitybetween <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector and o<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state, more particularly<strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development, should beobserved so as to protect <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Public Protector.k) Clear protocols for <strong>the</strong> delegation <strong>of</strong> powersand functions must be established so as toavoid <strong>the</strong> potential for internal conflict.THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR107


CHAPTER 8


CHAPTER 8CHAPTER 8THE NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION1. BackgroundPrior to democracy in South Africa in <strong>the</strong> early1990s, political, social and economic oppressionensured that <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> South Africanyouth grew up vastly disadvantaged. BlackSouth African youth were forced to live inunderdeveloped, poor communities, with minimalgovernment services, grossly inadequateschooling, practically non-existent sporting andrecreational facilities and little or no access toadequate health care and social development.The squalor <strong>of</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id was <strong>the</strong> harsh realityfor <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> youth. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>youth, however, were active in asserting <strong>the</strong>irneeds, forming youth organisations, joiningpolitical movements and protesting against <strong>the</strong>injustices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id system. Young peopleparticipated vociferously in <strong>the</strong> national liberationstruggle, fighting for freedom, equalityand justice. However, for many young people,this required huge sacrifices including education,social exclusion, living under <strong>the</strong> fear <strong>of</strong>arrest, torture and detainment and having tomove away from <strong>the</strong>ir families. Many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>youth were not afforded <strong>the</strong> opportunity todevelop and advance to <strong>the</strong>ir full potential.The new democratic dispensation recognised <strong>the</strong>importance <strong>of</strong> youth development in its transformationagenda. Youth development remains acritical component <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> full realisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>vision <strong>of</strong> a new and better South Africa foundedon <strong>the</strong> values <strong>of</strong> human dignity, equality, humanrights, non-racialism and non-sexism.The National Youth Commission was establishedon 16 June 1996 in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalYouth Commission Act 19 <strong>of</strong> 1996. This waspart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> democratic government’s plan todevelop a comprehensive strategy to address<strong>the</strong> challenges facing young men and womenbetween <strong>the</strong> ages <strong>of</strong> 14 and 35 years.The creation <strong>of</strong> a National Youth Commissionwas in direct response to <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> a Youth Summit convened by <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>nDeputy President, Thabo Mbeki, in December1994. Representatives at <strong>the</strong> Summit hadcalled for <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a Commissionthat would serve to highlight and monitor <strong>the</strong>situation <strong>of</strong> young people, while co-ordinatingand initiating <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> appropriatepolicies and strategies geared to youth development.Approximately 70% <strong>of</strong> South Africa’s populationis under <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> 35 years, while youth in <strong>the</strong>age group between 14 and 35 years make upclose to 40% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total population. This figurerises to 60% when <strong>the</strong> total population for<strong>the</strong> continent is considered, and it is expectedthat this figure will rise to 80% by <strong>the</strong> year2020. Accordingly, it is to be expected thatyouth development will continue to grow inprominence as youth continue to grapple withsuch issues as poverty, employment opportunities,education, substance abuse and <strong>the</strong>effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> scourge <strong>of</strong> HIV and AIDS.Although <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission is nota constitutional institution, it is a statutory bodythat is accountable to <strong>the</strong> President. ThePresident, however, has delegated his powersin this regard to <strong>the</strong> Minister in <strong>the</strong> Presidency.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> Commission is funded througha transfer payment from <strong>the</strong> Presidency.None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> deemed it necessaryto include <strong>the</strong> Commission in its review forthree main reasons: <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> youthdevelopment; <strong>the</strong> fact that a committee <strong>of</strong>Parliament advertises, compiles a shortlist andinterviews for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners; and <strong>the</strong> oversight role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly over <strong>the</strong> Commission as anorgan <strong>of</strong> state.THE NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION109


2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe preamble to <strong>the</strong> National YouthCommission Act 47 <strong>of</strong> 1997 acknowledges <strong>the</strong>role that <strong>the</strong> youth have played, and will continueto play, in society, as well as <strong>the</strong> need toredress <strong>the</strong> imbalances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past. As such,<strong>the</strong> Act establishes a National YouthCommission mandated to -a) Co-ordinate and develop an integratednational youth policy;b) Develop an integrated national plan for <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> youth in South Africa;c) Develop principles and guidelines and makerecommendations to <strong>the</strong> Government for<strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> an integrated nationalyouth policy;d) Co-ordinate, direct and monitor <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> such a policy;e) Implement measures to redress <strong>the</strong> imbalances<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past;f) Promote uniformity <strong>of</strong> approach amongorgans <strong>of</strong> state, including provincial governments,towards youth development;g) Maintain close liaison with similar institutions,bodies or authorities in order to fostercommon policies and practices and to promoteco-operation;h) Co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincialyouth commissions, and link those activitiesto <strong>the</strong> national youth policy; andi) Develop recommendations relating to anymatters that may affect <strong>the</strong> youth.2.1. POWERS AND FUNCTIONSThe Act provides <strong>the</strong> Commission with extensivepowers and functions that include:a) Developing and monitoring <strong>of</strong>national policy;b) Acting as a link between government, youthorganisations and <strong>the</strong> youth generally;c) Maintaining close liaison with similar bodiesto foster common policies and practices andto promote co-operation;d) Conducting research;e) Monitoring and reviewing <strong>the</strong> policies andpractices <strong>of</strong> organs <strong>of</strong> state and o<strong>the</strong>r publicbodies with regards to youth matters;f) Developing and conducting information andeducational programmes;g) Evaluating legislation, and recommendingnew legislation to Parliament;h) Preparing and publishing reports toParliament on any legal instrument relevantto youth matters; andi) Monitoring <strong>the</strong> Republic’s compliance withapplicable international instruments.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> received from <strong>the</strong> Commissiona written response to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire it hadcirculated. This document formed <strong>the</strong> basis for<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s discussions with <strong>the</strong>Commission, which took place on 24 January<strong>2007</strong>. The <strong>Committee</strong>’s findings were supple-110 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 8mented by written submissions, as well as fur<strong>the</strong>rrepresentations from <strong>the</strong> Commission,which were supplied at <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’srequest. From <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong> following emerged:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission isnot a Chapter 9 institution, nor is it establishedin terms <strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r constitutionalprovision. The legal basis for <strong>the</strong> establishmentand functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is<strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission Act 19 <strong>of</strong>1996.b) The Commission is not autonomous and issituated in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> President andaccounts directly to <strong>the</strong> Minister in <strong>the</strong>Presidency.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re is some discussionregarding <strong>the</strong> restructuring <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that aconvention in June 2006 reviewed <strong>the</strong>implementation <strong>of</strong> youth programmes. Theconvention proposed that a national youthdevelopment agency be established inSouth Africa merging <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Youth Commission and <strong>the</strong>Umsobomvu Youth Fund to drive a seamlessapproach to <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> youthprogrammes. In essence, <strong>the</strong> agency willfind expression at national, provincial, districtas well as local government levels. Thisagency should be given <strong>the</strong> authority totable and influence legislation critical toyouth development.3.2. INTERPRETATION ANDUNDERSTANDING OF MANDATEa) The <strong>Committee</strong> is not satisfied that <strong>the</strong>Commission is addressing its mandate adequately,as <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> contends that <strong>the</strong>Commission’s mandate in law is more farreachingthan as interpreted by <strong>the</strong>Commission. The Commission has adopted<strong>the</strong> following strategic priorities: policy andresearch; advocacy and lobbying; co-ordinationand capacity building; and monitoringand evaluation. However, even within <strong>the</strong>sefocal areas, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> wishes to reiteratethat <strong>the</strong> Commission is not addressing itsmandate adequately. For example, <strong>the</strong>Commission has not reported on <strong>the</strong>Government’s compliance with its internationalobligations regarding youth development.b) The Commission is tasked with <strong>the</strong> co-ordinationand development <strong>of</strong> an integratednational youth policy. The Commissionadopted such a policy in 2000, but this policywas never formally adopted as <strong>the</strong>Commission wished to personally hand over<strong>the</strong> policy to President Mandela but <strong>the</strong>opportunity to do so never arose.Subsequently, <strong>the</strong> policy did not form <strong>the</strong>basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Youth DevelopmentPolicy Framework (2002 – <strong>2007</strong>), which wasadopted by Cabinet in 2002. To date <strong>the</strong>policy has yet to be finalised, although <strong>the</strong>Commission has been instrumental in developing<strong>the</strong> aforementioned National YouthDevelopment Policy Framework that hasbeen used extensively. It is evident that <strong>the</strong>Commission’s focus on <strong>the</strong> Framework hasbeen at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r core activities.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> anintegrated youth policy creates enormousdifficulties, as <strong>the</strong>re is nothing against whichto measure <strong>the</strong> success or failure <strong>of</strong> measuresaimed at youth development. At present,youth development initiatives are notTHE NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION111


integrated, occurring in a haphazard wayacross various government departments andstructures.d) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that it does not have <strong>the</strong> resources to implementprogrammes aimed at youth development.Instead, it sees itself as an advisorybody ra<strong>the</strong>r than an implementer <strong>of</strong> programmes.The Commission indicated that ithas adopted a limited approach to initiatingyouth development programmes by means<strong>of</strong> piloting flagship programmes, which are<strong>the</strong>n handed over to <strong>the</strong> Executive for rollout.This, however, creates a fragmentedapproach to youth development issues.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas prioritised research. Thus, for example, itplans to launch <strong>the</strong> Youth DevelopmentResearch Institute by September <strong>2007</strong>, hasconducted a study on localising youth developmentand is planning to conduct a desktopstudy on establishing ward committeesand youth representation. While such initiativesare commendable, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>notes that <strong>the</strong> research is not empirical innature. More generally, regarding <strong>the</strong>Commission’s research function, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>Commission should be strategic in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong>its resources, particularly given <strong>the</strong> researchalready being conducted by <strong>the</strong> Youth Deskin <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Presidency.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas not been strategic in <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> its powersto ensure that youth matters attractgreater visibility. For example, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission has not publishedany reports to Parliament on government’simplementation <strong>of</strong> human rights instrumentspertaining to youth, although <strong>the</strong> Commissionplans to lobby for <strong>the</strong> implementation andratification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> African Youth Charter by <strong>the</strong>South African Government.g) The Commission states that <strong>the</strong> enablinglegislation does not provide it with adequatepowers <strong>of</strong> enforcement where <strong>the</strong>re is neglect<strong>of</strong> youth development issues. However,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> contends that nothing prevents<strong>the</strong> Commission from receiving complaintsand recommendations from <strong>the</strong> public,and youth in particular, on any matterrelating to youth development. Therefore, if<strong>the</strong> Commission is to have any relevance, itshould be able to receive and consider suchcomplaints and recommendations, whichwill provide a more meaningful basis for <strong>the</strong>Commission’s work. The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>rnotes that <strong>the</strong> Commission has not utilisedits powers to approach ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Presidentor Parliament with regard to any matterrelating to <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its powers or <strong>the</strong>performance <strong>of</strong> its functions.3.3. APPOINTMENTSa) The Commission consists <strong>of</strong> up to five fulltimemembers, who are appointed by <strong>the</strong>President on <strong>the</strong> advice <strong>of</strong> a committee <strong>of</strong>Parliament for a period not exceeding fiveyears. This term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice is, however,renewable. At present, five Commissionersare appointed for three years.b) The criteria for appointment and <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocess are set out in <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> enabling legislation. Commissionersmust be fit for appointment on account <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir qualifications, knowledge or experiencerelating to <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.The <strong>Committee</strong> contends that <strong>the</strong>re is no reasonwhy <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissionersshould be limited to persons under 35 years112 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 8<strong>of</strong> age. There may be o<strong>the</strong>r persons, over<strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> 35, who are suitably qualified andexperienced in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> youth developmentand should <strong>the</strong>refore not be excludedfrom appointment.c) In practice, <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> appointments isreferred to <strong>the</strong> Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong>on Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status<strong>of</strong> Children, Youth and Disabled Persons,which advertises, compiles <strong>the</strong> short list andconducts <strong>the</strong> interviews.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> present systemdoes not allow for continuity in <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissioners. Somedegree <strong>of</strong> continuity is necessary whenappointing Commissioners in order to avoidloss <strong>of</strong> institutional memory, <strong>the</strong>reby undermining<strong>the</strong> Commission’s effective and efficientfunctioning while creating a situationin which Commissioners are overly dependenton <strong>the</strong> Youth Desk in <strong>the</strong> Presidency forcritical strategic support.3.4. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>Commission should be more proactive andcreative in its efforts to ensure greater visibility<strong>of</strong> its work. This can be achievedthrough various means, including targetedcampaigns that address <strong>the</strong> issues that mostaffect <strong>the</strong> youth, as well as <strong>the</strong> dissemination<strong>of</strong> pamphlets and displaying posters at<strong>the</strong> many government and parliamentaryaccess points.b) The South African Youth Council was formedfor <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> co-ordinating andenhancing <strong>the</strong> participation <strong>of</strong> civil society inyouth matters. The <strong>Committee</strong> is not satisfiedthat <strong>the</strong> Commission’s engagementswith civil society are sufficiently structured.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The Commission states that <strong>the</strong>re is no overlapbetween its work and that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter9 institutions, since none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutionsare tasked with monitoring and coordinating<strong>the</strong> integration <strong>of</strong> youth development.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> rejects this. Not only doessection 8(1)(a)(vi) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enabling legislationtask <strong>the</strong> Commission with maintainingclose relations with institutions, bodies orauthorities similar to it in order to fostercommon policies and practices and to promoteco-operation, but <strong>the</strong> Commission isspecifically mandated to make recommendationson policy concerning <strong>the</strong> commonalityand uniqueness <strong>of</strong> gender, <strong>the</strong> provision<strong>of</strong> equal resources to <strong>the</strong> genders and <strong>the</strong>principle <strong>of</strong> equal representation <strong>of</strong> genderson administrative and o<strong>the</strong>r bodies. A relationshipwith <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality would <strong>the</strong>refore appear to be anobvious necessity.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas worked closely with <strong>the</strong> ElectoralCommission to develop a plan to mobiliseyouth participation in democratic processes,particularly <strong>the</strong> elections. This partnershipinvolves youth participation in voter educationprogrammes, joint media appearances,and facilitating partnerships with youthorganisations. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Commissionstated that <strong>the</strong>re had been meetingsbetween it and <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions for<strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> information sharing.However, <strong>the</strong>se meetings appear to occur onan ad hoc basis, <strong>the</strong> last such meeting havingbeen in May 2006.THE NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION113


3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) The Commission is required to report to <strong>the</strong>President at least once a year, and <strong>the</strong>President is tasked with tabling <strong>the</strong> reportpromptly in <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.b) The Commission’s interaction with Parliamentis largely through <strong>the</strong> Joint Monitoring<strong>Committee</strong> on Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong>Life and Status <strong>of</strong> Children, Youth andDisabled Persons, although <strong>the</strong> Commissionbriefs o<strong>the</strong>r parliamentary committees fromtime to time on specific issues. Given <strong>the</strong>broad scope <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandate,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>re is,however, room for greater interactionbetween <strong>the</strong> Commission and o<strong>the</strong>r parliamentarycommittees.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) It was put to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>Commission’s interaction with <strong>the</strong> Executiveoccurs chiefly through <strong>the</strong> Minister in <strong>the</strong>Presidency and by means <strong>of</strong> reporting via<strong>the</strong> Social Cluster <strong>of</strong> Cabinet. O<strong>the</strong>r less formalmechanisms for interaction with <strong>the</strong>Executive exist through interactions withvarious Ministers and participation in variousinter-ministerial forums.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas a close working relationship with <strong>the</strong>Presidency. This is <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> specialnature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislation. The Commission’srelationship with <strong>the</strong> Executive <strong>the</strong>refore differsfrom <strong>the</strong> relationship o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9bodies have with <strong>the</strong> Executive.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Presidency,through its Youth Desk, has provided <strong>the</strong>Commission with critical strategic support,particularly while <strong>the</strong> new Commissionerstook up <strong>the</strong>ir positions in mid-2006.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong>re appears to beconsiderable overlap between <strong>the</strong> Commission’smandate and that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Youth Desk.Certainly <strong>the</strong>re is a close working relationshipbetween <strong>the</strong> two structures. A Youth Deskwas set up in <strong>the</strong> Presidency in 2005. TheMinister in <strong>the</strong> Presidency informed <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Youth Desk is directlyintegrated into <strong>the</strong> institutional structures <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Presidency, performing an integrating andfacilitative role with regards to youth developmentissues by ensuring, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs,that <strong>the</strong> policies and programmes proposedby <strong>the</strong> Commission are taken through <strong>the</strong>Cabinet cluster system. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> view that this is a serious overlap, in <strong>the</strong>sense that if <strong>the</strong> Commission is formulatingpolicy, it <strong>the</strong>n clashes with <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Youth Desk in relation to policy formulation.The Youth Desk also facilitates andadministers <strong>the</strong> Presidential Youth WorkingGroup and youth initiatives associated with<strong>the</strong> Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiativefor South Africa (AsgiSA), as well as acting asa link between national line departments and<strong>the</strong> actual implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalYouth Service.e) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that it has experienced difficulties in securing<strong>the</strong> co-operation <strong>of</strong> all governmentdepartments, although this has improvedsince 2006 when an unprecedented number<strong>of</strong> departments established youth directorates.Most government departmentshave reduced issues <strong>of</strong> youth developmentto skills development, and youth developmentis not generally considered to include<strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> houses and basic servicesfor youth.114 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 8f) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> various institutionsor structures created within governmentto focus on youth issues do not complementeach o<strong>the</strong>r and that very <strong>of</strong>ten<strong>the</strong>re is a degree <strong>of</strong> duplication, which is awaste <strong>of</strong> resources.g) The lines <strong>of</strong> accountability for youth developmentinstitutions are blurred and confusing.There are a multiple number <strong>of</strong> bodiesdealing with youth development as well as<strong>the</strong> State-established Umsobomvu Fund.This fund focuses on skills development andemployment as opposed to <strong>the</strong> entire scope<strong>of</strong> youth economic participation. However, itdoes not seem to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>reis much interaction and thus <strong>the</strong>re is very littleguarantee that policy emerging from <strong>the</strong>National Youth Commission will find expressionin <strong>the</strong> Umsobomvu Fund or in o<strong>the</strong>rgovernment departments for that matter.3.8. RELATIONSHIP WITH THEPROVINCIAL YOUTH COMMISSIONSa) The Commission’s relationship with <strong>the</strong>provincial youth commissions is not clear.The Commission states that <strong>the</strong> enablinglegislation does not provide it with <strong>the</strong> necessaryauthority concerning <strong>the</strong> provincialyouth commissions. In this regard, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong> Commissionformalise <strong>the</strong> Chairperson’s Forum,which is <strong>the</strong> vehicle for <strong>the</strong> Commission’sinteraction with <strong>the</strong> provincial commissions,as a means <strong>of</strong> regularising its authority. The<strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong>re is very littleinformation on <strong>the</strong> specifics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> composition,powers, budget and activities <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> provincial commissions in <strong>the</strong> legislation.It is critical that this be addressed.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is unable to establish what<strong>the</strong> precise functions or terms <strong>of</strong> reference<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se provincial commissions are orshould be.3.<strong>9.</strong> INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong>accountability and authority are not clearlydrawn. The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that on occasion<strong>the</strong>re has been a blurring <strong>of</strong> functionsbetween <strong>the</strong> Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> secretariat,as sometimes <strong>the</strong> secretariat arecalled upon to perform what is essentially apolitical function.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> noted that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhad several vacancies in key positions, forexample, <strong>the</strong> Chief Financial Officer and <strong>the</strong>Chief Executive Officer. This means that <strong>the</strong>administrative functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionis compromised.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionerswere unable to attend <strong>the</strong> initial meetingwith <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in September 2006,as <strong>the</strong>y were all unavailable. However, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> expressed <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>reneeded to be a clear policy on overseas visits.3.10. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) The Commission stated that its fundingarrangements are inadequate. It does nothave an opportunity to motivate for its ownbudget with National Treasury as <strong>the</strong> budgetprocess is led by <strong>the</strong> Presidency. TheCommission’s budget is allocated from <strong>the</strong>Presidency’s Vote. The amount allocated<strong>the</strong>n informs <strong>the</strong> Commission’s businessplan.THE NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION115


) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission’sfunding arrangements are unusual, as <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget falls under that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Presidency. The <strong>Committee</strong> is also <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> viewthat <strong>the</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> financial resources to <strong>the</strong>Commission is not modest. Table 1 below setsout <strong>the</strong> Commission’s allocation and expendituresince 2003/04, as well as <strong>the</strong> amounts ithas been allocated in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MediumTerm Expenditure Framework.Table 1: Income and expenditure 2003/04 –2009/10 28c) Institutional governance mechanisms requireattention, particularly regarding clarification <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> powers and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ChiefExecutive Officer vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Commissioners.d) The parliamentary mechanisms for oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission are inadequate. Generalrecommendations are made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report for <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> parliamentarymechanisms <strong>of</strong> oversight andaccountability.R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Budgetallocation 13 766 13 488 17 983 19 228 20 614 21 647 22 621<strong>Ad</strong>ditionalfunding 2 322 1 728 2 045Expenditure 15 892 17 015 18 656Surplus/(Deficit) (196) (1 815) 1 3 724. General Conclusionsa) When viewed against <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s terms <strong>of</strong>reference, <strong>the</strong> Commission, as it is presentlyformed, does not serve its purpose. The<strong>Committee</strong> presents certain recommendationsfor <strong>the</strong> rationalisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> role and function<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in order to enhance its relevance.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> appointment proceduresin respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission to be,generally speaking, appropriate. However, <strong>the</strong>present arrangements have resulted in anentirely new Commission being appointed enmasse in 2006, with an accompanying loss <strong>of</strong>institutional memory with reference to <strong>the</strong> previousCommission. General recommendationsare made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report to enhancea more pr<strong>of</strong>essional approach.e) The budget process and funding model affect<strong>the</strong> Commission’s ability to carry out its mandate.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport for <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budgetprocess.f) The Commission has a disclosure mechanismin terms <strong>of</strong> which all senior managers andCommissioners sign an annual disclosure form.This is done by way <strong>of</strong> an affidavit, and <strong>the</strong>forms are <strong>the</strong>n submitted to <strong>the</strong> Presidencyand are dealt with in line with <strong>the</strong> PublicService Regulation Framework.5. Recommendationsa) The Commission is not particularly effective incarrying out its mandate. In particular, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> similarity between <strong>the</strong>Commission’s mandate and <strong>the</strong> tasks being28 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>116 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 8performed by <strong>the</strong> Youth Desk in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Presidency. Despite submissions from variousyouth formations that <strong>the</strong> Commission beabolished, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is mindful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>importance <strong>of</strong> youth development in SouthAfrica, as well as <strong>the</strong> many challenges thatface this sector <strong>of</strong> our population.b) In addition, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view thatit is an anomaly that <strong>the</strong>re is no specialisedstructure devoted to promoting children’srights, despite <strong>the</strong>ir vulnerability as a group.There need to be specific institutional arrangementsfor <strong>the</strong> voice <strong>of</strong> our young people.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandate should be widenedto encompass both children and <strong>the</strong> youth andthat <strong>the</strong> Commission should be given powersto receive complaints, investigate matters andactively lobby. There is indeed already adegree <strong>of</strong> overlap as <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandateincludes children aged 14 to 18 years.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> is accordingly proposing a twostageprocess for <strong>the</strong> future, namely that <strong>the</strong>reconstituted Commission devoted to childrenand youth issues should fall under <strong>the</strong> umbrella<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, and thata dedicated commissioner for children andyouth be appointed.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r proposes that in <strong>the</strong>interim, whilst <strong>the</strong> recommendation set out in(b) above is addressed, a number <strong>of</strong> recommendationsto improve <strong>the</strong> efficiency andeffectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission be implementedforthwith:i. The Commission’s enabling legislationshould be urgently reviewed and amendedso as to include both <strong>the</strong> youth and children.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, in addition to <strong>the</strong>Commission’s existing powers, it should bemandated and capacitated to lead campaignsactively, hear and investigate complaintsand undertake research on importantmatters such as child abuse, violenceamongst our children and youth, drugabuse and so forth.ii. The reconstitution and revitalization <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Forum <strong>of</strong> Independent Statutory Bodies, avoluntary body, should be actively encouragedin order to improve co-ordinationbetween Chapter 9 and associated institutions.iii. The Commission should develop moreinnovative ways to increase its visibility.iv. Mechanisms to improve <strong>the</strong> relationshipand interaction between Parliament and<strong>the</strong> Commission should be determined. Therole <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly discussedin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report shouldalso be considered in this regard.v. In general, <strong>the</strong> appointment proceduresshould be reviewed. The <strong>Committee</strong>makes proposals in this regard in Chapter 2<strong>of</strong> this report.vi. The budget process and location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget allocation should berevised in accordance with <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report.vii. The directorships, partnerships and consultancies<strong>of</strong> Commissioners and senior <strong>of</strong>ficialsshould be disclosed in <strong>the</strong> annualreports. In addition, <strong>the</strong> disclosures <strong>of</strong>pecuniary and o<strong>the</strong>r interests <strong>of</strong>Commissioners and staff members must bekept available in a register and an indicationmust be given in <strong>the</strong> annual report <strong>of</strong>where such information is available.General recommendations are made in thisregard, in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.THE NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION117


CHAPTER 9


CHAPTER 9CHAPTER 9THE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD1. BackgroundThe marginalisation and suppression <strong>of</strong> indigenouslanguages in South Africa was part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>systematic and deliberate oppression <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>majority by <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id government. Byrefusing recognition to indigenous cultures andlanguages, <strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id government strippedpeople fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir heritage, dignity, identityand sense <strong>of</strong> belonging. At <strong>the</strong> same time,<strong>the</strong> languages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ruling minority were elevatedand developed through considerablestate assistance. English and Afrikaans, recognisedas <strong>the</strong> only two <strong>of</strong>ficial languages during<strong>the</strong> apar<strong>the</strong>id era, were <strong>the</strong> medium <strong>of</strong> instructionat schools, and all government informationand communication were provided in <strong>the</strong>selanguages only. This had <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> systematicallydiminishing <strong>the</strong> status, usage anddevelopment <strong>of</strong> indigenous languages and alsocreated access barriers to <strong>the</strong> limited governmentservices provided to <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>population.It was <strong>the</strong>refore a key consideration during <strong>the</strong>constitution-making process in South Africa toprovide due recognition to <strong>the</strong> historicallydiminished indigenous languages in respect <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>ir use and status. In our presentConstitution, <strong>the</strong>re is considerable emphasis onlanguages.As part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> founding provisions, <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution in Chapter 1 recognises eleven <strong>of</strong>ficiallanguages <strong>of</strong> South Africa, including nineindigenous languages. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>Constitution requires <strong>the</strong> state to take practicaland positive measures to elevate <strong>the</strong> status andadvance <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indigenous languages.To ensure <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficiallanguages in South Africa, with particular attentionto <strong>the</strong> previously marginalised languages,<strong>the</strong> Constitution also makes provision in section6(5) for <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a Pan SouthAfrican Language Board. The Board was establishedby <strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language BoardAct 59 <strong>of</strong> 1995 and its first members wereappointed in <strong>the</strong> same year.2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe Pan South African Language Board is establishedin terms <strong>of</strong> Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.Its constitutional position <strong>the</strong>refore differsmarkedly from <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 bodies underreview in this report. Unlike <strong>the</strong>se bodies, <strong>the</strong>Board does not have its independence andauthority guaranteed in <strong>the</strong> Constitution; nei<strong>the</strong>ris <strong>the</strong>re a constitutional obligation placedon <strong>the</strong> Board to act without fear, favour or prejudicewhen implementing its mandate,although <strong>the</strong>se guarantees are contained inlegislation. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, no provision is madein <strong>the</strong> Constitution for <strong>the</strong> Board to be accountablesolely to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.The constitutional role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board must beunderstood in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutionalduty placed on <strong>the</strong> state to take practical andpositive measures to elevate <strong>the</strong> status andadvance <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> indigenous languages inorder to ensure that all <strong>of</strong>ficial languages enjoyparity <strong>of</strong> esteem and are treated in an equitablemanner.The Board is <strong>the</strong>refore created in section 6(5) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution to assist <strong>the</strong> state in this task(Annexure 1). It provides for <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board by national legislation and requires <strong>the</strong>Board to promote, and create conditions for, <strong>the</strong>development and use <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong>ficial languagesin South Africa, as well as <strong>the</strong> Khoi, Nama andSan languages and sign language.THE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD119


The Board must also promote and ensurerespect for all languages commonly used bycommunities and for religious purposes inSouth Africa, including German, Greek, Gujarati,Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu, Urdu, Arabic,Hebrew and Sanskrit.The Pan South African Language Board Act providesfor <strong>the</strong> recognition, implementation andfur<strong>the</strong>rance <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in South Africaand <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> previously marginalisedlanguages. In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act, <strong>the</strong>objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board are, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, topromote respect for, and ensure <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> following principles:a) The creation <strong>of</strong> conditions for <strong>the</strong> developmentand promotion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equal use andenjoyment <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial South Africanlanguages;b) The prevention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> any languagefor <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> exploitation, dominationor division;c) The promotion <strong>of</strong> multilingualism;d) The promotion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> translationand interpreting facilities;e) The fur<strong>the</strong>r development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficialSouth African languages;f) Fostering respect for languages o<strong>the</strong>r than<strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial languages; andg) The promotion <strong>of</strong> respect for, and <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong>, languages used by communitiesand for religious purposes.The powers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board conferred on it by <strong>the</strong>Act may be grouped broadly as follows: advisoryfunctions in relation to functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Executive; investigation and remedy <strong>of</strong> complaints;promotion <strong>of</strong> language rights andusage; and co-ordination <strong>of</strong> language planning.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> met with <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board on 31 January <strong>2007</strong>. It isregrettable that <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boardwas unable to attend this meeting. The Board’swritten response to <strong>the</strong> questionnaire, variouspublic submissions, and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s consideration<strong>of</strong> relevant documents such as <strong>the</strong>annual reports and budgets <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boardformed <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> discussions. The<strong>Committee</strong> reports on <strong>the</strong> following findings:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL ANDLEGAL MANDATEa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re is a seriousdiscrepancy between <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PanSouth African Language Board Act regarding<strong>the</strong> main objective <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. Section6(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution states that “all <strong>of</strong>ficiallanguages must enjoy parity <strong>of</strong> esteemand must be treated equitably”(<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis). The Act on <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r hand states that one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mainobjectives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board is to create “conditionsfor <strong>the</strong> development and for <strong>the</strong> promotion<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equal (<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis)use and enjoyment <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial SouthAfrican languages”.b) When this discrepancy was pointed out to<strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board, <strong>the</strong>y informed usthat <strong>the</strong> Board preferred <strong>the</strong> construction <strong>of</strong>its mandate in <strong>the</strong> Act. The <strong>Committee</strong>notes that this view is not constitutionallytenable because <strong>the</strong> Constitution is <strong>the</strong> higherlaw and all law that is in conflict with <strong>the</strong>120 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 9Constitution is invalid to <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>conflict. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is perplexedat <strong>the</strong> Board’s assertion in thisregard, given that <strong>the</strong> “equal” use andenjoyment <strong>of</strong> all languages in South Africawould have enormous and far-reachingsocial, political, business and resource implicationsand would not be possible. The<strong>Committee</strong> draws <strong>the</strong> special attention <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly to this importantmatter.c) It emerged during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s interactionswith <strong>the</strong> Board and from considering<strong>the</strong> documentation at <strong>the</strong> disposal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Board evidently doesnot fully appreciate its constitutional andlegal mandate. The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that<strong>the</strong> Board has a very narrow focus and has<strong>the</strong>refore not fully pursued its extensive legislativemandate nor has made use <strong>of</strong> itsextensive powers. For example, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> was unable to find significantevidence ei<strong>the</strong>r in documentation or in itsinteractions with <strong>the</strong> Board that <strong>the</strong> Boardhas implemented programmes to promote<strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> sign language, to promote <strong>the</strong>use <strong>of</strong> interpretation and translation facilities,to investigate alleged abuses <strong>of</strong> a languageright, policy or practice, to facilitateco-operation with language-planning agenciesoutside South Africa or to monitor <strong>the</strong>observance <strong>of</strong> constitutional and legislativeprovisions regarding <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> language.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> Board’s submissionduring discussions that it had standardisedinterpretation, translation and editing qualificationsand had developed guidelines fortranslation and interpretation services.e) The Board has also used a considerableamount <strong>of</strong> its available resources (more thanR9 million, or almost one third <strong>of</strong> its budget,in 2006) in its lexicography activities and <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> dictionaries for <strong>the</strong> differentlanguages. The <strong>Committee</strong> turns to this inrelation to <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Arts andCulture later in this Chapter.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> Boardhas misconstrued its mandate as it relates tointeraction with <strong>the</strong> public. The Constitutionand <strong>the</strong> Act state that <strong>the</strong> Board must promoteall <strong>of</strong>ficial languages as well as respectfor multilingualism. In fact, <strong>the</strong> Act statesthat <strong>the</strong> Board has a legal duty actively to“promote an awareness <strong>of</strong> multilingualismas a national resource.” This necessarilyrequires <strong>the</strong> Board to embark on informationand public education campaigns as ignoranceand prejudice against multilingualismare amongst <strong>the</strong> greatest obstacles in itsrealization. This has not been done. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes that, because <strong>of</strong> this misapprehensionregarding its mandate, <strong>the</strong>Board has unfortunately not devised orimplemented a coherent and sustained publiceducation campaign. Instead, it has beeninvolved only in ad hoc and reactive campaigns,<strong>the</strong>reby falling far short <strong>of</strong> what isrequired by <strong>the</strong> Constitution.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act<strong>the</strong> Board also has <strong>the</strong> power to monitor <strong>the</strong>observance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitutional provisionsregarding <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> language and <strong>the</strong> contentsand observance <strong>of</strong> any existing and newlegislation, practice and policy dealing directlyor indirectly with language matters at anylevel <strong>of</strong> government. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>was informed by members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boardthat <strong>the</strong>re has been no systematic monitoring<strong>of</strong> this kind – merely “informal checking to seewhe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re has been compliance”. The<strong>Committee</strong> considers it unfortunate that noTHE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD121


details are available about <strong>the</strong> monitoring <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> observance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant constitutionalprovisions as this makes it very difficult toascertain <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) Sections 5 and 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board Act provide for <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board, a Chief Executive Officerand o<strong>the</strong>r staff and establishes <strong>the</strong> Board as<strong>the</strong> policy-making body. However, The<strong>Committee</strong> was told by members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board that <strong>the</strong> legislation is not clearenough about <strong>the</strong> exact relationshipbetween <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong>staff and that <strong>the</strong>re have been someinstances where <strong>the</strong> Board members haveencroached on management responsibilitiesbest left for <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer todeal with, instead <strong>of</strong> focusing on governanceand policy issues. The <strong>Committee</strong> finds thislack <strong>of</strong> clear lines <strong>of</strong> authority between <strong>the</strong>Board and <strong>the</strong> staff deeply troubling. Theroles <strong>of</strong> part-time members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board arealso not clearly defined.b) Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board also told <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>re was a need toimprove <strong>the</strong> institutional governancearrangements and expressed <strong>the</strong> view thatit was imperative that clear policy guidelinesbe provided for <strong>the</strong> Board members toenable <strong>the</strong>m to acquaint <strong>the</strong>mselves with<strong>the</strong>ir role and <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mandatewithin <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution.The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that this passiveattitude is unhelpful and counter-productiveand believes that Board membersshould take pro-active steps to clarify <strong>the</strong>extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mandate.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong> Boardhas not ensured that <strong>the</strong> relevant managementpolicies and procedures are put inplace to ensure <strong>the</strong> effective and accountablerunning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board’s affairs and toguard against wasteful or unwarrantedexpenditure. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes withconcern that <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General provided aqualified audit report for <strong>the</strong> financial year2004/05. The report pointed out that mostpolicies or procedures for internal controlsand efficient risk management were notapproved or updated regularly. The<strong>Committee</strong> was not presented with any evidencethat this has been rectified.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong> NationalLexicography Units, which fall under <strong>the</strong>authority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board, have not reported to<strong>the</strong> Board in an adequate fashion. Accordingto <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General’s report, during <strong>the</strong>2003/04 financial year only four <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>eleven units submitted <strong>the</strong>ir financial statements,while only one submitted <strong>the</strong> statementsin <strong>the</strong> required format. During2004/05 only one unit did not submit afinancial statement, while three <strong>of</strong> thosewhich had submitted statements did notcomply with <strong>the</strong> requirements. The<strong>Committee</strong> is concerned that <strong>the</strong> Boardfailed to take <strong>the</strong> necessary steps immediatelyto ensure that all <strong>the</strong> units report in<strong>the</strong> required manner.e) In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pan South African LanguageBoard Act, <strong>the</strong> Board appoints <strong>the</strong> ChiefExecutive Officer on such terms and conditionsas <strong>the</strong> Board may determine. This necessarilymeans that <strong>the</strong> Board has authorityover <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer and has aduty to oversee his or her work. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Board was unableor unwilling to give <strong>the</strong> appropriate directionto <strong>the</strong> former Chief Executive Officer and122 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 9that internal disputes accordingly resulted.There was a desperate lack <strong>of</strong> internal disputeresolution mechanisms between <strong>the</strong>Board and <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer. TheBoard also informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that,because <strong>the</strong> former Chief Executive Officerwas so strong-willed, relations with <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture had becomestrained. Relations with <strong>the</strong> Departmentseemed to have improved since <strong>the</strong> departure<strong>of</strong> that Chief Executive Officer.f) The Chief Executive Officer is a member <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Board, participates in <strong>the</strong> Board’sdebates and has <strong>the</strong> rights and duties <strong>of</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r members, but does not vote. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that while <strong>the</strong> participation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer in<strong>the</strong> meetings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board is an operationalrequirement, this arrangement leads to ablurring <strong>of</strong> responsibilities and needs to beaddressed.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> advises that <strong>the</strong> Boardshould also develop and approve an internaldispute resolution mechanism.h) The Board confirmed, in its response to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> during deliberations, that it doesnot have mechanisms for <strong>the</strong> ChiefExecutive Officer, <strong>the</strong> Chairperson, <strong>the</strong>Deputy Chairperson and o<strong>the</strong>r members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Board to disclose private financial interestsor o<strong>the</strong>r relevant involvements.i) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that regulations issuedin terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act require <strong>the</strong> ChiefExecutive Officer to seek <strong>the</strong> Board’s permissionto perform outside remunerative work.However, <strong>the</strong> Act prohibits members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board or staff from conducting investigationsin respect <strong>of</strong> matters in which <strong>the</strong>y havepecuniary or o<strong>the</strong>r interest that might preclude<strong>the</strong>m from exercising <strong>the</strong>ir powers,duties and functions in a fair and unbiasedmanner. If a member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board or a staffmember fails to disclose such interests, <strong>the</strong>Board may take such steps, as it deems necessaryto ensure a fair and unbiased investigation.j) The <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that, in commonwith o<strong>the</strong>r bodies, <strong>the</strong> Board shouldhave a register <strong>of</strong> interests and any directorshipsor partnerships held by members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Board should be published in its annualreport.k) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes with concern that <strong>the</strong>Board does not have in place a mechanismthat would allow <strong>the</strong> public to raise complaintsabout its work. Moreover, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> was presented with evidencethat <strong>the</strong> Board does not always follow up on<strong>the</strong> complaints it has received.3.3. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) As stated above, <strong>the</strong> approach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boardto public awareness is based on a misunderstanding<strong>of</strong> its legal mandate. This hasresulted in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a clear and sustainedpublic education campaign. This situationchanged in 2003 when, in responseto a decline in complaints lodged by <strong>the</strong>public, <strong>the</strong> Board launched a linguistichuman rights awareness campaign. The<strong>Committee</strong> is not satisfied that this piecemealapproach to public awareness and outreachis adequate, appropriate and goodvalue for money.b) The statistics at <strong>the</strong> disposal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> suggest that <strong>the</strong> Board does nothave <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> public pr<strong>of</strong>ile that <strong>the</strong>important work it is tasked to do warrantsTHE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD123


and requires. Moreover, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> considers<strong>the</strong> decline in <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> complaintsreceived by <strong>the</strong> Board to be indicative<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decline in its public pr<strong>of</strong>ile.During <strong>the</strong> 2002/03 financial year <strong>the</strong> Boardreceived 83 complaints, during 2003/04 itreceived 22 complaints and during 2004/05it received 33 complaints.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that <strong>the</strong> Boardreceived only about 400 complaints since itsinception. The slight increase in 2004/05was <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> an intervention by <strong>the</strong>Board to raise <strong>the</strong> public pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> its languagehuman rights initiative. The generaldecline, however, points to <strong>the</strong> notion that<strong>the</strong> Board may have become surplus torequirements. The Board appears to havelittle impact. This brings into question itscontinued existence in its current form.3.4. APPOINTMENTSa) The Minister <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture appoints n<strong>of</strong>ewer than eleven and no more than fifteenpersons as members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. When itbecomes necessary to fill vacancies on <strong>the</strong>Board, <strong>the</strong> Minister, after consultation, with<strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture,appoints an ad hoc committee <strong>of</strong> no fewerthan nine persons to invite <strong>the</strong> public to nominatepersons for appointment. This ad hoccommittee submits to <strong>the</strong> portfolio committeea shortlist <strong>of</strong> no more than 25 candidatesfor <strong>the</strong> portfolio committee to consider.b) The portfolio committee interviews <strong>the</strong> candidatesand submits a final shortlist <strong>of</strong> nomore than 20 names to <strong>the</strong> Minister forappointment. The Minister <strong>the</strong>n appointsmembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board from <strong>the</strong> names thatappear on <strong>the</strong> shortlist after consulting with<strong>the</strong> portfolio committee. Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board are appointed for a term <strong>of</strong> five yearsand are eligible for re-appointment for onemore term.c) The Act sets minimum criteria that bind <strong>the</strong>Minister when appointing members to <strong>the</strong>Board. It requires that <strong>the</strong> Board <strong>of</strong> 11 to 15members should be broadly representative<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> users <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial languages.It also requires that members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board must be supportive <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong>multilingualism and must have languageskills, which may include interpreting, translation,terminology, lexicography, literacyteaching and language planning.d) The Board elects one <strong>of</strong> its members as <strong>the</strong>Chairperson and ano<strong>the</strong>r as Deputy Chairperson.The Chairperson and <strong>the</strong> DeputyChairperson hold <strong>of</strong>fice for a period <strong>of</strong> notmore than two years after which electionsare held for a new chairperson and deputychairperson. This approach seems to havehampered <strong>the</strong> efficient functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board. Since 2002 <strong>the</strong> Board has had threechairpersons. It has led to a loss <strong>of</strong> continuityand focus and has fur<strong>the</strong>r undermined<strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that, in <strong>the</strong> event<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board being retained in its presentform, this rotation <strong>of</strong> chairpersons should bereviewed and a chairperson should beappointed for a full 5-year term.e) The term <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board ended on 30 February <strong>2007</strong>. Although<strong>the</strong> Act does not provide for an extension <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> members, <strong>the</strong> Ministerextended <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> currentmembers until <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> June <strong>2007</strong>. At <strong>the</strong>time <strong>of</strong> writing this report, <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture had agreedon a final shortlist <strong>of</strong> candidates for appoint-124 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 9ment. The Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> felt that onlyone member <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board should be recommendedfor reappointment, given <strong>the</strong> underperformance<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. In <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>recommendations made by this <strong>Committee</strong>about <strong>the</strong> reconstruction <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pan SouthAfrican Language Board and <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities, it may be wise to put a moratoriumon <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> a new Board.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) Unlike Chapter 9 institutions, <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board is not guaranteed in <strong>the</strong>Constitution. As pointed out above, <strong>the</strong>Board’s founding Act does provide for itsmembers to serve impartially and independentlyand exercise and perform <strong>the</strong>ir powersand functions in good faith and without fear,favour, bias or prejudice, subject only to <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> Act. The Act also statesthat no organ <strong>of</strong> state may interfere with <strong>the</strong>Board or its members and requires allorgans <strong>of</strong> state to afford <strong>the</strong> Board suchassistance as may be reasonably required.b) Despite <strong>the</strong>se legal assertions <strong>of</strong> impartialityand independence, <strong>the</strong> Act invests <strong>the</strong>Minister <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture with wide powersover <strong>the</strong> Board. The Minister may terminatea member’s membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boardif <strong>the</strong> Minister is satisfied that <strong>the</strong> memberno longer complies with <strong>the</strong> requirementsfor membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board; if <strong>the</strong> memberhas requested <strong>the</strong> Minister to be removed;if <strong>the</strong> member has been absent for twoconsecutive meetings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board withoutleave; or if, on reasonable grounds, <strong>the</strong>majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members recommend <strong>the</strong>removal <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> member. The Minister mayalso dissolve <strong>the</strong> Board on any reasonablegrounds. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>seprovisions are extraordinarily broad andafford <strong>the</strong> Minister vast discretionary powersover <strong>the</strong> Board. Such authority afforded to<strong>the</strong> Minister places a question mark over <strong>the</strong>Board’s independence.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendations inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report regarding <strong>the</strong> powers<strong>of</strong> Ministers in respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocedures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodies under review.d) Given <strong>the</strong>se powers accorded to <strong>the</strong> Ministerby <strong>the</strong> Act, it is not surprising that <strong>the</strong> Boardinformed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that its relationshipwith <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture isnot cordial. The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed <strong>of</strong>severe tension between <strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong>Department and a view from <strong>the</strong> side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Board that <strong>the</strong> Department was encroachingon its mandate on language development,which, in turn, it felt, compromised its independence.e) This view contrasted sharply with a viewfrom <strong>the</strong> Department that it sees <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong> languages as one <strong>of</strong> its primaryresponsibilities. To that end <strong>the</strong> Departmenthas undertaken initiatives involving <strong>the</strong> creation<strong>of</strong> extensive capacity in terminologydevelopment and management; <strong>the</strong> coordinationand advancement <strong>of</strong> human languagetechnologies; language policy development;<strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> translation, editingand interpreting services; literature promotionand development; <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong>language research and development centres;and <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> telephoneinterpreting services for South Africa.THE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD125


f) The Department has also established <strong>the</strong>National Language Forum which co-ordinates<strong>the</strong> activities <strong>of</strong> language units withingovernment and legislatures, <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection<strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities and <strong>the</strong> Board. The Departmentclaims that national and provincialdepartments look to <strong>the</strong> National LanguageForum for guidance on language policyimplementation. There has also been establishedwithin <strong>the</strong> Department a NationalLanguage Services Directorate that is taskedwith <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> languages, has alsobeen established within <strong>the</strong> department.g) The Department maintains that <strong>the</strong>re is nooverlap between its responsibilities andthose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. Despite <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Act which, as has been pointed outabove, give <strong>the</strong> Board a broad mandate topromote multilingualism and indigenous languages,<strong>the</strong> Department views <strong>the</strong> Board asan advisory body that may monitor <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> languages. The Departmentmaintains that <strong>the</strong> Board cannot be expectedto do <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> language developmentand be watchdog at <strong>the</strong> same time and thatit is best suited to investigate complaints,conduct research, and monitor and makerecommendations to appropriate institutions.h) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> presentimpasse between <strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong>Department is untenable and needs to beresolved without delay. The <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat <strong>the</strong> National LexicographyUnits established by <strong>the</strong> Board be transferredto <strong>the</strong> National Language ServicesDirectorate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that this is <strong>the</strong>best course <strong>of</strong> action because -i. The Board does not have <strong>the</strong> requiredhuman and financial capacity to dealadequately and comprehensively with<strong>the</strong> important task <strong>of</strong> developing indigenousSouth African languages. In contrast<strong>the</strong> National Language ServicesDirectorate situated in <strong>the</strong> Department iswell-funded and better equipped to dealwith <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> South Africa’sindigenous languages; andii. The Board as such is not involved in <strong>the</strong>issue <strong>of</strong> language development, but hasfor all intents and purposes delegatedthis task to <strong>the</strong> National LexicographyUnits. The rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board’s workrelates to raising public awareness, disputeresolution, <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> multilingualismand <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> respectfor o<strong>the</strong>r languages.i) In order to facilitate this change, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong> Board delegatesome <strong>of</strong> its members and <strong>the</strong> heads<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Lexicography Units to meet with representatives<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department to map <strong>the</strong>way forward.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) Unlike <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r institutions under review,<strong>the</strong> Board is not explicitly made accountableto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. However, <strong>the</strong>Board does submit its annual report to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly, which refers it for considerationto <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> Artsand Culture. The members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Boardinformed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong>y felt <strong>the</strong>rewas a complete lack <strong>of</strong> constructive engagementby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly with itsannual reports. They also expressed frustrationat <strong>the</strong> general lack <strong>of</strong> engagement by<strong>the</strong> National Assembly with its work. The126 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 9National Assembly has not taken any actionto deal with <strong>the</strong> recommendations and frustrationscontained in <strong>the</strong> annual reports.b) Apart from its annual report, <strong>the</strong> Act alsorequires <strong>the</strong> Board to submit quarterlyreports to Parliament to furnish details <strong>of</strong> itsactivities. It is unclear to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se quarterly reports are regularlysubmitted and whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> engages with <strong>the</strong>se reports. The<strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong> Board has notrequested a special debate in ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Houses <strong>of</strong> Parliament on important aspectscontained in any <strong>of</strong> its reports.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The Pan South African Language Board Actrequires <strong>the</strong> Board to promote close cooperationbetween itself and o<strong>the</strong>r organs<strong>of</strong> state, institutions and persons involved in<strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> languages. However,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is unaware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board havinginitiated any activities to promote suchclose co-operation with organs <strong>of</strong> state, orany persons or institutions.b) There is a clear overlap between <strong>the</strong> mandate<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board and that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission for<strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities.Both institutions are empowered to promote<strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> marginalised linguistic communitiesand to conduct research on this issue.While <strong>the</strong> Commission ostensibly deals with<strong>the</strong> matter from a rights-based perspectiveand <strong>the</strong> Board from a more practical perspective,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that –apart from <strong>the</strong> work done by <strong>the</strong> LexicographyUnits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board – <strong>the</strong>re is in principle verylittle difference between <strong>the</strong> mandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>two institutions.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r notes with concernthat, despite this overlap, <strong>the</strong> Board only hasa tentative, unsigned co-operation agreementwith <strong>the</strong> Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong>was also informed that <strong>the</strong>se two bodieshave not formalised <strong>the</strong>ir working relationshipin any o<strong>the</strong>r way, although <strong>the</strong>y do cooperateon an informal and ad hoc basis,d) The <strong>Committee</strong> received submissions fromcivil society pointing out this overlap and <strong>the</strong>lack <strong>of</strong> formal co-operation between <strong>the</strong>sebodies and suggesting that steps should betaken to address this matter. The <strong>Committee</strong>is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> such anagreement leads to duplication and rendersboth institutions less effective than <strong>the</strong>y o<strong>the</strong>rwisewould have been. The duplication <strong>of</strong>mandates also has serious cost implications.e) In <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se considerations, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong> Board beamalgamated with <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities and that a new institution, <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities (including <strong>the</strong>Pan South African Language Board), be createdto face <strong>the</strong> important challenges <strong>of</strong>especially <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> indigenous languagesin South Africa. This proposal isaddressed fur<strong>the</strong>r below.f) There is a cross-referral <strong>of</strong> cases and informalco-operation with <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission: <strong>the</strong> Commission refers casesinvolving language rights violations to <strong>the</strong>Board and <strong>the</strong> Board refers human rightsissues to <strong>the</strong> Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong>again emphasises <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> efficientrecord-keeping, tracking and monitoring<strong>of</strong> referrals.THE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD127


