Journal of Identity and Migration Studies - Research Centre on ...

Journal of Identity and Migration Studies - Research Centre on ...

RCIMIong>Researchong> ong>Centreong> on ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> IssuesUniversity ong>ofong> Oradeaong>Journalong> ong>ofong>ong>Identityong> ong>andong>ong>Migrationong>ong>Studiesong>University ong>ofong> Oradea Publishing HouseVolume 4, number 1, 2010

JOURNAL OF IDENTITY AND MIGRATION STUDIESThe ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong> (JIMS) is an online review published semi-annually underthe auspices ong>ofong> the ong>Researchong> ong>Centreong> on ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> Issues – RCIMI, from the Faculty ong>ofong>Political Science ong>andong> Communication Sciences, University ong>ofong> Oradea, Romania.DirectorLia Pop, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaEditor-In-ChiefCristina Matiuta, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaDeputy Editor-In-ChiefMarius Tatar, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaEditorial BoardGabriel Badescu, Babes-Bolyai University, RomaniaBernardo Cardinale, University ong>ofong> Teramo, ItalyRadu Cinpoes, Kingston University, London, UKAlexong>andong>ru Ilies, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaZaiga Krisjane, University ong>ofong> Latvia, LatviaMihaela Stefanescu, Soros Foundation, RomaniaJan Wendt, University ong>ofong> Gdansk, Polong>andong>Luca Zarrilli, University ong>ofong> Chieti-Pescara, ItalyAssistant EditorsIoana Albu, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaDan Apateanu, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaIoan Laza, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaIrina Pop, University ong>ofong> Oradea, RomaniaThe responsibility for the content ong>ofong> the contributions published in JIMS belongs exclusively to theauthors. The views expressed in the articles ong>andong> other contributions are those ong>ofong> the authors ong>andong> donot necessarily reflect the views ong>ofong> the editors ong>ofong> JIMS.JIMS - JOURNAL OF IDENTITY AND MIGRATION STUDIESong>Researchong> ong>Centreong> on ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> Issues - RCIMIFaculty ong>ofong> Political Science ong>andong> Communication ScienceUniversity ong>ofong> OradeaAddress:Str. Traian Blajovici nr. 2Oradea, 410238RomaniaTel./Fax: +40 259 455 525E-mail:; contact@e-migration.roWebsite: www.jims.e-migration.roCopyright © JIMS, 2010. No parts ong>ofong> this publication can be reproduced without the writtenpermission ong>ofong> the editors.ISSN 1843 – 5610

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010TABLE OF CONTENTSTHEMATIC ARTICLES –NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: MIGRANTS AND HOST SOCIETIES ...... 2Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> Canada:Impossibly Utopian or Simply Social Justice?, Habiba ZAMAN .............................. 2Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: the Case ong>ofong> Arab Woman, MohamedBENITTO ................................................................................................................ 20Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian Economy: SkilledMigrants in Malaysia, Chuie-Hong TAN ................................................................. 35Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable Immigration in aSmall Canadian City, Ritendra TAMANG .............................................................. 51RESEARCH ARTICLES .................................................................................................. 73Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian Entrepreneurs in Japan,Naoto HIGUCHI ..................................................................................................... 73A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> Globalisation on TransnationalIdentities: The Jamaican Example, Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICK ............................ 91The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong> between the EU ong>andong> theMENA Region, Tamirace FAKHOURY .................................................................. 110ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, Ecuador (1997-2008), Óscar ÁLVAREZGILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANA ....................... 137NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ..................................................................................... 154

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010THEMATIC ARTICLES – NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES:MIGRANTS AND HOST SOCIETIESAsian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong>Canada: Impossibly Utopian or Simply Social Justice? 1Habiba ZAMAN 2Abstract. Both Australia ong>andong> Canada have adopted extensive immigration policies as well asa policy ong>ofong> multiculturalism to maintain “harmony” between immigrants ong>andong> the widersociety. Currently, the majority ong>ofong> immigrants to Australia ong>andong> Canada are from Asia. In fact,six ong>ofong> the ten top-ranking migrant-sending countries for Australia ong>andong> Canada are located inAsia. Building on exploratory research undertaken in Australia ong>andong> Canada, this paper findsthat class predominates over race in the recruiting ong>ofong> immigrants in both Australia ong>andong>Canada. However, Asian immigrants as well as advocacy groups including left, progressive,ong>andong> social activists are challenging the neo-liberal agenda. These groups have a vision forcreating an alternative society based on social justice.Keywords: Asian immigrants, multiculturalism, social justice, Australia, Canada1 This paper is an outcome ong>ofong> a SSHRC (Social Sciences ong>andong> Human ong>Researchong> Council ong>ofong>Canada)—MCRI (Major Collaborative ong>Researchong> Initiative)—funded internationalmultidisciplinary project titled Neo-liberal Globalism ong>andong> Its Challengers, generally knownas the Globalism Project, from 2000-2005. The paper was presented to an internationalconference titled Building an Alternative World at the University ong>ofong> Adelaide, Adelaide,Australia, April 18-21, 2005. Also, I presented part ong>ofong> this paper to several nationalconferences/meetings in Canada, such as Canadian Sociology ong>andong> Anthropology meetings,Canadian Women‘s Association Meetings in 2006 ong>andong> 2007.2 In 2005 (January-February), I was a visiting Prong>ofong>essor at the University ong>ofong> Technology,Sydney. During my stay in Sydney, I received generous support from James Goodman(University ong>ofong> Technology), Kate Lee, Stuart Rosewarne (University ong>ofong> Sydney), ong>andong> FrankStilwell (University ong>ofong> Sydney). Especially, my sincere gratitude ong>andong> thanks go to JamesGoodman ong>andong> Kate Lee who provided me with both academic ong>andong> logistic support ong>andong>services. However, I alone am responsible for any interpretations in this paper.2

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010IntroductionAustralia ong>andong> Canada are two major immigrant-receiving countries withgoals ong>ofong> attracting workers with certain skills from the international labourmarket ong>andong> meeting specific target numbers for these workers in any givenyear. In fact, both Australia ong>andong> Canada actively seek to attract immigrants 3with what one may identify as “population policies” 4 . Currently, the majority ong>ofong>immigrants in Australia ong>andong> Canada are from Asia, ong>andong> at least six ong>ofong> the tentop-ranking migrant-sending countries are located in Asia. Unlike the UnitedStates, the “skilled” category constitutes a major proportion ong>ofong> currentimmigrant population in Australia ong>andong> Canada (Antecol, 2003). To maintain“harmony” 5 between immigrants ong>andong> the wider society, both Australia ong>andong>Canada have adopted a policy ong>ofong> multiculturalism.In my exploration ong>ofong> the issues ong>ofong> immigration ong>andong> multiculturalism inAustralia ong>andong> Canada, I use class as a central category ong>ofong> analysis because itinteracts with other axes ong>ofong> power such as gender ong>andong> race. I argue, in thispaper, that under neo-liberal policies, class overshadows race ong>andong> bypassesgender in the recruiting ong>ofong> immigrants in both Australia ong>andong> Canada. Further,the restructuring ong>ofong> multiculturalism as part ong>ofong> neo-liberal strategies riskscreating a monoculture ong>andong> challenging the central aspect ong>ofong> the welfare state -- social justice.Key Questions ong>andong> FrameworkThis paper primarily addresses the following key questions: (i) To whatextent is immigration a market-driven agenda that ignores the role ong>ofong> social3 Generally, immigrants are legal permanent residents. In this paper, ―immigrants/ citizens,‖whose country ong>ofong> origin is in Asia, ong>andong> ―migrants,‖ who have the potential to get permanentresidency, have been used synonymously. The term ―immigrant‖ has been used to describethe Asian migrant population, who is visibly different in terms ong>ofong> skin colour, language,accent, dress, culture ong>andong> so on4 In 1997, in rejecting the Jones report titled Australia’s Carrying Capacity: One Nation –Two Ecologies, the Minister for Immigration ong>andong> Multicultural Affairs, Philip Ruddock,pointed out that given the projected fertility rate in Australia ong>andong> its immigration policy,population growth would still decline over the next 30 to 50 years.5 During my research in Sydney, Australia, an Australian academic used this term ong>andong>illustrated that the Australian government now focuses on harmony rather than onmulticulturalism.3

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Immigration Policies in Australia ong>andong> Canada: Non-discriminatory ong>andong> Market-drivenAustraliaUntil the end ong>ofong> the 1960s, Australia’s immigration policies were overtlyracist, deliberately promoting “White Australia” ong>andong> not receptive to migrants fromAsia, Africa ong>andong> Latin America. The residency requirement for non-Europeans wasfive years as opposed to one year for Europeans. Further, under the guise ong>ofong>maintaining “social cohesiveness”, a policy ong>ofong> assimilation was introduced for asmall number ong>ofong> immigrants ong>ofong> colour (Castles et al., 1994). This assimilation policyfailed for two reasons: (1) the labour market became segmented along gender,race ong>andong> class lines, which restricted racialized immigrants in their upgrading ong>ofong>language ong>andong> educational skills; (2) non-British citizens continued to be segregatedin where they lived ong>andong> in their social interactions. The White Australia policyended when the Labour Party won in the 1972 election ong>andong> in the mid-‘70s,introduced several non-discriminatory immigration policies. 7 For example, theAustralian Citizenship Act ong>ofong> 1948 was amended in 1973; as a result, all immigrantsirrespective ong>ofong> nationality became eligible to apply for Australian citizenship. Inaddition to moral grounds ong>andong> an international political climate where overt racismwas becoming unacceptable 8 , Australia’s abolition ong>ofong> the racist policy was linkedwith two major international factors. First, the British government entered into theEuropean Common Market ong>andong> loosened its relationship to its former colonies inAsia. Second, to place Australia in the geopolitical world, Australia aspired to link itsforeign ong>andong> trade policies with those ong>ofong> Asian countries (Dutton, 2002:84-85).Consequently, in 1975, the Australian government passed the Racial DiscriminationAct prohibiting discrimination based on colour, descent, race, ong>andong> national orethnic origin. This act shifted immigration policy from Eurocentric to nondiscriminatoryong>andong> allowed increased numbers ong>ofong> immigrants from Asia. Forexample, during the period from 1973 to 1999, out ong>ofong> 2.4 million immigrants,approximately 796,000 immigrants (about 33 percent) came from Asia (Dutton,2002:88).Under its non-discriminatory immigration policies Australia was graduallytransformed from a monocultural society to one characterized by diverse countries7 Both the Labour Party ong>andong> its advocate for anti-racist policy worked tirelessly to eliminatediscriminatory immigration policy based on race (Dutton, 2002).8 Dutton (2002) illustrated several moral grounds ong>andong> described the international politicalclimate ong>ofong> those times in a chapter entitled ―The End ong>ofong> White Australia‖.5

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>ofong> origin. As the table below shows, from July 2001 to July 2002, New Zealong>andong>constituted 17.6 percent ong>ofong> settler arrivals by country ong>ofong> birth, while othercountries ranged from the UK at 9.8 percent to Malaysia at 2.2 percent.Table 1. July 2001 to June 2002 settler arrivals, by country ong>ofong> birthCountryPercentageNew Zealong>andong> 17.6%United Kingdom 9.8%China 7.5%South Africa 6.4%India 5.7%Indonesia 4.7%Philippines 3.2%Fed. Rep. Of Yugoslavia 2.3%Sri Lanka 2.3%Malaysia 2.2%Source: Department ong>ofong> Immigration ong>andong> Multicultural ong>andong> Indigenous Affairs 2003However, the table clearly shows that immigrants from Asia comprise asignificant number -- about 26 percent. The increasing number ong>ofong> Asians hasresulted in increasing debate among some Australian-born citizens about the“Asianizationong>ofong> Australia. Dutton eloquently describes the debate as having twomajor points: first, to some this trend has disrupted social cohesion ong>andong> facilitatedethnic or racial concentration in certain areas; second, non-discriminatoryimmigration policies ong>andong> later on, multiculturalism, have “privileged” ethnic groupswhile diminishing Australian national identity (2002:89).Based on overall labour market outcomes ong>andong> under pressures frombusiness groups, the Australian government has begun favouring skilled migrationover family reunion migration (Department ong>ofong> Immigration ong>andong> Multicultural ong>andong>Indigenous Affairs, 2000). For example, in 1999, nearly 69 percent ong>ofong> immigrantsbelonged to the family stream ong>andong> only 29 percent were in the skilled stream (Jupp,2002:160). By 2000-2001, more than 50 percent ong>ofong> new migrants were selectedfrom the skilled stream ong>andong> 44 percent from the family stream (Department ong>ofong>Immigration ong>andong> Multicultural ong>andong> Indigenous Affairs, 2000). This patterncontinued in 2001-2002, with 57 percent in the skilled stream ong>andong> 41 percent in the6

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010family stream – apparently contradicting the family values commitment ong>ofong> theCoalition government (Jupp, 2002:160). In 2001-2002, ong>ofong> all skilled migrants, 38percent were from Asia 9 . The concept ong>ofong> “skill” is ambiguous ong>andong> relies heavily onImmigration ong>ofong>ficers’ interpretations 10 , which mostly favour men. As Fincher states,“It is clear that males dominate migrant entry: ‘active’ immigrant entrants are morefrequently men, not because men are more active but because ong>ofong> theadministrative interpretation ong>ofong> activity as something which males best comply!”(1997:223). Despite their credentials, Asian migrants in Australia are sharplydivided into two broad ong>andong> distinct categories: (i) one group is highly educated ong>andong>is concentrated in prong>ofong>essional ong>andong> white-collar jobs; (ii) the other group consists ong>ofong>labourers in semi-skilled ong>andong> unskilled occupations (for details, Jayasuriya ong>andong>Pookong, 1999; Jupp, 2002). The majority ong>ofong> Asian women immigrants areconcentrated in semi-skilled ong>andong> unskilled occupations, i.e., in low-paid, temporaryjobs. One reason is that they generally enter as spouses ong>andong> family members. Asianwomen, mostly migrating as spouses or family members, are at disadvantage forprimarily two reasons: (i) Asian countries systematically ong>andong> structurallydiscriminate against women, ong>andong> this discrimination perpetuates women’ssecondary position in the labour market in the country ong>ofong> origin; (ii) most Asianmen have more credentials than most Asian women – in other words, “skills” thatcommong>andong> higher salaries ong>andong> better working conditions.With a Liberal government 11 in power in Australia, major cuts have beenintroduced along with a program ong>ofong> deregulation ong>andong> privatization heralding theembracing ong>ofong> neo-liberal policies. For example, fees for English courses weredrastically increased ong>andong> many occupational English courses were discontinued.The waiting period for eligibility for social security benefits ong>andong> entitlements wasextended from six months, first introduced by the Keating government, to twoyears after the election ong>ofong> the Coalition in 1996 (Jupp, 2002) 12 . Jupp attributes this9 Out ong>ofong> this 38 percent, 22 percent were from South-East Asia ong>andong> 16 percent were fromNorth-East Asian ong>andong> Southern Asia (Australian Bureau ong>ofong> retrieved on December 13, 2004).10 The National Film Board ong>ofong> Canada‘s film titled Who Gets In (1989) illustrates poignantlyhow immigration ong>ofong>ficers‘ interpretations influence the decision-making process.11 The Liberal government in Australia leans towards conservative policies – comparable toCanada‘s Conservative party.12 A new immigrant is not entitled to seek unemployment benefits for the first two years ong>andong>is barred from a number ong>ofong> basic entitlements. Interviewees identified this situation as ―thetwo-year waiting period‖.7

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010change to “American notions ong>ofong> ‘cost-free immigrationong>andong> ‘user pays’”, ideasintended to recover full cost on some services (2002:152). Cost-free migration aswell as the two-year waiting period for basic entitlements reinforces neo-liberalideology, which perceives immigrants as responsible for their own settlement,training ong>andong> employment. In the case ong>ofong> new immigrants ong>andong> their settlements, theneo-liberal ideology ong>ofong> the Australian government is becoming similar to thesystem in the US. To reduce settlement costs, the government is providingimmigration status to overseas students in Australia who already have Australiantraining, degree, language ability, ong>andong> work experience. This procedure allowsgovernment to reduce its cost for overseas embassies ong>andong> save its settlementservices while receiving new immigrants’ skills immediately as the economydesperately searches for skilled immigrants. The introduction ong>ofong> the point system in1999 emphasizes skills ong>andong> familiarity with the English language, ong>andong> thuseliminates prospective unskilled migrants from Asia, especially women. Indeed, asJupp points out: “A high proportion ong>ofong> recent refugees have been from the middleclasses, many ong>ofong> them familiar with English” (2002:215). This applies also to currentskilled immigrants from countries in Asia. In Australia, it is clear that under neoliberalpolicies, class overshadows race ong>andong> bypasses gender in the recruiting ong>ofong>immigrants.CanadaCanada carried out overtly discriminatory racist immigration policies until1962, when the Immigration Act removed the racist content ong>ofong> the formerimmigration policy. In 1967, a “non-discriminatory” points system was introduced.Because ong>ofong> the new selection criteria, i.e., points system, significant changes haveoccurred in the composition ong>ofong> Canada’s immigrants. From 1991-1996, the top fivecountries ong>ofong> origin ong>ofong> immigrants were the People’s Republic ong>ofong> China, India, HongKong, the Philippines ong>andong> Sri Lanka, with more than one-third ong>ofong> all immigrantsfrom these countries arriving annually (Boyd ong>andong> Vickers, 2000). Census 2001identified Canada as one ong>ofong> the most diverse nations in the world. Anderson (2003)describes this diversity as a “kaleidoscope” ong>ofong> cultures, languages, ong>andong> nationalitiesreflecting more than 200 diverse ethnic groups – a mix second only to Australia’s.As this table shows, currently the top seven out ong>ofong> ten migrant-sending countriesare located in Asia.8

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Table 2. Top Ten Source Countries for Immigrants (Principal Applicants ong>andong>dependents): Year 2002Country Percentage RankChina 14.51 1India 12.58 2Pakistan 6.18 3Philippines 4.80 4Iran 3.38 5Korea 3.20 6Romania 2.48 7United States 2.31 8Sri Lanka 2.17 9United Kingdom 2.06 10Source: Citizenship ong>andong> Immigration Canada–Facts ong>andong> Figures: Immigration Overview (2002:8)Like Australia, Canada focuses on the skilled-stream category ong>ofong>immigrants, ong>andong> thus 50 percent ong>ofong> skilled workers come from Asia ong>andong> thePacific (Citizenship ong>andong> Immigration Canada, 2002). In terms ong>ofong> genderbreakdown, ong>ofong> all the skilled workers, 75 percent are males ong>andong> 25 percentare females, a ratio clearly reflecting men’s domination in the skilled stream(Citizenship ong>andong> Immigration Canada, 2002). Interestingly, skilled immigrantswere the most likely to emigrate, especially immigrants with high-demong>andong>skills, such as IT workers, health care managers, ong>andong> physicians. Dryburgh ong>andong>Hamel have also found that economic migrants are most likely to emigrate(2004:16).Recently, despite their language abilities ong>andong> high qualifications,immigrants in Canada are less likely to be employed, ong>andong> their situation hasbecome increasingly precarious. Many are more likely to be employed insectors with variable, short-term employment, like construction, industries,ong>andong> manufacturing. Thus, it is not surprising that Canada’s recent immigran tsshow a higher incidence ong>ofong> unemployment rates ong>andong> poverty. For example, in1996, immigrant men had a 13.6 percent unemployment rate compared with a9.3 percent rate for Canadian-born men (Thompson, 2002). Immigrant womensuffer the most. For example, in 2002, 8.6 percent ong>ofong> Canadian-born womenwere unemployed, while 20.2 percent ong>ofong> recent immigrant women were9

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010unemployed (Thompson, 2002:10). In general, immigrants’ incomes are lowerthan those ong>ofong> Canadian-born people. One could conclude that manyimmigrant groups live in poverty ong>andong> their low incomes will accelerate classdivision within Canadian society. Picot has summarized the situation: “Thisdeterioration in low-income rates over the past 20 years was not restricted torecent immigrants. It was observed among all immigrant groups, no matterhow long they have resided in Canada, with the exception ong>ofong> immigrants livingin Canada for more than 20 years” (2004:11).According to Picot (2004), competition from domestic labourers, aswell as hurdles faced in transferring education ong>andong> job experience fromcountries ong>ofong> origin, may constitute two major factors contributing to higherunemployment rates among immigrants. Although the skill-stream categoryattracts more highly educated immigrants, lack ong>ofong> recognition for immigrants’credentials – education ong>andong> job as well as training experience – keep manyimmigrants in a low-income category. Under neo-liberal policies, funding forlanguage programs ong>andong> vocational programs has been restructured ong>andong>reduced continuously, resulting in the restricting ong>ofong> immigrants’ access toservices. So that immigrant settlement services are cost-free -- another neoliberalstrategy -- the federal government charges $975 dollars as a long>andong>ingfee. As in Australia, then, immigrants bear the costs ong>ofong> their own settlementong>andong> services.For example, in 2003, 54 percent ong>ofong> 221,352 new immigrants settled inOntario, ong>andong> the province received $800 per immigrant. 13 Transfer ong>ofong> paymentper immigrant in Ontario, which receives more than 50 percent ong>ofong> Canada’snew immigrants annually, indicates clearly that the federal government hasadopted a market-driven, neo-liberal strategy. Moreover, the federalgovernment does not transfer the full amount charged to immigrants to theprovince, keeping $195 per immigrant for federal immigration services.Overall, unemployment ong>andong> underemployment due to lack ong>ofong> accreditation foreducation ong>andong> training contribute to the de-skilling ong>ofong> immigrants in the longrun ong>andong> concentrate them in low-skilled, low-paid ong>andong> part-time jobs.13 Source: The Windsor Star, March 18, 2005. The title ong>ofong> the article is ―Immigration:Ontario‘s Valid Argument.‖ The report argues that Windsor‘s population has jumped by16,970 to 208,405 from 1991 to 2001 ong>andong> immigrants accounted for 63 percent.10

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Multiculturalism in Australia ong>andong> CanadaTo create tolerance for minorities, to appreciate racial diversities, ong>andong> tong>ofong>oster sustainability among different cultural groups, Australia ong>andong> Canada haveadopted multiculturalism as a policy. Both countries have taken this step despitearguments for ong>andong> against from an array ong>ofong> groups. Multicultural policy is intendedto create an environment where minority groups, including immigrants,irrespective ong>ofong> their countries ong>ofong> origin, enjoy rights ong>andong> are treated equally tothose born in Canada.In their book Changing Multiculturalism (1997), Kincheloe ong>andong> Steinberglaid out five categories ong>ofong> multiculturalism: conservative (monoculturalism), liberal,pluralist, left-essentialist ong>andong> critical. My following analysis ong>ofong> multiculturalism hasbeen influenced by Kencheloe ong>andong> Steinberg’s framework ong>ofong> “criticalmulticulturalism,” although the paper has used the common notion ong>ofong>multiculturalism that the governments in Australia ong>andong> Canada use in discourse ong>andong>power politics. Through the vantage point ong>ofong> critical theory that originated from theFrankfurt School ong>ofong> Social ong>Researchong> in Germany, critical multiculturalism focuses onpower ong>andong> domination within a national framework, which Kincheloe ong>andong> Steinherg(1997) have articulated in their analytical framework.AustraliaAccording to Jayasuriya ong>andong> Pookong, “The term ‘multiculturalism’ *inAustralia] borrowed from Canada is a shorthong>andong> way ong>ofong> characterizing the doctrineong>ofong> cultural pluralism that has evolved over the past two decades” (1999:20). The1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia argues: “Multicultural policiesseek to eliminate discriminations. They aim to protect the rights ong>ofong> all members ong>ofong>society to enjoy their culture, language, ong>andong> to practice their religion – within theinstitutional framework ong>ofong> Australian law, parliamentary democracy, ong>andong>acceptable methods ong>ofong> conflict resolution” (Ruddock, 1997:6). In recognizingdiversity, Australia’s multicultural policies stress common bonds associated withdemocratic traditions.Two views are noticed when one visits Australian multiculturalism: (i)multicultural policy is intelligible within a monocultural framework; (ii)multiculturalism has evolved in Australia in a controlled manner without gaining11

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010public legitimacy (Jayasuriya ong>andong> Pookong, 1999). In the advent ong>ofong> the NewWorld Order ong>andong> free trade agreements such as GATT, multiculturalism as anong>ofong>ficial strategy mobilizes, albeit manages, ethnic ong>andong> racialized groups topursue progress ong>andong> development. In Australia, to achieve economicredirections ong>andong> a liberal economy directed towards the Asian marketplace,multiculturalism has become a central strategy for the Keating government.Pauline Hanson’s (a member in the Parliament) advocacy ong>ofong> a onenationparty is a clear indication that the fears ong>andong> prejudices ong>ofong> manyAustralians have not diminished ong>andong> both immigration ong>andong> multiculturalism areunder direct attack. Prime Minister Howard has condemned racism, but neverendorsed multiculturalism in an effective way. As far back as in 1988, Howarddelivered a message to the Ethnic Communities in Canberra ong>andong> stated thatmulticulturalism could not unite a nation (Jakubowicz, 1997). Further, Howard’saggressive policies towards asylum seekers (e.g., the Tampa Crisis 14 ong>ofong> August2001) played a vital role in his wining the next election. Australia’s focus on theskilled-stream category, bringing IT workers from Asia while rejecting asylumseekers, clearly indicates that class more than race is an important issue withinthe context ong>ofong> immigration ong>andong> multiculturalism.With the two-year eligibility period for basic entitlements ong>ofong> the welfarestate, such as unemployment ong>andong> sickness benefits, newly arrived immigrants,especially less wealthy ong>andong> family-class immigrants, suffer the most. As Collinspoints out, “Funds are cut from adult migrant education, immigration ong>andong>multicultural research, health ong>andong> human rights areas. Welfare ong>andong>unemployment services are privatised ong>andong> dismantled at the very time [Asianimmigrants+ are needed” (1998:27). These policies hurt immigrants, especiallyAsian immigrants ong>andong> women, who are less privileged compared with peoplefrom developed countries. If the current trend ong>ofong> slashing budgets formulticulturalism continues, multiculturalism will lose its very essence: itscommitment to diversity ong>andong> self-identity. Indeed, increasing support for theLiberal party for its hong>andong>ling ong>ofong> the Tampa affair ong>andong> the rise ong>ofong> “One Nation”ideology jeopardize multiculturalism ong>andong> indicate that Australia may be shiftingagain towards a monocultural society.14 The Australian government denied permission for the ship Tampa – filled with asylumseekers – to dock at nearby Christmas Islong>andong>. This denial, in effect, excluded asylum seekersfrom the legal system, i.e., the courts in Australia. For details, see Brennan‘s (2003)Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem.12

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010CanadaThe liberalization ong>ofong> immigration policy in the 1960s opened the doorfor immigrants from Asia as well as for multiculturalism. In 1971, Prime MinisterTrudeau announced the multiculturalism policy as a legislative response toethnic plurality. In 1982, the Canadian Charter ong>ofong> Rights through Section 27affirmed that multiculturalism “should assist ong>andong> encourage the integration (butnot assimilation) ong>ofong> all immigrants” (Harles, 1997). In Canada, multiculturalismwas a response to the dissatisfaction ong>ofong> immigrant ong>andong> social activist groups.Through the Charter ong>ofong> Rights, Canada has established multiculturalism as asymbol ong>ofong> a Canadian identity that represents diverse cultural communities.However, many immigrants, especially racialized immigrants, experiencesystematic discrimination in the workplace as well as in the recognition ong>ofong> theircredentials ong>andong> training in their country ong>ofong> origin.In Canada, multiculturalism is a state-initiated policy with a governingapparatus ong>andong> administrative bureaus sanctioned by the legalistic framework.Consequently, a change has taken place over the years. The Department ong>ofong>Multiculturalism ong>andong> Citizenship was disbong>andong>ed in the 1990s ong>andong>multiculturalism was moved to the Department ong>ofong> Canadian Heritage. InOctober 1996, the Liberal government restructured the multiculturalism policywhile focusing on themes ong>ofong> “identity,” “civic participation”, ong>andong> “social justice”(Abu-Laban, 2000). The Canadian Ethnocultural Council argues that the verybasis ong>ofong> social justice has been compromised by restructuring ong>andong> decreases infederal funding. To establish social justice by decreasing social inequality isimpossible without having appropriate funds for the concerned department. Onthe other hong>andong>, Jones (2000) argues that this revised policy demonstrates thecommitment ong>ofong> the federal government to multiculturalism. Despite therhetoric ong>ofong> multiculturalism, words spoken by a front-line activist in Vancouverillustrate its effectiveness among disadvantaged groups:This week we are celebrating International Women’s Day with other women ong>ofong>colour ong>andong> grassroots women. This year’s theme is: “Health for All.” Andpresently we are doing a research on the Filipino nurses, called “FromRegistered Nanny to Registered Nurse.” It’s funded by Multiculturalism.(Vancouver, March 2004)13

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010The Vulnerability ong>ofong> Immigrants ong>andong> Their Vision for an Alternative SocietyDuring my research in Australia, I visited four places: three migrantresource centres ong>andong> an Immigrant Women’s Speak Out association – all located inNew South Wales. Although I contacted several migrant resource centres inadvance ong>andong> received enthusiastic positive responses, some were not related to myresearch interest -- for example, trauma victims’ centres, which deal with violenceong>andong> so on. In addition to collecting published materials, I spoke with several peoplein these centres ong>andong> audiotaped four women’s interviews. My analysis has beenbased on these interviews ong>andong> the published materials.Immigrating to a new country from an Asian country involves culture shockong>andong> financial stress. For new immigrants in Australia, the two-year waiting periodcan place them in a precarious situation ong>andong> eventually de-skill them, as thisnarration illustrates:[T]here is a two-year waiting period … for those newly arrived migrants beforethey can access full support in terms ong>ofong> getting employment ong>andong> this is verydifficult … although some services are available for them like medicare ong>andong>others…. *W+hile you are looking for a job, you can’t access to have any financialsupport … what happens with these families if a family has three children. *T+heparents will do any job, like cleaning job or be a hotel housekeeper as they call itong>andong> then the other one goes to an educational institution in order to upgrade hisskills ong>andong> usually it’s the man. *T+he woman has to stay home ong>andong> at the same timedo a part-time job. … *S+he gets a part-time job during the weekend in order tosupport the rest ong>ofong> the family so it is really tough on women ong>andong> well … she is inthe path to deskilling, becoming deskilled ong>andong> losing her self-confidence. (NewSouth Wales, Australia, February 2005)As most immigrants migrate to Australia in the skill-stream category, menas “heads ong>ofong> families” as well as in the “skilled” category get priority when enteringAustralia. Further, as the above narration shows, the two-year waiting periodescalates gender differences in terms ong>ofong> education ong>andong> upgrading skills -- most mengo to school to re-skill, while women get de-skilled due to the nature ong>ofong> the jobsthey do to support families ong>andong> maintain childcare responsibilities.When national or international crises happen, immigrants bear the majorburden, as they become the target groups for restructuring ong>andong> coping witheconomic changes. After 9/11, hotels where many immigrants worked wererestructured ong>andong> hundreds ong>ofong> jobs eliminated. This affected men ong>andong> women in14

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010problem ong>ofong> de-skilling ong>andong> the accreditation gap. [We] never stop campaigningmost strongly for the migrants’ concerns. There are meetings, sharing for focusgroups, which is a very important tool for us because that way we learn new issuesaffecting the lives ong>ofong> many, so it is time to unite… (Vancouver, Canada,March 2004)This front-line worker perceives that immigrants must act together, intransnational solidarity, to counter issues around de-skilling ong>andong> lack ong>ofong>accreditation. On the other hong>andong>, a worker at the Migrant Resource ong>Centreong> in NewSouth Wales argues:[The] accommodation issue is big because ong>ofong> the demong>andong> ong>andong> because ong>ofong> the lackong>ofong>… refugee houses for women here in Australia. Especially, in the middle ong>ofong> thenight… I find it very, very stressful when I have to organize anaccommodation for a woman who is fleeing domestic violence because there areonly a few places. You would be lucky to find a place for a woman or a refugeestraight away… But it’s very very hard. There is lack ong>ofong> accommodation…some places accept families, the whole family you know, including the husbong>andong>… whether they’re evicted or… (February 2005)Food, clothing ong>andong> shelter are considered by most as basic human rightsong>andong> the absence ong>ofong> these rights does not indicate scarcity ong>ofong> these resources inwelfare states like Australia ong>andong> Canada. To be cost-free ong>andong> market-driven,Australia bars new immigrants from access to basic entitlements for a limitedperiod, i.e., two years. On the other hong>andong>, while Canada generally does not makedistinctions between its citizens ong>andong> new immigrants, it imposes long>andong>ing fees thatmake immigrants responsible for their own settlements. It is evident thataccommodation, a basic need for survival, is a key issue for both immigrants ong>andong>refugees. Domestic violence heightens the impact ong>ofong> lack ong>ofong> accommodation onthose who need the most. The following narration illustrates:… *for+ women fleeing domestic violence… there is a crisis in accommodation,there are short term accommodation, there are long-term accommodationbecause crisis accommodation is the time when they flee domestic violence sothere are different categories … within 6 weeks they have to be moved to a shortterm accommodation, which is from 6 weeks to 3 months. The median is …sometimes 6 months ong>andong> then after 6 months they need to be moved again to alonger-term accommodation. (New South Wales, Australia, February 2005)The above narration further shows lack ong>ofong> accommodation for immigrantsas well as lack ong>ofong> resources for immigrant women who flee from domestic violence.In turn, Immigrant women who have left their homes due to domestic violence16

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010have a very difficult time in finding accommodation. While all immigrant womenare more vulnerable in the absence ong>ofong> family ong>andong> friends, women who live withdomestic violence are in a desperate situation. Another narration elaborates onhow complex some immigrant women’s lives can be:…financial assistance is a big thing especially for those women who don’t qualifyfor centrelink payment because ong>ofong> the two-year waiting period. … for those whohave recently arrived they cannot accept financial assistance or centrelinkpayments or benefits …they have to pay the rent weekly. They have to eat, youknow, or buy things for the household. If they don’t have financial assistancein the first few months ong>ofong> arrival, they are in a very difficult situation. Sometimesbecause ong>ofong> a desire to earn a living for the family, they accept jobs below thelevel ong>ofong> their qualifications. (New South Wales, Australia, February 2005)The above narration clearly illustrates the effect on immigrant women ong>ofong>the cost-effective neo-liberal strategy, i.e., the two-year waiting period for basicsocial entitlements. This two-year waiting period forces immigrants to do menialjobs despite high educational qualifications, credentials, ong>andong> job experience incountries ong>ofong> origin. Immigrant women are in a double bind both as women ong>andong> as aspouse or family member. Once the two-year waiting period is over, it is men whohave upgraded skills ong>andong> women who are still concentrated in menial, low-paid,flexible-work-hour jobs. This vicious cycle traps immigrant women in the lowerechelons ong>ofong> society. One participant made these thoughtful comments about thissituation:…early intervention is important rather than addressing the issues later on. This iswhat we in the community sector are speaking about, representing to thegovernment about. It is very important to address the issues when they firstarrive, preventing them from falling into that pit, you know. (New South Wales,Australia, February 2005)Although all the people I interviewed worked either at the MigrantResource ong>Centreong>s or at Immigrant Women Speak Out Association, they also actedas advocates for immigrants, especially for immigrant women. Despite the natureong>ofong> their jobs ong>andong> the source ong>ofong> their funding, which was mostly from government,these participants had not lost their vision for social justice. They unequivocallyadvocated scrapping the two-year waiting period, which ultimately hinders theemotional, social ong>andong> economic growth ong>ofong> new immigrants, especially immigrantwomen. A similar tone is evident in a front-line activist’s voice in Vancouver:17

Habiba ZAMANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010One ong>ofong> the clear examples that we’re saying is in relation to housing. Housing issupposed to be a basic human right. It’s supposed to be one ong>ofong> the most basicrights for all humans – access to food, clothing ong>andong> shelter (Vancouver, Canada,March 2004).ConclusionThe above analysis suggests strongly that class predominates over race inthe recruiting ong>ofong> immigrants in both Australia ong>andong> Canada. Those who are upperong>andong>middle-class, English-speaking, educated, ong>andong> have jobs as well as educationexperience in the developed countries are preferred immigrants. Males who areperceived as skilled thus comprise a major portion ong>ofong> immigrants recruited. On theother hong>andong>, disadvantaged groups such as women, working class, ong>andong> non-Englishspeakingpeople are barred from migrating to either Australia or Canada. The onlyoption most disadvantaged groups have is to migrate either as a spouse, or as afamily member, a domestic worker, or, at worst, an asylum seeker or refugee.These categories eventually transfer disadvantaged groups into low-skilled, lowwagedong>andong> temporary jobs. The rise ong>ofong> Pauline Hanson’s “One Nationong>andong> theLiberal Government’s hong>andong>ling ong>ofong> the Tampa Crisis have created an environment inAustralia where the public is leaning towards some sort ong>ofong> monocultural frameworksupported by the Liberal Government’s neo-liberal agenda. In Canada, theincreasing slashing ong>ofong> funds for multiculturalism may be compromising socialjustice. However, in Australia ong>andong> Canada, Asian immigrants as well as advocacygroups including feminist, left, progressive, ong>andong> social activists, are challenging theneo-liberal agenda. These groups have a vision for creating an alternative societybased on social justice, i.e., where everyone has access to basic entitlements suchas food, clothing ong>andong> housing irrespective ong>ofong> class, gender, ong>andong> immigration status.ReferencesAbu-Laban, Yasmeen. 2000 “Reconsidering the constitution, minorities, ong>andong> politics in Canada,”Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Political Science, Vol. 33(3):465-497.Anderson, Erin. 2003 “Immigration shift population kaleidoscope,” The Globe ong>andong> Mail, January 22:A6.Antecol, Heather. 2003 “Immigration policy ong>andong> the skills ong>ofong> Immigrants to Australia, Canada, ong>andong> theUnited States,” ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Human Resources, Winter, Vol. 38(1): 2718

Asian Immigrants’ Vision ong>ofong> an Alternative Society in Australia ong>andong> CanadaJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Boyd, Monica ong>andong> Michael Vickers. 2000 “100 years ong>ofong> immigration in Canada,” Canadian Social Trends,Autumn:13.Brennan, Frank. 2003 Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem. Queens long>andong>:University ong>ofong> Queens long>andong> Press.Castles, Stephen, et al. 1994 “Australian immigration between globalization ong>andong> recessions,”International ong>Migrationong> Review, Vol. 28(2):370 – 383.Citizenship ong>andong> Immigration Canada. 2002 Facts ong>andong> Figures: Immigration Overview.Collins, Jock. 1998 “Immigrants ong>andong> inequality in Australia in the 1990s,” Migrant Action, December:25-27.Department ong>ofong> Immigration ong>andong> Multicultural ong>andong> Indigenous Affairs (DIMA), Australia. 2003 “Key Factsin Immigration” (retrieved on 11/26/2004)Department ong>ofong> Immigration ong>andong> Multicultural ong>andong> Indigenous Affairs (DIMA), Australia. 2000 “DIMA FactSheet 1: Immigration background.” (retrieved on10/1/2000)Dryburgh, Heather & Jason Hamel. 2004 “Immigrants in demong>andong>: Staying or leaving?” Canadian SocialTrends, Autumn:12-17.Dutton, David. 2002 One ong>ofong> us: A century ong>ofong> Australian citizenship. Sydney: University ong>ofong> New SouthWales.Fincher, R. 1997 “Gender, age ong>andong> ethnicity for an Australian nation,” Environment ong>andong> Planning, Vol.29:217-236.Jakubowicz, Andrew. 1998 “Is Australia a racist society? Reflections on globalization, multiculturalismong>andong> Pauline Hanson,” Migrant Action, Vol. 20(2):31-37.Jones, Beryle Mae. 2000 “Multiculturalism ong>andong> citizenship: The Status ong>ofong> ‘visible minorities’ in Canada,”Canadian Ethnic ong>Studiesong>, Vol. 32(1):1-13.Jayasuriya, Laksiri ong>andong> Pookong, Kee. 1999 The Asianisation ong>ofong> Australia? Some Facts about the Myths.Victoria: Melbourne University Press.Jupp, James. 2002 From White Australia to Woomera: The Story ong>ofong> Australian Immigration. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Harles, John C. 1997 “Integration before assimilation: Immigration, multiculturalism ong>andong> the CanadianPolity,” Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Political Science, Vol. 30(4).Kincheloe, Joe L. ong>andong> Shirley R. Steinberg. 1997 Changing Multiculturalism, Buckingham: Open UniversityPress.The National Film Board ong>ofong> Canada. 1989 Who Gets In? 52 min. videocassette.Picot, Garnett. 2004 “The deteriorating economic welfare ong>ofong> immigrants ong>andong> possible causes,” Ottawa:Statistics Canada, Ministry ong>ofong> Industry.Ruddock, Phillip. 1997 “Public policy ong>andong> religious diversity – a government view,” ong>Migrationong> Action,September:6-11.Thompson, Eden. 2002 “Immigrants ong>andong> the Canadian labour market: An overview.” Human ResourcesDevelopment Canada.The Windsor Star. 2005 “Immigration: Ontario’s Valid Argument”, March 18, Friday.19

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: the Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanMohamed BENITTOAbstract. Coexistence ong>ofong> various ethnic groups within the American ong>andong> British societiesmade newspaper headlines following the events ong>ofong> 9/11 in the United States ong>andong> ong>ofong> July 7 inGreat Britain. This article based on survey research ong>andong> focus group interviews aims toaddress intergroup contact. In a heterogeneous society, two major tendencies with regardto relation ong>ofong> the Arab community with the mainstream society surface. On the one hong>andong>,we notice a tendency to forge a new identity that is deep-rooted in the Arab culture, butwith a declared belonging to the host society. On the other hong>andong>, there is a tendency ong>ofong>restraint ong>andong> isolation. This choice ong>ofong> restraint ong>andong> isolation is sometimes allotted to theambivalent feelings generated by cultural disparity ong>andong> stubborn attachment to certainvalues ong>andong> traditions. In this context, our study targets the exploration ong>ofong> relationship ong>ofong>Arab women with the mainstream society with the stress laying on the reasons governingups ong>andong> downs ong>ofong> their integration within a new cultural environmentKeywords: Arab women, integration, race relations, multiculturalismIntroductionAn intergroup contact implies a situation when individuals that belong to aparticular group interact individually or collectively with another group. Summerused the terms in-group ong>andong> out-group to make a distinction between a socialgroupings to which a particular individual belongs or does not belong (Brewer,Miller 2003:23). The same race relations are usually dominated by convergenceong>andong> solidarity. Cross-race relations are, however, divergent; not only out-groupcontacts are fewer in number than the same race-relations, but their duration ong>andong>quality may be lower. Ethnic groups tend to restrict their social environments ong>andong>to favour mostly the intimacy ong>ofong> in-group relations. Attachment to in-group is anexpression ong>ofong> preference ong>andong> loyalty to its norms ong>andong> trust-worthiness in dealingswith its members. With regard to Arab women in the Diaspora, western literature20

