directed-energy-weapons

HPM weapons appear much harder to defend against. Shielding can work, but it is difficult to fully shield either platformsor facilities. There are few systems, particularly conventional weapons, which employ hardened electronics.U.S. nuclear-capable platforms have been hardened against electromagnetic pulse. So too have U.S. Navy ships. Mostplatforms are not so hardened. It is very expensive to provide such protection. It is likely that only a small number ofplatforms will have even modest hardening.A fixed facility such as a command bunker could be built inside a metal grid, a sort of “Faraday cage,” in order to besecure against electromagnetic energy. But this is costly. By shutting itself off from the external world, a command centereffectively places itself out of action. Or the command center could stock spare electronic devices such as radios andcomputers in the event of an HPM attack. But it is unlikely that even the best-equipped facility could withstand morethan one such event.Deployment of fiber optic communications networks also can reduce the effects of HPM weapons. But unless thefacilities at either end of a fiber optic cable are also hardened, it may make little difference in terms of the overall vulnerabilityof the network to attack.The deployment of obscurants or the use of hardening techniques as a countermeasure against laser weapons is neithereasy nor cost-free to the defender. It would be extremely difficult to effectively shield aircraft, helicopters or tacticalmissiles against laser weapons. The same problem exists for light-skinned ground vehicles. It might be possible toincorporate polarizing materials in the canopies of helicopters and aircraft that could reduce the risk of damage toavionics. Providing hardened electronics for vehicle computers, radios and sensor systems would be possible but alsowould be very expensive.Directed-energy weapons are not the proverbial “silver bullet.” They have a number of potentially very useful, even revolutionary,applications. Like all other weapons systems, they also have limitations and can be affected by countermeasures.However, on balance, their potential impact on the battlefield far outweighs the possibility that they may confrontcountermeasures.IV.THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECTED ENERGYAn assessment of the current state of U.S. directed-energy technology and its potential to change the nature of modernwarfare must conclude that directed-energy weapons are the essence of transformation. Directed-energy weaponsoffer the potential for the most dramatic transformation of modern militaries since the advent of electronics and possiblyeven gunpowder. The deployment of weapon systems with extremely long ranges, speed-of-light engagement,deep magazines and, in some instances, no obvious countermeasure would naturally revolutionize the way militaryforces are equipped, organized, supplied and operated.One of the most interesting and potentially transformative features of some directed-energy weapons is their ability tobe employed as both sensor and weapons systems. U.S. military leaders have spoken at length of the importance ofshortening the sensor-to-shooter time line. The first and easiest way of doing this is by allowing the sensor to communicatedirectly with the shooter. The next step in shortening the time line is to place both the sensor and theweapon on the same platform. An example of this is the ABL. The final step in this process is to make the sensorThe Military Uses and National-Security Implications of Directed-Energy Weapons33