3.8. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) The budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board has increased fromjust over R19 million in 2002/03, to justover R29 million in 2005/06. Of thisamount, just more than R9 million, or aboutone third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total budget, was allocatedfor <strong>the</strong> lexicography work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalLanguage Units. The salary expenses and<strong>the</strong> expenses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board accounted forano<strong>the</strong>r R9 million, which means that onlyone third <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> available money was spenton <strong>the</strong> mandated activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board.The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes with concern <strong>the</strong>relatively high amount budgeted for <strong>the</strong><strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Board hasbeen setting up provincial <strong>of</strong>fices in severalprovinces and that <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se provincial<strong>of</strong>fices takes up a sizable amount <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>budget. The <strong>Committee</strong> was unable to identify<strong>the</strong> demonstrable benefits <strong>of</strong> such<strong>of</strong>fices vis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> realisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board’slegal and constitutional mandate and relatedactivities, which require considerableattention. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinionthat <strong>the</strong>se <strong>of</strong>fices are not cost-effective andthat <strong>the</strong>y should be closed as soon as ispracticable. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes moredetailed recommendations in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.c) The budget for <strong>the</strong> Board for <strong>the</strong> past fouryears is summarised in <strong>the</strong> following Table:Table 1: Income and Expenditure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PanSouth African Language Board 29ITEM 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06INCOMEGrant Received 18 645 000 21 634 000 24 677 000 26 976 000O<strong>the</strong>r Income 228 680 490 287 45 009 229 914Interest Received 648 253 1 313 006 311 496 306 410Total Income 19 521 934 23 437 293 25 033 505 27 512 324EXPENDITURETotal Expenses 19 302 026 21 924 587 29 928 505 29 126 342SURPLUS/(DEFICIT) 219 907 1 512 706 (4 895 000) (1 614 000)29 The Board’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>128 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 94. General conclusionsThe <strong>Committee</strong> draws <strong>the</strong> following generalconclusions in addressing <strong>the</strong> specific matterscontained in its terms <strong>of</strong> reference:a) While <strong>the</strong> current and intended constitutionaland legal mandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pan SouthAfrican Language Board are still suitable for<strong>the</strong> South Africa <strong>of</strong> today, <strong>the</strong> contribution <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Board to democracy is limited.b) Reorganisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board will bring abouta sharper focus on its constitutional andlegal mandates and avoid duplication <strong>of</strong>work with that carried out by <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities and <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture.c) The appointments procedure for <strong>the</strong> Boardrequires revision, particularly to assert fur<strong>the</strong>r<strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.d) Institutional governance arrangements <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Board require attention. This includesestablishing clear lines <strong>of</strong> accountabilitybetween <strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong> Chief ExecutiveOfficer and a stringent system for disclosure<strong>of</strong> interests.e) The Board has a legal requirement to promoteclose co-operation with organisationsperforming similar work to its own. Littleevidence <strong>of</strong> such co-operation is evident.This requires serious attention.f) The relationship between <strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong>National Assembly, through <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture, is unsatisfactory.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report.g) Funding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board appears to be adequate.The budget process arrangements,however, require amendment to assert fur<strong>the</strong>r<strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.5. Recommendationsa) As pointed out above, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> firm view that <strong>the</strong>re is an unnecessary,ineffective and costly duplication <strong>of</strong> workbetween <strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong> Commission for<strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights<strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities, and between <strong>the</strong> Board and<strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture on languagedevelopment needs. It is <strong>the</strong>reforerecommended that <strong>the</strong> Lexicography Units<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board be transferred to <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture and that <strong>the</strong>Board be incorporated into <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities as a joint activity.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that both<strong>the</strong> Board and <strong>the</strong> Commission are constitutionalbodies and that it might not be possibleto amend <strong>the</strong> Constitution in <strong>the</strong> nearfuture. The <strong>Committee</strong> is never<strong>the</strong>less <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> consolidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twobodies as a joint activity should and can beachieved in a relatively short period. Legaladvice obtained by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> suggeststhat <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Board as a jointTHE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD129


activity within <strong>the</strong> Commission can beachieved without necessarily amending <strong>the</strong>Constitution. The motivation for such amove can be summarised as follows:c) The Board is a creature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionand has a constitutional duty to fulfil itsfunctions in accordance with section 6(5).However, <strong>the</strong> Constitution does not stipulatein what manner or form <strong>the</strong> Board must fulfil<strong>the</strong>se constitutional obligations. TheConstitution fur<strong>the</strong>rmore does not requirethat <strong>the</strong> Board act independently, nor does itguarantee its sovereignty. Instead,Parliament is accorded <strong>the</strong> discretionthrough legislation to provide for an institutionthat would fulfil <strong>the</strong>se functions. Itwould <strong>the</strong>refore be constitutionally tenable– but not ideal in <strong>the</strong> long term – forParliament to adopt legislation that wouldcombine <strong>the</strong> Board with <strong>the</strong> Commission ifcertain conditions are met: -i. The envisaged legislation will have toensure that <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> newbody encompasses <strong>the</strong> duties accordedto <strong>the</strong> existing Board in <strong>the</strong> Constitutionminus <strong>the</strong> functions transferred to <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture. Such anew body must <strong>the</strong>refore be given amandate to promote and create conditionsfor <strong>the</strong> development and sustainability<strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong>ficial languages as well as<strong>the</strong> Khoi, Nama and San languages andsign language, and a mandate to promoteand ensure respect for o<strong>the</strong>r listedlanguages.ii. The legislation must take cognisance <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> independence andimpartiality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is guaranteedin <strong>the</strong> Constitution. This means that<strong>the</strong> existing legislative arrangement,which does not allow <strong>the</strong> Board sufficientindependence from <strong>the</strong> Minister and <strong>the</strong>Department, may not be replicated in <strong>the</strong>new legislation. The legislation must alsoprovide for a mandate for <strong>the</strong> new bodythat accords with <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission in <strong>the</strong> Constitution.iii The Constitution provides for <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> Commissioners to <strong>the</strong>Commission to be regulated by legislationand does not prescribe a specificappointments procedure. New legislationcan thus provide for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>a new body <strong>of</strong> Commissioners capable <strong>of</strong>fulfilling <strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> both bodies.The requirement in <strong>the</strong> Constitution thatsuch a body must be broadly representative<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main cultural, religious andlinguistic communities in South Africa isalready mirrored in <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board Act, which suggests that<strong>the</strong> joining <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two could be done relativelyspeedily.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that it isimperative that members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two institutionsshould work toge<strong>the</strong>r to ensure asmooth transition to joint activity. At <strong>the</strong>same time such a transition would requireamendment <strong>of</strong> legislation. The <strong>Committee</strong><strong>the</strong>refore recommends that each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodiesnominate three members to form a taskteam with six members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly (preferably members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture)nominated by <strong>the</strong> Speaker in proportion to<strong>the</strong> various parties’ electoral strength to dealwith <strong>the</strong> practical implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>proposal. The task team should be requiredto report to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly withinone year <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> this report witha practical plan for implementing this proposal.Such a report should also containdraft legislation ready for submission to <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture.130 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 9THE PAN SOUTH AFRICAN LANGUAGE BOARD131


CHAPTER 10


CHAPTER 10CHAPTER 10THE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTIONOF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS ANDLINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES1. BackgroundThe negotiators <strong>of</strong> South Africa’s 1993Constitution were confronted with a stark choiceabout <strong>the</strong> way in which human rights would beprotected in a new democratic order. Wouldsuch a Constitution protect <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural,linguistic or o<strong>the</strong>r groups, or would it protectindividuals to choose for <strong>the</strong>mselves whom<strong>the</strong>y wished to associate with and how <strong>the</strong>ywished to live <strong>the</strong>ir lives? The negotiators decisivelyrejected <strong>the</strong> first option and chose,instead, to inscribe a justiciable Bill <strong>of</strong> Rightswith a list <strong>of</strong> individual rights into <strong>the</strong>Constitution. Instead <strong>of</strong> protecting group rights,<strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights protects <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> individualswho have a strong association with a particularcultural, linguistic or o<strong>the</strong>r community, to associatefreely with <strong>the</strong> community <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir choice.Thus <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights shows respect for SouthAfrica’s cultural and linguistic diversity withoutperpetuating apar<strong>the</strong>id-style group classificationsbased on language, culture or religion.However, <strong>the</strong> negotiators <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution agreed to address fur<strong>the</strong>r concerns<strong>of</strong> cultural, linguistic and religious minorities bycreating <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities to help promoterespect for <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> such. According to aHuman Sciences Research Council <strong>Report</strong> entitled“Overcoming <strong>the</strong> Legacy <strong>of</strong> Discriminationin South Africa”, pressure for <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission came mainly from groups whowished to ensure <strong>the</strong> continued recognition andsupport for <strong>the</strong> Afrikaans language and culturein a democratic South Africa. However, given<strong>the</strong> diverse nature <strong>of</strong> South African society, <strong>the</strong>Constitution created a Commission that woulddeal with <strong>the</strong> important issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> promotionand protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> all cultural, linguisticand religious communities.The Commission was identified in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution and given constitutional protectionas one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions streng<strong>the</strong>ningconstitutional democracy. In <strong>the</strong> negotiations<strong>the</strong> Constitutional Assembly was bound by <strong>the</strong>constitutional principles. The ConstitutionalAssembly agreed that <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission would give proper expression toconstitutional principles XI and XII relating toencouragement <strong>of</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> language andculture and <strong>the</strong> protection and recognition <strong>of</strong>collective rights <strong>of</strong> self-determination in formingand joining organs <strong>of</strong> civil society includinglinguistic, cultural and religious associations.Despite agreement in 1996 on <strong>the</strong> provisionscreating <strong>the</strong> Commission, it took six yearsbefore Parliament adopted <strong>the</strong> requisite legislationto set up <strong>the</strong> Commission and it onlybecame fully operational in 2004. Given <strong>the</strong>short lifespan <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> finds that it was difficult to determineto what extent <strong>the</strong> Commission has fulfilledits mandate. This must be kept in mindwhen reading <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s findings in this<strong>chapter</strong>.2. Constitutional andlegal mandateSection 185 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution states that <strong>the</strong>primary objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission are threefold.Firstly, it must promote respect for cultural,religious and linguistic communities.Secondly, it must promote and develop peace,friendship, humanity, tolerance and nationalunity among cultural, religious and linguisticcommunities on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> equality, non-discriminationand free association. Thirdly, itmust recommend <strong>the</strong> establishment or recognition<strong>of</strong> cultural councils for communities inTHE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES133


South Africa. The section also states that legislationmust provide <strong>the</strong> Commission with <strong>the</strong>power necessary to achieve <strong>the</strong>se objectivesand should include <strong>the</strong> power to monitor,investigate, research, educate, lobby, adviseand report on issues concerning <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong>cultural, religious and linguistic communities.The Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities Act 19 <strong>of</strong> 2002states that, apart from <strong>the</strong> objects listed in <strong>the</strong>Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Commission also has <strong>the</strong>object <strong>of</strong> fostering mutual respect among cultural,religious and linguistic communities andpromoting <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> communities to develop<strong>the</strong>ir historically diminished heritage.To achieve <strong>the</strong>se goals, <strong>the</strong> Act contains <strong>the</strong> followingpowers and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission:a) To conduct information and education programmesto promote public understanding<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objects, role and activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission;b) To conduct programmes to promote respectfor, and fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> rights<strong>of</strong> cultural, religious and linguistic communities;c) To assist in <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> strategiesthat facilitate <strong>the</strong> full and active participation<strong>of</strong> cultural, religious and linguistic communitiesin nation-building in South Africa;d) To promote awareness among <strong>the</strong> youth <strong>of</strong>South Africa <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> cultural, religiousand linguistic communities and <strong>the</strong>irrights;e) To monitor, investigate and research anyissue concerning <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural, religiousand linguistic communities. Whenconducting an investigation <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas <strong>the</strong> power to summon witnesses, whohave a legal duty to produce all relevantdocumentation;f) To educate, lobby, advise and report on anyissue concerning <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural, religiousand linguistic communities;g) To facilitate <strong>the</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> frictionbetween and within cultural, religious andlinguistic communities or between any suchcommunity and an organ <strong>of</strong> state where <strong>the</strong>cultural, religious or linguistic rights <strong>of</strong> acommunity are affected;h) To receive and deal with requests related to<strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural, religious and linguisticcommunities; andi) To make recommendations to <strong>the</strong> appropriateorgan <strong>of</strong> state regarding legislation thatimpacts, or may impact, on <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural,religious and linguistic communities.The Act also provides for <strong>the</strong> powers and duties<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong> creation and recognition<strong>of</strong> community councils. The Commission isgiven <strong>the</strong> power to recognise community councilscreated by communities <strong>the</strong>mselves or fosteredby <strong>the</strong> Commission where communitiesare not organised already. The Act states that<strong>the</strong> aims <strong>of</strong> a community council recognised by<strong>the</strong> Commission should be to preserve, promoteand develop <strong>the</strong> culture, religion or language<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community for which it is recognisedor advise <strong>the</strong> Commission on, and assist<strong>the</strong> Commission in, matters concerning <strong>the</strong>achievement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.The Constitution fur<strong>the</strong>r states that <strong>the</strong>134 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 10Commission may report any matter that fallswithin its functions or powers to <strong>the</strong> SouthAfrican Human Rights Commission for investigation.3. FindingsThe Commission responded to <strong>the</strong> questionnairecirculated by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>. Theresponse formed <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’smeeting with <strong>the</strong> Commission on 16 February<strong>2007</strong>. The Commission provided <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> with supplementary information at<strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>. Following consideration<strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> information at its disposal,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds as follows:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhad not settled yet on what exactly constituteda cultural, religious or linguistic community– despite <strong>the</strong> fact that it was <strong>the</strong>main task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission to promoterespect for <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> such communities.The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission <strong>of</strong>ten used <strong>the</strong> words “community”and “group” interchangeably both in itswritten and oral submissions. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds this disturbing and perplexing.It does not seem to bode well for <strong>the</strong>effectiveness and relevance <strong>of</strong> a bodycharged with protecting and promoting <strong>the</strong>rights <strong>of</strong> communities, if that body has notdetermined what <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> communitiesare that <strong>the</strong>y are supposed to protect.The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore recommends that<strong>the</strong> Commission engage fur<strong>the</strong>r with thisissue with a view to producing a workabledefinition <strong>of</strong> communities.b) As set out above, <strong>the</strong> Commission has <strong>the</strong>power to initiate <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> communitycouncils and can also recognise communitycouncils. However, <strong>the</strong> Commissionwas not able to provide <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> with<strong>the</strong> set <strong>of</strong> criteria <strong>the</strong> Commission uses for<strong>the</strong> recognition <strong>of</strong> such communities. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>Commission should devise a policy on <strong>the</strong>recognition <strong>of</strong> community councils takinginto account <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>re is a tensionbetween <strong>the</strong> two potentially contradictoryroles envisaged for <strong>the</strong> Commission by <strong>the</strong>Constitution and <strong>the</strong> legislation. On <strong>the</strong> onehand <strong>the</strong> Commission is mandated to promote<strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> au<strong>the</strong>ntic cultural,religious and linguistic identities. On <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it is also mandated to promotenational unity, friendship and peace. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionbelieves that <strong>the</strong>re is no real contradictionbetween <strong>the</strong>se two goals. The Commissionargues that by providing <strong>the</strong> space withinwhich communities can thrive, it is helpingto build tolerance, understanding and peacebetween different communities. The<strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> aim <strong>of</strong> cultivatingrespect for community diversity is laudableand that this may well be <strong>the</strong> best wayfor <strong>the</strong> Commission to deal with what o<strong>the</strong>rwisewould appear to be a contradiction inits mandate.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned that while <strong>the</strong>Commission has <strong>the</strong> power to deal withcomplaints, it has only received 25 complaintssince its inception.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r notes with concernthat <strong>the</strong> Commission complained that it didnot have <strong>the</strong> power to investigate complaintsfully because section 185(3) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>THE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES135


Constitution and <strong>the</strong> concomitant section <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> legislation requires it to report any matterthat falls within its powers and functionsto <strong>the</strong> South African Human RightsCommission. The Commission is clearly misunderstandingits powers in this regard as itis not required (<strong>Committee</strong>’s emphasis) torefer a matter to <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission, but is merely permitted to doso if it sees fit. There is, <strong>the</strong>refore, no legalimpediment to <strong>the</strong> Commission investigatingcomplaints about <strong>the</strong> breach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> cultural,religious or linguistic rights <strong>of</strong> individualsprotected in <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that legitimateminority concerns should primarily be dealtwith in a human rights context. However,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission has already established proceduresfor <strong>the</strong> adequate investigation <strong>of</strong> complaints.The Human Rights Commission doesthis relatively speedily.g) The Commission is concerned that it was“not a party in <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act 4 <strong>of</strong>2000” and argued that <strong>the</strong>re was a need forit to be involved in Equality Court work toensure that Equality Courts balanced individualrights and community rights. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds that this submission fundamentallymisconstrues <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> itsmandate and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.As <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides for <strong>the</strong> protection<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> cultural,religious and linguistic communities as individualhuman rights, <strong>the</strong>re is no need to“balance” <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> communities against<strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> individuals. The Bill <strong>of</strong> Rightsguarantees individual rights, including <strong>the</strong>rights <strong>of</strong> individuals to freely associate withcommunities.h) In effectively pursuing its constitutionalmandate, <strong>the</strong> Commission <strong>the</strong>refore has aduty to assist individuals who complain that<strong>the</strong>y have been discriminated againstbecause <strong>the</strong>y belong to a particular cultural,religious or linguistic community. The Actprovides for any body – including <strong>the</strong>Commission – to approach an Equality Courtwith such a complaint on behalf <strong>of</strong> any personor group <strong>of</strong> people. The <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat <strong>the</strong> Commission familiarizeitself with <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act andmake every attempt to take relevant complaints<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public to <strong>the</strong> Equality Court onbehalf <strong>of</strong> aggrieved individuals.i) The Commission has <strong>the</strong> power to reviewlegislation that may impact on <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong>cultural, religious and linguistic communitiesand to make recommendations to <strong>the</strong>appropriate authority for changes to suchlegislation. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission has not yet done so.3.2. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The Act provides for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> n<strong>of</strong>ewer than 11 and no more than 17Commissioners who, in turn, must appoint aChief Executive Officer responsible for <strong>the</strong>formation and development <strong>of</strong> an efficientadministration. The Commission functionswith an executive committee, but all importantdecisions must be taken by <strong>the</strong> plenaryconsisting <strong>of</strong> all Commissioners. Only <strong>the</strong>Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission serves in afull-time capacity.b) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that <strong>the</strong>re are no clearly defined roles forCommissioners and that <strong>the</strong>re has been tensionbetween Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> secre-136 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 10tariat. This tension stems mostly from <strong>the</strong>lack <strong>of</strong> clarity on <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> part-timeCommissioners in relation to <strong>the</strong> secretariat,particularly regarding <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> decisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes with concern that afterfour years <strong>of</strong> existence this obvious confusionabout roles has not been addressed andthat Commissioners seem not to realise that<strong>the</strong>y have <strong>the</strong> power and <strong>the</strong> duty to fix thisproblem <strong>the</strong>mselves. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforerecommends that <strong>the</strong> Commissionaddress this problem forthwith.c) Section 15 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act states that everymember <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission has a duty todisclose to <strong>the</strong> Commission any personal orprivate business interests which that memberor that member’s spouse, partner orclose family member may have in any matterbefore <strong>the</strong> Commission, and must withdrawfrom <strong>the</strong> proceedings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission when that matter is considered,unless <strong>the</strong> Commission decides that <strong>the</strong>member’s interest in <strong>the</strong> matter is trivial orirrelevant. The Act also prohibits aCommissioner from using his or her positionor privileges for private gain or to benefitano<strong>the</strong>r.d) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that all members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission havedeclared <strong>the</strong>ir interests. The Commissionhowever admitted that this declaration hasnot been updated for <strong>2007</strong>. The <strong>Committee</strong>was also informed that <strong>the</strong> Chief ExecutiveOfficer and all senior employees have beenrequested to submit information about <strong>the</strong>irfinancial and o<strong>the</strong>r interests to <strong>the</strong>Commission in line with <strong>the</strong> Public FinanceManagement Act. However, <strong>the</strong> 2005/06report <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General on financialstatements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission reveals thatsenior <strong>of</strong>ficials had not declared <strong>the</strong>ir interests,contrary to good corporate governance.The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that both <strong>the</strong>Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> senior <strong>of</strong>ficialsshould declare <strong>the</strong>ir interests annually inline with <strong>the</strong> recommendations made inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.e) The Commission submitted that it hasapproved a Code <strong>of</strong> Conduct dealing withtransgressions by, and conflicts between,Commissioners. Staff relations are informedby <strong>the</strong> Public Service Handbook for SeniorManagement.3.3. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The Commission has a public education andadvocacy unit whose function it is to conductinformation and education programmesto promote public understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s objects, role and activities. TheCommission was only launched in 2004, andneeded to conduct extensive promotionalwork to establish a public pr<strong>of</strong>ile. In thatregard a national consultative conferencewas held, and <strong>the</strong> media campaign thataccompanied <strong>the</strong> conference assisted inmaking <strong>the</strong> public aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conferenceand its objects.b) During 2004/05 <strong>the</strong> Commission received16 complaints and during 2005/06 itreceived 29 complaints. Complaints aboutreligion headed <strong>the</strong> list, followed by complaintsabout culture and language. Mostcomplaints about culture were from ruralareas, while most complaints about languagewere from urban areas. There is aconcentration <strong>of</strong> complaints in <strong>the</strong> Gautengprovince. The Commission has handledcomplaints from only three o<strong>the</strong>r provinces.THE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES137


c) The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned about <strong>the</strong> smallnumber <strong>of</strong> complaints lodged with <strong>the</strong>Commission as this suggests ei<strong>the</strong>r that <strong>the</strong>public is unaware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work done by <strong>the</strong>Commission, or that it has no confidencethat <strong>the</strong> Commission will be able to addressits concerns. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore recommendsthat <strong>the</strong> Commission take proactivesteps to improve its pr<strong>of</strong>ile by,amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs taking relevant cases to <strong>the</strong>Equality Courts.d) The analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaints shows that by<strong>the</strong> time <strong>the</strong> 2005/06 annual report waspublished in 2006, none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaintsreceived during <strong>the</strong> 2004/05 financial yearhad been concluded. While only three <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> 29 complaints received during 2005/06were settled satisfactorily, 26 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaintswere scheduled for considerationand investigation in <strong>2007</strong>. The <strong>Committee</strong> isconcerned at <strong>the</strong> slow pace <strong>of</strong> investigation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaints.e) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that it did not have an established procedurefor <strong>the</strong> public to complain about its investigations.The Chairperson and <strong>the</strong> ChiefExecutive Officer receive such complaints.The submission by <strong>the</strong> Commission did notprovide <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> complaints that <strong>the</strong>Chairperson or <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officerhad received from <strong>the</strong> public.3.4. APPOINTMENTSa) The National Assembly is not involved in <strong>the</strong>appointment process for Commissioners.The Act provides that, whenever vacanciesneed to be filled, <strong>the</strong> Minister for Provincialand Local Government must invite individualsand organisations to nominate suitablyqualified individuals to serve on <strong>the</strong>Commission. The Minister must also appointa selection panel consisting <strong>of</strong> persons whocommand public respect for <strong>the</strong>ir fair-mindedness,wisdom and understanding <strong>of</strong> issuesconcerning South African cultural, religiousand linguistic communities. The panel mustsubmit to <strong>the</strong> President a list <strong>of</strong> names <strong>of</strong> atleast one-and-a-half times <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong>vacancies to be filled. This list <strong>of</strong> nomineesmust be broadly representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> maincultural, religious and linguistic communitiesand must also broadly reflect <strong>the</strong> gendercomposition <strong>of</strong> South Africa. The President<strong>the</strong>n selects <strong>the</strong> requisite number <strong>of</strong>Commissioners from <strong>the</strong> list <strong>of</strong> nomineesand appoints <strong>the</strong>m.b) The Act provides for <strong>the</strong> President to appoint<strong>the</strong> Chairperson and no fewer than 11 and nomore than 17 o<strong>the</strong>r Commissioners. ThePresident may appoint a deputy chairpersonfrom <strong>the</strong> ranks <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioners. ThePresident determines <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong>Commissioners to be appointed. The Presidentmay reduce <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> Commissionersonly when appointing Commissioners for anew term. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> Commission is too big. The size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission contributes to <strong>the</strong> confusion about<strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioners and seemswasteful and expensive. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforerecommends that <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong>Commissioners should not exceed 11.c) It is unclear why <strong>the</strong> Minister for Provincialand Local Government should play such acentral role in <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners. The role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister inthis process may impact negatively on <strong>the</strong>independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, which isguaranteed in section 181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution. While <strong>the</strong> role and function <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission does not require <strong>the</strong> high-138 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 10est protection from Executive influence tosafeguard its independence, <strong>the</strong> involvement<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister may well create <strong>the</strong>impression in <strong>the</strong> minds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public that<strong>the</strong> Commission is not independent.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore recommends that<strong>the</strong> Commission be appointed by <strong>the</strong>President on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. In line with <strong>the</strong> recommendationsin Chapter 2, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>recommends that <strong>the</strong> relevant portfoliocommittee should invite nominations, drawup a short-list and interview <strong>the</strong> candidatesbefore recommending a list <strong>of</strong> names to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly for approval.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) The Commission does not have any formalrelationship with <strong>the</strong> Executive. It interactswith relevant members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive onan ad hoc basis. However, <strong>the</strong> Executivecurrently plays a decisive role in <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioners. Aspointed out above, this might impact negativelyon public perceptions about <strong>the</strong> independence<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> procedurefor appointment should be changed toensure that <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and not<strong>the</strong> Minister or <strong>the</strong> President plays <strong>the</strong> decisiverole in <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissioners.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> member <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Executive formally designated to dealwith <strong>the</strong> affairs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is <strong>the</strong>Minister for Provincial and Local Government.It is unclear why <strong>the</strong> Commission isrequired to deal with this Minister who doesnot seem to have a specific link with <strong>the</strong>work done by <strong>the</strong> Commission. The mandate<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, properly understood,requires it to promote and protect <strong>the</strong> rights<strong>of</strong> individuals who belong to particular cultural,religious or linguistic communities. Thepromotion and protection <strong>of</strong> rights associatedwith <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is <strong>the</strong>proper ambit <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onArts and Culture. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforerecommends that <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Arts andCulture should be designated as <strong>the</strong> member<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive dealing with <strong>the</strong>Commission.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) In terms <strong>of</strong> section 181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution<strong>the</strong> Commission is accountable to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. At present <strong>the</strong> Commissionreports to <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onProvincial and Local Government. TheCommission has expressed dissatisfactionwith this arrangement and has indicatedthat <strong>the</strong> work done by <strong>the</strong> Commission doesnot relate to <strong>the</strong> interests and expertise <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onProvincial and Local Government. The<strong>Committee</strong> agrees with <strong>the</strong> Commission.For <strong>the</strong> reasons provided in <strong>the</strong> previousparagraph, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> viewthat <strong>the</strong> Commission should ra<strong>the</strong>r report to<strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture.b) The Commission has expressed some frustrationwith <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> interaction with <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. Although <strong>the</strong> Commissionsubmits its reports to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly and appears before <strong>the</strong> relevantPortfolio <strong>Committee</strong> once a year, <strong>the</strong>re is noproper feedback from <strong>the</strong> Assembly. The<strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> proposalson parliamentary oversight in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report will address most <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> concerns<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.THE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES139


3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER NINEAND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The Act allows <strong>the</strong> Commission to makeappropriate arrangements with ano<strong>the</strong>r constitutionalinstitution or an organ <strong>of</strong> state toassist <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong>any <strong>of</strong> its functions. The Act also requires<strong>the</strong> Commission to co-operate with o<strong>the</strong>rconstitutional institutions and organs <strong>of</strong>state where <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionoverlap with those <strong>of</strong> such o<strong>the</strong>r constitutionalinstitutions or organs <strong>of</strong> state. Asmentioned above, <strong>the</strong> Commission may alsoreport any matter that falls within its functionsand powers to <strong>the</strong> South AfricanHuman Rights Commission for investigation.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that <strong>the</strong>re wassome informal co-operation between <strong>the</strong>Commission and o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 bodiesthrough membership <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Forum <strong>of</strong>Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons <strong>of</strong>Chapter 9 Institutions. Recently, <strong>the</strong> ChiefExecutive Officers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions havealso organised <strong>the</strong>mselves into a forum thatshares information on programmes andchallenges <strong>the</strong>y experience in <strong>the</strong>ir institutions.The Commission pointed out that,because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se interactive initiatives, adhoc collaboration has resulted, including aco-hosting <strong>of</strong> human rights day activitieswith <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, and<strong>the</strong>re has been fruitful collaboration on afew programmes. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>notes with concern that <strong>the</strong> Commission hasno formal co-operation agreement with any<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutions or with<strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board,despite <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong>re are clear areas <strong>of</strong>overlap <strong>of</strong> functions.c) The Commission attempted to draw a distinctionbetween <strong>the</strong> work done by <strong>the</strong> PanSouth African Language Board to promotemultilingualism and its work to promote <strong>the</strong>rights <strong>of</strong> linguistic minorities. It argued thatit did not have to work with <strong>the</strong> Pan SouthAfrican Language Board because <strong>the</strong> functions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two bodies did not overlap inany material way. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>opinion that <strong>the</strong> differences in <strong>the</strong> functions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two institutions are less pronouncedthan <strong>the</strong> Commission suggests.Both bodies have <strong>the</strong> power to deal withcomplaints where individual members <strong>of</strong>linguistic communities feel aggrieved aboutrespect for <strong>the</strong>ir language and both have aconstitutional duty to promote and protect<strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> individuals to have <strong>the</strong>ir languagesrespected.d) However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes with concernthat despite this overlap, no formal co-operationagreement has been reached with <strong>the</strong>Pan South African Language Board. Anagreement with <strong>the</strong> Board was concludedbut it has not been signed. The <strong>Committee</strong>has been informed that <strong>the</strong>se two bodieshave also not formalised <strong>the</strong>ir working relationshipin any o<strong>the</strong>r way, but do co-operatein an informal manner. The <strong>Committee</strong>received submissions from civil societypointing out this overlap and <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> formalco-operation between <strong>the</strong>se bodies andsuggesting that steps should be taken toaddress this matter.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>absence <strong>of</strong> such an agreement leads to duplicationand renders both institutions lesseffective than <strong>the</strong>y would o<strong>the</strong>rwise havebeen. The duplication <strong>of</strong> mandates also hasserious cost implications. The <strong>Committee</strong><strong>the</strong>refore recommends that <strong>the</strong> Board beincorporated within <strong>the</strong> Commission and that140 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 10a new institution, <strong>the</strong> “Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities(including <strong>the</strong> Pan South African LanguageBoard)”, be created to face <strong>the</strong> importantchallenges <strong>of</strong> especially <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong>indigenous languages in South Africa. Thisproposal is fur<strong>the</strong>r addressed below.f) The Commission also submitted that it refersmatters falling outside <strong>of</strong> its mandate too<strong>the</strong>r institutions as mandated by <strong>the</strong> Act,but it failed to mention how many suchmatters were referred. The <strong>Committee</strong>notes with concern that no systems are inplace to provide statistics about such casesand to follow up on referrals and recommendsthat such systems be developed andput in place forthwith.g) In its submission <strong>the</strong> Commission seemed tolament <strong>the</strong> legislative provision that it mayreport matters falling under its functions andpowers to <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission forlitigation. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> Commission should have been activelypromoting collaboration especially in matterspertaining to equality, given its stated desire,and its mistaken belief, that it has no role toplay in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> equality legislation.3.8. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) The first budget allocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission was determined by <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Provincial and LocalGovernment in 2003/04 and had no directrelation to strategic plans as <strong>the</strong> institutionhad not yet been established. TheCommission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that ithas begun to engage with <strong>the</strong> NationalTreasury when dealing with <strong>the</strong> budgetprocess, and that <strong>the</strong> money is still allocatedto it via <strong>the</strong> Budget Vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department<strong>of</strong> Provincial and Local Government. TheCommission was concerned about <strong>the</strong>involvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Executive and proposedthat <strong>the</strong> budget should be dealt with by <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. The recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report dealwith this problem and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>believes that <strong>the</strong>se will allay <strong>the</strong> concerns <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission.b) The Commission received R8.9 million inappropriations from government in <strong>the</strong>2003/04 financial year, which was lateradjusted to R7.9 million. At that stage <strong>the</strong>Commission was not fully functional andwas still housed in <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong>Provincial and Local Government. The budgetfor <strong>the</strong> Commission has grown steadilysince <strong>the</strong>n and for <strong>the</strong> current financial year<strong>the</strong> budget is R13.4 million. The table belowprovides a breakdown <strong>of</strong> income and expenditure,as well as <strong>the</strong> amounts allocated interms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Medium Term ExpenditureFramework.c) The Commission’s principal source <strong>of</strong> incomeis a transfer from <strong>the</strong> National Treasury, andis appropriated in <strong>the</strong> Vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Provincial and LocalGovernment. Expenditure has increasedsubstantially from <strong>the</strong> first year <strong>of</strong> operation,suggesting that <strong>the</strong> institution did not domuch in <strong>the</strong> first year <strong>of</strong> operation, but starteddoing work in <strong>the</strong> 2004/05 financial year.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> is surprised at <strong>the</strong> largeincreases in <strong>the</strong> Commission’s budget in terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> medium Term Expenditure Framework.From <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s interaction with <strong>the</strong>Commission it was unclear whe<strong>the</strong>r thismoney would be spent in an effective manner.The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that <strong>the</strong>THE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES141


Commission planned to open provincial <strong>of</strong>fices g) The Commission submitted that its currentand that some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> money would go staff complement was 15, and that <strong>the</strong>re aretowards this. As <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> has pointed 46 vacancies that needed to be filled inout in Chapter 2, it is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> <strong>2007</strong>. Although <strong>the</strong> Commission is in itsopening <strong>of</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fices is seldom <strong>the</strong> infancy, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view thatmost effective way for a Chapter 9 institution <strong>the</strong> small staff complement hinders <strong>the</strong>to spend its limited resources. The <strong>Committee</strong> Commission’s work. The slow pace <strong>of</strong> completinginvestigations attests to this. It cre-<strong>the</strong>refore recommends that a moratorium beplaced on <strong>the</strong> opening <strong>of</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r provincial ates <strong>the</strong> impression that <strong>the</strong> Commission is<strong>of</strong>fices at least until <strong>the</strong> Commission has formalisedits relationship with <strong>the</strong> Pan South end <strong>of</strong> 2006 showed that <strong>the</strong>re was oneoverwhelmed. The staff complement at <strong>the</strong>African Language Board.researcher for religion, culture and diminishedidentity.Table 1: Income and Expenditure 2003/3004– 2009/2010 30R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Income 7960 9 718 11 586 13 403 15 447 18 496 20 393Expenditure 1 280 12 471 11 427Surplus/(Deficit) 6 680 (2 753) 159e) The largest items on <strong>the</strong> financial statement<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission are <strong>the</strong> salaries at R3.7million and consultancy fees at R1,2 millionduring <strong>the</strong> 2005/06 financial year. With <strong>the</strong>small staff complement, it appears that <strong>the</strong>Commission was dependent on consultantsand o<strong>the</strong>r service providers for <strong>the</strong> provision<strong>of</strong> research and o<strong>the</strong>r services. It appearsthat <strong>the</strong> allocations were just sufficient tokeep <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice running and acquire equipment.f) There was overspending in both <strong>the</strong>2004/05 and 2005/06 financial years.Although <strong>the</strong> overspending could beexplained by <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> setting up a newinstitution, <strong>the</strong> Commission did not explain<strong>the</strong> overspending.4. General conclusionsThe <strong>Committee</strong> draws <strong>the</strong> following generalconclusions in addressing <strong>the</strong> specific matterscontained in its terms <strong>of</strong> reference:a) While <strong>the</strong> current and intended constitutionaland legal mandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission arestill suitable for <strong>the</strong> South Africa <strong>of</strong> today, <strong>the</strong>duration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionmakes it difficult for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> to drawabsolute conclusions regarding its contributionto democracy.b) Reorganisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in linewith <strong>the</strong> recommendations made in <strong>the</strong>Chapter dealing with <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board will enhance <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission and avoid duplication.30 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>142 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 10c) The appointments procedure for <strong>the</strong>Commission requires revision. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.d) Institutional governance arrangements <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission should be revised. Thisincludes establishing clear lines <strong>of</strong> accountabilityand an appropriate system for disclosure<strong>of</strong> interests.e) The relationship between <strong>the</strong> Commissionand <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, through <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture, isunsatisfactory. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes generalrecommendations in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.f) Funding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission appears to beadequate. The budget process arrangements,however, require amendment toassert fur<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes generalrecommendations in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.5. Recommendationsa) As pointed out above, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> firm view that <strong>the</strong>re is an unnecessary,ineffective and costly duplication <strong>of</strong> workbetween <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> Pan SouthAfrican Language Board. It is <strong>the</strong>refore recommendedthat <strong>the</strong> Pan South AfricanLanguage Board be incorporated into <strong>the</strong>Commission.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that both<strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> Board are establishedby <strong>the</strong> Constitution and that it mightnot be possible to change <strong>the</strong> Constitution in<strong>the</strong> near future. The <strong>Committee</strong> is never<strong>the</strong>less<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong> joining <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>two bodies should and can be achieved in arelatively short period. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> view that speedy action could turn <strong>the</strong>situation around. The <strong>Committee</strong> obtainedlegal advice, and is informed that <strong>the</strong> twobodies can be joined without necessarilychanging <strong>the</strong> Constitution. The motivationfor such a move can be summarized as follows:i. The Board is a creature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution and has a constitutional dutyto fulfil its functions in accordance withsection 6(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution. However,<strong>the</strong> Constitution does not stipulatein what manner or form <strong>the</strong> Board mustfulfil <strong>the</strong>se constitutional obligations. TheConstitution fur<strong>the</strong>rmore does not requirethat <strong>the</strong> Board act independently, nordoes it guarantee its sovereignty. Instead,Parliament is accorded <strong>the</strong> discretionthrough legislation to provide for an institutionthat would fulfil <strong>the</strong>se functions. Itwould <strong>the</strong>refore be constitutionally tenable,although not ideal in <strong>the</strong> long term,for Parliament to adopt legislation thatwould incorporate <strong>the</strong> Board into <strong>the</strong>Commission if certain conditions weremet.ii. As set out in <strong>the</strong> Chapter on <strong>the</strong> PanSouth African Language Board, <strong>the</strong> envisagedlegislation will have to ensure that<strong>the</strong> mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> new body encompass<strong>the</strong> duties accorded to <strong>the</strong> existingBoard.iii. The amalgamating legislation must takecognisance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> independenceand impartiality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionis guaranteed in <strong>the</strong> Constitution. Thismeans that <strong>the</strong> new legislation shouldTHE COMMISSION FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNITIES143


not only provide for a mandate for <strong>the</strong>new body that would accord with <strong>the</strong>mandates <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> Commission and<strong>the</strong> Board, but should also ensure that<strong>the</strong> Commission’s independence is notaffected.iv. The Constitution provides for <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> Commissioners to <strong>the</strong>Commission to be regulated by legislationand does not prescribe a specificappointments procedure. Amalgamatinglegislation can thus provide for <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> a new body <strong>of</strong>Commissioners capable <strong>of</strong> fulfilling <strong>the</strong>amalgamated mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two bodies.The requirement in <strong>the</strong> Constitutionthat such a body must be broadly representative<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main cultural, religiousand linguistic communities in SouthAfrica is already mirrored in <strong>the</strong> PanSouth African Language Board Act, whichsuggests that <strong>the</strong> amalgamation could bedone relatively speedily. As set outabove, <strong>the</strong> current system <strong>of</strong> appointmentsdoes not accord fully with <strong>the</strong>requirements <strong>of</strong> independence andshould be changed to allow <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly to nominate Commissioners forappointment in line with <strong>the</strong> recommendationsin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.v. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that it isimperative that members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> twoinstitutions work toge<strong>the</strong>r to ensure asmooth amalgamation process. At <strong>the</strong>same time, such a process would requireamendment <strong>of</strong> legislation. We <strong>the</strong>reforerecommend that each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodiesnominate three members who will forma task team toge<strong>the</strong>r with six members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly (preferablymembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onArts and Culture) nominated by <strong>the</strong>Speaker in proportion to <strong>the</strong> various parties’electoral strength to deal with <strong>the</strong>practical implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proposal.The task team should report to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly within one year <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>adoption <strong>of</strong> this report with a practicalplan for implementing <strong>the</strong> proposal.Such a report should also contain draftlegislation ready for submission to <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture.vi. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that, as discussedin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report, in <strong>the</strong>long term <strong>the</strong> Commission should beamalgamated with <strong>the</strong> South AfricanHuman Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong>rebyaddressing <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s central recommendation<strong>of</strong> a single Human RightsCommission for all rights issues as discussedin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.144 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