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010“problematises” their integration within western societies. The notion ong>ofong> culturaldifference was mainly developed in this sense. It not only punctuates differences inclothes ong>andong> language, but it also underscores the fundamental divergence in lifestylesong>andong> value-systems between the Arab world ong>andong> the West. Female headgearhas become the emblem ong>ofong> women’s oppression ong>andong> conservatism. Theirattachment to traditionalism or adjustment to modern life is usually emphasised inthe western discourse by reference to their appearance ong>andong> vesture. When theywear a veil or a scarf, they are assumed to be in favour ong>ofong> a traditionalconservatism ong>andong> to stubbornly reject the transgression ong>ofong> the gap in the way ong>ofong> lifebetween the Arab societies ong>andong> the western ones. The adoption ong>ofong> the fashionsworn by western women, by contrast, equates them with modernity ong>andong>integration into the host societies.Morokvasc (1987:3) laid bare the assumption that Arab women perceivedas living on the margin ong>ofong> western culture embody models for an oppressed Arabwoman prototype. Kohl (1989: 190) calls this representation, a symbolic stong>andong>ardong>ofong> male power within which Arab woman “serves man ong>andong> is oppressed by him, beit as one among many other wives, or as the cleaning lady in the west who mustalways walk three steps behind her husbong>andong>, or even as the woman who lives thespoilt ‘life ong>ofong> luxury’ in the Arab ruling houses so beloved by the tabloids- sheremains passive ong>andong> dependent. 1 ” In the western discourse Arab women are ong>ofong>tenrepresented under the oppression ong>andong> submission ong>ofong> men, deprived ong>ofong> the right tohave a say in the matters related to their status as members ong>ofong> the family(Minces1980).Erotic descriptions dominate writings about Arab women in the westerndiscourse with fantasies running wild on them in paintings, drawings, literature ong>andong>fables. Alloula (1986) has analysed the female images produced by orientalistpainters ong>andong> photographers. She underlines that the oriental female was portrayedas a prisoner ong>ofong> traditional social restraints, the counter-pole ong>ofong> liberated westernwomen to the extent that, as Fatema Mernssi (2001:18) notices, in the West theword ‘harem’ is given pejorative connotations that evoke a sentiment ong>ofong> shame.This article targets the exploration ong>ofong> intergroup contact, mainly Arabwomen’s relations with mainstream society in America ong>andong> Britain. It begins byreference to background ong>ofong> Arab immigration, the development ong>ofong> the notion ong>ofong>1 A. Lueg, ‗the Perception ong>ofong> Islam in Western Debate‘ the Next Threat: Western Perceptionsong>ofong> Islam, p.18.21

Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010identity ong>andong> cultural difference so as sketch out, as a final step, the differenttendencies ong>ofong> Arab women with respect to existence ong>andong> coexistence withinheterogeneous societies.Background to Arab immigrationAmerica ong>andong> Britain are two English-speaking countries that were adestination ong>ofong> immigrants from the Arab world. During the period ong>ofong> the Greatong>Migrationong> in the American history, which extends from 1880 to 1924, significantwaves ong>ofong> Arabs entered the United States, including immigrants from "GreaterSyria” which includes present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, ong>andong> Palestine (McCarus,1994:23). Most ong>ofong> them were farmers or artisans who were seeking betteropportunities elsewhere. They settled mainly in the cities ong>ofong> New York, Boston,Detroit, Chicago, ong>andong> Clevelong>andong>, but they could also be found in every state in theUnited States, in small towns as Arab populations tended to dispersegeographically, particularly in the American South where their major economicactivity was trade (Abu-Laban, Suleiman 1989:84).If the first wave ong>ofong> Arab immigrants was unqualified, the recent arrivalsconstituted a component ong>ofong> educated, bilingual, politicized immigrants that belongto middle-class backgrounds ong>andong> formed a diverse group either religiously orgeographically (McCarus, 1994, Naff 1985). In general, Arab immigration wasmotivated by the pursuit ong>ofong> better economic opportunities ong>andong> the desire to escapethe political ong>andong> military chaos that dominated the Arab region.Arabs in Britain originate from a wide spectrum ong>ofong> Arab countries like Iraq,Jordan, Syria, Egypt, ong>andong> Yemen. Their presence in Britain is largely related to thecolonial past ong>ofong> Britain in the Arab region. In the nineteen century, Yemeni seamensailed with British ships from Aden which was under British control; some ong>ofong> themstayed in Britain where their ships docked, ong>andong> began working in the British navy,or the burgeoning rail network (Halliday 1992). At the same period, a number ong>ofong>Somalis, Syrians ong>andong> Lebanese settled also around British ports as a result ong>ofong>serving on British ships, mainly in Manchester.Large-scale Arab immigration began after 1945, with Palestinians fleeingZionist ethnic cleansing, Egyptians ong>andong> Sudanese coming for prong>ofong>essionaladvancement ong>andong> later Moroccans seeking a better life as the post-war economicboom ong>andong> the ensuing labour shortages led to Britain’s active recruitment ong>ofong>22

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010migrant labour (El solh 1992: 240). London’s East End, Tyneside, Liverpool ong>andong>Cardiff became centres ong>ofong> small Arab communities (Lawless, 1995). Politicalinstability in the home countries continued to be a major reason behind Arabimmigration ong>andong> in the 80’s ong>andong> 90’s, mainly from Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, ong>andong>Somalia. Greater London is the main centre for British Arabs; but there are alsotraditional areas ong>ofong> Arab settlement, such as Sheffield, where many Yemenis movedto work in the steel industry.Once in the Diaspora, Arabs started to bring their families ong>andong> manyassociations emerged to forge an educational ong>andong> cultural forum. The tendency ong>ofong>Arab community in the Diaspora to set up their own organisations reveals theconcern they attach to the question ong>ofong> culture ong>andong> identity in terms ong>ofong>perpetuation ong>ofong> traditions, religious practices ong>andong> language. To prepare the groundfor the discussion ong>ofong> the impact ong>ofong> cultural diversity on relations ong>ofong> Arab womenwith mainstream society in America ong>andong> Britain, it is crucial to have a look initiallyat the definition ong>ofong> the term “identity” ong>andong> its implications.On the notion ong>ofong> identityImmigration movements around the world knocked over the relativehomogeneity ong>ofong> modern societies where the plural aspect is becoming more visible.Cultural pluralism is thus a dominant aspect ong>ofong> many societies in America ong>andong>Europe. The question ong>ofong> identity arises in a multicultural environment whereindividuals ong>andong> groups raise questions about their cultural particularity ong>andong> thesuitable manner to bear on their singularity. Emergence ong>ofong> this concept ong>andong> itscirculation in human sciences are attributed to the psychologist Erik Erikson. Hewas the first to suggest the notion ong>ofong> identity through the concept ong>ofong> 'identitycrisis', while studying changes undergone by Indians facing modernity in the UnitedStates. His studies scrutinise identity crisis ong>andong> conflicts resulting from doublebelonging. The term 'identity' spread widely in human sciences in the sixties inAmerica with the claims ong>ofong> the black minority to uphold their economic ong>andong> culturalrights. The claim for one’s identity is the major factor behind conflicts, politicalactivities ong>andong> demonstrations ong>ofong> ethnic minorities in different parts ong>ofong> the globe asthe case ong>ofong> the Basques in Spain, the Kurds in Turkey ong>andong> the Kabyle people inAlgeria. Several authors from a variety ong>ofong> disciplines attempted to define theconcept ong>ofong> identity like Erik Erikson, Margaret Mead, Henri Tajfel, ong>andong> Basil23

Bernstein.Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>Identityong> as a notion refers to a set ong>ofong> elements that individualizes a personong>andong> implies the existence ong>ofong> another person who is different. According to EdmondMarc Lipiansky, identity appears in a paradoxical way through a relation ong>ofong>difference ong>andong> sameness (Saez, 1995:35). The construction ong>ofong> identity is built ontwo poles ong>ofong> differentiation ong>andong> identification in relation to our surroundings. Thedialectic differentiation / resemblance that ensures the fundamental ong>andong>paradoxical nature ong>ofong> identity is described by Edmond-Marc Liapiansky as adialectic union ong>ofong> two processes: an identification one by which individuals appearsimilar to others ong>andong> a differentiation process by which they take distance fromothers designed as culturally different (Tap, 1980: 35).Individuals recognise sameness ong>andong> shrink from difference in process ong>ofong>ebb ong>andong> flow at the time ong>ofong> contact with others cultural groups. Hence, Ting-Toomey (1998) adds another process which is the dialectic security /vulnerabilitythrough which individuals strike a balance between the need for the recognition ong>ofong>their existence as different ong>andong> an inherent uncertainty resulting from theirinteractions with others. The concern for the preservation ong>ofong> one’s identity iscaught not only between the two poles ong>ofong> differentiation ong>andong> resemblance, butbetween four poles: security/vulnerability ong>andong> differentiation / resemblance.Individuals combine, when manifesting their identity, three-dimensions ong>ofong> identity:the perception ong>ofong> the self, the representation ong>ofong> others ong>andong> the image generated bythe perception ong>ofong> others (Pollak, 990: 276). ong>Identityong> has therefore a cultural ong>andong>communicational aspect with diverse facets. It is the image ong>ofong> the self for the selfong>andong> a potential representation ong>ofong> a person by another>Researchong> method ong>andong> sampleThe present study is an attempt to shed light on intergroup contactthrough the study ong>ofong> the case ong>ofong> Arab women in America ong>andong> Britain. It is designedto highlight the various tendencies that dominate Arab women contacts with themainstream society. Our qualitative analysis is intended to check out hindrance ong>ofong>out-group contact. We conducted interviews, in order to assess the relationshipbetween gender ong>andong> intergroup contact, with 76 Arab-American women ong>andong> 89British-Arab women from different national origins, ages ong>andong> socio-economicstatus, identified through Arab associations. The sample which is mixed in terms ong>ofong>24

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010religious affiliation ong>andong> nationality ranges in age from 20’s to 55 years old with bothfirst ong>andong> second generation immigrants. The overwhelming majority ong>ofong>interviewees are Lebanese, or Iraqi, but also present in the group are women whowere born or originating in Egypt, Sudan ong>andong> Morocco. The criteria for selectingparticipants were their willingness to take part in the study. The aim ong>ofong> the study,however, was not to make empirical generalisations about Arab women, but toexplore the manner they endeavour to live in heterogeneous societies. Nonrong>andong>omsampling techniques were particularly conducive in this sense. In fact, theywere effective in drawing attention to the major tendencies ong>ofong> Arab women withregard to out-group contact.Arab women ong>andong> out-group contactGender is a powerful determinant ong>ofong> the dealings ong>ofong> Arabs in the Diaspora.The ways women interact with the host society are clearly different from those ong>ofong>men. Women bear more on the anti-assimilation tendency than men ong>andong> tendusually to emphasize differences ong>andong> heterogeneity in relation to others. Theirsocial relations are more confined to members ong>ofong> their ethnic group. This restrictedcontact with in-group reveals that Arab women operate within established ethnicboundaries, where indigenous cultural norms ong>andong> values shape their contacts ong>andong>relations (Read, 2004). However, migration may be a driving force behind women’scompulsion for integration given that the new cultural environment may modifytheir perceptions. This may give birth to the reconceptualisation ong>ofong> theirconvictions ong>andong> habits. Renegotiation ong>ofong> religious ong>andong> cultural identity discloses aprocess ong>ofong> adaptation ong>andong> reformulation ong>ofong> cultural values. For Arab women,reconciliation ong>ofong> cultural differences ong>andong> establishment ong>ofong> contacts withmainstream society is far from being a harmonious ong>andong> painless process. Opposingong>andong> sometimes clashing attitudes give tongue to ambivalent feelings which markissues ong>ofong> cultural identity ong>andong> race relations. Our study reveals that, regarding outgroupcontact, attitudes ong>ofong> Arab women are torn between a tendency ong>ofong>conservatism that sets as limits frequenting the in-group, an inclination ong>ofong> a mosaicidentity with developed bonds with others cultural groups, whereas a break in therelations with the co-ethnics ong>andong> the adoption ong>ofong> cultural norms ong>ofong> the hostsocieties dominate the life ong>ofong> a category ong>ofong> Arab women.25

Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Tendency ong>ofong> restraint ong>andong> adherence to ideals ong>ofong> cultural singularityBoth in America ong>andong> Britain, Arab women draw boundaries ong>ofong> inclusion ong>andong>exclusion in light ong>ofong> attachment to cultural singularity. Degree ong>ofong> involvement insocial relations with the mainstream society differs between them. The choice ong>ofong>withdrawal into one’s culture ong>andong> rejection ong>ofong> that ong>ofong> the mainstream societycharacterises race relations ong>ofong> a group ong>ofong> Arab women. This option is explained by adesire to live without transgression ong>ofong> Arab ong>andong> Islamic cultural values. Culturaldivergence, mentality ong>andong> religious difference are crossroads where this group ong>ofong>informants turns his back to out-group contacts. Karima, an Arab American womanstresses this tendency:“Our cultural values ong>andong> traditions are different from those ong>ofong> most Americanpeople. They tolerate drinking, relations without marriage, I do not want my kidsto get these bad habits, obedience ong>andong> respect for parents is very important. I feelconcerned ong>andong> worried about education ong>ofong> my kids; they have to be dutiful withsubmissive behaviour to our religion ong>andong> culture…..”The exclusive attachment to one’s cultural values is a kind ong>ofong> resistance, aresponse, sometimes, to a fear ong>ofong> assimilation ong>andong> the loss ong>ofong> cultural traits ong>andong>practices that define them as a distinct entity apart from others. Those whoespouse such positions are attached to the traditional way ong>ofong> life in the Arabsociety, particularly in its religious dimensions. The concern ong>ofong> an external culturalimpact ong>andong> dissolution ong>ofong> cultural identity are the central motives behindrestriction ong>ofong> intercultural contacts. Frequent relations with members ong>ofong> ethnic,religious or national group dominate this group’s contacts, evoking as a reasonbehind the desire to rub elbows with members ong>ofong> their community the question ong>ofong>cultural kinship. Hence, the rareness ong>ofong> interaction with members ong>ofong> themainstream society is usually related to an inclination to live in an Arab culturalsurrounding that resembles that ong>ofong> the country ong>ofong> origin with the same concernsong>andong> preoccupations as Leila, a British Arab indicates:“I know so many British people, but, to tell you the truth, I do not feel at allcomfortable making social relations with them. You know, they are different. Look,when you first go into their house, the way they keep asking if you would like adrink ong>andong> you keep making the point that you do not drink. Even if I talk to themabout my own problems, they don’t relate to those problems. I need somebodyfrom my own culture to understong>andong>”Adoption ong>ofong> this attitude is characterized by an immersion in the Arab26

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010cultural environment. Social life ong>ofong> this group ong>ofong> informants revolves aroundcommunity ong>ofong> compatriots, ethnic ong>andong> religious group in line with existing linksbefore immigration, or other bonds woven after settlement in the host societies.Having social relations on the far side ong>ofong> the ethnic ong>andong> religious group is reallyseldom. This backward step from interpersonal relations outside the ethnic ong>andong>religious group is sometimes ascribed to a growing distrust towards others,inadaptability to cultural change, or the acerbity ong>ofong> feelings towards certain culturaldifferences. Most Arab women in this group ong>ofong> informants take a dim view ong>ofong>individual liberty that characterizes relations within the mainstream society, mainlymores’ release as the viewpoint ong>ofong> this Arab American woman mirrors:It scares us, the lifestyle that kids have over here, the drugs, ong>andong> the sex. Oh lookthey are always kissing in daylight. People start worrying about their childrengrowing up in this environment. I want my kids to have a definite sense ong>ofong>direction ong>andong> not to be distracted by things that are foreign to our culture, wechange our clothes, but our values we can not change them, here people do notcare about religion… cohabitation is tolerated ong>andong> marriage between people ong>ofong> thesame sex is allowed,, honour matters a lot for us”This spirit ong>ofong> individual liberty in terms ong>ofong> sexual liberty ong>andong> cohabitation issystematically deplored in a manner that imparts a fear that such attitudespermeate Arab families. Morality with respect to sexual behaviour is a virtue Arabwomen endeavour to hong>andong> over to their ong>ofong>fspring. The protection ong>ofong> honour isrepeatedly mentioned regardless whether they are Christians or Muslims. Theaccent is on the relation ong>ofong> the community to the surrounding society; it is thatrelation that is raised. The notion ong>ofong> honour ranks Arab women along specific linesong>ofong> conduct ong>andong> frequentation. The theme ong>ofong> female sexuality dictates theirorientation in that the preservation ong>ofong> cultural identity ong>andong> assimilation to the hostsociety’s norms are put in opposition. In this sense, the perpetuation ong>ofong> culturalidentity was gendered, sexualized ong>andong> disproportionately placed on daughters.Their rejection ong>ofong> this vision ong>ofong> Arab womanhood could denote cultural loss ong>andong> thenegation, in consequence, ong>ofong> the quality ong>ofong> ‘good Arab woman’. The accent is puton eastern values ong>ofong> honor ong>andong> chastity ong>andong> rejection ong>ofong> aspects ong>ofong> western culturethat lead, they believe, to social disrespect for women ong>andong> many other social illsthat are contrary to their mores.Moreover, the patriarchal nature ong>ofong> the family blocks extension ong>ofong>networks ong>ofong> relations beyond religious ong>andong> ethnic group. The rules ong>ofong> conduct thatare prescribed to women by the ethnic surrounding ong>andong> families make their27

Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010contacts limited to members ong>ofong> their community. They are incited to abide bycustoms ong>andong> mores ong>ofong> the ethno-religious community ong>andong> to maintain behaviouralpatterns that are normative in their ethnic group. This control ong>andong> limitation take astricter dimension for women who are single.Overall, this group ong>ofong> Arab women has been shaped by a culture ong>andong> areligious tradition that are very different from those ong>ofong> the host societies. This isclearly manifested in the case ong>ofong> marriage as religious endogamy is a parametergoverning the possibilities ong>ofong> spousal relationships, mainly among Muslim Arabwomen who refer to Islam as the central criterion to validate the choice ong>ofong> theirpartners. In a word, these Arab women have developed their own cultural values,their own definitions ong>ofong> status ong>andong> prestige within the host societies ong>andong> tend toplace greater constraints on intergroup relations.Tendency ong>ofong> inclusion coupled with a hybrid identityContrary to the first tendency, for a group ong>ofong> Arab women maintainingcultural integrity is married with integration into the new cultural environment.There is an inclination towards the adoption ong>ofong> some cultural traits ong>ofong> themainstream society’s culture ong>andong> a desire to simultaneously retain the Arabculture. It is a kind ong>ofong> hybridization that promotes assimilation ong>andong> acculturationthat encourage the incorporation ong>ofong> positive Arab ong>andong> western cultural traits. Incontrast to the conservatism ong>ofong> the first group, for the proponents ong>ofong> this trend,change is no longer seen as an evil, but rather as a vital necessity. These Arabwomen tend to have modern interpretations ong>ofong> religious concepts ong>andong> to reconcilethem with values ong>andong> stong>andong>ards ong>ofong> the new cultural environment. They do not wantto be isolated members ong>ofong> the host societies, alienated from others due to theirdifference. They rather endeavour to forge a hybrid identity as Hoda, an ArabAmerican woman underlines:We are supposed to keep our tradition, but I do not see contradiction in identifyingas an Arab, with being in this country ong>andong> identifying with the values ong>andong> traditionsong>ofong> this country. There is not really any contradiction; rather it is luck to be enrichedby the fact that you combine the two cultures.Authenticity is a recurrent word in these women’s discourse. However, theaccent is laid on the necessity to accommodate ong>andong> adapt to the culturalenvironment in which they live. Authenticity ong>andong> attachment to tradition are not28

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010necessarily constructed on passive ong>andong> rigid terms. Without talking explicitly ong>ofong>assimilation, this group ong>ofong> Arab women evoke the necessity ong>ofong> initiating ong>andong>establishing parameters ong>ofong> dialogue ong>andong> contact with members ong>ofong> the mainstreamsociety. In parallel with the identification with Arab culture, there is a desire toestablish a harmonious relationship between Arab identity ong>andong> culture ong>ofong> the hostsocieties. The issue ong>ofong> “keeping our tradition” is at the core ong>ofong> concerns ong>andong>preoccupations, but the movement toward other cultural groups is a concreterecognition on the part ong>ofong> these women that they are no longer temporaryimmigrants. On the contrary, they are, in essence, affirming their belonging to themainstream societies, to two cultures ong>andong> trying to maintain a presence in both.Hence, the emphasis is put on the importance ong>ofong> restructuring an identitywith deep-roots in Arab culture ong>andong> a willingness or readiness to receive ong>andong>interact with different cultures ong>andong> groups. Cultural re-authenticity within thecontext ong>ofong> a new cultural environment means a re-definition ong>ofong> identity that takesinto account the fact ong>ofong> living in culturally mosaic societies. Arab cultural reauthenticityemerges as a reaction or an alternative to the stubborn attachment tocultural singularity that induces the withdrawal into oneself ong>andong> sets barriers inrelation with peoples ong>ofong> different cultures. In this regard, interviewees stress theneed to conform to the dominant ways ong>ofong> life ong>andong> to affirm their compatibility withthe mainstream societies. To put it another way, relation with the host societies isbuilt on dichotomy ong>ofong> belonging ong>andong> maintaining an Arab identity ong>andong> culture. Theiraffirmation ong>ofong> cultural singularity is combined with notions ong>ofong> assimilations ong>andong>integration as this Arab American woman states:We have to participate in civic work, to become part ong>ofong> the mainstream, weshould take part in all activities in the society as our own society, ong>andong> we have toavoid looking as outsiders, I don’t see that being an Arab is related to wearing aheadgear. It is essential to integrate into the mainstream, to establish bonds, notto be immersed in your own micro-community, to become American, notAmericanized.Whereas some women turn to Islam ong>andong> cultural singularity as the onlypossible path to either maintain or indeed achieve both personal ong>andong> socialadvancement in a context ong>ofong> dislocation in different societies, other Arab womenshow flexibility in practising Islam ong>andong> admit different behaviours, adopting ahyphenated identity in a more progressive manner in their intergroup contacts.More importantly, Arab women who renegotiate the question ong>ofong> religious ong>andong>cultural identity construct their own versions ong>ofong> authenticity by reformulating ong>andong>29

Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010accommodating diverse cultural ong>andong> religious practices. This position is mirrored ininterpersonal relations which exceed ethnic ong>andong> religious limits, setting thusintergroup bonds. If co-ethnic relations are advocated by a group ong>ofong> informants in amore steadfast way to a degree ong>ofong> isolation, another group ong>ofong> Arab women movestowards other cultures ong>andong> ethnic groups in a process ong>ofong> forging a new identity.Arab women: between Americanized ong>andong> Anglicized?Acculturation refers to changes that occur within a society or culture whentwo different cultural groups come into direct continuous contact (Bastide, 1998).It is a process in which members ong>ofong> one cultural group adopt beliefs ong>andong> behavioursong>ofong> another group. Although a minority group usually adopts habits ong>andong> languagepatterns ong>ofong> the dominant group, acculturation can be reciprocal, that is, thedominant group can also adopt patterns typical ong>ofong> the minority group. In thesample used for this study, for some Arab women, the significance ong>ofong> eitherreligious practices or cultural identity may shift. Accused ong>ofong> capitulating to awestern hegemonic culture, which they have assimilated, this group ong>ofong> Arabwomen wish to define themselves in their own terms, resisting ong>andong> contesting therhetoric ong>ofong> cultural identity. Salima, an Arab American woman from Michiganstates:Really, I tried not to get in touch with people from my own community. You know,actually, I do not like the fact that they talk about each other ong>andong> they expect youto behave in a certain way. I did not want the stigma ong>ofong> this woman goes out, I didnot want to see that in people’s eyes. I wanted lead a life as I like”These Arab women have been assimilated into culture ong>ofong> the mainstreamsocieties, adapting themselves to its norms ong>andong> customs. It is a deliberateinculcation ong>ofong> an “American or British” code ong>ofong> conduct ong>andong> a break with Arabculture. They are totally detached from their previous cultural background to whichthey are unable to re-assimilate themselves. They behave like ordinary British orAmerican citizens ong>andong> prefer to be considered as British or American. Members ong>ofong>their community design them as Anglicized or Americanized Arab women. Thismeans that they have become culturally “lost” ong>andong> eventually separated from theircommunity. Their attitudes, values ong>andong> norms are indistinguishable from those ong>ofong>their native counterparts. Despite their efforts to reconcile themselves with theprevailing culture, their religious roots ong>andong> cultural tradition create some ambiguity30

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>andong> conflict within them, leading to pattern ong>ofong> behaviour reminiscent, sometimes,ong>ofong> the undetermined identity.Adaptation to western culture ong>andong> secularization in social life crystallizethis group ong>ofong> Arab women. They seem to be involved in multiplex secular socialrelationship with non-Arabs ong>andong> are less oriented towards Arab cultural ong>andong>religious values. Once this degree ong>ofong> social interaction ong>andong> assimilation is attained,many viewpoints on Arab ong>andong> Islamic values, social communication ong>andong> theperformance ong>ofong> religious rituals are modified. This shows significant divergencesfrom orientations ong>andong> practices ong>ofong> other groups ong>ofong> Arab women, especially thosewho uphold, defend ong>andong> promote what has been called “resistant identity”. For theyouth, in particular, all the trappings ong>ofong> western culture, relations before marriage,occasional drinking are culturally accepted norms, ong>andong> religion has no relevance totheir present lives. Typically, they have adopted a new identity as a consequence ong>ofong>social interaction with the mainstream societies.The extent to which ethnic intermarriage occurs is widely accepted as animportant indicator ong>ofong> assimilation ong>andong> identification. This group ong>ofong> Arab womenadvocate marriage outside their religious ong>andong> ethnic group, evoking the constraintsthat marriage with a person ong>ofong> the same group may engender. Exogamousmarriage is a way to escape the social rules seen as barriers to the smooth conductong>ofong> marital life. Unlike the previous group who sticks to endogamy ong>andong> have astronger cultural adherence to the marital ideals ong>ofong> their community, this group ong>ofong>Arab women favour intermarriage which weakens ethnic attachments ong>andong> increasecontacts with potential mates from other groups. Christian Arab women are morelikely to out-marry than Muslims who are subjected to stronger social control,particularly in the choice ong>ofong> an appropriate marriage partner.ConclusionArab women adopt multiple ways concerning race relations within the newcultural environment. On the one hong>andong>, some Arab women appropriate culturalsingularity as the only alternative to assimilation ong>andong> cultural homogenisationwhich, for many ong>ofong> them, are perceived as immediate dangers ong>ofong> identity loss. Thisreflects a global phenomenon whereby cultural identity is constructed as an arenauntouched by western globalisation ong>andong> is propounded as the culturally authenticalternative to western modernity (Tucker, 1993:52). In a context ong>ofong> migration, the31

Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010assumption ong>ofong> an Arab identity with its religious ong>andong> cultural facets involvesdrawing boundaries which define belonging to community ong>ofong> Arabs ong>andong> Muslims, alocal ong>andong> transnational universal community. The fear ong>ofong> dissolution ong>ofong> theircultural difference, the assumption ong>ofong> cultural symbols ong>andong> rituals ong>andong> thesocialisation in an Arab environment respond to the need to make this differenceong>andong> identity visible. Women embrace an Arab ong>andong> Islamic identity as an attempt todistinguish themselves from western society, a society deplored as a disorderedone where the family is fragmented ong>andong> women’s bodies are exhibited as objects.On the other hong>andong>, another group ong>ofong> Arab women are engaged in aprocess ong>ofong> identity reconstruction in an endeavour to adapt to the new culturalenvironment. Advocating the preservation ong>ofong> cultural specificity is associated withidentification with the mainstream society. Hence, openness is the key feature thatcharacterise their relations with other cultural groups. These Arab womenconstruct a model ong>ofong> identity that bring into consonance Arab cultural traditionsong>andong> western values ong>ofong> society. It is apparent that religion ong>andong> cultural identityaffect women's contacts decisions. However, some women do not assignsignificance to religion ong>andong> cultural identity in their lives ong>andong> tend to shrink fromtraditional conservatism ong>ofong> their community. These women adopt a more liberalattitude that is not bound by religious ong>andong> cultural considerations. Culturalassimilation is greater among Arab women with longer exposure to the norms ong>ofong>the host society ong>andong> relations with mainstream society differ among them. Thoseborn in the Arab world have kinship networks ong>andong> an attachment to indigenouscultural norms with an inclination to associate mostly with people from their ethnicgroup. Native born Arab women, on the contrary, shift from this tendency to adopta more progressive attitude in their intergroup contacts. Arab women’s relationwith mainstream society is affected by their degree ong>ofong> ethnic identification ong>andong>religiosity, given that Arab kinship networks ong>andong> religious circles tend to favour amore conservative attitude.If ups ong>andong> downs characterise relations ong>ofong> Arab women with the hostsociety, it is important to stress, as a final point, that intergroup relations in thiscase cannot be dissociated from the international context. Beyond any doubt,geopolitical problems have an impact on the internal situation in that therelationship between the mainstream societies ong>andong> Arab communities is shaken byevents in the Arab world. The whole life in Diaspora has been punctuated by thenews ong>ofong> the Middle East, news ong>ofong> wars, conflicts, killings ong>andong> after the wars, the32

Gender ong>andong> Intergroup Contact: The Case ong>ofong> Arab WomanJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010prejudice against minorities, mainly Arabs ong>andong> Muslims, ong>andong> the whole mediaportrayal ong>ofong> them tend to cloud race relations in general. Medias install barriersong>andong> impede tolerance ong>andong> acceptance ong>ofong> cultural diversity by conveyance ong>ofong> animage ong>ofong> mainstream society that is white, Anglo-Saxon under threat ong>ofong> othercultures that endanger its values (Poole, 2002). The representation ong>ofong> Arabs orMuslims either stresses cultural deviance or religious fanaticism. As a result, in theirregularities which characterise writings ong>ofong> the western elite about the Arab worldong>andong> Islam, (Huntington, 1998, Fallaci (2002), cultural otherness is represented as anultimate excuse to dismiss the other whose religion ong>andong> culture are takenincompatible with “living together”.BibliographyAltorki, S. (1988) Arab women in the Field: Studying yours own Society, Syracuse: Syracuse Universitypress.Abu-Laban, B., Suleiman, M.,(1989) Arab Americans: Community ong>andong> Change, Belmont, Mass.,Association ong>ofong> Arab-American University Graduates.Alloula, M. (1986) the colonial Harem. Minneapolis: University ong>ofong> Minneapolis Press.Baugnet, L. (1998) l’identité Sociale, Paris : Dunod.Bastide, R. (1998) Acculturation, in Encyclopedia Universalis, 1-114 c et suivant.Brewer, M., Miller, N.(2003) Intergroup Relations, Buckingham ; Philadelphia : Open University Press.Cainker, L. (1996) « Immigrant Palestinian women Evaluate their lives »pp. 41-59 in Barbara C. Aswadong>andong> Barbara B. (eds) Family ong>andong> Gender among American Muslims: Issues facing MiddleEastern Immigrants ong>andong> their Descendants. Philadelphia: temple University Press.Dubar, C. (2000) La Crise des Identités : l’Interprétation d’une mutation. Paris: PUF.Deaden. (1975) Arab Women, London, Minority Rights Group.Fallaci, O. (2002) La Rage et l’Orgueil, paris : Plon.Fortier, C. (1997) Les Individus au Coeur du Social, Laval : les Presses de l’Université Laval.Lawless, R.(1995), From Ta'izz to Tyneside : an Arab community in the North-East ong>ofong> Englong>andong> during theearly twentieth century, Exeter, Devon : University ong>ofong> Exeter Press.Morokvasic, M. (1984) ‘Birds ong>ofong> passage are also women’ International migration review, 18, 68:886-907.Mernissi, F. (2001) le Harem et l’Occident, paris : Albin Michel.Minces, J. (1980) la femme dans le Monde Arabe, Editions Mazarine.Khol, K. H. (1989) Cherchez la femme d’Orient’ in H. Budde ong>andong> G. Sievernich (eds), Europa und derOrient 800-1900. Berlin. P.356-376.Tucker, J. (ed) (1993) Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers, Indiana Press University.Huntington, S. (1998) the Clash ong>ofong> civilizations ong>andong> the remaking ong>ofong> world order. London, New York:Touchstone.Hentsch, T. (1987) L'Orient imaginaire : la vision politique occidentale de l'Est méditerranéen, Paris : Edde Minuit.33

Mohamed BENITTOJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Halliday, F. (1992) Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain, London: I.B. Tauris & Co LtdPublishers.Moghissi, H. (2006) Muslim Diaspora: Gender, Culture ong>andong> ong>Identityong>, London: Loutledge. Mucchielli, A.(1986) l’identité, Paris: PUF.Naff, A., (1985) Becoming American: the Early Immigrant Experience, Illinois: Southern Illinois UniversityPress.Poole, E. (2002), reporting Islam: Media representation ong>ofong> British Muslim, London, NY: I. B. Tauris.Read, J. G. (2004) Culture, Class, ong>andong> Work among Arab-American Women, New York: LFB ScholarlyPublishing LLC.Hewstone, M., Brown, R. (eds) (1986) Contact ong>andong> Conflict in intergroup encounters, Oxford: Blackwell.Shakir, E. (1997), Bint Arab: Arab ong>andong> Arab American in the United States, Westport: Praeger.Saez, J. (1995) Identités Cultures et Territoires. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer.Sloh, C. (1994) Muslim Women’s Choices: religious belief ong>andong> social reality. Providence: Berg.Swanson, C. (1996) “Ethnicity, Marriage ong>andong> Role Conflict: the Dilemma ong>ofong> a Second-Generation Arab-American” pp.241-49 in Family ong>andong> Gender among Arab MuslimsStephen Bochner, S. (ed) (1982), Cultures in Contact: ong>Studiesong> in Cross-cultural interaction. Oxford, NY:Pergamon Press.Tap, P. (ed) (1980) Identité Individuelle et Personnalisation. Toulouse: Pivat.34

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to MalaysianEconomy: Skilled Migrants in MalaysiaChuie-Hong TANAbstract. This article examines the effects ong>ofong> immigrants’ perceptions ong>ofong> their contributionto the host country, access to equal opportunities ong>andong> government support on their careersatisfaction. Results suggested that expatriates’ willingness to contribute to the hostcountry have a significant positive association with their career satisfaction. Expatriates’positive perceptions on equal opportunities to be successful are also significantly relateddirectly to their career satisfaction. Results support the view that the expatriates’ optimisticperceptions towards the host country will enhance the quality ong>ofong> their career undertakings.Government should adopt a light touch towards the problem, by providing entry relaxationfor them ong>andong> promoting Malaysia as an attractive working ong>andong> living environment.Keywords: Career satisfaction, contribution, equal opportunity, government support,MalaysiaIntroduction“The geographical circulation ong>ofong> intellectual elites ong>andong> the transfer ong>ofong>knowledge”, is a phenomenon ong>ofong> the twentieth century (Ash ong>andong> Söllner, 1996). Infifty years, the movement ong>ofong> skilled people has gone from “brain drain” to the“international exchange ong>ofong> human resources”. While much skilled migration wasonce forced by conflict or by ethnic discrimination, it now includes a search forgreater opportunities, better life chances ong>andong> lifestyle ong>andong> the globalisation as wellas liberalisation ong>ofong> opportunities in newly developing countries, such as Malaysia. Aglobal labour market now exists in some occupations where a person’s skill is his orher greatest asset to be bought ong>andong> sold.As a developing country ong>andong> moving towards achieving the status ong>ofong> anewly industrialised country, the level ong>ofong> local technology ong>andong> skills in Malaysia isrelatively low as compared to countries like Singapore, Hong Kong, Republic ong>ofong>Korea, ong>andong> Taiwan. To move up the chain value, via the ladder ong>ofong> dynamic35

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010comparative advantage, Malaysia needs to produce goods based on highervalue added in terms ong>ofong> improved product design ong>andong> development which inturn, requires not only substantial inflows ong>ofong> foreign financial resources but alsothe training ong>ofong> higher skilled prong>ofong>essionals ong>andong> workers. Moreover it is alsoimperative for Malaysia economy to improve labour market competitivenessthrough maintaining competitive wages, ong>andong> providing a sufficient supply ong>ofong>manpower ong>andong> skilled workers. Although levies are still imposed on foreignprong>ofong>essionals, the government is considering to ong>ofong>fer incentives for work in theinformation technology industry in Malaysia as part ong>ofong> that country’s efforts toplay a central role in the information ‘super-highway’ (Manning, 2000).Skilled immigrants in MalaysiaSkilled or highly skilled labour is usually defined as having universitydegrees or extensive experience in a given field. It includes highly skilledspecialists, independent executives ong>andong> senior managers, specialisedtechnicians or trades-people, investors, physicians, business people ong>andong> subcontractworkers (Steiner ong>andong> Mohr, 1998; OECD SOPEMI, 1997). Individuals inthese categories may seek to maximise return on investment in their educationong>andong> training by moving around the world in search ong>ofong> the highest paid or mostrewarding employment. Others seek to take their skills where they feel they willbe better able to use their capabilities ong>andong> enjoy superior conditions ong>ofong> workong>andong> existence.In Malaysia, the flows ong>ofong> the highly skilled are associated essentiallywith the development ong>ofong> international business, transnational corporations ong>andong>banks, ong>andong> the transfer ong>ofong> government ong>ofong>ficials ong>andong> international civil servantsong>ofong> one type or another. Foreign prong>ofong>essional, technical ong>andong> skilled workersworking in Malaysia are commonly referred to as “expatriates” ong>andong> they hold anemployment pass. In the public sector, the expatriates mainly hold diplomaticposts in foreign embassies or as consultants for government agencies; while inthe private sector, the expatriate managers are mostly positioned inMultinational Corporations that run business operations.Malaysia has adopted more restrictive policies towards foreignprong>ofong>essionals in the early 1990s. Malaysia has imposed an annual business levyong>ofong> several thousong>andong> dollars in the early 1990s (Ruppert, 1999). The process ong>ofong>36

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010entering Malaysia as a foreign skilled labour takes a period ong>ofong> time. An initialstep requires that persons satisfy employment requirements before theirapplications for migration are assessed. Principal applicants must meet one ong>ofong>the three employment criteria: occupation must be on an approved generaloccupations list; on a designated occupations list; or they have employment inMalaysia. The movement ong>ofong> skilled labours is not restricted by a numerical limitbut they must have pre-arranged employment with a Malaysian employer inone ong>ofong> the occupations covered by the agreement. Normally, they arrive ascontract workers to meet shortages or as skilled transients. Skilled migrants canenter the country only as designated employees.Records on expatriates started only in mid-1997 with an estimated12,600 labours. There was an open entry policy by skilled labours ong>andong>prong>ofong>essionals from any country except Israel ong>andong> Yugoslavia. Malaysia receivedexpatriates from well over 100 different countries with the majority comingfrom the United Kingdom, Japan ong>andong> India. Generally, they were foundoccupying top managerial ong>andong> executive positions in the private sector, mostlymultinationals. In Malaysia, expatriates whose prong>ofong>essions are related toInformation, Communication ong>andong> Technology sector are allowed to enter intoMalaysia at the age ong>ofong> 21 years ong>andong> above as compared to other prong>ofong>essions inwhich their age must be 27 years ong>andong> above (Immigration Department, 2004).The expatriate may hold the post for up to ten years. Within one year ong>ofong> theexpatriates’ arrival, a training programme must begin for a Malaysian to fill theposition (The Economic Intelligent Unit, 2005).Challenges perceived by the expatriatesIt is inevitable that the necessity ong>ofong> learning new customs ong>andong>, ong>ofong>ten, anew language is a must for international migrants. As Elashmawi (2000,February 19) mentioned, expatriates tend to bring along their “culturebaggage” ong>andong> when cultural clashes occur, misunderstong>andong>ing ong>andong>misconceptions may result out ong>ofong> it. Living in a new environment, expatriatesare bound to face challenges ong>andong> make adjustments in their life-styles in orderto stay ong>andong> work effectively (Ward ong>andong> Rana-Deuba, 2000; Zakaria, 2000). Thereare expatriates who find that the challenges have an influence towards theirdecision to reconsider staying in the host country (Aycan, 1997).37

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Specific institutional policies in the host country could also beimportant. The intake ong>ofong> expatriates in Malaysia has always been governed bystrict criteria aimed at ensuring technology transfer ong>andong> fair promotionopportunities for Malaysians. Firms are required to prove that suitableMalaysians are not available for these careers, ong>andong> that Malaysians are beingtrained to take over. In Malaysia, a very fair share ong>ofong> immigrants obtains aMalaysian citizenship. It takes a very long ong>andong> arduous process so much so thatthe immigrants interest to be naturalised wears ong>ofong>f in the end.Tiebout (1956) argued that if a sufficient number ong>ofong> communities existto accomodate the different types ong>ofong> individual preferences, individuals willorganise themselves into communities that provide the public good they want.In a globalising world in which citizens are highly mobile, the theorem wouldalso be useful in explaining international migration. The quality ong>ofong> publicdomain is ong>ofong> vital concern to many policy makers. The institutions that governthe production ong>ofong> public goods ong>andong> services face growing tensions arising fromdemographic change, globalisation, ong>andong> related public policies ong>andong> proposedpolicy reforms.Not many studies have been done on the arena ong>ofong> expatriates inMalaysia. Most ong>ofong> the research focused on the unskilled foreign labour ong>andong>illegal immigrants (Nayagam, 1992; Pillai, 1992; Athukorala, 1993; Pang, 1993;Kanapathy, 2001; Kassim, 2000). Mohd. Tahir ong>andong> Ismail (2007) exploredchallenges faced by the expatriates ong>andong> adjustments made to the challenges. Indepthinterviews were conducted with 20 male ong>andong> female expatriates workingin various firms ong>andong> institutions in Malaysia. The study highlighted thepsychological, socio-cultural ong>andong> work challenges. Adjustments were based onindividual initiatives based on the psychological ong>andong> mental strengths ong>ofong> theexpatriates, combined with efforts ong>ofong> peer expatriates, parent firms ong>andong> hostorganisations.Surienty (2005) examined the spillover effects ong>ofong> work ong>andong> non-workfactors on Malaysia expatriate international adjustment. Findings indicate thatrole discretion ong>andong> role conflict ong>ofong> work-related factors, ong>andong> favourabledestination ong>ofong> non-work factors have direct within-domain ong>andong> cross-domainrelationships with expatriates international adjustment. Expatriates who arehigh in commitment have decreasing work adjustment as role clarity increases.Culture novelty shows only a within-domain effect towards general adjustment.38