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CHAPTER 11


CHAPTER 11CHAPTER 11THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY1. BackgroundSouth African women are subject to deeplyentrenched and overlapping forms <strong>of</strong> oppression,with a result that <strong>the</strong>y suffer unfair discriminationin almost every aspect <strong>of</strong> humanendeavour. While much has been done since<strong>the</strong> advent <strong>of</strong> democracy to address structuralgender inequalities, discrimination on <strong>the</strong>grounds <strong>of</strong> gender remains a reality for manySouth African women. Their plight is aggravatedfur<strong>the</strong>r by such factors as race, sexual orientation,rural origins and indigence. South Africaremains a society with strong patriarchal tendenciesin which women are expected to fulfilinferior, gender-based roles.It was, <strong>the</strong>refore, hardly surprising that at <strong>the</strong>time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> drafting <strong>of</strong> both <strong>the</strong> 1993 and 1996Constitutions, women and o<strong>the</strong>r gender activistsexpressed concern that <strong>the</strong> unique and pressinghuman rights based needs <strong>of</strong> women would besubsumed in and sublimated by <strong>the</strong> largerstruggle for <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a human rightsculture in <strong>the</strong> country. Agreement emergedabout <strong>the</strong> critical need to establish a separatebody to deal with <strong>the</strong> distinctive needs <strong>of</strong>women in South Africa, and to prevent <strong>the</strong> marginalisation<strong>of</strong> those concerns most closelyassociated with <strong>the</strong> lives <strong>of</strong> women.The 1993 Constitution accordingly created anindependent Commission for Gender Equality todeal specifically with <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> genderequality and to advise and make recommendationsrelating to gender equality and <strong>the</strong> status<strong>of</strong> women. Legislation to establish <strong>the</strong>Commission was finally enacted by Parliamentin June 1996 and <strong>the</strong> Commission on GenderEquality Act 39 <strong>of</strong> 1996 came into operation on8 August 1996.The discussion around <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitutionreaffirmed <strong>the</strong> constitutional basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. Section 181 read with section 187establishes such a Commission.One <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> issues that arose in <strong>the</strong> discussionconcerned <strong>the</strong> relationship between <strong>the</strong>Commission and <strong>the</strong> national gender machineryaimed at advancing <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrican women. While many countries hadestablished gender machineries as a singlestructure in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> women’s ministries, <strong>the</strong>concern was expressed that such an arrangementwould serve to marginalise women’sissues in South Africa. Instead, a collection <strong>of</strong>interrelated institutions was proposed situatedboth within and outside <strong>of</strong> government. Thesewere to operate at national, provincial, regionaland local level. The Commission for GenderEquality formed part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national gendermachinery and was to function within this integratedset <strong>of</strong> institutions. In addition, <strong>the</strong> adoption<strong>of</strong> a ’gender mainstreaming’ approach thatintegrated gender concerns into all aspects <strong>of</strong>governance was agreed upon. However, as <strong>the</strong>Constitution specifically establishes <strong>the</strong>Commission as an independent body, <strong>the</strong> constitutionalbasis for <strong>the</strong> Commission’s role within<strong>the</strong> national gender machinery is unclear.Although, <strong>the</strong> decision was to establish a separateand distinct Commission for GenderEquality, <strong>the</strong>re was, never<strong>the</strong>less, awarenessthat <strong>the</strong>re might be duplication in <strong>the</strong> roles <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission and o<strong>the</strong>r bodies, such as <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission and <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector. However, <strong>the</strong> historical oppression <strong>of</strong>women in a starkly patriarchal society weighedheavily in <strong>the</strong> decision to establish <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equality as its establishmentmeant increased public participation toinfluence government policy and promisedgreater horizontal accountability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state toachieve substantive gender equality.THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY147


2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe Commission has a broad mandate toachieve gender equality in South Africa. Thelegal mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is derivedfrom <strong>the</strong> Constitution, and such o<strong>the</strong>r legislationas <strong>the</strong> Commission on Gender Equality Act39 <strong>of</strong> 1996 and <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act 4 <strong>of</strong>2000.2.1. CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATESection 119 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution providedfor <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a Commission forGender Equality ’to promote gender equalityand to advise and to make recommendations toParliament or any o<strong>the</strong>r legislature with regardto any laws or proposed legislation whichaffects gender equality and <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong>women’. Section 120 stated that legislationwould provide for <strong>the</strong> composition, powers,functions and functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionand for all related r matters.The 1996 Constitution affirms <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission and provides in greater detailfor <strong>the</strong> Commission’s powers and functions.Section 187 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution states that<strong>the</strong> Commission must promote respect for genderequality and <strong>the</strong> protection, developmentand attainment <strong>of</strong> gender equality. It alsoaffirms that <strong>the</strong> Commission must have <strong>the</strong>power, as regulated by legislation, necessary toperform its functions, including <strong>the</strong> power tomonitor, investigate, research, educate, lobby,advise and report on issues concerning genderequality. These powers and functions are fullydetailed in <strong>the</strong> Commission on Gender EqualityAct.2.2. MANDATE IN TERMS OFCOMMISSION ON GENDER EQUALITYACTIn common with o<strong>the</strong>r institutions, in terms <strong>of</strong>section 181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>the</strong> Commissionis independent. More specifically with regard to<strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commission on GenderEquality Act affirms <strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission and requires Commissioners toperform <strong>the</strong>ir duties without fear, favour orprejudice. The Act also prohibits any organ <strong>of</strong>state or person from interfering with, hinderingor obstructing <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong> exercise<strong>of</strong> its duties. The legislation requires that allorgans <strong>of</strong> state afford <strong>the</strong> Commission <strong>the</strong>assistance it reasonably requires to protect itsindependence, impartiality and dignity.The Commission’s functions can be groupedinto five broad categories, namely monitoringand evaluation, investigations, education andinformation, research, and liaison. The Act provides<strong>the</strong> Commission with wide powers to fulfilits functions.Firstly, <strong>the</strong> Act requires <strong>the</strong> Commission tomonitor and evaluate <strong>the</strong> practices <strong>of</strong> organs <strong>of</strong>state at any level; statutory bodies or functionaries;public bodies and authorities; andeven private businesses, enterprises and institutions,in order to promote gender equality.The Commission is also authorised to make anyrecommendations to Parliament or any o<strong>the</strong>rlegislature that it considers fit in response to itsmonitoring activities.Secondly, <strong>the</strong> Commission has a legal duty toprepare and carry out information and educationprogrammes to foster public understanding<strong>of</strong> gender equality and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’srole.148 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11Thirdly, <strong>the</strong> Commission is tasked with <strong>the</strong>important duty <strong>of</strong> reviewing laws and policieslikely to affect gender equality and <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong>women. These include Acts <strong>of</strong> Parliament; anysystem <strong>of</strong> personal and family law or custom;any system <strong>of</strong> indigenous law, customs or practices;and any o<strong>the</strong>r existing law or draft legislation.The Act also empowers <strong>the</strong> Commissionto make recommendations to Parliament oro<strong>the</strong>r relevant legislatures about necessaryamendments to <strong>the</strong> law and <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong>new legislation.Fourthly, <strong>the</strong> Commission has a duty to investigateany gender-related issues <strong>of</strong> its own accordor on receipt <strong>of</strong> a complaint. When investigatingsuch a complaint, it is required to try andresolve <strong>the</strong> dispute or to rectify <strong>the</strong> act or omissioncomplained <strong>of</strong>, through mediation, conciliationor negotiation. The Commission also has<strong>the</strong> power, at any time during <strong>the</strong> process, torefer <strong>the</strong> matter to <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector or any o<strong>the</strong>rrelevant authority. The Commission has widepowers <strong>of</strong> search and seizure and can subpoenaany witnesses when investigating complaints inorder to ga<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> necessary information. Thismeans that, unlike civil society organisations,<strong>the</strong> Commission (subject always to appropriateprocedures) has <strong>the</strong> power not only to compel<strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> evidence from any public or privatebody, but also <strong>the</strong> attendance <strong>of</strong> witnessesfor purposes <strong>of</strong> an investigation. 31It is <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that section 38<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, which allows anyone toapproach a competent court to enforce a rightfound in <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights, additionally empowers<strong>the</strong> Commission to take a case to court onbehalf <strong>of</strong> a complainant.In <strong>the</strong> fifth instance, <strong>the</strong> Commission has <strong>the</strong>duty to monitor South Africa’s compliance withinternational agreements adopted by <strong>the</strong> staterelating to <strong>the</strong> objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. Thereare very important international conventions atissue on matters <strong>of</strong> race, women and children,and human rights in general.Finally, <strong>the</strong> Commission must, as far as is practicable,maintain close liaison with institutions,bodies or authorities with similar objectives tothose <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, in order to foster commonpolicies and practices and to promote cooperationwhere appropriate. The Commissionmust also liaise and interact with any organisationthat actively promotes gender equality.2.3. MANDATE IN TERMS OF PROMOTIONOF EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OFUNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ACTAlthough significant progress has been made intransforming our society and its institutions,structural gender inequalities remain deeplyembedded in social relations, practices and attitudesin South Africa. These inequalities invariablylead to unfair discrimination on <strong>the</strong> basis<strong>of</strong> sex and gender and frustrate <strong>the</strong> achievement<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> society promised by <strong>the</strong>Constitution. To address this problem in a systematic,consistent and fair manner, <strong>the</strong>Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality and Prevention <strong>of</strong> UnfairDiscrimination Act 4 <strong>of</strong> 2000 was enacted inorder to carry out <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution.The Act is intended to provide an easiermethod for ordinary people to challenge unfairdiscrimination by <strong>the</strong> state, or by private institutionsor individuals, through <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> asystem <strong>of</strong> equality courts. It envisages animportant role for <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality in <strong>the</strong> successful implementation andfunctioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.31 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). Organisational and institutional assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South AfricanCommission for Gender Equality. Final <strong>Report</strong>, October 2006. p.40THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY149


Firstly, section 20 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act allows <strong>the</strong>Commission to institute proceedings under <strong>the</strong>Act in an equality court on behalf <strong>of</strong> anyaggrieved person or group. In addition, wherea presiding <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> such a court decides torefer a matter to <strong>the</strong> Commission, it must dealwith it speedily. The Act also places a duty on<strong>the</strong> Commission to assist complainants whowish to lodge a complaint and to conductinvestigations where necessary.Secondly, <strong>the</strong> Act envisages that <strong>the</strong>Commission will play a role in <strong>the</strong> promotionand achievement <strong>of</strong> equality. Under <strong>the</strong> Act,<strong>the</strong> Commission may, for example, request anystate institution or any person to supply informationon any measures relating to <strong>the</strong>achievement <strong>of</strong> equality, including informationon executive action and compliance with <strong>the</strong>law. The Human Rights Commission must alsoconsult <strong>the</strong> Commission when it deals wi<strong>the</strong>quality plans submitted by governmentdepartments. Unfortunately, this second part <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Act has not yet been brought into force.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> met with <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission, supported by <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission, on 2 March <strong>2007</strong>. TheCommission’s written response to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s questionnaire, as well variouswritten and oral submissions, including thosefrom civil society and certain governmentMinistries, informed <strong>the</strong> discussions. The<strong>Committee</strong> requested <strong>the</strong> Commission to furnishit with additional information relating to itsmonitoring <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> internationaltreaties, <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> complaintslodged with it by <strong>the</strong> public during <strong>the</strong>2005/06 financial year, <strong>the</strong> number and nature<strong>of</strong> complaints that were finalised in 2005/06and <strong>the</strong> number and nature <strong>of</strong> complaints notfully dealt with during <strong>the</strong> same year.The <strong>Committee</strong> had a preliminary discussionwith <strong>the</strong> Chairperson as to why <strong>the</strong>re was noproper Commission in place. The reasons forthis are expanded on in <strong>the</strong> report.The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that it must report on <strong>the</strong>Commission in pain and sorrow, ra<strong>the</strong>r than inanger. As such, it strongly believes that <strong>the</strong>Commission represents a lost opportunity asuntil now it has failed to engage in a sustainedand effective manner with <strong>the</strong> policies,approaches and mechanisms to eliminate allforms <strong>of</strong> gender discrimination and to promotegender issues in South Africa.3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISAs with <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission on GenderEquality Act <strong>of</strong> 1996 came into law before <strong>the</strong>1996 Constitution was enacted, and contains referencesto <strong>the</strong> now repealed 1993 Constitution.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> Act requires amendment to bringit into line with <strong>the</strong> Constitution.3.2. UNDERSTANDING ANDINTERPRETATION OF MANDATEThe Commission has a broad mandate andpowers and has, at times, used its powerstowards achieving its objectives, most notablyby intervening as a friend <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> court(described in Latin as amicus curiae) in genderrelatedConstitutional Court cases. However,<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commission’spresentation to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> its understandingand interpretation <strong>of</strong> its mandate isinadequate:a) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that it requires greater powers, includingpowers <strong>of</strong> enforcement, in order that it mightdeal more effectively with <strong>the</strong> various forms<strong>of</strong> gender discrimination in our society.150 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11b) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that, although<strong>the</strong> Commission may not have any enforcementpowers, <strong>the</strong> Commission on GenderEquality Act provides <strong>the</strong> Commission withwide-ranging legal powers that, if utilisedappropriately, could prove extremely effective.Thus, for example, in undertaking aninvestigation <strong>the</strong> Commission is affordedwith powers <strong>of</strong> subpoena, as well as powers<strong>of</strong> search and seizure. It can also conducton-site inspections. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>Commission has <strong>the</strong> power to recommend<strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> witnesses where necessary,and to recommend reparations. It mayalso refer matters to court for enforcement.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> expresses concern that <strong>the</strong>Commission has not used <strong>the</strong>se powers,<strong>the</strong>reby contributing to <strong>the</strong> perception that itis powerless. 32d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas interpreted <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation aspreventing it from initiating litigation in itsown name or on behalf <strong>of</strong> any o<strong>the</strong>r person.The Commission has confined its role to supportingor participating in cases that raiseimportant gender issues. 33This has comeabout in some instances in response to aninvitation by <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court tomake submissions In o<strong>the</strong>r cases <strong>the</strong>Commission has applied to be a friend <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>court. 34e) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds this reticence surprising,given <strong>the</strong> fact that section 38 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, which provides for access to<strong>the</strong> courts for purposes <strong>of</strong> enforcement <strong>of</strong>rights, allows anyone, including <strong>the</strong>Commission, to approach a court on behalf<strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r person, group or even in <strong>the</strong> publicinterest in order to assist in enforcing<strong>the</strong>ir rights.f) The Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality and Prevention <strong>of</strong>Unfair Discrimination Act clearly provides <strong>the</strong>Commission with <strong>the</strong> capacity to litigate in<strong>the</strong> equality courts in its own name or onbehalf <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r. The <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore,finds it even more surprising that <strong>the</strong>Commission has never assisted anyone intaking a case to <strong>the</strong> equality courts becauseit ’has never been approached by prospectivelitigants’. The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that,even if litigants have not approached <strong>the</strong>Commission, <strong>the</strong> Commission has a dutyactively to seek out litigants on whosebehalf it could take groundbreaking cases to<strong>the</strong> equality courts.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commission isnot being used as an alternative forum for<strong>the</strong> resolution <strong>of</strong> complaints in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality and Prevention <strong>of</strong>Unfair Discrimination Act. Equality courts areempowered to refer matters to <strong>the</strong>Commission for resolution by means <strong>of</strong>mediation, conciliation or negotiation. TheCommission is also empowered to investigatecases referred to it by <strong>the</strong> equalitycourts and to make recommendations. It isnot <strong>the</strong> Commission’s fault that until now <strong>the</strong>equality courts have not referred matters to<strong>the</strong> Commission.h) The Commission has a duty to monitor andevaluate <strong>the</strong> policies and practices <strong>of</strong> governmentdepartments to ensure that concernfor gender equality remains a top priorityin <strong>the</strong> work done by <strong>the</strong> departments toensure ’gender mainstreaming’. The governmentis <strong>the</strong> largest employer in <strong>the</strong>country. The <strong>Committee</strong> has not been able toascertain to what extent <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas had success in this regard, nor could <strong>the</strong>Commission provide <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> withadequate pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> its activities.32 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP. October 2006. p 6833 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p.4034 In this regard see Amod v Multilateral Vehicle Accidents Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA); Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) BCLR 111 (CC); S v Jordan2002 (11) BCLR (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister <strong>of</strong> Home Affairs 2000 (1) BCLR 39; Christian Lawyers Associationv Minister <strong>of</strong> Health 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T)THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY151


iThe <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas not adequately fulfilled its legal obligationto monitor and evaluate government’scompliance with relevant international obligationssuch as <strong>the</strong> Convention for <strong>the</strong>Elimination <strong>of</strong> Discrimination AgainstWomen and o<strong>the</strong>r relevant instruments. Itwas not clear whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> Commission hasfully grasped <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> its legal obligationin this regard and, if it did, whe<strong>the</strong>r ithad given any priority to this.j) The Commission told <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that itwas unable to adequately monitor and evaluate<strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Conventionfor <strong>the</strong> Elimination <strong>of</strong> Discrimination AgainstWomen and o<strong>the</strong>r relevant international legalinstruments because it found it difficult oreven impossible to obtain <strong>the</strong> necessary andtimely information from <strong>the</strong> Office on <strong>the</strong>Status <strong>of</strong> Women. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>view that <strong>the</strong> Commission has <strong>the</strong> necessarylegal powers to obtain all relevant documentsfrom <strong>the</strong> relevant government department oragency, but that it was ei<strong>the</strong>r unaware <strong>of</strong> thispower or unwilling to use it. The <strong>Committee</strong>finds this reticence regrettable.k) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas a legal duty to liaise with similar institutionsin terms <strong>of</strong> its mandate and functions.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong>Commission has not been proactive in fosteringstructured relations with ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions, orwith civil society organisations involvedwith gender issues. This is explored morefully later in this <strong>chapter</strong>.l) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that it has undertaken research largely relatingto systemic gender-related problems,where <strong>the</strong> Commission has identified gapsin <strong>the</strong> law, or where a specific issue hascome to its attention. However, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> believes that such researchwould be more effective and far-reaching ifundertaken in collaboration with relatedinstitutions, such as <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission, as it would enhance <strong>the</strong> impact<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> research and help to place systemicproblems <strong>of</strong> gender oppression within <strong>the</strong>broader human rights agenda.3.3. APPOINTMENTSThe <strong>Committee</strong> is deeply concerned about <strong>the</strong>shambles that has accompanied <strong>the</strong> recentappointment <strong>of</strong> new Commissioners. Due to<strong>the</strong> delay in <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners, <strong>the</strong> Commission was, inessence, expected to function with only aChairperson and a secretariat for a period <strong>of</strong> 14months. The <strong>Committee</strong> finds such a frivolousapproach to <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissionersto a constitutional body <strong>of</strong> this nature regrettablein <strong>the</strong> extreme. The <strong>Committee</strong> feels thatit is important to use this example to illustrate<strong>the</strong> severe negative impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> a systemicand coordinated process and mechanismfor <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissioners. The<strong>Committee</strong> provides details relating to <strong>the</strong>pathology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> process that has betrayed <strong>the</strong>interests <strong>of</strong> women:a) The Commission for Gender Equality Act providesfor a Commission consisting <strong>of</strong> aChairperson and no fewer than seven but nomore than eleven Commissioners. The Act,which as already indicated predates <strong>the</strong>1996 Constitution, provides that <strong>the</strong>President appoints <strong>the</strong> Commissioners whoare nominated by a joint committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and <strong>the</strong> National Council<strong>of</strong> Provinces and approved by both Houses<strong>of</strong> Parliament at a joint meeting. The legis-152 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11lation has not yet been amended. TheConstitution is very clear, however, that <strong>the</strong>National Assembly must recommend personsfor appointment nominated by a committee<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Assembly and approved by <strong>the</strong>Assembly by a majority <strong>of</strong> its members. The<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore recommends that <strong>the</strong>legislation be brought up to date.b) The Act provides that, before appointingmembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong>Justice and Constitutional Development mustinvite interested parties to propose candidatesfor consideration by <strong>the</strong> joint committee.As indicated, this has in any eventbeen overtaken by section 193 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1996 which provides thatnominations for appointment as members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission must be made by a committee<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. TheCommissioners may be appointed on ei<strong>the</strong>ra full or part-time basis – no fewer than twoand no more than seven may be appointedon a full-time basis. This is slightly anomalous.The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, whichcould be an ad hoc committee, shouldextend <strong>the</strong> invitation to interested parties topropose candidates for appointment.c) Due largely to policy differences amongstCommissioners, a number <strong>of</strong> vacanciesarose between January 2004 and January2005, while <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> seven Com-missionersexpired in April and May 2006. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes that, with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Chairperson whose appointment is toexpire in October <strong>2007</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Commission hasbeen without Commissioners for an extendedperiod, as <strong>the</strong>se vacancies were onlyfilled in May <strong>2007</strong>. The <strong>Committee</strong> wasinformed by <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission that it had continued to operatelegally in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> Commissioners, assection 4(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act provides for <strong>the</strong>validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s proceedingsdespite <strong>the</strong>re being a vacancy in <strong>the</strong>Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> is also concernedthat section 4(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act does notensure <strong>the</strong> legal validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionin a case where no Commissioners havebeen appointed. Therefore <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> situation is highlyunsatisfactory, as a Commission withoutCommissioners cannot really be legallyoperational.d) The appointments process began inSeptember 2005, when <strong>the</strong> Deputy Ministerfor Justice and Constitutional Developmentsubmitted nominations to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly to consider shortlisting appropriatecandidates for recommendation forappointment. On 2 November 2005 <strong>the</strong>Assembly, by resolution, established an adhoc committee to consider nominations t<strong>of</strong>ill <strong>the</strong> vacancies in <strong>the</strong> Commission andrequired it to report by no later than 15February 2006. However, shortly after establishing<strong>the</strong> ad hoc committee, <strong>the</strong> last parliamentarysession for 2005 ended, delayingit’s work. The ad hoc committee asked <strong>the</strong>National Assembly to extend its term to 22March 2006, as it needed time to receivebriefings from <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development on <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocess. Why this was necessary is notclear to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>.e) As <strong>the</strong> tenure <strong>of</strong> all Commissioners, except<strong>the</strong> Chairperson, would end on 18 and 30April 2006, <strong>the</strong> Minister had extended aninvitation to <strong>the</strong> public on 24 February 2006to nominate suitable candidates to filleleven vacancies on <strong>the</strong> Commission. Theinvitation stated that <strong>the</strong> Minister would rec-THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY153


ommend that <strong>the</strong> tenure <strong>of</strong> members not gobeyond 30 September <strong>2007</strong>. The successfulcandidates would <strong>the</strong>refore serve for a term<strong>of</strong> one year.f) The ad hoc committee engaged with <strong>the</strong>Department about <strong>the</strong> process and <strong>the</strong> limitationplaced on <strong>the</strong> tenure <strong>of</strong> Commissioners.Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public and women’s organisationsaddressed <strong>the</strong> Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, raising concerns about <strong>the</strong> shortterm <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice, particularly regarding itsimpact on attracting suitable candidates. TheCommission also raised <strong>the</strong> same concernswith <strong>the</strong> Presidency, <strong>the</strong> Ministry and <strong>the</strong>Speaker. The Speaker discussed <strong>the</strong> matterwith <strong>the</strong> Minister and requested that <strong>the</strong>Minister re-advertise <strong>the</strong> vacancies and callfor nominations <strong>of</strong> persons to serve a term <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>fice not exceeding five years as determinedby legislation. On 26 May 2006, <strong>the</strong> Ministerre-advertised <strong>the</strong> vacancies calling for nominationsfor a term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice not exceeding fiveyears.g) On 23 March 2006 <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyagreed to extend <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoccommittee to 12 May 2006. On that date,<strong>the</strong> committee reported to <strong>the</strong> Assembly,recommending that <strong>the</strong> House support <strong>the</strong>Speaker’s call that <strong>the</strong> vacancies be readvertisedfor a term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice not exceedingfive years and that <strong>the</strong> House extend itsterm to allow it to complete its work. TheHouse adopted this report on 17 May 2006.h) With an expanded mandate specifically toconsider <strong>the</strong> staggering <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> fulltimeCommissioners within <strong>the</strong> five-yearlimit imposed by legislation, <strong>the</strong> ad hoc committeerecommended 11 candidates forappointment on 18 September 2006. In itsreport, <strong>the</strong> ad hoc committee recommendedthat <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> full-timeCommissioners be staggered over <strong>the</strong> fiveyears. After failing on 21 September 2006 toachieve <strong>the</strong> majority support <strong>of</strong> 201 votes asrequired by <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> House finallyapproved <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> candidatesby resolution on 12 October 2006.i) The Speaker communicated <strong>the</strong> decision <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly to <strong>the</strong> President on17 October 2006 to initiate <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> Commissioners. As mentioned previouslyin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> report, in March <strong>2007</strong> <strong>the</strong>ad hoc committee was reconvened specificallyto consider and make recommendationsto <strong>the</strong> President, through <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Speaker, on <strong>the</strong> staggering <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> full-time Commissioners. Theappointments were only made in May <strong>2007</strong>.While <strong>the</strong> ad hoc committee’s initial failureto address <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> staggering <strong>of</strong>appointments provides some reason for <strong>the</strong>delay, it is never<strong>the</strong>less unclear to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> why it took five months for <strong>the</strong>appointments <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioners to beeffected, when all that was required was for<strong>the</strong> President to assent formally to <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.j) The <strong>Committee</strong> reiterates that <strong>the</strong> inordinatedelay in appointing Commissioners is highlyunsatisfactory, displaying a lack <strong>of</strong> seriousnessabout <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners. The delays also highlight amore systemic problem, namely that <strong>the</strong>reis no uniform process or consistency <strong>of</strong>approach in <strong>the</strong> way vacancies are filled orappointments are made. The involvement<strong>of</strong> parliamentary ad hoc committees in <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> commissioners, particularlyin instances where vacancies arise duringtimes <strong>of</strong> parliamentary recess, creates problems.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes specific recommendationsin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report inorder to rectify this situation.154 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11k) The <strong>Committee</strong> regrets to conclude that veryfew parties come out <strong>of</strong> this with credit.3.4. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that public awareness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is generally poor. Nordoes <strong>the</strong>re appear to have been any significantincrease in public awareness in pastyears: A countrywide study in 2000 foundthat only 34% <strong>of</strong> respondents had heard <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission. The most recent study, conductedin 2002, found that only 27% <strong>of</strong>women had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights andonly 34% <strong>of</strong> respondents knew <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. 35 The <strong>Committee</strong> is dissatisfiedwith <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> general awareness concerning<strong>the</strong> Commission and its activities,and finds that <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> public visibilityundermines <strong>the</strong> Commission’s credibility andefficacy. The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned thatvery few applications and requests for systemicinvestigations are made to <strong>the</strong>Commission. It is sad that over this periodthat <strong>the</strong>re has been no significant increasein requests.b) The Commission has a major role to play asa champion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> women, througheducation, promotion and assistance withcomplaints. If women do not approach <strong>the</strong>Commission, it can hardly assist <strong>the</strong>m inenforcing <strong>the</strong>ir rights.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that in addition to itshead <strong>of</strong>fice, <strong>the</strong> Commission has established<strong>of</strong>fices in all provinces, most recently inMpumalanga and Gauteng. Public awarenessprogrammes are carried out through a variety<strong>of</strong> means, including workshops, seminars,dialogues with civil society organisations,campaigns and <strong>the</strong> distribution <strong>of</strong> promotionalmaterials such as pamphlets and posters.The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed, however, that<strong>the</strong>se public awareness programmes are nei<strong>the</strong>rsystematic, nor are <strong>the</strong>y linked to abroader outreach programme. 36d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas <strong>the</strong> power to investigate gender-relatedcomplaints <strong>of</strong> its own accord or on receipt <strong>of</strong>a complaint. The Commission’s annual reportfor 2005/06 reveals that, although provincesdo report complaint statistics, <strong>the</strong>se are notcollated. This makes it very difficult to ascertain<strong>the</strong> precise number <strong>of</strong> complaints <strong>the</strong>Commission receives annually, let alone what<strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>of</strong> such complaints have been.The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong> Commissionlacks <strong>the</strong> electronic systems and s<strong>of</strong>tware toconduct analyses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaints received.Analysis is currently done manually and, generally,only annually for reporting purposes. 37This is a serious concern, impacting adverselyon <strong>the</strong> Commission’s ability to monitor andplan accordingly.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> is perplexed by <strong>the</strong>Commission’s contention that its role andfunctions do not overlap with those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 and associated institutions.The Commission informed us that it views itsrole as complementing that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rChapter 9 institutions. However, this patentlyignores <strong>the</strong> reality that <strong>the</strong>re are vitaloverlaps between <strong>the</strong> roles <strong>of</strong> different institutionsas <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> women cannot bedivorced from human rights in general.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes, in particular, that <strong>the</strong>Commission on Gender Equality Act envisagessuch an overlap and requires <strong>the</strong>35 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p 21. Quotes from <strong>the</strong> National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research (NIPILAR)(2000) Awareness <strong>of</strong> human rights and human rights institutions (Johannesburg: CASE); and Government <strong>of</strong> South Africa (2006), A nation in <strong>the</strong>making: A discussion document on macros-social trends in South Africa, Pretoria: Policy Co-ordination and <strong>Ad</strong>visory Services (The Presidency) 2006.36 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p 7337 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p 76THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY155


Commission, as far as it is practicable, tomaintain close relations with institutions orbodies having similar objectives to <strong>the</strong>Commission in order to foster common policiesand practices and to promote co-operationin relation to <strong>the</strong> handling <strong>of</strong> complaintsin cases <strong>of</strong> overlapping jurisdiction and ino<strong>the</strong>r relevant circumstances.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that in 1998 <strong>the</strong>Commission formed part <strong>of</strong> a newly createdForum for Independent Statutory Bodies,which was aimed at providing better liaisonamong constitutional and statutory bodies,sharing information on developments in <strong>the</strong>field <strong>of</strong> human rights, and making joint representationsto government on matters <strong>of</strong>common interest. Participation in <strong>the</strong> Forumwas voluntary. Most organisations havesince pulled out, leaving only <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9institutions to continue with this vision. Eventhis pared down version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Forum isstruggling to implement substantive jointprogrammes successfully. Among <strong>the</strong> reasonsgiven for this is a disparity in resourceallocation, both human and financial, thathas inhibited some Chapter 9 institutionsfrom fully participating in collaborative activities.This body has, <strong>the</strong>refore, not functionedsuccessfully, and it appears to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that it is defunct.d) Today <strong>the</strong>re is <strong>the</strong>refore limited co-operationbetween <strong>the</strong> Commission and o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter9 and associated institutions. The<strong>Committee</strong> believes that this is entirelyunsatisfactory and that <strong>the</strong>re is an urgentneed for greater and more structured cooperationand collaboration between <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 institutions and related bodies.Such co-operation and collaboration shouldbe focused, carefully planned and implementedin a structured manner.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> is aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> potential forforum-shopping, with <strong>the</strong> attendant dangers<strong>of</strong> complainants taking <strong>the</strong>ir claims from onebody to <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r even where <strong>the</strong>re is nocase. As such, it is <strong>of</strong> particular importancethat <strong>the</strong> relevant bodies should work toge<strong>the</strong>rto monitor <strong>the</strong> system <strong>of</strong> referrals. This isa particular concern for <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, as<strong>the</strong> present referral system between <strong>the</strong>Commission and <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission and <strong>the</strong> Public Protectorappears to be informal in nature.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission does not appear to have systemsin place to monitor <strong>the</strong> progress <strong>of</strong> itsreferrals to o<strong>the</strong>r institutions.f) Conversely, a danger exists that complainantswith a valid claim will be referredfrom one institution to ano<strong>the</strong>r withoutbeing assisted. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforerecommends that <strong>the</strong> various human rightsbodies take immediate steps to integrate<strong>the</strong>ir complaints databases to ensure betterco-operation and prevent forum-shopping.The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r recommends that<strong>the</strong> structured co-operation should be aimedat embarking on joint public awarenesscampaigns, human rights advocacy campaignsand human rights training, as well asjoint submissions to Parliament or <strong>the</strong> courtson issues <strong>of</strong> vital mutual concern. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendations in thisregard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH INTERNATIONALORGANISATIONSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionparticipates in a number <strong>of</strong> regional andinternational meetings, such as those organisedby <strong>the</strong> Sou<strong>the</strong>rn African DevelopmentCommunity states, <strong>the</strong> African Union, and156 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11<strong>the</strong> United Nations <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Status<strong>of</strong> Women. The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that, typically,<strong>the</strong>se bodies do not provide <strong>the</strong> opportunityfor <strong>the</strong> Commission to participate <strong>of</strong>ficially.The Commission must generallyattend <strong>the</strong>se meetings as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficialgovernment delegation, ei<strong>the</strong>r as delegatesor as technical advisers to <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial countrydelegation, and not in <strong>the</strong>ir capacity asspokespersons for an independent statutorybody. The <strong>Committee</strong> regrets this lack <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>ficial recognition, as it is a serious obstacleto <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission to presentan independent account <strong>of</strong> government’sprogress regarding <strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> genderequality in South Africa. Such treatmentviolates its independent status.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission’slack <strong>of</strong> voice and failure to consult wi<strong>the</strong>xternal stakeholders, including civil society,prior to international meetings is ano<strong>the</strong>rfactor that undermines <strong>the</strong> Commission’scredibility and effectiveness.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) Although independent, <strong>the</strong> Commissionoperates as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national gendermachinery, <strong>the</strong> institutional mechanismestablished by government in accordancewith its obligations in terms <strong>of</strong> internationaltreaties and conventions. However, as <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> pointed out in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport, like all o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutions<strong>the</strong> Commission is obliged to be independentand to perform its legislative and constitutionalmandate impartially. Therefore itcannot be part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> government. The<strong>Committee</strong> is, <strong>the</strong>refore, concerned that <strong>the</strong>Commission does not fully appreciate <strong>the</strong>need to remain independent and act independentlyfrom <strong>the</strong> Executive.b) The Commission distinguishes itself from <strong>the</strong>Office on <strong>the</strong> Status <strong>of</strong> Women and <strong>the</strong> specialprogramme directorates, which aretasked exclusively with <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Gender Policy Frameworkwithin government structures. TheCommission audits <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Policy Framework. However, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> role and functions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> Office on <strong>the</strong> Status<strong>of</strong> Women and <strong>the</strong> Joint Monitoring<strong>Committee</strong> on Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong>Life and Status <strong>of</strong> Women are blurred as<strong>the</strong>se o<strong>the</strong>r components <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gendermachinery also have monitoring functions.c) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that its relationship with <strong>the</strong> Executive isunstructured and issue-based. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission experiencesdifficulties in obtaining access to <strong>of</strong>ficialdocuments, such as <strong>the</strong> country reporton <strong>the</strong> status <strong>of</strong> women. In addition, <strong>the</strong>Commission complained <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong>recognition that prevents it from participatingin <strong>of</strong>ficial processes concerning genderreferred to previously.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissioncommits itself to pursuing a co-operativerelationship with all state institutions,including <strong>the</strong> Executive and <strong>the</strong> Legislature,in line with principles <strong>of</strong> co-operative governmentas set out in section 41 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution. As discussed in Chapter 1 <strong>of</strong>this report, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> reiterates that<strong>the</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> co-operative governmentdo not apply to <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutionsand that this approach is inconsistent with<strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and<strong>the</strong> rulings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutional Court.THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY157


3.8. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Commissionis accountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.However, section 15(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionon Gender Equality Act provides that <strong>the</strong>Commission must report annually to <strong>the</strong>President, who, in turn, will ’cause suchreport to be tabled promptly in Parliament’.While this requirement does not prevent <strong>the</strong>Commission from submitting any report atany time to Parliament, in practice <strong>the</strong>Commission’s annual report is first presentedto <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment, who presents it to <strong>the</strong>President for tabling in Parliament. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds that this circuitous andtime-consuming route <strong>of</strong> reporting to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly is inefficient, unnecessaryand does not give effect to <strong>the</strong> intentions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.b) The Commission reports to <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment on an annual basis. TheChairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission told <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> portfolio committee isoverextended and that its interaction with<strong>the</strong> Commission is not adequate. The<strong>Committee</strong> agrees that <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s interaction with <strong>the</strong> portfoliocommittee is largely confined to scrutiny <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission’s annual report, which isunsatisfactory.c) The Commission has interacted with <strong>the</strong>Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> onImprovement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status <strong>of</strong>Women on particular issues, such as <strong>the</strong>implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Domestic ViolenceAct 116 <strong>of</strong> 1998, which was adopted to protect,amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, women against violencefrom <strong>the</strong>ir life partners. In addition,<strong>the</strong> Commission has made submissions toParliament on <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act <strong>of</strong>2000, as well as on o<strong>the</strong>r legislation.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas not approached Parliament, particularly<strong>the</strong> portfolio committee, with regard to anymatter relating to <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its powersor <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> its functions as it islegally entitled to do. Although <strong>the</strong>Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission has told <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Commission has writtento <strong>the</strong> Speaker, it is regrettable that <strong>the</strong>Commission has not turned to Parliament forassistance with its various problems.3.<strong>9.</strong> RELATIONSHIP WITH CIVIL SOCIETYa) The Commission on Gender Equality Actrequires <strong>the</strong> Commission to liaise and interactwith any organisation that actively promotesgender equality and o<strong>the</strong>r sectors <strong>of</strong>civil society. The Commission confirmed that<strong>the</strong>re was little interaction between itselfand <strong>the</strong> gender-based civil society organsbut expressed frustration that civil societyorganisations did not take <strong>the</strong> initiative inbuilding co-operative relationships. It isclear that any interaction with civil societyoccurs on an ad hoc basis. The <strong>Committee</strong>believes that this failure to take proactivesteps to formalise interaction with civil societybodies is deeply regrettable and inbreach <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s legal obligations.This is an important provision, asParliament has considered it necessary thatsuch human rights bodies must have structuredrelationships with civil society.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that, since 2000, <strong>the</strong>Commission has had limited consultationwith civil society as a way <strong>of</strong> informing itsoverall strategic planning, its work and its158 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11focus areas. It was put to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that this is in contrast to <strong>the</strong> situation priorto 2000, when <strong>the</strong>re was a substantialdegree <strong>of</strong> consultation with civil society toinform <strong>the</strong> Commission’s strategic planningand priorities. While <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> cannotignore <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a fullCommission since 2004, it finds that <strong>the</strong> failureto consult broadly undermines <strong>the</strong>Commission’s credibility and brings intoquestion <strong>the</strong> relevance <strong>of</strong> its work to its constituency.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> perceptionamongst external stakeholders that <strong>the</strong>Commission is unwilling to take a publicstand on controversial issues <strong>of</strong> overwhelmingpublic importance such as issues aroundservice delivery failures, <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong>poverty on women and <strong>the</strong> roll-out <strong>of</strong> antiretroviraldrugs for people living with HIVand AIDS. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that suchperceptions, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y are based on factor not, undermine <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission and contribute to a situationwhere external stakeholders are dissuaded‘from seeking <strong>the</strong> support <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong>ir activities, or from considering<strong>the</strong> Commission as a central playerin <strong>the</strong> ongoing struggles for gender equality’.38The <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, wishes toemphasise once again its finding that <strong>the</strong>Commission needs to improve its relationshipswith civil society organisations.3.10. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) It is common cause that <strong>the</strong>re has been significantinternal conflict betweenCommissioners since <strong>the</strong> inception <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission more than ten years ago. In2001/02 senior persons resigned onaccount <strong>of</strong> ideological differences <strong>of</strong> opinion,which should not have led to such tension.Again in 2004/05 differences emerged concerning<strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’sapproach on women’s issues. As a result <strong>of</strong>internal tensions, a significant number <strong>of</strong>persons resigned.There have also been tensions betweenCommissioners and staff members. The<strong>Committee</strong> was informed that certain problemsarose when Commissioners were allocatedto specific provinces, which led to tensionbetween <strong>the</strong> staff employed by <strong>the</strong>Commission in that province and <strong>the</strong>Commissioner involved. These tensions haveimpacted on <strong>the</strong> institution’s overall effectivenessand efficiency, have affected <strong>the</strong>Commission’s credibility, and have fed <strong>the</strong>perception that <strong>the</strong> Commission lacks programmaticfocus.The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>setensions should have been handled in a differentway and should not have affected <strong>the</strong>Commission’s work. The <strong>Committee</strong>believes that some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se tensions couldhave been avoided if <strong>the</strong> division <strong>of</strong> rolesand responsibilities amongst Commissionersand between Commissioners and staff hadbeen clearly identified from <strong>the</strong> outset. The<strong>Committee</strong> was informed that <strong>the</strong> differentroles have now been clarified and thatCommissioners have been given terms <strong>of</strong>reference.The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that it mightbe necessary formally to identify <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong>authority, responsibilities and accountabilitiesin <strong>the</strong> organisation. These must bedelineated in a detailed manner and shouldnot be unduly legalistic.38 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p 54THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY159


) The <strong>Committee</strong> is dissatisfied with <strong>the</strong>Commission’s present mechanisms for disclosure<strong>of</strong> interests. Commissioners areprohibited in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legislation fromconducting or assisting in an investigation inwhich <strong>the</strong>y have any form <strong>of</strong> pecuniary oro<strong>the</strong>r interest. While <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> learntthat <strong>the</strong> Commission does require disclosure,such information is not readily accessible tointerested persons. The <strong>Committee</strong> discusses<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> interests more fullyand makes recommendations in this regardin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> provision in<strong>the</strong> relevant legislation that <strong>the</strong> Presidentdetermines <strong>the</strong> remuneration <strong>of</strong> Commissionersis unsatisfactory. This has been <strong>the</strong>cause <strong>of</strong> some dissatisfaction amongCommissioners, as any adjustment is accompaniedby lengthy delays in receivingapproval.d) In addition, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong>present method <strong>of</strong> determining <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong>remuneration for Commissioners is a difficultissue. The Commission on Gender EqualityAct fails to outline <strong>the</strong> conditions <strong>of</strong> service<strong>of</strong> Commissioners, simply stating that this isto be determined by <strong>the</strong> President. In practice,Commissioners are remunerated in linewith public service and National Treasuryregulations. The Commissioners are remuneratedat lower levels than members <strong>of</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r similar constitutional bodies. TheCommission has expressed concern aboutthis.e) The level <strong>of</strong> remuneration <strong>of</strong> Commissionershas received criticism from some sectors <strong>of</strong>civil society, as salaries <strong>of</strong> Commissionersappear to comprise a disproportionate portion<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s budget. 39f) The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that <strong>the</strong>re are no performanceagreements against whichCommissioners can be evaluated in order tohold <strong>the</strong>m accountable. 40While remunerationfor Commissioners comprises 35% <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission’s budget, <strong>the</strong> Commissionstated that this is due to <strong>the</strong> large number<strong>of</strong> Commissioners and not <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> payment.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> understands that <strong>the</strong>Commission feels that <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong>Commissioners should be reduced.h) While <strong>the</strong> Commission has <strong>the</strong> authority toemploy <strong>the</strong> skilled staff it needs, <strong>the</strong>Commission has had difficulties with poorstaff morale and a high staff turnover. TheCommission’s inability to retain staff is aserious concern to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, as itdirectly impacts on <strong>the</strong> continuity and efficiency<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s work.3.11. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that <strong>the</strong> Commissioners and <strong>the</strong> secretariatprepare a Medium Term ExpenditureFramework budget, which is submitted to<strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment for inclusion in <strong>the</strong>Department’s budget. In <strong>the</strong> past, <strong>the</strong>Commission was <strong>the</strong>n invited to present itsbudget to <strong>the</strong> National Treasury. However,this process was amended for <strong>the</strong> pastfinancial year and <strong>the</strong> Commission informed<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that it was not provided anopportunity to present its requirements to<strong>the</strong> Treasury. The budget agreed upon byTreasury is <strong>the</strong>n included in <strong>the</strong> budget for<strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment, from which money is allocatedto <strong>the</strong> Commission.39 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p 6040 Civil Society <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Programme (CSAP). October 2006, p 60160 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission e) The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes with concern thatdoes not have a separate Vote but that its <strong>the</strong> Commission has been opening provincialbudget falls under <strong>the</strong> Budget Vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>of</strong>fices across South Africa. The CommissionDepartment <strong>of</strong> Justice and Constitutional informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that six staff membersstaffed each <strong>of</strong>fice and that <strong>the</strong> averageDevelopment, which transfers <strong>the</strong> fundsdirectly to <strong>the</strong> Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> yearly cost for a provincial <strong>of</strong>fice wasis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> approximately R1.5 million. The <strong>Committee</strong>Commission’s budget allocation within <strong>the</strong> has not been presented with any evidenceBudget Vote <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department impacts to justify <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>ficesnegatively on <strong>the</strong> perceived independence and could not be directed to any tangible<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes deliverables flowing from <strong>the</strong> work done byspecific recommendations in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se <strong>of</strong>fices. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinionthat it may well be that this expenditurethis report in this regard.is a wasteful allocation <strong>of</strong> resources. Thec) The budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission has increased <strong>Committee</strong> questions <strong>the</strong> need for provincialfrom just over R19 million in 2003/04 (<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fices, and makes specific recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thiswhich R1.7 million was donor funds) to overR37 million in 2006/07. Taking into account report.donor funds, <strong>the</strong> Commission has, however,underspent since 2003/04.d) The Table below also shows <strong>the</strong> budgets for<strong>the</strong> Commission in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> MediumTerm Expenditure Framework. The Tablereveals that <strong>the</strong> Commission’s budget willincrease significantly from R3<strong>9.</strong>7 million in<strong>2007</strong>/08 to R46.5 million in 2009/10.Table 1: Income and Expenditure 2003/04 –2009/10 41R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Income 19 300 22 400 28 000 37 757 39 745 44 193 46 550Expenditure 19 000 20 700 25 800Surplus/(Deficit) 300 1 700 2 20041 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY161


4. General conclusionsa) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that, in <strong>the</strong> interim,a strong and effective Commission acting onits own is absolutely necessary for <strong>the</strong> transformation<strong>of</strong> gender relations in our country.It is a matter <strong>of</strong> regret that a combination <strong>of</strong>factors, both internal and external to <strong>the</strong>Commission, has undermined its efficiencyand effectiveness and has brought into questionits relevance in its present formation.b) The Commission displays a poor understanding<strong>of</strong> its legal and constitutional mandate.Recommendations to rectify this are included.c) The approach to <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>Commissioners was regrettable. This sorrystate <strong>of</strong> affairs has undermined <strong>the</strong>Commission’s operations. The <strong>Committee</strong>includes recommendations aimed ataddressing this problem.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> Commission’sefficiency and effectiveness can beenhanced if certain institutional arrangementsare addressed. These are elaboratedon in <strong>the</strong> recommendations below.e) The relationship between <strong>the</strong> Commissionand civil society is unsatisfactory andrequires urgent attention.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds <strong>the</strong> collaborationbetween <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rChapter 9 and related constitutional institutionsto be informal and unsystematic. This is<strong>of</strong> particular concern with regards to <strong>the</strong> referral<strong>of</strong> cases. In Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsfor <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> such collaborativerelations that would apply to all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9and associated institutions under reviewg) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that public awareness<strong>of</strong>, and engagement with, <strong>the</strong> Commission’swork is inadequate and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>makes recommendations in this regard.h) At present, <strong>the</strong> Commission’s interactionwith Parliament, more specifically with <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Justice andConstitutional Development, is unsatisfactoryand insufficient for effective oversightand accountability. In addition to specificrecommendations aimed at facilitating <strong>the</strong>Commission’s accountability to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report makes general recommendationsfor <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oversight andaccountability mechanisms that would applyto all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutionsunder review.i) The budget process and funding model <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission adversely affect its accountabilityand independence. The <strong>Committee</strong>makes general recommendations in Chapter2 <strong>of</strong> this report on measures for <strong>the</strong>improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget process thatwould apply to all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions.5. Recommendations5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATEIMPLEMENTATIONThe <strong>Committee</strong> makes <strong>the</strong> following recommendationsto streng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> efficiency andeffectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong> interim:a) The National Assembly should –i. Establish appropriate mechanisms for <strong>the</strong>timely initiation and systematic imple-162 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11mentation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> processes for <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> Commissioners to ensurethat <strong>the</strong> outrageous delay experienced in<strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> currentCommissioners is never repeated. Therecommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report should be consideredin this regard.ii. As soon as is reasonably possible, amend<strong>the</strong> Commission on Gender Equality Act<strong>of</strong> 1996 to bring it into line with <strong>the</strong>Constitution. The <strong>Committee</strong> is not in aposition to recommend which committeeor entity within Parliament should initiatethis. This is a matter for Parliament todetermine.iii. Ensure that <strong>the</strong> appointments procedure,and budgetary arrangements, arereviewed to support fur<strong>the</strong>r and assert<strong>the</strong> Commission’s independence. The<strong>Committee</strong>’s recommendations inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report should be consideredin this regard.iv. Ensure that clear lines <strong>of</strong> accountability,command and authority, particularlybetween <strong>the</strong> Commissioners <strong>the</strong>mselvesand between <strong>the</strong> Commissioners and <strong>the</strong>secretariat, are clearly specified in <strong>the</strong>Commission’s policies.b) The Commission should -i. Develop and popularise a five-yearstrategic plan and performance plans thatset annual priorities, for example <strong>the</strong>socio-economic empowerment <strong>of</strong>women. This would serve as an importantmonitoring and evaluation tool for<strong>the</strong> Commission, civil society andParliament.ii. Place greater emphasis on exercising itspowers <strong>of</strong> investigation <strong>of</strong> its own accordand bring <strong>the</strong> outcomes <strong>of</strong> such investigationsto <strong>the</strong> special attention <strong>of</strong>Parliament by means <strong>of</strong> its reporting to<strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Where appropriate,matters should also be referred to<strong>the</strong> Public Protector or Human RightsCommission.iii. Develop more stringent processes andaccountability measures for <strong>the</strong> co-ordination<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> its provincial<strong>of</strong>fices. Where provincial <strong>of</strong>fices are tobe established, <strong>the</strong> Commission shouldconsider sharing premises with o<strong>the</strong>rconstitutional bodies that might alreadyhave provincial <strong>of</strong>fices. A cost-benefitanalysis should be conducted before <strong>the</strong>establishment <strong>of</strong> additional provincial<strong>of</strong>fices is approved.iv. <strong>Ad</strong>dress forthwith certain institutionalmatters, such as policies to deal withinternal conflict at all levels, includingamongst Commissioners and betweenCommissioners and <strong>the</strong> Secretariat, and<strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> a staff retention policyand strategy.v. Ensure that collaborative relations with<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 Institutions and relatedconstitutional bodies are establishedand formalised, where appropriate.Collaboration should include, amongsto<strong>the</strong>rs, joint research, joint submissionsto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly (or Parliament)and joint court applications. All jointactivities should be budgeted in consultationwith <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r relevant institutions.vi. Formulate a communications strategy toensure that it raises its public pr<strong>of</strong>ile andTHE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY163


embark on a public awareness campaignand public outreach programme.vii .Ensure that <strong>the</strong> details <strong>of</strong> directorships,partnerships and consultancies <strong>of</strong>Commissioners and senior <strong>of</strong>ficials aredisclosed in <strong>the</strong> annual report. Disclosure<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pecuniary and o<strong>the</strong>r interests <strong>of</strong>Commissioners and staff membersshould be made and kept in a register.Mention should be made in <strong>the</strong> annualreport <strong>of</strong> where such information is availableto interested parties. General recommendationsconcerning <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong>financial interests are made in Chapter 2<strong>of</strong> this report.c) For coherence and consistency, <strong>the</strong> oversightand accountability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission shouldbe moved from its current location with <strong>the</strong>Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Justice andConstitutional Development to <strong>the</strong> JointMonitoring <strong>Committee</strong> on Improvement <strong>of</strong>Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status <strong>of</strong> Women. TheJoint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> should meetwith <strong>the</strong> Commission at least twice per yearto engage on its strategic plan and annualreport. The Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong>should also provide opportunities forengagement on specific reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission as required. The interactionsbetween <strong>the</strong> Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong>and <strong>the</strong> Commission should be co-ordinatedby <strong>the</strong> proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Speaker discussed in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTUREIMPLEMENTATIONThe <strong>Committee</strong> makes <strong>the</strong> following recommendationfor future implementation:a) Human rights are indivisible and interrelated,and <strong>the</strong> fact that some Chapter 9 institutionsrefrain from dealing with overlappingissues is not ideal. Given <strong>the</strong> indivisibilityand interrelated nature <strong>of</strong> human rights, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> recommends that <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equality be incorporatedinto a single national human rightsinstitution, which will have a dedicatedCommissioner for Gender Equality.b) The main advantage for <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> asingle body is that matters will <strong>the</strong>n not fallthrough <strong>the</strong> cracks. The present plethora <strong>of</strong>bodies each competing for resources andareas <strong>of</strong> competence cannot be said to be<strong>the</strong> most efficient or effective model.International best practice seems to be torecognise <strong>the</strong> seamlessness <strong>of</strong> rights andpromote <strong>the</strong>m under a single umbrella body,which gives full expression to all dimensions<strong>of</strong> human rights.c) However, as this requires large-scale constitutionalamendment, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recognizesthat this recommendation may not beable to be implemented immediately. The<strong>Committee</strong>’s recommendations in thisregard are elaborated fur<strong>the</strong>r in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong>this report, as well as in <strong>the</strong> Chapter on <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission.164 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 11THE COMMISSION FOR GENDER EQUALITY165


CHAPTER 12


CHAPTER 12CHAPTER 12THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION1. BackgroundSouth Africa’s 1996 Constitution is <strong>of</strong>tenreferred to as transformative as it requires andassists in facilitating <strong>the</strong> complete transformation<strong>of</strong> our society from a culture that wasoppressive, secretive and pr<strong>of</strong>oundly disrespectful<strong>of</strong> basic human rights to a humanrights based culture in which <strong>the</strong> human dignity<strong>of</strong> all is both respected and celebrated.The Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights holds out <strong>the</strong> promise to allSouth Africans, no matter how poor or marginalised,that <strong>the</strong>ir human dignity will be respectedand protected against abuse not only by <strong>the</strong>state but also by private institutions and individuals.The South African Human RightsCommission has a vital role to play in honouringthis constitutional promise. Many poor andmarginalised individuals in South Africa do nothave easy access to <strong>the</strong> legal system and <strong>the</strong>reforecannot exercise <strong>the</strong>ir rights without assistancefrom a strong, independent and impartialhuman rights body. At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong>establishment and entrenchment <strong>of</strong> a vibranthuman rights culture requires strong leadershipfrom a legitimate, independent and authoritativebody, as envisaged with <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.For an accurate and responsible evaluation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission, it is important to consider justhow it fits into our democratic landscape. Morespecifically, a keen understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s place in <strong>the</strong> constitutional architecturevis-à-vis <strong>the</strong> Legislature, <strong>the</strong> Executiveand <strong>the</strong> Judiciary is necessary.The Commission has a duty to promote andprotect human rights but does not act as a substitutefor <strong>the</strong> Legislature, <strong>the</strong> Executive or <strong>the</strong>Judiciary. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Commission finds itselfpositioned somewhere between <strong>the</strong> Judiciary,which is tasked with enforcing human rights,and <strong>the</strong> Legislature to which <strong>the</strong> Executive ando<strong>the</strong>r institutions are accountable. On <strong>the</strong> onehand, <strong>the</strong> Commission has <strong>the</strong> power todemand answers from <strong>the</strong> Legislature, <strong>the</strong>Executive and private institutions and individualsabout adherence to and protection <strong>of</strong>human rights, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs through itspower <strong>of</strong> subpoena. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, it doesnot have <strong>the</strong> authority, like a court, to makebinding judgments. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Commissionmust try to ensure <strong>the</strong> realisation <strong>of</strong> rightsthrough co-operation and mediation. In thisregard, it acts as a check on <strong>the</strong> legislative andexecutive branches <strong>of</strong> government, whileassisting <strong>the</strong>m with <strong>the</strong> promotion and protection<strong>of</strong> human rights in <strong>the</strong> broadest sense <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> word. In order to be effective, <strong>the</strong>Commission needs to act fearlessly, withoutshowing any favour or prejudice. Yet it mustalso co-operate, when necessary, with some <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> institutions it is required to hold accountable.By nature its work is sensitive. Therefore,institutions engaged with <strong>the</strong> promotion andprotection <strong>of</strong> human rights need support.2. Constitutional andlegal mandateThe Commission’s mandate is extremely broad,encompassing almost every aspect <strong>of</strong> civil,political, social and economic rights. The legalmandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission is derived fromsection 184 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution; <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission Act 54 <strong>of</strong> 1994; <strong>the</strong>Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access to Information Act 2 <strong>of</strong>2000; and <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act 4 <strong>of</strong>2000.THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION167


2.1. CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATEThe 1993 Constitution provided for <strong>the</strong> establishment<strong>of</strong> a Human Rights Commission to promote<strong>the</strong> observance <strong>of</strong>, respect for, and protection<strong>of</strong> fundamental rights through a variety<strong>of</strong> means. 42The Human Rights Commission Act53 <strong>of</strong> 1994, based on <strong>the</strong> provisions containedin <strong>the</strong> interim Constitution, saw <strong>the</strong>Commission’s establishment in October 1995and its launch on 21 March 1996.Similarly, <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution provides for anindependent and impartial South AfricanHuman Rights Commission. Section 184 requires<strong>the</strong> Commission to promote respect for humanrights and a culture <strong>of</strong> human rights; to promote<strong>the</strong> protection, development and attainment<strong>of</strong> human rights; and to monitor andassess <strong>the</strong> observance <strong>of</strong> human rights in SouthAfrica.In order to achieve <strong>the</strong>se goals <strong>the</strong> Constitutionrequires <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> legislation that providesfor <strong>the</strong> investigation and reporting <strong>of</strong>human rights abuses; steps to be taken tosecure redress when rights have been violated;research to be undertaken; and <strong>the</strong> education<strong>of</strong> society about <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> humanrights. In addition, section 184(3) tasks <strong>the</strong>Commission with <strong>the</strong> duty to monitor <strong>the</strong>implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social and economicrights protected in <strong>the</strong> Constitution by once ayear requiring relevant organs <strong>of</strong> state to provide<strong>the</strong> Commission with information on <strong>the</strong>measures that <strong>the</strong>y have taken towards <strong>the</strong>realisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se rights.2.2. MANDATE IN TERMS OF THE HUMANRIGHTS COMMISSION ACTWhile o<strong>the</strong>r legislation is applicable to <strong>the</strong>Commission’s activities, <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act 54 <strong>of</strong> 1994 forms <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission’s work. The Act affirms <strong>the</strong>independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and requiresCommissioners to serve impartially and independentlyand exercise <strong>the</strong>ir powers, dutiesand functions in good faith and without fear,favour, bias or prejudice. The Act also prohibitsany organ <strong>of</strong> state, or any person, from interferingwith, hindering or obstructing <strong>the</strong>Commission in <strong>the</strong> exercise <strong>of</strong> its duties. TheAct requires that all organs <strong>of</strong> state afford <strong>the</strong>Commission <strong>the</strong> assistance it reasonablyrequires to protect its independence, impartialityand dignity.The Act provides <strong>the</strong> Commission with widepowers to carry out its responsibilities, whichinclude <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> human rights througheducation; <strong>the</strong> monitoring and evaluatinghuman rights; and protecting <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> ordinarypeople through investigation <strong>of</strong> complaints,mediation, litigation, and redress.It is important to note that <strong>the</strong> Commission isnot a court <strong>of</strong> law and cannot make bindingdecisions on complaints lodged with it. It can,however, investigate individual complaints orsystemic infringements <strong>of</strong> human rights, makerecommendations, and “name and shame” <strong>the</strong>parties found to be violating <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs.It can also mediate disputes and take casesto court in ei<strong>the</strong>r its own name or on behalf <strong>of</strong>an aggrieved party.When investigating complaints, <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas considerable powers to ga<strong>the</strong>r information,including <strong>the</strong> power (within <strong>the</strong> limits<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law) to subpoena witnesses, to enterand search premises, and to attach articles <strong>of</strong>relevance to its investigation. These powersprovide <strong>the</strong> Commission with all <strong>the</strong> legal toolsit requires to pursue its investigations and toaddress more systemic infringements <strong>of</strong> human168 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions42 In terms <strong>of</strong> section 116 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Commission’s powers and functions were to ‘promote <strong>the</strong> observance <strong>of</strong>, respect for and <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> fundamental rights;develop an awareness <strong>of</strong> fundamental rights among all people <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic; make recommendations to organs <strong>of</strong> State at all levels <strong>of</strong> government where it considers such actionadvisable for <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> progressive measures for <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> fundamental rights within <strong>the</strong> framework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> law and this Constitution, as well as appropriate measuresfor <strong>the</strong> full observance <strong>of</strong> such rights; undertake such studies for report on or relating to fundamental rights as it considers advisable in <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> its functions; and requestany organ <strong>of</strong> state to supply it with information on any legislative or executive measures adopted by it relating to fundamental rights’. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Commission could commenton whe<strong>the</strong>r proposed legislation was in violation <strong>of</strong> international human rights law and could investigate, ei<strong>the</strong>r on its own initiative or on receipt <strong>of</strong> a complaint, any alleged violation<strong>of</strong> fundamental rights, as well as assist <strong>the</strong> complainant in achieving redress, including pursuing a case before a court or o<strong>the</strong>r forum.


CHAPTER 12rights (For example, systemic infringementsthat occur in certain sectors such as farmingcommunities and schools).Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission’s monitoringand evaluation function, relevant organs<strong>of</strong> state must provide <strong>the</strong> Commission withinformation on an annual basis on measurestaken to realise <strong>the</strong> rights contained in <strong>the</strong> Bill<strong>of</strong> Rights concerning housing, health care, food,water, social security, education and <strong>the</strong> environment.The role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in thisrespect is <strong>of</strong> cardinal importance, particularlyfor <strong>the</strong> vast numbers <strong>of</strong> South Africans forwhom <strong>the</strong> realisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> socio-economicrights contained in <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights is a priorityas it concerns <strong>the</strong>ir daily struggle for survival.There is an important provision in <strong>the</strong> Act thatis not found elsewhere. Parliament recognisedafter lengthy debate that placing emphasisexclusively on political rights is like throwing arope <strong>of</strong> sand to our people. Therefore, <strong>the</strong>Constitution provides <strong>the</strong> Commission with aunique power to identify, defend and initiatesocio-economic aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.Given <strong>the</strong> tremendous socio-economic disparitiesfound in our society, <strong>the</strong> Commission isunder enormous pressure to deliver in respect<strong>of</strong> its part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> promises concerning <strong>the</strong> socioeconomicrights contained in <strong>the</strong> Constitution.Unless <strong>the</strong>se rights are adequately addressed,<strong>the</strong> full enjoyment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> civil and politicalrights also found in <strong>the</strong> Constitution will remaina secondary consideration.2.3. MANDATE IN TERMS OF PROMOTIONOF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACTThe right <strong>of</strong> easy access to <strong>the</strong> relevant informationnecessary to vindicate one’s rights is <strong>of</strong>supreme importance in a constitutional democracy.The legislation aimed at helping ordinarySouth Africans to gain such access gives <strong>the</strong>Commission an important role in its implementation.The Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access to Information Act 2 <strong>of</strong>2000 creates an elaborate framework withinwhich individuals must operate to access relevantinformation, but does not create a separateInformation Commissioner to oversee <strong>the</strong>implementation and smooth running <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>system. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Act envisages that <strong>the</strong>South African Human Rights Commission willplay a major role in ensuring <strong>the</strong> effectiveimplementation and operation <strong>of</strong> this constitutionallymandated legislation.Firstly, <strong>the</strong> Act requires <strong>the</strong> Commission to takea lead in educating and informing <strong>the</strong> publicabout <strong>the</strong> way <strong>the</strong> legislation works. TheCommission is required to compile and regularlyupdate a guide on how to use <strong>the</strong> Act. Theguide must be published in each <strong>of</strong>ficial language<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic and must be compiledwithin three years <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commencement <strong>of</strong>section 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act, which came into operationon 15 February 2002. The Commissionmust also, within <strong>the</strong> available resources,develop and conduct education programmes tohelp members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public, especially thosefrom disadvantaged communities, to understand<strong>the</strong> ways in which <strong>the</strong>y can exercise <strong>the</strong>irrights in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.Secondly, <strong>the</strong> Act requires that <strong>the</strong> Commissionmonitor <strong>the</strong> Act’s implementation and submitdetailed reports to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly inthis regard. The Commission must report annuallyto <strong>the</strong> National Assembly on <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong>cases lodged in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act, <strong>the</strong>ir outcomesand how many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> decisions wereappealed internally or to <strong>the</strong> courts. This reportmust also include any recommendations for <strong>the</strong>improvement or amendment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act orTHE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION169


elated legislation and particulars <strong>of</strong> records <strong>of</strong>requests for access to information in relation toeach public body in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.Thirdly, <strong>the</strong> Act allows <strong>the</strong> Commission to assistpeople who approach it and wish to exercise<strong>the</strong>ir rights with making <strong>the</strong> necessary applicationsin terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.The Act explicitly states that any expenditure inconnection with <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s functions in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Actmust be defrayed from moneys appropriated to<strong>the</strong> Commission for that purpose.2.4. MANDATE IN TERMS OF PROMOTIONOF EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OFUNFAIR DISCRIMINATION ACTAlthough significant progress has been made intransforming our society and its institutions,structural inequalities remain deeply embeddedin social relations, practices and attitudes.These inequalities invariably lead to unfair discriminationand <strong>the</strong> marginalisation <strong>of</strong> vulnerablegroups and frustrate <strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> society promised by <strong>the</strong> Constitution, whichupholds <strong>the</strong> values <strong>of</strong> human dignity, equality,freedom and social justice in a united, nonracialand non-sexist society. To address thisproblem in a systematic and comprehensivemanner, <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act 4 <strong>of</strong>2000 was enacted in terms <strong>of</strong> section 9(4) <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution, which prevents or prohibitsunfair discrimination on any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> listedgrounds including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,belief, culture, language and birth.The Act provides an accessible avenue for ordinarypeople without access to lawyers to challengeunfair discrimination by <strong>the</strong> state or,unusually, by private institutions or individualsthrough <strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> a system <strong>of</strong> equalitycourts. It envisages an important role for <strong>the</strong>South African Human Rights Commission in <strong>the</strong>successful implementation and functioning <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.Firstly, <strong>the</strong> broad jurisdictional provisions in <strong>the</strong>Act allow <strong>the</strong> Commission to institute proceedingsin an equality court on behalf <strong>of</strong> anyaggrieved person or group. Where a presiding<strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> such a court decides to refer a matterto <strong>the</strong> Commission, it must deal speedily withsuch a case. The Act also places a duty on <strong>the</strong>Commission to assist complainants who wish tolodge a complaint and to conduct investigationswhere necessary.Secondly, <strong>the</strong> Act envisages an important rolefor <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong> promotion andachievement <strong>of</strong> equality. The Commission may,for example, request any state institution orany person to supply information on any measurestaken relating to <strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong>equality including, where appropriate, legislativeand executive action and compliance withlegislation, codes <strong>of</strong> practice and programmes.The Commission is also charged with receivingequality plans from government Ministries andmust consult with <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality when dealing with such plans. Thispart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act has not yet been brought int<strong>of</strong>orce. This is regrettable, as it is clear that matters<strong>of</strong> discrimination still require urgent attention.The Commission must on a quarterly basis inspecial reports to <strong>the</strong> President and toParliament in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act, include an assessment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>extent to which unfair discrimination on <strong>the</strong>170 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12grounds <strong>of</strong> race, gender and disability persist inSouth Africa and <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> such practices.These reports must include recommendationson how best to address <strong>the</strong> problems identified.South Africa also has international obligationsunder numerous binding treaties and customaryinternational law in <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> humanrights, which promote equality and prohibitunfair discrimination. Among <strong>the</strong>se are <strong>the</strong>rights specified in <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong>Elimination <strong>of</strong> All Forms <strong>of</strong> DiscriminationAgainst Women, <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong>Elimination <strong>of</strong> All Forms <strong>of</strong> Racial Discriminationand <strong>the</strong> Convention on <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Child.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> met with <strong>the</strong> Commission on 9March <strong>2007</strong>. The Commission’s written responseto <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s questionnaire, as well varioussubmissions from civil society, <strong>the</strong> academicsector and <strong>the</strong> Ministries informed <strong>the</strong> discussions.The Commission also supplied <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> with supplementary informationfollowing <strong>the</strong> discussions. From <strong>the</strong>se, <strong>the</strong> followingemerged:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) The Human Rights Commission Act, 1994, isoutdated. This legislation was originally consistentwith <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993Constitution, which differ in importantrespects from those contained in <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution. This is no longer sufficient.These discrepancies have implications for<strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandate and functioning.For example, <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitutionentrenches a number <strong>of</strong> socio-economicrights not contained in <strong>the</strong> 1993Constitution, such as <strong>the</strong> right to a cleanenvironment, <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> access to housingand healthcare, <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> access to food,water and social security and <strong>the</strong> right toeducation. The Commission is constitutionallymandated to monitor <strong>the</strong> progressiverealisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se socio-economic rightscontained in <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights. As <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission Act predates <strong>the</strong>1996 Constitution, it makes no mention <strong>of</strong>this important task.b) When <strong>the</strong> Department appeared before <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>, it was informed through <strong>the</strong>Deputy Minister <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment that <strong>the</strong> preparation <strong>of</strong> draftlegislation to amend <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act to bring it into line with <strong>the</strong>1996 Constitution was “at an advancedstage”.c) Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> regulations promulgated interms <strong>of</strong> section 19 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act relating to staff matters,including salaries, appointments, codes <strong>of</strong>conduct, transport and legal liability, are outdatedand in some instances in contravention<strong>of</strong> labour law. 43This creates difficultiesin managing <strong>the</strong> Commission and contributesto difficulties in <strong>the</strong> promotion andmaintenance <strong>of</strong> healthy labour relationswithin <strong>the</strong> Commission.d) The Commission has raised this matter on anumber <strong>of</strong> occasions with both <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment and <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justiceand Constitutional Development. The <strong>Committee</strong>was supplied with a letter to <strong>the</strong>Minister <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment, dated 27 October 2005, inwhich <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> department informed<strong>the</strong> Commission that <strong>the</strong>ir draft staff regulationshad been submitted to <strong>the</strong> formerMinister towards <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> 2004.43 For example, section 16 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Regulations limits <strong>the</strong> grant <strong>of</strong> paid maternity leave to two confinements, while no maternity leave may begranted in <strong>the</strong> first year <strong>of</strong> employment at <strong>the</strong> Commission. This is in contravention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Basic Conditions <strong>of</strong> Employment Act 75 <strong>of</strong> 1997.THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION171


e) During 2002 <strong>the</strong> Commission submitteddraft staff regulations to <strong>the</strong> Department forcomment and promulgation. However, <strong>the</strong>Department indicated that section 19 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission Act, which wouldhave formed <strong>the</strong> legal basis for <strong>the</strong> promulgation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulations, required amendment.As <strong>the</strong>se amendments were neveraccomplished, <strong>the</strong> drafting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulationsstalled. Since <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> Commission hasupdated its draft regulations, which are substantiallyin line with <strong>the</strong> rules applicable in<strong>the</strong> Public Service. These have been adoptedas “interim regulations”.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes with concern that <strong>the</strong>delay in updating <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act and its associated regulationsaffects <strong>the</strong> ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission tocarry out its mandate effectively and efficiently,and impacts negatively on its operationalefficiency.3.2. UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETA-TION OF MANDATEa) The <strong>Committee</strong> was impressed with <strong>the</strong> wayin which <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionexplained <strong>the</strong>ir understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s mandate when <strong>the</strong>y appearedbefore <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>. The Commissionersshowed a firm grasp <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> social, economicand political context within which <strong>the</strong>ywere required to operate and displayed anintimate knowledge <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> legal mandateunder which <strong>the</strong>y were required to achieve<strong>the</strong>ir goals.b) Over <strong>the</strong> past decade, <strong>the</strong> Commission hasbuilt up a reputation amongst human rightsactivists and members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public as anactive and passionate defender <strong>of</strong> humanrights. With limited financial and humanresources, <strong>the</strong> Commission has made a realdifference to <strong>the</strong> promotion and protection<strong>of</strong> human rights in <strong>the</strong> areas it focused on.At <strong>the</strong> same time, <strong>the</strong> Commission has managedto retain civil relationships with <strong>the</strong>Legislature and Executive, and has workedwith relevant individuals and institutions in<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r branches <strong>of</strong> government whenthis was required.c) The Commission has also developed aninternational reputation as an independentinstitution for <strong>the</strong> promotion and protection<strong>of</strong> human rights and assists human rightscommissions elsewhere in Africa withcapacity building.d) The members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission affirmed<strong>the</strong>ir belief in <strong>the</strong> interdependence and indivisibility<strong>of</strong> rights and expressed a desire toinvestigate and report every complaint andpromote all <strong>the</strong> rights in <strong>the</strong> Constitution.However, <strong>the</strong> Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that,given <strong>the</strong> Commission’s limited resources, itremained a reality that, unless a specificissue had a strong champion, <strong>the</strong> chanceswere that <strong>the</strong> Commission would focus itsresources elsewhere.e) Despite its many remarkable achievements,and in <strong>the</strong> light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> admission madeabove that strong champions get thingsdone, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> wishes to highlight <strong>the</strong>following important areas in need <strong>of</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>rattention and improvement:3.2.1. Children and disabled personsa) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that childrenand disabled persons are among <strong>the</strong> vulnerablegroups most in need <strong>of</strong> a champion to172 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12ensure <strong>the</strong> full realisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rights.However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes that, despite<strong>the</strong> contributions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong>promotion and protection <strong>of</strong> human rightsbroadly, it devoted limited resources andenergy to <strong>the</strong> promotion and protection <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> children and disabled persons.While <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is pleased to note that<strong>the</strong> Commission has now appointed a fulltimeco-ordinator to address <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong>children and disabled persons, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seareas is <strong>of</strong> considerable importance and,<strong>the</strong>refore, each should be dealt with by a“champion” <strong>of</strong> its own. Accordingly, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> expresses <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>the</strong>establishment <strong>of</strong> distinct structures with adedicated focus on <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> children anddisabled persons.b) However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is not in favour <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> proliferation <strong>of</strong> human rights bodies. It<strong>the</strong>refore recommends that such dedicatedstructures should form part <strong>of</strong> existinghuman rights bodies. Until legislation isenacted to include children in <strong>the</strong> NationalYouth Commission’s mandate, <strong>the</strong> HumanRights commission should streng<strong>the</strong>n itsfocus on children.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> also wishes to propose <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> a dedicated Commissionerto “champion” <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> disabled persons.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Officeon <strong>the</strong> Status <strong>of</strong> Disabled Persons has beenestablished to promote and protect <strong>the</strong>rights <strong>of</strong> people with disabilities. This <strong>of</strong>ficeis located within <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Presidencyand its staff report directly to <strong>the</strong> Minister in<strong>the</strong> Presidency. Provincial <strong>of</strong>fices replicate<strong>the</strong> national <strong>of</strong>fice.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> is concerned that <strong>the</strong>re maybe some duplication <strong>of</strong> functions, whichmay result in squandering <strong>of</strong> resources.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, fragmentation <strong>of</strong> functions andservices could result in confusion and uncertaintyamongst <strong>the</strong> public.e) The <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, suggests thatonce a dedicated Commissioner has beenappointed for <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> President should review <strong>the</strong> Office on<strong>the</strong> Status <strong>of</strong> Disabled Persons.3.2.2. Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access toInformation Acta) The Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access to Information Actgives people <strong>the</strong> right to request relevantinformation, <strong>the</strong>reby providing ordinary peoplewith easy access to information necessaryfor <strong>the</strong>m to enforce <strong>the</strong>ir rights andaccess that to which <strong>the</strong>y are entitled. Thereason for <strong>the</strong> Act is that for a long timegovernment departments failed to supplyrequired information.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that this veryimportant legislation aimed at promotingaccess to information does not, as intended,provide ordinary people with easy access toinformation needed for <strong>the</strong>m to enforce<strong>the</strong>ir rights and access <strong>the</strong>ir entitlements.The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that about 50percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> requests for information fromgovernment departments never receive aresponse.c) The complex and potentially expensiveappeals mechanism provided for in <strong>the</strong> legislationplaces fur<strong>the</strong>r obstacles in <strong>the</strong> way<strong>of</strong> ordinary individuals wishing to accessinformation. The Act contains a long list <strong>of</strong>grounds for refusing a request. Once arequest has been refused, an elaborateinternal appeals process must be followed,THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION173


which requires that an individual providelegal reasons for <strong>the</strong> appeal. This is not aneasy task for most laypersons.d) Should this internal appeals process beunsuccessful, an aggrieved individual canonly challenge decisions denying access toinformation in an ordinary court <strong>of</strong> law. Thecost and complexity <strong>of</strong> such processes <strong>of</strong>tenmake it difficult if not impossible for individualsor groups without adequate resourcesto exercise <strong>the</strong>ir right to information through<strong>the</strong> Act. It is significant that only a handful<strong>of</strong> cases reach <strong>the</strong> courts.e) Without assistance, members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> publicwhose requests for information are deniedwould have to show extraordinary resilienceif <strong>the</strong>y were to lodge a successful appeal in<strong>the</strong> courts. As noted above, <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission has <strong>the</strong> power to assistindividuals with <strong>the</strong>se appeals. It is notclear to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>Commission has assisted any individuals orgroups wishing to lodge an appeal, as envisagedin <strong>the</strong> Act.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> was also informed about <strong>the</strong>lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge by public servants andprivate bodies <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.Given <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> Commission wastasked with <strong>the</strong> duty to inform and educateall parties about <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act,this lack <strong>of</strong> knowledge points to a failure onits part. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that this failuremay be blamed partly on <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong>resources provided for this task, despite <strong>the</strong>explicit provisions in <strong>the</strong> legislation providingfor funding.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas failed to prepare guidelines on <strong>the</strong> provisionsand implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act within<strong>the</strong> legally stipulated timeframe. The<strong>Committee</strong> acknowledges, however, that<strong>the</strong> deadline applicable to <strong>the</strong> Commissionwas extended through <strong>the</strong> issuing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>necessary regulations. As mentioned,capacity constraints have also contributed to<strong>the</strong> Commission’s failure in this regard.h) The <strong>Committee</strong> received proposals for a newbody to deal with this issue. The proposalscentre around <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> an independentinformation commissioner mandatedto receive appeals from persons lodgingrequests for information and make bindingorders on access and disclosure. The informationcommissioner would also giveadvice to government departments and <strong>of</strong>ficialsseeking clarification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir duties andresponsibilities with respect to access toinformation. Such a proposal results fromimpatience with <strong>the</strong> capacity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission to provide real teeth in implementingthis legislation.i) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that a dedicatedinformation commissioner would go a longway towards ensuring effective implementation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act. In its submission to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Commission proposes twooptions concerning <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> an informationcommissioner. One option is to createan entirely new body that does not formpart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. This would ensurethat <strong>the</strong> staff and commissioner <strong>of</strong> this bodywould be appointed as specialists, who willdeal solely with <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access toInformation Act as well as legislation pertainingto privacy.j) The second option, which <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>favours, is to appoint an information commissionerwithin <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission. The <strong>Committee</strong> is opposed to174 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12<strong>the</strong> proliferation <strong>of</strong> human rights bodies, andthis approach would ensure that <strong>the</strong> informationcommissioner works within an existingstructure. To ensure <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> thisintervention, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> proposes that<strong>the</strong> information commissioner should beallocated a ‘ring-fenced’ budget within <strong>the</strong>budget allocation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission and a dedicated staff.k) There are many advantages to this option,including <strong>the</strong> efficient and effective sharing<strong>of</strong> infrastructure and o<strong>the</strong>r resources.l) At <strong>the</strong> request <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>Commission costed <strong>the</strong> two options. Theestimated cost for option 1 is approximatelyR 7,6 million, while that for option 2 isapproximately R 5,6 million. The <strong>Committee</strong>recognises that accepting <strong>the</strong> second option<strong>of</strong> vesting an information commissionerwithin <strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission ismuch cheaper and, <strong>the</strong>refore, cost effective.m)Notwithstanding <strong>the</strong> resource constraints <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Human Rights Commission, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> highlights <strong>the</strong> urgent need for<strong>the</strong> Commission to pay particular attentionto its functions and obligations in terms <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access to Information Act.n) In general, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinionthat <strong>the</strong> Commission needs to adopt a moreaggressive stance towards <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act, particularly regarding provisionson <strong>the</strong> reporting by private and publicbodies as well as assisting in <strong>the</strong> bringing <strong>of</strong>matters to <strong>the</strong> courts.3.2.3. The Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Acta) Section 28 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act,which relates to special measures to promoteequality with regard to race, genderand disability, has not yet come into operation.The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that <strong>the</strong>Commission has raised this problem with<strong>the</strong> previous Minister <strong>of</strong> Justice, but that ithas not received a response. In 2006 a committee<strong>of</strong> Parliament also looked into thismatter, but <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is not aware thatany results were forthcoming.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds it regrettable that sixyears after <strong>the</strong> Act came into force, <strong>the</strong> regulationsthat would bring this section intooperation have yet to be promulgated. Thisdelay adversely affects <strong>the</strong> Commission’seffectiveness in promoting <strong>the</strong> right toequality, which is central to <strong>the</strong> enjoyment<strong>of</strong> all o<strong>the</strong>r human rights in South Africa.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> commends <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor its initiatives in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act.Amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, <strong>the</strong> Commission has -i. Produced a guide on how to use <strong>the</strong> Act;ii. Established an Equality Unit and hasensured law clinic status for <strong>the</strong> legalservices departments <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> itsprovincial <strong>of</strong>fices to handle equality courtwork;iii. Brought and concluded at least fifteencases <strong>of</strong> unfair discrimination in equalitycourts; andiv. Received and processed approximately428 equality cases in 2005/06.THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION175


d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> following challengesthat negatively impact on <strong>the</strong>Commission’s work in this regard:i. Not all <strong>the</strong> designated equality courts arefully functional and where <strong>the</strong>y are functional<strong>the</strong>y are not always easily accessibleand/or visible to <strong>the</strong> public. The regulationsare also cumbersome, and <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> has been informed that <strong>the</strong>average time for a complaint to befinalised is two years, which is inordinatelylong.ii. The cost <strong>of</strong> public transport to accessequality courts is unaffordable to poorcomplainants.iii. In some instances, presiding <strong>of</strong>ficers andclerks at equality courts are hesitant toact because <strong>the</strong>y are unfamiliar with <strong>the</strong>Act and, <strong>the</strong>refore, lack confidence.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that <strong>the</strong> Actdoes not appear to be used much by <strong>the</strong>poor and marginalised, but primarily by <strong>the</strong>wealthy or educated. The <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>the</strong>refore <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that <strong>the</strong>Commission must take a more proactiveapproach towards assisting individualsaffected by unfair discrimination, especiallyin rural areas and in isolated townships.3.2.4. International obligationsa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas interpreted its mandate to include monitoring<strong>of</strong> how South Africa fulfils its obligationsin terms <strong>of</strong> international treaties. TheCommission has increased its capacity to dothis, and envisages playing a strong monitoringrole regarding <strong>the</strong> ratification, reportingand following up on <strong>the</strong> recommendations<strong>of</strong> treaty bodies as well as <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> various special rapporteurs. TheCommission is now aiming to present anindependent account <strong>of</strong> South Africa’s compliancewith its various international humanrights treaty obligations. The <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that such work is vital andaccordingly commends <strong>the</strong> Commission fortaking this initiative.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> Commission’s participationin <strong>the</strong> processes to promotehuman rights and <strong>the</strong> growth and development<strong>of</strong> national human rights institutions inAfrica. The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> richinterplay between <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong>national human rights institutions <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rcountries. In this regard, <strong>the</strong> Commissionregularly hosts delegations from o<strong>the</strong>r countries.The <strong>Committee</strong> also notes that <strong>the</strong>Commission was requested to do a presentationto <strong>the</strong> Judicial <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> PanAfrican Parliament on its mandate, andmore generally on <strong>the</strong> role and place <strong>of</strong>human rights and national human rightsinstitutions in <strong>the</strong> broader human rightsframework <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> African continent. This isano<strong>the</strong>r example <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commendable activities<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.3.3. APPOINTMENTSa) While <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution provided for <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> eleven Commissioners, <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission Act <strong>of</strong> 1994 providesthat no fewer than five Commissionersmay be appointed. However, <strong>the</strong> Act doesnot stipulate <strong>the</strong> maximum number <strong>of</strong>Commissioners that may be appointed.b) In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution, <strong>the</strong>President appoints both full-time and parttimecommissioners on <strong>the</strong> recommenda-176 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12tion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly after adoption<strong>of</strong> a resolution supported by a majority <strong>of</strong> itsmembers. When appointments need to bemade, an ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly is established for this purpose.This <strong>Committee</strong> invites nominations from<strong>the</strong> public and civil society, draws up ashortlist and calls applicants on <strong>the</strong> shortlistfor interviews. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>n submitsits recommendations to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly for approval. Commissioners hold<strong>of</strong>fice for a fixed term that is determined by<strong>the</strong> President but may not exceed sevenyears. Commissioners may be reappointedfor one fur<strong>the</strong>r term.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes with concern that <strong>the</strong>term <strong>of</strong> all five Commissioners currentlyserving will come to an end simultaneouslyin 200<strong>9.</strong> This may result in a loss <strong>of</strong> institutionalmemory and may negatively affect<strong>the</strong> continuity <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. The<strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore proposes that at leasttwo new Commissioners be appointedimmediately. One commissioner should beappointed to deal with rights issues relatingto disabled persons, while <strong>the</strong> secondshould deal with issues <strong>of</strong> access to information.The <strong>Committee</strong> discusses <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> staggering <strong>of</strong> appointments <strong>of</strong> commissionersmore fully and makes recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> is not convinced that <strong>the</strong>case for limitations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice hasbeen made, particularly in a country withlimited resources for <strong>the</strong> replacement <strong>of</strong>commissioners. In <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission, continuation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice would be required, particularly inconsideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> important responsibilities<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> proposedrevision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> human rights framework andmechanisms. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes a specificrecommendation to address this matter.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that, during <strong>the</strong> previousappointment cycle, <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>President may have misunderstood <strong>the</strong> provisions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and hence disregarded<strong>the</strong> National Assembly’s recommendationto appoint eleven Commissioners,appointing only five. The <strong>Committee</strong>believes that <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> only fivecommissioners to an institution with asbroad a mandate as that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SouthAfrican Human Rights Commission is deeplyproblematic and wholly inadequate. The<strong>Committee</strong> fails to understand <strong>the</strong> rationalefor <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> minimum number<strong>of</strong> Commissioners, particularly given <strong>the</strong>expanded mandate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission interms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access toInformation Act and <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong>Equality and Prevention <strong>of</strong> UnfairDiscrimination Act. The <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore,recommends that <strong>the</strong> legislationshould provide for <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> aminimum <strong>of</strong> seven Commissioners.3.4. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) The Commission has a constitutional andlegal mandate to conduct public educationand promote public awareness <strong>of</strong> humanrights. The <strong>Committee</strong> was informed that<strong>the</strong> Commission has embarked on extensivepublic education, particularly through its<strong>of</strong>ficial training provider, <strong>the</strong> National Centrefor Human Rights Education and Training.The <strong>Committee</strong> was impressed by <strong>the</strong> modeldeveloped by <strong>the</strong> Commission, as well as by<strong>the</strong> range <strong>of</strong> activities and programmesundertaken by this body. It is, however, <strong>of</strong>some concern that <strong>the</strong> Commission’s publicTHE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION177