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Framework ong>andong> hypothesesThe definition ong>ofong> well-being ong>ofong> expatriates includes but extends beyondthe narrower concepts ong>ofong> material well-being or living stong>andong>ards. For example,to achieve full participation in the host society ong>andong> make contribution to thehost country, opportunities ong>ofong>fered by the society ong>andong> governmental supportare essential aspects. In this study, perceptions ong>ofong> the expatriates on theirwillingness to contribute, equal opportunities ong>andong> government support thatdetermine their quality work life will be analyzed.To develop a set ong>ofong> indicators ong>ofong> settlement success ong>ofong> the expatriates inthe host country requires a conceptual framework for examining their outcomein staying in Malaysia. Career satisfaction in the host country can be achieved ifthe expatriates are active in economic ong>andong> social participation. In other words,the expatriates show willingness to contribute to the host country economicallyong>andong> socially. The expatriates must be self-reliant ong>andong> treated as valuedmembers too. The sense ong>ofong> belonging ong>andong> being accepted in the host societyare important in the settlement success ong>ofong> expatriates. Besides that, thegovernment also plays a crucial role in imposing legislations ong>andong> regulationsrelating to the rights ong>ofong> expatriates as well as providing resources.The processes ong>ofong> integrating into the existing social structures ong>andong> thequality ong>ofong> these connections improve the career satisfaction ong>ofong> the expatriates.Settlement success ong>andong> long-term integration into the community are hinderedif expatriates are concentrated among the disadvantaged. In keeping with thisapproach, the expatriates’ perceptions ong>ofong> their contributions to Malaysia, equalopportunities to make a success ong>andong> governmental support are essential in theintegration processes. Figure 1 shows a conceptual framework ong>ofong> processes ong>ofong>integration involving the expatriates, society ong>andong> host government.To achieve full participation in the host society, it is inevitable thatexpatriates need to make contribution to the host country. The willingness ong>ofong> theexpatriates to join into the host society may have great impact in their careersatisfaction. The sense ong>ofong> belonging to the host country may be more fulfilling forthe expatriates to participate economically through their career aspect. Hence, it ispresumed that the more willingness the expatriate to contribute to the hostcountry, the more likely he or she will be satisfied with their career. Thissupposition is explored in H1:39

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010H1. Expatriates willingness to contribute to the host country have apositive association with their career satisfaction.Society: ong>ofong>fersopportunities,makes demong>andong>sSkilled immigrants: makescontribution ong>andong> createsopportunities byparticipation in economicong>andong> social domainsGovernment:imposesrestrictions ong>andong>providesresourcesSkilled immigrants’ careersatisfactionFIGURE 1: Processes ong>ofong> integration: A conceptual framework.A study by Rita Mae Kelly (1998), suggests that for citizens to remainsatisfied as customers, they need some broader ong>andong> comprehensive informationassuring that either all were treated equally, or if people were treated differently,they were treated equitably ong>andong> fairly according to various criteria that areaccepted for valid reasons. This implication ong>ofong> equal opportunities can be alsoapplied in the arena ong>ofong> expatriates. Hence, expatriates who have positiveperceptions on equal opportunities to make a success in the host country maybemore satisfied in their career. H2 examines this presumption:H2. Expatriates’ positive perceptions on equal opportunities to make asuccess are directly related to their career satisfaction.Expatriates are attracted to cities because ong>ofong> career opportunities thatmakes the agglomeration itself ong>ofong> positive local amenities. Expatriates move awayfrom environmental hazards like polluted cities is a case ong>ofong> migration in response tonegative local amenities. In this study, the quality ong>ofong> public domain depends onhow expatriates perceive in which (mainly government) institutions functions ong>andong>the degree to which good ong>andong> services produced by these institutions are valued.Perceptions ong>ofong> the quality ong>ofong> the public domain are therefore a reflection ong>ofong> both40

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010the goods ong>andong> the governance institutions that try to correct negative localamenities ong>ofong> individual action (Kaul ong>andong> Mendoza, 2004). According to Asma (1996,February 16), the foreigners during their stay in Malaysia commented the issues ong>ofong>the local public services, cleanliness, environment awareness ong>andong> restricted localmedia. This supposition is investigated in H3:H3. Host government support is positively related to the careersatisfaction among the expatriates.MethodSampleThe sample was drawn from expatriates currently staying ong>andong> working inthe areas ong>ofong> Klang Valley for at least one year. With reference to a study done byTung (1998), majority ong>ofong> the expatriates took six to twelve months to feelcomfortable living in a new cultural setting. Around 70 per cent ong>ofong> the expatriatesin Malaysia were concentrated in the big cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Cyberjayaong>andong> Petaling Jaya (Yong, 2006). They were prong>ofong>essionals working in highereducation institutions ong>andong> Multinational Corporations (MNCs). The participantswere chosen through purposive sampling, whereby it “is based on the assumptionthat the researcher wants to discover, understong>andong> ong>andong> gain insight ong>andong> thereforeselect a sample from which most can be learned” (Merriam, 1998). Purposivetechnique is widely used in exploratory studies (Cooper ong>andong> Schindler, 2001; Davis,2000) ong>andong> since the current study was also exploratory in nature, the use ong>ofong> thissampling technique was justified.Data were gathered through a self-administered questionnaire, which wasdistributed in the month ong>ofong> May 2006-July 2006 in the Klang Valley. A selfadministeredsurvey methodology was used due to cost effectiveness, reach ong>andong>convenience ong>ofong> this tool for both respondents ong>andong> researchers (Dillman, 2000). Thesurvey methodology also provided the capacity to reveal quantitative differences inperceptions among subjects. Respondents were ensured that individual responseswere anonymous. To ensure the quality ong>ofong> the data collected, all completedquestionnaires were checked for completeness ong>andong> consistency ong>ofong> responses. Theinterviewers were required to revisit the respondents to rectify mistakes that weredetected. The global response rate was 90 per cent. A total ong>ofong> 121 validquestionnaires were received. The SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences)41

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010song>ofong>tware was used for data entry ong>andong> analyses. Computer editing was carried outto check for inconsistency ong>ofong> responses ong>andong> out-ong>ofong>-range codes.Prong>ofong>ile ong>ofong> RespondentsCharacteristics ong>ofong> the sample are presented in Table 1 in this section. In thesample, 81.0 per cent ong>ofong> the expatriates surveyed are males ong>andong> 19.0 per cent arefemales. The sample comprises 29.8 per cent Muslims, 28.1 per cent Hindus, 26.4per cent Christians, 13.2 per cent Buddhists ong>andong> 2.5 per cent others. The majorityong>ofong> the expatriates (66.1 per cent) are between 21-40 years old while 33.9 per centong>ofong> them belong to the age group 41 years old ong>andong> above. A total ong>ofong> 41.3 per cent ong>ofong>the expatriates originate from South Asia, 25.6 per cent come from Europe, 12.4per cent from Middle East, 9.9 per cent from Japan while the rest from South EastAsia, USA ong>andong> Australia.TABLE 1: Prong>ofong>ile ong>ofong> respondentsDemographic characteristics % Demographic characteristics %Age groupCountry ong>ofong> origin21-30 14.9 South East Asia 6.631-40 51.2 South Asia 41.341-50 19.8 Japan 9.9Above 50 14.0 Middle east 12.4Gender Europe 25.6Male 81.0 USA 2.5Female 19.0 Australia 1.7Marital statusMonthly incomeSingle 18.2 RM5,000 or less 50.4Married 81.8 RM5,001 – RM10,000 24.0Religion More than RM10,000 25.6Muslim 29.8 Years ong>ofong> stay since arrivedBuddhist 13.2 5 years or less 66.9Hindu 28.1 6-10 years 25.6Christian 26.4 More than 10 years 7.4Others 2.5 Reason ong>ofong> migrationLanguages spoken Work 76.0English 100 Study ong>andong> later work 3.3Malay 0 Work ong>andong> study 12.4Follow spouse ong>andong> later work 9.142All the expatriates are well versed with English but none ong>ofong> them speaks

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Malay Language. English is the language ong>ofong> commerce ong>andong> normally used in theworking ong>ofong>fice. However, Malay is the first language in Malaysia. It is the languageong>ofong> instruction ong>andong> almost all daily interchange in Malaysia. Therefore, prong>ofong>iciencywith the Malay Language is an important indicator ong>ofong> the ability ong>ofong> expatriates toparticipate fully in Malaysian society. Restrictions upon social intercourse ong>andong> theformation ong>ofong> friendship networks apply if a person living in Malaysia is unable tocommunicate adequately in the Malay language. For such people, networks will beconfined very largely to people speaking the same ethnic language ong>andong> Englishspeakingpeople.About half ong>ofong> the sample has monthly income ong>ofong> RM5,000 or less. Out ong>ofong>this poorest group ong>ofong> expatriates, about 68.9 per cent ong>ofong> them have less than 5years ong>ofong> experience upon arriving in Malaysia ong>andong> majority ong>ofong> them aged between21-40 years old. A total ong>ofong> 24.0 per cent ong>ofong> the expatriates has a monthly income ong>ofong>RM5,001-RM10,000 ong>andong> these respondents are likely to have more than 5 years ong>ofong>working experience upon arriving to Malaysia. 25.6 per cent ong>ofong> the expatriates whoare in the highest earning group (more than RM10,000) have more than 10 years ong>ofong>experience ong>andong> hold top managerial position.It is observed that the majority ong>ofong> the expatriates (76.0 per cent) come toMalaysia for work reason while 12.4 per cent ong>ofong> them come to work ong>andong> study atthe same time. A total 9.1 per cent ong>ofong> the sample are ‘trailing spouse’ who laterfind full-time career ong>andong> 3.3 per cent arrived as students ong>andong> later work to supportthemselves. Participation in education is an important component ong>ofong> socialparticipations since this is likely to contribute to their integration into the labourforce.InstrumentThree categories which consisted ong>ofong> “contribution to Malaysia”, “equalopportunities to make a success”, ong>andong> “host government support to expatriates”were measured on a seven-point scale. The increasing point indicated the higherthe level ong>ofong> agreement with the statements. These items were measured using ascale ong>ofong> 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Cronbach’s alpha was computedto test the reliability for the three categories.Contributions to Malaysia was measured by seven items developed byKong>ofong>odimos (1995). One sample item was “I care much ong>andong> try to make Malaysia agood community to live in”. This general affective measure was intended tocapture the extent to which the respondents’ willingness to contribute ong>andong>43

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010integrate into the host society. Equal opportunities to make a success wasmeasured by three items ong>andong> drawn from the work ong>ofong> Greenhaus et al. (1990). Onesample item was “In general, everyone has an equal chance ong>ofong> getting ahead inMalaysian society”. The items measure the expression ong>ofong> equal opportunity tosettle successfully in Malaysia. Perceptions ong>ofong> the local government assessed theextent to which respondents had been provided support ong>andong> direct assistance bythe host government, in the form ong>ofong> law, facilities ong>andong> environment. Five indicatorsong>ofong> host government support were included. One sample item was “The governmentprovides basic services such as health care ong>andong> legal services to expatriates”.The quality in the expatriates work is assessed in terms ong>ofong> their careersatisfaction illustrated over a five-point Likert scale ranging from very dissatisfied tovery satisfied. Consistent with the work by Andrews ong>andong> Withey (1976) ong>andong> Wonget al. (2000), this study suggests a set ong>ofong> 4 life domains to evaluate the quality ong>ofong>career ong>ofong> the expatriates in Malaysia. Each domain ong>ofong> life is then rated on a fivepointLikert scale by the expatriates to indicate their perception ong>ofong> satisfaction withthat domain. The sample domains involve ‘specific career responsibilities’,‘expected performance stong>andong>ards’, ‘supervisions ong>andong> guidance ong>ofong> subordinates’ ong>andong>‘interacting with Malaysian colleagues’.Hierarchical regression analysis was employed to examine the relationshipsamong the perceptions ong>ofong> expatriates in the three categories which are‘contributions to Malaysia’, ‘equal opportunities to make a success’ ong>andong> ‘hostgovernment support’ with ‘career satisfaction’. To assess the perception ong>ofong> theexpatriates with regard to each ong>ofong> the category, the means ong>andong> stong>andong>ard deviationswere computed for each item.ResultsTable 2 presents descriptive statistics. All the variables’ characteristics,including means, stong>andong>ard deviations, ong>andong> Cronbach’s alphas are reasonable(Nunnally, 1978). It is notable that the expatriates have a mean score ong>ofong> careersatisfaction above what is depicted as satisfied, well above the mid-level point. Thismay indicate that they are quite comfortable with the work environment inMalaysia. The mean for contributions to Malaysia, equal opportunities ong>andong>government support are also above the mid-level point ong>ofong> its scale, with thenearest scale point ong>ofong> ‘somewhat agree’. For expatriates’ perceptions ong>ofong> host44

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010government, it is even higher, almost coinciding with the scale point ‘agree’,indicating an affirmation ong>ofong> their optimistic in the government support.TABLE 2: Characteristics ong>ofong> the variable in the sampleVariable Mean Stong>andong>ardDeviation1. Career Satisfaction (JS) a 4.09 0.74 0.852. Contributions to Malaysia(C) b 4.91 1.16 0.823. Equal Opportunities (EQ) b 4.80 1.44 0.744. Government Support (GS) b 5.46 0.82 0.71a Scale ranged from 1-5Cronbach’salphab Scale ranged from 1-7In addition, table 3 presents a correlation matrix among the researchvariables. As can be seen, most ong>ofong> the inter-correlations hold in the expecteddirections, ong>andong> none ong>ofong> them exceeds the maximum level ong>ofong> 0.70, which is a goodindication for the absence ong>ofong> multicollinearity among the variables. Thesecorrelations suggests that career satisfaction among the expatriates in Malaysia arepositively related with contribution to Malaysia ong>andong> equal opportunities (r = 0.37, p< 0.001 ong>andong> r = 0.27, p < 0.05, respectively). The results for equal opportunities areeven stronger. Equal opportunities is positively related with contribution toMalaysia ong>andong> government support (r =0.68, p < 0.001 ong>andong> r = 0.41, p < 0.001,respectively). Government support is modestly positively related with equalopportunities (r = 0.52, p < 0.001). These findings provide initial support for thedirect relationship between dependent ong>andong> the independent variables. However,these relationships still need to be tested with hierarchical regression analysis toexamine their importance.4.094.914.805.46TABLE 3: Correlation matrix among the research variables for the sample.Mean 1 2 3 4 5 6(S.D.)1. Career-Satisfaction a (0.74)2. Contributions to0.37** -Malaysia b (1.16)3. Equal0.27* 0.68** - -Opportunities b (1.44)4. Government0.08 0.41** 0.52** -Support b (0.82)5. Gender(1 = male)- 0.20* 0.19* 0.12 -0.04 -45

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 20106. Years ong>ofong> stay in 6.73 0.21* 0.09 -0.10 -0.19* 0.09 -Malaysia(15.35)Note : *p < 0.05; **p < 0.001; a Scale ranged from 1-5; b Scale ranged from 1-7Since career satisfaction is a process over time, the years the expatriateshad spent in Malaysia ong>andong> gender are used as a control variable in the data analysisong>andong> entered first. Table 4 presents the results ong>ofong> hierarchical regression analysis totest the direct relationships. Expatriates’ career satisfaction is regressed on thecontrol variables (step 1). Second, contributions to Malaysia, equal opportunitiesong>andong> government support are added to the equations (step 2) to examine theindependent contribution ong>ofong> each ong>ofong> these variables to the overall explainedvariance ong>ofong> the dependent variables.In the first step ong>ofong> the equations, the control variables (gender ong>andong> years ong>ofong>stay in Malaysia) have no significant relationship with the dependent variables.However, the second step ong>ofong> the regressions provides very interesting findings.Years ong>ofong> stay in Malaysia is significantly positive to expatriates’ career satisfactionin the second step (β = 0.24, p < 0.01). Male expatriates show more significantcareer satisfaction as compared to female counterparts (β = 0.14, p < 0.05). Step 1shows only 4 per cent ong>ofong> the explained variance in expatriates’ career satisfaction.The control variables have a minor effect on the analysis. Men are more likely thanwomen to be satisfied in their work. In addition, career satisfaction is higher amongthose who have been staying a longer period in Malaysia.TABLE 4: Hierarchical regression analysis for the dependent variable expatriates’career satisfaction (stong>andong>ardized coefficients; t-test in parentheses)Variable Step 1 Step 21. Gender (1 = male) 0.18 (1.94) 0.14(2.04*)2. Years ong>ofong> stay in Malaysia 0.08 (0.81) 0.24 (3.21**)3. Contribution to Malaysia (CM) 0.29 (2.69**)4. Equal Opportunities (EQ) 0.56 (6.80***)5. Government Support (GS) 0.14 (1.71)R 2 0.040 0.540Adjusted R 2 0.023 0.506ΔR 2 0.040 0.034F 2.36 15.70***F for ΔR 2 2.36 2.00*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p < 0.00146As can be seen from the results, willingness to contribute to Malaysia is

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010significant ong>andong> positively related with career satisfaction among the expatriates inthe second step (β = 0.29, p < 0.01, respectively). Equal opportunities to make asuccess is also strongly ong>andong> positively related with career satisfaction among theexpatriates (β = 0.56, p < 0.001, respectively). Government support reportsinsignificance. This variable indicates a lack ong>ofong> importance for its relationship tocareer satisfaction. The inclusion ong>ofong> the three variables in the step 2 contributes toa high 54 per cent ong>ofong> the explained variance in career satisfaction among theexpatriates. The F value is statistically significant, implying a good data fit betweenthe regression model ong>andong> the data. These findings support H1 ong>andong> H2.Conclusion ong>andong> discussionControlling for the years the expatriates have been assigned to Malaysiaong>andong> gender, the results show that the more willingness the expatriate to contributeto the host country, the more satisfied is their career undertakings. Similarly, theresults also present that expatriates’ positive perceptions on equal opportunities tomake a success are directly related to their career satisfaction, after gender ong>andong>years ong>ofong> stay in Malaysia variables being controlled.The present study deals with perceptions ong>ofong> contributions to Malaysia,equal opportunities to make a success ong>andong> host government support in the arenaong>ofong> expatriates in Malaysia. The main rationale for this approach is based on the ideathat these views are important for a better understong>andong>ing ong>ofong> other perceptions ong>andong>behaviours ong>ofong> expatriates toward host government ong>andong> toward the contribution toMalaysia. Expatriates’ perceptions ong>ofong> willingness to contribution to Malaysia, equalopportunities ong>andong> host government support may thus prove useful in explainingsatisfaction in their career.With the subjective method ong>ofong> assessment where the perceptions ong>ofong> theexpatriates are clearly reflected, policy makers ong>andong> service providers from bothpublic ong>andong> private sectors would be able to gain a better insight on the type ong>ofong>initiatives ong>andong> services that could improve the well being ong>ofong> the expatriates ong>andong>retain them. Efforts to improve mechanisms that promote the equality ong>andong> wellbeingong>ofong> the expatriates will encourage them to stay ong>andong> contribute. Above all, awell-planned ong>andong> future oriented policy consistent with the long run prospects ong>ofong>the market must be viewed as a strategy in increasing the inflow ong>ofong> skilled labourimmigrants.47

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010The findings help us to promote ideas about how to improve themanagement ong>ofong> expatriates to further contribute to our country. Another majorachievement ong>ofong> this paper is its exploration ong>ofong> an alternative viewpoint regardingthe study ong>ofong> career satisfaction ong>ofong> expatriates to the receiving country. The studydemonstrated that a variety ong>ofong> perspectives need to be considered whenexamining the level ong>ofong> career satisfaction among the expatriates.The primary data was moderate in size. A total ong>ofong> 121 respondents’questionnaires were collected ong>andong> analyzed. However, based on the samplingtechnique used, the number ong>ofong> sample is sufficient, ong>andong> indeed it is big enough torun a robust statistical analysis (Balian, 1994). The purposive method was adoptedfor this study because there was no sampling frame available. Though this samplingstrategy is acceptable for this study, there is a possibility that the adoption ong>ofong> thisstrategy may limit the generalization ong>ofong> the findings, to some extent. Futureresearch could try to replicate ong>andong> extend this exploratory study. Besides askingexpatriates, employers could be requested to comment on their perceptions ong>ofong>their performance ong>andong> staff-related issues. This information is important as theemployer is one ong>ofong> the main contacts for the foreign skilled labours.ReferencesAndrews, F. M., ong>andong> Withey, S. B. Social Indicators ong>ofong> Well-Being: Americans’ Perceptions ong>ofong>Life Quality. New York: Plenum Press, 1976.Asma, A. “Delights, puzzles ong>andong> irritations ong>ofong> Malaysian culture to foreigners.” News StraitsTimes, 16 February, 1996.Ash, M. G., ong>andong> Söllner A. “Introduction”, in M.G. Ash ong>andong> A. Sollner (Eds.), Forcedong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Scientific Change (pp. 1–22). German Historical Institute,Washington DC.: Cambridge University Press, 1996.Athukorala, P. “International labour migration in the asian-pacific region: patterns, policiesong>andong> economic implications.” Asia-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 7, No. 2, (1993):28-57.Aycan, Z. “Expatriate adjustment as a multifaceted phenomenon: Individual ong>andong>organisational level predictors.” The International ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Human ResourceManagement, Vol. 8, No. 4, (1997): 434-456.Balian, E. S. The Graduate ong>Researchong> Guidebook (3 rd ed.). New York: University Press ong>ofong>America, 1994.Cooper, D. R., ong>andong> Schindler. P. S. Business ong>Researchong> Methods (7 th ed.). McGraw-Hill HigherEducation, Singapore, 2001.Davis, D. Business ong>Researchong> for Decision Making (5 th ed.). Duxbury, California, 2000.Dillman, D. Mail ong>andong> Internet Surveys (2 nd ed.). Wiley, New York, 2000.Elashmawi, F. “Cross-cultural negotiation.” New Straits Times, 19 February, 2000, p. 8.48

Career Satisfaction ong>andong> Willingness to Contribute to Malaysian EconomyJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Greenhaus, J. H., Parasuraman, S., ong>andong> Wormley, W. “Organizational experiences ong>andong> careersuccess ong>ofong> black ong>andong> white managers.” Academy ong>ofong> Management ong>Journalong>, Vol. 33,(1990): 64-66.Immigration Department ong>ofong> Malaysia. Annual Statistical Report. Kuala Lumpur: GovernmentPress, 2004.Kanapathy, V. “International migration ong>andong> labour market adjustments in Malaysia: TheRole ong>ofong> Foreign Labour Management Policies.” Asian ong>andong> Pacific ong>Migrationong> ong>Journalong>,Vol. 10, No.3-4 (2001): 429-461.Kassim, A. “Integration ong>ofong> foreign workers ong>andong> illegal employment in Malaysia”, in Simpson,J. (Ed.). International ong>Migrationong> in Asia. Trends ong>andong> Policies, Organisation forEconomic Co-operation ong>andong> Development Proceedings (2000): 113-135. Japan.Kaul, I., ong>andong> Mendoza, R. U. “Advancing the concept ong>ofong> public goods”, in I. Kaul, P.Conceicao, K. Le Goulven. ong>andong> R. U. Mendoza (Eds.), Providing Global Public Goods– Managing Globalisation (pp. 78-111). Oxford University Press, 2004.Kong>ofong>odimos, J. Balancing Act. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA., 1995.Manning, C. Trade Facilitation in the Asia Pacific: New directions ong>andong> the developmentchallenge. APEC workshop held in Hotel Meritus, Singapore on 13-14 September,2000, World Bank, Washington DC., 2000Merriam, S. B. Qualitative ong>Researchong> ong>andong> Case Study Applications in Education (p. 61). SanFrancisco, CA.: Jossey-Bass Publishers, , 1998.Mohd. Tahir, A. H., ong>andong> Ismail, M. “Cross-cultural challenges ong>andong> adjustments ong>ofong>expatriates: A case study in Malaysia.” Alternatives: Turkish ong>Journalong> ong>ofong>International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3 ong>andong> 4, Fall ong>andong> Winter, (2007).Nayagam, James “Migrant labour absorption in Malaysia.” Asian ong>andong> Pacific ong>Migrationong>ong>Journalong>, Vol. 1, No. 3-4, (1992): 477-494.Nunnally, J. C. Psychometric Theory (2 nd .ed), p. 245. McGraw-Hill, London, 1978.Pang, E. F. Regionalisation ong>andong> Labour Flows in Pacific Asia. Development ong>Centreong>, OECD,Paris, 1993.Pillai, P. People on the Move: An Overview in Recent Immigration ong>andong> Emigration toMalaysia (ISIS Discussion Paper, p. 53). Institute ong>ofong> Strategic ong>andong> Internationalong>Studiesong>, Malaysia, 1992.OECD SOPEMI Trends in International ong>Migrationong> (Continuous Reporting System onong>Migrationong> Annual Report 1996) Organisation for Economic Co-operation ong>andong>Development, Paris, 1997.Rita Mae Kelly ong>andong> Amy J. Dabul Marin “Position power ong>andong> women’s career advancement.”Women in Management Review, Vol. 13, No. 2. (1998).Ruppert, E. Managing Foreign Labour in Singapore ong>andong> Malaysia: Are there Lessons for GCCCountries? World Bank, Washington, DC. 1999.Steiner, V., ong>andong> Mohr, R. “Industrial change, stability ong>ofong> relative earnings ong>andong> substitution ong>ofong>unskilled labour in West Germany”. Mimeo (ong>Centreong> for Europen Economicong>Researchong>, Mannheum: Germany), 1998.Surienty, Lilis Work/non-work Factors ong>andong> Expatriates International Adjustment:Moderating Effects ong>ofong> Self-Monitoring ong>andong> Hardiness. Doctoral dissertation,Malaysia University ong>ofong> Science (USM), Malaysia, 2005.The Economic Intelligence Unit The Economist, 1 June, 2005.Tiebout, C. M. “A pure theory ong>ofong> local expenditures.” ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Political Economy, Vol. 64,(1956): 416-424.49

Chuie-Hong TANJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Tung, R. L. “American expatriates abroad: From neophytes to cosmopolitans.” ong>Journalong> ong>ofong>World Business, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1998): 125-144.Ward, C., ong>andong> Rana-Deuba, A. “Home ong>andong> host culture influences on sojourner adjustment.”International ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> International Relations, Vol. 24, (2000): 291-306.Wong, G. K. M., Foo, T. S., ong>andong> Lim, L. Y. “Quality ong>ofong> life ong>ofong> expatriates in Singapore.” inProceedings ong>ofong> the Second International Conference on Quality ong>ofong> Life in Cities,Singapore, 2000.Yong, Aster “Foreign labour employment policy ong>andong> change in Australia, Singapore ong>andong>Malaysia.” ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Business Systems, Governance ong>andong> Ethics, Vol. 1, No. 1(2006): 25-35.Zakaria, N. “The effects ong>ofong> cross-cultural training on the acculturation process ong>ofong> the globalworkforce.” International ong>ofong> ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Manpower, Vol. 21, No. 6, (2000): 492-510.50

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to SustainableImmigration in a Small Canadian CityRitendra TAMANGAbstract. This article examines some ong>ofong> the challenges confronting immigrants in PrinceGeorge, a small city in the province ong>ofong> British Columbia, Canada, ong>andong> evaluates theresponses ong>ofong> local agencies to the diverse needs ong>ofong> newcomers. Specifically, it will explorethe effects ong>ofong> the current economic restructuring ong>andong> the lack ong>ofong> coordination among publicemployment, housing, education, ong>andong> health agencies ong>andong> private agencies such aschurches. Shortfalls in the quality ong>andong> effectiveness ong>ofong> the delivery ong>ofong> essential services toimmigrants, particularly those who do not speak English or French, have affectedimmigrants’ sense ong>ofong> belonging, patterns ong>ofong> settlement, ong>andong> negotiation ong>ofong> new identities inthe community.Keywords: Canada, citizenship, migrants, multiculturalism, nationalism, new identitiesIntroductionIn recent years, scholars, activists, ong>andong> policy makers have raised concernsabout social ong>andong> economic decline resulting from the concentration ong>ofong> immigrantsin large Canadian cities such as Vancouver ong>andong> Toronto. This issue arises at a timewhen regions across Canada are undergoing a series ong>ofong> economic restructuringsong>andong> when migration to resource-based small cities such as Prince George (BritishColumbia) is declining. Although attempts have been made to promote settlementin small cities, there has been limited research into settlement patterns ong>ofong>immigrants in small urban centers ong>andong> strategies used by municipal authorities toattract ong>andong> retain immigrants. To help fill this gap, this study examines thechallenges confronting immigrants in Prince George, a small city in northern BritishColumbia, ong>andong> evaluates the responses ong>ofong> local agencies to the diverse needs ong>ofong>newcomers. Specifically, I explore the effects ong>ofong> the current social ong>andong> economicrestructuring ong>andong> the lack ong>ofong> coordination among public employment, housing,education, ong>andong> health agencies as well as private agencies such as churches. This51

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010research contributes to the ongoing discussion among researchers, policy makers,ong>andong> stakeholders regarding issues ong>ofong> immigrants’ access to critical social servicesong>andong> the lack ong>ofong> coordination between public ong>andong> private agencies in small Canadiancenters.I use textual analysis methods to analyze various forms ong>ofong> texts (e.g., publicannouncements ong>andong> population statistics) produced by the provincial governmentong>ofong> British Columbia. In addition, I use scholarly literature to supplement theinformation contained in these texts. To discuss issues ong>ofong> citizenship, identity,belonging, ong>andong> Canadian immigration, I draw from theories in political studies,geography, ong>andong> anthropology. I discuss three prominent current theories frompolitical studies concerning citizenship—liberal, republican, ong>andong> communitarian—ong>andong> explore their limitations ong>andong> possibilities with regard to theorizing aboutidentity, citizenship, ong>andong> belonging. Within this discussion, I explain the need for anew conceptualization ong>ofong> citizenship centering on the ways groups construct theirbelonging ong>andong> the fluidity ong>ofong> group identities within the contexts ong>ofong> globalizationong>andong> transnationalism. I also draw on the geographical theory ong>ofong> politics ong>ofong> space todiscuss immigration processes, immigration policies, ong>andong> the effects these have onshaping settlement patterns ong>ofong> immigrants in small Canadian cities. This combinedapproach allows me to examine the challenges that immigrants experience in smallCanadian cities, the implications ong>ofong> these challenges for individuals’ ong>andong> groups’sense ong>ofong> belonging, ong>andong> the limitations that exist in the strategies used by policymakers at the municipal level to attract ong>andong> retain immigrants.I argue that shortfalls in the quality ong>andong> effectiveness ong>ofong> the delivery ong>ofong>essential services to immigrants, particularly those who do not speak English orFrench, have affected immigrants’ sense ong>ofong> belonging, patterns ong>ofong> settlement, ong>andong>negotiation ong>ofong> new identities in the community ong>ofong> Prince George.BackgroundAlthough migration is not a recent phenomenon, its causes ong>andong> effects areincreasingly linked to the globalization processes. Since the end ong>ofong> the Cold War,individuals ong>andong> groups in various parts ong>ofong> the world have been motivated toemigrate out ong>ofong> their homelong>andong>s by violent conflicts, shifts in geopolitical relations,ong>andong> the expansion ong>ofong> trade ong>andong> production that cut across nation-states’boundaries. The decision to migrate is multifaceted, ong>andong> migration can be either52

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010voluntary or forced. Voluntary migration involves the decision to leave one’s homein search ong>ofong> better economic opportunities or to reunite with family abroad.Involuntary or forced migration takes place when circumstances such as war orenvironmental degradation force individuals to abong>andong>on their homes. ong>Migrationong>can also be long term or short term. Long-term migration involves crossing nationalborders ong>andong> establishing permanent settlement in a different state. Short-term ortemporary migration applies to guest workers, seasonal workers, ong>andong> students. 1International migrants contribute significantly to the growing global laborforce. In an effort to identify those who cross their national borders, states createvarious categories for migrants, such as visitors ong>andong> migrant workers. However,these categories ong>ofong>ten misconstrue the reality ong>ofong> those who cross states’ borders.For example, tourists may enter a country ong>andong> decide to stay to search foremployment, ong>andong> refugees or asylum seekers who leave their country for politicalreasons may choose to migrate to a specific country in search ong>ofong> employmentopportunities or to reunite with their families. 2 Under these circumstances,individuals ong>andong> groups forge their identities ong>andong> political membership frommultiple locations.One ong>ofong> the challenges experienced by contemporary states is controllingmigration flows. Failure to control territorial boundaries can pose serious threats tonational security ong>andong> challenges to the country’s leadership. Therefore statesadjust their immigration policies in the interests ong>ofong> securing their territorialborders. Mass flows ong>ofong> migration also create pressures on state governments,particularly those who do not have the capacity to accommodate large influxes ong>ofong>international migrants. If a state does not have the capacity to provide essentialpublic services such as health care ong>andong> housing for large numbers ong>ofong> migrants inaddition to its citizens, this limitation can cause tensions between groups ong>andong>individuals, as well as competition for limited resources such as goods ong>andong>employment. 3The reading ong>andong> interpretation ong>ofong> government documents in this projectare situated within the context ong>ofong> dominant meanings ong>ofong> nationalism ong>andong>multiculturalism in Canada. The majority ong>ofong> written texts used in this project arepopulation statistics ong>andong> documents published by the federal, provincial, ong>andong>1 Fiona B. Adamson, ―Crossing Borders: International ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> National Security,‖International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 165–99.2 Adamson, ―Crossing Borders.‖3 Ibid.53

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010municipal governments. Together, these sources are important for addressing theissues ong>ofong> immigrants’ access to public services (e.g., language training, housing, ong>andong>health care) ong>andong> how government public policies—including immigration policies—influence immigrants’ settlement patterns. The government documents areavailable online. Using supplemental information from scholarly literature, I applytextual ong>andong> spatial analysis to examine the ong>ofong>ficial texts. Textual analysis involvesthe reading ong>andong> analyzing ong>ofong> texts to discover groups’ ideological practices. Thismethod is useful in uncovering how institutional knowledge is formed through thecreation ong>andong> legitimizing ong>ofong> categories (e.g., immigrant ong>andong> citizen) within a state.In this project I also use spatial analysis, which is effective for examining settlementpatterns ong>andong> economic performance ong>ofong> immigrants in cities on a regional scale.Theorizing CitizenshipState immigration policies are designed around two main goals:determining who can enter the country ong>andong> who can become state members. Eachnation-state develops its own elaborate rules ong>andong> regulations for those the staterecognizes as its citizens ong>andong> for those who are immigrants. State membership, alsoknown as citizenship, is perceived by scholars as a collection ong>ofong> economic ong>andong>cultural practices as well as political ong>andong> civil rights ong>andong> duties that delineate anindividual membership within the specific polity. 4 Because citizenship is both apractice ong>andong> a status, it cannot be viewed as apurely sociological concept nor purely legal concept but a relationship between thetwo. . . . While, then, citizenship can be defined as a legal ong>andong> political status, froma sociological point ong>ofong> view it can be defined as competent membership in a polity,thus emphasizing the constitute aspect ong>ofong> citizenship. 5By this definition, those who do not possess political ong>andong> social rights areconsidered noncitizens ong>ofong> the state ong>andong> are thereby excluded from exercising these4 Alan C. Cairns, ―Introduction,‖ in Citizenship, Diversity ong>andong> Pluralism: Canadian ong>andong>Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan C. Cairns et al. (Montreal: Queens-McGill UniversityPress, 1999), 3–22; Engin Fahri Isin ong>andong> Patricia K. Wood, ―Redistribution, Recognition, ong>andong>Representation,‖ in Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>, ed. Engin Fahri ong>andong> Patricia K. Wood (London:Sage, 1999), 1–24; Yvonne M. Hébert ong>andong> Lori A. Wilkinson, ―The Citizenship Debates:Conceptual, Policy, Experiential, ong>andong> Educational Issues,‖ in Citizenship in Transformationin Canada, ed. Yvonne M. Hébert (Toronto: University ong>ofong> Toronto Press, 2002), 3–36;David Miller, Citizenship ong>andong> National ong>Identityong> (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).5 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution,‖ 4.54

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010rights. The exclusion from rights not only has important implications on relationsbetween those who identify themselves as citizens ong>andong> those who are noncitizensor migrants, it also shapes migrants’ sense ong>ofong> belonging to the state or nation.A discussion ong>ofong> concepts ong>ofong> identity ong>andong> citizenship must make reference tothe specific location ong>andong> to historical ong>andong> cultural contexts. Citizenship continues tobe a popular topic ong>ofong> debate among scholars ong>andong> policy makers. In particular,citizenship is one ong>ofong> the important cultural ong>andong> political identity markers that serveto differentiate members from nonmembers within the specific nation-state.According to previous scholars (such as Max Weber) who held Eurocentric ong>andong>imperialistic views, the idea ong>ofong> citizenship originated in the West ong>andong> did not existin non-Western societies. 6 More recently, scholars have pointed out thatthroughout history, societies around the world have different ways ong>ofong> recognizingpolitical membership ong>andong> status ong>andong> thereby construct their own definition ong>ofong>citizenship. 7 In addition to problematizing the Eurocentric ong>andong> imperialistictendency ong>ofong> earlier theories ong>ofong> citizenship, these scholars also contend thatindividuals ong>andong> groups within specific places engage in struggles ong>andong> conflicts forthe right to claim citizenship. In doing so, these scholars succeeded in challengingthe universalistic ong>andong> Western view ong>ofong> citizenship held by previous theorists, ong>andong>they challenge us to rethink the concept ong>ofong> citizenship as fluid ong>andong>multidimensional.Currently, three prominent theories aid in understong>andong>ing the concept ong>ofong>citizenship: liberalism, communitarianism, ong>andong> civic republicanism. The liberal viewconsiders the individual to be a polity ong>andong> regards citizenship as a set ong>ofong> specificrights granted to the individual by the nation-state. The individual has the right tochoose when ong>andong> whether to exercise this right. Critics argue that the liberaldefinition ong>ofong> citizenship has a limited conception ong>ofong> group rights. 8Alternatively, communitarianism emphasizes the notion ong>ofong> community ong>andong>seeks to situate the individual within the collective. Although communitarianismdoes not reject the liberal conceptualization ong>ofong> individual rights, it stresses theimportance ong>ofong> individual rights within the context ong>ofong> group interests, as the6 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution.‖7 Cairns, ―Introduction‖; Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution‖; Miller, ―Citizenship‖; Hébert ong>andong>Wilkinson, ―Citizenship Debates.‖8 Cairns, ―Introduction‖; Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution‖; Miller, ―Citizenship‖; Hébert ong>andong>Wilkinson, ―Citizenship Debates.‖55

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010individual is not isolated from his or her community. 9 Critics ong>ofong> communitarianismargue that the theory is limited, as individual loyalties ong>andong> obligations toward thegroup are taken for granted. 10Unlike liberalism ong>andong> communitarianism, republicanism privileges neitherthe individual nor the community. Instead, it places a strong emphasis on the ideaong>ofong> “civic identity,” which is shared by all citizens in the pursuit ong>ofong> common interestsong>andong> does not compromise individual goals. According to the republican model,participation in political forums should be based on a common identity as citizens.In the decision-making process, differences among people should be disallowedong>andong> competing views resolved in accordance with the overarching goals ong>ofong> justiceong>andong> common interests. 11 Advocates ong>ofong> the politics ong>ofong> recognition have criticized therepublican universal model because it assumes a singular ong>andong> unitary politicalcommunity ong>andong> fails to recognize that the concept ong>ofong> citizenship is contestedbetween dominant ong>andong> marginalized groups. Furthermore, the guidelines existingin the republican model only benefit the interests ong>ofong> the dominant groups ong>andong>therefore fail to address contemporary issues ong>ofong> discrimination ong>andong> oppression. 12These critics also doubt that groups will be willing to set aside their specificidentities in order take part in political debates that assume that citizens have ahomogeneous identity.The politics ong>ofong> recognition seeks to ong>ofong>fer new ways ong>ofong> theorizing citizenship.Advocates ong>ofong> this emerging theory argue for a new model ong>ofong> citizenship that willchallenge dominant cultural values ong>andong> interests, provide equal opportunities forall groups to participate in the political realm, ong>andong> legitimize differences amonggroups. The new model would also emphasize the redistribution ong>ofong> interests thatfavor groups identifying as marginalized or oppressed, such as immigrants ong>andong>women. 13 In addition, policies would be based on decision-making discussions ong>andong>would take into account group differences ong>andong> how the policies would affectgroups that are on society’s margins. 14 As David Miller points out, “Equal treatmentwill not be enough in circumstances where different groups are very unequally9 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution‖; Miller, ―Citizenship.‖10 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution.‖11 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution‖; Miller, ―Citizenship.‖12 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution.‖13 Ibid.14 Cairns, ―Introduction‖; Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution‖; Miller, ―Citizenship‖; Hébert ong>andong>Wilkinson, ―Citizenship Debates.‖56