awareness campaigns remain, in essence,urban based, although <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> wasinformed that <strong>the</strong> Commission has nowlaunched a programme aimed at addressingthis bias.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> was also informed that <strong>the</strong>Commission has had considerable success inincluding human rights education across <strong>the</strong>school curriculum. The Commission is to becongratulated on this very importantachievement, which has not been replicatedby o<strong>the</strong>r entities elsewhere.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> most widelyknown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions, withapproximately 50% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public indicatingan awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. None<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>supports <strong>the</strong> Commission’s contention thatmore needs to be done to increase publicawareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> functions, activities andservices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas admitted that it does not, at present,have a comprehensive and effective communicationspolicy and strategy. This undermines<strong>the</strong> good work done by <strong>the</strong>Commission. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinionthat such a strategy should make betteruse <strong>of</strong> existing points <strong>of</strong> contact between<strong>the</strong> public and state institutions such as publicservice <strong>of</strong>fices, post <strong>of</strong>fices, communitycentres and social grant pay-points toenhance its visibility and provide ordinarypeople with better access to its services. The<strong>Committee</strong> refers to some innovative initiativeson <strong>the</strong> part <strong>of</strong> government that couldbe useful in this regard. This matter is discussedmore fully and general recommendationsare made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Report</strong>.e) The Commission’s relationship with civil societyis unstructured. While committees allowingfor civil society participation were establishedin terms <strong>of</strong> section 5 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission Act, <strong>the</strong>se committees areno longer functioning. The <strong>Committee</strong> supports<strong>the</strong> intention, expressed by members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission, to reconstitute <strong>the</strong> committeesas a way <strong>of</strong> bringing outside expertiseinto <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission, including<strong>the</strong> expertise <strong>of</strong> civil society.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> received a representationalleging that commissioners should notserve on <strong>the</strong> boards <strong>of</strong> non-governmentalorganisations because this could lead to conflicts<strong>of</strong> interest. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>does not share this view. The <strong>Committee</strong>believes that <strong>the</strong> involvement <strong>of</strong> commissionerswith non-governmental organisationswill serve to streng<strong>the</strong>n relationshipswith such organisations and will build <strong>the</strong>capacity and knowledge <strong>of</strong> Commissioners.The <strong>Committee</strong>, in fact, encourages suchinvolvement with non-governmental organisations,as long as it does not detract froma Commissioner’s core functions and responsibilitiesto <strong>the</strong> Commission.g) Some submissions before <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>concluded that <strong>the</strong> Commission does notfocus sufficiently on issues that deeplyinvolve <strong>the</strong> public such as <strong>the</strong> HIV and AIDSpandemic. Given <strong>the</strong> enormous publicexpectations resting on <strong>the</strong> shoulders <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> viewthat <strong>the</strong> Commission should develop a comprehensivestrategic communications strategythat will inform <strong>the</strong> public about its variousactivities and will highlight <strong>the</strong>Commission’s independence and willingnessto assist <strong>the</strong> most marginalised and vulnerablesections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community.178 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12h) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commission,through its legal department, deals with arelatively large number <strong>of</strong> complaints.Obviously, such a large number <strong>of</strong> complaintsreflects on <strong>the</strong> state <strong>of</strong> human rightsin our society. From <strong>the</strong> 5 763 complaintsreceived in 1999/2000, <strong>the</strong> Commission’scaseload has increased to 11 710 in2005/06. Of <strong>the</strong> more than 11 700 complaintsreceived in <strong>the</strong> year ending in 2006,3 903 were accepted, and 547 were rejectedbecause <strong>the</strong>y did not, in <strong>the</strong> opinion <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> legal department, constitute a humanrights claim. A fur<strong>the</strong>r 1 636 complaintswere referred to o<strong>the</strong>r bodies such as <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equality and <strong>the</strong>Public Protector for resolution. TheCommission could not tell <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>se cases referred to o<strong>the</strong>r bodieswere ever resolved because <strong>the</strong>Commission had not followed this up, whichis pretty much common practice. The status<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> remaining 5 624 cases is unclear to<strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>. The Commission resolved732 cases through mediation, conciliation orcourt intervention, while in 1 360 cases afinding was made after receiving <strong>the</strong> version<strong>of</strong> both parties involved.i) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas identified <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> public awareness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Accessto Information Act and <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong>Equality and Prevention <strong>of</strong> UnfairDiscrimination Act as constraining factors in<strong>the</strong>ir effective implementation and utilisation.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat <strong>the</strong> Commission be more proactivein promoting public awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se Acts.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) The Commission is accountable to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly. At present it reports to<strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Justice andConstitutional Development on its annualreport. The <strong>Committee</strong> understands thatusually <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> wouldengage with this report for about two hours.Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission expressed adesire for more structured and informedengagement by <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>with <strong>the</strong> annual report. The <strong>Committee</strong>’sproposals on parliamentary oversight inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report addresses <strong>the</strong>se concerns.b) As <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandate is broad,straddling almost every sector <strong>of</strong> society, itis frequently requested to appear before differentparliamentary committees to provideinput on issues relevant to each committee.This <strong>of</strong>ten draws <strong>the</strong> Commission away fromits core work and places extra strain on itshuman resources. In this regard <strong>the</strong>re isneed for a focal point in Parliament to facilitateand co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> manner in whichParliament and <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission (as well as o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9Institutions) interact. The <strong>Committee</strong>addresses this matter in <strong>the</strong> general <strong>chapter</strong>on <strong>the</strong> relationship between Parliament and<strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutions.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> compliments <strong>the</strong>Commission on <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> its 6thSocio-Economic Rights <strong>Report</strong> in 2006. The<strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> progressive improvementsin <strong>the</strong> socio-economic rights reportsover <strong>the</strong> years. In particular, <strong>the</strong>re has beena vast improvement in <strong>the</strong> manner in whichinformation is solicited from governmentdepartments and <strong>the</strong> accuracy with whichTHE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION179


that information is reported. The <strong>Committee</strong>emphasises <strong>the</strong> need to ensure that <strong>the</strong>information in <strong>the</strong>se reports is current, since<strong>the</strong> reports can act as important yardsticksfor <strong>the</strong> Executive, civil society and <strong>the</strong> courtsfor measuring <strong>the</strong> progressive realisation <strong>of</strong>socio-economic rights in South Africa. The<strong>Committee</strong> suggests that <strong>the</strong> Commissionshould highlight specific aspects <strong>of</strong> its socioeconomicrights report by making use <strong>of</strong> itslegal mandate to bring matters to <strong>the</strong> attention<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly for discussionand action. This could serve as an impetusfor national debate on matters <strong>of</strong> national orpublic interest emerging from <strong>the</strong> Commission’sreports.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r recommends that<strong>the</strong> National Assembly should arrange biannualjoint meetings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> portfolio committeesdealing with <strong>the</strong> subject areas coveredin <strong>the</strong> socio-economic rights report.These would include housing, health, environmentalaffairs, education, social developmentand water affairs.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) The Commission engages with <strong>the</strong> Executivein an ad hoc or unstructured fashion, basedon particular human rights issues that mayarise. However, members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioninformed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that it does notalways receive <strong>the</strong> necessary reports fromgovernment departments, especially concerning<strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> information for <strong>the</strong>socio-economic rights reports. While <strong>the</strong>Commission’s socio-economic rights reportsdo mention non-compliant departments,this does not appear to be a sufficient deterrent.The Commission also reported that,when dealing with requests for access toinformation in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong>Access to Information Act and with complaintsagainst government departments ingeneral, <strong>the</strong> Commission is regularly metwith a lack <strong>of</strong> co-operation or assistancefrom government <strong>of</strong>ficials.b) As <strong>the</strong> Commission can only make recommendationsand cannot formally sanction<strong>of</strong>fending <strong>of</strong>ficials, its effectiveness lies, inpart, in its ability to hold those responsiblepublicly accountable and to seek answers toconduct that impacts on human rights.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> Commission’s efficacy iscompromised by <strong>the</strong> tardiness <strong>of</strong> governmentdepartments in responding, or <strong>the</strong>irfailure to respond altoge<strong>the</strong>r.c) The Commission informed <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>that its practice at present is to write to governmentdepartments on three occasions tosolicit <strong>the</strong> required information or response.Only if <strong>the</strong>re is no response after <strong>the</strong> thirdletter <strong>of</strong> request does <strong>the</strong> Commission resortto its powers <strong>of</strong> subpoena. The <strong>Committee</strong>views this as an overly timid approach and apoor use <strong>of</strong> resources. The <strong>Committee</strong>,<strong>the</strong>refore, recommends that <strong>the</strong> Commissionshould proceed to use its powers <strong>of</strong> subpoenaif a department does not respond after areasonable time following <strong>the</strong> first letter <strong>of</strong>request.d) The Commission has a unique opportunity tosolicit <strong>the</strong> assistance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly in dealing with problematic relationshipswith members <strong>of</strong> governmentdepartments. The <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, recommendsthat if a matter is one <strong>of</strong> publicimportance and a department ei<strong>the</strong>r doesnot respond within a reasonable time, orresponds but rejects <strong>the</strong> complaint, or providesincomplete information, <strong>the</strong>Commission should exercise its powers in180 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12terms <strong>of</strong> section 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act to bring <strong>the</strong> matter to <strong>the</strong>attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) As <strong>the</strong> Commission’s mandate is extraordinarilybroad, <strong>the</strong>re is much potential foroverlap or duplication <strong>of</strong> functions betweenit and o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 and related institutions.In 1998 <strong>the</strong> Commission initiated <strong>the</strong>creation <strong>of</strong> a Forum for IndependentStatutory Bodies to provide for better liaisonamong <strong>the</strong> various constitutional and statutorybodies, to share information on developmentsin <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> human rights, and tomake common representation to governmenton matters <strong>of</strong> common interest.Participation in this body was voluntary.However, over time most organisationspulled out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Forum, leaving only <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 institutions to continue with collaborativeefforts. The remaining institutionshave been struggling to implementsubstantive joint programmes successfully.A reason that was given for <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> cohesionwas <strong>the</strong> disparity in resource allocation,both human and financial, that has preventedor inhibited some Chapter 9 institutionsfrom participating in joint programmes.More recently, <strong>the</strong> European Union has fundeda project to formalise <strong>the</strong> co-operationbetween <strong>the</strong> Commission, <strong>the</strong> PublicProtector and <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality.b) There is a need for greater and more structuredco-operation and collaborationbetween <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions andrelated constitutional bodies. Such co-operationand collaboration should be focused,planned and implemented in a structuredmanner. The <strong>Committee</strong> has been informedby Commissioners that, given <strong>the</strong> proliferation<strong>of</strong> bodies, <strong>the</strong>re is a danger that complainantswill forum-shop and will take <strong>the</strong>irclaims from one body to ano<strong>the</strong>r evenwhere <strong>the</strong>y have no case. Conversely, a dangerexists that complainants with a validclaim will be referred from one institution toano<strong>the</strong>r without being assisted.c) The <strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, recommends that<strong>the</strong> various human rights bodies take immediatesteps to integrate <strong>the</strong>ir complaintsdatabases to ensure better co-operation andprevent such forum-shopping.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> fur<strong>the</strong>r recommends thatsuch structured co-operation should beaimed at embarking on joint public awarenesscampaigns, human rights advocacycampaigns and human rights training, aswell as joint submissions to Parliament or<strong>the</strong> courts on issues <strong>of</strong> vital mutual concern.e) High quality research in <strong>the</strong> field <strong>of</strong> humanrights is important and necessary but can bevery costly. The <strong>Committee</strong> recommendsthat <strong>the</strong> Commission co-operate with o<strong>the</strong>rChapter 9 institutions or academics to planand execute joint research projects. Suchprojects should be budgeted for at <strong>the</strong> start<strong>of</strong> each year and would require long termplanning from all bodies involved.f) At present, <strong>the</strong> Commission collaborateswith o<strong>the</strong>r institutions in <strong>the</strong> following ways:i. The Commission has a formal arrangementwith <strong>the</strong> Commission for GenderEquality regarding <strong>the</strong> handling <strong>of</strong> casesand complaints by <strong>the</strong> legal departments<strong>of</strong> both institutions. In addition, <strong>the</strong>Commissions have indicated that <strong>the</strong>yTHE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION181


attempt to ensure that <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>of</strong>fices are in<strong>the</strong> same building or in close proximity <strong>of</strong>each o<strong>the</strong>r but are constrained by existinglong-term leases. The <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that this should be a highpriority because it will save money andprovide better and more convenientaccess to <strong>the</strong> public.ii. There is no formal relationship with <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, although complaintshave been referred between <strong>the</strong> institutionswhere appropriate. The <strong>Committee</strong>is pleased to note that <strong>the</strong> Commissionhas an electronic database and systemthat allows it to monitor complaintsreferred to o<strong>the</strong>r constitutional bodies.As previously recommended, this databaseshould be integrated with those <strong>of</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r human rights bodies as soon aspossible.3.8. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The Commission has experienced internaldissent and this led to <strong>the</strong> resignation <strong>of</strong> itsChief Executive Officer towards <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong>2005. According to news reports, <strong>the</strong>Commission had been beset with difficultiesin <strong>the</strong> preceding two years, including anexodus <strong>of</strong> staff and reports <strong>of</strong> victimisationby senior management. In July 2005 unhappystaff members addressed an open letterto <strong>the</strong> Speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assemblystating that at least 15 staff members hadresigned in <strong>the</strong> first six months <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> yearand asking for her urgent intervention tosave <strong>the</strong> Commission from a “crisis”.b) The structural reasons for such tensions canbe found in <strong>the</strong> relevant provisions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Finance Management Act that assigns<strong>the</strong> position <strong>of</strong> chief accounting <strong>of</strong>ficer to <strong>the</strong>Chief Executive Officer. The Chairperson <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission also informed <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act fails to make it clear that<strong>the</strong> Chairperson is <strong>the</strong> head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. This has led to confusion about<strong>the</strong> hierarchical relationship between <strong>the</strong>Chief Executive Officer and <strong>the</strong> Chairperson<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and <strong>the</strong> lines <strong>of</strong> authoritybetween <strong>the</strong>m. The <strong>Committee</strong> believesthat establishing clear lines <strong>of</strong> authority isimperative in any institution or body, andhas made appropriate recommendations todeal with such problems should <strong>the</strong>y arise in<strong>the</strong> future in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.c) The division <strong>of</strong> roles and responsibilitiesamongst Commissioners and between commissionersand staff has not always beenclear, creating tensions that have impactedon <strong>the</strong> Commission’s organisational efficiencyand effectiveness. The <strong>Committee</strong> ispleased to note that in order to avoid <strong>the</strong>potential for conflict, <strong>the</strong> Commissioners andChief Executive Officer have signed performancecontracts. In addition, <strong>the</strong>y meet regularlyto ensure <strong>the</strong> smooth running <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. The Commission has alsoadopted a document in 2006 that outlines<strong>the</strong> channels <strong>of</strong> accountability in <strong>the</strong> organisation.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, Commissioners conductvisits to <strong>the</strong> provincial <strong>of</strong>fices to ensure <strong>the</strong>overall smooth running <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> organisation.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> fulltimeCommissioners undertaking privatework requires clarification. There is no policyin place that requires Commissioners todisclose or seek permission for <strong>the</strong>ir involvementin private or commercial concerns.However, in September 2006 Commissionerswere for <strong>the</strong> first time required to182 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12declare <strong>the</strong>ir membership <strong>of</strong> boards ororganisations, and whe<strong>the</strong>r such membershipswere accompanied by financialreward. The issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> disclosure <strong>of</strong> financialinterests, as well as membership <strong>of</strong>boards is discussed more fully in Chapter 2<strong>of</strong> this report. The <strong>Committee</strong> also makesrecommendations in this regard.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> necessary legislative framework contemplatedin terms <strong>of</strong> section 219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, <strong>the</strong> President determines <strong>the</strong>remuneration and conditions <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong>Commissioners in consultation with <strong>the</strong>Cabinet and <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Finance. Such anarrangement can create <strong>the</strong> perception that<strong>the</strong> independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissioners isnot fully safeguarded. The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>reforefinds this arrangement wholly unsatisfactory.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.3.<strong>9.</strong> FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission informed <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officerprepares <strong>the</strong> draft budget in consultationwith <strong>the</strong> Commissioners. Once this process isfinalised, it is submitted to <strong>the</strong> Treasury toinfluence <strong>the</strong> Treasury’s budgetary determinationin terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Medium TermExpenditure Framework. A copy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budgetis also submitted to <strong>the</strong> Director-General<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development.b) This is done in October and months later <strong>the</strong>Commission is informed about <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> itsbudget by <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Development. TheChairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission made it clearthat <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer never interactswith <strong>the</strong> department regarding <strong>the</strong>Commission’s budget.c) The National Treasury makes its recommendationto Cabinet where <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong>Justice and Constitutional Development mayhave to defend <strong>the</strong> budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission. There seems to be some confusion,however, about <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Minister and her <strong>of</strong>ficials in <strong>the</strong> budgetingprocess.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong>re is a needto ensure consistency and certainty in <strong>the</strong>funding arrangements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review, which at present are sadlylacking. The <strong>Committee</strong> addresses ways todeal with this matter in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes with approval that <strong>the</strong>Commission has received unqualified auditreports for five consecutive years.Expenditure trends versus budget allocationhave increased over <strong>the</strong> past five years dueto an increase in <strong>the</strong> Commission’s activities.Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se activities relate to <strong>the</strong> legislativeduties <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in terms <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Access to Information Actand <strong>the</strong> Promotion <strong>of</strong> Equality andPrevention <strong>of</strong> Unfair Discrimination Act.f) In 2001/02 <strong>the</strong> Commission was allocatedR32.7 million, which has increased to R 4<strong>9.</strong>2million in 2006/07. The following table providesa detailed breakdown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission’s baseline allocation and expendituresince 2003/2004, as well as <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>increases in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Medium TermExpenditure Framework.THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION183


Table 1: Budget allocation and expenditure2003/04 – 2009/10 44R’000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10BudgetAllocation 32 728 37 653 41 774 49 220 55 281 60 603 66 129Expenditure 29 458 38 827 42 393Surplus/(Deficit) 3 270 (1 174) (719)g) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes with concern that <strong>the</strong>rehas been a dramatic increase in personnelcosts and that <strong>the</strong>se comprise roughly 60%<strong>of</strong> total expenditure. However, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> was unable to quantify to whatextent <strong>the</strong> increased budget and increasedspending on personnel have contributed toan increase in <strong>the</strong> mandated activities <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission.4. General conclusionsa) It appears to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> HumanRights Commission more than adequatelysatisfies requirements as identified in <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>’s terms <strong>of</strong> reference with regardto pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism, efficiency and effectiveness.The <strong>Committee</strong> believes that <strong>the</strong> workdone by <strong>the</strong> Commission is <strong>of</strong> vital relevancefor South Africa and makes an important contributionto <strong>the</strong> deepening <strong>of</strong> democracy and<strong>the</strong> achievement <strong>of</strong> a human rights culture inthis country.b) As pointed out previously, however, legislationgoverning this institution is outdated andmust be amended. There is also a need,firstly, for closer co-operation betweenhuman rights institutions and, secondly, for arationalisation <strong>of</strong> functions, role and organisation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> various human rights institutionsto ensure that <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> vulnerableand marginalised sectors <strong>of</strong> society are givenpriority and to bring our institutions in linewith international good practice in thisregard.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocedures for Commissioners to be inappropriate.In Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> makes recommendations that itbelieves will enhance consistency, coherenceand accountability in this process.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> supports <strong>the</strong> Commission’sintentions to establish mechanisms toenhance collaboration and co-ordination witho<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 and associated institutionsand civil society organisations. The<strong>Committee</strong> encourages <strong>the</strong> Commission to bemore vigorous in its efforts in this regard. Afull discussion is found in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport, as well as recommendations in thisregard.e) The parliamentary mechanisms for oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission and engagementwith its reports are inadequate. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin Chapter 2 for <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>oversight and accountability mechanisms44 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Commission’s submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>184 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 12that would apply to all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions under review.f) The budget process and funding model <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> adversely affects its accountability andindependence. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes generalrecommendations in Chapter 2 for <strong>the</strong>improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> budget process thatwould apply to all <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associatedinstitutions under review.5. RecommendationsThe principal recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> in respect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission is to establish a Commission thatwould comprehensively address <strong>the</strong> promotionand protection <strong>of</strong> all human rights within a singleinstitution. This recommendation flowsfrom <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s understanding that allhuman rights are interdependent and indivisibleand that one well-resourced body wouldbetter address <strong>the</strong> human rights needs <strong>of</strong> especially<strong>the</strong> most marginalised and vulnerablemembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> community.The <strong>Committee</strong> is, however, aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> factthat <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> a single Commissionis a complex task that will also require significantconstitutional amendment. The <strong>Committee</strong>discusses <strong>the</strong> reasons and advantages for sucha move in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report, where it alsoprovides detailed proposals for <strong>the</strong> implementation<strong>of</strong> this recommendation.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that this amalgamationmay take some time to complete but that <strong>the</strong>Commission may well benefit from <strong>the</strong> insightsgained during this review process. The<strong>Committee</strong> is, <strong>the</strong>refore, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opinion that<strong>the</strong>re is a need for <strong>the</strong> immediate implementation<strong>of</strong> specific recommendations in this regard.5.1. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATEIMPLEMENTATIONThe <strong>Committee</strong> makes <strong>the</strong> following recommendationsto fur<strong>the</strong>r improve <strong>the</strong> efficiency,effectiveness and independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission:a) The Department <strong>of</strong> Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment should –i. Finalise and table in Parliament forthwitha new draft <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act <strong>of</strong> 1994 to bring it intoline with <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution and <strong>the</strong>mandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. The draftBill should also address <strong>the</strong> issues concerning<strong>the</strong> respective responsibilitiesand powers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chairperson and ChiefExecutive Officer <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission.ii. The draft should fur<strong>the</strong>r provide for <strong>the</strong>regulation <strong>of</strong> pecuniary and o<strong>the</strong>r interests<strong>of</strong> Commissioners and senior <strong>of</strong>ficialsin line with <strong>the</strong> recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>, and should require that <strong>the</strong>Commissioners and <strong>of</strong>ficials disclose <strong>the</strong>irinterests in a register that is kept availableto interested parties.b) In particular, Parliament should –i. Initiate a review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appointments andbudget arrangements for all <strong>the</strong>Commissions to support fur<strong>the</strong>r andassert <strong>the</strong> Commissions’ independence.The <strong>Committee</strong> makes specific proposalsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.ii. Initiate <strong>the</strong> speedy appointment <strong>of</strong> atleast two more Commissioners. Oneshould be specifically designated to dealwith <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> disabled persons andTHE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION185


<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r with access to informationissues.iii. Ensure that no less than sevenCommissioners are appointed for a term<strong>of</strong> no more than 7 years, renewable for afur<strong>the</strong>r term.iv. Ensure that <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onJustice and Constitutional Developmentmeets with <strong>the</strong> Commission more <strong>of</strong>tento review <strong>the</strong> Commission’s annual reportand strategic plan and activities.v. In consultation with <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong>Chairpersons <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly,co-ordinate <strong>the</strong> Commission’s interactionswith o<strong>the</strong>r parliamentary committees.vi. Pass an amendment to <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission Act 54 <strong>of</strong> 1994 to provide for<strong>the</strong> President to extend <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> current Commissioners for a period<strong>of</strong> 2 years. Parliament should ensure that<strong>the</strong> comprehensive revision <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act iscompleted before this extended term <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>fice expires.c) In <strong>the</strong> meantime, <strong>the</strong> Commission should: -i. Initiate <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> establishing formalcollaborative relationships with o<strong>the</strong>r relevantChapter 9 institutions as suggestedin this <strong>chapter</strong> to ensure far closer cooperationbetween institutions with aview to <strong>the</strong>ir eventual amalgamation.This process must pay special attention to<strong>the</strong> need to integrate <strong>the</strong> complaintsdatabases <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant human rightsinstitutions, as discussed above.ii. Use <strong>the</strong> powers granted to <strong>the</strong>Commission in terms <strong>of</strong> section 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Human Rights Commission Act, or correspondingprovisions in <strong>the</strong> proposedamending legislation, to bring to <strong>the</strong>attention <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assemblythrough <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speaker shockinginstances <strong>of</strong> departmental failures orunsatisfactory responses to any enquiriesor complaints.iii. Develop a communications policy andstrategy to raise awareness <strong>of</strong> and populariseits work.iv. Expand on and fur<strong>the</strong>r invigorate publicawareness campaigns and public educationprogrammes.186 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


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CHAPTER 13


CHAPTER 13CHAPTER 13THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONSAUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA1. BackgroundThe Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong>South Africa (<strong>the</strong> Authority) is an independentbody established as <strong>the</strong> regulator and mainlicensing body in <strong>the</strong> broadcasting andtelecommunications sectors. The Authority is<strong>the</strong> successor to <strong>the</strong> previous IndependentBroadcasting Authority and <strong>the</strong> South AfricanTelecommunications Regulatory Authority andtook over <strong>the</strong>ir functions.The rationale for <strong>the</strong> merger <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se two bodiesin 2000 into a single entity is ostensiblyfound in <strong>the</strong> increasing convergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>broadcasting, telecommunications and informationtechnology sectors, as well as in efficiencyand cost benefits. However, nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>enabling legislation, nor <strong>the</strong> Authority’s internalstructure in which <strong>the</strong> divisions for broadcastingand telecommunications continued to operatequite separately from each o<strong>the</strong>r, reflected<strong>the</strong>se technological advancements. It was onlyin 2005, with <strong>the</strong> enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ElectronicCommunications Act 36 <strong>of</strong> 2005, that <strong>the</strong>underlying legislation pertaining to broadcastingand telecommunications was repealed toeffect convergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se sectors.The enactment <strong>of</strong> legislation to establish <strong>the</strong>Authority has a complex history, as <strong>the</strong> broadcastingand telecommunications sectors havedeveloped separately and were regulated bydifferent laws. However, digitalisation has seen<strong>the</strong> traditionally separate broadcasting andtelecommunications sectors converging, with<strong>the</strong> result that <strong>the</strong> old service and technologyspecificlegislation no longer met <strong>the</strong> requirements<strong>of</strong> markets that had subsequentlymerged.1.1. INDEPENDENT BROADCASTINGAUTHORITYThe Independent Broadcasting Authority wasestablished in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IndependentBroadcasting Act 153 <strong>of</strong> 1993 on 30 March1994, its purpose being to ensure a free, fairand open broadcasting system. Its objects providedfor <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> broadcasting activitiesin <strong>the</strong> public interest to promote <strong>the</strong> provision<strong>of</strong> a diverse range <strong>of</strong> sound and televisionbroadcasting services on a national, regionaland local level, which when viewed collectivelywould cater for all languages and culturalgroups. The legislation established an independentregulatory authority to ensure <strong>the</strong>development <strong>of</strong> three levels <strong>of</strong> broadcasting:public, private and community-based. 45The passage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent BroadcastingAuthority Act in 1994 took place “in <strong>the</strong> pressure-cookerenvironment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political negotiations’;46giving effect to <strong>the</strong> prevailing viewthat freedom <strong>of</strong> expression is a prerequisite forfree political activity. As such, priority wasgiven to ensuring that <strong>the</strong> regulation <strong>of</strong> broadcastingwas done independently <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ngovernment and, <strong>the</strong>refore, that broadcastingwas free from political interference. A fairprocess for awarding licenses, whe<strong>the</strong>r to privateor public broadcasters, was also consideredimportant.These priorities were captured in section 15 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution, which entrenched <strong>the</strong>right <strong>of</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> expression. Specifically, section15(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993 Constitution providedthat ”all media financed by or under <strong>the</strong> control<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state shall be regulated in a mannerwhich ensures impartiality and <strong>the</strong> expression<strong>of</strong> diversity <strong>of</strong> opinion”. While section 16 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1996 Constitution sets out <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> freedom<strong>of</strong> expression, it does not contain a provision45 Horwitz, R. Communications and Democratic Reform in South Africa. Cambridge University Press: New York. 2005.46 Horwitz, R. 2005. p 148THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA189


similar to that contained in section 15(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>1993 Constitution. An independent regulator forbroadcasting is instead provided for in Chapter9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution that deals with stateinstitutions supporting constitutional democracy.Section 192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution provides thatnational legislation must establish an independentauthority to regulate broadcasting in<strong>the</strong> public interest, as well as to ensure fairnessand diversity <strong>of</strong> views broadly representing oursociety.However, <strong>the</strong> provision relating to broadcastingis not placed in section 181 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionwhich lists <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r institutions found inChapter 9 as state institutions streng<strong>the</strong>ningconstitutional democracy. A possible explanationfor this distinction is that <strong>the</strong> constitutionalentrenchment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> broadcasting regulatorwas decided only in 1996, shortly before <strong>the</strong>passage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> final Constitution. The negotiatorsdebated <strong>the</strong> proper location in <strong>the</strong>Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> principle that had beenembodied in section 15(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993Constitution, as <strong>the</strong> drafters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1996Constitution did not believe that <strong>the</strong> provisionshould form part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.Never<strong>the</strong>less, it was thought that <strong>the</strong> protectionafforded by section 15(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 1993Constitution was sufficiently important torequire incorporation elsewhere in <strong>the</strong>Constitution.Traditionally broadcasters have been closelyregulated in terms <strong>of</strong> who may broadcast andwhat may be broadcasted. Given South Africa’spolitical history, <strong>the</strong> provision for <strong>the</strong> existence<strong>of</strong> an independent regulator for broadcasting isintended to give meaning to certain rights suchas freedom <strong>of</strong> expression, <strong>the</strong> right <strong>of</strong> access toinformation, and language rights. If implementedeffectively, such regulation can <strong>the</strong>reforecontribute to <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong> democracy.1.2. SOUTH AFRICANTELECOMMUNICATIONSREGULATORY AUTHORITYThe importance <strong>of</strong> telecommunications to modernlife should not be underestimated. It wouldnot be stretching <strong>the</strong> point too far to say thatvirtually all <strong>of</strong> modern life is dependent ontelecommunications. Certainly, it is a drivingfactor in economic growth, determining a country’sability to participate in <strong>the</strong> global economy.47Direct revenue from telecommunicationservices comprises, on average, between twoand three percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> gross domestic productfor most countries. In South Africa, this percentageis significantly higher, being estimatedto be in <strong>the</strong> region <strong>of</strong> six percent, and it isimpossible to determine <strong>the</strong> value <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sectorto <strong>the</strong> economy as a whole. 48Until 1992, telecommunications in South Africawas delivered on a monopoly basis through agovernment department responsible for Postsand Telecommunications. The department fellunder <strong>the</strong> control <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Postmaster General,who was subject only to <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Postsand Telecommunications. South Africa was notunique in this regard. It is only in <strong>the</strong> past 25years that <strong>the</strong>re has been a trend in parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>democratic world to liberalise telecommunications.49The alleged benefits <strong>of</strong> liberalisation(and <strong>the</strong> resulting competition) for <strong>the</strong> sectorinclude greater efficiency, cheaper services,more pricing options, more services, better andmore reliable technology, and better customerservice. This is in contrast to <strong>the</strong> historical positionthat viewed <strong>the</strong> telecommunicationsindustry as a natural monopoly, as this wasthought to be <strong>the</strong> most efficient and effectiveway <strong>of</strong> providing services at <strong>the</strong> lowest cost. 50Before 1996, <strong>the</strong> communications sector inSouth Africa was a monopoly driven exclusive-47 Love, D .An Overview <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African Telecommunications Industry: From Pre-1994 Policy-Making to Gloomy 2005 Realities. HonoursResearch report submitted to <strong>the</strong> University <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Witwatersrand. Supervisor: Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Tom Lodge. 2005. p 3.48 Love, D. 2005.p 4.49 Love, D. 2005.50 Love, D. 2005. p 3190 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13However, while <strong>the</strong>re may be general agreemently by <strong>the</strong> government Department <strong>of</strong> Posts andcient and responsive service delivery. 54 broadcasting, telecommunications and infor-Telecommunications. The sector was commercialisedin 1992 with <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> an regarding <strong>the</strong> need for an independentregulator, <strong>the</strong> complex relationship <strong>of</strong> governmentincorporated entity Telkom SA Limitedwith <strong>the</strong> industry creates many manifes-(Telkom). However, <strong>the</strong> locus <strong>of</strong> power tations <strong>of</strong> this ideal. 55remained largely unaltered with <strong>the</strong>Postmaster General and <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong>Communications retaining control over Telkom.In South Africa, while <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitution hasprovided in section 192 that national legislationmust create an independent authority to regulateIn 1996 <strong>the</strong> new government issued a WhitePaper that expressed commitment to <strong>the</strong> ideal<strong>of</strong> telecommunications not being simply anaspect <strong>of</strong> development, but a precondition forbroadcasting in <strong>the</strong> public interest and toensure fairness and diversity <strong>of</strong> views broadlyrepresenting South African society, no such constitutionalimperative existed for telecommunications.its success. 51The White Paper set out a clearInstead, <strong>the</strong> Telecommunications Actroute marking <strong>the</strong> transition from exclusivity 103 <strong>of</strong> 1996 created an independent regulator.through a duopoly towards full liberalisation.The resulting regulatory framework created by The South African Telecommunications<strong>the</strong> Telecommunications Act 103 <strong>of</strong> 1996 wasintended to smooth <strong>the</strong> sector’s liberalisation.Regulatory Authority was established in 1997with regulatory responsibilities. The Minister <strong>of</strong>Communications was empowered to play aIt is widely accepted that a major component <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> reform <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> communication’s sector is <strong>the</strong>existence <strong>of</strong> an independent regulator that isconsidered to be credible to <strong>the</strong> industry, legitimateto consumers and accountable to stakeholders.major role in licensing and regulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>sector, despite <strong>the</strong> possibility for conflicts <strong>of</strong>interest arising from <strong>the</strong> Minister’s multipleroles in <strong>the</strong> sector as both policy maker andcustodian <strong>of</strong> state assets.52As, globally, this sector has in <strong>the</strong>past been characterised by state-ownedmonopolies, <strong>the</strong> international model now1.3. INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONSAUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICArequires that <strong>the</strong>se regulators be independentto reduce <strong>the</strong> potential for conflict <strong>of</strong> interestarising from <strong>the</strong> multiple public roles played by<strong>the</strong> state in this sector. Therefore, regulatorsare intended “to set <strong>the</strong> rules <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> game, particularlyreduce barriers for new entrants andcurtail any abuses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dominant marketpower <strong>of</strong> incumbents who <strong>of</strong>ten continued tobe owned by <strong>the</strong> state”. 53As previously stated, in May 2000 both <strong>the</strong>Independent Broadcasting Authority and <strong>the</strong>South African Telecommunications RegulatoryAuthority were dissolved, and <strong>the</strong>ir functionstransferred to <strong>the</strong> newly established Authority.The Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong>South Africa Act 13 <strong>of</strong> 2000 established a singleregulatory authority for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> regulatingboth broadcasting and telecommunications.It is argued that <strong>the</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> an independentregulator has a direct influence on <strong>the</strong>speed and quality <strong>of</strong> reform, and is essential forraising investment capital, and ensuring effi-The merger <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent BroadcastingAuthority and <strong>the</strong> South African TelecommunicationsRegulatory Authority was undertaken inrecognition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rapid convergence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>51 Love, D. 2005.52 Love, D. 2005. p 6.53 Gillwald, A. Submission on <strong>the</strong> Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa (ICASA), <strong>2007</strong>. p 654 Cohen, T. Rethinking (Reluctant) Capture: The Development <strong>of</strong> South African Telecommunications 1992 – 2002 and <strong>the</strong> Impact <strong>of</strong> Regulation.Work in progress for <strong>the</strong> TPRC Conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2002.55 Cohen, T. 28 September 2002.THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA191


mation technology sectors requiring a singleregulator.Never<strong>the</strong>less, more than a decade since <strong>the</strong>transition to democracy, South Africa continuesto have a heavily regulated and partially government-ownedcommunications sector. Yet<strong>the</strong> country’s social and economic developmentagenda remains pressing. Prices <strong>of</strong> serviceshave risen considerably; for example, <strong>the</strong> price<strong>of</strong> a landline remains unaffordable to <strong>the</strong> vastmajority <strong>of</strong> South Africans. These high pricesare not only detrimental to <strong>the</strong> economy, butalso prevent many South African’s from participatingin <strong>the</strong> knowledge economy. 562. Constitutional andlegal mandateAs previously mentioned, <strong>the</strong> 1996 Constitutionestablishes through national legislation anindependent regulatory authority to regulatebroadcasting in <strong>the</strong> public interest and toensure fairness and a diversity <strong>of</strong> views broadlyrepresenting our society.Both <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> enabling legislationdescribe <strong>the</strong> Authority as independent. Notonly does section 192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution establishan independent regulator through legislation,<strong>the</strong> enabling legislation affirms this byproviding that <strong>the</strong> Authority is independent,subject only to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law.The Authority must be impartial, and performits functions without fear, favour or prejudice.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> legislation specifically providesthat <strong>the</strong> Authority must function withoutany political or commercial interference. While<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> independence is explored morefully elsewhere in this <strong>chapter</strong>, this is a <strong>the</strong>methat <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> was referred to time andtime again, particularly in <strong>the</strong> submissions itreceived. In this regard, it is noteworthy that<strong>the</strong> submissions from <strong>the</strong> Ministry andDepartment <strong>of</strong> Communications were bothdevoted entirely to this topic.As successor-in-title to <strong>the</strong> IndependentBroadcasting Authority and <strong>the</strong> South AfricanTelecommunications Regulatory Authority, <strong>the</strong>Authority regulates <strong>the</strong> environment for operatorsin broadcasting and telecommunicationsand provides universal access and service delivery.Its functions include making regulations;issuing licences to providers <strong>of</strong> telecommunicationsand broadcasting services; planning;supervising licence holders; controlling andmanaging <strong>the</strong> frequency spectrum; hearing anddeciding on disputes and complaints brought byindustry or members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public againstlicence holders; and protecting consumers fromunfair business practices, poor quality servicesand harmful or inferior products. The Authorityhas been recently assigned postal services, previouslyunder <strong>the</strong> auspices <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Department<strong>of</strong> Communications.The Authority must also give effect to <strong>the</strong>Electronic Communications Act 36 <strong>of</strong> 2005. ThisAct repealed <strong>the</strong> Independent BroadcastingAuthority Act, <strong>the</strong> Telecommunications Act andpart <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Broadcasting Act 4 <strong>of</strong> 199<strong>9.</strong> TheElectronic Communications Act provides for <strong>the</strong>regulation <strong>of</strong> electronic communications (whichincludes broadcasting, telecommunications,network services and electronic communications)in <strong>the</strong> public interest and for that purposeto promote and facilitate convergence.3. FindingsThe <strong>Committee</strong> met with <strong>the</strong> IndependentCommunications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa on20 February <strong>2007</strong>. The discussions wereinformed by <strong>the</strong> Authority’s written response to56 Love, D. 2005.192 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13<strong>the</strong> questionnaire circulated by <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>prior to <strong>the</strong> meeting, as well as submissionsfrom <strong>the</strong> Ministry and <strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong>Communications and individuals. The<strong>Committee</strong> also requested additional informationfrom <strong>the</strong> Authority, which was provided,and received subsequent submissions from <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Communications. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds as follows:3.1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASISa) The Constitution and enabling legislation isclear regarding <strong>the</strong> Authority’s independence.Section 192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution providesthat national legislation must establishan independent authority to regulate broadcastingin <strong>the</strong> public interest, and to ensurefairness and diversity <strong>of</strong> views broadly representingSouth African society.Accordingly, <strong>the</strong> Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa Act 13 <strong>of</strong>2000, as amended, guarantees <strong>the</strong>Authority’s independence: Section 3(3) notonly states that <strong>the</strong> Authority is independent,subject only to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong>law, and must be impartial, but requires thatit perform its functions without fear, favouror prejudice. In this respect section 3(3) mirrors<strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> section 181(2) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, which is <strong>the</strong> provision that lists<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r bodies created in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution as state institutions streng<strong>the</strong>ningconstitutional democracy. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore,section 3(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Act states that <strong>the</strong>Authority must function without any politicalor commercial interference.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> received submissions on <strong>the</strong>issue <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Authority’s independence. Itwas put to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> constitutionalprovision for <strong>the</strong> establishment <strong>of</strong> abody <strong>of</strong> this nature is inappropriate. In particular,<strong>the</strong> Department <strong>of</strong> Communicationspresented a number <strong>of</strong> factors in support <strong>of</strong>this view, including:i. The Authority is not listed in section 181<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution and, consequently,can be distinguished from <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r institutionsdescribed in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution;ii. The constitutional criteria <strong>of</strong> fairness, efficiencyand diversity were intended toapply to broadcasting, and not totelecommunications or to electronic communications;andiii. Given <strong>the</strong> rapid technological developmentswithin <strong>the</strong> communications sector,it is no longer appropriate to retain <strong>the</strong>Authority’s constitutional status.Constitutional entrenchment creates <strong>the</strong>danger that <strong>the</strong> regulator might beunable to adapt sufficiently swiftly to anever-changing technological environment.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> submissionsfrom <strong>the</strong> Ministry and Department <strong>of</strong>Communications only address <strong>the</strong>Authority’s legal standing. The <strong>Committee</strong> is<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that this is a misunderstanding,as <strong>the</strong> Constitution is not <strong>the</strong> only place thatprovides for an independent regulator. Infact, <strong>the</strong> phraseology <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> enabling legislationgoes much fur<strong>the</strong>r than <strong>the</strong> constitutionalprovisions. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>re areo<strong>the</strong>r constitutional institutions, not found inChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, which arenone<strong>the</strong>less independent. The relevant constitutionalprovisions and <strong>the</strong> legislationdetermine <strong>the</strong>ir legal status.THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA193


d) The <strong>Committee</strong> also considered <strong>the</strong> submission<strong>of</strong> Parliament’s Constitutional Review<strong>Committee</strong> that section 192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution should be amended by substituting<strong>the</strong> word ‘communications’ for <strong>the</strong>word “broadcasting”. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that for political and legalreasons such an amendment is unnecessaryat this time.e) Fur<strong>the</strong>r, on <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> independence, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> notes that while <strong>the</strong> Authority isdescribed in <strong>the</strong> enabling legislation asindependent, <strong>the</strong> Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa Act, asamended, contains a number <strong>of</strong> provisionsthat appear to be in conflict with, or potentiallycurtail, <strong>the</strong> Authority’s independence:i. Section 6A provides that <strong>the</strong> Ministermust, in consultation with <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, establish a performance managementsystem to monitor and evaluate<strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chairperson ando<strong>the</strong>r Councillors <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Council establishedby <strong>the</strong> Act. Performance agreementsare to be concluded betweenevery Councillor, including <strong>the</strong> chairperson,and <strong>the</strong> Minister, and <strong>the</strong> evaluationprocess is to be undertaken by a panelconstituted by <strong>the</strong> Minister in consultationwith <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Thepanel’s report, however, is submitted to<strong>the</strong> National Assembly for consideration.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes however, that <strong>the</strong>system is not yet operational. In <strong>the</strong> view<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, this is a matter for <strong>the</strong>Authority.ii. Section 5 provides that <strong>the</strong> Minister, onapproval by <strong>the</strong> National Assembly,appoints <strong>the</strong> Councillors. The appointment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Councillors by <strong>the</strong> Minister isdiscussed in greater detail later in this<strong>chapter</strong>.iii. Section 10 provides that <strong>the</strong> chairpersonand Councillors are paid such remunerationand allowances and receive suchbenefits as <strong>the</strong> Minister may determinewith <strong>the</strong> concurrence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong>Finance.iv. In terms <strong>of</strong> section 14A(2), <strong>the</strong> Authoritymay appoint experts to assist it in performingits functions. However, where<strong>the</strong> expert is not a citizen or permanentresident, <strong>the</strong> Authority must seek <strong>the</strong>Minister’s approval before appointingsuch expert.v. Section 15 states that, in addition tomonies appropriated from Parliament,<strong>the</strong> Authority may also receive moneydetermined in any o<strong>the</strong>r manner as maybe agreed between <strong>the</strong> Minister and <strong>the</strong>Minister <strong>of</strong> Finance and approved byCabinet. The Authority has made proposalson <strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> self-funding. These arediscussed in greater detail later in this<strong>chapter</strong>.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong> powersthat <strong>the</strong> legislation gives to <strong>the</strong> Minister,as set out above, may negatively affect <strong>the</strong>independence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Authority from <strong>the</strong>Executive and should, <strong>the</strong>refore, be revised.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> is convinced <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> necessityfor <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> an independent regulatorfor both <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> free speechand <strong>the</strong> economic development <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sector.In particular, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> highlights<strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> an independent regulatorfor broadcasting as a key construct <strong>of</strong>democracy. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, markets where194 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13monopolies or, as is <strong>the</strong> case in South Africa,duopolies continue to exist require that <strong>the</strong>regulator be vigilant in monitoring <strong>the</strong>behaviour <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> incumbent(s) with regardto possible overcharging and denial <strong>of</strong> fairaccess to rivals. In South Africa, despitesome liberalisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> telecommunicationsmarket, <strong>the</strong> state has retained significantshareholdings in <strong>the</strong> communicationssector.h) In its supplementary submission to <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong>, <strong>the</strong> Authority points to <strong>the</strong>necessity for competition within <strong>the</strong> communicationssector. A competitive communicationsenvironment is regarded as being afundamental enabler <strong>of</strong> economic growth inboth emerging and developed markets. Theliberalisation <strong>of</strong> our communications sector,which is accompanied by a rapidly increasingrange <strong>of</strong> services and stakeholders,requires a sophisticated and independentregulator to ensure maximum benefits toour society.3.2. UNDERSTANDING ANDINTERPRETATION OF MANDATEa) As discussed above, in terms <strong>of</strong> its constitutionaland legal mandate, <strong>the</strong> Authority’sobjects are to regulate broadcasting in <strong>the</strong>public interest and to ensure fairness and adiversity <strong>of</strong> views broadly representingSouth African society, as required by section192 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, as well as <strong>the</strong> regulation<strong>of</strong> electronic communications, whichhas now overtaken broadcasting andtelecommunications, and postal matters.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Authority’smandate is extremely broad. The <strong>Committee</strong>understands that <strong>the</strong> increased scope <strong>of</strong>responsibilities that accompany <strong>the</strong> passing<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electronic Communications Act willhave implications for <strong>the</strong> Authority’s organisationalstructure and processes, as well asits workload.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds <strong>the</strong> Authority’s understanding<strong>of</strong> its functions adequate.i. It was put to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> that <strong>the</strong> currenthigh prices within <strong>the</strong> telecommunicationssector are indicative <strong>of</strong> systemicproblems relating to a lack <strong>of</strong> competition.57This is a serious concern as itspeaks to <strong>the</strong> Authority’s core mandate,which is to regulate <strong>the</strong> communicationssector in <strong>the</strong> public interest and to ensurefair and diverse access to, and provision<strong>of</strong>, services. High prices prevent access toa wide range <strong>of</strong> services, effectively barring,or creating unequal opportunitiesfor, access to <strong>the</strong> knowledge economythat underpins modern life.ii. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Authorityis unique amongst <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 andassociated institutions as it is <strong>the</strong> onlyone that issues licenses. The <strong>Committee</strong>considers this to be a critical function, asit has great potential for corruption.3.3. APPOINTMENTSa) In terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa Act, asamended, <strong>the</strong> Minister appoints <strong>the</strong>Chairperson and eight Councillors upon <strong>the</strong>approval <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Theappointment process must encompass <strong>the</strong>following principles: public participation in<strong>the</strong> nomination process; transparency andopenness; and <strong>the</strong> publication <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shortlistfor comment. The procedure for <strong>the</strong>appointment <strong>of</strong> Councillors is as follows:57 Gillwald, A. <strong>2007</strong>.THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA195


i. The National Assembly must submit a listto <strong>the</strong> Minister that is one –and-a-halftimes as long as <strong>the</strong> required number <strong>of</strong>appointees. Technical and sectoralexperts may assist <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyin <strong>the</strong> selection, evaluation and appointmentprocesses.ii. The Minister must <strong>the</strong>n recommend to<strong>the</strong> National Assembly <strong>the</strong> persons he orshe proposes to appoint from <strong>the</strong> list submitted.The National Assembly mayrequest that <strong>the</strong> Minister reconsider if it isnot satisfied with <strong>the</strong> Minister’s selection<strong>of</strong> appointees measured against <strong>the</strong>qualifications listed in <strong>the</strong> amended legislation.The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that,beyond requiring that <strong>the</strong> Minister reconsiderhis or her selection <strong>of</strong> appointees,<strong>the</strong> legislation is silent as to what shouldhappen if <strong>the</strong> Minister and <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly disagree on <strong>the</strong> Minister’sselection <strong>of</strong> appointees.b) In order to be considered as suitable candidatesfor appointment, Councillors must bepersons who are committed to fairness,freedom <strong>of</strong> expression, openness andaccountability and when viewed collectivelyare representative <strong>of</strong> a broad section <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>population. Councillors must possess suitablequalifications, expertise and experiencein a very wide range <strong>of</strong> fields that include,among o<strong>the</strong>rs, broadcasting, electronic communications,postal policy or operations,public policy development, electronic engineering,law, marketing, journalism, entertainment,education, economics, finance orany o<strong>the</strong>r relevant expertise or qualifications.c) The Chairperson is appointed for a renewableperiod <strong>of</strong> five years. O<strong>the</strong>r Councillorsare appointed for a term <strong>of</strong> four years,renewable for a fur<strong>the</strong>r term. TheChairperson and all Councillors are appointedon a full-time basis, to <strong>the</strong> exclusion <strong>of</strong>any o<strong>the</strong>r remunerative employment, occupationor <strong>of</strong>fice.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> learnt that highly paid, personaltechnical advisers assist eachCouncillor. This is <strong>the</strong> only institution underreview that has such an arrangement. The<strong>Committee</strong> finds <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>setechnical advisers both unusual and costly.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> recent decision toincrease <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> Councillors to nine.This is not only in contrast to <strong>the</strong> internationaltrend to reduce <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> regulatory bodiesas <strong>the</strong> sector matures, but is also costly,and inhibits ra<strong>the</strong>r than enhances speedydecision-making. The <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong> Authority had previouslymade submissions requesting that <strong>the</strong> number<strong>of</strong> Councillors be reduced but its proposalswere not accepted by Parliament at <strong>the</strong>time. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> understandsthat <strong>the</strong>re is a division <strong>of</strong> functions betweenCouncillors and that, <strong>the</strong>refore, a degree <strong>of</strong>expertise is required. The <strong>Committee</strong> isunable to decide in this very technical areawhe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>re should be five, seven or eveneleven Councillors. While <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Authority is important, it seems that <strong>the</strong>nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Authority will determine itscomposition, and that any changes must beaccompanied by greater consultation.f) The <strong>Committee</strong> highlights that until now<strong>the</strong>re has not been a systematic study <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>various, and vastly divergent, appointmentprocedures that are applicable to <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutions. Theappointment <strong>of</strong> Councillors to <strong>the</strong> Authority’s196 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13Council illustrates once more <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> uniformityand consistency when selecting andappointing <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers. While <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> acknowledges that a “one sizefits all” approach is inappropriate, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> notes that, apart from <strong>the</strong> PanAfrican Language Board, this is <strong>the</strong> onlyinstitution under review in respect <strong>of</strong> which<strong>the</strong> Minister and not <strong>the</strong> President appoints<strong>of</strong>fice-bearers. The <strong>Committee</strong> is dissatisfiedwith <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister’s involvementin <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> Councillors asthis may create a perception that <strong>the</strong>Authority is not an independent institution.3.4. PUBLIC AWARENESSa) As part <strong>of</strong> its functions as regulator <strong>the</strong>Authority must interact with <strong>the</strong> public invarious ways, including conducting publichearings on licensing, regulation and policymatters. The Authority also uses mediareleases and interviews, <strong>the</strong> website andcorporate brochures as <strong>the</strong> main forms <strong>of</strong>communication to inform <strong>the</strong> public <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Authority’s regulatory activities. TheAuthority receives public enquiries throughan e-mail system. The <strong>Committee</strong> commends<strong>the</strong> Authority on its public participationefforts but highlights <strong>the</strong> need for a systematicand coherent public awareness programmeand communications policy andstrategy, especially in relation to consumercomplaints against operators.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a formalmechanism to deal with complaints by<strong>the</strong> public regarding <strong>the</strong> Authority’s work or<strong>the</strong> failure to attend to issues. This is unacceptable.The Authority does have a policythat, where a complainant has exhausted<strong>the</strong> avenues <strong>of</strong> complaint within <strong>the</strong>Authority, he or she will be directed to <strong>the</strong>Public Protector.3.5. RELATIONSHIP WITH PARLIAMENTa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Authority isaccountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly andappears before <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onCommunications on average twice a year.The Independent Communications Authority<strong>of</strong> South Africa Act, as amended, requiresthat <strong>the</strong> Authority present <strong>the</strong> Minister withits annual report, which is <strong>the</strong>n tabled inParliament. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> viewthat this can create <strong>the</strong> perception that <strong>the</strong>Authority lacks independence, <strong>the</strong>rebyundermining its credibility.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> feels that <strong>the</strong>re is need forstronger and more effective interactionbetween <strong>the</strong> Authority and <strong>the</strong> portfoliocommittee. In this regard, attention is drawnto <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>’s recommendations tostreng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> portfolio committeeswhen exercising oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review.c) More specifically concerning oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Authority, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that<strong>the</strong> issue <strong>of</strong> technical expertise for membership<strong>of</strong> a parliamentary committee <strong>of</strong> thisnature has not received sufficient attention.If robust interaction is to occur between <strong>the</strong>portfolio committee and <strong>the</strong> Authority,members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> portfolio committee mustpossess a certain degree <strong>of</strong> technical competencein, or knowledge <strong>of</strong>, <strong>the</strong> field. Thisis <strong>of</strong> particular importance in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>portfolio committee’s role in <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> Councillors and <strong>the</strong> assessment <strong>of</strong>performance.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> provision thatpermits <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> a panel <strong>of</strong> technicaland sectoral experts to assist <strong>the</strong> portfoliocommittee in <strong>the</strong> appointments process is notmandatory, and, in fact, this provision was notTHE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA197


made use <strong>of</strong> in <strong>the</strong> first cycle <strong>of</strong> appointmentsunder <strong>the</strong> amended legislation.3.6. RELATIONSHIP WITH CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSa) The Authority contended that any overlapbetween it and <strong>the</strong> institutions under reviewis <strong>of</strong> a general nature ins<strong>of</strong>ar as <strong>the</strong>Authority’s work is aimed at promotingdemocracy and ensuring freedom <strong>of</strong> expression.b) As is <strong>the</strong> general case for all <strong>the</strong> institutionsunder review, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> finds that<strong>the</strong>re is no formal collaborative relationshipbetween <strong>the</strong> Authority and any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 or associated institutions. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes specific recommendationsfor <strong>the</strong> collaboration and co-operation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions under review.3.7. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EXECUTIVEa) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that in its submission<strong>the</strong> Authority stated that it maintains a cooperativeand effective relationship with <strong>the</strong>Minister <strong>of</strong> Communications on all matterspertaining to policy and implementation. Asystem <strong>of</strong> minuted, bilateral meetingsensures overall co-ordination between policyand implementation activities <strong>of</strong> both.b) Although <strong>the</strong> Authority is constitutionallyand legally independent, it described itselfas being “connected” to <strong>the</strong> executive arm<strong>of</strong> government through <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong>Communications. The Ministry plays a supportiverole on matters <strong>of</strong> policy, strategicalignment, and budgeting. As previouslymentioned, <strong>the</strong> Authority also submits itsannual report to Parliament via <strong>the</strong> Minister<strong>of</strong> Communications.3.8. INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCEARRANGEMENTSa) The <strong>Committee</strong> accepts that a lack <strong>of</strong> capacity,experience, resources and understanding<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sector has contributed to <strong>the</strong>Authority’s difficulties. 58The <strong>Committee</strong> haslearnt that <strong>the</strong> Authority has had to resort to<strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> consultants to compensate for <strong>the</strong>shortage <strong>of</strong> skills available to it. Unfortunately<strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> consultants <strong>of</strong>ten fails totake into account <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SouthAfrican market and <strong>the</strong> social needs <strong>of</strong> adeveloping nation, and has failed to transfer<strong>the</strong> skills necessary for implementation.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that <strong>the</strong> difficultiesexperienced by <strong>the</strong> Authority with <strong>the</strong>recruitment and retention <strong>of</strong> staff is a matterfor serious concern. The <strong>Committee</strong> acceptsthat <strong>the</strong> Authority’s inability to pay marketrelatedsalaries is a contributory factor, particularlyin an industry that <strong>of</strong>fers lucrativeand competitive packages. In this regard, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> highlights <strong>the</strong> need for a staffrecruitment and retention strategy.c) The <strong>Committee</strong> received a submission thatperceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Authority’s lack <strong>of</strong> independenceand inability to regulate effectivelyundermine its credibility. In a self-perpetuatingcycle, such perceptions dissuadethose who have expertise and politicalweight from availing <strong>the</strong>mselves forappointment to <strong>the</strong> Authority or its secretariat,compounding <strong>the</strong> capacity constraints<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Authority.d) The <strong>Committee</strong> understands that <strong>the</strong>Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong>South Africa Act, as amended, requires thata substantial number <strong>of</strong> regulations be drafted(one submission put <strong>the</strong> figure at no less58 Gillwald, A. Submission on <strong>the</strong> Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa (ICASA), <strong>2007</strong>. p 9198 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13than 200 regulations), ei<strong>the</strong>r in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong>entirely new regulations, or existing regulationsthat must be reformulated to meet <strong>the</strong>requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electronic CommunicationsAct. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>learnt that <strong>the</strong> Authority has been handedadditional responsibilities (for example, it isnow <strong>the</strong> regulator for postal services) but<strong>the</strong>se have not been accompanied by additionalbudget allocations, which is placing<strong>the</strong> already under-resourced Authority underincreased financial strain.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> finds that internal conflictand tensions have undermined <strong>the</strong>Authority’s operational effectiveness andefficiency. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong> eventssurrounding <strong>the</strong> suspension <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Authority’s Chief Executive Officer in January2006 that left <strong>the</strong> Authority without a ChiefExecutive Officer for approximately eightmonths. The <strong>Committee</strong> finds this to be anextraordinary way <strong>of</strong> operating, especiallysince <strong>the</strong> Chief Executive Officer subsequentlyresigned without any disciplinaryprocedures being conducted.f) The Authority states that <strong>the</strong> remunerationthat Councillors receive is not competitive.In this regard, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notes <strong>the</strong>wide discrepancies that exist between <strong>the</strong>various institutions regarding <strong>the</strong> determination<strong>of</strong> remuneration, benefits and conditions<strong>of</strong> service for <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.g) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Authority hasadopted a code <strong>of</strong> conduct that sets out <strong>the</strong>standards to promote and ensure <strong>the</strong>integrity and good conduct <strong>of</strong> itsChairperson, Councillors and Chief ExecutiveOfficer. In addition, <strong>the</strong> Chairperson,Councillors and Chief Executive Officer arerequired to declare all financial interests.These are recorded in a register, which haspublic and confidential sections. Section 12<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South Africa Act, as amended,also prohibits Councillors from participatingin meetings or hearings in which <strong>the</strong>y havean interest. General recommendations aremade in this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.h) The <strong>Committee</strong> has learnt that <strong>the</strong>re is agreat deal <strong>of</strong> litigation that involves <strong>the</strong>Authority. This is cumbersome, costly andtime-consuming. The <strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>view that while this is not unusual in <strong>the</strong>communications industry internationally,mechanisms should be established to avertlitigation through arbitration, for example.3.<strong>9.</strong> FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTSa) <strong>Ad</strong>equate funding is a prerequisite for aneffective and independent regulatoryagency. From <strong>the</strong> evidence received, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> is <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> view that <strong>the</strong>Authority’s budget is inadequate for <strong>the</strong> efficientand effective performance <strong>of</strong> its operations,particularly in light <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> many additionalresponsibilities that accompany <strong>the</strong>enactment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Electronic CommunicationsAct.b) The Authority’s transformation from anorganisation that is technology- and servicebasedto one that is focused on convergencerequires substantial funding. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>needs that have been identified include acomplete redesign <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existing regulations,as well as <strong>the</strong> re-organisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Authority’s internal structuring involving,THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA199


d) At present all revenues from licence feesamongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, a skills audit for <strong>the</strong> entire2009/10 59 mentary submission on its proposal to develstaff,developing a comprehensive humanresources database, consolidating enforcement-monitoringcollected by <strong>the</strong> Authority are transferred to<strong>the</strong> National Revenue Fund. These are con-functions, and robust staff siderable amounts: In 2005/06 <strong>the</strong>training on <strong>the</strong> implications <strong>of</strong> convergence.This transformation process may also requireAuthority collected R1 486 million; while in2004/05 it collected R1 256 million.additional external expertise and support.e) The <strong>Committee</strong> investigated <strong>the</strong> possibilityc) The <strong>Committee</strong> heard that <strong>the</strong> Authority’ssources <strong>of</strong> income are <strong>the</strong> funds allocated toit by Parliament and interest earned on cashbalances. The Authority’s budget allocationtakes <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> direct transfers from <strong>the</strong>Department <strong>of</strong> Communications. There aresubstantial increases in <strong>the</strong> allocations interms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Medium Term ExpenditureFramework. However, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> notesthat in years past <strong>the</strong> Authority’s operatingexpenses generally exceeded its incomefrom government appropriations. Therefore,with <strong>the</strong> exception <strong>of</strong> 2003/04, <strong>the</strong>Authority has shown a deficit in each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>financial years under consideration, as isdemonstrated in <strong>the</strong> Table below.Table 1: Income and Expenditure: 2003/04 –<strong>of</strong> alternative funding models, including <strong>the</strong>sourcing <strong>of</strong> funds over and above <strong>the</strong> parliamentaryallocation. The <strong>Committee</strong> learntthat <strong>the</strong> Authority is developing a self-fundingmodel that is based on <strong>the</strong> concept thata percentage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> licence fee revenue collectedbe retained to fund <strong>the</strong> Authority’soperations, <strong>the</strong>reby eliminating its relianceon government funding. Initially, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> rejected this proposal, beingpersuaded, amongst o<strong>the</strong>rs, by <strong>the</strong> fact that<strong>the</strong>re are too many uncertainties (<strong>the</strong>amounts collected may vary from one yearto <strong>the</strong> next), and <strong>the</strong> potential that this maywell result in <strong>the</strong> inflation <strong>of</strong> licensing feescreating additional barriers to market entry.f) The Authority subsequently made a supple-R ‘000 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 <strong>2007</strong>/08 2008/09 2009/10Grantavailable 123 954 128 633 150 489 199 738 222 475 242 272 263 607Expenditure 116 949 153 262 178 605Surplus/(Deficit) 7 005 (24 628) (11 382)59 National Treasury (<strong>2007</strong>), Estimates <strong>of</strong> National Expenditure and <strong>the</strong> Authorities submission to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>200 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13op a self-funding model in terms <strong>of</strong> which<strong>the</strong> Authority would fund its operations byretaining a percentage <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> licence fee revenuethat it collects, <strong>the</strong>reby eliminating itsreliance on government funding.g) As noted previously, <strong>the</strong> Authority collectsapproximately R1 billion in fees from industryplayers, transferring all collected fees to<strong>the</strong> National Revenue Fund. The current feestructure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African communicationssector varies according to <strong>the</strong> technologiesand services <strong>of</strong>fered, and are a combination<strong>of</strong> regulatory fees and additional feesbased on market activity. The Authority’sfunding proposal identifies four potentialfunding models for national regulators, all <strong>of</strong>which have certain advantages and disadvantages:i. The first option is that <strong>of</strong> governmentgrants. This is <strong>the</strong> present budgetaryarrangement and has <strong>the</strong> advantage <strong>of</strong>providing <strong>the</strong> most predictable cash flowsolution. However, this option does notallow for financial flexibility in an environmentthat is characterised by rapidchange, and <strong>the</strong>re is also <strong>the</strong> danger that<strong>the</strong> amount allocated may be insufficient.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong>re is significantrisk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> regulator becoming embroiledin political debate, which could prevent itfrom pursuing its independent mandate,<strong>the</strong>reby undermining its credibility andlegitimacy.ii. The second option is that <strong>of</strong> regulatoryfees. The funding <strong>of</strong> regulators entirelyfrom regulatory fees would dissolve <strong>the</strong>tension between market developmentsand political interests. Potential disadvantagesare <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> high fluctuationsin cash flow and <strong>the</strong> erection <strong>of</strong>barriers to market entry due to excessivefees. Both <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se disadvantages can beaddressed by legislation.iii. A third option is funding from marketactivities. While this option is <strong>the</strong> mostmarket-friendly and <strong>the</strong> regulator itselfhas a vested interest in maintaining aprosperous sector, <strong>the</strong> major disadvantage<strong>of</strong> this option is difficulties <strong>of</strong> implementingwhile respecting some basicprinciples <strong>of</strong> regulation so that only revenuesfrom regulated activities are subjectto regulatory charges.iv. A hybrid model incorporates a number <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se models.h) The Authority identified six criteria which itbelieves require consideration in order toassess whe<strong>the</strong>r a funding option will provideit with sufficient resources in <strong>the</strong> longterm, namely political independence, financialflexibility, income stability, ease <strong>of</strong>implementation, incentives towards promarketregulation and credibility amongmarket players. Taking all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se intoaccount, <strong>the</strong> Authority concludes that it willclearly benefit from a government-independenthybrid model <strong>of</strong> regulatory andmarket-activity-based fees.i) Such a model would not only significantlyenhance <strong>the</strong> Authority’s credibility within<strong>the</strong> sector, but it should also comfortablyprovide sufficient funding <strong>of</strong> its activities.Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, <strong>the</strong> model would be easy toimplement as <strong>the</strong> existing fee collection systemcould stay in place unaltered. The onlychange would be that <strong>the</strong> Authority wouldretain a portion <strong>of</strong> collected fees while continuingto transfer <strong>the</strong> remaining funds to<strong>the</strong> National Revenue Fund. There wouldTHE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA201


also be a savings on administrative costsassociated with <strong>the</strong> government grants.j) The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that <strong>the</strong> Authority statedthat it would need to retain approximately30% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fees collected to replace <strong>the</strong>present direct government funding. TheAuthority did warn, however, that sufficientfunding through a percentage <strong>of</strong> collectedfees could only be ensured if <strong>the</strong> overall feecollection base does not change significantly.k) A concern that is frequently raised is <strong>the</strong>accumulation <strong>of</strong> excess funds. Severaloptions are available to address this concern.l) The <strong>Committee</strong> is persuaded by <strong>the</strong>Authority’s submission on alternative fundingmodels and recommends that it be permittedto retain a portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> revenue itcollects, <strong>the</strong> precise details <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fundingmodel to be determined after fur<strong>the</strong>r consultationwith <strong>the</strong> relevant stakeholders.4. General conclusionsa) The Authority is a very important body toSouth Africa. The <strong>Committee</strong> finds <strong>the</strong> existence<strong>of</strong> an independent regulator necessaryfor <strong>the</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> free speech, as well as<strong>the</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> a stable industrial and investmentenvironment for <strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong>this strategic sector in <strong>the</strong> information age. 60However, <strong>the</strong> perception that <strong>the</strong> Authoritylacks independence is potentially undermining<strong>of</strong> its credibility and, <strong>the</strong>refore, its legitimacy.This is undesirable.b) The <strong>Committee</strong> considers <strong>the</strong> presentappointment procedures for Councillors tobe inappropriate. General recommendationsare made to enhance consistency, coherenceand accountability in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport, while specific recommendations areincluded below.c) The efficiency and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutioncould be enhanced if certain institutionalarrangements were addressed. Theseare elaborated in <strong>the</strong> recommendationsbelow.d) The parliamentary mechanisms for oversight<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Authority’s work are inadequate. Inaddition to recommendations that arespecifically applicable to <strong>the</strong> Authority, <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> makes general recommendationsin Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report for <strong>the</strong>improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oversight and accountabilitymechanisms that would apply to all<strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated institutionsunder review.e) The budget process and funding model <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Authority adversely affects its accountabilityand independence. The <strong>Committee</strong>makes general recommendations in Chapter2 <strong>of</strong> this report for <strong>the</strong> improvement <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>budget process that would apply to all <strong>the</strong>Chapter 9 and associated institutionsreviewed. In addition, specific recommendationsare made concerning <strong>the</strong> Authority’sfunding below.5. RecommendationsThe <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that -a) The appointment procedures for Councillorsbe reviewed to support and assert <strong>the</strong>60 Gillwald, A. <strong>2007</strong>. p 3202 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


CHAPTER 13Authority’s independence fur<strong>the</strong>r. The<strong>Committee</strong> makes general proposals in thisregard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report. Morespecifically regarding appointments to <strong>the</strong>Authority, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> recommends that<strong>the</strong> legislation be amended as follows:i. The President, on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly, should appoint<strong>the</strong> Councillors.ii. Regarding qualifications <strong>of</strong> Councillors forappointment, at least a third <strong>of</strong> thoseappointed should have technical expertise.This will obviate <strong>the</strong> need for technicaladvisers.iii. The provision relating to <strong>the</strong> performancemanagement system should be revisedto remove <strong>the</strong> role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Minister in thisregard.b) The Authority’s funding model should berevised on <strong>the</strong> basis as indicated in paragraph3.9(h) above in order to support andenhance its independence and effectiveness.c) The legislative framework envisaged interms <strong>of</strong> section 219(5) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitutionto determine <strong>the</strong> salaries, allowances andbenefits <strong>of</strong> judges, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector, <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General, and members <strong>of</strong> any commissionprovided for in <strong>the</strong> Constitutionshould be developed. The <strong>Committee</strong> makesproposals in this regard in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.mechanisms, staff attraction and retentionstrategies and <strong>the</strong> Authority’s governancemodel should be addressed to improve itsefficiency and effectiveness.e) The directorships, partnerships and consultancies<strong>of</strong> Councillors and senior <strong>of</strong>ficialsshould be disclosed in <strong>the</strong> annual report. Inaddition, <strong>the</strong> disclosures <strong>of</strong> pecuniary ando<strong>the</strong>r interests <strong>of</strong> Councillors and staff membersshould be kept available in a registerand an indication should be given in <strong>the</strong>annual report <strong>of</strong> where such information isavailable. General recommendations in thisregard are made in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.f) Collaborative relations with relevant Chapter9 and related constitutional bodies shouldbe established. The <strong>Committee</strong> makes generalrecommendations in this regard inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report.g) Mechanisms to improve <strong>the</strong> relationship andinteraction between Parliament and <strong>the</strong>Authority should be determined.Consideration should be given to ensuringthat members appointed to <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Communications have <strong>the</strong>relevant technical competence in <strong>the</strong> field.General recommendations are made inChapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report to streng<strong>the</strong>n portfoliocommittees in exercising oversight <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions under review. The role <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>proposed unit in <strong>the</strong> Office <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Speakerdiscussed in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> this report shouldalso be considered in this regard.d) Certain institutional governance matters,such as a conflict-resolution policy andTHE INDEPENDENT COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA203


CHAPTER 14


CHAPTER 14CHAPTER 14CONCLUSIONThe <strong>Committee</strong>, having conducted this firstreview, believes that it is correct to protect<strong>the</strong>se bodies through our Constitution as wasdone in 1993 and 1996 because this insulates<strong>the</strong>m from pressure, cajolement or undue influence.The <strong>Committee</strong> considers this review to be ahistoric task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly. Itreflects on <strong>the</strong> strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> democratic orderthat <strong>the</strong> National Assembly considered it appropriateto undertake this assessment <strong>of</strong> whatthis report already describes as uniquely positionedbodies, which are not paralleled anywhereelse in <strong>the</strong> world.The <strong>Committee</strong> is satisfied that, broadly speaking,<strong>the</strong> bodies have come up to <strong>the</strong> expectationslaid down in <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> reference issuedby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.Whe<strong>the</strong>r all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodies should be includedin Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution is a matter <strong>the</strong><strong>Committee</strong> has given thought to. These bodieswere set up when democrats felt that <strong>the</strong>reshould be special bodies to protect rights. Theexistence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodies was conditioned bytime and context. Since <strong>the</strong>n that context haschanged. Democracy in our country now hasfirmer roots than in 1994 and <strong>the</strong> instruments<strong>of</strong> governance enthusiastically subscribe to <strong>the</strong>Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights.The <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>the</strong>refore addressed this issue,but did so specifically in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong>streng<strong>the</strong>ning <strong>the</strong> authority and functioning <strong>of</strong>what we call, broadly, Chapter 9 institutionswithin <strong>the</strong> paradigm <strong>of</strong> an entrenched culture<strong>of</strong> human rights. All <strong>the</strong> matters raised in thisreport and <strong>the</strong> recommendations put before<strong>the</strong> National Assembly should be considered inthis context. It is very important that <strong>the</strong>National Assembly gives serious considerationto <strong>the</strong> recommendations so that <strong>the</strong> work <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong>se institutions is streng<strong>the</strong>ned and <strong>the</strong>defects removed.The <strong>Committee</strong> reiterates that it is vital toensure <strong>the</strong> distinctiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> bodies as indicatedin <strong>the</strong> report and <strong>the</strong>ir independent status,but in <strong>the</strong> area <strong>of</strong> human rights to give credenceto interrelatedness. The <strong>Committee</strong><strong>the</strong>refore proposes a cohesive, strong and comprehensiveumbrella human rights body. TheNational Assembly and <strong>the</strong> Executive shouldgive priority to this central recommendation.AcknowledgementsThe <strong>Committee</strong> could not have completed itswork without <strong>the</strong> active participation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions <strong>the</strong>mselves, civil society and individuals.The <strong>Committee</strong> could not respond toall <strong>the</strong> individual submissions, as some werepersonal grievances to be dealt with elsewhere.Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> have worked ono<strong>the</strong>r committees <strong>of</strong> a similar nature and wouldlike specifically to mention <strong>the</strong> exceptionalservice rendered by <strong>the</strong> support staff assignedto this <strong>Committee</strong>. In particular, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>is grateful to <strong>the</strong> most senior member <strong>of</strong> staffassigned to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong>, Dr. Gabriel, <strong>the</strong>researcher, Ms. Silkstone, <strong>the</strong> secretary, Mr.Philander, and Mr Molukanele <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly Table.The <strong>Committee</strong> issues a special word <strong>of</strong> thanksto Pr<strong>of</strong> De Vos for assistance in drafting <strong>the</strong>report and <strong>the</strong> former Secretary to <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly, Mr Hahndiek, for assisting with editingand advice at <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reportingprocess.CONCLUSION205


ANNEXURE 1SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996


ANNEXURE 1Chapter 1 Founding Principles6. LANGUAGES1. The <strong>of</strong>ficial languages <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic areSepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati,Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English,isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.2. Recognising <strong>the</strong> historically diminished useand status <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> indigenous languages <strong>of</strong>our people, <strong>the</strong> state must take practical andpositive measures to elevate <strong>the</strong> status andadvance <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se languages.3 (a) The national government and provincialgovernments may use any particular <strong>of</strong>ficiallanguages for <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> government,taking into account usage, practicality,expense, regional circumstancesand <strong>the</strong> balance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> needs and preferences<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population as a whole or in<strong>the</strong> province concerned; but <strong>the</strong> nationalgovernment and each provincial governmentmust use at least two <strong>of</strong>ficial languages.(b) Municipalities must take into account <strong>the</strong>language usage and preferences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>irresidents.4. The national government and provincialgovernments, by legislative and o<strong>the</strong>rmeasures, must regulate and monitor <strong>the</strong>iruse <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial languages. Without detractingfrom <strong>the</strong> provisions <strong>of</strong> subsection (2), all<strong>of</strong>ficial languages must enjoy parity <strong>of</strong>esteem and must be treated equitably.5. A Pan South African Language Board establishedby national legislation musta)promote, and create conditions for, <strong>the</strong>development and use <strong>of</strong>i.all <strong>of</strong>ficial languages;ii. <strong>the</strong> Khoi, Nama and San languages;andiii. sign language; andb) promote and ensure respect fori.all languages commonly used bycommunities in South Africa, includingGerman, Greek, Gujarati, Hindi,Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu; andii. Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit and o<strong>the</strong>rlanguages used for religious purposesin South Africa.Chapter 2 Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights38. ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTSAnyone listed in this section has <strong>the</strong> right toapproach a competent court, alleging that aright in <strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights has been infringed orthreatened, and <strong>the</strong> court may grant appropriaterelief, including a declaration <strong>of</strong> rights. Thepersons who may approach a court area)anyone acting in <strong>the</strong>ir own interest;b) anyone acting on behalf <strong>of</strong> ano<strong>the</strong>r personwho cannot act in <strong>the</strong>ir own name;c) anyone acting as a member <strong>of</strong>, or in <strong>the</strong>interest <strong>of</strong>, a group or class <strong>of</strong> persons;d) anyone acting in <strong>the</strong> public interest; ande) an association acting in <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> itsmembers.Chapter 3 Co-operativeGovernment41. PRINCIPLES OF CO-OPERATIVEGOVERNMENT AND INTERGOVERN-MENTAL RELATIONS1. All spheres <strong>of</strong> government and all organs <strong>of</strong>state within each sphere musta)preserve <strong>the</strong> peace, national unity and<strong>the</strong> indivisibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic;b) secure <strong>the</strong> well-being <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> people <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Republic;c) provide effective, transparent, accountableand coherent government for <strong>the</strong>Republic as a whole;d) be loyal to <strong>the</strong> Constitution, <strong>the</strong> Republicand its people;e) respect <strong>the</strong> constitutional status, institu-SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996207


tions, powers and functions <strong>of</strong> governmentin <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r spheres;f) not assume any power or function exceptthose conferred on <strong>the</strong>m in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution;g) exercise <strong>the</strong>ir powers and perform <strong>the</strong>irfunctions in a manner that does notencroach on <strong>the</strong> geographical, functionalor institutional integrity <strong>of</strong> government inano<strong>the</strong>r sphere; andh) co-operate with one ano<strong>the</strong>r in mutualtrust and good faith byi.fostering friendly relations;ii. assisting and supporting one ano<strong>the</strong>r;iii. informing one ano<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong>, and consultingone ano<strong>the</strong>r on, matters <strong>of</strong> commoninterest;iv. co-ordinating <strong>the</strong>ir actions and legislationwith one ano<strong>the</strong>r;v. adhering to agreed procedures; andvi. avoiding legal proceedings againstone ano<strong>the</strong>r.2. An Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament musta)establish or provide for structures andinstitutions to promote and facilitateintergovernmental relations; andb) provide for appropriate mechanisms andprocedures to facilitate settlement <strong>of</strong>intergovernmental disputes.3. An organ <strong>of</strong> state involved in an intergovernmentaldispute must make every reasonableeffort to settle <strong>the</strong> dispute by means <strong>of</strong>mechanisms and procedures provided forthat purpose, and must exhaust all o<strong>the</strong>rremedies before it approaches a court toresolve <strong>the</strong> dispute.4. If a court is not satisfied that <strong>the</strong> requirements<strong>of</strong> subsection (3) have been met, itmay refer a dispute back to <strong>the</strong> organs <strong>of</strong>state involved.Chapter 9 State InstitutionsSupporting ConstitutionalDemocracy181. ESTABLISHMENT AND GOVERNINGPRINCIPLES1. The following state institutions streng<strong>the</strong>nconstitutional democracy in <strong>the</strong> Republic:a) The Public Protector.b) The South African Human RightsCommission.c) The Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural,Religious and Linguistic Communities.d) The Commission for Gender Equality.e) The Auditor-General.f) The Electoral Commission.2. These institutions are independent, and subjectonly to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law, and<strong>the</strong>y must be impartial and must exercise<strong>the</strong>ir powers and perform <strong>the</strong>ir functionswithout fear, favour or prejudice.3. O<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state, through legislative ando<strong>the</strong>r measures, must assist and protect<strong>the</strong>se institutions to ensure <strong>the</strong> independence,impartiality, dignity and effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.4. No person or organ <strong>of</strong> state may interferewith <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.5. These institutions are accountable to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly, and must report on <strong>the</strong>iractivities and <strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir functionsto <strong>the</strong> Assembly at least once a year.Public Protector (ss 182-183)182. FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC PROTECTOR1. The Public Protector has <strong>the</strong> power, as regulatedby national legislationa)to investigate any conduct in state affairs,or in <strong>the</strong> public administration in anysphere <strong>of</strong> government, that is alleged orsuspected to be improper or to result inany impropriety or prejudice;208 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 1b) to report on that conduct; andc) to take appropriate remedial action.2. The Public Protector has <strong>the</strong> additional powersand functions prescribed by national legislation.3. The Public Protector may not investigatecourt decisions.4. The Public Protector must be accessible to allpersons and communities.5. An report issued by <strong>the</strong> Public Protectormust be open to <strong>the</strong> public unless exceptionalcircumstances, to be determined interms <strong>of</strong> national legislation, require that areport be kept confidential.183.TENUREThe Public Protector is appointed for a nonrenewableperiod <strong>of</strong> seven years.South African Human Rights Commission(s 184)184.FUNCTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICANHUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION1. The South African Human Rights Commissionmusta)promote respect for human rights and aculture <strong>of</strong> human rights;b) promote <strong>the</strong> protection, developmentand attainment <strong>of</strong> human rights; andc) monitor and assess <strong>the</strong> observance <strong>of</strong>human rights in <strong>the</strong> Republic.2. The South African Human Rights Commissionhas <strong>the</strong> powers, as regulated by nationallegislation, necessary to perform its functions,including <strong>the</strong> powera)to investigate and to report on <strong>the</strong> observance<strong>of</strong> human rights;b) to take steps to secure appropriateredress where human rights have beenviolated;c) to carry out research; andd) to educate.3. Each year, <strong>the</strong> South African Human RightsCommission must require relevant organs <strong>of</strong>state to provide <strong>the</strong> Commission with informationon <strong>the</strong> measures that <strong>the</strong>y havetaken towards <strong>the</strong> realisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights in<strong>the</strong> Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights concerning housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, educationand <strong>the</strong> environment.4. The South African Human Rights Commissionhas <strong>the</strong> additional powers and functions prescribedby national legislation.Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural,Religious and Linguistic Communities(ss 185-186)185.FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION1. The primary objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission for<strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights<strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities area)to promote respect for <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural,religious and linguistic communities;b) to promote and develop peace, friendship,humanity, tolerance and nationalunity among cultural, religious and linguisticcommunities, on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong>equality, non-discrimination and freeassociation; andc) to recommend <strong>the</strong> establishment orrecognition, in accordance with nationallegislation, <strong>of</strong> a cultural or o<strong>the</strong>r councilor councils for a community or communitiesin South Africa.2. The Commission has <strong>the</strong> power, as regulatedby national legislation, necessary to achieveits primary objects, including <strong>the</strong> power tomonitor, investigate, research, educate,lobby, advise and report on issues concerning<strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> cultural, religious and linguisticcommunities.3. The Commission may report any matterwhich falls within its powers and functionsSELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996209


to <strong>the</strong> South African Human Rights Commissionfor investigation.4. The Commission has <strong>the</strong> additional powers andfunctions prescribed by national legislation.186.COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION1. The number <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities and <strong>the</strong>ir appointment andterms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice must be prescribed bynational legislation.2. The composition <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission musta)be broadly representative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> maincultural, religious and linguistic communitiesin South Africa; andb) broadly reflect <strong>the</strong> gender composition <strong>of</strong>South Africa.Commission for Gender Equality (s 187)187.FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSION FORGENDER EQUALITY1. The Commission for Gender Equality mustpromote respect for gender equality and <strong>the</strong>protection, development and attainment <strong>of</strong>gender equality.2. The Commission for Gender Equality has <strong>the</strong>power, as regulated by national legislation,necessary to perform its functions, including<strong>the</strong> power to monitor, investigate, research,educate, lobby, advise and report on issuesconcerning gender equality.3. The Commission for Gender Equality has <strong>the</strong>additional powers and functions prescribedby national legislation.Auditor-General (ss 188-189)188.FUNCTIONS OF AUDITOR-GENERAL1. The Auditor-General must audit and report on<strong>the</strong> accounts, financial statements andfinancial management <strong>of</strong>a)all national and provincial state departmentsand administrations;b) all municipalities; andc) any o<strong>the</strong>r institution or accounting entityrequired by national or provincial legislationto be audited by <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General.2. In addition to <strong>the</strong> duties prescribed in subsection(1), and subject to any legislation,<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General may audit and report on<strong>the</strong> accounts, financial statements andfinancial management <strong>of</strong>a)any institution funded from <strong>the</strong> NationalRevenue Fund or a Provincial RevenueFund or by a municipality; orb) any institution that is authorised in terms<strong>of</strong> any law to receive money for a publicpurpose.3. The Auditor-General must submit auditreports to any legislature that has a directinterest in <strong>the</strong> audit, and to any o<strong>the</strong>rauthority prescribed by national legislation.All reports must be made public.4. The Auditor-General has <strong>the</strong> additional powersand functions prescribed by national legislation.18<strong>9.</strong>TENUREThe Auditor-General must be appointed for afixed, non-renewable term <strong>of</strong> between five andten years.Electoral Commission (ss 190-191)190. FUNCTIONS OF ELECTORALCOMMISSION1. The Electoral Commission musta)manage elections <strong>of</strong> national, provincialand municipal legislative bodies in accordancewith national legislation;b) ensure that those elections are free andfair; andc) declare <strong>the</strong> results <strong>of</strong> those electionswithin a period that must be prescribedby national legislation and that is as shortas reasonably possible.2. The Electoral Commission has <strong>the</strong> additionalpowers and functions prescribed by nationallegislation.210 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 1191.COMPOSITION OF ELECTORALCOMMISSIONThe Electoral Commission must be composed <strong>of</strong>at least three persons. The number <strong>of</strong> membersand <strong>the</strong>ir terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice must be prescribed bynational legislation.Independent Authority to RegulateBroadcasting (s 192)192.BROADCASTING AUTHORITYNational legislation must establish an independentauthority to regulate broadcasting in<strong>the</strong> public interest, and to ensure fairness and adiversity <strong>of</strong> views broadly representing SouthAfrican society.General Provisions (ss 193-194)193.APPOINTMENTS1. The Public Protector and <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong>any Commission established by this Chaptermust be women or men whoa)are South African citizens;b) are fit and proper persons to hold <strong>the</strong>particular <strong>of</strong>fice; andc) comply with any o<strong>the</strong>r requirements prescribedby national legislation.2. The need for a Commission established bythis Chapter to reflect broadly <strong>the</strong> race andgender composition <strong>of</strong> South Africa must beconsidered when members are appointed.3. The Auditor-General must be a woman or aman who is a South African citizen and a fitand proper person to hold that <strong>of</strong>fice.Specialised knowledge <strong>of</strong>, or experience in,auditing, state finances and public administrationmust be given due regard in appointing<strong>the</strong> Auditor-General.4. The President, on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly, must appoint <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General and <strong>the</strong>members <strong>of</strong>a)<strong>the</strong> South African Human RightsCommission;b) <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality; andc) <strong>the</strong> Electoral Commission.5. The National Assembly must recommendpersonsa)nominated by a committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Assembly proportionally composed <strong>of</strong>members <strong>of</strong> all parties represented in <strong>the</strong>Assembly; andb) approved by <strong>the</strong> Assembly by a resolutionadopted with a supporting votei.<strong>of</strong> at least 60 per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Assembly, if <strong>the</strong> recommendationconcerns <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Protector or <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General; orii. <strong>of</strong> a majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Assembly, if <strong>the</strong> recommendationconcerns <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> a member<strong>of</strong> a Commission.6. The involvement <strong>of</strong> civil society in <strong>the</strong> recommendationprocess may be provided foras envisaged in section 59 (1) (a).194.REMOVAL FROM OFFICE1. The Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General ora member <strong>of</strong> a Commission established bythis Chapter may be removed from <strong>of</strong>ficeonly ona)<strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> misconduct, incapacity orincompetence;b) a finding to that effect by a committee <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly; andc) <strong>the</strong> adoption by <strong>the</strong> Assembly <strong>of</strong> a resolutioncalling for that person’s removalfrom <strong>of</strong>fice2. A resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly concerning<strong>the</strong> removal from <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong>a)<strong>the</strong> Public Protector or <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General must be adopted with a supportingvote <strong>of</strong> at least two thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Assembly; orb) a member <strong>of</strong> a Commission must beadopted with a supporting vote <strong>of</strong> amajority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Assembly.SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996211