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010affected by the policies that are chosen.” 15 Whereas supporters ong>ofong> the politics ong>ofong>recognition support the idea ong>ofong> legitimizing group differences in democraticpolitics, opponents argue that this model promotes division ong>andong> fragmentationamong groups as it privileges groups’ segmental identities such as ethnicity, class,religion, ong>andong> sexuality. 16By highlighting differences, the politics ong>ofong> recognitiondownplays the common bond among various marginalized groups ong>andong> disguisesclass conflicts that underlie many ong>ofong> the struggles. 17 What is needed are newtheories ong>ofong> citizenship that move away from universal conceptualization to focus onmultidimensional ong>andong> plural concepts ong>ofong> citizenship. Within the new framework,citizenship would be viewed not as a fixed entity but as a fluid ong>andong> ongoing processong>ofong> negotiation ong>ofong> identity ong>andong> difference.In the discipline ong>ofong> geography, the politics ong>ofong> space is an important tool forexamining the relationship between immigration, place, ong>andong> identity. According tothe politics ong>ofong> space theory, the concept ong>ofong> place or community is constructedthrough discourses, practices, ong>andong> relations between people. 18 Supporters ong>ofong> thistheory acknowledge that regional interests arise from the interests ong>ofong> groups in agiven place; in addition, within regions there are tensions between centers ong>andong>hinterlong>andong>, so that all voices within a region are not equally represented. 19Advocates ong>ofong> the politics ong>ofong> space argue that policies regarding regionaldevelopment must ensure the participation ong>ofong> all groups residing within theseplaces ong>andong> that the policies must reflect the interests ong>ofong> all groups. 20Immigration ong>andong> Settlement in Small Canadian CitiesFor the purpose ong>ofong> this research, the term city will be used to define sets ong>ofong>social relations, symbols, ong>andong> political economies expressed in the city, ong>andong> urban15 Miller, ―Citizenship,‖ 64.16 Isin ong>andong> Wood, ―Redistribution‖; Miller, ―Citizenship.‖17 Miller, ―Citizenship.‖18 Ash Amin, ―The Regions Unbound: Towards a New Politics ong>ofong> Space,‖ GeographyAnnual 86B, no. 1 (2004): 33–44.19 Amin, ―Regions‖; R. Alan Walks, ―The Urban in Fragile, Uncertain, Neoloberal Times:Towards New Geographies ong>ofong> Social Justice?‖ The Canadian Geographer 53, no. 3 (2009):345–56.20 Amin, ―Regions‖; Larry S. Bourne ong>andong> Damaris Rose, ―The Changing Face ong>ofong> Canada:The Uneven Geographies ong>ofong> Population ong>andong> Social Change,‖ The Canadian Geographer 45,no. 1 (2001): 105–19; Walks, ―Urban.‖57

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010will refer to a process rather than a category. 21 The transformations brought aboutby globalization ong>andong> transnational migration create new linkages that connect theglobal to the local. As Setha M. Low comments,The city is not the only place where [global ong>andong> local] linkages can be studied, butthe intensification ong>ofong> these processes—as well as their human outcomes—occursong>andong> can be understood best in cities. Thus, the “city” is not a reification but thefocus ong>ofong> cultural ong>andong> sociopolitical manifestations ong>ofong> urban lives ong>andong> everydaypractices. 22Emphasizing the interaction between the global ong>andong> the local is useful forthe study ong>ofong> the transformations that have taken place in Canadian>Researchong> indicates that Canada is becoming increasingly urban. 23Citieshave been growing rapidly since the 1920s, ong>andong> metropolitan areas since the1970s. 24 This growth has been attributed to, among other things, demographictransition ong>andong> changes in components ong>ofong> demographic growth, changes in familystructure, increases in immigration ong>andong> cultural diversity, changes in globalmarkets, ong>andong> the shift between the state ong>andong> civil society. 25These changescontribute to the rise in ethnic, linguistic, ong>andong> cultural diversity in Canada. A studyby Larry S. Bourne ong>andong> Jim Simmons demonstrates how the majority ong>ofong> thecountry’s current wealth, employment, ong>andong> population are concentrated in 139cities with populations ong>ofong> 10,000 or more. Bourne ong>andong> Simmons’s research shows adiscrepancy in growth between cities: While larger cities or metropolitan placeswith a population ong>ofong> more than 10,000 grew by 6.2 percent in 2003, cities ong>ofong> lessthan 10,000 grew by only 1.5 percent in the same year. Bourne ong>andong> Simmonssuggest that the level ong>ofong> metropolitan concentration will increase in the future. At21 Setha M. Low, ―The Anthropology ong>ofong> Cities: Imagining ong>andong> Theorizing the City,‖ AnnualReview ong>ofong> Anthropology 25 (1996): 383–409.22 Ibid., 384.23 Bourne ong>andong> Rose, ―Changing Face‖; Larry S. Bourne ong>andong> Jim Simmons, ―New FaultLines? Recent Trends in the Canadian Urban System ong>andong> Their Implications for Planningong>andong> Public Policy,‖ Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Urban ong>Researchong> 12, no. 1 (2003): 22–47; DanielHeibert, ―Newcomers in the Canadian Housing Market: A Longitudinal Study 2001-2005,‖The Canadian Geographer 53, no. 3 (2009): 268–87; Margaret Walton-Roberts, ―RegionalImmigration ong>andong> Dispersal: Lessons from Small- ong>andong> Medium-Sized Urban ong>Centreong>s inBritish Columbia,‖ Canadian Ethnic ong>Studiesong> 37, no. 3 (2005): 12–34; Casey Warman ong>andong>Christopher Worswick, ―Immigrant Earnings Performance in Canadian Cities: 1891 through2001,‖ Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Urban ong>Researchong> 13, no. 1 (2004): 62–84.24 Bourne ong>andong> Simmons, ―New Fault Lines?‖25 Bourne ong>andong> Rose, ―Changing Face‖; Heibert, ―Newcomers‖; Walton-Roberts, ―RegionalImmigration‖; Warman ong>andong> Worswick, ―Immigrant Earnings.‖58

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010the time ong>ofong> their research, 57 percent ong>ofong> the country’s population lived in 15metropolitan areas with populations over 300,000. 26 Out ong>ofong> the 139 cities identifiedby the authors, 69 places suffered from population decline. Bourne ong>andong> Simmonspredict that differences in growth rates among cities “will likely lead to verydifferent urban environments in the years to come—each with relatively distinctivesocial, economic, ong>andong> policy challenges.” 27According to the British Columbia Ministry ong>ofong> Advanced Education ong>andong>Labour Market Development, approximately 237,758 new immigrants arrived inCanada in 2007. The majority ong>ofong> these were admitted as Business Class immigrants(60.3 percent). Others were admitted as Family Class (26.5 percent), Refugee Class(8.8 percent), ong>andong> Other immigrants (4.3 percent). These immigrants tend togravitate to three provinces: Ontario, Quebec, ong>andong> British Columbia. Ontarioreceived the largest number ong>ofong> immigrants (110,896), Quebec received 45,212, ong>andong>British Columbia welcomed 43,950 immigrants. Within these provinces, themajority ong>ofong> immigrants tend to settle in larger cities such as Toronto, Montreal, ong>andong>Vancouver. 28 Scholars suggest that immigrants concentrate in large cities becauseong>ofong> the existing social networks that aid newcomers in obtaining employment ong>andong>housing. 29 Also, immigrant groups are ong>ofong>ten seen by Canadians as “different” or“other” because ong>ofong> their cultural values ong>andong> religious differences, so they prefer tosettle in large cities where there is more diversity. 30 While the significant number ong>ofong>immigrants contributes to the economic growth in these cities, concerns have beenraised by researchers ong>andong> policy makers that immigrant clustering in large cities26 Bourne ong>andong> Simmons, ―New Fault Lines?‖27 Ibid., 28.28 British Columbia Ministry ong>ofong> Advanced Education ong>andong> Labour Market Development,Immigration Trends Highlights 2007 (Online, 2007), Bourne ong>andong> Simmons, ―New Fault Lines?‖; Hugh Grant ong>andong> Arthur Sweetman,―Introduction to Economic ong>andong> Urban Issues in Canadian Immigration Policy,‖ Canadianong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Urban ong>Researchong> 13, no. 1 (2003): 1–24; Kristin Good, ―Patterns ong>ofong> Policies inCanada‘s Immigrant-Receiving Cities ong>andong> Suburbs: How Immigrant Settlement PatternsShape the Municipal Role in Multiculturalism Policy,‖ Policy ong>Studiesong> 26, no. 3/4 (2005):261–89; Carlos Teixiera, ―New Immigrant Settlement in a Mid-Sized City: A Case Study ong>ofong>Housing Barriers ong>andong> Coping Strategies in Kelowna, British Columbia, The CanadianGeographer 53, no. 3 (2009): 323–39; Walton-Roberts, ―Regional Immigration.‖30 Yasmeen Abu-Laban ong>andong> Judith A. Garber, ―The Construction ong>ofong> Geography ong>ofong>Immigration as a Policy Problem: The United States ong>andong> Canada Compared,‖ Urban AffairsReview 40, no. 4 (2005): 520–61; Laura Y. Liu, ―The Place ong>ofong> Immigration in ong>Studiesong> ong>ofong>Geography ong>andong> Race,‖ Social ong>andong> Cultural Geography 1, no. 2 (2000): 169–82.59

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010may act as a hindrance to immigrants’ acquisition ong>ofong> skills in Canada’s ong>ofong>ficiallanguages (English ong>andong> French); in addition, such clustering can limit immigrants’earnings, discourage immigrant dispersal, ong>andong> play a role in the formation ong>ofong> ethnicghettos. 31Because the opportunities for economic advancement in Canada aremainly dependent upon prong>ofong>iciency in one ong>ofong> the ong>ofong>ficial languages, immigrantswho possess few or no skills in these languages are at a severe disadvantage. Astudy by Hugh Grant ong>andong> Arthur Sweetman reveals a decline in the number ong>ofong>immigrants who can speak the ong>ofong>ficial languages fluently. Grant ong>andong> Sweetmanconclude that the earnings ong>ofong> immigrants who speak neither English nor Frenchtend to be lower than those ong>ofong> immigrants who are fluent in at least one ong>ofong> theong>ofong>ficial languages. 32Other studies also show a general downward trend inimmigrants’ earnings, especially in large cities, since the 1980s. A study by Casey R.Warman ong>andong> Christopher Worsick shows how immigrants who arrived in Canadaprior to the 1980s earn higher incomes than those who arrived later. The study alsodemonstrates that the incomes ong>ofong> immigrants in large cities are generally lowerthan those ong>ofong> their Canadian-born counterparts. Warman ong>andong> Worsick attribute thedifferences in earnings mainly to fluctuations in the economy; they also suggestthat immigrants’ earnings tend to rise over time. 33 Although their study contributesto our understong>andong>ing ong>ofong> immigrants’ economic performance in Canadian largecities, there has been little research on immigrants’ settlement patterns in smallcities, ong>andong> knowledge about settlement patterns in small cities remains limited.In response to the demographic shift that has taken place over the years,provincial ong>andong> municipal governments across Canada have made efforts to attractimmigrants. However, the responses ong>ofong> municipalities to the ethnocultural diversityong>ofong> immigrants have been varied. 34 ong>Researchong> by Kristen Good indicated that thecities ong>ofong> Toronto (Ontario) ong>andong> Vancouver (British Columbia) have beencomprehensive in adapting their services ong>andong> governance structure” to addressdiverse needs ong>ofong> immigrants ong>andong> ethnocultural minorities. Good cited variouspolicies that these two cities adopted to accommodate immigrants’ needs,31 Abu-Laban ong>andong> Garber, ―Construction‖; Liu, ―Place ong>ofong> Immigration‖; Walton-Roberts,―Regional Immigration.‖32 Grant ong>andong> Sweetman, ―Introduction,‖ 11–12.33 Warman ong>andong> Worswick, ―Immigrant Earnings.‖34 Good, ―Patterns.‖60

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010including “multilingual interpretation ong>andong> translation policies, employment equitypolicies, ong>andong> anti-racism policies. 35There have also been joint efforts between federal, provincial, ong>andong>municipal governments to help immigrants settle ong>andong> integrate within Canadiansociety. For example, the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP), a form ong>ofong>regionalization policy, enables provinces ong>andong> territories to select immigrantsaccording to their economic needs ong>andong> interests. In Quebec, immigrants arerequired to possess French language skills in order to obtain employment in theprovince. In 2005, the PNP agreement existed in all provinces ong>andong> territories exceptfor Ontario ong>andong> Nunavut. At the municipal level, the City ong>ofong> Winnipeg introducedthe Winnipeg Private Refugee Sponsorship Assistance Program (WPRSAP) in 2002to support the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council’s refugee sponsoringprogram. 36In British Columbia, Premier Gordon Campbell introduced the WelcomeBCProgram in 2007 to help immigrants “moving to British Columbia access existingong>andong> expong>andong>ed services under one umbrella so they are better able to adapt to lifein their new communities.” At the time, the premier expressed his optimism thatthe new program “will help newcomers to British Columbia find everything fromimportant information about English language courses to employment, health,education ong>andong> recreation services in their new communities.” Furthermore,Campbell pledged “$43 million over two years through WelcomeBC to help expong>andong>these important services ong>andong> help immigrants adapt to their new life in BritishColumbia.” In the same year, the British Columbia provincial government ong>andong> thefederal government entered the Cooperation on Immigration Agreement, underwhich the federal government agreed to contribute $71.5 million in funding over atwo-year period to expong>andong> services to aid immigrants with their settlement, ong>andong>$1.573 million for the expansion ong>ofong> antiracism ong>andong> multiculturalism services. Theprovincial government was required to invest part ong>ofong> the funding to developprograms in cooperation with service providers. 37 The WelcomeBC Program wasintended35 Ibid., 269.36 Walton-Roberts, ―Regional Immigration.‖37 BC Liberal Party. WelcomeBC to Help Immigrants Settle, Access Work (Online, 2007),,_access_work.61

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010to reduce waiting times for English training ong>andong> increase access to advancedlanguage training for those trying to gain employment. The initiative will improveimmigrants’ access to jobs, reduce barriers for refugees ong>andong> assist newcomers tosettle into their communities. It will also help immigrant youth ong>andong> their families. 38The existence ong>ofong> these programs demonstrates the importance ong>ofong> jointefforts between various levels ong>ofong> government.Scholars have noted that the economic restructuring that took place inrecent years in response to the changes ong>ofong> the global market, refugee ong>andong>immigration policies, ong>andong> the rise ong>ofong> neoliberal public policies not only shapedrelations between large ong>andong> small cities but also produced new social identities ong>andong>otherness in cities across Canada. 39 . Neoliberalism involves, among other things, areliance on market solutionsto public policy problems, privileging the action ong>ofong> the wealthy ong>andong> the “talented”,the privatization ong>ofong> state assets ong>andong> functions, ong>andong> an attack on welfare stateprovision. At its heart, neoliberalism is a political project with utopian overtonesthat seeks to restructure welfare states ong>andong> reinstate class power. 40Neoliberal policy shifts have been associated with the decline ong>ofong> thewelfare state ong>andong> the reduction ong>ofong> responsibility in service delivery ong>andong>expenditures. Among the problems created by neoliberalism for Canadian cities arethe uneven resource allocation ong>andong> decision-making processes whereby upperlevels ong>ofong> government possess the majority ong>ofong> power. These changes pose seriouschallenges for local governments as they struggle to fulfill their newresponsibilities. 41The economic restructuring in conjunction with the rise ong>ofong> neoliberalpolicies ong>andong> changes in the global market have negatively affected small cities morethan large ones, because smaller cities’ economies are less diversified ong>andong> areaffected by policy makers in larger urban centers. 42 Across Canada, these negativeeffects are more apparent in small resource-based cities ong>andong> towns. The economicproduction in these places is ong>ofong>ten based on specific commodities such as lumber,mining, agricultural products, ong>andong> fishing. The constant fluctuation ong>ofong> demong>andong>s ong>andong>supplies driven by the global economy place these small cities ong>andong> towns in a more38 Ibid.39 Walks, ―Urban.‖40 Ibid, 346.41 Walks, ―Urban.‖42 Ibid.62

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010vulnerable position than their larger counterparts. Small resource-based cities ong>andong>towns are made even more vulnerable by the temporary nature ong>ofong> the work ong>andong>the labour force. 43 With economic restructuring, small cities ong>andong> towns acrossCanada become increasingly vulnerable.Prior to World War II, small cities ong>andong> towns were mainly isolated ong>andong> selfsufficientin the provision ong>ofong> services. However, the situation changed after thewar, when the federal government became the main provider ong>ofong> public servicessuch as health care ong>andong> education. 44 Since the 1980s, there has been a decline ingovernment support for public services. This shift was characterized by thedownsizing or closing ong>ofong> post ong>ofong>fices, employment service ong>ofong>fices, ong>andong> humanresource ong>ofong>fices in small cities ong>andong> towns. In addition, declines in transfer paymentsfor health care ong>andong> education from the federal government to provincialgovernments severely reduced these services in small municipalities. The problemhas been compounded by changes in provincial funding for immigrant servicessince the 1990s ong>andong> by increased regionalization ong>ofong> services. These changesresulted in further downsizing or closing down ong>ofong> essential services such as healthcare ong>andong> education in small cities ong>andong> towns, ong>andong> increased centralization ong>ofong>services in larger cities. 45The downsizing ong>ofong> public services in conjunction with the shift in provincialgovernment funding has significant impact on residents in small cities ong>andong> towns,especially those identified as vulnerable (e.g., immigrants, women, ong>andong> seniors).Under the changes, residents are now forced to travel to access services, ong>andong> thisproves to be particularly challenging for those who experience financial constraintsong>andong> do not have access to transportation. It also has a negative effect on thequality ong>ofong> services residents receive in small cities; the restructuring compelsresidents in these places to create alternative strategies in order to retain services.A study carried out by Greg Halseth ong>andong> Laura Marie Ryser in the towns ong>ofong>Mackenzie (British Columbia), Wood River (Saskatchewan), Tweed (Ontario), ong>andong>43 Sean Markey, Greg Halseth, ong>andong> Don Manson, ―Challenging the Inevitability ong>ofong> RuralDecline: Advancing the Policy ong>ofong> Place in Northern British Columbia,‖ ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Ruralong>Studiesong> 24 (2007): 409–21.44 Markey et al., ―Challenging‖; Brian Stauffer ong>andong> Greg Halseth, ―Population Change inPrince George,‖ in A Social Geography ong>ofong> B.C.’s Northern Capital, ed. G. Halseth ong>andong> R.Halseth (Prince George: UNBC Press, 1998), 13–44.45 Greg Halseth ong>andong> Laura Marie Ryser, ―The Deployment ong>ofong> Partnership by the VoluntarySector to Address Service Needs in Rural ong>andong> Small Town Canada,‖ Voluntas 18 (2007):241–65.63

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Springhill (Nova Scotia) found that residents in these communities increasingly relyon volunteer organizations such as churches. Halseth ong>andong> Ryser’s findings alsoindicate a need for improved cooperation between volunteer organizations ong>andong>municipal service agencies in order to cope with the economic restructuring,cutbacks in services, ong>andong> regionalization ong>ofong> services. 46A study by Margaret Walton-Roberts sheds some light on immigrantsettlement decisions ong>andong> the challenges immigrants experience in the small citiesong>ofong> Kelowna ong>andong> Squamish (British Columbia). Walton-Roberts’s analysis indicatesthat immigrant settlement decisions were largely based on the existence ong>ofong>employment opportunities ong>andong> family networks. Her research also identifiesseveral problems that immigrants experience in these small cities. The challengesinclude a shortage ong>ofong> governmental services that provide language training ong>andong>accreditation. Many immigrant respondents in Walton-Roberts’s study expresseddiscontent with the lack ong>ofong> information about, ong>andong> peripheral services for, thelanguage training that they received. The limited number ong>ofong> English classes ong>ofong>feredin small cities hinders immigrants’ opportunities to acquire ong>ofong>ficial languages.Walton-Roberts also interviewed staff from the Multicultural Society in Kelownaong>andong> in Squamish about the language training services ong>ofong>fered to immigrants. Staffin both cities suggested that recent provincial budget cutbacks have had aprong>ofong>ound effect on the quality ong>ofong> services provided to immigrants ong>andong> that localmunicipal governments do not have enough resources to meet the needs ong>ofong>immigrants. Walton-Roberts concluded that the issue ong>ofong> coordination betweenlocal governments, service providers, ong>andong> senior levels ong>ofong> government need to beaddressed in order to encourage immigrant dispersal in small cities. 47Aside from limited language training opportunities, the participants inWalton-Roberts’s research considered the issue ong>ofong> accreditation to be a majorobstacle to immigrants’ economic advancement. Walton-Roberts found thatemployers’ failure to recognize immigrants’ qualifications ong>andong> experience is acontributing factor in immigrants’ feelings ong>ofong> marginalization. She furthersuggested that regardless ong>ofong> where immigrants choose to settle, the lack ong>ofong>recognition ong>ofong> such skills will hinder the integration ong>ofong> immigrants in Canadiansocial ong>andong> economic systems. 48 Walton-Roberts’s study demonstrates that much46 Ibid.47 Walton-Roberts, ―Regional Immigration.‖48 Ibid.64

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010remains to be done to address the issue ong>ofong> immigrants’ accreditation.A recent study by Carlos Teixeira examines the current housing crisis in thecity ong>ofong> Kelowna ong>andong> the effects it has had on new immigrants’ access to housing.Kelowna is one ong>ofong> the fastest growing cities in Canada; its population increasedfrom 70,000 in 1971 to 107,000 in 2006. As in other fast-growing cities in thecountry, a recent economic boom has led to an increased demong>andong> for labor. Inaddition, Kelowna has acquired a reputation as an ideal place to retire. Theprovincial ong>andong> municipal governments are aware ong>ofong> the city’s growing need forlabor ong>andong> have placed the issues ong>ofong> recruiting ong>andong> retaining immigrants at the topong>ofong> their political agendas. Although economic development ong>andong> changes in thecity’s population have increased the demong>andong> for housing, there is a lack ong>ofong>affordable housing in both rentals ong>andong> homeownership in Kelowna. In addition, thecity has not been successful in attracting immigrants to fill the labor gap. OfKelowna’s 107,000 residents, approximately 15 percent are immigrants, comparedto 25 percent in British Columbia as a whole. None ong>ofong> the few ethnic clusters in thecity have developed into well-established ethnic communities typically found inlarge cities, ong>andong> the city suffers from a lack ong>ofong> multicultural atmosphere as a result.In the absence ong>ofong> ethnic neighborhoods, newly arrived immigrants are forced torely mainly on existing kinship networks for help with housing ong>andong> employment.The steady rise in housing prices, in conjunction with the lack ong>ofong> affordable housing,poses a serious challenge for new immigrants seeking housing in Kelowna ong>andong> hasimportant implications for immigrants’ residential mobility. 49 Teixeira’s researchdemonstrates that all levels ong>ofong> government need to give more attention to theissue ong>ofong> housing access among immigrants in small cities.The Construction ong>ofong> Immigrants ong>andong> Immigration in CanadaIn viewing Canada’s immigration history, the challenge has always beencreating a narrative that can be relevant to ong>andong> provide a shared meaning fordifferent groups who experienced the historical events. Prior to the late 1970s,Canada’s immigration history was predominantly characterized by the arrival ong>ofong>people from Europe. 50 However, the history ong>ofong> non-European immigrants ong>andong>indigenous people predate the founding ong>ofong> Canada in 1867, ong>andong> since the end ong>ofong>49 Teixiera, ―New Immigrant.‖50 Bourne ong>andong> Rose, ―Changing Face.‖65

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010World War II ong>andong> especially since the 1960s, various waves ong>ofong> immigration fromnon-European countries have contributed to Canada’s ethnocultural diversity. Ashift in federal refugee ong>andong> immigration policies since the 1960s has encouragedimmigration from what were previously considered nontraditional sources,particularly Africa, Latin America, ong>andong> Asia. 51 These immigrants from diverse socialong>andong> economic backgrounds contribute significantly to the skilled labor force ong>andong> toCanadian>Researchong>ers have noted the significant role ong>ofong> the news media in shapingthe public’s perception ong>andong> understong>andong>ing ong>ofong> immigrants ong>andong> immigration inCanada. Specifically, these researchers suggest that immigrants are ong>ofong>tenmisrepresented or underrepresented in the dominant news media. 52 As MinelleMahtani comments, the media have “power to create social agendas, constructideologies ong>andong> frame social issues, providing the lens through which we viewourselves.” 53 The events ong>ofong> September 11, 2001, ong>andong> the subsequent conflicts inIraq ong>andong> Afghanistan altered the representation ong>ofong> immigrants in the news>Studiesong> such as Mahtani’s demonstrate how these events contribute to themisrepresentation ong>ofong> immigrants in news media. Mahtani’s study shows howcontemporary dominant news media in Canada draw heavily on oriental discoursesto construct narratives ong>andong> representations ong>ofong> immigrants. Through news storiesabout immigrants, the news media have succeeded in reinforcing hegemonic racialong>andong> national ideologies. 54 Consequently, the distorted images ong>ofong> immigrants innews media effectively contribute to tensions between different ethnic ong>andong>cultural groups ong>andong> shape immigrants’ sense ong>ofong> belonging in>Migrationong> ong>andong> the Boom ong>andong> Bust Years in Prince George66Prince George has been known as a resource-based city specializing in theproduction ong>ofong> lumber products. As is the case in other forest resource basedcommunities, much ong>ofong> the local economy is highly vulnerable to fluctuations inglobal markets for local forest products. The development ong>ofong> forest resources51 Bourne ong>andong> Rose, ―Changing Face‖; Good, ―Patterns‖; Grant ong>andong> Sweetman,―Introduction.‖52 Abu-Laban ong>andong> Garber, ―Construction‖; Minelle Mahtani, ―The Racialized Geographies ong>ofong>News Consumption ong>andong> Production: Contaminated Memories ong>andong> Racialized Silences,‖Geoong>Journalong> 74 (2008): 257–64.53 Mahtani, ―Racialized Geographies,‖ 258.54 Mahtani, Racialized Geographies.‖

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010created a demong>andong> for public services ong>andong> commercial sector employment, ong>andong>development in these economic sectors generated an increase in population fromthe mid-1960s to the early 1980s. Both interprovincial ong>andong> internationalimmigrants have been attracted by the employment opportunities in thecommunity. The boom periods ong>ofong> the 1960s ong>andong> the 1980s led to an influx ong>ofong>migrants to fill the labor gap. Aside from the forest industry sector, theestablishment ong>ofong> postsecondary institutions such as the College ong>ofong> New Caledoniaong>andong> later the University ong>ofong> Northern British Columbia contributed to the expansionong>ofong> services in the area. 55The growth ong>ofong> Prince George can be traced back to the early 20th century,when the city provided railway connections to eastern Canada. In 1903, the federalgovernment entered an agreement with the Grong>andong> Trunk Pacific Railway Company,whereby the latter would construct a railway line from Winnipeg through centralBritish Columbia. During the construction ong>ofong> the railway line, the indigenouspopulation in the city was displaced to the community ong>ofong> Shelly, upstream on theFraser River. In 1915, Prince George was ong>ofong>ficially incorporated into the province ong>ofong>British Columbia. Between 1915 ong>andong> 1950, not many immigrants came to PrinceGeorge. Approximately 50 sawmills were operating at this time, ong>andong> many ong>ofong> theeconomic opportunities were connected to logging ong>andong> sawmills. Earlyinternational immigrants to the city were mainly young European males whostayed for short periods. The second period ong>ofong> growth in Prince George came aboutduring the 1950s; a second rail line was constructed to connect the city withVancouver, improving the transportation link between Prince George ong>andong> otherparts ong>ofong> the country ong>andong> contributing to the growth ong>ofong> the city. The creation ong>ofong> thePrince George Pulp ong>andong> Paper Mill in 1966 transformed the city from a smallresource-based community into one ong>ofong> British Columbia’s major industrial centers.During the construction period, many skilled trade workers moved to the city, ong>andong>most remained after the mill was built. Most ong>ofong> these workers brought theirfamilies with them or married locally ong>andong> made Prince George their home. In 1968,the Intercontinental Pulp ong>andong> Paper Mill was constructed, creating an additional400 permanent jobs. 56Since the early 1970s, concerns about urban management have emerged in55 Bev Christensen, Prince George: Rivers, Railways, ong>andong> Timber (Burlington, Ontario:Windsor Publications, 1989); Stauffer ong>andong> Halseth, ―Population Change.‖56 Christensen, Prince George; Stauffer ong>andong> Halseth, ―Population Change.‖67

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Prince George. In 1973, the city ong>ofong> Prince George carried out a study to try to findsolutions to the problems caused by urban growth. At the time, the main concernwas extending the city boundaries to accommodate the growing population.Despite opposition by some residents, the municipal government perceived thatextension was necessary to address service problems in the city. At the time ong>ofong> thestudy, Prince George’s population was growing rapidly. The city’s annual growthrate reached 6.5 percent to 7.5 percent, exceeding both the national average (lessthan 2 percent) ong>andong> the provincial average (4 percent). 57 In 2006, the population ong>ofong>Prince George was 70,981, ong>andong> approximately 4,205 people in the communityidentified themselves as members ong>ofong> a “visible minority.” 58 In 1975, with theapproval ong>ofong> the provincial government, the city expong>andong>ed its boundaries to includemost ong>ofong> the surrounding population. 59Because Prince George’s economy is based primarily on resourceindustries, it is vulnerable to market fluctuations. Since the early 1980s, a decline inthe forest industry has had a significant effect on the city’s population. 60 Theeconomic recession significantly slowed down economic development, ong>andong> thepopulation remained almost unchanged between 1981 ong>andong> 1986. The creation ong>ofong>the University ong>ofong> Northern British Columbia in 1992 signaled the emergence ong>ofong>Prince George as an increasingly cosmopolitan city. The university providedopportunities for local residents to obtain postsecondary education whileremaining in the area. The hiring ong>ofong> faculty ong>andong> support staff brought additionalpopulation to the city. 61 However, questions have been raised as to whether thegrowing educational sector will help to generate other economic activities.The economic recession ong>ofong> the early 1980s was exacerbated by increases inlabor costs, demong>andong> for low-cost products, ong>andong> low-cost global competitors, as wellas by an ongoing trade dispute with the United States over song>ofong>twood lumber ong>andong> ashift in provincial resource policies. 62In response to the changes, resourcecompanies underwent a series ong>ofong> restructurings toward a more “flexible style ong>ofong>57 Stauffer ong>andong> Halseth, ―Population Change.‖58 BC Stats, Prong>ofong>ile ong>ofong> Diversity in BC Communities 2006: Prince George: A City in Fraser-Fort George Regional District (Online, 2006), Stauffer ong>andong> Halseth, ―Population Change.‖60 Christensen, Prince George.61 Stauffer ong>andong> Halseth, ―Population Change.‖62 Markey et al., ―Challenging.‖68

Dynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010production.” 63 the changes involved increased levels ong>ofong> technology, larger mills, ong>andong>fewer employees. The restructurings have had significant social ong>andong> economicimpacts in Prince George, a city that relies mainly on resource industry productionfor growth.Layong>ofong>fs ong>andong> the closing ong>ofong> a number ong>ofong> pulp mills since the 1980s have ledto a decrease in the city’s population for the first time since World War II. Theeconomic decline also served to deter immigration to Prince George. Thesechanges also had an important effect on the age structure ong>ofong> the city’s population.The restructuring severely limited opportunities for young people to enter theworkforce. The aging ong>ofong> Prince George’s population poses problems for health careong>andong> community services in the city. 64The response ong>ofong> the federal ong>andong> provincial governments to restructuringsince the 1980s is best described as a general economic ong>andong> social withdrawal. Thewithdrawal ong>ofong> federal ong>andong> provincial support for public services has been partly inresponse to the rising demong>andong> for “bottom-up” representation ong>andong> local control. 65However, some scholars interpret it as a form ong>ofong> abong>andong>onment ong>andong> a failure torecognize the need for ongoing government support for local development. 66 Therestructuring led to a series ong>ofong> downsizings or closures ong>ofong> governmental servicessuch as employment, schools, ong>andong> postal services in Prince George ong>andong> othernorthern communities. 67 In order to retain these essential services in PrinceGeorge, the community would have needed to assume additional financialburdens. Together, these changes have had a significant effect on the delivery ong>ofong>essential services—such as health, education, language training, ong>andong> housing—tonew immigrants. Immigrants who do not speak English or French are especiallylikely to experience challenges in accessing social services ong>andong> obtaining adequateemployment.Since the early 1980s, the provincial government’s public policy has beengeared toward large-scale industrial resource development. This has translated intoan expansion ong>ofong> oil ong>andong> gas development projects as well as lifting some forestindustry regulations in order to generate interest in investment. 68The63 Ibid., 414.64 Stauffer ong>andong> Halseth, ―Population Change.‖65 Halseth ong>andong> Ryser, ―Deployment‖; Markey et al., ―Challenging‖; Walks, ―Urban.‖66 Halseth ong>andong> Ryser, ―Deployment‖; Markey et al., ―Challenging.‖67 Markey et al., ―Challenging.‖68 Ibid.69

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010government’s perception ong>ofong> resource-based communities mainly as places forresource extraction means that little attention is given to improving social servicesin these communities.ConclusionCanada continues to rely on immigration for population, economic, ong>andong>social growth. In recent years, however, changes in the global market, the rise ong>ofong>neoliberalism, ong>andong> shifts in regional development have influenced immigrants’earning power ong>andong> shaped their settlement patterns. These changes in turn haveproduced uneven development ong>ofong> cities across Canada. Recent funding cutbacks,changes in public policies, downsizing or closure ong>ofong> public ong>ofong>fices such as postong>ofong>fices ong>andong> employment services, increased local government autonomy, ong>andong>economic restructuring have had negative impacts on small cities like PrinceGeorge. These changes create new challenges for local residents ong>andong> newimmigrants in accessing essential services such as language training, education,housing, ong>andong> health care. At the same time, small cities across the country areaware ong>ofong> ong>andong> have made attempts to cope with these changes.The federal ong>andong> provincial governments’ emphasis on localization ong>ofong> socialong>andong> economic development continues to challenge small cities like Prince George.The downsizing or closure ong>ofong> public services makes it difficult for immigrants to gainaccess to these services ong>andong> thereby limits their opportunities for economicadvancement. As a result, immigrants ong>andong> other marginalized groups are furtherexcluded from participating fully in Canadian society. Although the provincialgovernment has made a series ong>ofong> attempts to encourage the dispersal ong>ofong>immigrants to small cities over the years, recent economic restructuring ong>andong> thedecline in public services pose important questions about immigrants’ access toessential services ong>andong> their sense ong>ofong> belonging in Canada. This paper identifiedsome ong>ofong> the major challenges facing contemporary small cities: demographicchanges, access to public services, ong>andong> the politics ong>ofong> regional ong>andong> local inclusionong>andong> exclusion. There is a need for greater investment by the federal ong>andong> provincialgovernments in restoring public services ong>andong> expong>andong>ing local economies. Theprocess ong>ofong> change can begin by increasing funding to local public service providersong>andong> encouraging greater cooperation between governments at all levels, as well asbetween governments ong>andong> local organizations.70

BibliographyDynamics ong>ofong> Citizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>: Obstacles to Sustainable ImmigrationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Abu-Laban, Yasmeen ong>andong> Judith A. Garber. “The Construction ong>ofong> Geography ong>ofong> Immigration as a PolicyProblem: The United States ong>andong> Canada Compared,” Urban Affairs Review 40, no. 4 (2005):520–61.Adamson, Fiona B. “Crossing Borders: International ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> National Security,” InternationalSecurity 31, no. 1 (2006): 165–99.Amin, Ash. “The Regions Unbound: Towards a New Politics ong>ofong> Space,” Geography Annual 86B, no. 1(2004): 33–44.BC Liberal Party. WelcomeBC to Help Immigrants Settle, Access Work. Online, 2007.,_access_work.BC Stats. Prong>ofong>ile ong>ofong> Diversity in BC Communities 2006: Prince George: A City in Fraser-Fort GeorgeRegional District. Online, 2006., Larry S., ong>andong> Damaris Rose. “The Changing Face ong>ofong> Canada: The Uneven Geographies ong>ofong>Population ong>andong> Social Change,” The Canadian Geographer 45, no. 1 (2001): 105–19.Bourne, Larry S. ong>andong> Jim Simmons. “New Fault Lines? Recent Trends in the Canadian Urban System ong>andong>Their Implications for Planning ong>andong> Public Policy,” Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Urban ong>Researchong> 12, no.1 (2003): 22‒47.British Columbia Ministry ong>ofong> Advanced Education ong>andong> Labour Market Development. Immigration TrendsHighlights 2007. Online, 2007., Alan C. “Introduction,” in Citizenship, Diversity ong>andong> Pluralism: Canadian ong>andong> ComparativePerspectives, ed. Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, ong>andong>David E. Smith, 3–22. Montreal: Queen’s-McGill University Press, 1999.Christensen, Bev. Prince George: Rivers, Railways, ong>andong> Timber. Burlington, Ontario: WindsorPublications, 1989.Good, Kristin. “Patterns ong>ofong> Policies in Canada’s Immigrant-Receiving Cities ong>andong> Suburbs: How ImmigrantSettlement Patterns Shape the Municipal Role in Multiculturalism Policy,” Policy ong>Studiesong> 26,no. 3/4 (2005): 261–89.Grant, Hugh ong>andong> Arthur Sweetman. “Introduction to Economic ong>andong> Urban Issues in CanadianImmigration Policy,” Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Urban ong>Researchong> 13, no. 1 (2003): 1–24.Halseth, Greg ong>andong> Laura Marie Ryser. “The Deployment ong>ofong> Partnership by the Voluntary Sector toAddress Service Needs in Rural ong>andong> Small Town Canada,” Voluntas 18 (2007): 241–65.Hébert, Yvonne M. ong>andong> Lori A. Wilkinson. “The Citizenship Debates: Conceptual, Policy, Experiential, ong>andong>Educational Issues,” in Citizenship in Transformation in Canada, ed. Yvonne M. Hébert, 3–36.Toronto: University ong>ofong> Toronto Press, 2002.Heibert, Daniel. “Newcomers in the Canadian Housing Market: A Longitudinal Study, 2001-2005,” TheCanadian Geographer 53, no 3 (2009): 268–87.Isin, Engin Fahri ong>andong> Patricia K. Wood 1999 “Redistribution, Recognition, ong>andong> Representation,” inCitizenship ong>andong> ong>Identityong>, ed. Engin Fahri Isin ong>andong> Patricia K. Wood, 1–24. London: Sage, 1999.Liu, Laura Y. “The Place ong>ofong> Immigration in ong>Studiesong> ong>ofong> Geography ong>andong> Race,” Social ong>andong> Cultural Geography1, no 2. (2000): 169–82.Low, Setha M. “The Anthropology ong>ofong> Cities: Imagining ong>andong> Theorizing the City,” Annual Review ong>ofong>Anthropology 25 (1996): 383–409.71

Ritendra TAMANGJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Mahtani, Minelle. “The Racialized Geographies ong>ofong> News Consumption ong>andong> Production: ContaminatedMemories ong>andong> Racialized Silences,” Geoong>Journalong> 74 (2008): 257–64.Markey, Sean, Greg Halseth, ong>andong> Don Manson. “Challenging the Inevitability ong>ofong> Rural Decline: Advancingthe Policy ong>ofong> Place in Northern British Columbia,” ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Rural ong>Studiesong> 24 (2007): 409–21.Miller, David. Citizenship ong>andong> National ong>Identityong>. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.Stauffer, Brian, ong>andong> Greg Halseth. “Population Change in Prince George,” in A Social Geography ong>ofong> B.C.’sNorthern Capital, ed. G. Halseth ong>andong> R. Halseth, 13–44. Prince George: UNBC Press, 1998.Teixiera, Carlos. “New Immigrant Settlement in a Mid-Sized City: A Case Study ong>ofong> Housing Barriers ong>andong>Coping Strategies in Kelowna, British Columbia,” The Canadian Geographer 53, no. 3 (2009):323–39.Walks, R. Alan. “The Urban in Fragile, Uncertain, Neoliberal Times: Towards New Geographies ong>ofong> SocialJustice?” The Canadian Geographer, 53, no. 3 (2009): 345–56.Walton-Roberts, Margaret. “Regional Immigration ong>andong> Dispersal: Lessons from Small- ong>andong> Medium-Sized Urban ong>Centreong>s in British Columbia,” Canadian Ethnic ong>Studiesong> 37, no. 3 (2005): 12–34.Warman, Casey, ong>andong> Christopher Worswick. “Immigrant Earnings Performance in Canadian Cities: 1981through 2001,” Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Urban ong>Researchong> 13, no. 1 (2004): 62–84.72

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010RESEARCH ARTICLESMigrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> BrazilianEntrepreneurs in JapanNaoto HIGUCHIAbstract. Classical studies on migration as those ong>ofong> the Chicago school emphasized thesocial disorganization ong>ofong> migrants. However, migration researchers have regarded socialnetworks as the key to understong>andong>ing migration processes. Social capital generated bymigrant networks is now considered as essential for the social mobility ong>ofong> migrants. Indeed,the contrasting views ong>ofong> migrant networks are too simple to clarify the dynamic processesong>ofong> network formation. Few studies have tested how migrant networks are changing in hostsocieties, which ties are transplanted from the home country, ong>andong> which ong>ofong> them areutilized. This paper aims to clarify the missing link between pre-migration ong>andong> postmigrationsocial networks, examining the multiplicity ong>ofong> migrants’ social networks. Thisstudy tested three hypotheses ong>ofong> social capital on Brazilian entrepreneurs in Japan. Byanalyzing the social capital these migrant entrepreneurs mobilized to start businesses, thisstudy found that while most depended on social capital in the initial phase ong>ofong> theirbusinesses, they relied less on social relationships transplanted to Japan than on othersources. In addition, Brazilian entrepreneurs selectively used different sources ong>ofong> socialcapital. These results show that migrants selectively maintain ong>andong> reconstruct socialnetworks in the process ong>ofong> migration.Keywords: migrant network, ethnic business, Japanese Brazilians1. IntroductionMigrant networks have been the key to understong>andong>ing various aspects ong>ofong>migration phenomena for the past 30 years. ong>Researchong>ers ong>ofong> migrant networksregard migrants as social actors embedded in networks through close-knit ties thatconnect their destination with their place ong>ofong> origin. These ties influence the volumeong>andong> direction ong>ofong> migration flows, the ability ong>ofong> migrants to learn the ropes at theirdestination, the making ong>ofong> immigrant niches, the educational performance ong>ofong>immigrant children, ong>andong> so on. The vitality ong>ofong> migration networks even brings73

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010unintended consequences to immigration policies ong>andong> helps to overcome themigrants’ disadvantaged status as ethnic minorities at their country ong>ofong> destination(Portes, 1997).However, the multiplicity ong>ofong> factors in the formation ong>andong> function ong>ofong>migrant networks is yet to be explored. The purpose ong>ofong> this paper is to focus on thecontinuity ong>ofong> migrant networks before ong>andong> after migration, using the data ong>ofong>Brazilian migrant entrepreneurs in Japan. The basic questions are if transmigrantssustain social networks brought from home ong>andong> if they construct new relations attheir destinations. To answer these questions it is necessary to make a carefuldistinction between personal ties formed in places ong>ofong> origin before migration,hereafter referred to as pre-migration networks, ong>andong> those constructed atdestinations after migration, hereafter referred to as post-migration networks.2. Social Networks ong>andong> Social Capital2.1 Social Networks ong>ofong> International Migrants: from Disorganization to SolidarityAs mentioned above, there have been two answers to the question ong>ofong> howmigrants adapt themselves to new environments at their destinations, thedisorganization-assimilation model ong>andong> the solidarity-ethnicization model. Hong>andong>lin(1951) presented the former model, arguing that immigrants have been uprootedfrom their origins ong>andong> exist in a prolonged state ong>ofong> crisis, in the sense ong>ofong> being ong>andong>remaining unsettled. In the end, they become assimilated ong>andong> remade as, in thecases he studied, Americans.74Chicago sociologists as Wirth (1934) were the originators ong>ofong> suchdisorganization-assimilation theses. Park ong>andong> Miller (1921) characterizedimmigrants as being subject to the disorganization ong>ofong> primary groups ong>andong> increaseddeviance, yet their ethnographic articles are not always consistent with their thesis.Indeed, they also pointed out the salience ong>ofong> chain migration, spatial segmentationalong with the place ong>ofong> origin, ong>andong> institutions for mutual assistance. However,their research had hardly gone beyond the social disorganization thesis, althoughthey found a variety ong>ofong> migrant communities composed ong>ofong> social networks.Tilly ong>andong> Brown’s (1967) seminal work on migration networks presentedthe solidarity-ethnicization thesis in opposition to the disintegration-assimilationthesis. Criticizing the situation in which the ‘ghost ong>ofong> Park’ was still alive, theyemphasized the importance ong>ofong> networks in the migration process. Referring toWilliam Whyte’s Street Corners Society, Tilly ong>andong> Brown (1967) presented the

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010following thesis:If we suppose that extensive personal relations are actually common in cities, ong>andong>that such relations ong>ofong>ten ease the pain ong>ofong> abrupt shifts in social position, we canconclude that the sequence going from migration to personal disorganization tosocial disorganization will in fact be fairly rare. (p. 140)The development ong>ofong> urban anthropology, as well as the increasing numberong>ofong> empirical studies on migration after the revision ong>ofong> U.S. immigration law in 1965,resulted in a paradigm shift from disorganization to solidarity (Brettel, 2000).Migrants are not uprooted from their cultures ong>andong> societies ong>ofong> origin, buttransplant them into their countries ong>ofong> destination. This type ong>ofong> viewpoint stronglyinfluenced such studies ong>ofong> American migration history as Bodnar (1985), whichlooked into the development ong>ofong> the social institutions that support chain migrationong>andong> the resilience ong>ofong> social ties. Ostergren (1988) described the formation ong>ofong>mother-ong>andong>-daughter communities between Sweden ong>andong> the United States. Chainmigration brings transplanted social relations as well as residential concentrationsin destination cities (Bodnar, 1985; Ostergren, 1988).In terms ong>ofong> contemporary migration, Massey et al. (1987), Massey ong>andong>Durong>andong> (2002), ong>andong> Durong>andong> ong>andong> Massey (2005) collected a vast amount ong>ofong> data onmigration from Mexico to the United States, clarifying the formation process ong>ofong>mother-ong>andong>- daughter communities across the border. Massey (1990) argued thatevery new migrant creates a set ong>ofong> friends ong>andong> relatives with social ties to someonewith valuable migrant experience. Through migrant networks, new arrivals find jobsong>andong> housing ong>andong> learn the ropes at the destination through interactions indaughter communities.In contrast to the atomized ong>andong> isolated images ong>ofong> early studies, Gurak ong>andong>Caces (1992) described migrants as actors embedded in ties with family, kin, ong>andong>friends, explaining migrant behavior through their social networks. Networksprovide not only tangible resources, but also psychological relief to newcomers,thereby smoothing their adaptation to host societies. Migrant networks that rangefrom the place ong>ofong> origin to destinations may even be considered a necessarycondition for massive migration (Gurak & Caces, 1992).It is true that migrant networks facilitate migration flows ong>andong> adaptation atdestinations, but there still remains much to be explored about them. Thoughvarious articles have referred to the multiplicity ong>ofong> these networks’ functions, fewscholars have paid attention to the effects ong>ofong> their different sources on migration75

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010processes. Networks have tacitly been regarded to be continuous from their placesong>ofong> origin. Massey et al. (1987) described transplanted neighborhood ties by notingthat:There, people from Santiago began to meet every Sunday, bringing their familiesfor free diversion ong>andong> entertainment. The field, nicknamed ‘Los Patos’ (‘TheDucks’) by the townspeople, became an obligatory place ong>ofong> reunion for allpaisanos. It became the focal point ong>ofong> the out-migrant community, the placewhere one made dates, obtained work, located friends, welcomed new arrivals,ong>andong> exchanged news ong>ofong> the town itself. (p. 146)However, Massey et al. (1987) made no reference to networks constructedafter migration, although migrant networks are both retained from the place originong>andong> developed at destinations. For example, Japanese migrants in Peru startedtheir businesses by mobilizing both such pre-migration networks as families ong>andong>neighbors from their places ong>ofong> origin ong>andong> such post-migration networks as kenjin(those ong>ofong> the same prefectural origin), fellow passengers on ships from Japan toPeru, ong>andong> colleagues at colonies (Akagi 2000).Networks go along with migrants, but they have diverse sources whichinfluence their strength ong>andong> functions. It is therefore necessary to answer thequestions ong>ofong> how migrant networks are transplanted to destinations, how they areconstructed at destinations, which networks are used in specific contexts, ong>andong> howthey serve specific purposes.2.2 Immigrant Businesses ong>andong> Social Capitalong>Studiesong> on immigrant businesses have increasingly focused on the role ong>ofong>entrepreneurs’ social networks (Light & Gold, 2000; Portes, 1995; Waldinger et al.1990). Social networks are the primary source ong>ofong> social capital, which Portes (1995)defined as “the capacity ong>ofong> individuals to commong>andong> scarce resources by virtue ong>ofong>their membership in networks or broader social structures” (p. 12).76Networks ong>ofong> family, kin, ong>andong> friends serve as providers ong>ofong> social capital tostart businesses, since most immigrants are not rich in other sources ong>ofong> capital(Min, 1988; Portes & Bach, 1985; Yoon, 1997). However, networks have not beenextensively examined in terms ong>ofong> how differences in the characteristics ong>ofong> a varietyong>ofong> networks generate different resources (Yoo, 1998). It is a matter ong>ofong> course thatnetworks help to initialize ong>andong> expong>andong> immigrant businesses. ong>Researchong> on migrantnetworks ong>andong> immigrant businesses must go beyond the simplistic notion ong>ofong>immigrant social capital.