3. The Presidenta)may suspend a person from <strong>of</strong>fice at anytime after <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> proceedings <strong>of</strong>a committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyfor <strong>the</strong> removal <strong>of</strong> that person; andb) must remove a person from <strong>of</strong>fice uponadoption by <strong>the</strong> Assembly <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> resolutioncalling for that person’s removal.Chapter 10 Public <strong>Ad</strong>ministration195.BASIC VALUES AND PRINCIPLES GOV-ERNING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION1. Public administration must be governed by<strong>the</strong> democratic values and principlesenshrined in <strong>the</strong> Constitution, including <strong>the</strong>following principles:a) A high standard <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional ethicsmust be promoted and maintained.b) Efficient, economic and effective use <strong>of</strong>resources must be promoted.c) Public administration must be development-oriented.d) Services must be provided impartially,fairly, equitably and without bias.e) People’s needs must be responded to,and <strong>the</strong> public must be encouraged toparticipate in policy-making.f) Public administration must be accountable.g) Transparency must be fostered by providing<strong>the</strong> public with timely, accessible andaccurate information.h) Good human-resource management andcareer-development practices, to maximisehuman potential, must be cultivated.i) Public administration must be broadlyrepresentative <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African people,with employment and personnelmanagement practices based on ability,objectivity, fairness, and <strong>the</strong> need toredress <strong>the</strong> imbalances <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> past toachieve broad representation.2. The above principles apply to-a) administration in every sphere <strong>of</strong> government;b) organs <strong>of</strong> state; andc) public enterprises.3. National legislation must ensure <strong>the</strong> promotion<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> values and principles listed insubsection (1).4. The appointment in public administration <strong>of</strong>a number <strong>of</strong> persons on policy considerationsis not precluded, but national legislationmust regulate <strong>the</strong>se appointments in<strong>the</strong> public service.5. Legislation regulating public administrationmay differentiate between different sectors,administrations or institutions.6. The nature and functions <strong>of</strong> different sectors,administrations or institutions <strong>of</strong> publicadministration are relevant factors to betaken into account in legislation regulatingpublic administration.196.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION1. There is a single Public Service Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Republic.2. The Commission is independent and mustbe impartial, and must exercise its powersand perform its functions without fear,favour or prejudice in <strong>the</strong> interest <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>maintenance <strong>of</strong> effective and efficient publicadministration and a high standard <strong>of</strong>pr<strong>of</strong>essional ethics in <strong>the</strong> public service. TheCommission must be regulated by nationallegislation.3. O<strong>the</strong>r organs <strong>of</strong> state, through legislativeand o<strong>the</strong>r measures, must assist and protect<strong>the</strong> Commission to ensure <strong>the</strong> independence,impartiality, dignity and effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission. No person or organ <strong>of</strong>state may interfere with <strong>the</strong> functioning <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Commission.212 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 14. The powers and functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission area)to promote <strong>the</strong> values and principles setout in section 195, throughout <strong>the</strong> publicservice;b) to investigate, monitor and evaluate <strong>the</strong>organisation and administration, and <strong>the</strong>personnel practices, <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public service;c) to propose measures to ensure effectiveand efficient performance within <strong>the</strong>public service;d) to give directions aimed at ensuring thatpersonnel procedures relating to recruitment,transfers, promotions and dismissalscomply with <strong>the</strong> values and principlesset out in section 195;e) to report in respect <strong>of</strong> its activities and<strong>the</strong> performance <strong>of</strong> its functions, includingany finding it may make and directionsand advice it may give, and to providean evaluation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> extent to which<strong>the</strong> values and principles set out in section195 are complied with; andf) ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> its own accord or on receipt <strong>of</strong>any complainti.to investigate and evaluate <strong>the</strong> application<strong>of</strong> personnel and public administrationpractices, and to report to <strong>the</strong>relevant executive authority and legislature;ii. to investigate grievances <strong>of</strong> employeesin <strong>the</strong> public service concerning<strong>of</strong>ficial acts or omissions, and recommendappropriate remedies;iii. to monitor and investigate adherenceto applicable procedures in <strong>the</strong> publicservice; andiv. to advise national and provincialorgans <strong>of</strong> state regarding personnelpractices in <strong>the</strong> public service, includingthose relating to <strong>the</strong> recruitment,appointment, transfer, discharge ando<strong>the</strong>r aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> careers <strong>of</strong>employees in <strong>the</strong> public service.g) to exercise or perform <strong>the</strong> additionalpowers or functions prescribed by an Act<strong>of</strong> Parliament.5. The Commission is accountable to <strong>the</strong>National Assembly.6. The Commission must report at least once ayear in terms <strong>of</strong> subsection (4) (e)-a) to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly; andb) in respect <strong>of</strong> its activities in a province, to<strong>the</strong> legislature <strong>of</strong> that province.7. The Commission has <strong>the</strong> following 14 commissionersappointed by <strong>the</strong> President:a) Five commissioners approved by <strong>the</strong>National Assembly in accordance withsubsection (8) (a); andb) one commissioner for each provincenominated by <strong>the</strong> Premier <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>province in accordance with subsection(8) (b).8. a) A commissioner appointed in terms <strong>of</strong>subsection (7) (a) must bei.recommended by a committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly that is proportionallycomposed <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> all partiesrepresented in <strong>the</strong> Assembly; andii. approved by <strong>the</strong> Assembly by a resolutionadopted with a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> a majority <strong>of</strong> its members.b) A commissioner nominated by <strong>the</strong>Premier <strong>of</strong> a province must bei.recommended by a committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>provincial legislature that is proportionallycomposed <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> allparties represented in <strong>the</strong> legislature;andii. approved by <strong>the</strong> legislature by a resolutionadopted with a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> a majority <strong>of</strong> its members.<strong>9.</strong> An Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament must regulate <strong>the</strong> procedurefor <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> commissioners.10.A commissioner is appointed for a term <strong>of</strong>SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996213


five years, which is renewable for one additionalterm only, and must be a woman or aman who isa)a South African citizen; andb) a fit and proper person with knowledge<strong>of</strong>, or experience in, administration, managementor <strong>the</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> public services.11.A commissioner may be removed from<strong>of</strong>fice only ona)<strong>the</strong> ground <strong>of</strong> misconduct, incapacity orincompetence;b) a finding to that effect by a committee <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly or, in <strong>the</strong> case <strong>of</strong>a commissioner nominated by <strong>the</strong>Premier <strong>of</strong> a province, by a committee <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> legislature <strong>of</strong> that province; andc) <strong>the</strong> adoption by <strong>the</strong> Assembly or <strong>the</strong>provincial legislature concerned, <strong>of</strong> a resolutionwith a supporting vote <strong>of</strong> amajority <strong>of</strong> its members calling for <strong>the</strong>commissioner’s removal from <strong>of</strong>fice.12.The President must remove <strong>the</strong> relevantcommissioner from <strong>of</strong>fice upona)<strong>the</strong> adoption by <strong>the</strong> Assembly <strong>of</strong> a resolutioncalling for that commissioner’sremoval; orb) written notification by <strong>the</strong> Premier that<strong>the</strong> provincial legislature has adopted aresolution calling for that commissioner’sremoval.13. Commissioners referred to in subsection (7)(b) may exercise <strong>the</strong> powers and perform<strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission in <strong>the</strong>irprovinces as prescribed by national legislation.Chapter 13 Finance214.EQUITABLE SHARES ANDALLOCATIONS OF REVENUE1. An Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament must provide fora)<strong>the</strong> equitable division <strong>of</strong> revenue raisednationally among <strong>the</strong> national, provincialand local spheres <strong>of</strong> government;b) <strong>the</strong> determination <strong>of</strong> each province’sequitable share <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provincial share <strong>of</strong>that revenue; andc) any o<strong>the</strong>r allocations to provinces, localgovernment or municipalities from <strong>the</strong>national government’s share <strong>of</strong> that revenue,and any conditions on which thoseallocations may be made.2. The Act referred to in subsection (1) may beenacted only after <strong>the</strong> provincial governments,organised local government and <strong>the</strong>Financial and Fiscal Commission have beenconsulted, and any recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission have been considered, andmust take into accounta)<strong>the</strong> national interest;b) any provision that must be made inrespect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national debt and o<strong>the</strong>rnational obligations;c) <strong>the</strong> needs and interests <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> nationalgovernment, determined by objectivecriteria;d) <strong>the</strong> need to ensure that <strong>the</strong> provincesand municipalities are able to providebasic services and perform <strong>the</strong> functionsallocated to <strong>the</strong>m;e) <strong>the</strong> fiscal capacity and efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>provinces and municipalities;f) developmental and o<strong>the</strong>r needs <strong>of</strong>provinces, local government and municipalities;g) economic disparities within and among<strong>the</strong> provinces;h) obligations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> provinces and municipalitiesin terms <strong>of</strong> national legislation;i) <strong>the</strong> desirability <strong>of</strong> stable and predictable214 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 1allocations <strong>of</strong> revenue shares; andj) <strong>the</strong> need for flexibility in responding toemergencies or o<strong>the</strong>r temporary needs,and o<strong>the</strong>r factors based on similar objectivecriteria.21<strong>9.</strong>REMUNERATION OF PERSONS HOLD-ING PUBLIC OFFICE1. An Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament must establish aframework for determininga)<strong>the</strong> salaries, allowances and benefits <strong>of</strong>members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly, permanentdelegates to <strong>the</strong> National Council<strong>of</strong> Provinces, members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Cabinet,Deputy Ministers, traditional leaders andmembers <strong>of</strong> any councils <strong>of</strong> traditionalleaders; andb) <strong>the</strong> upper limit <strong>of</strong> salaries, allowances orbenefits <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> provincial legislatures,members <strong>of</strong> Executive Councils andmembers <strong>of</strong> Municipal Councils <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> differentcategories.2. National legislation must establish an independentcommission to make recommendationsconcerning <strong>the</strong> salaries, allowancesand benefits referred to in subsection.3. Parliament may pass <strong>the</strong> legislation referredto in subsection (1) only after consideringany recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> commissionestablished in terms <strong>of</strong> subsection (2).4. The national executive, a provincial executive,a municipality or any o<strong>the</strong>r relevantauthority may implement <strong>the</strong> national legislationreferred to in subsection (1) only afterconsidering any recommendations <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>commission established in terms <strong>of</strong> subsection(2).5. National legislation must establish frameworksfor determining <strong>the</strong> salaries,allowances and benefits <strong>of</strong> judges, <strong>the</strong>Public Protector, <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General, andmembers <strong>of</strong> any commission provided for in<strong>the</strong> Constitution, including <strong>the</strong> broadcastingauthority referred to in section 192.Financial and Fiscal Commission(ss 220-222)220.ESTABLISHMENT AND FUNCTIONS1. There is a Financial and Fiscal Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Republic which makes recommendationsenvisaged in this Chapter, or in nationallegislation, to Parliament, provincial legislaturesand any o<strong>the</strong>r authorities determinedby national legislation.2. The Commission is independent and subjectonly to <strong>the</strong> Constitution and <strong>the</strong> law, andmust be impartial.3. The Commission must function in terms <strong>of</strong>an Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament and, in performing itsfunctions, must consider all relevant factors,including those listed in section 214 (2).221.APPOINTMENT AND TENURE OFMEMBERS1. The Commission consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> followingwomen and men appointed by <strong>the</strong>President, as head <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> national executive:a) A chairperson and deputy chairperson;b) three persons selected, after consulting<strong>the</strong> Premiers, from a list compiled inaccordance with a process prescribed bynational legislation;c) two persons selected, after consultingorganised local government, from a listcompiled in accordance with a processprescribed by national legislation; andd) two o<strong>the</strong>r persons.2. National legislation referred to in subsection(1) must provide for <strong>the</strong> participation <strong>of</strong>a)<strong>the</strong> Premiers in <strong>the</strong> compilation <strong>of</strong> a listenvisaged in subsection (1) (b); andb) organised local government in <strong>the</strong> compilation<strong>of</strong> a list envisaged in subsection(1) (c).3. Members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission must haveappropriate expertise.4. Members serve for a term established interms <strong>of</strong> national legislation. The PresidentSELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996215


may remove a member from <strong>of</strong>fice on <strong>the</strong>ground <strong>of</strong> misconduct, incapacity or incompetence.222.REPORTSThe Commission must report regularly both toParliament and to <strong>the</strong> provincial legislatures.Chapter 14 General Provisions237.DILIGENT PERFORMANCEOF OBLIGATIONSAll constitutional obligations must be performeddiligently and without delay.23<strong>9.</strong>DEFINITIONSIn <strong>the</strong> Constitution, unless <strong>the</strong> context indicateso<strong>the</strong>rwise-‘organ <strong>of</strong> state’ meansa)any department <strong>of</strong> state or administrationin <strong>the</strong> national, provincial or localsphere <strong>of</strong> government; orb) any o<strong>the</strong>r functionary or institutioni.exercising a power or performing afunction in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution ora provincial constitution; orii. exercising a public power or performinga public function in terms <strong>of</strong> anylegislation, but does not include acourt or a judicial <strong>of</strong>ficer;216 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 1SELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996217


ANNEXURE 2COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TOAPPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICEAND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OFSERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATEDINSTITUTIONS


ANNEXURE 2Table 1. Appointments procedures and conditions <strong>of</strong> serviceName <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceThe Auditor-General Chapter 9, Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1996(sections 181, 188, 189, 193and 194)Public Audit Act 25 <strong>of</strong> 2004The President appoints <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly.The Speaker initiates <strong>the</strong>process in <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly for <strong>the</strong> appointment<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General. (Section6(1), Public Audit Act, 2004).A committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Assemblynominates <strong>the</strong> Auditor Generaldesignate. The nomination isapproved by a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> at least 60% <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly. (Section193(4) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,1996, and section 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Public Audit Act, 2004).A resolution concerning <strong>the</strong>removal from <strong>of</strong>fice must beadopted with a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> at least two-thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly.(Section 8 <strong>of</strong> Public Audit Act,2004 and section 194 <strong>of</strong>Constitution, 1996)The Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong>Auditor General must, in consultationwith <strong>the</strong> AuditorGeneral, recommend to <strong>the</strong>President <strong>the</strong> conditions <strong>of</strong>employment (including <strong>the</strong>salary) for <strong>the</strong> Auditor Generaldesignate.(Section 7 (1) & (2) PublicAudit Act, 2004).The President appoints <strong>the</strong>Auditor-General for single, nonrenewableterm <strong>of</strong> between 5and 10 years. (Section 189 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution, 1996).The President determines <strong>the</strong>length <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term (section6(2), Public Audit Act, 2004).COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS219


Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceThe Commission for GenderEqualityChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996 (sections 181, 187, 193and 194Commission on Gender EqualityAct 39 <strong>of</strong> 1996The President appoints aChairperson and no fewer than7 and no more than 11 commissioners.Between 2 and 7 commissionersmust be appointed as fulltime members for a period notexceeding five years, providedthat <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> fulltimemembers does not expiresimultaneously. The appointmentis renewable for a fur<strong>the</strong>rterm. (Section 3, Commissionon Gender Equality Act, 1996).A resolution concerning <strong>the</strong>removal from <strong>of</strong>fice must beadopted with a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> a majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly.(Section 194, Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996).The President determinesremunerations, allowances andconditions <strong>of</strong> service for bothfull time and part time members.(Section 8, Commission onGender Equality Act, 1996).The Minister <strong>of</strong> Justice andConstitutional Developmentshall invite nominationsthrough media and by notice in<strong>the</strong> Gazette.A joint ad hoc committee <strong>of</strong>both Houses <strong>of</strong> Parliament isestablished to consider <strong>the</strong>nominations and short list candidates.The nominations areapproved by both Houses in ajoint sitting.This procedure is contrary to<strong>the</strong> provisions for appointment<strong>of</strong> commissioners to <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equalitycontained in <strong>the</strong> section 193(4)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, 1996).220 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 2Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceThe Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic CommunitiesChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996 (sections 181, 185,193and 194)The Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religiousand Linguistic Communities Act19 <strong>of</strong> 2002The National Assembly has norole in <strong>the</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong>commissioners.The President appoints aChairperson and no fewer than11 and no more than 17 membersfor a period <strong>of</strong> 5 years.President appoints from a shortlist compiled by a selectionpanel appointed by <strong>the</strong>Minister (Section 11, <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotionand Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities Act, 2002).The President can remove ongrounds <strong>of</strong> misconduct, incapacityor incompetence, onadoption <strong>of</strong> a resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>majority <strong>of</strong> National Assemblymembers (section 17 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotionand Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities Act, 2002 andsection 194, Constitution,1996).The Minister in consultationwith <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Financedetermines conditions <strong>of</strong> service(section 15, <strong>the</strong> Commissionfor <strong>the</strong> Promotion andProtection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities Act, 2002).Chairperson and DeputyChairperson appointed as fulltime members, while not morethan three o<strong>the</strong>r members maybe appointed in a full-timecapacity (section 14, <strong>the</strong>Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotionand Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong>Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunities Act, 2002).COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS221


Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceThe Electoral CommissionChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996 (sections 181, 190, 191,193 and 194)Electoral Commission Act 51 <strong>of</strong>1996, as amended by Act 117<strong>of</strong> 1998, Act 27 <strong>of</strong> 2000, Act 34<strong>of</strong> 2003 and Act 14 <strong>of</strong> 2004.The President on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly appoints commissioners.The Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onHome Affairs considers a shortlist <strong>of</strong> candidates, compiled bya panel consisting <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>President <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ConstitutionalCourt, <strong>the</strong> Public Protector andrepresentatives from <strong>the</strong>Commission for Gender Equalityand <strong>the</strong> South African HumanRights Commission.The President can only removeon <strong>the</strong> grounds <strong>of</strong> misconduct,incapacity and incompetence,after <strong>the</strong>re has been a findingto that effect by a committee<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly upon<strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Electoral Court, and a majorityresolution to that effect by <strong>the</strong>National Assembly.(Section 194 <strong>of</strong> Constitution,1996; Section 7(3) <strong>of</strong> ElectoralCommission Act, 1996).President after consultationwith Commission onRemuneration <strong>of</strong>Representatives determinesconditions and remuneration.(Section 7 <strong>of</strong> ElectoralCommission Act, 1996).The Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> nominatescandidates for considerationby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly.The National Assembly’s recommendationsfor appointmentto <strong>the</strong> President must beapproved by a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> a majority <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly.The President appoints 5 members,one <strong>of</strong> who should be ajudge, for a period <strong>of</strong> 7 years(section 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ElectoralCommission Act, 1996).222 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 2Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceThe South African Human RightsCommissionChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996 (sections 181, 184, 193and 194)Human Rights Commission Act54 <strong>of</strong> 1994A chairperson and 10 commissioners(Section 115 <strong>of</strong> 1993Constitution) are appointed by<strong>the</strong> President for a term notexceeding 7 years. (Section 3,Human Rights Commission Act54, 1994).Commissioners are appointedon <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly after beingnominated by a committee <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly andapproved by a supporting vote<strong>of</strong> a majority <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Assembly. (Section 193(4)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution, 1996)Requires <strong>the</strong> approval by <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and <strong>the</strong>National Council <strong>of</strong> Provinces bya resolution adopted by amajority <strong>of</strong> at least 75 per cent<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Members present at ajoint meeting.(Section 3 <strong>of</strong> Human RightsCommission Act, 1994)This is contrary to <strong>the</strong> provisions<strong>of</strong> section 194 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1996, whichrequires that <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly resolution to removea commissioner be supportedby a majority <strong>of</strong> members.The President in consultationwith Cabinet and <strong>the</strong> Minister<strong>of</strong> Finance determines remunerationsand conditions <strong>of</strong>service. (Section 13, HumanRights Commission Act, 1994)The Public ProtectorChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996 (sections 181,182, 183,193 and 194)Public Protector Act, 23 <strong>of</strong> 1994(as amended by Act 113 <strong>of</strong>1998 and Act 22 <strong>of</strong> 2003)The President appoints PublicProtector on <strong>the</strong> recommendation<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyfor a non-renewable period <strong>of</strong>7 years.The National Assembly initiates<strong>the</strong> appointment process.A resolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly must be adoptedwith a supporting vote <strong>of</strong> atleast two thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly (section 194 <strong>of</strong>Constitution, 1996).The National Assembly determines<strong>the</strong> remuneration andconditions <strong>of</strong> service on <strong>the</strong>advice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant parliamentarycommittee (section 2<strong>of</strong> Public Protector Act, 1994).An ad hoc committee is establishedto nominate candidates.The National Assemblyapproves <strong>the</strong> nomination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> by a supportingvote <strong>of</strong> at least 60% <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly. (Section 193,Constitution, 1996).COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS223


Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceIndependent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South AfricaChapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution,1996 (section 192)Independent CommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South African Act13 <strong>of</strong> 2000, as amended by Act3 <strong>of</strong> 2006The National Assembly through<strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onCommunications initiates <strong>the</strong>process and considers candidatesfor appointment.A Chairperson and 8 councillorsare appointed by <strong>the</strong> Ministeron <strong>the</strong> approval by <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly.The National Assembly mayinvite technical experts to assistin <strong>the</strong> selection, evaluation andappointment processes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>councillors.Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice requires<strong>the</strong> adoption by <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly <strong>of</strong> a resolution callingfor that councillor’s removal.The Minister must remove acouncillor from <strong>of</strong>fice on adoption<strong>of</strong> such a resolution by <strong>the</strong>National Assembly (Section 8,Independent CommunicationsAuthority Act, 2000 as amended).The Minister <strong>of</strong>Communications with concurrence<strong>of</strong> Minster <strong>of</strong> Financedetermines remuneration (section10 <strong>of</strong> IndependentCommunications Authority Act,2000, as amended)The National Assembly submitsto <strong>the</strong> Minister a list <strong>of</strong> suitablecandidates at least 1 1/2 times<strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> required candidates.(Section 5, IndependentCommunications Authority Act,2000 as amended).The Chairperson is appointedfor a term <strong>of</strong> 5 years. O<strong>the</strong>rcouncillors are appointed for aterm <strong>of</strong> 4 years (section 7,Independent CommunicationsAuthority Act, 2000 as amended).224 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 2Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> servicePan South African LanguageBoardChapter 1 <strong>of</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996 (section 6)Pan South African LanguageBoard Act 59,1995, as amendedby Act 10 <strong>of</strong> 1999 and Act36 <strong>of</strong> 2001.The Minister appoints no fewerthan 11 and no more than 15members for a renewable term<strong>of</strong> 5 years.The Minister, after consultingwith <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>on Arts and Culture, appoints acommittee to invite nominationsfor <strong>the</strong> general public. ThePortfolio <strong>Committee</strong> conductsinterviews and compiles a shortlist from <strong>the</strong> names forwardedto it by that committee. ThePortfolio <strong>Committee</strong>’s short listis <strong>the</strong>n forwarded to Minister,who makes <strong>the</strong> selection forappointment after consultingwith <strong>the</strong> Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>(section 5, Pan South AfricanLanguage Board Act, 1995, asamended).Minister may terminate membershipIf he or she is satisfiedthat:• The person no longer complieswith criteria (fit andproper, South African citizen,broadly representative<strong>of</strong> diversity pf users <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficiallanguages; have languageskills; supportive <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> principle <strong>of</strong> multi-lingualism);• Absence from two or moreconsecutive meetings <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Board without leave;• On request <strong>of</strong> memberwishing to resign;• Recommendation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>majority <strong>of</strong> Board (on reasonablegrounds).(Section 5(4) Pan South AfricanLanguage Board Act, 1995, asamended)The Minister with <strong>the</strong> concurrence<strong>of</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Financedetermines criteria for payment<strong>of</strong> honoraria and reimbursementsto members (section 13,Pan South African LanguageBoard Act, 1995, as amended).Public Service CommissionChapter 10 <strong>of</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong>1996(section 196)Public Service Commission Act17 <strong>of</strong> 199714 Commissioners appointed by<strong>the</strong> President: 5 are nominatedby <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and9 are nominated by Premiers <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> provinces (section 196(7)<strong>of</strong> Constitution, 1996).The Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> onPublic Service and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration considers nominationsfor <strong>the</strong> 5 candidates tobe nominated by <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly.Removed in terms <strong>of</strong> section196(11) and (12) <strong>of</strong>Constitution.<strong>Ad</strong>option by <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly <strong>of</strong> a resolution for aCommissioner’s removal.Written notification by <strong>the</strong>Premier that <strong>the</strong> provincial legislaturehas adopted a resolutionfor removal.The President determines conditions<strong>of</strong> service and remunerations(section 6 <strong>of</strong> PublicService Commission Act, 1997).COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS225


Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceNational Youth CommissionNo Constitutional basisNational Youth Commission Act19 <strong>of</strong> 1996 (as amended by Act19 <strong>of</strong> 2000)President appoints 5 membersfor a renewable term notexceeding 5 years. Currently<strong>the</strong> commissioners are appointedfor three years.Appointed on <strong>the</strong> advice <strong>of</strong>committee <strong>of</strong> Parliament (section4, National YouthCommission Act, 1996Removed from <strong>of</strong>fice byPresident after consultationwith <strong>the</strong> Commission, if in hisor her opinion <strong>the</strong>re aregrounds to do so.(Section <strong>of</strong> National YouthCommission Act, 1996) ThePresident, in consultation with<strong>the</strong> Minster <strong>of</strong> Finance determinesconditions <strong>of</strong> service andremunerations.(Section 11 <strong>of</strong> National YouthCommission Act, 1996The Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong>on <strong>the</strong> Status and Quality <strong>of</strong>Life <strong>of</strong> Children, Youth andDisabled Persons considersnominations..226 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 2Name <strong>of</strong> bodyConstitutional and legislativebasisAppointments process Removal from <strong>of</strong>fice Remuneration and conditions<strong>of</strong> serviceFinancial and Fiscal CommissionChapter 13 <strong>of</strong> Constitution (sections220 and 221)Financial and Fiscal CommissionAmendment Act 99 <strong>of</strong> 1997, asamended by Act 96 <strong>of</strong> 1997and Act, 25 <strong>of</strong> 2003There is no role for <strong>the</strong>National Assembly in <strong>the</strong>appointment processAppointed by <strong>the</strong> President fora term not exceeding fiveyears.Section 221(1), Constitutionmade provision for 22 commissioners.Removed from <strong>of</strong>fice by <strong>the</strong>President on <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> atribunal appointed by <strong>the</strong>President for that purpose.(Section 11 <strong>of</strong> Financial andFiscal Commission Act, 1997, asamended).The President determinesremunerations and o<strong>the</strong>r conditions<strong>of</strong> service taking intoaccount factors such as recommendations<strong>of</strong> Minister and <strong>the</strong>commission in section 219(5)<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution.(Section 9 <strong>of</strong> Financial andFiscal Commission Act, 1997)Section 7 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South AfricaSecond Amendment Act 61 <strong>of</strong>2001 amended section 221 <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Constitution, 1996, reducing<strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> commissionersfrom 22 to 9:• Chairperson and DeputyChairperson.• Three persons selected afterconsulting with <strong>the</strong>Premiers, from a list compiledin accordance with aprocess prescribed bynational legislation.• Two persons selected afterconsulting with organisedlocal government in accordancewith a process prescribedby national legislation• Two o<strong>the</strong>r persons.The Minister must consultPremiers to make nominationswhenever vacancies for 3 personsappointed by Premiersneed to be filled.COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS227


Table 2. Membership, date <strong>of</strong> appointment and expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficeInstitution Membership Appointment date Expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice dateThe Auditor General Mr T Nombembe 1 November 2006 30 October 2013The Commission forGender EqualityMrs J Piliso-Seroke, ChairpersonFulltime:Dr Teboho MaitseMs Nomboniso Papama GasaMs Janine Lousie HicksMr Dizkline Mfanozelwe ShoziDr Yvette AbrahamsMs Ndileka Eumera Portia Loyilane1 October 2002All appointed 1 May<strong>2007</strong>30 September <strong>2007</strong>30 April 201230 April 201230 April 201231 October 201131 October 201131 October 2011Part-time<strong>Ad</strong>v Salome Khutsoane<strong>Ad</strong>v Nomazotsho Memani-BalaniMs Rosieda ShabodienRev Bafana Gideon KhumaloMs Kenosi Vanessa MerutiAll appointed 1 May<strong>2007</strong>30 April 201230 April 201230 April 201230 April 201230 April 2012The Commission for <strong>the</strong>Promotion and Protection<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural,Religious and LinguisticCommunitiesDr MD Guma, ChairpersonMs M BethlehemDr WA BoezakDr LP BoshegoPr<strong>of</strong> S DangorDr MAE DockratMr H GouvelisDr MD JobsonDr JCH LandmanDr WRJ LangeveldtMs M Le RouxMs DDK MaraisMr BB MgcinaDr ON MndendePr<strong>of</strong> SE NgubaneMr MKS NtlhaMs M Soni AminDr TSC MagwazaAll appointed 1 January 2004All expire in five years228 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 2Institution MembershipAppointment date Expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice dateThe Electoral CommissionDr B Bam, ChairpersonMs NFT MpumlwanaMr. T Tselane, andMr F Van der MerweJudge H Q Msimang20 October 200420 October 200420 October 200420 October 200412 February 2006Term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice expires inseven years.The South African HumanRights CommissionJodi Kollapen, ChairpersonZonke Majodina, DeputyAll appointed 1 October2002Term <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice expires inseven years.Charlotte Mcclain-NhlapoTom ManthataLeon WesselsKathy GovenderResigned 1 December 2006The Public ProtectorMr M L MushwanaMs M Shai, Deputy Public Protector1 October 20021 December 2005Terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice expires inseven years.The IndependentCommunicationsAuthority <strong>of</strong> South AfricaMr P Mashile, ChairpersonMs T CohenMr Z MasizaMr M ZokweMr N NkunaMs B NtombelaPr<strong>of</strong> J van RooyenDr N Socikwa1 July 20041 July 20041 July 20041 July 20051 October 20061 October 20061 October 20061 April <strong>2007</strong>30 June 200830 June 200830 June 200830 June 200930 September 201030 September 201030 September 201030 March 2011** Ms M Mohlala, appointed on 1 October 2006, hasresigned with effect from 31 May <strong>2007</strong>. ThePortfolio <strong>Committee</strong> is in process <strong>of</strong> appointing anew councillor.COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS229


Institution Membership Appointment date Expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice dateThe Pan South AfricanLanguage BoardMr HM Thipa, ChairpersonMr HA Strydom, DeputyMs R FinlaysonMr MA MolelekiMr MB KumaloMs H MorganMs MF SadikiMr P NkomoMr SNL MkhatshwaMr AC Le FleurMr PB SkhosonaMr Mr MalopeMs NCP GololeAll appointed February2002All expire February <strong>2007</strong>On 16 January <strong>2007</strong> <strong>the</strong>Minister extended term<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice to June <strong>2007</strong>The Public ServiceCommissionThe following are nominated by <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly:All appointed November2003All expire November2008Pr<strong>of</strong> SS Sangweni, ChairpersonMr JH Ernstzen, Deputy ChairpersonDr EG BainMs MRV MokgalongMs N Mxakato-DisekoNominated by <strong>the</strong> Provincial Legislatures:Mr JDS Mahlangu, Member (North West Province)Mr DW Mashego, Member (Mpumalanga)Mr M Msoki, Member (Eastern Cape)Ms PM Tengeni, Member (KwaZulu/Natal)Mr P Helepi, Member (Free State)Dr NV Maharaj, Member (Western Cape)Mr KE Mahoai, Member (Limpopo)Mr KL Ma<strong>the</strong>ws, Member (Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape)Dr R Mgijima, Member (Gauteng)230 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 2Institution Membership Appointment date Expiry <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fice dateThe National YouthCommissionMs N Nkondlo, ChairpersonMs V TuleloMr M MothupiMr D J Van VuurenMr O SipukaAll appointed 1 July 2006 All expire 30 June 2009The Financial and FiscalCommissionDr B Setai, ChairpersonMr J Josie, Deputy1 August 200530 January 200230 July 20101 February <strong>2007</strong>Ms T AjamMr R MalulekeMr M KuscusMr K ChettyMr B Mosley-LefatolaMs G MoloiDr A Melck1 July 20041 July 20041 July 20041 January 20021 July 20041 July 200430 January 200230 June 200930 June 200930 June 00931 December <strong>2007</strong>30 June 200930 June 20091 February <strong>2007</strong>COMPARISON OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO APPOINTMENTS, REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND REMUNERATION AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE IN CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS231


ANNEXURE 3LIST OF CHAPTER NINE AND OTHERSTATUTORY INSTITUTIONS IN WHICHTHE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS AROLE TO PLAY


ANNEXURE 3LIST OF CHAPTER NINE AND OTHER STATUTORY INSTITUTIONSIN WHICH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS A ROLE TO PLAYName <strong>of</strong> bodyThe Auditor-GeneralRole <strong>of</strong> ParliamentAppointed by President on recommendation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly for a period <strong>of</strong> between 5and 10 years (section 188 Constitution).The Commission for Gender EqualityNo fewer than 7 and no more than 11 membersappointed by <strong>the</strong> President for a period <strong>of</strong> 5years after nomination by National Assemblycommittee and approval by National Assembly(Section 193, Constitution).The Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and LinguisticCommunitiesThe Electoral CommissionNo fewer than 12 and no more than 17 membersappointed by <strong>the</strong> President for a period <strong>of</strong> 5years. No role for Parliament in <strong>the</strong> appointmentprocess.No role for <strong>the</strong> National Assembly except normaloversight role.5 members appointed by <strong>the</strong> President for a period<strong>of</strong> 7 years, on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong>National Assembly after nomination by NationalAssembly committee.The South African Human Rights CommissionMembers appointed by <strong>the</strong> President for a termnot exceeding 7 years on recommendation <strong>of</strong>National Assembly after nomination by NationalAssembly committee (Section 193, Constitution).The Public ProtectorAppointed by <strong>the</strong> President on recommendation<strong>of</strong> National Assembly, after nomination byNational Assembly committee, for a non-renewableperiod <strong>of</strong> 7 years.Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> SouthAfricaAppointed by <strong>the</strong> Minister after approval by <strong>the</strong>National Assembly.LIST OF CHAPTER NINE AND OTHER STATUTORY INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS A ROLE TO PLAY233


Part II: O<strong>the</strong>r Constitutional and Statutory BodiesName <strong>of</strong> BodyAgricultural Marketing Council, NationalDrug Authority, CentralMembership10 members appointed by <strong>the</strong> Minister after committees<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Houses responsible for agriculture have submittednames <strong>of</strong> suitable candidates. (Section 9 <strong>of</strong>Agricultural Research Council Act 86 <strong>of</strong> 1990)12 members appointed by <strong>the</strong> Minister after parliamentarycommittees for welfare <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assemblyand <strong>the</strong> National Council <strong>of</strong> Provinces has made recommendationsto <strong>the</strong> Minister in relation <strong>the</strong>reto after atransparent and open process <strong>of</strong> considering persons sonominated. (Prevention and Treatment <strong>of</strong> DrugDependency Act 20 <strong>of</strong> 1992)Inspector-General <strong>of</strong> IntelligenceAppointed by <strong>the</strong> President after nominations by JointStanding <strong>Committee</strong> on Intelligence and approval byNational Assembly.National Assembly designates six <strong>of</strong> its members toserve on <strong>the</strong> Commission (section 178, Constitution), for<strong>the</strong> duration <strong>of</strong> Parliament. The Members sit in <strong>the</strong>Commission when it considers appointment <strong>of</strong> judges.12 members <strong>of</strong> council appointed by Minister <strong>of</strong> Artsand Culture after consultation with <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong>Education for a period <strong>of</strong> 3 years. The Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Arts and Culture has to approve <strong>the</strong>panel that will compile a short list. (Section 7 <strong>of</strong> Libraryand Information Services Act 6 <strong>of</strong> 2001).7 members appointed by <strong>the</strong> Minister for a period notexceeding 5 years, after recommendations by relevantPortfolio <strong>Committee</strong> (Section 3 <strong>of</strong> Lotteries Act 57 <strong>of</strong>1997).The National Assembly appoints four <strong>of</strong> its members,for <strong>the</strong> duration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term <strong>of</strong> Parliament.The Agency consists <strong>of</strong> 9 members, 6 <strong>of</strong> whom areappointed by <strong>the</strong> President on <strong>the</strong> recommendation <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> National Assembly. The chairperson and 3 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 6members are appointed for 5 years, while <strong>the</strong> rest hold<strong>of</strong>fice for 3 years.Judicial Service CommissionLibrary and Information Services, Panel to appointmembers <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Council forLotteries Board, NationalMagistrates CommissionMedia Development and Diversity AgencyPan South African Language Board234 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 3Membership11-15 members appointed by Minister for a period <strong>of</strong>five years after consultation with Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong>on Arts and Culture.The Constitution and <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission Actprescribes appointment <strong>of</strong> 14 Commissioners by <strong>the</strong>President for a period <strong>of</strong> 5years, 5 <strong>of</strong> whom areapproved by <strong>the</strong> National; Assembly after recommendationby a committee <strong>of</strong> National Assembly.The Director-General: Transport and no fewer than 11and no more than 12 members appointed by <strong>the</strong>Minister for a period <strong>of</strong> not more than 3 years after recommendationby selection committee established by<strong>the</strong> Minister. (Road Accident Fund Act 56 <strong>of</strong> 1996).Appointed by Minister after consultation with relevantparliamentary committees (Section 6 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NationalResearch Foundation Act 23 <strong>of</strong> 1998).Appointed by Minister after he or she invited nominationsfrom parliamentary committees for housing(Section 23 <strong>of</strong> Housing Consumers Protection MeasuresAct 95 <strong>of</strong> 1998).Appointed by Minister after he or she invited nominationsfrom parliamentary committees for housing.(Section 4 <strong>of</strong> Housing Consumers Protection MeasuresAct 95 <strong>of</strong> 1998).Appointed by Minister after recommendations by committees<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and National Council<strong>of</strong> Provinces on Social Development. (Section 5,<strong>Ad</strong>visory Board on Social Development Act 3 <strong>of</strong> 2001).Name <strong>of</strong> bodyPublic Service CommissionRoad Accident Fund, BoardBoard <strong>of</strong> National Research Foundation<strong>Ad</strong>visory <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Home BuildersRegistration CouncilNational Home Builders Registration Council<strong>Ad</strong>visory Board on Social DevelopmentSouth African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) Board12 non-executive members appointed by <strong>the</strong> Presidentfor a period not exceeding 5 years on <strong>the</strong> advice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Assembly and three executive members.(Section 13 <strong>of</strong> Broadcasting Act 4 <strong>of</strong> 1999).National Youth CommissionAppointed by <strong>the</strong> President on advice <strong>of</strong> Parliament.The Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> shortlists candidates.LIST OF CHAPTER NINE AND OTHER STATUTORY INSTITUTIONS IN WHICH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS A ROLE TO PLAY235


ANNEXURE 4TERMS OF REFERENCE


ANNEXURE 4Thursday, 21 September 2006] 2079No 46—2006] THIRD SESSION, THIRD PARLIAMENTREPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICAMINUTES OF PROCEEDINGSOFNATIONAL ASSEMBLYTHURSDAY, 21 SEPTEMBER 20061 The House met at 14:03.2 The Deputy Speaker took <strong>the</strong> Chair and requested members to observe amoment <strong>of</strong> silence for prayers or meditation.3 [14:04] The Chief Whip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Majority Party moved: That <strong>the</strong> House refers<strong>the</strong> Government Immovable Asset Management Bill back to <strong>the</strong> Portfolio<strong>Committee</strong> on Public Works for fur<strong>the</strong>r consideration.Agreed to.4. [14:05] The Chief Whip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Majority Party moved: That <strong>the</strong> Houseestablishes an ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> State InstitutionsSupporting Constitutional Democracy and <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission—(1) <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> to consist <strong>of</strong> 10 members as follows: ANC 5; DA 2;IFP 1; and o<strong>the</strong>r parties 2;(2) <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> to review State Institutions Supporting ConstitutionalDemocracy as listed in <strong>chapter</strong> 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution as well as <strong>the</strong>Public Service Commission as established in <strong>chapter</strong> 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Constitution, for <strong>the</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong>—(a) assessing whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> current and intended Constitutional andlegal mandates <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions are suitable for <strong>the</strong> SouthAfrican environment, whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> consumption <strong>of</strong> resources by<strong>the</strong>m is justified in relation to <strong>the</strong>ir outputs and contribution todemocracy, and whe<strong>the</strong>r a rationalisation <strong>of</strong> function, role ororganisation is desirable or will diminish <strong>the</strong> focus on importantareas;(b) reviewing <strong>the</strong> appropriateness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> appointment and employment arrangements for commissions and <strong>the</strong>ir secretariats with aview to enhanced consistency, coherence, accountability andaffordability;(c) reviewing institutional governance arrangements in order todevelop a model <strong>of</strong> internal accountability and efficiency;MINUTES: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NO 46—2006TERMS OF REFERENCE237


2080 [Thursday, 21 September 2006(d) improving <strong>the</strong> co-ordination <strong>of</strong> work between <strong>the</strong> institutionscovered in this review, as well as improving co-ordination andco-operation with government and civil society;(e) recognising <strong>the</strong> need for a more structured oversight role byParliament in <strong>the</strong> context <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir independence; and(f) reviewing <strong>the</strong> funding models <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, includingfunding derived from transfers and licences and o<strong>the</strong>r fees, witha view to improving accountability, independence and efficiency;(3) <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> to conduct its review also with reference to o<strong>the</strong>rorgans <strong>of</strong> state <strong>of</strong> a similar nature whose work is closely related to <strong>the</strong>work <strong>of</strong> institutions covered in this review;(4) <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> may exercise those powers in Rule 138 that may assistit in carrying out its task; and(5) <strong>the</strong> <strong>Committee</strong> to report by not later than 30 June <strong>2007</strong>.Agreed to.5. FIRST ORDER [14:05]Consideration <strong>of</strong> Special <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> Joint Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on Intelligence (JSCI)(Announcements, Tablings and <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>Report</strong>s, 21 August 2006, p 1790—<strong>Report</strong>s <strong>of</strong>Inspector General <strong>of</strong> Intelligence).Debate concluded.The Deputy Chief Whip <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Majority Party moved: That <strong>the</strong> <strong>Report</strong> be noted. Motion agreedto. <strong>Report</strong> accordingly noted.6. SECOND ORDER [15:10]Consideration <strong>of</strong> Request on Recommendations on Appointment <strong>of</strong> councillors to <strong>the</strong>Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa (as received from Minister)(Announcements, Tablings and <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>Report</strong>s, 20 September 2006, p 2078).Question put: That Dr A J Barendse, Ms M Mohlala, Mr R Nkuna, Ms B Ntombela and Pr<strong>of</strong> JC W van Rooyen be approved for appointment as councillors to fill vacancies on <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa.Declarations <strong>of</strong> vote made on behalf <strong>of</strong> Inkatha Freedom Party, Democratic Alliance and AfricanNational Congress.Question agreed to (Inkatha Freedom Party dissenting).Dr A J Barendse, Ms M Mohlala, Mr R Nkuna, Ms B Ntombela and Pr<strong>of</strong> J C W van Rooyenaccordingly approved for appointment as councillors to fill vacancies on <strong>the</strong> Council <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Independent Communications Authority <strong>of</strong> South Africa.7. THIRD ORDER [15:18]Consideration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on Nomination <strong>of</strong> Persons to fill Vacancies onCommission for Gender Equality (Announcements, Tablings and <strong>Committee</strong> <strong>Report</strong>, 18September 2006, p 2053).MINUTES: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NO 46—2006238 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 4Thursday, 21 September 2006] 2081Question put: That <strong>Ad</strong>v S Khutsoane, Ms N Memani-Balani, Ms R Shabodien, Mr B G Khumaloand Ms K V Meruti be recommended for appointment as part-time councillors, and Dr T Maitse,Ms N P Gasa, Ms J L Hicks, Mr D M Shozi, Ms Y Abrahams, and Ms N E P Loyilane be recommendedfor appointment as full-time councillors on <strong>the</strong> Commission for Gender Equality.AYES—176: Abram, S; Ainslee, A R; Anthony, T G; Asiya, S E; Asmal, AK; Batyi, F; Benjamin,J; Bhamjee, Y S; Bhengu, F; Bhengu, P; Bhoola, R B; Bici, J; Bloem, D V; Booi, M S; Botha,N G W; Burgess, C V; Cachalia, I M; Cele, M A; Chikunga, L S; Chohan-Khota, F I; Coetzee,R; Cronin, J P; Cwele, S C; Dambuza, B N; Daniels, P; Diale, L N; Dikgacwi, M M; Dlali, DM; Doidge, G Q M; Doman, W P; Farrow, S B; Fihla, N B; Frolick, C T; Fubbs, J L; Gaum, AH; Gigaba, K M N; Gololo, C L; Gumede, D M; Hajaig, F; Hanekom, D A; Hendrickse, P A C;Hogan, B A; Jeffery, J H; Johnson, C B; Johnson, M; Kasienyane, O R; Kasrils, R; Kekana, CD; Khumalo, K K; Khumalo, K M; Khunou, N P; King, R J; Koornh<strong>of</strong>, G W; Kotwal, Z;Landers, L T; Lekgetho, G; Lekgoro, M M S; Lishivha, T E; Louw, J T; Luthuli, A N; Maake, JJ; Mabe, L L; Mabena, D C; Madasa, Z L; Madella, AF; Madlala-Routledge, N C ; Maduma, LD;Mahlangu-Nkabinde, G L; Mahlawe, N M; Mahomed, F; Mahote, S; Maine, M S; Maja, S J;Makasi, X C; Maloyi, P D N; Maluleka, H P; Maluleke, D K; Martins, BAD; Mashangoane, PR; Mashigo, R J; Masutha, T M; Mathibela, N F; Matlala, M H; Matsemela, M L; Mbili, M E;Mbombo, N D; Mdaka, N M; Mentor, M P; Meruti, M V; Mgabadeli, H C; Minnie, K J; Mnguni,B A; Mnyandu, B J; Moatshe, M S; Modisenyane, L J; Mogale, O M; Mogase, I D; Mohamed,I J; Mokoena, A D; Moloto, K A; Morobi, D M; Morutoa, M R; Mosala, B G; Moss, L N; Moss,M I; Motubatse-Hounkpatin, S D; Mshudulu, S A; M<strong>the</strong>mbu, B; M<strong>the</strong>thwa, E N; Mzondeki, MJ G; Nawa, Z N; Ndzanga, R A; Nel, A C; Nene, M J ; Nene, N M; Newhoudt-Druchen, W S;Ngaleka, E; Ngcengwane, N D; Ngcobo, B T; Ngcobo, E N N; Ngele, N J; Njikelana, S J; Njobe,MA A; Nkabinde, N C; Nkem-Abonta, E; Nkuna, C; Nogumla, R Z; Ntuli, B M; Ntuli, M M;Ntuli, R S; Ntuli, S B; Nwamitwa-Shilubana, T L P; Nxumalo, M D; Nyambi, A J; Olifant, D AA; Oosthuizen, G C; Pandor, G N M; Phadagi, M G; Phungula, J P; Pieterse, R D; Radebe, B A;Ramakaba-Lesiea, M M; Ramgobin, M; Ramotsamai, C P M; Rasmeni, S M; Saloojee, E;Schippers, J; Schneemann, G D; Seadimo, M D; Sekgobela, P S; Semple, J A; Sibanyoni, J B;Sigcau , S N; Sithole, D J; Skosana, M B; Smith, V G; Smuts, M; Solomon, G; Sonto, M R;Sotyu, M M; Swart, M; Swart, P S; Swa<strong>the</strong>, M M; Thabe<strong>the</strong>, E; Tinto, B; Tobias, T V; Tolo, LJ; Tsenoli, S L; Tshivhase, T J; Tshwete, P; Vadi, I; Van den Heever, R P Z; Van der Merwe, S C; Van der Walt, D; Van Dyk, S M; Van Wyk, A.ABSTAIN—9: Bhengu, M J; Chang, E S; Mpontshane, A M; Rabinowitz, R; Sibuyana, M W;Smith, P F; Spies, W D; Vezi, T E; Vos, S C.Majority <strong>of</strong> support required in terms <strong>of</strong> section 193(5)(a)(ii) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Constitution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic<strong>of</strong> South Africa, 1996, not obtained.Decision <strong>of</strong> question postponed.8 [15:47] Members’ statements.9 [16:20] House Chairperson Ms C-S Botha made a statement in regard to<strong>of</strong>fensive remarks made by Mr R B Bhoola <strong>the</strong> previous day.MINUTES: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NO 46—20062082 [Thursday, 21 September 200610. FOURTH ORDER [16:23]Debate on Heritage Day: Proclaiming our African identity through our cultural heritage.Debate concluded.11. The House adjourned at 17:18.ZA DINGANISecretary to ParliamentMINUTES: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NO 46—2006TERMS OF REFERENCE239