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Yoo’s (1998) study ong>ofong> Korean entrepreneurs in America is worth notingbecause he clarified some different functions ong>ofong> different networks. Distinguishingbetween family ong>andong> social networks in order to analyze their different functions, 1he found that social networks tended to be the fundamental resource forinformation mobilization, whereas family networks had only a minor influence. Healso found that, in contrast, financial capital tended to be mobilized through familynetworks far more frequently than through social networks. These results suggestsupport for Granovetter’s (1973) view ong>ofong> the different functions ong>ofong> strong ong>andong> weakties.However, Yoo’s (1998) typology is still inadequate for analyzing differencesbetween pre-migration ong>andong> post-migration networks. It is true that migrants bringfamily ong>andong> kinship networks from their places ong>ofong> origin, but they also maintain theirsocial networks, as most migrant-network theory has emphasized. Rather thong>andong>istinguishing between family ong>andong> social networks, it seems more useful to make adistinction between pre-migration ong>andong> post-migration networks.This paper’s next step, then, is to address the issues ong>ofong> the extent to whichpre-migration networks are maintained, how new ones are created after migration,ong>andong> how differently pre-migration ong>andong> post-migration networks function.2.3 HypothesesTo address these issues, this paper will present several hypotheses aboutthe origins ong>andong> functions ong>ofong> migrant networks. 2On the origins ong>ofong> social networksNetworks can be divided into those formed before migration ong>andong> aftermigration. As the Chicago sociologists emphasized, networks may also be lost atdestinations, isolating migrants. The point here is how migration affects theingredients ong>ofong> migrants’ social networks. Brazilian migrant entrepreneurs in Japanmay hold ties with families, relatives, ong>andong> friends they knew before migration, lose1 Family networks are ―based on connections with family or relatives which Koreanimmigrants already had in America before immigration‖, ong>andong> social networks are ―based onconnections with members in the community other than family or relatives, which Koreanimmigrants after immigration by entering the ethnic community, ong>andong> which ong>ofong>ten reflect theimmigrants‘ human capital ong>andong> socio-economic background in the country ong>ofong> origin‖ (Yoo,1998: 107).2 To formulate these hypotheses, the community question ong>ofong> urban sociology such as Fischer(1982) ong>andong> Wellman (1979) was useful.77

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010connections ong>andong> become isolated, or become acquainted with Brazilian colleaguesong>andong> Japanese neighbors after migration. Combining these conditions suggests threehypotheses about the origins ong>ofong> social networks, a disorganization hypothesis, aresilience hypothesis, ong>andong> a reorganization hypothesis.The disorganization hypothesis suggests that Brazilian migrants lose mostong>ofong> their social relationships after migration ong>andong> do not construct new networks inJapan, leading to their social disorganization. This means that migrant Brazilianentrepreneurs cannot rely on social capital for establishing businesses, althoughhuman ong>andong> financial capital are crucial for this.The resilience hypothesis suggests that Brazilian migrants transplant ong>andong>maintain their pre-migration social networks after arriving in Japan. As the migrantsystems theory suggests, places ong>ofong> origin ong>andong> destination are connected by chainmigration, establishing mother-ong>andong>-daughter communities across borders (Masseyet al. 1987), ong>andong> when migrants start their businesses they obtain the necessarysocial capital exclusively from their pre-migration networks.The reorganization hypothesis suggests that Brazilian migrants selectivelyretain their ties from Brazil ong>andong> construct new ones after migration. They also usethese ties selectively in accordance with the resources they need when they starttheir businesses.On the functions ong>ofong> social networksSocial networks can be divided into those with strong ties ong>andong> those withweak ties, each serving different purposes (Granovetter, 1973). They provide threeresources necessary to start up businesses: experience, information ong>andong> guarantee,ong>andong> finance (Bailey & Waldinger, 1991; Min, 1988). Following Granovetter (1973)ong>andong> Yoo (1998), functions ong>ofong> these ties can be hypothesized as either weak orstrong.The strong tie hypothesis suggests that networks with family ong>andong> relativesare composed ong>ofong> strong ties which are usually stable ong>andong> difficult to dissolve.Strong ties are crucial for mobilizing financial capital, something which requires ahigh level ong>ofong> mutual trust, but their homogeneity tends to limit the capacity to gainaccess to the other two types ong>ofong> resources.The weak tie hypothesis suggests that networks with Brazilian friends madeboth before ong>andong> after migration, or with Japanese acquaintances, can be regardedas constituting weak ties. Though weak ties are ong>ofong> little use for mobilizing financial78

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010capital, their heterogeneity tends to facilitate the gaining ong>ofong> experience ong>andong> ong>ofong>information ong>andong> guarantee.3. Brazilians in Japan: Overview ong>andong> Data Collection3.1 Data ong>andong> SampleThe principal source ong>ofong> data for this study is a set ong>ofong> two mutually relatedstudies. The first was a study ong>ofong> Brazilian entrepreneurs conducted betweenFebruary ong>andong> October 1997, involving interviews with the owners ong>ofong> 78 Brazilianbusinesses in Japan. Since no complete list ong>ofong> Brazilian enterprises was available,this study could not use the rong>andong>om sampling method. Instead, the researchersconstructed a list using four Portuguese newspapers, several magazines, brochures,ong>andong> personal acquaintances, visiting each business owner as ong>ofong>ten as possible. Allbut a few ong>ofong> the Brazilian entrepreneurs contacted agreed to the interviews.This study collected its second data set through a survey questionnairedistributed to 2,054 Brazilian employees working in Japanese factories. The surveyrequired the collaboration ong>ofong> 30 labor contractors ong>andong> was conducted betweenJanuary ong>andong> March 1998. The contractors distributed the questionnaire to theBrazilian employees, who responded to it.The data indicated that entrepreneurs are rich in human capital. Fortypercent ong>ofong> the entrepreneurs enrolled in universities, compared with 19% ong>ofong> thefactory workers (see Table 1). In addition, 43% ong>ofong> the entrepreneurs had been selfemployedor business owners in Brazil. In this context, however, what is moreimportant is the quality ong>ofong> social capital that the entrepreneurs mobilized to initiatetheir businesses. Only three (4%) used financial capital brought from Brazil, the vastmajority accumulated their capital while working in Japan. Instead ong>ofong> financialcapital, they transplanted human capital accumulated in Brazil, leaving thequestion ong>ofong> how social capital was developed before ong>andong> after migration.Table 1 Education ong>ofong> entrepreneurs ong>andong> factory workersEntrepreneursFactory workersNo % No %Primary 10 13 618 30.9Secondary 36 46.7 996 49.7Tertiary 31 40.3 389 19.4Total 77 100 2003 10079

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 20103.2 Brazilian Entrepreneurs in JapanThe registered population ong>ofong> Brazilians in Japan is shown in table 2. 3 Thefigure reveals that the number suddenly increased in 1988, followed byskyrocketing growth from 1989 to 1991, although the return migration ong>ofong> the firstgeneration had already started in the early 1980s (Higuchi, 2003). It should also benoted that the number ong>ofong> Brazilians in Japan basically increased even after thecollapse ong>ofong> the bubble economy in 1991. Though Latin American population rapidlydecreased after the economic crisis in September 2008, more than 300,000Brazilians lived in Japan as ong>ofong> the end ong>ofong> 2008, comprising Japan’s third largest non-Japanese nationality group after the Koreans ong>andong> the Chinese.Table 2 Foreign ong>andong> Latin American Population in Japantotal Brazil Peru Bolivia Argentine Paraguay1989 984,455 14,528 4,121 238 1,704 4711990 1,075,317 56,429 10,279 496 2,656 6721991 1,218,891 119,333 26,281 1,766 3,366 1,0521992 1,281,644 147,803 31,051 2,387 3,289 1,1741993 1,320,748 154,650 33,169 2,932 2,934 1,0801994 1,354,011 159,619 35,382 2,917 2,796 1,1291995 1,362,371 176,440 36,269 2,765 2,910 1,1761996 1,415,136 201,795 37,099 2,913 3,079 1,3011997 1,482,707 233,254 40,394 3,337 3,300 1,4661998 1,512,116 222,217 41,317 3,461 2,962 1,4411999 1,556,113 224,299 42,773 3,578 2,924 1,4642000 1,686,444 254,394 46,171 3,915 3,072 1,6782001 1,778,462 265,962 50,052 4,409 3,229 1,7792002 1,851,758 268,332 51,772 4,869 3,470 1,8952003 1,915,030 274,700 53,649 5,161 3,700 2,0352004 1,973,747 286,557 55,750 5,655 3,739 2,1522005 2,011,555 302,080 57,728 6,139 3,834 2,2872006 2,084,919 312,979 58,721 6,327 3,863 2,4392007 2,152,973 316,967 59,696 6,505 3,849 2,5562008 2,217,426 312,582 59,723 6,527 3,777 2,542Source: Ministry ong>ofong> Justice (1990-2009)Brazilians as a nationality group are not only characterized by the returnmigration ong>ofong> Japanese descendants, but also by their homogeneity in the Japanese3 Since the first generation ong>andong> the second generation with Japanese nationality are notcounted as Brazilians, they are excluded from this statistics.80

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010labor market. The percentage ong>ofong> their population that is working is much higherthan the other groups listed in Table 3. Since a great majority ong>ofong> Brazilians areemployed by labor contractors as a flexible workforce (Higuchi & Tanno, 2003), theratio ong>ofong> employees among the working population is also high. As a result, althoughthe Japanese in Brazil are known as a middleman minority group operating smallbusinesses, employers ong>andong> the self-employed comprise only 2.2% ong>ofong> the Braziliansin Japan, which is among the lowest among major migrant groups in Japan on table3.Table 3 Employment Status ong>ofong> Foreigners in Japan (2005)NationalityRespondentsWorkingPopulationEmployeesEmployers/Self-EmployeesNumber % Number %Number%Brazil 215,487 140,830 65.4 137,715 97.8 3,115 2.2China 353,437 185,738 52.6 167,315 90.1 18,423 9.9Indonesia 18,379 12,909 70.2 12,644 97.9 265 2.1Korea/NorthKorea472,711 225,888 47.8 144,990 64.2 80,898 35.8Peru 40,444 22,552 55.8 21,837 96.8 715 3.2Philippines 126,486 64,185 50.7 59,845 93.2 4,340 6.8Thailong>andong> 27,129 11,366 41.9 9,964 87.7 1,402 12.3Vietnam 20,901 11,467 54.9 10,876 94.8 592 5.2Total 1,555,505 772,375 49.7 647,004 83.8125,37116.2Source: Ministry ong>ofong> Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts ong>andong> Telecommunications Japan (2008)Nevertheless, because ong>ofong> the larger population compared to othernewcomer groups, the absolute number ong>ofong> entrepreneurs is not negligible.Although Brazilian businesses developed within the boundaries ong>ofong> an ethnicprotected market, a variety ong>ofong> business activities flourished in the 1990s (Kajita etal., 2005). Opportunity structures were opened for potential entrepreneurs withrich in human capital by serving as co-ethnics, enabling upward mobility to a part ong>ofong>the population 4 .4 Brazilian communities are primarily formed around these businesses; most communityleaders are entrepreneurs.81

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 20104. Sources ong>ofong> Social Capital among Brazilian EntrepreneursThis study analyzed the respondents’ social capital mobilization from thepoint ong>ofong> view ong>ofong> network utilization. Since cooperation ong>andong> assistance for businessactivities require a high degree ong>ofong> trust, an analysis ong>ofong> the entrepreneurs’ socialcapital should enable the clarification ong>ofong> which ties are important ong>andong> which arenot. As mentioned above, this study separates pre-migration ong>andong> post-migrationnetworks. The former is composed ong>ofong> three networks. These are family (parents,children, ong>andong> siblings), relatives (aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, ong>andong> cousins), ong>andong>pre-migration friends (those other than family ong>andong> relatives with whom they wereacquainted in Brazil before migration). The latter consists ong>ofong> two networks. Theseare post-migration friends (Brazilians encountered in Japan after migration), ong>andong>Japanese friends ong>andong> acquaintances.4.1 Origins ong>ofong> Social NetworksThe relationship between the types ong>ofong> networks ong>andong> the degree ong>ofong>contribution varied in importance. Table 4 shows how the respondents dependedon each network, indicating a factor ranging from 0 to 3 for contributions tong>ofong>inance, experience, ong>andong> information ong>andong> guarantee. Examining the factorscontributing to these networks leads to the consideration ong>ofong> three hypothesesabout the origins ong>ofong> social networks.Table 4 Sources ong>ofong> social capital at the initial phase ong>ofong> businessesContributionPostmigrationPremigrationJapanese family relativesfactor friends friendsNo % No % No % No % No %0 (lowest) 37 47.4 69 88.5 40 51.3 39 50.0 72 92.31 25 32.1 6 7.7 28 35.9 32 41.0 6 7.72 13 16.7 3 3.8 7 9.0 7 9.0 0 0.03 (highest) 3 3.8 0 0.0 3 3.8 0 0.0 0 0.0Total 78 100.0 78 100.0 78 100.0 78 100.0 78 100.0average 0.63 0.14 0.59 0.53 0.10Disorganization hypothesisDuring our interviews, only four ong>ofong> 78 entrepreneurs answered that theyhad no dependence on social networks. Most respondents relied on some kind ong>ofong>82

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010contribution, ong>andong> the average contribution factor was 1.7. In this sense, thedisorganization hypothesis is a null hypothesis in regard to Brazilian entrepreneursin Japan, as they overwhelmingly succeeded in mobilizing social capital to starttheir businesses.Resilience hypothesisA more careful look at Table 4 suggests that the contributions ong>ofong> family,post-migration friends, ong>andong> Japanese associates were much higher than those ong>ofong>pre-migration friends ong>andong> relatives. About half ong>ofong> the respondents were supportedby each one ong>ofong> the former, while only 10% relied on the latter. This result isambivalent in regard to the resilience hypothesis. Family networks functioned wellfor business formation, but pre-migration friends ong>andong> relatives were ong>ofong> littleimportance. In general, the premise ong>ofong> the resilience hypothesis is embodied by thecase ong>ofong> Jose. 5Jose, age 41, is a restaurant owner with a telephone agency in HamamatsuCity. A university-graduate engineer, he was also a co-owner ong>ofong> a hamburger shop.He came to Japan in 1991 to work in a motor factory, but was laid ong>ofong>f in thesummer ong>ofong> 1994. His two business partners, the co-owners ong>ofong> the hamburger shop,were also in Japan ong>andong> had been laid ong>ofong>f at that time, so they decided to reopentheir business. When they opened a grocery store in Hamamatsu in 1995, aBrazilian entrepreneur engaged in several businesses consulted ong>andong> stoodguarantee for them.Jose opened his shop by investing $30,000, as did each ong>ofong> his two partners,whom he had met in Brazil. However, his case is relatively exceptional, as Table 4indicates. In addition, a post-migration Brazilian friend also consulted with him asthe business predecessor. Relatives had even less ong>ofong> a presence, though Alex, thesecond case, relied on his wife’s cousin for guarantee.Alex is a German Brazilian who came to Japan in 1993 at the age ong>ofong> 29 withhis wife, a third-generation descendant ong>ofong> Japanese migrants. They had both beensystems engineers in Brazil ong>andong> had planned to open a computer school there.However, when they went back to Brazil for a temporary visit they found plenty ong>ofong>computer schools already there, which made them to change their plans. As aresult, they determined to open a school in Japan. Since Alex’s wife’s cousin hadalready opened a barber shop in the town ong>ofong> Oizumi, they moved there ong>andong> relied5 All names used in this section are pseudonyms.83

on her for guarantee.Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010It is safe to say that part ong>ofong> the pre-migration networks were sustained ong>andong>mobilized, but relatively weak ties with relatives ong>andong> friends were not transplantedto Japan.Reorganization hypothesisThe results shown in Table 4 seem more compatible with thereorganization hypothesis. As mentioned above, primary sources for social capitalare from both ong>ofong> the pre-migration (family) ong>andong> post-migration (Brazilian-migrantfriends ong>andong> Japanese associates) networks. Migrant Brazilian entrepreneursselectively utilize these networks for different purposes. Marcos, for example,experienced on-the-job training for entrepreneurship ong>andong> gained information ong>andong>guarantee from his Japanese employer ong>andong> received financial capital from hisfamily. He could open his meat grocery four years after his arrival because ong>ofong> hisutilization ong>ofong> various sources ong>ofong> social capital.Marcos came to Japan at the age ong>ofong> 34 in 1991, ong>andong> worked in aconstruction company for two years. Then he ong>andong> his wife changed jobs to aBrazilian grocery store owned by a Japanese, in which they learned how to managea food business ong>andong> accumulated capital to open their own shop.Song>andong>ra, age 23, was assisted by her family ong>andong> post-migration friends.Though her salary in Japan was only two-thirds ong>ofong> that ong>ofong> male workers, partnershipong>andong> assistance from her father paved the way for her entrepreneurship.She opened a grocery store in 1996. Her father had come to Japan in 1990ong>andong> worked in Toyota City. Though she had moved to Japan in 1993 with hermother ong>andong> brothers, they did not join their father since the labor recruiter did notong>ofong>fer them work in Toyota. She worked in a Suzuki factory in Kosai City for twoyears before changing her job to working in a grocery store owned by a Brazilian.Learning the necessary knowledge to start a business there, she started her ownshop with her colleague Fabio ong>andong> her father’s colleague Mario. Her father loanedher $15,000 ong>andong> a Japanese labor contractor stood for guarantee to rent the shop.Nelson, the biggest Brazilian importer/wholesaler at the time ong>ofong> this study,started his business as a side job, delivering foods on holidays with his factorycolleague Carlos. As was the case with Carlos ong>andong> Nelson, factory colleagues areimportant sources ong>ofong> post-migration friendship, since they work long hourstogether, even on holidays occasionally.84

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Nelson was 23 years old when he arrived in Japan in 1991. He worked in amotor factory, where he became acquainted with Carlos. He ong>andong> Carlos started afood delivery business on holidays in 1993, while working in the factory onweekdays. Their luck enabled them to expong>andong> the business, opening two grocerystores in Hamamatsu City. They divided their business in 1996. Nelson became theowner ong>ofong> the retail division ong>andong> Carlos obtained the trade ong>andong> wholesale division.It is easier for migrants to establish post-migration friendships than to keepties with pre-migration friends. These results show that migrants are unlikely toactivate non-family pre-migration networks. Family, however, appears usually to bean insufficient resource for starting businesses, ong>andong> therefore potentialentrepreneurs have sought assistance from Japanese associates ong>andong> post-migrationBrazilian friends.4.2 Functions ong>ofong> Migrant NetworksIf Brazilians’ networks are reorganized in Japan, how are these networksfunctionally differentiated? Figure 1 shows the relationships between differentnetworks ong>andong> the resources they provide. Among the three resources, informationong>andong> guarantee are most ong>ofong>ten mobilized, followed by finance. Here emphasisshould be placed on the differentiation ong>ofong> each network’s ability to supply thesethree resources.Figure 1 Sources ong>ofong> social capital at the start ong>ofong> businesses(N=78)3530252015105Training Information/guarantee Finance0Pre-migrationfriendPost-migrationfriendFamily Kin JapaneseTraining 1 7 2 2 10Information/guarantee 8 30 11 2 32Finance 3 20 33 2 685

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Strong tie hypothesisAs the strong tie hypothesis suggests, family networks are the primarysource ong>ofong> financial contributions to investment, but are ong>ofong> limited efficiency as thesource ong>ofong> information ong>andong> guarantee. Therefore, the presence ong>ofong> family networkssupports the strong-tie hypothesis. It is also noteworthy that migrant Brazilianentrepreneurs in Japan show no tendency to employ kinship networks. Althoughthey should be next strongest after family networks, ties with relatives are virtuallydisconnected in Japan.Weak tie hypothesisIt is the Japanese who most support the weak tie hypothesis. They are thetop providers ong>ofong> information ong>andong> guarantee to migrant Brazilian entrepreneurs,especially stong>andong>ing guarantees for room rent. It is also the case with experience,since Japanese businesses oriented to the Brazilian market ong>ofong>ten employ Brazilianmigrants. They are, however, much less important for financial assistance.Japanese associates are not important business partners for migrant Brazilianentrepreneurs, but they are useful with heterogeneous resources that are notavailable within Brazilian communities. The case ong>ofong> Bardes embodies the strengthong>ofong> weak ties in which Japanese associates ong>ofong>fer information.Bardes is not a typical Brazilian migrant, as he came to Japan at the age ong>ofong>26 in 1992 to work in his uncle’s Portuguese press company. He later moved to animport-export company his uncle owned, through which he participated in a localJunior Chamber ong>ofong> Commerce (JC). When he started a restaurant, his membershipin the JC brought him know-how ong>andong> provided guarantee.This study’s findings in regard to post-migration Brazilian friends asresources for migrant Brazilian entrepreneurs in Japan are more complex. Theysupport the weak tie hypothesis by finding that such friends are the next mostimportant providers ong>ofong> experience ong>andong> information ong>andong> guarantee after Japaneseassociates, but are also prominent as sources ong>ofong> financial contributions. In thissense, post-migration Brazilian friends produce much stronger ties than relatives.5. Discussion ong>andong> Conclusion5.1. DiscussionThis study has examined the social capital mobilization ong>ofong> migrant Brazilianentrepreneurs in Japan to clarify the continuity ong>andong> discontinuity ong>ofong> their networks.Among the three hypotheses proposed for the origins ong>ofong> social networks, the86

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010study’s findings most strongly supported the reorganization hypothesis. In terms ong>ofong>pre-migration networks, families were the primary source ong>ofong> financial capital, whilerelatives ong>andong> pre-migration friends were ong>ofong> little help in starting up businesses. Inthis sense, Brazilian migrants seem to transplant only family networks as reliablesources ong>ofong> social capital.Instead, migrant Brazilian entrepreneurs in Japan constructed postmigrationnetworks with Japanese associates ong>andong> fellow Brazilians they met inJapan. In terms ong>ofong> post-migration networks, their ties with Japanese associates areconsistent with the weak tie hypothesis, as these provided resources other thanfinancial capital. More important, however, were their post-migration Brazilianfriends, who were found to be contributors ong>ofong> all necessary resources. Oncedeprived ong>ofong> many ties left at their place ong>ofong> origin, the migrant Brazilianentrepreneurs studied reorganized new networks at their Japanese destinations.This study also found that those who could construct new relations in the newenvironment were capable ong>ofong> starting businesses. They carefully reconstructednetworks in Japan ong>andong> selectively utilized them to maximize their resources.These findings suggest modifications to conventional migrant networktheory. Werbner's (1990) anthropological study on Pakistanis in Britain describedsocial networks transplanted from Pakistan as strong ties, while regarding ethnicnetworks formed around neighborhoods ong>andong> workplaces as weak ties. This,however, is not the case with Brazilians in Japan. When they migrated to Japan,kinship ong>andong> friendship ties did not cross the border. Instead, they formed strongties with colleagues in their workplaces, which complemented the loss ong>ofong> premigrationnetworks. In this sense, migrant networks are more volatile than theconventional theory suggests.5.2 ConclusionTwo things can be pointed out to conclude this paper. The first is in regardto the structure ong>ofong> the immigrant community. In the so-called Brazilian towns asHamamatsu ong>andong> Oizumi, a variety ong>ofong> such ethnic institutions as businesses,religious organizations, football clubs, ong>andong> cultural circles have been developed. Itseems to be indeed the emergence ong>ofong> little Brazils which migrants havetransplanted from their country ong>ofong> origin.However, such a simplistic notion should be modified. The formation ong>ofong>immigrant institutions does not always accompany the transplantation ong>ofong> socialnetworks. The data suggested only the strongest networks, such as families, were87

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010maintained after migration. In the case ong>ofong> Brazilians in Japan, it is increasinglyBrazilian co-workers, rather than chain migration, who serve as incubators forentrepreneurship.The second point concerns the correlation between types ong>ofong> migrationsystems ong>andong> migrant communities. According to Werbner (1990), interactionsbetween mother (in her study, Pakistan) ong>andong> daughter (in her study, Englong>andong>)communities are vigorous among the first generation, while networks with schoolong>andong> workplace fellows are more important for the second generation. The secondgenerationPakistani migrants studied reorganized social networks, partly takingover their parents’ social relations. Moreover, Grieco (1998) examined the effect ong>ofong>migration systems on the establishment ong>ofong> Indian communities in Fiji. Since Indiansmigrated to Fiji as contract workers for plantations, labor recruiters, rather thanpersonal networks, promoted these migration flows. As a corollary, the socialnetworks among the Indian community in Fiji have been reconstructed sincemigration.In the case ong>ofong> Brazilian migration to Japan, this study’s analysis found thatonly family networks were transplanted, ong>andong> found little evidence ong>ofong> chainmigration beyond family networks. This is because Brazilian migration has beendriven by networks ong>ofong> labor recruiters, which can be called market-mediatedmigration systems (Kajita, Tanno & Higuchi 2005). Market-mediated migrationsystems are highly responsive to the demong>andong> for migrant labor, rather than tocommunal ties, ong>andong> thus enable what can be considered an economically optimalallocation ong>ofong> the workforce. However, they have brought about the loss ong>ofong> premigrationnetworks ong>andong> forced the construction ong>ofong> post-migration networks.ReferencesAkagi, Taeko, Kaigai Imin Network no Kenkyuu: Peru Ijusha no Ishiki to Seikatsu (ong>Researchong> on EmigrantNetwork: Consciousness ong>andong> Lives ong>ofong> Japanese Migrants in Peru). Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 2000.Bailey, Thomas ong>andong> Roger Waldinger, “Primary, Secondary ong>andong> Enclave Labor Markets: A TrainingSystems Approach,” American Sociological Review. 56: 432-445, 1991.Brettel, Caroline B., “Theorizing ong>Migrationong> in Anthropology: The Social Construction ong>ofong> Networks,Identities, Communities, ong>andong> Globalscapes,” in ong>Migrationong> Theory: Talking Across Disciplines,eds. Caroline B. Brettel ong>andong> James F. Hollifield (New York: Routledge, 2000).Durong>andong>, Jorge ong>andong> Douglas S. Massey eds., Crossing the Border: ong>Researchong> from the Mexican ong>Migrationong>Project. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 2004.88

Migrant Networks across Borders: The Case ong>ofong> Brazilian EntrepreneursJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Fischer, Claude S., “Toward a Subcultural Theory ong>ofong> Urbanism,” American ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Sociology. 95: 1319-1341, 1975.Fischer, Claude S., To Dwell among Friends. Berkeley: University ong>ofong> California Press, 1982.Granovetter, Mark, “The Strength ong>ofong> Weak Ties,” American ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Sociology. 78: 1360-80, 1973.Grieco, Elizabeth M., “The Effects ong>ofong> ong>Migrationong> on the Establishment ong>ofong> Networks: Caste Disintegrationong>andong> Reformation among the Indians ong>ofong> Fiji,” International ong>Migrationong> Review. 32: 704-736,1998.Gurak, Douglas T. ong>andong> Fe Caces, “ong>Migrationong> Networks ong>andong> the Shaping ong>ofong> ong>Migrationong> Systems,”International ong>Migrationong> Systems: A Global Approach, eds. Mary Kritz et al. (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1992).Hong>andong>lin, Oscar, The Uprooted: The Epic Story ong>ofong> the Great ong>Migrationong>s That Made the American People.Boston: Little Brown (reprint ed), 1951.Higuchi, Naoto, “ong>Migrationong> Process ong>ofong> Nikkei Brazilians,” Emigración Latinoamericana: ComparaciónInterregional entre América del Norte, Europa y Japón, ed. Mutsuo Yamada (Osaka: JapanCenter for Area ong>Studiesong>, 2003).Higuchi, Naoto ong>andong> Kiyoto Tanno, “What’s Driving Brazil-Japan ong>Migrationong>? The Making ong>andong> theRemaking ong>ofong> Brazilian Niche in Japan,” International ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Japanese Sociology. 12: 33-48,2003.Kajita, Takamichi, Kiyoto Tanno ong>andong> Naoto Higuchi, Kao no Mienai Teijuuka: Nikkei Brajiru jin to Kokka,Shijo, Imin Network (Invisible Residents: Japanese Brazilian vis-à-vis State, Market ong>andong>Immigrant Network). Nagoya: University ong>ofong> Nagoya Press, 2005.Light, Ivan ong>andong> Steven J. Gold, Ethnic Economies. San Diego: Academic Press, 2000.Massey, Douglas, “Social Structure, Household Strategies, ong>andong> the Cumulative Causation ong>ofong> ong>Migrationong>,”Population Index. 56: 3-26, 1990.Massey, Douglas et al., Return to Aztlan: The Social Processes ong>ofong> International ong>Migrationong> from WesternMexico. Berkeley: University ong>ofong> California Press, 1987.Massey, Douglas, Jorge Durong>andong> ong>andong> Nolan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke ong>andong> Mirrors: Mexican Immigrationin an Era ong>ofong> Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.Min, Pyong Gap, Ethnic Business Enterprise: Korean Small Business in Atlanta. Staten Islong>andong>: Center forong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>, 1988.Ministry ong>ofong> Justice, Annual Report ong>ofong> Statistics on Legal Migrants. Tokyo: National Printing Bureau, 1990-2009.Ministry ong>ofong> Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts ong>andong> Telecommunications Japan, 2005 PopulationCensus ong>ofong> Japan, Vol.8, Results ong>ofong> Special Tabulation on Foreigners. Tokyo: Japan StatisticalAssociation, 2008.Ostergren, Robert C., A Community Transplanted: The Trans-Atlantic Experience ong>ofong> a Swedish ImmigrantSettlement in the Upper Middle West, 1835-1915. Madison: University ong>ofong> Wisconsin Press,1988.Park, Robert E. ong>andong> Herbert A. Miller, Old World Traits Transplanted. New York: Harper ong>andong> Brothers(reprint ed.), 1921.Portes, Alejong>andong>ro, “Economic Sociology ong>andong> the Sociology ong>ofong> Immigration,” The Economic Sociology ong>ofong>Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, ong>andong> Entrepreneurship. ed. Alejong>andong>ro Portes (NewYork: Russell Sage Foundation, 1995).Portes, Alejong>andong>ro, “Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems ong>andong> Opportunities,”International ong>Migrationong> Review. 31: 799-825, 1997.Portes, Alejong>andong>ro ong>andong> Robert L. Bach, Latin Journey: Cuban ong>andong> Mexican Immigrants in the UnitedStates. Berkeley: University ong>ofong> California Press, 1985.89

Naoto HIGUCHIJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Tilly, Charles ong>andong> C. Harold Brown, “On Uprooting, Kinship, ong>andong> the Auspices ong>ofong> ong>Migrationong>,” Internationalong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Comparative Sociology. 8: 139-164, 1967.Waldinger, Roger et al., Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business in Industrial Societies. Newbury Park:Sage, 1990.Wellman, Barry, “The Community Question,” American ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Sociology. 99: 1201-1231, 1979.Werbner, Pnina, The ong>Migrationong> Process: Capital, Gifts ong>andong> Offerings among British Pakistanis. Oxford:Berg, 1990.Wirth, Louis, “Urbanism as a Way ong>ofong> Life,” American ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Sociology. 44:1-24, 1934.Yoo, Jin-Kyung, Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Network ong>andong> Ethnic Resources. New York: Garlong>andong>,1998.90

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> Globalisation onTransnational Identities: The Jamaican ExampleBéatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKAbstract: Trans-national identity is a composite ong>ofong> individual ong>andong> group identitydevelopment, construction ong>andong> negotiation. It is ong>ofong> importance to the collective ong>andong> to theindividual. Its significance extends from collective national action through its influences ongovernmental policy to the individual who simply asks, "Who am I?" Globalization ong>andong>modern labor movements between countries with diasporic populations complicate thealready complex rapidly changing interdependencies ong>ofong> cultural-ethnic identities comprisingindividual ong>andong> collective trans-national identity. This paper utilizes an instrument forassessing, comparing ong>andong> tracking the changing composite cultural-ethnic identities ong>ofong>individuals ong>andong> groups that comprise trans-national identity. The instrument is the CulturalIndex (Boufoy-Bastick, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008); a two-item ipsative scale capable ong>ofong> beinggrounded in each group's definition ong>ofong> their own identity. Jamaican respondents (N=126)participated in a one-on-one Mall interrupt survey to assess the relative contributions ong>ofong>Jamaican, African ong>andong> Anglo-American cultures to their trans-national identity. Gender ong>andong>age comparisons, tested for both construct ong>andong> concurrent validity, showed that Anglo-American culture currently has a significantly smaller impact on Jamaican's collective transnationalidentity than do both African ong>andong> Jamaican cultures. The research is important formonitoring the intrusions ong>ofong> Globalization on the trans-national identities ong>ofong> diasporiccommunities.Keywords: Culturometrics, globalization, transnational identitiesIntroductionTrans-national identity is a composite ong>ofong> individual ong>andong> group identitydevelopment, construction ong>andong> negotiation. It is ong>ofong> importance to the collective ong>andong>to the individual. Its significance extends from collective international action throughits influences on national governmental policy to the individual who simply asks,"Who am I?" Globalization 1 ong>andong> modern labor movements between countries with1 Jerzy Smolicz ong>andong> Margaret Secombe, ―Globalisation, ong>Identityong>, ong>andong> Cultural Dynamics in aMultiethnic state: Multiculturalism in Australia‖, in Nation-Building, ong>Identityong> ong>andong>91

92Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010diasporic populations complicate the already complex rapidly changinginterdependencies ong>ofong> cultural-ethnic identities comprising individual ong>andong> collectivetrans-national identity.Ethnic ong>andong> racial categories may be considered to be as much cultural ong>andong>ideological creations ong>ofong> inclusions ong>andong> differentiations as they are genetic orgeographic classifications (Boyd, Goldman & White 2 , 2000). This is most certainly thecase for sociological categories that mediate cultural identities. In practice, ethnicong>andong> racial categories are usually identified by 'visible minority' categorizationcommon to ong>ofong>ficial censuses ong>andong> civic regulations (Chard ong>andong> Renaud 3 , 1999). Whatconstitutes a visible minority depends very much on noticeable inter-groupdifferences ong>ofong> interest ong>andong> concern, particularly relative to the indigenous or basecultural group. Note that 'visible' in this sense refers to discernable differences ong>ofong>social interest ong>andong>/or concern, rather than to only physical appearance. Thus theong>ofong>ficial United States classification ong>ofong> 'Asian' is very different from that used in theUnited Kingdom. Similarly, 'Black' in the United States includes people who wouldnot be considered 'Black' in Jamaica. Even within national boundaries the meaning ong>ofong>a single classification system would change as applied in different communities(Bissoondath 4 , 1994; Sindicz ong>andong> Secombe 5 , 2009; Thomas 6 , 2004). Such fixednominal categorizations are too coarse ong>andong> simplistic to capture the complexinterrelated influences that might change an individual’s trans-national identity, or toact as a basis ong>ofong> measurement for trans-national identity. Such complexity can beillustrated by a partial list ong>ofong> some ong>ofong> the inter-linked influences that change transnationalidentity. This would include ancestry, assimilation ong>andong> intermarriage,religious conversion ong>andong> education, proximity ong>ofong>, ong>andong> contact with family, existenceCitizenship Education, eds. Joseph Zajda, Holger Daun ong>andong> Lawrence J. Saha, chapt. 6,2009.2 Monica Boyd, Gustave Goldman ong>andong> Pamela White, ―Race in the Canadian Census‖ inRace ong>andong> Racism: Canada’s Challenge, eds. Leo Driedger ong>andong> Halli S. Shiva (Montreal:McGill/Queen‘s University Press, 2000).3 Jennifer Chard ong>andong> Viviane Renaud, ―Visible Minorities in Toronto, Vancouver ong>andong>Montreal‖ Canadian Social Trends, 54 (1999), 20-25.4 Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: The Cult ong>ofong> Multiculturalism in Canada, (Toronto:Penguin Books, 1994).5 Jerzy Smolicz ong>andong> Margaret Secombe, ―Globalisation, ong>Identityong>, ong>andong> Cultural Dynamics in aMultiethnic state: Multiculturalism in Australia‖, in Nation-Building, ong>Identityong> ong>andong>Citizenship Education, eds. Joseph Zajda, Holger Daun ong>andong> Lawrence J. Saha, chapt. 6,2009.6 Deborah Thomas, Nationalism, Globalization ong>andong> the Politics ong>ofong> Culture in Jamaica(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>ofong> community centers ong>andong> support, memberships ong>ofong> religious ong>andong> secularorganizations, psychological belongingness ong>andong> social cohesion, connections to ethnicheritage, labor force characteristics ong>andong> business networks, use ong>ofong> ethnic symbols,restrictions on ownership ong>andong> social participation.In this study, three major, ong>andong> almost inclusive, cultural constructions fromwithin Jamaican society are used to represent the Primary Cultural Identities thatcomprise Jamaican trans-national identity. These are culturally relative constructs ong>ofong>'Jamaican-ness', 'Anglo-American-ness' ong>andong> 'African-ness' as understood byconsensus in urban Jamaican society. The main influences on trans-national identityin Jamaica that are considered as possible explanations ong>ofong> generational differences inthis study are connections to ethnic heritage, education ong>andong> proximity ong>ofong>, ong>andong>contact with one’s family.As indicated above, the measurement ong>ofong> cultural identity, particularly transnationalidentity, is fraught with practical ong>andong> conceptual problems. There seem tobe no extant instruments suitable for measuring trans-national identity. Publishedinstruments for measuring the cultural identity components ong>ofong> trans-national identitycan be categorized as (i) Acculturation scales, (ii) Multigroup Ethnic instruments or(iii) Culturally specific instruments. Acculturation scales for use in multiculturalsocieties, for example those by Pillen ong>andong> Hoewing-Roberson 7 (1992) ong>andong> by Israel 8(1995), tend to assess the degree to which subjects from different cultures match tothe base culture (commonly North American). The degree ong>ofong> matching, e.g.integrated, separated, assimilated, or marginalized, is used to predict psychosocialproblems such as stress, drug addiction or marital abuse. Acculturation scales are notsuitable for assessing the cultural identity components ong>ofong> trans-national identitybecause they relate only to the mores ong>ofong> one base culture. Multigroup Ethnicinstruments that exist for use in multicultural groups, e.g. the much used 'MultigroupEthnic ong>Identityong> Measure' (Phinney 9 , 1992), ong>andong> the 'Acculturation Measure for LatinoYouth' (Pillen ong>andong> Hoewing-Roberson 10 , 1992), tend to measure what is common toethnic groups rather than what makes them unique. The 'Acculturation Measure for7 Michelle Pillen ong>andong> Renee Hoewing-Roberson, ―Development ong>ofong> an Acculturation Measurefor Latino Youth‖, (1992).8 Cuellar Israel, ―Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans‖ Hispanic ong>Journalong> ong>ofong>Behavioral Sciences, (17)3, (1995): 275-304.9 Jean Phinney, ―The Multigroup Ethnic ong>Identityong> Measure: A New Scale for Use withDiverse Groups‖ ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Adolescent ong>Researchong>, 7(2), (1992): 156-76.10 Michelle Pillen, Michelle ong>andong> Renee Hoewing-Roberson, ―Development ong>ofong> anAcculturation Measure for Latino Youth. (1992).93