ANNEXURE 5QUESTIONNAIRE


ANNEXURE 5AD HOC COMMITTEE ON REVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 ANDASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSQuestionnairePlease read <strong>the</strong> following to assist you with <strong>the</strong> completion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questionnaire:a) Please answer this questionnaire in English.b) This questionnaire has five sections. Please answer ALL questions. Where a question doesnot apply to your institution, your answer should indicate accordingly.c) Please respond to questions in <strong>the</strong> same sequence as <strong>the</strong> questionnaire.d) Provide detailed responses in a concise manner.e) Please e-mail completed questionnaires preferably by 15 December 2006, but not laterthan 10 January <strong>2007</strong> to mphilander@parliament.gov.zaA. Role and Functions <strong>of</strong> Institution1. How do you view your institution’s constitutional/legal mandate? In o<strong>the</strong>r words provide adescription <strong>of</strong> your understanding <strong>of</strong> your institution’s constitutional/legal mandate.2. What role or function does your institution perform that is not carried out by o<strong>the</strong>r institutions,whe<strong>the</strong>r in government or civil society?3. In what way, if any, does <strong>the</strong> role and function <strong>of</strong> your institution overlap or potentially overlapwith o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutions?4. What outcomes do you strive for in order to realise <strong>the</strong> constitutional/legal mandate set out in1 above?5. Does <strong>the</strong> empowering legislation governing your institution provide a clear, workable, and comprehensivelegal framework that supports and empowers <strong>the</strong> institution to successfully fulfil itscore mandate?6. What mechanisms do you have in place to measure <strong>the</strong> outcomes set out in 4 above, and howdo you assess <strong>the</strong> effectiveness and impact <strong>of</strong> your work?7. Have you carried out any evaluation looking at <strong>the</strong> success or o<strong>the</strong>rwise <strong>of</strong> your functions, especiallyin relation to recommendations sent to government, parliament or o<strong>the</strong>r public institutions?8. What have been/are <strong>the</strong> major constraints facing your institution and how have <strong>the</strong>se impactedon its ability to achieve its mandate?B. Relationships with o<strong>the</strong>r bodies<strong>9.</strong> How do you view your institution’s relationship with <strong>the</strong> executive and Parliament, given its constitutionallyguaranteed independence and impartiality and <strong>the</strong> constitutional requirement to beaccountable to <strong>the</strong> National Assembly? In particular please address <strong>the</strong> following issues:a) What legal and o<strong>the</strong>r mechanisms are in place to ensure and streng<strong>the</strong>n your institution’sindependence;b) What mechanisms are in place to facilitate reporting to (and being accountable to) <strong>the</strong>National Assembly;c) How do you view your relationship with <strong>the</strong> executive and under what circumstances do youengage <strong>the</strong> executive.QUESTIONNAIRE241


10.Is Parliament currently effectively fulfilling its oversight role over your institution? If not, how canthis be improved?11.What was <strong>the</strong> intended relationship <strong>of</strong> accountability between your institution and o<strong>the</strong>r institutionssupporting constitutional democracy and <strong>the</strong> different branches <strong>of</strong> government? To whatextent have <strong>the</strong>se relationships been realised?12.Does your institution have any <strong>of</strong>ficial or informal relationship with o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutionsor institutions <strong>of</strong> a similar nature? If yes, describe <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> this relationship and <strong>the</strong> outcomesenvisaged and generated by this relationship.13.What is <strong>the</strong> extent <strong>of</strong> collaboration and coordination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> work carried out by your institutionand similar/related work carried out by o<strong>the</strong>r Chapter 9 institutions or institutions <strong>of</strong> a similarnature? Give examples <strong>of</strong> successful initiatives in this regard.C. Institutional Governance14.What are <strong>the</strong> institutional governance arrangements in your institution? Are <strong>the</strong>se arrangementsclearly set out and do <strong>the</strong>y allow for a smooth running <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution? Is <strong>the</strong>re a clear, logicaland workable division between <strong>the</strong> members <strong>of</strong> your institution appointed by <strong>the</strong> Presidenton advice <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> National Assembly and <strong>the</strong> secretariat? What suggestions do you have toimprove <strong>the</strong> institutional governance arrangements?15.Does your institution have mechanisms in place to deal with internal conflict in your institution?If yes, what are <strong>the</strong>se mechanisms and are <strong>the</strong>y effective?16.What mechanisms are in place for Chief Executive Officers, Chairpersons and Commissioners todisclose and/or seek permission for private commercial/financial interests or involvement? Aresuch mechanisms effective or sufficient to ensure transparency and avoid conflict <strong>of</strong> interest?D. Interaction with <strong>the</strong> public17.What was <strong>the</strong> intended relationship between your institution and <strong>the</strong> public? To what extent hasthis relationship been realised?18.Does your institution have mechanisms in place to deal with complaints by <strong>the</strong> public about <strong>the</strong>work done by your institution or <strong>the</strong> failure to attend to issues?1<strong>9.</strong>If you deal with public complaints, what mechanisms are in place to deal with such complaints,to follow through on such complaints and to successfully resolve such complaints?E. Financial matters20.Give an indication <strong>of</strong> your budget allocation, additional funding and expenditure over <strong>the</strong> pastfive years.21.Please provide detailed information <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> remuneration packages for <strong>of</strong>fice-bearers andCommissioners.22.Please illustrate <strong>the</strong> budget process followed by your institution, including <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> allocation<strong>of</strong> funds.23.Are <strong>the</strong> current budgetary and administrative arrangements sufficient to ensure autonomy <strong>of</strong>Chapter 9 institutions?24.To what extent are <strong>the</strong> resources allocated to your institution directly spent on meeting its keyresponsibilities?242 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 5QUESTIONNAIRE243


ANNEXURE 6LIST OF SUBMISSIONS


ANNEXURE 6AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF CHAPTER 9AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONSSUBMISSIONS RECEIVEDINDIVIDUALS1. Banda, Mr Bright2. Bisch<strong>of</strong>, Ms L3. Boom, Mr Andrew4. Borain, Mr Anthony5. Botes, Mr Hennie6. Boyle, Mrs M7. Buys, Mr Enver8. Canterbury, Mr Athol<strong>9.</strong> Chohan, MP, Ms F I10. Cloete, Mr E11. Cloete, Mrs J12. Coetzee, Mr D13. Cort, Mrs J14. Cronje, Mr Frans15. Devenish, Pr<strong>of</strong> G E16. Doman, MP, Mr W P17. Ms P Dyasi18. Faasen, Mr Kobus1<strong>9.</strong> Franks, Ms Arlette20. Gillwald, Pr<strong>of</strong> Alison21. Goedhys, Mr Diederik22. Golele, Pr<strong>of</strong> N C P23. Govind, Mr N K24. Gouws, Pr<strong>of</strong> Amanda25. Gqomo, Ms L N26. Groenewald, Mr D27. Gupta, Pr<strong>of</strong> Ram Kishore28. Haessler, Mr Fred2<strong>9.</strong> Haines, Mr Redvers30. Hassan, Ms Fatima31. Hlongwane, Mrs Jennifer32. Houston, Mr E M33. Jasson, Mr Heinz D G34. Joosab, Mr E D35. Khumalo, Ms Grace36. Laher, Mr Ameen37. Landman, Dr Chris38. Langeveldt, Dr W3<strong>9.</strong> Lawrence, Mr Graham40. Lesejane, Ms M E41. Lilley, Ms Marilyn42. Malefo, Mr L D43. Maltese, X44. Marawu, Mr M M45. Mndai, Mr O46. Modise, Mr L G M47. Moeketsi, Mr P D48. Moganetsi, Mr M J4<strong>9.</strong> Moila, Mr Modisi Jo50. Morar, Mr R51. Motsoeneng, Mr Thabang52. Naidoo, Mr P53. Ngamlana, Ms Koleka54. Nkosi, Mrs N R55. Nongayiyana, Mr T56. Okungu, Mr M57. Pillay, Mr Reggie58. Poremba-Brumer, Mr D5<strong>9.</strong> Potter, Mr Charl60. Pretorius, Ms Sarah61. Prinsloo, Mr J P62. Qhautse, Mr Aubrey63. Schafer, Mr Karl Heinz64. Semple, Ms J A65. Seoka, Rt Rev Jo66. Singh, Mr B67. Skiti, Miss L68. Smuts, MP, Ms M6<strong>9.</strong> Sokopase, Mr Yamkela70. Swanepoel, Mr E71. Thompson, Mr Rhett72. Tyolwana, Ms Nonkosi73. Ulrich, Mr Neil74. Van der Merwe, Dr C J75. Van der Merwe, MP, Mr J H76. Van Heerden, Mr Fanie77. Vorster, Mrs A M78. Vosloo, Mr J M J S7<strong>9.</strong> White, Ms Mary80. Williams, Mr Anthony81. Williams, Miss Chris82. Winegaard, Mr L83. Wixley, Ms M84. Anonymous85. AnonymousLIST OF SUBMISSIONS245


ORAL SUBMISSIONS1. Aids Law Project2. Congress <strong>of</strong> South African Trade Unions(COSATU)3. Department <strong>of</strong> Communications4. F W de Klerk Foundation5. Foundation for Human Rights6. Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)7. Institute for Democracy in South Africa(IDASA)8. Ministry for Justice and ConstitutionalDevelopment<strong>9.</strong> Ms B A Hogan, MP, Chairperson <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General10. Ms F Chohan, MP11. Open Democracy and <strong>Ad</strong>vice Centre (ODAC)12. Pr<strong>of</strong> Amanda Gouws13. Tutumike14. University <strong>of</strong> Cape Town (UCT)NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS1. Afriforum2. Aids Law Project3. Amukelani Resource Centre4. ANC Youth League5. ANC Women’s League6. Anonymous7. Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI)8. COSATU<strong>9.</strong> Deaf Federation <strong>of</strong> South Africa (DEAFSA)10. Edzwilini Lemindeni Haven11. English Language Academy <strong>of</strong> SA12. Foundation for Human Rights13. Gender <strong>Ad</strong>vocacy Program (GAP)14. F W De Klerk Foundation15. Helen Suzman Foundation16. Human Rights Institute <strong>of</strong> South Africa(HURISA)17. IDASA (Political Information MonitoringService)18. Kathorus Community Radio1<strong>9.</strong> Lusikisiki Child Abuse Centre (Lucare)20. Open Democracy <strong>Ad</strong>vice Centre (ODAC)21. People Opposing Women Abuse (POWA)22. TUTUMIKE23. UWC Community Law Centre24.UWC Gender Equity UnitGOVERNMENT MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS1. Department <strong>of</strong> Arts and Culture2. Ministry <strong>of</strong> Communications3. Department <strong>of</strong> Education4. Ministry <strong>of</strong> Home Affairs5. Department <strong>of</strong> Justice & ConstitutionalDevelopment6. Minister in <strong>the</strong> Presidency7. Ministry <strong>of</strong> Provincial and Local Government8. Department <strong>of</strong> National TreasuryPARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES1. Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong>Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status <strong>of</strong>Children, Youth and Persons with disabilities2. Joint Monitoring <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong>Improvement <strong>of</strong> Quality <strong>of</strong> Life and Status<strong>of</strong> Women3. Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Communications4. Portfolio <strong>Committee</strong> on Public Service and<strong>Ad</strong>ministration5. Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on Public Accounts6. Standing <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Auditor-General246 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 6LIST OF SUBMISSIONS247


ANNEXURE 7REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY


ANNEXURE 7CHAPTER NINE, CHAPTER TEN AND ASSOCIATEDRIGHTS-BASED INSTITUTIONS:A PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYRESEARCHED FORParliament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South AfricaBY THECommunity Agency For Social EnquiryJUNE <strong>2007</strong>This report was compiled and produced for <strong>the</strong> Parliament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> SouthAfrica by <strong>the</strong> Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE)Yuri Ramkissoon P.O. Box 32882Aislinn DelanyBraamfonteinMandla Vilikazi 2017Telephone: +27 (11) 646 5922Fax: +27 (11) 646 5919E-mail: director@case.org.zaWebsite: www.case.org.zaREPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY249


Table <strong>of</strong> ContentsTABLE OF CONTENTS 250EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 251Background to <strong>the</strong> Study 251Study design 251Results 251Conclusion 253RIGHTS-BASED INSTITUTIONS SURVEY 254Introduction 254Background to <strong>the</strong> Study 255Aim and Objectives 255STUDY DESIGN 256Instrument Design 257Training & <strong>the</strong> Fieldwork Team 257Capturing and Analysis 257Limitations 257RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 258Demographic Pr<strong>of</strong>ile 258Awareness <strong>of</strong> Rights-Based Institutions 259Importance and Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Institutions 260Conclusion 267250 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7Executive SummaryBACKGROUND TO THE STUDYEnshrined in Chapter 9, Chapter 10 and o<strong>the</strong>r sections <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African Constitution is a list <strong>of</strong>institutions that were initiated to <strong>of</strong>fer democratic support to South African citizens and serve tostreng<strong>the</strong>n constitutional democracy in <strong>the</strong> South African Republic. These institutions include <strong>the</strong>:• Human Right’s Commission• Commission on Gender Equality• National Youth Commission• Public Protector• Independent Electoral Commission• Public Service Commission• Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Right’s <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious andLinguistic Communities• Pan South African Language Board• Auditor-General, and• Independent Authority to Regulate BroadcastingAs part <strong>of</strong> a wider survey to rationalise <strong>the</strong> inclusion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions within <strong>the</strong> constitution,C A S E was commissioned to undertake a nationwide survey to assess <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence,significance and efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.STUDY DESIGNThe study consisted <strong>of</strong> a national household survey. Data from <strong>the</strong> 2001 Census was used as asampling frame and a multi-stage stratified cluster sampling procedure was used to draw <strong>the</strong>sample. The sample was stratified by province, race and type <strong>of</strong> area and eight randomly selectedrespondents (aged 14 years and above) were interviewed in each selected enumerator area. Inaddition, a quota system was used to ensure a gender balance in <strong>the</strong> sample.Data was captured using a Micros<strong>of</strong>t Excel template designed by C A S E and <strong>the</strong>n exported toStata 9 for cleaning and statistical analysis.RESULTSThe following results were obtained from <strong>the</strong> household survey regarding <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong>rights-based institutions and perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance, effectiveness and efficiency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>seinstitutions.REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY251


Demographic Pr<strong>of</strong>ile• The sample was evenly split between males and females.• Ages ranged from 14 years old to 89 years old, with a slightly larger proportion <strong>of</strong> respondentsin <strong>the</strong> 14 – 35 year age group than <strong>the</strong> >35 year age group.• The majority <strong>of</strong> respondents were African followed distantly by Coloured (11%) and White(10%). Indians constituted <strong>the</strong> smallest group (3%).• The majority <strong>of</strong> respondents had some secondary qualification and less than a quarter hadsome primary education. A total <strong>of</strong> 14% had some post-matric education while 4% had n<strong>of</strong>ormal schooling.Awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Rights-Based Institutions• Over three quarters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IndependentElectoral Commission and two thirds had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human Right’s Commission. Just overhalf had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission on Gender Equality and <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission,while a quarter had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board.• A significant relationship was noted between <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions andlevel <strong>of</strong> education at a 95% confidence interval. With an increase in education level, anincrease in level <strong>of</strong> awareness was noted.• A breakdown <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> institutions that respondents were aware <strong>of</strong>, shows a substantiallevel <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>chapter</strong> 9 and <strong>the</strong> associated rights-based institutions. Only16% <strong>of</strong> respondents were not aware <strong>of</strong> at least 1 institution, and more than 50% <strong>of</strong> respondentswere aware <strong>of</strong> 4 or more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 8 institutionsEfficiency <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Rights-Based Institutions• All <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions were rated as important by <strong>the</strong> respondents but not as effective. TheHRC and IEC were rated as effective by 62% and 68% <strong>of</strong> respondents respectively, while halffelt <strong>the</strong> same about <strong>the</strong> NYC and just over a third felt <strong>the</strong> same about <strong>the</strong> CGE. Only 23% feltthat <strong>the</strong> PSLAB was effective in its function.• On average, 90% <strong>of</strong> respondents agreed that <strong>the</strong> institutions could improve <strong>the</strong>ir services by“assisting people to understand and access <strong>the</strong>ir rights, informing <strong>the</strong> public more <strong>of</strong> what<strong>the</strong>y are doing and being more visible.”• In total, 554 respondents had some form <strong>of</strong> contact with one or more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, <strong>the</strong>majority with <strong>the</strong> IEC.• The nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contact was mainly through attendance at a public meeting or event.• More than half <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents that had laid a complaint indicated that <strong>the</strong>y had found iteasy to do so and just over a third indicated that <strong>the</strong>y were informed <strong>of</strong> what was being doneabout this complaint.• Approximately one quarter <strong>of</strong> respondents indicated that <strong>the</strong>y were first contacted about <strong>the</strong>ircomplaint within 2 to 4 weeks or 2 to 3 months and <strong>the</strong> majority indicated that it took lessthan one month to receive a final response.• Most respondents felt that <strong>the</strong> overall manner in which <strong>the</strong>ir complaint was handled was verypoor, while just over a quarter felt <strong>the</strong> manner was good.252 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7CONCLUSIONOverall, awareness was high for <strong>the</strong> IEC and HRC but lower for <strong>the</strong> remaining institutions andoverall awareness increased with an increase in <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> education. Although institutions wereapportioned high importance, <strong>the</strong>ir effectiveness was rated poorly and <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> respondentsagreed that institutions needed to incorporate all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> suggested improvements.Most contact with <strong>the</strong> IEC and <strong>the</strong> HRC mainly in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a public meeting or event andthrough elections. Few respondents laid a formal complaint, but <strong>of</strong> those that did, most were satisfiedwith <strong>the</strong> ease at which <strong>the</strong>y were able to lay this complaint and feedback on <strong>the</strong>ir complaint.For <strong>the</strong> most part, respondents were first contacted about <strong>the</strong>ir complaint between 2 to 4 weeksor 2 to three months after <strong>the</strong>y had placed it, although some stated that <strong>the</strong>y had never beencontacted. In terms <strong>of</strong> finalisation, most respondents indicated that <strong>the</strong>ir complaint was finalisedin less than a week, but again, many never benefited from a finalisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir complaint. Themanner in which complaint were handled was rated mainly as very poor.Overall, it necessary to increase <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> less distinguishable institutions, especially forthose respondents lacking in secondary or tertiary qualifications. It is also necessary to improve<strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> institutions, promote contact and feedback and improve <strong>the</strong> handling <strong>of</strong> complaints,REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY253


Rights-Based Institutions SurveyINTRODUCTIONThe Chapter 9 institutions and associated rights-based institutions that are <strong>the</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> this studyare those institutions established primarily under Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South AfricanConstitution (although <strong>the</strong> mandates <strong>of</strong> some are specified elsewhere) that <strong>of</strong>fer democratic supportto South Africans and serve to streng<strong>the</strong>n constitutional democracy in South Africa.These institutions are independent and should remain impartial at all times, exercising <strong>the</strong>ir powersand performing <strong>the</strong>ir functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 61 Given that state institutions<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> previous government had little credibility, <strong>the</strong>re was a need under <strong>the</strong> new government fornew Constitutional arrangements to support <strong>the</strong> new democracy. These institutions are intendedto <strong>of</strong>fer support and oversight on issues relating to constitutional rights between <strong>the</strong> governmentand <strong>the</strong> general public, and to promote <strong>the</strong> empowerment <strong>of</strong> South Africans.When initiated, it was envisaged that <strong>the</strong>se independent institutions would support constitutionaldemocracy because, amongst o<strong>the</strong>r things, <strong>the</strong>y would help to:• Restore <strong>the</strong> credibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> state and its institutions in <strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> majority <strong>of</strong> citizens• Ensure that democracy and <strong>the</strong> values associated with human rights and democracy flourishin <strong>the</strong> new South Africa• Ensure <strong>the</strong> successful establishment <strong>of</strong> and continued respect for <strong>the</strong> Rule <strong>of</strong> Law• Ensure that <strong>the</strong> state became more open and responsive to <strong>the</strong> needs <strong>of</strong> its citizens and morerespectful <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir rights 62The institutions described in Chapter 9 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African Constitution that <strong>of</strong>fer this constitutionalsupport include:• South African Human Rights Commission (HRC): performs <strong>the</strong> functions relating to humanrights entrenched in Chapter 2 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> constitution. It functions to promote human rightsand to monitor <strong>the</strong> conformation to <strong>the</strong>se rights.• Commission for Gender Equality (CGE): functions to promote respect and promote attainmentfor gender equality.• Public Protector (PP): investigates and reports on improper conduct in state affairs or publicadministration, but may not investigate court decisions.• The Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Right’s <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious andLinguistic Communities: aims to promote respect and tolerance for <strong>the</strong> rights <strong>of</strong> variousgroups within South Africa• The Auditor-General: functions to audit and report on <strong>the</strong> accounts <strong>of</strong> all national, provincialand municipal departments within <strong>the</strong> government <strong>of</strong> South Africa, as well as anyo<strong>the</strong>r institution that falls under national or provincial legislation.• The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC): serves to organise and manage all national,provincial and local election and to ensure that <strong>the</strong>se elections are free and fair.61 Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA). What are <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 Institutions?http://www.idasa.org.za/index.asp?page=faqs_details.asp%3FRID%3D7662 Asmal, K. (2006): Rationale for <strong>the</strong> inclusion <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 Institutions in <strong>the</strong> Constitutionhttp://oldwww.parliament.gov.za/pls/portal/web_app.utl_output_filter2?p_index=speech_index&p_id=643233254 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7Under Chapter 10 <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African Constitution:• Public Service Commission: to promote principles and values in <strong>the</strong> public service byinvestigating, monitoring, evaluating, communicating and reporting on public administration.And to ensure <strong>the</strong> promotion <strong>of</strong> excellence in governance and <strong>the</strong> delivery <strong>of</strong> affordableand sustainable quality services 63 .O<strong>the</strong>r associated rights-based institutions:• National Youth Commission: functions to coordinate, promote and monitor youth developmentthrough <strong>the</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> an integrated youth development framework. Youthis defined as people aged 14 – 35 years.• Pan South African Language Board: promotes multilingualism in South Africa by fostering<strong>the</strong> development <strong>of</strong> all 11 <strong>of</strong>ficial languages, while encouraging <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> manyo<strong>the</strong>r languages spoken in <strong>the</strong> country.For <strong>the</strong> purposes <strong>of</strong> this study, <strong>the</strong> above institutions shall be referred to collectively as ‘rightsbased’institutions.BACKGROUND TO THE STUDYIn 1999, a report submitted to Parliament which detailed, amongst o<strong>the</strong>r issues, <strong>the</strong> ‘oversight’role <strong>of</strong> Parliament (including <strong>the</strong> management <strong>of</strong> constitutional rights-based institutions), proposeda more structured oversight role by Parliament over <strong>the</strong>se institutions. Subsequently, inFebruary 2005 <strong>the</strong> Cabinet tasked <strong>the</strong> Minister <strong>of</strong> Public Service and <strong>Ad</strong>ministration with conductinga review <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions, a responsibility later adopted by Parliament itself due toConstitutional requirements. On 21 September 2006, an ad hoc committee was established with<strong>the</strong> mandate to review State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy, as listed in <strong>the</strong>South African Constitution.AIM AND OBJECTIVESIn this context, <strong>the</strong> Community Agency for Social Enquiry (C A S E) was commissioned by <strong>the</strong>Parliament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong> South Africa to undertake a brief survey <strong>of</strong> public perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>relevant institutions. The aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> study was to assess <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> South African citizens<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, and to obtain perceptions regarding <strong>the</strong> importance and effectiveness<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se rights-based institutions.The specific objectives were to:• Assess <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rights-based institutions amongst <strong>the</strong> public• Determine perceptions regarding <strong>the</strong> importance and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions in<strong>the</strong> eyes <strong>of</strong> South African citizens• Determine perceptions regarding contact with <strong>the</strong>se institutions.63 The Public Service Commission website: http://www.psc.gov.za/REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY255


STUDY DESIGNThe study consisted <strong>of</strong> a national household survey to assess public opinions on <strong>the</strong> above issues.A sample <strong>of</strong> 2500 households was selected using <strong>the</strong> South African Census 2001 64 data as a samplingframe. The sample was drawn by means <strong>of</strong> a multi-stage stratified cluster sampling technique,with <strong>the</strong> sample stratified by province, race and type <strong>of</strong> area. The next step was to selectenumerator areas (EA’s) from each stratum. A total <strong>of</strong> 313 EA’s were selected across all nineprovinces in <strong>the</strong> country, with <strong>the</strong> largest number <strong>of</strong> EA’s selected proportionally from Gautengand KwaZulu-Natal and <strong>the</strong> lowest from <strong>the</strong> Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape. The sample distribution is indicated in<strong>the</strong> table below.Province Enumerator areas InterviewsGauteng 67 536KwaZulu-Natal 66 528Western Cape 40 320Eastern Cape 38 304Limpopo 30 240North West 24 192Mpumalanga 18 144Free State 17 136Nor<strong>the</strong>rn Cape 13 104TOTAL 313 2504Table 1: Number <strong>of</strong> EA’s and interviews, by provinceThe final sampling step involved <strong>the</strong> identification <strong>of</strong> eight stands per EA. Interviewers used arandom interval (calculated by dividing <strong>the</strong> approximate number <strong>of</strong> stands in <strong>the</strong> EA by <strong>the</strong> totalnumber <strong>of</strong> interviews required in that EA) to identify households that should be included in <strong>the</strong>sample. A random number grid was used to select <strong>the</strong> appropriate respondents aged 14 years orolder. If selected respondents were under <strong>the</strong> age <strong>of</strong> 18 years, <strong>the</strong> parent or guardian wasrequired to sign a consent form, formalising <strong>the</strong>ir acceptance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> conditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> study andgiving permission for <strong>the</strong> child to participate.The original sample was drawn based on adults (aged 18 years or older), but this was laterchanged to include respondents aged 14 years and older to ensure that <strong>the</strong> target group <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>National Youth Commission (youth aged 14 – 35 years) were included in <strong>the</strong> study. The distribution<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> two groups is almost <strong>the</strong> same (see table in appendix). A gender quota was also usedto ensure an even gender distribution in <strong>the</strong> sample.The data has to be weighted due to over sampling in some strata to ensure sufficient numbers insmall strata. The weights for this data were calculated as <strong>the</strong> inverse <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> probability <strong>of</strong> selec-64 Census 2001, Statistics South Africa256 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7tion, using <strong>the</strong> same 2001 Census data as used for <strong>the</strong> sample selection.Instrument DesignThe original questionnaire was designed by <strong>the</strong> Research Unit at <strong>the</strong> Parliament <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Republic <strong>of</strong>South Africa and incorporated comments by C A S E researchers.TrainingOne-day training sessions were held in four provinces over a period <strong>of</strong> two weeks in late May.Training aimed to:• Provide a background on <strong>the</strong> rights-based institutions covered in <strong>the</strong> study• Generate a through understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> aims <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questionnaire, <strong>the</strong> structure and <strong>the</strong>administering <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> questionnaire.• Establish a comprehensive understanding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> random selection procedures; and• Discuss translations issues to ensure a common understanding <strong>of</strong> conceptsIn total, 70 fieldworkers were employed nationwide to administer <strong>the</strong> questionnaires.Capturing and AnalysisData was captured electronically internally on a Micros<strong>of</strong>t Excel spreadsheet designed by C A S E.The data was <strong>the</strong>n transferred to Stata 9 for cleaning and statistical analysis.We have generally reported on <strong>the</strong> percentage distribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> data across <strong>the</strong> institutions.Significance tests have been conducted to determine <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> demographic variation(primarily in terms <strong>of</strong> sex, age and education) and only results that are statistically significant at<strong>the</strong> 95% level have been reported (i.e. results that we are 95% sure are not due to chance).These significance tests have been adjusted to take into account <strong>the</strong> sampling errors due to <strong>the</strong>sampling design using <strong>the</strong> survey analysis procedures in Stata.LimitationsThis study was carried out over a period <strong>of</strong> just over one month under extremely tight deadlines,making <strong>the</strong> fieldwork a challenge and limiting <strong>the</strong> time allowed for analysis. This was exacerbatedby <strong>the</strong> public sector strike which took place at <strong>the</strong> same time.A second limitation was that although <strong>the</strong>re was a desire to include children (not just youth) in<strong>the</strong> survey, this was not possible due to logistical reasons at <strong>the</strong> time this was communicated. Forthis reason, <strong>the</strong> findings from this study are relevant only to those living in South Africa who areaged fourteen years and above.REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY257


Results <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> SurveyThis section considers <strong>the</strong> findings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>2007</strong> household survey <strong>of</strong> public perceptions <strong>of</strong> selectedrights-based institutions conducted in nine provinces across South Africa. After describing <strong>the</strong>demographic pr<strong>of</strong>ile, <strong>the</strong> findings are presented under three sections, namely awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>institutions, perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions and contact withinstitutions. Using <strong>the</strong> weighted data, <strong>the</strong> sample consisted <strong>of</strong> a total <strong>of</strong> 2457 interviews.DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILEN %GenderFemale 1214 50%Male 1237 50%N 2451 100%RaceAfrican 1838 75%Coloured 271 11%White 240 10%Indian 100 4%N 2454 100%EducationNo Formal Schooling 102 4%Primary School 481 20%Secondary School 1519 62%Tertiary Diploma 235 10%Undergraduate Degree 77 3%Postgraduate Degree 22 1%O<strong>the</strong>r (Specify) 1 0%N 2437 100%Table 2: Demographic Pr<strong>of</strong>ile <strong>of</strong> RespondentsThe sample was evenly split between males and females. The majority <strong>of</strong> respondents wereAfrican (75%), followed by Coloureds who constituted 11% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sample. Overall, <strong>the</strong> racial distributionfollowed <strong>the</strong> general distribution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> South African population.Most respondents (62%) had some form <strong>of</strong> secondary education, while 14% had a tertiary qualificationin <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a tertiary diploma or undergraduate or postgraduate degree. Few respondents(4%) had no formal education. A single respondent reported being an “apprentice” but didnot reflect <strong>the</strong>ir education level and was recorded as “o<strong>the</strong>r.”258 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7Awareness <strong>of</strong> Rights-Based InstitutionsAWARENESS OF INSTITUTIONS80604020065 53 54 42 74 38 34 26SOURCE: COMMUNITY AGENGY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRYHRC CGE NYC PPIEC PSC CPP PSALBFigure 1: Awareness <strong>of</strong> Right-based InstitutionsThree quarters <strong>of</strong> respondents (74%) indicated that <strong>the</strong>y had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Independent ElectoralCommission (IEC), while two thirds <strong>of</strong> respondents (65%) had heard <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Human RightsCommission (HRC). Just over half <strong>the</strong> respondents were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission on GenderEquality (CGE, 53%) and <strong>the</strong> National Youth Commission (NYC, 54%).It is important to note that a question that asks whe<strong>the</strong>r respondents have heard <strong>of</strong> an institutionis likely to overestimate <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> people who are familiar with <strong>the</strong> institution, as respondentsmay confuse <strong>the</strong> institution with o<strong>the</strong>r bodies or simply fall into a pattern <strong>of</strong> positiveresponses. The levels <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CPP) and <strong>the</strong> Public Service Commission(PSC) appear particularly high, but in <strong>the</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> a question in which respondents are askedto explain <strong>the</strong> functions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, it is difficult to determine <strong>the</strong> accuracy <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> reportedawareness.When comparing <strong>the</strong> mean <strong>of</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> awareness with <strong>the</strong> demographic results, <strong>the</strong>re was norelationship between awareness and gender or age.% 95% Confidence IntervalComparison <strong>of</strong> Level <strong>of</strong> Education with Awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> HRCNo formal education 29% 17% 42%Primary 45% 39% 52%Secondary 68% 65% 72%Tertiary 91% 86% 95%Table 3: Proportion Aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> HRC, by education levelREPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY259


There was, however, and association between awareness and <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> education <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>respondents. Overall, as <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> education increased so to did <strong>the</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions,as illustrated by <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> HRC indicated in <strong>the</strong> table above. A similarpattern was observed for all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions.N %Overall Awareness InstitutionsNone (0) 402 16%Low (1-3) 704 28%Medium (4-6) 822 35%High (7-8) 529 21%Total 2457 100%Table 4: Overall Awareness <strong>of</strong> InstitutionsThere is, in general, a substantial level <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 and associated rights-basedinstitutions. Only 16% <strong>of</strong> respondents were not aware <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, and more than50% <strong>of</strong> respondents were aware <strong>of</strong> 4 or more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 8 institutions.IMPORTANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INSTITUTIONSIn this section we will examine respondents’ perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> importance and effectiveness <strong>of</strong><strong>the</strong> Chapter 9 institutions.With respect to <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions, respondents who had indicated that <strong>the</strong>ywere aware <strong>of</strong> a particular institution were asked to indicate whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y thought <strong>the</strong> institutionwas “Not Important”, “Important”, “Very Important” or that <strong>the</strong>y had no opinion on <strong>the</strong> matter.In <strong>the</strong> following analysis we created a dichotomous classification <strong>of</strong> “Important” (those whoresponded “Important” or “Very Important”) and “Not Important” (those who responded “NotImportant” or “Don’t Know”). Responses to this question may have been biased towards“Important” because <strong>the</strong>re were two categories specifying important and only one categoryexplicitly specifying a lack <strong>of</strong> importance.A similar approach was adopted with <strong>the</strong> effectiveness <strong>of</strong> institutions. Respondents were given achoice <strong>of</strong> “Not Effective”, “Slightly Effective”, “Effective”, “Very Effective” and a category for noopinion. Again we created a dichotomous variable consisting <strong>of</strong> “Effective” (containing <strong>the</strong>responses “Effective” and “Very Effective”) and “Not Effective” (containing <strong>the</strong> categories “NotEffective”, “Slightly Effective” and “Do Not Know”).There are two possible ways in which <strong>the</strong> responses to <strong>the</strong>se questions may be represented, both<strong>of</strong> which have merit. For example, we can calculate <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> respondents who thought<strong>the</strong> institution was effective out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total who were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution or out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total260 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7population. In <strong>the</strong> first case we restrict our attention only to those respondents who were aware<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> particular institution and assume that <strong>the</strong> remaining respondents cannot respond in anymeaningful way on <strong>the</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution. This method will tend to over-estimate <strong>the</strong>population estimate <strong>of</strong> importance since we are assuming that <strong>the</strong> population who are not aware<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution would, if <strong>the</strong>y were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution, have <strong>the</strong> same general opinions asthose who are aware.The second option (calculating <strong>the</strong> proportion out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total population) assumes that all respondentswho are not aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institution would think that <strong>the</strong> institution is not important. Thismethod will tend to under-estimate <strong>the</strong> population estimate <strong>of</strong> importance.In <strong>the</strong> analysis that follows we will report on both sets <strong>of</strong> statistics and recommend that, in communicating<strong>the</strong>se results, <strong>the</strong> basis on which basis <strong>the</strong> calculation was performed is clearly specified.% RATING INSTITUTION AS IMPORTANT100968893 96 94909590806862605040384033 312320% OF THOSE AWARE0HRCCGE NYC PP IEC PSC CPP PSALB% OF POPULATIONSOURCE: COMMUNITY AGENGY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRYFigure 2: Importance <strong>of</strong> InstitutionsAlmost all (between 88% and 96%) <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents who were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutionsthought that <strong>the</strong> institution was important. However, when considering <strong>the</strong> total population, <strong>the</strong>proportions who think that <strong>the</strong> institution is important is significantly lower, from approximately20% for <strong>the</strong> Pan South African Language Board (PSALB) to 68% for <strong>the</strong> IEC.REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY261


% RATING INSTITUTION AS EFFECTIVE1008060676460 62805959 5990444034 32 272022 2015% OF THOSE AWARE0HRCCGE NYC PP IEC PSC CPP PSALB% OF POPULATIONSOURCE: COMMUNITY AGENGY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRYFigure 3: Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 InstitutionsAmong respondents who were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, a large proportion (80%) felt that <strong>the</strong> IECwas effective and just over two thirds (67%) felt that <strong>the</strong> HRC was effective in <strong>the</strong>ir functioning.As with <strong>the</strong> ratings on importance, <strong>the</strong> proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total population who felt that <strong>the</strong> variousinstitutions were important is significantly lower. A small proportion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total population feltthat <strong>the</strong> CPP (20%) or PSALB (15%) were effective or slightly effective in <strong>the</strong>ir performance, butin this case <strong>the</strong> perceptions <strong>of</strong> lower levels <strong>of</strong> effectiveness are likely to be a function <strong>of</strong> respondents’lack <strong>of</strong> awareness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions.Mean 95% Confidence IntervalComparison <strong>of</strong> Age with Perceived Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NYCYouth (14 years – 35 years) 77% 70% 84%<strong>Ad</strong>ults (> 35 years) 52% 40% 63%Table 5: Perceptions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> NYC, by ageThere was no significant relationship between perceived effectiveness and gender or level <strong>of</strong>education. A relationship was noted, however, between age and effectiveness with regards to <strong>the</strong>National Youth commission, in which perceived effectiveness was higher for respondents within<strong>the</strong> category <strong>of</strong> ‘youth’ (aged 14 – 35 years) than amongst older respondents.262 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7RATING OF OVERALL MANNER OF HANDLING COMPLAINT1008890 91898060BE MORE VISIBLE4020INFORM THE PUBLIC MOREASSIST PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THEIR RIGHTSASSIST PEOPLE TO ACCESS THEIR RIGHTS0SOURCE: COMMUNITY AGENGY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRYFigure 4: Aspects Institutions could address to Improve <strong>the</strong>ir ServicesWhen presented with four statements relating to what institutions could do to improve <strong>the</strong>ir serviceor performance, almost all respondents (between 88% and 91%) agreed with <strong>the</strong> statements.Because <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> agreement were so high, <strong>the</strong>re were no gender or age differences in terms<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> improvement suggestions provided.CONTACT WITH INSTITUTIONSN %Have you had any contact with any <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se bodies?Independent Electoral Commission 368 66%Human Rights Commission 98 17%National Youth Commission 57 10%Public Protector 55 10%Commission on Gender Equality 39 7%Public Service Commission 39 7%Commission for <strong>the</strong> Promotion and Protection <strong>of</strong>Rights <strong>of</strong> Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities 19 4%Pan South African Language Board 7 1%Total 554Table 6: Contact with InstitutionsREPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY263


When asked if respondents had had any contact with <strong>the</strong> institutions, 554 respondents indicatedthat <strong>the</strong>y had. The majority (66%) indicated that <strong>the</strong>y had had contact with <strong>the</strong> IEC. A smallerproportion had contact with <strong>the</strong> remaining institutions, <strong>the</strong> lowest being <strong>the</strong> PSALB.% CONTACTING THE INSTITUTION252020151510506HRC453442 2 22 21 10CGE NYC PP IEC PSC CPP PSALB% OF THOSE AWARE% OF POPULATIONFigure 5: Proportion who have contacted <strong>the</strong> InstitutionsSOURCE: COMMUNITY AGENGY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRYAmong respondents who were aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions, very few had had any contact with <strong>the</strong>institutions save <strong>the</strong> IEC. This level <strong>of</strong> contact, higher than <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r institutions, could be due to<strong>the</strong> elections which respondents perceived as a form <strong>of</strong> contact with <strong>the</strong> IEC.N % <strong>of</strong> all % <strong>of</strong> thoserespondents who madecontact 65What was <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> this contact?Attended a Public Meeting or Event 256 10% 46%O<strong>the</strong>r 195 8% 35%Sent a Complaint 86 4% 16%Table 7: Nature <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Contact with InstitutionsWhen questioned about <strong>the</strong> nature <strong>of</strong> this contact, most respondents (10% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total populationand 46% <strong>of</strong> those who indicated having made contact) had attended a meeting or public even<strong>the</strong>ld by or dealing with a particular institution. Only 16% <strong>of</strong> respondents who had made contactdid so by sending a formal complaint to one or more <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> institutions. Upon closer analysis <strong>the</strong>“o<strong>the</strong>r” category consisted mainly <strong>of</strong> responses relating to voting in <strong>the</strong> elections as a form <strong>of</strong>contact.65 Proportions do not add up to 100% as not all respondents who indicated having contact with an institution responded to this question.264 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7If you had complained, did you find it easy to do so?Yes 50 59%N 86 100%Were you told what was being done about your complaint?Yes 55 67%N 86 100%Table 8: Ease <strong>of</strong> Complaining and Feedback to ComplaintUnder two-thirds <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents who had laid a complaint indicated that <strong>the</strong>y had found iteasy to do so and over a third indicated that <strong>the</strong>y were informed <strong>of</strong> what was being done aboutthis complaint.N %How long before you were first contacted about your complaint?Less than one week 10 10%2 - 4 weeks 27 27%2 - 3 months 25 25%More than 3 months 7 7%More than 6 months 3 3%Never 22 22%Recent Complaint 7 7%N 101 100%How long before you were given a final response?Less than a month 27 36%2 – 3 months 11 16%More than 3 months 10 13%More than 6 months 1 1%Never 28 34%N 77 100%Table 9: Duration before first contact and responseApproximately a quarter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> respondents said that <strong>the</strong>y were first contacted about <strong>the</strong>ir complaint2 to 4 weeks after it was laid. Just under that proportion indicated that <strong>the</strong>y had neverbeen contacted.Approximately a third indicated that <strong>the</strong>ir complaint took less than one month to finalise and justover one-third indicated that <strong>the</strong>ir complaint was never finalised.REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY265


RATING OF OVERALL MANNER OF HANDLING COMPLAINT403530201017132311EXCELLENTGOODFAIRPOORVERY POOR0SOURCE: COMMUNITY AGENGY FOR SOCIAL ENQUIRYFigure 6: Rating <strong>of</strong> overall handling <strong>of</strong> complaintWhen asked to rate <strong>the</strong> overall manner in which <strong>the</strong>ir complaint was handled, a third indicatedthat <strong>the</strong> handling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint was good or excellent, while almost half (46%) felt that <strong>the</strong>overall handling was poor.266 <strong>Report</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ad hoc <strong>Committee</strong> on <strong>the</strong> Review <strong>of</strong> Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions


ANNEXURE 7CONCLUSIONSIn terms <strong>of</strong> awareness, <strong>the</strong> most widely recognised institutions were <strong>the</strong> IEC and HRC. It is importantto increase <strong>the</strong> visibility <strong>of</strong> less prominent institutions that provide essential constitutionalservices to South African citizens or ensure that government departments are being properlymanaged and regulated. This is especially applicable to <strong>the</strong> CPP and PSLAB, given that indigenouscultures in South African have been historically marginalised and disempowered. As illustrated by<strong>the</strong> significant link between awareness and level <strong>of</strong> education, it is also necessary to reach <strong>the</strong>less educated proportions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> population as <strong>of</strong>ten it is <strong>the</strong>se groups that are least empowered.The findings indicate that <strong>the</strong> identified institutions are clearly regarded by <strong>the</strong> general public asimportant for <strong>the</strong> success <strong>of</strong> South Africa’s young democracy. However, <strong>the</strong> perceived levels <strong>of</strong>effectiveness <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se institutions tended to be lower. There is a perception that while <strong>the</strong>se institutionshave a vital role to play in <strong>of</strong>fering support to citizens, <strong>the</strong>y are falling short <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir mandate.This is reflected in <strong>the</strong> extremely high level <strong>of</strong> agreement with <strong>the</strong> four suggestions forimprovement in <strong>the</strong> services provided by <strong>the</strong> rights-based institutions. On average, 90% <strong>of</strong>respondents agreed that <strong>the</strong> concerned institutions should increase <strong>the</strong>ir visibility, assist citizens tounderstand <strong>the</strong>ir rights and access <strong>the</strong>se rights, and do more to inform <strong>the</strong> public <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir activities.The IEC was <strong>the</strong> institution with which <strong>the</strong> highest levels <strong>of</strong> contact were reported, primarilythrough election mechanisms. The main form <strong>of</strong> contact with <strong>the</strong> institutions was through a publicmeeting or event or with <strong>the</strong> IEC through national, provincial or local elections. A very small proportion<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> total population had made use <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> mechanisms to lodge complaints.Most <strong>of</strong> those who laid a complaint agreed that <strong>the</strong>y found it easy to do so and indicated that<strong>the</strong>y were told what was being done about <strong>the</strong> complaint. However, some frustration with <strong>the</strong>process was evident, in that almost half (46%) felt that <strong>the</strong> overall handling <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> complaint waspoor.On <strong>the</strong> whole, <strong>the</strong> levels <strong>of</strong> awareness can be improved with regards to certain smaller institutionsand amongst specific groups, such as those with lower levels <strong>of</strong> education (and possiblelower access to information). The key areas for improvement, however, lie in <strong>the</strong> perceptions <strong>of</strong>effectiveness, <strong>the</strong> current lack <strong>of</strong> visibility and direct interaction with members <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public.REPORT ON PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY267

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