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Latino Youth' for example, uses family identity, self/peer identity, customs ong>andong> foodattributes that are particular to Puerto Ricans ong>andong> Mexicans ong>andong> more generally topeople with Latino ancestry. These Multigroup Ethnic instruments are not suitablefor assessing trans-national identity because they only target a small range ong>ofong>attributes that similar ethnic groups have in common. Culturally specific instrumentsare by far the largest category ong>ofong> cultural identity measures, such as Ortiz 11 , (1994);De Leon ong>andong> Mendez 12 , (1996); Ponterotto, Baluch ong>andong> Carielli 13 (1998); Reese, Veraong>andong> Paikong>ofong>f 14 , (1998); Smith ong>andong> Brookins 15 , (1997); ong>andong> Snowden ong>andong> Hines 16 , (1999)to mention only a few. These instruments assess degree ong>ofong> membership ong>ofong> a specificcultural group ong>andong> they also tend to derive from social issues research with one ong>ofong>North America's ong>ofong>ficial classifications ong>ofong> racial groups - Asian (now Asian ong>andong> PacificIslong>andong>ers), Black (now African-American), Hispanic, Native-American ong>andong> Anglo-American (now European-American). Although many such instruments exist for themeasurement ong>ofong> cultural identity, they each tend to focus on specific religious rituals,observances, language use, feelings ong>ofong> ethnic affirmation ong>andong> belongings, ethnicbehaviors, ong>andong> ethnic knowledge or attitudes that are particular to a single culture orsub-cultural group. This makes them inadequate for use with other cultures ong>andong>hence inappropriate for cross-cultural comparisons or for assessing cultural identityin multicultural societies where identity is a blend ong>ofong> more than one culture.The importance ong>ofong> an instrument capable ong>ofong> providing for such comparativeanalysis has been emphasized by Jose Itzigsohn ong>andong> Silvia Saucedo as a result ong>ofong> theircross-cultural study ong>ofong> the trans-national sociocultural practices ong>ofong> Colombian,11 Felix Ortiz, ―A Multidimensional Measure ong>ofong> Cultural ong>Identityong> for Latino ong>andong> LatinaAdolescents‖ Hispanic ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Behavioral Sciences, 16(2), (1994): 99-115.12 Brunilda De Leon ong>andong> Serafin Mendez, ‖Factorial Structure ong>ofong> a Measure ong>ofong> Acculturationin a Puerto Rican Population‖ Educational ong>andong> Psychological Measurement, 56(1), (1996):155-65.13 Joseph Ponterotto, Suraiya Baluch ong>andong> Dominick Carielli, ―The Suinn-Lew Asian Self-ong>Identityong> Acculturation Scale (SL-ASIA): Critique ong>andong> ong>Researchong> Recommendations‖Measurement ong>andong> Evaluation in Counseling ong>andong> Development, (31)2, (1998): 109-24.14 Leroy Reese, Elizabeth Vera, ong>andong> Roberta Paikong>ofong>f, ―Ethnic ong>Identityong> Assessment amongInner-City African American Children: Evaluating the Applicability ong>ofong> the MultigroupEthnic ong>Identityong> Measure‖ ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Black Psychology, (24)3, (1998): 289-304.15 Emilie Smith ong>andong> Craig Brookins, ―Toward the Development ong>ofong> an Ethnic ong>Identityong>Measure for African American Youth‖. ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Black Psychology, (23)4, (1997): 358-77.16 Lonnie Snowden, Lonnie ong>andong> Alice Hines, ―A Scale To Assess African AmericanAcculturationong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Black Psychology, (25)1, (1999): 36-47.94

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Dominican, ong>andong> Salvadorian immigrant to the USA (Itzigsohn ong>andong> Saucedo 17 , 2002).Such an instrument is particularly necessary for the measurement ong>ofong> trans-nationalidentities in European ong>andong> Caribbean countries, which are complex changingcomposites ong>ofong> values, attitudes, preferences ong>andong> practices derived from majordespotic cultures, colonial cultures, in situ multi-ethnic cultures, current political ong>andong>educational influences ong>andong> the pervasive culture ong>ofong> globalization. However, just as itis possible to sidestep the complexities ong>ofong> authentic measurement by employingproxy measures, so it is possible to avoid having to understong>andong> these complexcultural particulars in order to construct a valid ong>andong> reliable measure ong>ofong> transnationalidentity. From televisions to automobiles, it is commonplace in ourtechnological society for people to effectively use devices whose complexities arebeyond their understong>andong>ing. Many ong>ofong> our modern measuring instruments that utilizecomplex advanced technologies are designed for lay people to use. The CulturalIndex is a measuring paradigm incorporating such a design as these.This paper utilizes the Cultural Index for assessing, comparing ong>andong> trackingthe changing composite cultural-ethnic identities ong>ofong> individuals ong>andong> groups thatcomprise trans-national identity. The Cultural Index (CI) (Boufoy-Bastick 18 , 2001,2002, 2003) is a two-item ipsative scale capable ong>ofong> being grounded in each group'sdefinition ong>ofong> their own identity. The Cultural Index is a psychometric method thatutilizes definitive cultural self-knowledge ong>ofong> individuals ong>andong> groups to measure thecomposite cultural identities that constitute their trans-national identity. In this waythe CI assesses components ong>ofong> identity without needing to explicitly describe, oroperationally define, these complexities. The measures produced by the CI may alsobe used to identify the most apt subjects for further research to explore thesecomplexities ong>andong> their meanings. By grounding cultural identity in consensus emicmeaning, by using mean ratings ong>ofong> cultural attributes ong>ofong> a public object, it becomespossible to compare on a common metric the cultural identities ong>ofong> individuals, ong>andong> ong>ofong>subgroups, within ong>andong> between different cultures. In this study, the CI was used to17 José Itzigsohn, José ong>andong> Silvia Saucedo, ―Immigrant Incorporation ong>andong> SocioculturalTransnationalism‖ International ong>Migrationong> Review, 36(3), (2002): 66-98.18 Béatrice. Boufoy-Bastick, ―Introduction to Culturo-metrics: Measuring the Culturalong>Identityong> ong>ofong> Children ong>andong> Teachers‖. Paper presented at the 9 th European conference forong>Researchong> on Learning ong>andong> Instruction, Fribourg, Switzerlong>andong> (Aug, 2001).Béatrice Boufoy-Bastick, ―Measuring Cultural ong>Identityong> in Culturally Diverse Societies‖World Cultures, 13(1) (2002): 39-47.Béatrice. Boufoy-Bastick, Academic Attainments ong>andong> Cultural Values, Munich, Germany.Lincom Europa, 2003.95

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010identify differences in the trans-national identities ong>ofong> male ong>andong> female Jamaicans ong>andong>to track generational changes in trans-national identity within Jamaican society.To represent two successive generations for trans-generational identityanalysis this study used two groups with a mean age difference ong>ofong> 30 years. Thesetwo age groups differed from each other by a minimum ong>ofong> 17 years ong>andong> a maximumong>ofong> 54 years. This time difference for generations is well supported by the literatureong>andong> by the author’s personal experience. The years between generations in Jamaicaare relatively few because ong>ofong> early childbearing practices. Early childbearing practicesare encouraged in Jamaica by cultural traditions such as Ghetto culture markingmasculinity by men having many ‘baby mothers’, i.e. very young girls who aremothers ong>ofong> their children, ong>andong> by deriding young women who have not beenpregnant by referring to them as ‘mules’, i.e. infertile (Blake 19 , 1971; Brody 20 , 1981;Kitzinger 21 , 1982). As Senderowitz 22 (1995) says “cultural traditions encourage youngwomen to prove their fertility before marriage” ong>andong> as Saardchom 23 (2000) reports:Only about half ong>ofong> the population ong>ofong> Jamaica has never been married by age50: 51. 8% for males ong>andong> 54.2% for females, the lowest worldwide. Jamaica also hasthe world highest SMAM (Singulate Mean Age at Marriage): 34.6 for males ong>andong> 33.1for females. Getting married in Jamaica is far less important than having a child. Formen, having children is seen as a sign ong>ofong> virility ong>andong> for women, a sign ong>ofong> fertility.Moreover, women try to have children from multiple fathers to increase thelikelihood ong>ofong> financial support.Consequently, “By age 19, about 40 percent ong>ofong> Jamaican women have beenpregnant” (Eggleston, Jackson ong>andong> Hardee 24 , 1999). Similar statistics from theInternational Planned Parenthood Association (2004) are:Teenage births have decreased from 31% ong>ofong> total births in 1977 to 23.7% in19 Judith Blake, Family Structure in Jamaica: The Social Context ong>ofong> Reproduction. NewYork: Free Press ong>ofong> Glencoe, 1971.20 Eugene Brody, Sex, Contraception, ong>andong> Motherhood in Jamaica, Cambridge, MA, USA:Harvard University Press, 1981.21 Sheila Kitzinger, ―The social context ong>ofong> birth: some comparisons between childbirth inJamaica ong>andong> Britain‖ in Ethnography ong>ofong> Fertility ong>andong> Birth, ed., Cody MacCormack. NewYork: Academic Press, 1982.22 Judith Senderowitz, Adolescent Health: Reassessing the Passage to Adulthood, WorldBank Discussion Papers #272. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. (1995).23 Narumon Saardchom, Marriage Markets Across Countries, (2000). http24 Elizabeth Eggleston, Jean Jackson ong>andong> Karen Hardee, ―Sexual Attitudes ong>andong> BehaviorAmong Young Adolescents in Jamaica‖, International Family Planning Perspectives, 25(2),(1999): 78-84 & 91.96

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 20101992. In 1993, 2.5% ong>ofong> girls between 10 ong>andong> 14 years old had their first baby. Thefertility rate in 1993 for 15-19 year olds was 108 per 1000 women. .. Women aged15-19 giving live births each year (%): 11.MethodThis study used one-on-one Mall Interrupt interviews with 126 respondentsin an urban Jamaican district ong>ofong> Kingston to gather data on Anglo-American, Jamaicanong>andong> African self-identity. These three cultural constructs were chosen because theyare the most prominent cultural identities that comprise the trans-national identityong>ofong> Jamaican society. Subjects also gave their age ong>andong> gender so that any generationalchange in Jamaicans’ trans-national identity could be identified ong>andong> compared formales ong>andong> females. Subjects were given no information on the meaning ong>ofong> Anglo-American-ness, Jamaican-ness or African-ness ong>andong>, if they asked, they wereinstructed to use their own meaning ong>ofong> the terms.Subjects rated their own identity Q1 on each ong>ofong> the three cultural constructsusing questions q3 to q5q3 How Jamaican do you feel 0-9q4 How American do you feel 0-9q5 How African do you feel 0-9Subjects also rated the identity ong>ofong> a public object Q2, the Prime Minister atthe time ong>ofong> the study, Mr. P. J. Patterson, on the same constructs using questions q8to q10:q8 How Jamaican do you feel Patterson is 0-9q9 How American do you feel Patterson is 0-9q10 How African do you feel Patterson is 0-9A subject's Primary Cultural Indexes for each construct ‘c’ were calculated asPCIc=Q1c/Q2c x mean ong>ofong> Q2c, where the three values ong>ofong> ‘c’ refer to the three culturalconstructs ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness, Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness. So, for example,where PCIj, PCIam, PCIaf represent the subject's primary cultural indices ong>ofong> the threeconstructs Jamaican-ness, Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness:PCIj = q3/q8 x mean ong>ofong> q8PCIam = q4/q9 x mean ong>ofong> q9, ong>andong>PCIaf = q5/q10 x mean ong>ofong> q1097

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010To avoid 'dividing by zero' errors, all ratings were first increased by 1.To the first degree, that is assuming an individual’s judgment is a linearfunction ong>ofong> the actual amount to be judged, division ong>ofong> a subject’s self-rating by thesubject’s rating ong>ofong> the public object gives an ipsative measure ong>ofong> his or her culturalidentity as a proportion ong>ofong> the cultural identity ong>ofong> the public object, e.g. a subject mayconsider himself or herself to be half (1/2) as Jamaican as Patterson. The means ong>ofong>q8, q9 ong>andong> q10 represent the group’s consensus judgments ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness, Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness ong>ofong> Patterson. Multiplying each ipsative measure bythese means allows the individual’s ipsative judgments ong>ofong> their cultural identityconstructs to be grounded in the consensus judgments ong>ofong> the group. So, to continuethe example, if the group’s consensus judgment is that Patterson is rated at say 8 onJamaican-ness, then the individual’s Primary Index ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness, being 1/2 ong>ofong>Patterson’s, can be calculated as 1/2 x 8 = 4. Boufoy-Bastick 25 (2002) notes that, forpurposes ong>ofong> comparing the values ong>ofong> different subgroups, the Primary Cultural Indexcan be grounded in the consensus judgments ong>ofong> any subgroup. However, in this studythe main interest was the meanings given to the each ong>ofong> the three cultural identityconstructs by the whole group. Hence, means derived from the whole group wereused to ground each subject’s Primary Cultural Indices in the consensus judgments ong>ofong>the whole group.An individual subject’s trans-national identity prong>ofong>ile comprises all ong>ofong> thatsubject's Primary cultural-ethnic identities. The Relative Cultural ong>Identityong> (RCI) for anyconstruct, e.g. Anglo-American-ness, Jamaican-ness or African-ness is calculated asthe proportion that each PCIc is ong>ofong> the total PCI for a subject. For example, wherePCIj, PCIam, PCIaf represent the subject's primary cultural indices for the threeconstructs Anglo-American-ness, Jamaican-ness ong>andong> African-ness, the subject's TotalPrimary Cultural Index (TPCI) is PCIj+PCIam+PCIaf ong>andong> the subject's Relative CulturalIndex for say Jamaican-ness (RCIj) will be RCIj=PCIj/TPCI. Similarly, the subject'sRelative Cultural Index for American-ness (RCIam) will be RCIam=PCIam/TPCI ong>andong> thesubject's Relative Cultural Index for say African-ness (RCIaf) will be RCIaf=PCIaf/TPCI.These Relative Cultural Indices indicate the relative strengths ong>ofong> each component inthe subject’s trans-national identity ong>andong> so, in an otherwise unbiased context, wouldpredict subjects’ preferred culturally relevant behaviors, values ong>andong> choices. Hence,25 Béatrice Boufoy-Bastick, ―Measuring Cultural ong>Identityong> in Culturally Diverse Societies‖World Cultures, 13(1) (2002): 39-47.98

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010these Relative Cultural Indices can be used to test the concurrent validity ong>ofong> the threecultural-ethnic identity composites. For this purpose respondents also noted theirpreferences for living in America, Jamaica or Africa using questions q14, q15 ong>andong> q16:q14 How much do you like living in Jamaica 0-9q15 How much would you like living in America 0-9q16 How much would you like living in Africa 0-9As Relative cultural identities are predictive ong>ofong> relative cultural behaviorchoices, concurrent validity ong>ofong> the three cultural identity composites was tested usingcorrelations with subjects’ relative cultural preferences. For example, a correlationbetween RCIj ong>andong> preferring to live in Jamaica relative to the other countries wouldevidence the concurrent validity ong>ofong> the Cultural Indices ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness - ong>andong>similarly for the Cultural Indices ong>ofong> Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness.To triangulate the construct validity ong>ofong> these Cultural Indices, respondentswere also asked to rate the Anglo-American-ness, Jamaican-ness ong>andong> African-ness ong>ofong>a second, very different public object Q2b, namely a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC)retail outlet, using questions q11, q12 ong>andong> q13:q11 How Jamaican do you feel KFC is 0-9q12 How American do you feel KFC is 0-9q13 How African do you feel KFC is 0-9As the subject's identity should be independent ong>ofong> the public object chosenfor grounding we should find that subjects' RCIc based on Q2a should correlate withtheir identities based on Q2b. These correlations were calculated to confirm theconstruct validity ong>ofong> the Cultural Indices. However, correlations ong>andong> t-tests comparingthe ratings ong>ofong> the two different public objects, one t-test ong>andong> correlation for eachcultural construct, were first calculated to ensure that ratings ong>ofong> the two publicobjects were significantly different on each construct. These differences gave greaterrobustness to the triangulation ong>ofong> the construct validity.After calculating subjects’ Primary Cultural Indices ong>andong> Relative CulturalIndices for Jamaican-ness, Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness, ong>andong> confirming theconcurrent ong>andong> construct validities ong>ofong> these measures, subjects were grouped asMale or Female. They were also classified as Young or Old depending on them beingin the first or fourth quartiles ong>ofong> the age distribution. First ong>andong> fourth quartilegroupings for age were compared to ensure that the age difference between allsubjects would be greater than 17 years, with an inter-mean difference ong>ofong> 30 years,which is a generous estimate ong>ofong> mean generational age difference for Jamaica. A t-99

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010test was calculated to ensure that the two groups had significantly different meanages. The trans-national identities ong>ofong> these gender ong>andong> age groups were thencompared using a mixed model repeated measures ANOVA, 2 x 2 x (3), with age ong>andong>gender as between subject factors ong>andong> with composite trans-national identity atthree levels, Jamaican-ness, Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness as within subjectmeasures. In particular, the generational changes in trans-national identity wereidentified by comparing mean trans-national identity prong>ofong>iles ong>ofong> the older males ong>andong>females with those ong>ofong> younger males ong>andong> females.ResultsAll the subjects interviewed were Jamaican (N=126). Fifty-eight percentwere male (n=73) ong>andong> forty-two percent were female (n=53). The interviews lastedbetween one ong>andong> 19 minutes with a mean ong>ofong> seven minutes ong>andong> fifteen seconds.Ages ong>ofong> respondents ranged from 11 to 65 years with a mean ong>ofong> 31 years 9 months.The two youngest subjects were 11 ong>andong> 12 years old. All others were more than 15years old. The respondents in the first quartile (n=32) were all younger than 22 yearswith a mean age ong>ofong> 18.13 years, while those in the fourth quartile (n=35) were allolder than 39 years with a mean age ong>ofong> 48.05 years.Construct validityThe correlations between subjects’ Relative Cultural Indices based ondifferent public objects vis. the Prime Minister Patterson ong>andong> the fast food outlet KFCwere:RCI Jamaican-ness (based on ‘Prime Minister’ ong>andong> ‘KFC outlet’)r=0.232**, p=0.010, n=124RCI Anglo-American-ness (based on ‘Prime Minister’ ong>andong> ‘KFC outlet’)r=0.349**, p

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010r= 0.134, p=0.135, n=126How African are the ‘Prime Minister’ ong>andong> the ‘KFC outlet’, q10, q13r= 0.084, p=0.352, n=124** Correlations significant at p

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Generational age differencesThe quartile cut-points ong>ofong> the age distribution were at 22 years (25thpercentile), 29.5 years (50th percentile) ong>andong> 39 years for the 75th percentile. Theyoung subjects in the first quartile (n=32) were between 11 ong>andong> 22 years old with amean age ong>ofong> 18.13 years. Old subjects in the fourth quartile (n=35) were between 38ong>andong> 65 years old with a mean age ong>ofong> 48.03 years. Hence the minimum age differencebetween any subject in one group ong>andong> any subject in the other group was 17 yearswith a mean difference ong>ofong> 29.9 years. This difference was significant at p

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010There was an overall significant main effect for trans-national identityshowing a difference between the three Primary Cultural Indices ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness,Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness, using Huynh-Feldt Epsilon at F(2,95)=4.931,p=0.013.103

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Conclusion ong>andong> DiscussionPublished measures ong>ofong> Cultural ong>Identityong> can be classified as Acculturationscales, Multigroup Ethnic instruments or Culturally specific instruments. By askingculturally specific questions about accepted markers ong>ofong> culture such as ritualobservance, food preferences, language use, community attitudes, etc. theseinstruments claim to assess an individual's degree ong>ofong> enculturation into that specificculture. This paper has argued that, (i) although these culturally specific instrumentsmay be used to compare individuals on one cultural construct, they cannotmeaningfully ong>andong> efficiently compare subjects across cultural constructs, ong>andong> (ii)104

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010because they are based on fixed nominal categorizations, ong>ofong>ten from a perspective ong>ofong>the 'visible minority', they are too inflexible ong>andong> simplistic for use as measures ong>ofong>changing ong>andong> embedded concepts ong>ofong> trans-national identity. Trans-national identityis a composite ong>ofong> more than one cultural identity. The cultural identities ong>ofong> which it iscomposed are complex interacting ong>andong> continuously changing cultural constructsthat are defined differently by the varying experiences ong>ofong> cultural subgroups in agiven population. Hence, a different approach to the measurement ong>ofong> trans-nationalidentity seems to be justified. The Cultural Index, used in this study, utilized selfratingsong>andong> ratings ong>ofong> public objects to capture subjects' self-knowledge ong>ofong> culturalidentity ong>andong> ground this in a given group's consensus emic meaning ong>ofong> culturalidentity.Using data from one-on-one mall interrupt interviews, the trans-nationalidentity ong>ofong> 126 urban Jamaicans was measured in terms ong>ofong> the three most commoncomposite cultural constructs ong>ofong> trans-national identity in Jamaica, namely Jamaicanness,Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness. The construct validities ong>ofong> these PrimaryCultural Indices (PICIs) were verified by demonstrating that subjects' three PCIsremained the same even when their calculation was based on the ratings ong>ofong> two verydifferent public objects - 'the Prime Minister' ong>andong> 'a KFC fast food outlet'. This wasconsistent with the expectation that a subject's cultural identity should beindependent ong>ofong> the instruments that measure it. Further the non-significantcorrelations between ratings ong>ofong> these public objects ong>andong> the significant differences inthe mean ratings showed that these public objects were perceived as representingthe three cultural constructs very differently, These differences give greaterrobustness to the triangulation ong>ofong> the construct validity. The concurrent validities ong>ofong>the measures were demonstrated by the significant correlations between eachPrimary Cultural Index ong>andong> subjects' preferences for living in the matching country -the assumption being that the more pronounced is a subject’s primary culturalidentity then the greater would be the subject's preference for cultural choicesconsistent with that cultural identity. It was noticeable that the significantcorrelation between African-ness ong>andong> preferring to live in Africa was largest for thePrimary Cultural Index based on the 'person' public object ong>ofong> the Prime Minister whohas been widely 'publicised' in Jamaica as being African-Jamaican, ong>andong> that thesignificant correlation between Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> preferring to live inAmerica as well as the significant correlation between being Jamaican ong>andong> preferringto live in Jamaica, were based on the 'lifestyle' public ong>ofong> the KFC outlet.105

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010After establishing the construct ong>andong> concurrent validities ong>ofong> the threemeasures, the subjects were divided into two generations according togenerational age differences indicate by the age ong>ofong> first childbearing in Jamaica. Ithas been reported that about 40 percent ong>ofong> Jamaican women have been pregnantby the age 19 years. The first fourth quartiles ong>ofong> the age distribution werecompared ong>andong> were found to have a significant difference ong>ofong> 30 years, ong>andong> wereseparated by a minimum ong>ofong> 17 years, which generously represents the current agedifference between these generations in Jamaica. This enabled young (mean age 18years) ong>andong> old (mean age 48 years) males ong>andong> females to be compared so as toidentify gender differences ong>andong> generational differences in the trans-nationalidentities ong>ofong> these urban Jamaicans.ANOVA produced mean Primary Cultural Indices (PCIs) ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness,Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> African-ness for Males (M) ong>andong> Females (F) separately,for Old (O) ong>andong> Young (Y) separately, as well as for the older group split into M ong>andong>F, ong>andong> for the younger group split into M ong>andong> F. These means were graphed inFigures 1 to 10. The ANOVA showed that the means ong>ofong> the three composite culturalconstructs ong>ofong> trans-national identity were significantly different for these urbanJamaicans (Figure 1).When these overall means were decomposed into M ong>andong> F we saw that thefemales were more African-American, but less Jamaican, than the males (Figure 2).When decomposed by age, we saw that the young were more Jamaican ong>andong> lessAnglo-American than the old, but ong>ofong> equal African-ness (Figure 3). Then we lookedmore closely at these trans-generational differences by further decomposing eachong>ofong> the means ong>ofong> young ong>andong> old into M ong>andong> F. Figure 4 compared the identities ong>ofong>Young Males (YM) ong>andong> Young Females (YF). The males were more Jamaican ong>andong>African but much less Anglo-American than the females (Figure 4). We can begin toappreciate the meaning ong>ofong> these differences when we look at the very differenttrans-national identity prong>ofong>iles ong>ofong> Old Male (OM) ong>andong> Old Female (OF) Jamaicans infigure 5. These older men are much more Jamaican than the older women but theolder women are much more African-American than the older males (Figure 5). Onidentifying these differences we are led to hypothesize possible influences thatmight have led to these findings. These hypotheses point the way for furtherqualitative ong>andong> quantitative ethnographic research to investigate these differencesong>andong> their possible causes. Jamaican society is predominantly single-female head-ong>ofong>household.As pointed out by the International Planned Parenthood Association106

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010"Nearly half ong>ofong> all households are single-parent families headed by women"(International Planned Parenthood Association, 2004). Also, the children ong>ofong> theselone mothers tend to emigrate to become African-Americans. It is highly likely thatthese older women now identify themselves more with their African-Americanchildren ong>andong> less as Jamaicans than do the older males who have fewer suchexternal national influences upon them.When we compared generational differences for Females (OF vs. YF inFigure 6), we noticed that the young woman were very much more Jamaican ong>andong>much less African-American than their older counterparts. This would be consistentwith the strong in-country influences ong>ofong> more recent education on the younggroup, which emphasizes patriotic Jamaican-ness ong>andong> African slave heritage. Inaddition, because females ong>ofong> this age (mean 18 years-old) have higher educationalattainments than males they are more likely to be preparing for Americanimmigration than are the males in this same age group. These same explanationsalso clarify the differences plotted in Figure 7 that show YF are very similar in highJamaican-ness to OM yet are a little more African-American.Though the trans-national identity ong>ofong> OM is most similar to that ong>ofong> youngwomen (figure 7), the older women are most dissimilar to the young males (Figure8). It seems that within Jamaican society the cultural identity ong>ofong> older males is amuch stronger role model for the young than is that ong>ofong> the older women. Thisstrong male influence is commensurate with authority ong>ofong> masculinity in Jamaicansociety. These influences ong>ofong> education ong>andong> masculinity also explain the illustrationin Figure 9 where young males are shown as being very similar to older males inJamaican-ness ong>andong> in American-ness but are more pronounced in their Africanness.This is consistent with younger males having the older males as cultural rolemodels, with education enhancing their African-ness ong>andong> Jamaican-ness ong>andong> havingfew influential aspirations ong>ofong> American emigration.Figure 10 summarized these differences in trans-generational identities ong>ofong>urban Jamaican males ong>andong> females. It is clear that the older women have a verydifferent trans-national identity prong>ofong>ile to that ong>ofong> all males ong>andong> younger females.This large difference is consistent with older single-parent mothers identifying withtheir African-American emigrant children. The other differences are possibly dueto the in-country influences ong>ofong> the older Jamaican male as cultural role model,mediated by African slave heritage education influencing the cultural identities ong>ofong>younger males ong>andong> females, ong>andong> the likelihood that young females, because ong>ofong>107

Béatrice BOUFOY-BASTICKJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010their higher educational attainments, turn more to American emigration than dothe young males.In this study the Cultural Index made possible valid measures ong>ofong> the threePrimary Cultural Constructs ong>ofong> Jamaican-ness, Anglo-American-ness ong>andong> Africannessthat comprise the trans-national identities ong>ofong> urban Jamaicans. By comparingidentity prong>ofong>iles across generations for males ong>andong> females we identified differencesin trans-national identities from which educational, national ong>andong> global influenceswere hypothesized as being the most fruitful areas for future ethnographicresearch into these findings ong>ofong> changing trans-national identity in urban Jamaica.ReferencesBissoondath, Neil. Selling Illusions: The Cult ong>ofong> Multiculturalism in Canada, Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994.Blake, Judith. Family Structure in Jamaica: The Social Context ong>ofong> Reproduction. New York: Free Press ong>ofong>Glencoe, 1971.Boufoy-Bastick, Béatrice. “Introduction to Culturo-metrics: Measuring the Cultural ong>Identityong> ong>ofong> Childrenong>andong> Teachers”. Paper presented at the 9th European conference for ong>Researchong> on Learning ong>andong>Instruction, Fribourg, Switzerlong>andong> (Aug, 2001).Boufoy-Bastick, Béatrice. “Measuring Cultural ong>Identityong> in Culturally Diverse Societies” World Cultures,13(1) (2002): 39-47.Boufoy-Bastick, Béatrice. Academic Attainments ong>andong> Cultural Values, Munich, Germany. Lincom Europa,2003.Boufoy-Bastick, Béatrice. “Culturo-metrics: Quantitative methodology for measuring privilegedqualitative judgments”. Paper presented at the 5 th international conference on New Directionsin the Humanities, Paris, July 17-20, 2007.Boufoy-Bastick, Béatrice. “Educational, economic ong>andong> social influences on cultural heritage in Trinidad”.Paper presented at the International Conference on Education, Economy ong>andong> Society, Paris,July 17-19, 2008.Monica Boyd, Monica, Goldman, Goldman ong>andong> White, Pamela. “Race in the Canadian Census” in Raceong>andong> Racism: Canada’s Challenge, eds. Leo Driedger ong>andong> Shiva Halli (Montreal: McGill/Queen’sUniversity Press, 2000.Brody, Eugene. Sex, Contraception, ong>andong> Motherhood in Jamaica, Cambridge, MA, USA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1981.Chard, Jennifer ong>andong> Renaud, Viviane, “Visible Minorities in Toronto, Vancouver ong>andong> Montreal” CanadianSocial Trends, 54 (1999), 20-25.Eggleston, Elizabeth., Jackson, Jean ong>andong> Hardee, Karen. “Sexual Attitudes ong>andong> Behavior Among YoungAdolescents in Jamaica”, International Family Planning Perspectives, 25(2), (1999): 78-84 & 91.Also Family Health International, Jamaica: Reproductive Knowledge, Attitudes, ong>andong> BehaviorAmong Young Adolescents

A Culturometric Exploration ong>ofong> Intrusions ong>ofong> GlobalizationJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Ortiz, Felix. “A Multidimensional Measure ong>ofong> Cultural ong>Identityong> for Latino ong>andong> Latina Adolescents” Hispanicong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Behavioral Sciences, 16(2), (1994): 99-115.International Planned Parenthood Association. Available at>ofong>ile.asp?ISOCode=JM (accessedJan 2004)Israel, Cuellar. “Acculturation Rating Scale for Mexican Americans” Hispanic ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> BehavioralSciences, (17)3, (1995): 275-304.Itzigsohn, José ong>andong> Saucedo, Silvia. “Immigrant Incorporation ong>andong> Sociocultural Transnationalism”International ong>Migrationong> Review, 36(3), (2002): 66-98.Kitzinger, Sheila. “The social context ong>ofong> birth: some comparisons between childbirth in Jamaica ong>andong>Britain” in Ethnography ong>ofong> Fertility ong>andong> Birth, ed., Cody MacCormack. New York: AcademicPress, 1982.Leon De, Brunilda ong>andong> Mendez, Serafin. ”Factorial Structure ong>ofong> a Measure ong>ofong> Acculturation in a PuertoRican Population” Educational ong>andong> Psychological Measurement, 56(1), (1996): 155-65.Phinney, Jean. “The Multigroup Ethnic ong>Identityong> Measure: A New Scale for Use with Diverse Groups”ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Adolescent ong>Researchong>, 7(2), (1992): 156-76.Pillen, Michelle ong>andong> Hoewing-Roberson, Renee. Development ong>ofong> an Acculturation Measure for LatinoYouth. (1992) (ERIC Document Reproduction Services No. ED352411.)Ponterotto, Joseph., Baluch, Suraiya ong>andong> Carielli, Dominick. “The Suinn-Lew Asian Self-ong>Identityong>Acculturation Scale (SL-ASIA): Critique ong>andong> ong>Researchong> Recommendations” Measurement ong>andong>Evaluation in Counseling ong>andong> Development, (31)2, (1998): 109-24.Reese, Leroy, Vera, Elizabeth ong>andong> Paikong>ofong>f, Roberta “Ethnic ong>Identityong> Assessment among Inner-City AfricanAmerican Children: Evaluating the Applicability ong>ofong> the Multigroup Ethnic ong>Identityong> Measure”ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Black Psychology, (24)3, (1998): 289-304.Saardchom, Narumon. Marriage Markets Across Countries, (2000). (accessed Jan 2004).Senderowitz, Judith. Adolescent Health: Reassessing the Passage to Adulthood, World Bank DiscussionPapers #272. The World Bank, Washington, D.C. (1995).Smith, Emilie ong>andong> Brookins, Craig. “Toward the Development ong>ofong> an Ethnic ong>Identityong> Measure for AfricanAmerican Youth”. ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Black Psychology, (23)4, (1997): 358-77.Snowden, Lonnie ong>andong> Hines, Alice “A Scale To Assess African American Acculturationong>Journalong> ong>ofong> BlackPsychology, (25)1, (1999): 36-47.Thomas, Deborah, Nationalism, Globalization ong>andong> the Politics ong>ofong> Culture in Jamaica. Durham, NC: DukeUniversity Press, 2004.109

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong> between the EUong>andong> the MENA Region 1Tamirace FAKHOURYAbstract. This article examines the extent to which circular migration (CM) can be framedfirst as a useful migration typology ong>andong> second as an efficient migration strategy in theMENA region ong>andong> between the latter ong>andong> the EU. After discussing the difficultconceptualisation ong>ofong> the circular migration model, it alludes to the inherent discrepanciesbetween the normative, empirical ong>andong> prescriptive connotations ong>ofong> the concept, then itanalyses different examples ong>ofong> circularity in the MENA region ong>andong> between the latter ong>andong>the EU. It concludes that since the very concept ong>ofong> circular migration (as proposed by theEU) is still in its exploratory ong>andong> genesis phases, it is advisable to refrain from conferring anovervalued significance on the CM approach ong>andong> to consider it rather as a strategy inherentto a more global approach to labour migration in the EU-MENA context. On a moretheoretical level, ong>andong> beyond the specificities ong>ofong> the EU ong>andong> MENA, this article wouldsuggest caution in the normative use ong>ofong> circular migration. As much contention prevailsover circular migration as a migration typology, it would be recommendable that CM berather considered an option, a policy initiative suitable for some countries more thanothers, or a strategy to manage migration trends in transnational contexts.Keywords: circular migration, EU, Middle East ong>andong> North Africa (MENA) RegionI. Circularity in the backdrop ong>ofong> new ong>andong> shifting migration geographiesAs migration dynamics have grown into a confusing interplay ong>ofong> social,human ong>andong> spatial variables, the frontiers ong>ofong> mobility have become increasingly1 The findings ong>ofong> this article are inspired by ong>andong> based on a series ong>ofong> meetings (IntensiveThematic Session, The Role ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong> in the Euro-Mediterranean AreaFlorence, 17 - 19 October 2007; Conference with Policy-Makers, Circular ong>Migrationong>:Experiences, Opportunities ong>andong> Constraints for Southern ong>andong> Eastern MediterraneanCountries, January 27-28, 2008, Florence) ong>andong> original research on circular migrationundertaken in the framework ong>ofong> the Consortium ong>ofong> Applied International ong>Migrationong>(CARIM) at the European University Institute in Florence,

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010unfathomable, ong>andong> the challenges posed by the latter more ong>andong> more complex.Circular migration (CM) has lately come to the forefront in migrationmanagement as an innovative option that could address intricate migration issues. 2 Atfirst glance, circular migration seems like a natural scenario deriving from increasedpatterns ong>ofong> labour mobility ong>andong> merging geographical boundaries.Presented as a triple-win situation that could satisfy the supply ong>ofong> labourmarket in both origin ong>andong> receiving countries, provide in some cases an alternative tothe permanent settlement dilemma in host countries, ong>andong> mitigate the problem ong>ofong>brain drain afflicting origin countries, 3 the CM paradigm has increasingly caught theattention ong>ofong> various international players.A plethora ong>ofong> literature on migration has tackled in the last decade temporarymigration policies ong>andong> programmes (TMPPs) as migration opportunities that couldrespond –at least partially – to the challenges ong>ofong> undocumented migration, fill inlabour ong>andong> demographic gaps, ong>andong> provide new avenues for the internationalcirculation ong>ofong> skills. 4 Temporary migration schemes are thought a priori to consolidatethe link between migration ong>andong> development. 5 There is also an underlying butunverified assumption that the increase in temporary migration programmes for bothhighly-skilled ong>andong> lower-skilled migrants could decrease irregular migration. 6In a wider perspective, this interest in temporal migratory trends can be linked2See for example IOM‘s report, ―World ong>Migrationong> 2005: Costs ong>andong> Benefits ong>ofong> Internationalong>Migrationong>,‖ Geneva: International Organization for ong>Migrationong>, 2005 ; GCIM‘s report,―ong>Migrationong> in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action‖, Geneva: GlobalCommission on International ong>Migrationong>, 2005; the Abu Dialogue‘s Ministerial Consultationon Overseas Employment ong>andong> Contractual labour for Countries ong>ofong> Origin ong>andong> Destination inAsia, ―Contractual Labour Mobility in Asia Key Partnerships for Development betweenCountries ong>ofong> Origin ong>andong> Destination‖, 21-22 January 2008.3An underlying assumption is that if circular migration schemes are facilitated, there will beless ―pressure‖ for migrants to relocate their families ong>andong> settle in destination countries. SeeGraemo Hugo, ―Circular ong>Migrationong>: keeping Development Rolling,‖ ong>Migrationong> InformationSource, June 2003, 2.4For a discussion ong>ofong> the interrelationships between temporary migration ong>andong> development,see for example, Kevin O‘Neil, ―Using Remittances ong>andong> Circular ong>Migrationong> to DriveDevelopment,‖ ong>Migrationong> Policy Institute, June 2003, a recapitulation on the envisaged benefits ong>ofong> circular migration schemes, see, forexample, Steven Vertovec, ― Circular ong>Migrationong>: the Way forward in Global Policy‖,Working Paper, International ong>Migrationong> Institute, 2007, 1-9.6See European Commission, ―Towards a comprehensive European ong>Migrationong> Policy:Cracking down on employment ong>ofong> illegal immigrants ong>andong> fostering circular migration ong>andong>mobility partnerships‖, May 2007,

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010to a new overall approach to migration. In an international order marked by an uneasyrelationship between nation-states ong>andong> transnationalism, priorities have beenreformulated. Hence, since migration is an inevitable phenomenon commensuratewith security ong>andong> sovereignty concerns, it is essential to deal with the contentiousmatters that migration provokes through devising appropriate policy areas. In thisrespect, promoting temporary ong>andong> circular migration schemes (TCMSs) seem like aningenious route to address the thorny issues posed by irregular ong>andong> permanentmigration.Circular migration should thus be analysed as an ong>ofong>fshoot concept derived, onthe one hong>andong>, from the particularities ong>ofong> the present world, ong>andong>, on the other hong>andong>,from a renewed interest in temporary migration, 7 stemming from an internationaldrive to restructure migration perspectives in response to various challenges.These remarks notwithstong>andong>ing, the CM paradigm has provoked stridentcontroversy. Some scholars are particularly suspicious when it comes to presentingcircular migration as a breakthrough in migration management. It is thus emphasisedthat circular migration “cannot be considered as a new phenomenon”, ong>andong> should beconceptualised ong>andong> assessed against the background ong>ofong> previous temporaryprogrammes involving schemes ong>ofong> circularity. 8 Others warn against reviving the idea ong>ofong>temporariness in migration, in many ways reminiscent ong>ofong> the European Guest Workerlabour programmes ong>ofong> the 1960s ong>andong> the 1970s. 9 Hence, in the wake ong>ofong> the GuestWorker programmes, which stirred up diverse controversies concerning the settlement7It should be emphasised that temporary migration movements have gained considerableimportance in the Asian region, in North America, ong>andong> in the Euro-Mediterranean Zone. SeeTanya Basol, ―Mexican Seasonal ong>Migrationong> to Canada ong>andong> Development: a CommunitybasedComparison, ― International ong>Migrationong> 41 (2): 3-26, 2003; EU Commission, ―an EUApproach to Managing Economic ong>Migrationong>,‖ Green Paper, Brussels, (January 2005);Graeme Hugo, ―ong>Migrationong> in the Asia-Pacific region‖, a paper prepared for the PolicyAnalysis ong>andong> ong>Researchong> Programme for the Global Commission on International ong>Migrationong>,September 2005; Philip Martin, ―Migrants in the Global Labour Market‖, Geneva: GlobalCommission on International ong>Migrationong>, 2005.8See Ahmet Icduygu, ―Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Turkey: an Overview ong>ofong> the Past ong>andong> Present:some Demo-Economic Implications,‖ CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/10,, 1. Icduygu argues thatGuest Workers programmes in the 1960s between Turkey ong>andong> Europe were based uponcircularity.9See Abdelrazak, Zekri, ―La dimension politique de la migration circulaire en Tunisie,‖CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/17, details on the Western European Guest WorkerSystem‖, see Stephan Castles, ―Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?‖ Internationalong>Migrationong> Review, Vol. 40 (Winter 2006): 741-766.112

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>andong> integration ong>ofong> the workers ong>andong> their families, there was a general consent inEurope, especially during the 1980s, that temporary labour programmes were not thesolution to the region’s labour needs.Today, the concept ong>ofong> temporary migration is being revisited by policy-makersin the view ong>ofong> avoiding previous pitfalls. In its attempt to embark on a new migrationpath with third countries, for instance, the European Union has put temporarymigration labour programmes back into the limelight, 10 ong>andong> has picked on circularmigration as a prong>ofong>itable option for meeting certain human, developmental ong>andong>economic objectives in both source ong>andong> destination countries. 11 More specifically it hasproposed to integrate in national migration frameworks favourable elements thatcould facilitate the circular mobility ong>ofong> migrants, such as devising more flexible visaregimes in the backdrop ong>ofong> mobility partnerships. 12Proposing to probe into the far-reaching implications ong>ofong> circular migrationfrom both conceptual, empirical, ong>andong> prescriptive angles, this article discusses thedifficult conceptualisation ong>ofong> circular migration. Then, it tackles the applicability ong>ofong> CMschemes between the European Union ong>andong> the MENA region 13 , ong>andong> within the regionitself.After a critical review ong>ofong> the circular migration concept, the paper picks outexamples ong>ofong> circular migration patterns in the region. It asks whether circular migration– as understood by the EU – could evolve into a comprehensive solution in the region,10Focusing on the consolidation ong>ofong> legal migration ong>andong> the facilitation ong>ofong> temporarymigration schemes several EC-funded programmes between EU member states ong>andong> thirdcountries have been launched. Examples are the Morocco-Spain programme for managingseasonal immigration (January 2006-June 2008), ong>andong> the Egypt-Morocco-Italy programmefor ―sharing learning for a better migration life‖ (December 2006-May 2008).11See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, theEuropean Economic ong>andong> Social Committee ong>andong> the Committee ong>ofong> the Regions, ―ong>Migrationong>ong>andong> Development: Some Concrete Orientations‖, COM(2005) 390 final, September 2005;Communication from the Commission, Policy Plan on Legal ong>Migrationong>, COM(2005) 669final, Brussels, December, 2005; See Communication from the Commission to the EuropeanParliament, the Council, the European Economic ong>andong> Social Committee ong>andong> the Committeeong>ofong> the Regions, ―On Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Mobility Partnerships between the EuropeanUnion ong>andong> Third Countries‖, Brussels, COM (2007) 248, May 2007.12See Hugo Brady, ―EU ong>Migrationong> Policy: An A-Z‖, ong>Centreong> for European Reform, February2008, 10.13Since delimiting the frontiers ong>ofong> the MENA region has acquired several politicalconnotations over the years, it is important to note that the paper particularly addressescountries that are geographically close to Europe. More specifically it targets Eastern ong>andong>Southern Mediterranean countries, ong>andong> does not claim to cover the whole geopoliticalconstruct implied by the MENA region.113

forth. 16 Although the concept remains blurred, its fluidity is thought to beTamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>andong> tries to identify the dynamics that enhance or hinder its application. Anotherfundamental question that the article brings up is whether circular migration policiescould be easily integrated into the policy-making migration agendas ong>ofong> MENAgovernments.II. The vague notion ong>ofong> circular migration in the EU-MENA contextCircular migration has always existed in unmanaged ways. The currentterminological notion refers though more to a managed circularity than to aspontaneous pattern ong>ofong> rotational migration. In order to dispel confusion, migrationscholars attempted to frame the concept in various ways. A broad definition definescircular migration “as a continuing, long-term, ong>andong> fluid movement ong>ofong> people betweencountries, including both temporary ong>andong> more permanent movements.” 14A more concise definition proposes, instead, to define the present notion ong>ofong>circular migration with the following criteria: temporary, renewable, legal, respectful ong>ofong>migrants’ rights, circular in the sense that freedom ong>ofong> movement between source ong>andong>host countries is not hindered, ong>andong> managed in such a way as to fill in the gaps ong>ofong>labour demong>andong> ong>andong> supply. 15For the purpose ong>ofong> this paper, it is important to distinguish circular migrationfrom mere temporary or seasonal migration. In fact, circular migration impliesrepetitive or repeat migration which is not necessarily temporary or seasonal.Temporary migration could on, the other hong>andong>, imply a one-ong>ofong>f journey back ong>andong>intentional. It is thereby safe to define circular migration as flexibly designedrepetitive migration patterns between different migration destinations.The elasticity ong>ofong> the concept does in fact allow for a whole range ong>ofong> choices14Kathleen Newlong>andong> ong>andong> Dovelyn Agunias, ―How can Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> SustainableReturn Serve as Development Tools?‖ background paper for the preparation ong>ofong> the firstmeeting ong>ofong> the Global Forum on ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Development (GFMD), Brussels, 9-11 July2007.15Philippe Fargues, ―Circular ong>Migrationong>: is it Relevant South ong>andong> East ong>ofong> theMediterranean?‖ CARIM analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/40, Pierre Cassarino, ―Patterns ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong> in the Euro-Mediterranean Area:Implications for Policy-Making‖, CARIM analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/29,,114

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010both in attempts to concretise ong>andong> organise CM projects. Nevertheless, thisconceptual imprecision creates stark ambivalence regarding the components,applicability ong>andong> objectives ong>ofong> circular migration, which in the end undermines thevery functionality ong>ofong> the concept.The lack ong>ofong> consensus over the definitional implications ong>ofong> circularmigration in migration research poses various problems. And the prong>ofong>usion ong>ofong>meanings ong>andong> connotations facilitates neither the elaboration ong>ofong> a commonconceptual framework, nor the application ong>ofong> a model either for researchers or forpolicy-makers. For instance, whereas the EU Communication plays on the notion ong>ofong>return as “one ong>ofong> the key conditions” in circular migration, 17 some scholars studyingcircular migration on a larger scale emphasise the elements ong>ofong> permanence incircularity ong>andong> the elements ong>ofong> circularity in permanence. 18 Then we must notforget that circular migration has complex temporal components, but also complexspatial ones which blur the boundaries between circularity ong>andong> permanence ong>andong>raise pertinent questions on the finality ong>ofong> CM programs. 19 Furthermore, the termcould be classified both as a migration typology, which can be divided into severalsubtypes, 20 a policy initiative launched by specific organisms ong>andong> as a particular byproductong>ofong> temporary migration.17See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, theEuropean Economic ong>andong> Social Committee ong>andong> the Committee ong>ofong> the Regions, ―On Circularong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Mobility Partnerships between the European Union ong>andong> Third Countries,‖ 11.It is important to note that the EU envisages circular migration ong>ofong> third-country nationalsalready settled in the EU; however, it does not expong>andong> further on the elements ong>ofong> permanenceong>andong> circularity. Thus, in the EU Communication on circular migration (p. 8), the element ong>ofong>permanence is discarded ong>andong> is perceived as a pitfall that could ―defeat‖ the very ―objective‖ong>ofong> circular migration.18Circular migration can imply different scenarios among which repeated return visits ong>ofong>permanent migrants to their origin countries, or repeat migration followed by definitivereturn. See Newlong>andong> ong>andong> Agunias, ―How Can Circular ong>Migrationong>‖, 6.19A pertinent question would be whether circular migration implies the final return ong>ofong> themigrant to the country ong>ofong> origin. For instance, is the circular migrant a permanent migrant inthe sense that his/her circularity does not entail his final return to his source country, but toanother immigration country? Whereas some scholars consider this scenario as circularmigration (Newlong>andong> ong>andong> Agunias), EU communications stress the idea ong>ofong> return to thecountry ong>ofong> origin.20See for example Agunias ong>andong> Newlong>andong>, ―How Can Circular ong>Migrationong>,‖ 6; Agunias ong>andong>Newlong>andong>, ―Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Development: Trends, Policy Routes ong>andong> Ways Forward‖,ong>Migrationong> Policy Institute, Washington, D.C, 2007.115

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010The rift between the normative ong>andong> empirical aspects ong>ofong> circular migration: thelimitations to conceptualising CM in the EU-MENA contextIf the objective is to present circular migration as a broad migration“typology” or as flexible paradigm, then there is an obvious discrepancy betweenthe model ong>andong> its application in the policy-making field. Circular migration couldtheoretically imply various repetitive patterns ong>andong> trends ong>ofong> movements, which donot necessarily correspond to the specific type ong>ofong> managed ong>andong> selective circularityenvisioned by the EU, other international organisms or European countries. 21 Morespecifically, whereas in a theoretical perspective, circular migration implies theunconstrained ong>andong> voluntary movement ong>ofong> people, circular migration programmesas designed by some countries have targeted seasonal migrants who return everyyear to do some jobs related to agriculture or industry or who are selectedaccording to very stringent criteria. 22 This contradiction notwithstong>andong>ing, there arealso divergences over the understong>andong>ing ong>ofong> circular migration programmes in theEuropean Union. Thus, whereas some EU countries would like to target highlyskilledmigrants, others would like to apply circular migration schemes to seasonalmigrants. 23In the EU-MENA context, regardless ong>ofong> matters related to definingcircularity, there is no consensus or common vision so far on the differentconstitutive aspects that would allow the implementation ong>ofong> circular migration.Thus, researchers ong>andong> policy-makers in the MENA region are ‘still in the dark’ whenit comes to framing the model. 24In fact, the understong>andong>ing ong>ofong> circular migration in respect to the MENAregion remains arbitrary, ong>andong> elements ong>ofong> implementability in the EU-MENA regionare still blurred. 25 Also, in concrete terms, there is real doubt as to whether the EU21See Cassarino, ―Patterns ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>.‖22I refer mainly to temporary migration programs targeting seasonal migrant women whocome to Spain for the strawberry-picking season. These women are selected according tovery strict criteria that do not necessarily take into consideration humanitarian needs.23Brady, ―EU ong>Migrationong> Policy‖, 10.24See CARIM Coordination Team, Proceedings ong>ofong> two CARIM Meetings on Circularong>Migrationong>, CARIM Proceedings 2008/1, questions raised by policy-makers ong>andong> researchers from the MENA Region in thetwo meetings organised on circular migration revolved around the following: Should circularmigration be firmly institutionalised or can it entail certain degrees ong>ofong> flexibility? Should itsimplementation be left to the discretion ong>ofong> national migration policies? How can states ensurethe sustainability ong>ofong> circular migration programmes? Does it require new legislation in hostong>andong> source countries? How should the state approach the social ong>andong> political rights ong>ofong>116

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>andong> cooperative third parties have, on the one hong>andong>, appropriate policyinstruments ong>andong>, on the other hong>andong>, adequate cooperative channels to introduceong>andong> jointly monitor circular migration schemes.Additionally, on a definitional level, circular migration is presented as aflexible albeit regulated migratory pattern with various benefits: mitigating braindrain, favouring the return ong>ofong> human capital ong>andong> remittance inflows, with migrationas an incentive for development. 26 However, on the empirical level, there is noclear ong>andong> conclusive scientific assessment regarding the benefits ong>ofong> circularmigration or the optimal ways to institutionalise these practices. 27 It is alsocontroversial whether CM could contribute to alleviating the EU’s demographicproblems ong>andong> labour shortages. 28One could thus question whether the normative construct ong>ofong> circularmigration encompasses elements, which are not even verified empirically. Hence,from a methodological perspective, the rift between the promised potential ong>ofong>circular migration ong>andong> its unclear empirical outcomes cast doubt on the concept’sapplicability.In a wider perspective, before discussing the specifics ong>ofong> CM schemesbetween the EU ong>andong> the MENA region, it is also worth mentioning that previouspitfalls regarding provisional labour programmes in Europe have made migrationresearchers cautious when it comes either to revisiting worn-out migrationconcepts or conferring on temporary migration, with its various derivatives, aprescriptive formula. Moreover, relying on past normative lessons derived fromGuest Worker programmes does not necessarily help avoid old traps, for circularmigration today is supposed to operate in different socio-political ong>andong> economiccircular migrants? To what extent are visas portable given the backdrop ong>ofong> overregulatedborder controls? And how can states make sure that the migrants‘ work permits ong>andong> benefitsare portable? Should circular migration research at this point also engage in studying patternsfor the return ong>andong> reintegration ong>ofong> the circular migrants in their origin countries? All thesequestions point to the fact that circular migration programmes are highly sophisticatedschemes that require planning, coordination ong>andong> monitoring between concerned parties. Inthe absence ong>ofong> thought out ong>andong> coordinative measures, circular migration is likely to remain aconjectural issue. See Proceedings ong>ofong> two CARIM Meetings on Circular ong>Migrationong>.26See EU Communication on Circular ong>Migrationong>, 8.27For observations on the unsure empirical applicability ong>ofong> circular migration, see, forexample, Steffen Angenendt, ―Circular ong>Migrationong>: a sustainable Concept for ong>Migrationong>Policy,‖ SWP Comments, June 2007.28Castles, ―Guestworkers in Europe‖, 758-759. Castles also argue that as the EuropeanUnion will be facing major labour gaps, employers will fight to ―retain‖ qualified temporarymigrants, ong>andong> thus the system ong>ofong> rotation will defeat its purpose.117

constellations. 29Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Thus, migration research based on revisiting former circularitypatterns is not transferable to the present international context.Working HypothesesIn the light ong>ofong> these reservations, the article argues that there is adiscrepancy between the model ong>ofong> circular migration as envisaged by the EU ong>andong>circular migration as such in the MENA region. In other words, the notion asproposed by the EU is not compatible with the understong>andong>ing ong>andong> traditions ong>ofong>circularity existent in the Middle East ong>andong> North Africa. Whereas circular migrationscenarios do exist in the region, political contexts ong>andong> national prerogatives theredo not allow the application ong>ofong> the model as viewed by the EU. The article alsodemonstrates how the unclear concept, objects ong>andong> implementation tools ong>ofong>circular migration pose certain problems when it comes to framing the concept inthe MENA region.In order to prove these two claims, the paper first distinguishes betweenthe Middle Eastern ong>andong> North African contexts since requisites ong>andong> prospects forcircular migration schemes are different in the two cases. Second, it demonstratesthat background conditions in the Middle East will more likely hinder theapplication ong>ofong> CM programmes as visualised by the EU. In North Africa, whilstrepeat migration schemes seem at first easier to apply, negative indicatorsgenerated by incompatible policy-making stances between the EU ong>andong> NorthAfrican countries undermine these schemes.Despite the distinction that the paper wishes to make between the MiddleEast ong>andong> North Africa, it is argued that under present circumstances, circularmigration in both contexts cannot develop into a broad migration strategy forreasons revolving around conflicting policy-making agendas. Although pilot projectsong>ofong> temporary migration do take place between the EU ong>andong> the MENA region ong>andong>although there are circular movements within the region itself, prospects for asustainable CM approach as a structural part ong>ofong> a wider global migration approachare slight. 3029See also concluding remarks elaborated by Icduygu in ―Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Turkey‖,15.30The article differentiates between limited temporary labour ong>andong> circular migration projects(TLCM) ong>andong> a structured as well as sustainable circular migration approach in the region. Itargues that temporary migration pilot projects are by no means a reflection ong>ofong> the ambitiousdefinition ong>ofong> CM as a ―as a continuing, long-term, ong>andong> fluid movement ong>ofong> people betweencountries, including both temporary ong>andong> more permanent movements.‖ See Newlong>andong> ong>andong>118

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010The reasons why this paper looks for differences between the MiddleEastern ong>andong> Northern African contexts despite the undoubted presence ong>ofong>similarities can be justified as follows: assessing the feasibility ong>ofong> circular migrationschemes in the Middle East requires different analytical tools from those enablingthe assessment ong>ofong> circular migration schemes in North Africa.This is due to the excessively turbulent political setting in the Middle Eastong>andong> the Middle Eastern governments’ agendas which are more structured bysecurity politics ong>andong> the conditionalities ong>ofong> ongoing conflicts than by migrationrelatedissues. 31 It would also be worth pondering whether North Africa’s extremegeographical closeness to some EU member states dictates different priorities inpolicy-making agendas.Because the unstable Eastern Mediterranean region is deeply marked byongoing political conflicts, governments tend to rivet their attention on immediatematters that derive from the region’s special structure ong>andong> problems. 32 In fact, theEastern Mediterranean political context dictates the region’s migrationpreoccupations as the latter are strongly influenced by political ong>andong> securityconcerns.On the other hong>andong>, due to the relative absence ong>ofong> acute conflicts, 33 politicalconditions in North Africa seem at first glance to be more favourable to thedevelopment ong>ofong> particular CM schemes. Yet, North Africa’s geographical closenessto the EU ong>andong> the strident controversy over the management ong>ofong> irregular migrationbetween the two regions, 34 as well as the disagreements over the externaldimension ong>ofong> EU’s immigration policy 35 more easily leads to discordanceconcerning the rationale ong>andong> objectives ong>ofong> CM schemes endorsed by the EU.Agunias, ―How Can Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Sustainable Return Serve as DevelopmentTools?‖ Brussels, 9-11 July 2007.31These conditions do not apply to the Southern Mediterranean countries where thegeopolitical context is less affected by ongoing conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.32Presently, migration agendas in Jordan, Syria, ong>andong> Lebanon are very much concerned withthe issue ong>ofong> Iraqi refugees in the wake ong>ofong> the US-led war in Iraq.33It is noteworthy that the region is not devoid ong>ofong> conflicts. We cite mainly politicalinstability in Mauritania, looming struggles between the government ong>andong> the opposition inAlgeria ong>andong> border problems between Morocco ong>andong> Algeria over the Sahara issue.34For instance, geographical proximity contributes to irregular migration from North Africato the EU as increased controls on the shortest routes explain the proliferation ong>ofong> alternativeong>andong> usually longer ong>andong> more dangerous routes.35Ounia Doukoure ong>andong> Helen Oger, ―The EC External ong>Migrationong> Policy: The Case ong>ofong> theMENA countries‖, CARIM ong>Researchong> papers 2006/07,

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010III. The EU vision ong>ofong> circular migration ong>andong> the particularities ong>ofong> the Middle EastBy revisiting the concept ong>ofong> circular migration, the EU would ideally like toprivilege managed circularity in a migration system ong>andong> make sure that migrationagendas are beneficial to both sending ong>andong> destination countries. Yet, to whatextent does the notion ong>ofong> circular migration find a positive echo in the MiddleEastern context? Are there sufficient in-built tools (agreements, supportive politicalstances, institutional approaches) in the region to facilitate or pave the way forcircular migration? If not, is there a propensity in the region for pro-circularmigration policies?The aforementioned theoretical ong>andong> empirical reservations towardscircular migration apply even more to the Eastern Mediterranean countries for thefollowing reasons:The first one developed above is ong>ofong> a general nature ong>andong> hinges on thecontroversial functionality ong>ofong> the concept ong>andong> its potential benefits for origincountries.The second reason revolves around the precarious political setting in theregion that is not favourable to a pro-circular migration approach. Prevailingconditions do not enhance or favour a vision ong>ofong> circularity – as described by theEuropean Commission – between the EU ong>andong> the Middle East or within the regionitself.As noted before, migration agendas in the Eastern Mediterranean havebeen lately shaped ong>andong> reshaped by various political ong>andong> ethnic conflicts. 36Furthermore, on a policy-making level, migration is perceived as essentially a‘security issue’ closely related to the difficult control ong>ofong> borders, to refugee crises,ong>andong> to concerns posed by irregular migration. 37 If the idea ong>ofong> circular migration, aspromoted by the EU, implies regulated ong>andong> managed movement, more researchshould be carried out on how CM can be made compatible with the controversiesong>ofong> irregular migration in the region, forced migration patterns induced by conflict-36I refer here to the unprecedented wave ong>ofong> Iraqi forced migration after the US-led war in2003 in Iraq ong>andong> the Palestinian exodus since 1948.37For an account on how security agendas dictate migration issues, see Francoise De Bel Air,―Irregular ong>Migrationong>: the Socio-Political Stakes in Jordan‖, CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Syntheticnotes 2008/78,

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010laden circumstances, ong>andong> fluid frontiers as well as lax border control. 38The third reason is ong>ofong> a historical nature as circular migration in the regionhas been spontaneous or informal, ong>andong> is embedded in societal structures. 39 Inother words, patterns ong>ofong> circularity have not obeyed institutionalised policyinstrumentsor top-down approaches ong>ofong> management. These movements remainfluid ong>andong> unstructured.The fourth ong>andong> final reason revolves around the lack ong>ofong> political support forcircular migration, on the one hong>andong>, ong>andong> the quasi-absence ong>ofong> in-built policyinstruments on the other. 40 Thus, in many Eastern Mediterranean countries,migration agendas are not well elaborated ong>andong> are relegated down the policyladder. 41 In fact, migration agendas seem to be superseded by more overridingsecurity, political, ong>andong> economic questions closely related to the turbulence ong>ofong> theregion ong>andong> to the various socio-economic difficulties which governments have toremedy.In addition, against the backdrop ong>ofong> political systems in the Arab worldwhere institutionalism is rather low, 42 the institutionalisation ong>ofong> circular migrationpolicies seems particularly difficult, ong>andong> there needs to be some reflection on howinformal practices ong>ofong> circular migration could be reconciled with an EU policyorientednotion ong>ofong> circular migration. 4338For more information on how fluid borders structure migration agendas in the region, seeFadia Kiwan,―Les dimensions sociopolitiques de la migration irrégulière au Liban,‖ CARIM Analytic ong>andong>Synthetic notes 2008/51,, ―Patterns ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>.‖40See Proceedings ong>ofong> two CARIM Meetings on Circular ong>Migrationong>.41See Kiwan, ―La perception de la migration circulaire au Liban,‖ CARIM Analytic ong>andong>Synthetic notes 2008/14, for example Eva Bellin, ―The Robustness ong>ofong> Authoritarianism in the Middle East:Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,‖ Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 139-153; );Rex Brynen, Baghat Korany ong>andong> Paul Noble, eds, Political Liberalization ong>andong>Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1995); Amin Saikal ong>andong> Albrecht Schnabel, eds, Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences,Struggles, Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003).43It is worth mentioning that implementing circular migration schemes does not only hingeon devising pilot projects or signing state-managed bilateral agreements, but on creatingprivate ong>andong> public incentives in both origin ong>andong> receiving countries, matching supply ong>andong>demong>andong> needs, elaborating adequate legal instruments as well as attractive private ong>andong> publicreturn migration incentives. In short, circular migration schemes encompass various elementsthat must be dealt with in the pre- ong>andong> post-phases ong>ofong> circularity.121

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010In the following paragraphs, I will detect existing scenarios ong>andong> thehistorical precedents ong>ofong> circularity in the region, ong>andong> analyse their characteristics. Iwill concentrate particularly on the Lebanese-Syrian, Jordanian ong>andong> Palestiniancases, ong>andong> demonstrate that the nature ong>ofong> circular trends does not currentlypredispose this region to a structural CM approach.Examples ong>ofong> existing patterns ong>ofong> circular migration in the Middle East: The gapbetween informal circularity ong>andong> “circular migration”Various patterns ong>ofong> quasi-circularity, either historical or spontaneous,characterise the region. These trends remain, however, largely unmanaged, ong>andong>depend on various socio-political contingencies.Following a long-stong>andong>ing tradition ong>ofong> repeat migration, patterns ong>ofong>circularity between Syria ong>andong> Lebanon have been occurring for decades. Especiallyduring the post-war period (1990-2005), 44 Syrian labour migrants rushed toLebanon – commonly considered as Syria’s economic hinterlong>andong>, for temporary orseasonal journeys. However, after the withdrawal ong>ofong> Syrian troops in 2005 ong>andong> theseverance ong>ofong> relations between the two countries, this number has decreaseddrastically.During the post-war period, repeat migration has been facilitated by theabolition ong>ofong> visa procedures between Lebanon ong>andong> Syria. Also, the fact that theseback ong>andong> forth journeys remained, to a certain extent, unmanaged gave anenormous margin ong>ofong> leeway for commuting workers.It is worth mentioning in this respect that Syrian-Lebanese treaties ineconomic, labour ong>andong> cultural sectors have been ratified so as to strengthencooperation between the two countries, yet none has institutionalised this type ong>ofong>labour migration.In short, though Syrian-Lebanese labour migration presents elements ong>ofong>circularity ong>andong> is ingrained in the countries’ historical structures, it remainscontingent upon unpredictable political conditions. 45For example, after theextension ong>ofong> former President Emile Lahoud’s mong>andong>ate in 2004 ong>andong> the adoption ong>ofong>UN Resolution 1559, a special unit was created in the Lebanese Ministry ong>ofong> Labour44The ratification ong>ofong> the Ta‘if treaty in 1990 endowed Syria with Lebanon‘s guardianship inthe name ong>ofong> regional stability ong>andong> security politics. Syrian troops were stationed in Lebanonuntil 2005.45Since 2005, Lebanon has been rocked by several periods ong>ofong> instability as a result ong>ofong> whichtemporary Syrian migrants had to leave the country ong>andong> return hastily to Syria.122

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010so as to institutionalise Syrian-Lebanese temporary migration. 46 Nonetheless,Lebanon’s unstable political climate ong>andong> successive crises since 2005 have hinderedany progress on this level. 47Patterns ong>ofong> circularity are also noticeable between Lebanon ong>andong> Africancountries, such as Ghana ong>andong> Nigeria. These patterns are also anchored in historicalstructures ong>andong> have always been perceived as part ong>ofong> a provisional trend.There are also trends ong>ofong> increasing circularity, notably in the post-warperiod, between Lebanon ong>andong> the Gulf countries. 48 These patterns are usuallycontingent on a job ong>ofong>fer in the Gulf countries ong>andong> are to a large extent conditionedby Lebanon’s successive economic crises ong>andong> turbulent politics. In fact, since 2005,temporary Lebanese emigration to the Gulf countries has been triggered byLebanon’s intermittent political crises. While most ong>ofong> these migration patterns areexpected to remain temporary, as men usually travel unaccompanied, we are stilllacking recent statistics that would allow an assessment ong>ofong> the scope ong>ofong> thephenomenon. On the other hong>andong>, such a repetitive migratory trend cannot be saidto provide a successful example ong>ofong> circular migration, as emigrants tend to live incircumscribed conditions, ong>andong> endure several limitations. 49In spite ong>ofong> these circular journeys, though temporary migration is veryfamiliar in Lebanese circles, the notion ong>ofong> ‘circular migration’ does not feature inLebanon’s policy-making agenda, ong>andong> most importantly, there is “no publicmethodical ong>andong> global reflection in order to elaborate a public political line in termsong>ofong> migration” in the country. 50 This is largely due to the unstable political setting ong>ofong>this small Arab republic ong>andong> to the fact that migration issues are superseded bymore crucial imperatives linked to the stabilisation ong>ofong> the country ong>andong> to the lack ong>ofong>46See Kiwan, ―La perception de la migration circulaire.‖47Most recently, Syria has declared to be considering an embassy in Beirut once the politicalclimate becomes more stable. This could, indeed, be a first step so as to normalise troubledSyrian-Lebanese relations. See ―Assad says Syria may open Lebanon embassy‖,International Herald Tribune, June 5, 2008, Hourani ong>andong> Eugene Sensenig Dabbous, ―Insecurity, ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Return: TheCase ong>ofong> Lebanon following the 2006 Summer War,‖ CARIM ong>Researchong> Report 2007/01, male migrants in Saudi Arabia live for example in rather circumscribed socialconditions.50Kiwan, ―La perception de la migration circulaire,‖ 3.123

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010consensus over political matters in the internal ong>andong> external policy realms. 51In the absence ong>ofong> stable political conditions ong>andong> in the light ong>ofong> contentiousborder demarcation, 52 it is unlikely that Lebanon will embark on a coherent ong>andong>comprehensive migratory policy, let alone a structured CM approach.The Jordanian case presents other interesting features that might shedmore light on the feasibility or non-feasibility ong>ofong> a CM approach in the region.In Jordan, various trends ong>ofong> circularity can be detected. Temporary labourmigration between Jordan ong>andong> surrounding Arab countries such as Syria ong>andong> Egypthas longstong>andong>ing traditional ong>andong> geostrategic roots. Moreover, hundreds ong>ofong>thousong>andong>s ong>ofong> Jordanian labour migrants move back ong>andong> forth between Jordan ong>andong>the Gulf countries; ong>andong> though this temporary labour migration tends to be moreor less organised, it falls short ong>ofong> a managed circularity framework. 53Notwithstong>andong>ing these patterns ong>ofong> circularity ong>andong> despite the fact thatpermanent migration to Jordan is becoming more restrictive, 54 “circular migrationis not monitored as such” in the country. 55 Even though institutional setupsregulate migratory flows between Jordan ong>andong> some countries ong>andong> governmentalplans 56 or bilateral agreements facilitate the accession ong>ofong> migrants to Jordan’slabour markets, 57 these measures fall far short ong>ofong> what could be called circular51For more information, see Kiwan, ―La ong>Migrationong> dans les Agendas politiques libanais,‖CARIM Analytical ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/43, is noteworthy that Lebanon has not formally demarcated its borders with Syria, ong>andong> that,the Shebaa farms controversy is still pending. Whereas Lebanese authorities declare theShebaa farms, a piece ong>ofong> long>andong> in the South ong>ofong> Lebanon, to be occupied by Israel, internationalactors such as the UN claim that the territory is Syrian ong>andong> not Lebanese. In addition to that,Lebanon‘s borders remain porous. Thus, until now, due to the unresolved Arab-Israeliconflict, ong>andong> to political wrangling between the government ong>andong> the opposition representedby Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite Party, there is no clear understong>andong>ing ong>ofong> the state‘sterritorial sovereignty ong>andong> border control.53Fargues, ―Circular ong>Migrationong>: is it Relevant?‖54Mohamad Olwan, ―Circular ong>andong> Permanent ong>Migrationong> : a Jordanian Perspective,‖ CARIMAnalytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/34,,1.55Email Communication with Francoise de Bel Air, expert on migration in Jordan, April2008. See also Fathi Arouri, ―Circular ong>Migrationong> in Jordan,‖ CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Syntheticnotes 2008/35,, 1-25, 2.56See Strategic Plan ong>ofong> the Jordanian Ministry ong>ofong> Labour (2006-2010) which tackles somemeasures pertaining to guest workers, available at for example the website ong>ofong> the Jordanian embassy in Qatar: For more information on bilateral labour cooperation124

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010migration schemes. Mobility partnerships remain thereby intricately connected toprivate ong>andong> economic interests, ong>andong> have not evolved into a state-managed visionin the realm ong>ofong> migration. 58Certainly circular migration schemes could prospectively help alleviatemany economic problems afflicting the Kingdom, such as unemployment,oversaturated labour markets, ong>andong> low wages in certain sectors. CM might alsoprovide new outlet opportunities for highly-skilled naturalised Palestinianssuffering from prong>ofong>essional or social discrimination in an implicitly segmentedsociety. Nonetheless, precedence is given to tackling undocumented migration, ong>andong>reforming labour legislation in order to uphold migrants’ rights in Jordan. 59Also, in the backdrop ong>ofong> recent regional confrontations, priorities are givento refugee settlement as well as stability ong>andong> border control issues.In short, despite the fact that there are pronounced trends towardstemporary migration from ong>andong> into Jordan, the abovementioned elements call intoquestion whether the socio-political requisites in the country could presentlycontribute to a large-scale CM approachMore importantly, Jordan remains first ong>andong> foremost a transit country ong>andong>a “refugee haven” 60in the Arab world, 61 whose migration parameters are mostlydictated by geopolitical variables ong>andong> whose policy-making priorities are structuredaround concerns hinging on economic ong>andong> political stability. 62Palestinian exceptionalism also tells us something about the problematicfeasibility ong>ofong> CM schemes in the Middle East, as it not only prevents theimplementation ong>ofong> circular migration schemes across Palestinian borders, but alsoimpinges on migration agendas in the wider Arab world.In the absence ong>ofong> clearly defined territorial rights, circularity across theIsraeli border is limited to Palestinian workers’ daily journey back ong>andong> forth toagreements between Jordan ong>andong> UAE, see Jordan Times, March 16, 2006, ong>andong> JordanTimes, January 17, 2007.58Email Communication with De Bel Air.59See Olwan, ―Circular ong>andong> Permanent ong>Migrationong>‖, 17-18.60Géraldine Chatelard, ―Jordan: a Refugee Haven‖, ong>Migrationong> Information Source, July2004, 7.61The country has hosted Palestinian refugees ever since the 1948 Palestinian exodus,displaced Iraqi migrants after the 1991 Gulf war ong>andong> the 2003 US-led War in Baghdad.62Chaterlong>andong>, ―Jordan: a Refugee Haven‖; De Bel Air, ―Irregular ong>Migrationong>.‖125

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010work. 63 And Palestine’s undefined political status ong>andong> restrictive migration policiesvis-à-vis Palestinians hinder the implementation ong>ofong> formal temporary migrationschemes with third countries.Beyond these causes, Palestine has become more ong>ofong> a transnational or fluidnation in the Arab world, a situation which affects the priorities ong>ofong> migration policymakingin the region. 64 On the one hong>andong>, the question ong>ofong> Palestinian refugees ong>andong>their integration shapes ong>andong> leads to various restrictions upon the migrationagendas ong>ofong> other Arab states, particularly Lebanon ong>andong> Jordan. On the other hong>andong>,Arab states have used the Palestinian-Israeli question ong>andong> Palestine’s undefinedpolitical status as a pretext to refrain from abong>andong>oning beaten policy paths –whether in drives towards more political liberalisation 65 or reform ong>ofong> policy-makingagendas in migration – in the name ong>ofong> stability ong>andong> security concerns.All these examples serve to show that in the Eastern Mediterranean,circularity is frequent, yet it does not match the notion ong>ofong> circular migration asenvisaged by the EU. More particularly, it does not comply with a top-downapproach, ong>andong> is largely dependent on mutable contingents.These examples also draw attention to the variables ong>ofong> border control ong>andong>disputed territoriality ong>andong> their undoubted influence on circular migration schemesin the Middle East. On the one hong>andong>, facilitated circularity in the region has beeninformally connected with certain states’ porous frontiers. For instance, Lebanon’sporous frontiers ong>andong> ineffective border control with Syria ong>andong> Palestine doesfacilitate undocumented circularity in many ways. However, this circularity doesnot match, by any means, the notion ong>ofong> CM as defined by international organisms.On the other hong>andong>, circularity in the region has been linked with theerosion ong>ofong> state sovereignty ong>andong> it is thus increasingly perceived in a bad light. Ithas particularly an uneasy relationship with authoritarian states’ conception ong>ofong>territorial sovereignty, as these states increasingly perceive migration governancemore in terms ong>ofong> a security issue than as a question ong>ofong> free movement.63See Haim Yacobi, ―Circular ong>Migrationong> in Israel‖, CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic Notes2008/19, Shahira Samy, ―Irregular ong>Migrationong> in the South Eastern Mediterranean: Socio-Political perspectives‖, CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic Notes 2008/69,, 8.65See Brynen, Korany ong>andong> Noble, eds, Political Liberalization ong>andong> Democratization in theArab World; Saikal ong>andong> Schnabel, eds, Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles,Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003).126

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010IV. The EU-North African case: are CM schemes a burden-shifting measure?At first glance, the North African region seems to lend itself to a morerealistic application ong>ofong> a broad CM approach. The region’s geographical closenessto Europe contributes to shaping migration imperatives, ong>andong> to enhancing theincentives ong>ofong> cooperation in the EU-Southern Mediterranean migration system.However, in the following paragraphs, I will demonstrate that whilecontextual settings are more favourable to circular migration schemes (CMSs) inthe region than in the Eastern Mediterranean, considerable hindrances get in theway ong>ofong> their implementation. For this purpose, I will explore, on an illustrativebasis, circularity in Egypt, 66 Morocco, ong>andong> Algeria.In Egypt, patterns ong>ofong> circularity to the Gulf countries, Jordan ong>andong> Libya havetraditional ong>andong> historical roots. In addition to these historical precedents ong>ofong> repeatmigration, bilateral agreements, which could be labelled as mobility partnershipdeals, are present. For example, the recent Italian-Egyptian model ong>ofong> cooperationfor managing labour migration 67 could pave the way for more developed schemesong>ofong> circularity between the two countries. However, the relevant question iswhether these cooperation models go beyond managing legal migration flows, ong>andong>can actually evolve into an institutionalised ong>andong> sustainable CM approach.Egypt’s difficult position at the crossroads ong>ofong> the Middle East ong>andong> NorthAfrica overburdens its migration agenda. Thus, the country is not only a refugeehaven, but also a hub ong>andong> a passageway for undocumented ong>andong> transit migrants. Itspriorities presently rotate, on the one hong>andong>, around finding convenient solutions tothe dilemmas posed by the refugee question (notably Sudanese ong>andong> Iraqi refugees)ong>andong>, on the other hong>andong>, around restructuring its own migration apparatuses,objectives ong>andong> visions so as to tackle various economic ong>andong> social hurdles inherentin Egyptian society.Moreover, even though temporary migration is deeply ingrained in Egypt’shistory, the notion ong>ofong> managed circular migration is not part ong>ofong> the policy-making66Although Egypt is at the crossroads ong>ofong> the Eastern ong>andong> Southern Mediterranean region, itwill be considered in this article as part ong>ofong> North Africa or the Southern Mediterranean.67Implemented by the Egyptian Ministry ong>ofong> Immigration ong>andong> Manpower, the IMIS ong>andong>IDOM schemes have provided a framework for organising labour migration between Italyong>andong> Egypt. See Howaida Roman, ―Italian-Egyptian Model in Managing the Emigration From Egypt toItaly. Dimensions ong>andong> Prospects‖, CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic Notes 2008/ 18,, 1-12.127

there. 70 I would argue, however, that these programmes cannot be categorised asjargon in Egypt – at least not to date. 68Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010As a result, Egypt has institutional apparatuses propitious to launchingtemporary labour migration schemes with the EU ong>andong> surrounding countries.However, the country’s contextual setting ong>andong> migration priorities do not presentlyfavour the development ong>ofong> a structured CM strategy.Another illustrative example is Morocco where dynamic migration trendshave created various patterns ong>ofong> permanent ong>andong> repetitive migration.are many.Examples ong>ofong> temporary or quasi-circular migration to ong>andong> from the countryAgreements with Spain ong>andong> France have paved the way for temporary ong>andong>seasonal migration programmes. 69 In Spain, temporary labour or seasonalprogrammes laid solid foundations for the legal management ong>ofong> temporarymigratory flows between the two countries. Also, against the backdrop ong>ofong>Morocco’s historical connection with France, several labour migration accordsbetween the two countries have encouraged a certain mobility ong>andong> circularityprototypes ong>ofong> circular migration, for they operate under very restrictive conditions,ong>andong> do not allow for the kind ong>ofong> flexibility that the normative concept ong>ofong> circularmigration seems to propose. 71 It is worth debating whether these circular patternsdo not remain rather inscribed within the logic ong>ofong> temporary labour migrationprogrammes (TLMP). In this light, it is important to look at the finality ong>ofong> thesetemporary schemes. Relevant questions are whether these schemes really differfrom mere seasonal programmes or short-term employment perspectives, ong>andong>whether they have the potential to develop into the kind ong>ofong> ambitious ong>andong> dynamiccircularity that the normative concept ong>ofong> circular migration promises. In fact, doesthe Temporary ong>andong> Circular Labour ong>Migrationong> approach (TCLM) between the EUong>andong> Morocco go beyond providing a legal mold for managing migration patterns?68See Proceedings ong>ofong> two CARIM Meetings on Circular ong>Migrationong>.69I refer for instance to the AENEAS-CARTAYA ―Programme for Ethical Management ong>ofong>Seasonal Immigration‖ between Morocco ong>andong> the Huelva Province whereby selected womentravel to the province for the fruit-picking season (March-June 2008).70It is estimated that seven thousong>andong> seasonal workers are recruited every year by France.See Mohamaed Khachani, ―La migration circulaire: cas du Maroc,‖ CARIM Analytic ong>andong>Synthetic Notes 2008/07,, 11.71For an account on the definitional aspects ong>ofong> circular migration, see Newlong>andong> ong>andong> Agunias,―How Can Circular ong>Migrationong>.‖128

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010The efficacy ong>ofong> this approach remains controversial. 72On another level, due to Morocco’s geographical proximity to Europe, thecountry’s previous experience in setting up Guest Worker agreements withEuropean countries ong>andong> to its more or less stable politics, it would be worthwhilestudying the advantages ong>andong> the feasibility ong>ofong> circular migration programmes. Moreimportantly, thanks to an array ong>ofong> migration programs, 73 Morocco has becomeendowed with ingrained institutional structures capable ong>ofong> laying a solid foundationfor more sophisticated temporary ong>andong> circular labour migration schemes.Still, despite the assumption that the Moroccan case seems an opportunelaboratory in which the feasibility ong>ofong> TCLM approach might be monitored, manyother important aspects have to be taken into account.In addition to the contentious finality ong>ofong> temporary migration schemesdiscussed above, reluctance has been expressed by Moroccan policy makers ong>andong>researchers when it comes to circular migration. Indeed, the latter is perceived asbeing intricately coupled with the external dimension ong>ofong> the EU migration policy,ong>andong> with the politics ong>ofong> readmission. 74 A worthwhile effort would be one thatattempts to bridge the gaps between the EU ong>andong> Morocco’s policy-making stancesso as to strike a balance between the needs ong>ofong> both.In Algeria, several quasi-circularity scenarios are traceable. Variousjourneys ong>ofong> temporary migration are observable between Algeria ong>andong> severalEuropean countries. Organised frameworks providing for the recruitment ong>ofong>Algerian migrants in external markets for a limited time frame help structuretemporary migration schemes. Still, migration policy-making in Algeria is notauspicious to the development ong>ofong> a CM approach.72The criteria pertaining to selecting ―temporary migrants‖ have been criticized ong>andong> depictedby some as restrictive tools to circumscribe ong>andong> control migration. See for example KemalKirsci, ―Three Way Approach to Meeting the Challenges ong>ofong> Migrant Incorporation in the European Union:Reflections from a Turkish Perspective,‖ CARIM ong>Researchong> Reports 2008/03,,14.73Many EU-financed programs - such as Support for the Movement ong>ofong> the People whose aimis to empower ANAPEC as an ―international interlocutor‖ so as to manage labour migrationto Europe ong>andong> support returnees – have been launched with Morocco so as to strengthen thecountry‘s management capacities in the realm ong>ofong> migration.74For an account on divergent perceptions regarding this issue, see proceedings ong>ofong> twoCARIM Meetings on Circular ong>Migrationong> (for example, p. 52). For an account on the riftbetween the external dimension ong>ofong> EU migration policy ong>andong> Morocco especially in mattersrelated to irregular migration ong>andong> readmission accords, see Abdelkarim Belguendouz, ―LeMaroc et la migration irrégulière: une analyse socio-politique‖, forthcoming, CARIM,European University Institute, Florence, 2009.129

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Although there are inherent institutional moulds that “contain instrumentsong>ofong> migratory mobility”, Algeria’s migration policy is not actively working onpromoting circularity, ong>andong> the policy-making migration apparatus has not yetseriously addressed the issue ong>ofong> circular migration. 75 ong>Migrationong> imperativespresently impinge on tackling irregular ong>andong> transit migration in the country, as wellas dealing with Algeria’s new status as a destination ong>ofong> immigration. Thus, whereasAlgeria has, in the past, focused in its migration agenda on the integration ong>ofong> itsDiasporas abroad, it is increasingly confronted with many intrinsic problemsengendered by migration flows, to which the country remains ill-prepared.Furthermore, as in the Moroccan case, there is a political reluctance to adopt aterminological lexicon proposed by the EU.Possible drawbacks in the North African caseThese observations draw attention to some drawbacks that restrict theimplementation ong>ofong> a sustainable CM approach in the region. Hence, as statedbefore, while it is true that geographical proximity enhances cooperation in thefield ong>ofong> migration; it also creates friction ong>andong> suspicion. In political discourses, somescepticism towards EU-imposed proposals prevails as these proposals are linked toEurope’s desire to shift its migratory burden onto neighbouring countries. 76 Circularmigration seems to pose a specific problem in this area as it is directly associatedwith the logic ong>ofong> readmission accords, given that the EU communication on CMlinks the issue ong>ofong> circular migration with return migration. 77 Indeed, it is importantto note that circular migration schemes or mobility partnerships promoted by theEU bear some aspects ong>ofong> conditionality: in order for circular migrants to benefitfrom certain mobility packages ong>andong> flexible visa regimes, third countries areexpected to cooperate more closely on thorny migration-related issues such asundocumented migration. 78There is also a more subtle clash ong>ofong> imperatives in policy-making discourses75Se Hocine Abdelaoui, ―La dimension socio-politique de la migration circulaire en Algérie‖, 1, CARIManalytical ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/13, 2008. ong>andong> Oger, ―The EC External ong>Migrationong> Policy: The Case ong>ofong> the MENAcountries.‖77These reservations were expressed by North African policy makers ong>andong> researchers duringthe policy-makers‘ meeting on circular migration organised by CARIM in Florence inJanuary 2008. See CARIM Coordination Team, Proceedings, 2008.78See Brady, Hugo, ―EU ong>Migrationong> Policy‖, 10.130

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010between the Maghreb ong>andong> the EU. Hence, while the Maghreb countries’ policymakingstances do attach major important to emigration ong>andong> more specifically tothe integration ong>ofong> their Diasporas in receiving countries, the EU communication onCM stresses the issue ong>ofong> return ong>andong> reintegration to the sending country.Moreover, it is questionable whether the existence ong>ofong> institutionalisedschemes ong>ofong> temporary or seasonal migration in the Southern Mediterranean couldlay the necessary pillars for the elaboration ong>ofong> large-scale CM programmes. Doubtprevails whether these programs are not more dedicated to managing legalmigration than to enhancing scenarios ong>ofong> circularity.As to the elaboration ong>ofong> CM programmes within North Africa ong>andong> betweenthe latter ong>andong> the EU, though the region remains more stable than the EasternMediterranean, tensions between adjacent countries ong>andong> some indicators ong>ofong>instability would affect the implementation ong>ofong> such plans. 79V. Synthesis: Favourable ong>andong> disruptive factors enhancing or hindering CM in theMENA regionThis article has tackled the various paradoxes lurking beneath the conceptong>ofong> circular migration as well as its application in the EU-MENA context.At times reduced to a mere synonym ong>ofong> a temporary guest workerprogramme, 80 ong>andong> at times endowed with a typological dimension, 81 circularmigration oscillates between a potentially normative concept ong>andong> a mere policyinitiative. So far, no consensus, either on the scholarly or on the policy-makinglevels, exists on its conceptualisation ong>andong> feasibility.Notwithstong>andong>ing limitations related to theorising circular migration,interesting conclusions could nonetheless be drawn on its feasibility in the EU-MENA context ong>andong> within the MENA itself.79I refer particularly to the closure ong>ofong> border between Morocco ong>andong> Algeria in 1962 afterMorocco‘s independence from France. See Hein de Haas, ―Morocco‘s ong>Migrationong> Experience:A Transitional perspective,‖ International ong>Migrationong> 45 (4), 2007 (p. 45), mentioned inCassarino, ―Patterns ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>‖, 3. As mentioned before, other indicators ong>ofong>instability can be found in Mauritania ong>andong> in Algeria.80Rosalio, Munoz, ―Circular migration ong>ofong> Labor: a Global Corporate Trend‖, People'sWeekly World Newspaper, April 10, 2007, Newlong>andong> ong>andong> Agunias‘s definition ong>ofong> circular migration in ―Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong>Development,‖ 2.131

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 20101. Circularity in the MENA region seems to be privileged between countrieswhose proximity or historical relations predispose them towards patterns ong>ofong>spontaneous repeat migration.2. In the EU-MENA context, proximity ong>andong> interest on both sides in regulatingmigration patterns are incentives that privilege the elaboration ong>ofong>institutionalised mobility partnerships, which could, in turn, pave the way formore developed schemes ong>ofong> temporary migration.3. In the EU-MENA context, cooperation in the domain ong>ofong> circular migrationschemes could incentivise launching dialogue processes which serve to addressdivergences over migration policies between the two ends.Nonetheless, these abovementioned points fall short ong>ofong> providing concretefoundations for a large-scale CM approach, as significant structural parameters ong>andong>contextual settings in the MENA region are more likely to impede the latter.The article has also allowed for the distinction ong>ofong> three types ong>ofong> circulartrajectories in the EU-MENA context or within the MENA context, which do notmeet either the criteria suggested by the EU or the broader notion ong>ofong> circularmigration.1. Some embedded movements ong>ofong> circularity in the MENA region are ong>ofong> historicalorigin ong>andong> remain in most cases unregulated ong>andong> unmanaged;2. Some trends ong>ofong> circularity, particularly in the Middle East, are derivatives ong>ofong>political tensions ong>andong> wars in the region. In these cases, refugees’ rights areseldom defined in the framework ong>ofong> mutual agreements, ong>andong> no efficientregional management channels have been set up;3. Observed trajectories ong>ofong> circularity do not go beyond mere restrictivetemporary pilot projects constrained in operatives ong>andong> time frames. It is worthpondering whether these institutionalised mobility schemes hinge more onmanaging migratory flows than on addressing circular migration as a sui generismodel.The article has also demonstrated that four important parameters in theMENA region constrain circular migration whether inside the region or with the EU:1. Socio-political conditions ong>ofong> stability;2. Frail institutional structures that hinder a symmetrical management ong>ofong>circular migration;132

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 20103. Divergent policy-making priorities within the MENA region or between thelatter ong>andong> the EU;4. Preoccupation with alternative priorities in MENA migration agendas.In most MENA countries, launching an open debate on complex CMschemes seems in fact precursory, not least because migration agendas in bothEastern ong>andong> Southern Mediterranean contexts remain in a transitional phase. Thus,whereas governments in the Middle East ong>andong> North Africa have previously focusedon emigration ong>andong> remittances, they are presently confronted with intrinsic ong>andong>emergent challenges linked to immigration, undocumented migration, refugeesettlement ong>andong> resettlement. These priorities are expected, at least for some time,to prevail over circular migration, which remains secondary or marginal in politicalstances on migration.To sum up, the prevailing lack ong>ofong> clarity over the rationale ong>andong> finality ong>ofong>CM does not provide a favourable context for the development ong>ofong> a CM approachin the region. There is an evident lack ong>ofong> consensus as well as evident knowledgegaps on the optimal policy-making approach as well as the best practices if moreambitious CM projects were to be developed.In addition, the particularity ong>ofong> political ong>andong> policy-making settings in theMENA region does not presently predispose the region to the development ong>ofong> alarge-scale CM approach. Also, from an EU perspective, there is even doubtconcerning the relevance ong>ofong> debating circular migration for the time being as anefficient labour ong>andong> migration strategy in the Euro-MENA zone.Even if CM schemes present some advantages for both sending ong>andong>receiving countries, EU member states’ migration agendas are being restructured inthe light ong>ofong> many challenges, such as divergences over migration policies within theEU, saturated labour supply in some EU countries, as well as the direct ong>andong> indirectrepercussions ong>ofong> EU enlargement. Thus, speculation is rife whether the MENA zoneremains the EU’s second option for recruiting circular migrants especially in lowskilledlabour. 8282 In Italy, for example, the saturation ong>ofong> labour supply in some fields after EU enlargement ong>andong> subsequent waves ong>ofong>East European emigration to the country undermine, at least in the short term, temporary migration labourprogrammes with the MENA region. Interview with Prong>ofong>essor Alessong>andong>ra Venturini, May 2008, Florence.133

Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Circular migration as a strategy in migration managementAs the very concept ong>ofong> circular migration is still in its exploratory ong>andong>genesis phases, only time will tell whether it will prove to be viable. 83 It is thusadvisable to refrain from conferring an overvalued significance on the CM approachong>andong> to consider it rather as a strategy inherent in a more global approach to labourmigration in the EU-MENA context. Thus, CM schemes in the region should remaincontextually-based, ong>andong> their feasibility should be assessed on a case by case basis.EU mobility partnerships – whether bilateral or multilateral – need to take intoconsideration the political particularities ong>andong> capacities ong>ofong> each country. Onepossibility would be to develop policies between the sending ong>andong> receivingcountries resting on the individualised management ong>ofong> circular migration, ong>andong> toadopt tailored approaches that take into consideration the different political, legalong>andong> socio-economic particularities ong>ofong> each case.On a more theoretical level, ong>andong> beyond the specificities ong>ofong> the EU ong>andong>MENA, this article would suggest caution in the normative use ong>ofong> circular migration.As much contention prevails over circular migration as a migration typology, itwould be recommendable that CM be rather considered an option, a policyinitiative suitable for some countries more than others, or a strategy to managemigration trends in transnational contexts.Literature CitedAbdelaoui, Hocine, “La dimension socio-politique de la migration circulaire en Algérie”, CARIM analyticalong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/13, 2008., Steffen, “Circular ong>Migrationong>: a sustainable Concept for ong>Migrationong> Policy,” SWP Comments,June 2007.Basol, Tanya, “Mexican Seasonal ong>Migrationong> to Canada ong>andong> Development: a Community-basedComparison,” International ong>Migrationong> 41 (2): 3-26, 2003.Bellin, Eva, “The Robustness ong>ofong> Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in ComparativePerspective,” Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 139-153.Belguendouz, Abdelkarim, “Le Maroc et la migration irrégulière: une analyse socio-politique”,forthcoming, CARIM, European University Institute, Florence, 2009.Brady, Hugo, “EU ong>Migrationong> Policy: An A-Z”, ong>Centreong> for European Reform, February 2008,83 Statement ong>ofong> a policy-maker, Conference on Circular ong>Migrationong> organized by CARIM Circular ong>Migrationong>:Experiences, Opportunities ong>andong> Constraints for Southern ong>andong> Eastern Mediterranean Countries, January 2008,Florence.134

The Difficult Conceptualisation ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong>JIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Brynen Rex, Korany Baghat ong>andong> Noble Paul, eds, Political Liberalization ong>andong> Democratization in the ArabWorld: Theoretical Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995);CARIM Coordination Team, Proceedings ong>ofong> two CARIM Meetings on Circular ong>Migrationong>, CARIMProceedings 2008/1,, Jean Pierre, “Patterns ong>ofong> Circular ong>Migrationong> in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Implications forPolicy-Making”, CARIM analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/29,, Stephan, “Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?” International ong>Migrationong> Review, Vol. 40(Winter 2006): 741-766.Chatelard, Géraldine “Jordan: a Refugee Haven”, ong>Migrationong> Information Source, July 2004.De Bel Air, Francoise, “Irregular ong>Migrationong>: the Socio-Political Stakes in Jordan”, CARIM, CARIM Analyticong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/78, Haas, Hein. “Morocco’s ong>Migrationong> Experience: A Transitional Perspective,” International ong>Migrationong> 45(4), 2007Doukoure ,Ounia ong>andong> Oger , Helen, “The EC External ong>Migrationong> Policy: The Case ong>ofong> the MENA countries”,CARIM ong>Researchong> papers 2006/07,, 1-34.Fargues, Philippe, “Circular ong>Migrationong>: is it Relevant South ong>andong> East ong>ofong> the Mediterranean?” CARIManalytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/40,, Guita ong>andong> Sensenig Dabbous, Eugene, “Insecurity, ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Return: The Case ong>ofong> Lebanonfollowing the 2006 Summer War,” CARIM ong>Researchong> Report 2007/01,, Graemo, “Circular ong>Migrationong>: Keeping Development Rolling”, ong>Migrationong> Information Source, June2003.Hugo, Graeme, “ong>Migrationong> in the Asia-Pacific region”, a paper prepared for the Policy Analysis ong>andong>ong>Researchong> Programme for the Global Commission on International ong>Migrationong>, September 2005.Icduygu, Ahmet, “ Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Turkey: an Overview ong>ofong> the Past ong>andong> Present: some Demo-Economic Implications,” CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/10,, Kemal, “Three Way Approach to Meeting the Challenges ong>ofong> Migrant Incorporation in theEuropean Union: Reflections from a Turkish Perspective,” CARIM ong>Researchong> Reports 2008/03,, Fadia, “les dimensions sociopolitiques de la migration irrégulière au Liban,” CARIM, CARIMAnalytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes 2008/51,, Fadia, “La perception de la migration circulaire au Liban,” CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic notes2008/14,, Mohamaed, “La migration circulaire: cas du Maroc,” CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic Notes2008/07,, 1- 20, 11Martin, Philip, “Migrants in the Global Labour Market”, Global Commission on International ong>Migrationong>,Geneva, 2005.Munoz, Rosalio, “Circular migration ong>ofong> Labor: a Global Corporate Trend”, People's Weekly WorldNewspaper, April 10, 2007,

136Tamirace FAKHOURYJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Newlong>andong>, Kathleen ong>andong> Agunias, Dovelyn, “How Can Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Sustainable Return Serve asDevelopment Tools?” background paper for the preparation ong>ofong> the first meeting ong>ofong> the GlobalForum on ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Development (GFMD), Brussels, 9-11 July 2007.Newlong>andong>, Kathleen ong>andong> Agunias, Dovelyn, “Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Development: Trends, Policy Routesong>andong> Ways Forward”, ong>Migrationong> Policy Institute, Washington, D.C, 2007.Olwan, Mohamad “Circular ong>andong> Permanent ong>Migrationong>: A Jordanian Perspective,” CARIM Analytic ong>andong>Synthetic notes 2008/34,, 1-16.O’Neil, Kevin, “Using Remittances ong>andong> Circular ong>Migrationong> to Drive Development,” ong>Migrationong> PolicyInstitute, June 2003,, Howaida, “Italian-Egyptian Model in Managing the Emigration From Egypt to Italy: Dimensionsong>andong> Prospects”, CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic Notes 2008/ 18,, Amin ong>andong> Schnabel, Albrecht, eds, Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles,Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003).Saikal, Amin ong>andong> Schnabel, Albrecht, eds, Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles,Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003).Samy, Shahira, “Irregular ong>Migrationong> in the South Eastern Mediterranean: Socio-Political perspectives”,CARIM ong>Researchong> Report, forthcoming in 2009.Yacobi, Haim, “Circular ong>Migrationong> in Israel”, CARIM Analytic ong>andong> Synthetic Notes 2008/19,, Abdelrazak, “La dimension politique de la migration circulaire en Tunisie,” CARIM Analytic ong>andong>Synthetic notes 2008/17, 1-17, ong>andong> communicationsAbu Dialogue’s Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment ong>andong> Contractual Labour for Countriesong>ofong> Origin ong>andong> Destination in Asia, “Contractual Labour Mobility in Asia Key Partnerships forDevelopment between Countries ong>ofong> Origin ong>andong> Destination”, January 2008.European Commission, “Towards a comprehensive European ong>Migrationong> Policy: Cracking down onEmployment ong>ofong> Illegal Immigrants ong>andong> Fostering Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Mobility Partnerships”,May 2007, Commission, “an EU Approach to Managing Economic ong>Migrationong>”, Green Paper, Brussels, January2005.Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economicong>andong> Social Committee ong>andong> the Committee ong>ofong> the Regions, “ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Development:Some Concrete Orientations”, COM (2005) 390 final, September 2005.Communication from the Commission, “Policy Plan on Legal ong>Migrationong>, COM (2005) 669 final, Brussels,December 2005.Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economicong>andong> Social Committee ong>andong> the Committee ong>ofong> the Regions, “On Circular ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> MobilityPartnerships between the European Union ong>andong> Third Countries, ” Brussels, COM (2007) 248,May 2007.IOM’s report, “World ong>Migrationong> 2005: Costs ong>andong> Benefits ong>ofong> International ong>Migrationong>,” Geneva:International Organization for ong>Migrationong>, 2005GCIM’s report, “ong>Migrationong> in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action”, Geneva: GlobalCommission on International ong>Migrationong>, 2005.

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, Ecuador (1997-2008)Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAAbstract. For decades migratory movements in Ecuador were mainly internal, althoughstarting about half a century ago there were some international flows to the United States,ong>andong> from the last decade ong>ofong> the 20th century to Europe. To a certain extent, environmentalfactors have played a role in the formation ong>andong> features ong>ofong> migratory flows in the past, bothinternal ong>andong> international. We have centered our attention in the 1997-1998 El Niñoclimatic event, the strongest ever recorded. From both the findings ong>ofong> the literary reviewong>andong> field research, we can conclude that this event affected the migratory patterns ong>ofong> largeregions ong>ofong> Ecuador forcing the change ong>ofong> the former internal, temporary or pendularmigratory movements ong>ofong> the inhabitants ong>ofong> these regions as a normal way to face theeconomic effects ong>ofong> the damage caused by previous El Niño events, into new internationalmovements, mainly to Spain ong>andong> other EU countries.Keywords: Ecuador, El Niño Southern Oscillation, International ong>Migrationong>, FloodsThe new Ecuadorean massive migratory currentEcuador is located in western South America, bordering the Pacific Oceanat the Equator, between Colombia, Brazil ong>andong> Peru. The country is usually dividedby geographers into three main natural regions (Dalmasso & Fillon 1972): thecoastal plain (Costa), the inter-Andean central highlong>andong>s (Sierra), ong>andong> the flat torolling eastern Amazonic jungle (Oriente). Each ong>ofong> these natural regions presentdifferent environmental features: climate, vegetation, potential agriculture, as wellas the influence ong>ofong> the history ong>ofong> human presence there. But these three regionscan also be differentiated because ong>ofong> their past ong>andong> present patterns ong>ofong> populationong>andong> migratory behavior.In fact, the weight ong>ofong> history can be easily noticed once we analyze thecomposition ong>andong> trends ong>ofong> population, even in the most recent times. First ong>ofong> all,the Andean Mountains (Sierra), which is the most anciently populated zone ong>ofong> thecountry, at least from the times ong>ofong> the Incan Empire ong>andong> beyond, holds the greatest137

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010part ong>ofong> the Ecuadorean population even today. The majority ong>andong> the mostimportant Ecuadorean provinces in terms ong>ofong> population are in this area, with thelargest ong>ofong> them being the province ong>ofong> Pichincha that has 17.94% ong>ofong> the totalpopulation ong>ofong> the country, in which Quito - the capital city - is situated (Pedone2003). This region received almost all the currents ong>ofong> internal immigration until themiddle ong>ofong> 19 th century. Today however, internal migrants are increasingly movingto other regions ong>ofong> Ecuador like the Costa (the lesser part) ong>andong> especially theOriente, ong>andong> to foreign countries (the metropolitan area ong>ofong> Quito being anexception to this general pattern because ong>ofong> its political functions) (Álvarez Velasco2007).The Pacific Coastal Low Long>andong>s (Costa), was mainly a marginal area ong>ofong> theformer Audiencia ong>ofong> Quito - the colonial precedent ong>ofong> today's Ecuador - for ages,with the only exception being the province ong>ofong> Guayas, where the main sea port ong>ofong>the country, Guayaquil, was located. The situation changed abruptly after half acentury ong>ofong> independence ong>ofong> Ecuador, after which the Costa increasingly became thedestination for internal migration, especially during the last third ong>ofong> 19 th ong>andong> allthrough the 20 th century. In fact, this region has showed the highest demographicgrowth rates ong>ofong> the whole country from 1900 to about 1990, because ong>ofong> thecolonization ong>ofong> former tropical forests, the expansion ong>ofong> intensive agriculture forexport (especially bananas) ong>andong> the sustained economic growth ong>ofong> the city ong>ofong>Guayaquil, that strengthen its traditional importance as the main seaport ong>ofong>Ecuador. During this period, Guayaquil took over the capital city ong>ofong> Quito as themost populated city ong>ofong> the country: one quarter (25.81%) ong>ofong> the population ong>ofong>Ecuador resides today in Guayas, the department whose head is Guayaquil. Thecity's trade functions have not been replaced so far by any other port ong>ofong> thecountry, so the shift ong>ofong> the economic balance ong>ofong> the country to newly developingareas such as Amazonia in the aftermath ong>ofong> the oil boom has not displacedGuayaquil from its prime position as the commercial ong>andong> financial capital ong>ofong>Ecuador. Nonetheless, the competence ong>ofong> the new economic developing regions ong>ofong>the country has a direct effect on the last migratory currents in the Costa. Thisregion, especially Guayaquil, is both receiving some internal immigration from theSierra ong>andong> rural areas within the Costa itself, ong>andong> being utilized as a point ong>ofong>departure for migrants on their way to Oriente ong>andong> to Europe.Finally, the Amazonian area (Oriente) is still a very sparsely populatedregion. While it occupies about 45% ong>ofong> the total surface ong>ofong> Ecuador, only 4% ong>ofong>138

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Ecuador’s population lived there according to 2001 census. Nonetheless, it hasexperienced the highest rates ong>ofong> demographic growth in the last two decades.Furthermore, it has suffered a strong process ong>ofong> occupation because ong>ofong> its oil wells.This is today the most demographically dynamic area ong>ofong> the country, as itsmigratory balance is clearly positive - it receives more immigrants than the fewemigrants it is sending outside.According to Camacho (2004), the periods ong>ofong> more internal mobility withinEcuador can be linked without hesitation to the main periods ong>ofong> economicdevelopment: the growth ong>ofong> cocoa (1860-1950) ong>andong> banana plantations (1948-1965) on the coast; ong>andong> the "oil revolution" in the Oriente (1972-1995).However, it is not internal, but international migration that define mostaccurately the current demographic dynamic ong>andong> behaviour in Ecuador. Along witha very high natural population growth, the Ecuadorean population increased 12.8%from 1991 to 2001, one ong>ofong> the most important features ong>ofong> the demography ong>ofong> thecountry in the 1990s was the emergence ong>ofong> a significant emigration current abroad,mainly directed to European Union countries.This does not mean that Ecuadoreans did not emigrate abroad before,even though most ong>ofong> the migrations at that time were primarily internal (ÁlvarezVelasco, 2007). In fact, at least from the early 1950s there is evidence ong>ofong> somepersistent out-migration networks in Ecuador. Moreover, historically, the UnitedStates ong>ofong> America was the “natural” destination ong>ofong> Ecuadorean emigrants becauseong>ofong>, among other reasons, (a) the geographical proximity; ong>andong> (b) the widespreadbelief in the possibilities ong>ofong> the “American dream” among large social strata. Evenuntil 2006, this country had the largest numbers ong>ofong> Ecuadorean immigrants livingthere. This preference ong>ofong> Ecuadoreans to migrate to the USA rather than to otherdestinations prevailed until 1998, although the flows were decreasing annuallybecause ong>ofong> the strengthening ong>ofong> measures to control immigration to the USA.According to Goycoechea ong>andong> Ramírez Gallegos (2002: 36), the pioneering regionsthat first started the migratory flows to the USA were the southern provinces ong>ofong>Azuay ong>andong> Cañar (Jokisch 2002: 23). Even today, the population ong>ofong> these twoprovinces shows a clear preference for emigrating to the USA rather than toEurope, in contrast to the rest ong>ofong> the country, because ong>ofong> the persistence ong>ofong>traditional, deeply rooted social networks.A clear breaking point in the migratory behavior ong>ofong> Ecuadoreans occurredin 1998. Suddenly migration to Europe began, starting migratory flows previously139

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010unknown in the country. Between 1998 ong>andong> 2001, when migratory flows fromEcuador to Europe reached their peak (Aierdi et al. 2008), about 350,000 migrantshad ong>ofong>ficially departed the country, even though some estimates increase thisamount ong>andong> roughly calculate up to 2 million citizens ong>ofong> Ecuador living abroad by2002. In the first half ong>ofong> 1999 alone, for instance, 172,320 Ecuadoreans moved toSpain. Two indicators help us to understong>andong> the tremendous impact ong>ofong> thesemigratory flows in Ecuador: on the one hong>andong>, the emergence ong>ofong> a new kind ong>ofong>"enterprise", usually belonging to the "informal economy", to provide services tong>ofong>uture emigrants: chulqueros or prestamistas (loaners) to support the cost ong>ofong> thetravel, ong>andong> coyotes (gangs that helped illegal immigrants crossing the borders). Onthe other hong>andong>, the Ecuadorean government had to implement for the first time aconsulate service to look after their citizens living abroad: the Dirección General deEcuatorianos en el Exterior (2005). The enforcement ong>ofong> new rules to enter Spainong>andong> the whole EU Schengen area with a newly implemented tourist visa in 2002,along with the changes in the immigration policy ong>ofong> the USA that made theprocedure to grant visas to Latin Americans more difficult (Ricaurte 2007), slowedbut did not stop the flows.The intensity ong>andong> quick development ong>andong> growth ong>ofong> Ecuadorean migrationto Europe in this period astonished politicians ong>andong> public opinion in both departureong>andong> arrival countries, ong>andong> thus created huge interest among social scientistsspecialized in the study ong>ofong> migration. In fact, the debate on the causes ong>ofong> thisunexpected ong>andong> quick growth, which has sometimes been referred to as a veritable"stampede" (Ramírez Gallegos ong>andong> Ramírez 2005), has usually focused on"traditional" explanations such as the economy. In 1998 the financial system ong>ofong>Ecuador collapsed, pulling down the rest ong>ofong> the economy also. A second reasongiven is the importance ong>ofong> chain migration system (García-Calvo Rosell 2006). Threenew main destinations abroad were clearly preferred: in order ong>ofong> quantitativerelevance, Spain, Italy ong>andong> the United Kingdom. Spain is chosen in most ong>ofong> the casesbecause ong>ofong> language, similarity ong>ofong> culture ong>andong> identity. The change ong>ofong> thegeographical patterns ong>ofong> Ecuadorean emigration abroad also affects thedistribution ong>ofong> preferential regions ong>ofong> origin. Along with the two traditionalprovinces ong>ofong> origin mentioned above, other provinces in both the Sierra ong>andong> theCoast joined the group ong>ofong> areas with high emigration rates: between 1998 ong>andong>2002, Azuay, Cañar, Loja, Manabí, Los Ríos, Guayas ong>andong> Pichincha had the highestlevels ong>ofong> outgoing emigration to other countries (De la Veg, 2006: 175). In almost all140

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010the cases, with the suprising exceptions ong>ofong> Guayas ong>andong> Pichincha - where the twomost populated cities ong>ofong> Ecuador are located - they are usually provinces whoseeconomy is mainly based upon agriculture, ong>andong> whose poverty levels are extremelyhigh, even for the average stong>andong>ards ong>ofong> the whole country: between 78.4 ong>andong>86.5% (according to UNDP data: Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 1999: 146-152).MethodologyThis article is based upon the research carried out during 2007 ong>andong> 2008within the frames ong>ofong> Environmental Changes ong>andong> Forced ong>Migrationong> Scenarios(EACH-FOR) research project 1 , to study the links between environmental changesong>andong> migration. The fieldwork consisted ong>ofong> several interviews using the EACH-FORsurvey model 2 with Ecuadorean migrants in Spain, (53) ong>andong> non-migrants (16) inthe province ong>ofong> Los Ríos, Ecuador, along with expert interviews with Ecuadoreanpoliticians, functionaries ong>andong> NGO ong>ofong>ficials. Historical documentation ong>andong> statisticalsources, when available, were also used.In Spain, the areas selected to conduct the surveys were Catalonia ong>andong> theUpper Ebro Valley (Saragossa, Navarre, La Rioja ong>andong> Álava), because it is a focusthat have attracted Ecuadorean workers for services ong>andong> agriculture. Fieldwork inEcuador was centered on a very specific province, Los Ríos, located in the Costa.This province is located in the Guayas river basin, very close to its mouth. The nameong>ofong> the province comes from its principal geographical feature, ais it occupies anarea drained by a dense web ong>ofong> rivers, all ong>ofong> them tributaires ong>ofong> the Guayas. It wasonce covered by a compact rainfores, but today only a few small areas ong>ofong> it remain.In the place where the rainforest used to be, today there is a succesion ong>ofong>plantations ong>andong> fams. Agriculture is the main source ong>ofong> income for the province'seconomy (cocoa, cong>ofong>fee, rice ong>andong> bananas). The province is located in the middle ong>ofong>a huge, low plain, so the capacity ong>ofong> the long>andong> to drain the excess ong>ofong> water isextremely low, especially in times when the flows are abnormally high. The risk ong>ofong>floods is the main environmental problem that affects this province (Map 1).1 With the financial support ong>ofong> the European Commision's Sixth FrameworkProgramme (contract No.: 044468).2 Both methodological background ong>andong> model ong>ofong> interviews, available athttp://www.each-for.eu141

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Map 1: Flood risk in Ecuador.Source: Peña Herrera (2008)The area highlighted in blue represent those whose risk ong>ofong> flood isconsidered high, according to the recurrence ong>ofong> past episodes ong>ofong> floods. Thesouthern part ong>ofong> Los Ríos province is covered by this risk.142

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Ecuadorean immigrants in Spain: How did environmental problems affect migration?If we only take into account the sole results ong>ofong> the survey onEcuadorean immigrants in Spain, we would probably deduce that environmenthas not played a major role in the latest migratory movements from Ecuador toEurope. In fact, only six people in the surveys said that the problems ong>ofong> theenvironment affected their decision to move from the place they lived in. Evenin these cases however, when the same people were asked other questionsrelated to environmental matters, they stated that the environment did notconcern themPerhaps one ong>ofong> the reasons for this can be found in the process ong>ofong> datacollection. It seems that some parts ong>ofong> the survey were misunderstood byinterviewees, especially regarding concepts related to the definition ong>ofong>“environment” ong>andong> “environmental problems.” Notably, a very similar kind ong>ofong>problem emerged in previous studies, such as the one developed byGoycoechea ong>andong> Ramírez (2002: 37): when they asked a Ecuadorean that hadnot migrated yet about whether environmental factors would influence theirdecision to migrate, the answer was: "I only know Europe from the photos, it's anice place, with beautiful scenery (..) It's like a paradise". It seemed that theinterviewee was interpreting environment to mean long>andong>scape. And thus, fromthis point ong>ofong> view, it was not rational for him to contend that the mere beautyong>ofong> the countryside could be reason enough to force people to cross an ocean tosettle in a foreign country so far away from home.When interviewees are directly asked about their reasons for migrating,as we would have probably expected, all the answers quote economic reasonfor their decision, sometimes highlighting the economic problems that hit themin their country, ong>andong> other times noting their desire for improvement.Moreover, this same desire lies behind the second ong>ofong> the most importantdeclared cause ong>ofong> migration: the search for better living conditions for theirfamilies (79% ong>ofong> the answers): "My life has improved here, I have a job ong>andong> Ihave formed my family". "I do not think about going back because I havegathered my family together ong>andong> we all have built our life here".Nonetheless, when interviewees are asked about specific environmentalproblems, people who came from rural areas admit that, to a certain extent,floods, droughts, the lack ong>ofong> water ong>andong> some disasters like earthquakes,143

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010eruptions ong>andong> El Niño events have ong>ofong>ten hit their country ong>andong> affected their lifequality strongly (32% ong>ofong> answers): "Droughts prevented me from working thefields ong>andong> now pollution affects my breathing". There was an earthquake inManabi in 1998 ong>andong> I emigrated as a result ong>ofong> it". "In Ecuador floods filled myhouse with water".In fact, the only direct ong>andong> clearly established statements ong>ofong>environmental reasons provoking migration in the answers provided by peoplecoming from rural areas were concerning natural disasters such as earthquakesong>andong> volcanic eruptions, ong>andong> their direct outcomes. There is actually a longtradition in Ecuador that links the occurrence ong>ofong> this kind ong>ofong> event ong>andong> theemergence ong>ofong> forced displacements ong>ofong> population. For instance, when in August1949 the Tungurahua volcano exploded, affecting several areas ong>ofong> the provincesong>ofong> Cotopaxi ong>andong> Tungurahua with long>andong>slides ong>andong> similar damages, one ong>ofong> theresponses ong>ofong> the government was to resettle the most vulnerable populationsto safer areas. Some ong>ofong> these emergency displacements finally resulted inpermanent migration, as in the case ong>ofong> those that moved from the town ong>ofong>Pelileo (Petit- Breuilh Sepúlveda 2004: 267). The connection with migrationcould also be established indirectly however, in that the intervieweesrecognized that environmental changes have produced effects on the economicbase ong>ofong> their families by means ong>ofong> the decreasing ong>ofong> productivity or even thedestruction ong>ofong> crops, both leading to a reduction ong>ofong> family income ong>andong> forcingrelocation.Besides, some pioneering studies, such as the one by Jokisch (2002),have asserted that that consideration ong>ofong> slow-onset environmental factorshelps to explain some ong>ofong> the migratory patterns in several rural areas. Forinstance, he found a correlation between migration ong>andong> deforestation in twocantons in the N.E. section ong>ofong> the province ong>ofong> Cañar (cantons ong>ofong> Mazar ong>andong>Llavircay (2002: 33), an area that - as we have stated before- is characterised bya long tradition ong>ofong> both internal migration ong>andong>, from the 1950s, to the UnitedStates. In the case ong>ofong> the Sierra region, slow processes like long>andong> degradation areeroding the productivity ong>ofong> farms ong>andong> putting stress in the evolution ong>ofong> averageincome ong>ofong> households.On the other hong>andong>, people from urban centres - who seem less affectedby disasters, at least in the same direct way as a flood or a drought can affectthe livelihood ong>ofong> a farmer- are more willing to admit the presence ong>ofong> some144

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010environmental problems in the pool ong>ofong> causes that made them decide to leavetheir homelong>andong>. Some ong>ofong> the interviewees, for instance, agreed that airpollution in the cities they lived in Ecuador is the main cause that made themmigrate - even though they paradoxically decided to settle down in cities ong>andong>urban areas in which air pollution is also a major environmental concern:"There was much pollution that affected my breathing". "I had breathingproblems ong>andong> infections there".It is also quite interesting to note that the only group ong>ofong> Ecuadoreanimmigrants in Spain that consider themselves primarily as "environmentalmigrants" is the community from the city ong>ofong> Otavalo. Otavalo is located in thecentral-northern part ong>ofong> the country, in the Sierra. It is a mining town whosegrowth occurred during the 20 th century. This city is an exception in the Sierra,as for decades it has been a place that has received a lot ong>ofong> Ecuadorean internalimmigrants because ong>ofong> its flourishing economy. But this situation also has areverse side: mining has created one ong>ofong> the most polluted environments in thewhole country (Interview with the consul ong>ofong> Ecuador in Barcelona, December2007). In this city, there is also a great presence ong>ofong> trade unions ong>ofong> workers ong>andong>miners, with a high level ong>ofong> participation in political parties, associations ong>ofong>workers ong>andong> so on. It has been considered "the most politicized city ong>ofong> thecountry." The fight against pollution is one ong>ofong> the hot topics on the politicalagendas ong>ofong> local groups. Thus, there is a greater awareness ong>ofong> environmentalproblems inside Otavaleños than in any other city in Ecuador. This likelyexplains why people ong>ofong> Otavalo see environmental problems as importantdriving forces for migration (Pujadas & Massal 2002: 68).Not surprisingly, emigrants from Otavalo tend to focus on the questionong>ofong> the lack ong>ofong> adequate policies ong>ofong> the government ong>andong> other responsibleagencies to help the society facing the problem. A statement repeated by someong>ofong> the Otavaleños says that the solution to the problem would start once thepoliticians decided to use the public resources in the development ong>ofong> thecountry ong>andong> the fight against climate change, instead ong>ofong> stealing them. As oneinterviewee stated; "all the blame is to be put in the hong>andong>s ong>ofong> the badgovernments that have ruled the country” (Goicoechea & Ramírez 2002: 37).Thus, the difference between immigrants coming from rural ong>andong> urbanareas in relation to the importance they place on environmental problemsaffecting their decision to migrate, can be summarized as follows:145

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010Table 1: Relevance ong>ofong> environmental factors in the decision to migrate.Area ong>ofong> origin (Ecuador) RURAL URBANArea ong>ofong> destination BOTH RURAL AND URBAN PREDOMINANTELY URBAN(Europe)Level ong>ofong> study, skills LOW LOW - MEDIUMIncidence ong>ofong> environment HIGH (environmental MEDIUM (catastrophicalinmigrationchanges affected cropsyield, high interannualevents, pollution)Level ong>ofong> knowledge ong>andong>awareness ong>ofong>environmental issuesExamplesvariability; El Niño)LOW(They do not quote"environment" as cause ong>ofong>migration)Provices ong>ofong> Los Ríos, ElOro, Imbabura or ManabíHIGH(Some ong>ofong> them highlight"pollution" as main causeong>ofong> migration)City ong>ofong> OtavaloThe effects ong>ofong> El Niño 1997-1998 in Ecuador. An overview from the literatureTwo important events related to the two main topics ong>ofong> our analysis(environment ong>andong> migration) had happened very closely to each other in the late1990s: on the one hong>andong>, the El Niño event ong>ofong> 1997-1998, that was the strongestrecorded since the starting ong>ofong> modern climate data collection; ong>andong> on the otherhong>andong>, the migratory "stampede" ong>ofong> Ecuadoreans abroad, most ong>ofong> them to Europe,that began in the second half ong>ofong> 1998 ong>andong> 1999. An important question is: Werethese two events connected to each other? Or was the time connection only amere coincidence? The search for answers to this question was tackled in twoways. First ong>ofong> all, a review was conducted ong>ofong> the available literature. Secondly, thequestion was explored as part ong>ofong> the field research in Los Rios, because thisprovince was inside one ong>ofong> the areas most affected by the worse consequences ong>ofong>the 1997-1998 El Niño, ong>andong> because it was also a zone with almost no previousexperience ong>ofong> international migration (Albornoz Guarderas ong>andong> Hidalgo Pallarés,2007). If any connection could be established between El Niño's effects ong>andong>international migration, this province would probably ong>ofong>fer us one ong>ofong> the best ong>andong>clearest examples ong>ofong> it.Almost none ong>ofong> the ong>ofong>ficial reports published by Ecuadorean governmentalagencies on the effects ong>ofong> the 1997-1998 El Niño, noted a relationship between thisevent ong>andong> the migratory movements in the decade after. However, when the146

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Corporación Andina de Fomento [CAF], an inter-state agency formed by severalcountries ong>ofong> Southern America collected an extensive assessment ong>ofong> the damagesproduced by the El Niño event in each ong>ofong> the most affected countries ong>ofong> the group(CAF, 2000), migratory movements were actually accepted as one ong>ofong> the socialchanges due to the effects ong>ofong> El Niño. In the case ong>ofong> Ecuador, the main findings ong>ofong>the CAF report pointed out that the most damaged areas (principally in the Costa,as the incidence ong>ofong> El Niño is moderate in the Andean plateau, ong>andong> not significant inthe Oriente), in which unusually strong precipitation, floods, soil erosion ong>andong> evensea level rise were noticed, were related to flows ong>ofong> internal migration, whichbrought people especially from poor, remote rural areas to the cities in search ong>ofong>jobs to compensate for the lack ong>ofong> income because ong>ofong> the loss ong>ofong> crops. In fact,agriculture was the sector ong>ofong> the economy most deeply hit by El Niño - agricultureexports account for 60% ong>ofong> the external trade balance ong>ofong> the country. In the fourmost damaged provinces (Guayas, Manabí, Los Ríos ong>andong> Esmeralda), livestock alsosuffered great losses, a circumstance not widely experienced in previous floodevents that have affected the same area (Rosero ong>andong> González 2003). From ademographic point ong>ofong> view, the 1997-1998 El Niño event simply intensified atendency to concentrate the former rural population into urban areas that startedsome decades before; but there is no mention about the start ong>ofong> international massmigration in the aftermath ong>ofong> the event.A review ong>ofong> the literature reveals that only a few scholars specialized inmigration studies believe that there was a direct cause-effect relationship betweenthe damage produced by El Niño ong>andong> the dramatic changes in Ecuadoreanmigratory patterns. For most ong>ofong> scholars in this field, the strong economic crisis thathit Ecuador between 1998 ong>andong> 1999 is understood as the main -ong>andong> maybe onlycauseong>ofong> the migratory boom ong>ofong> those years (Gómez Quintero, 2005; De la Vega,2006, who ong>ofong>fer an interesting summary ong>ofong> the main findings ong>ofong> the previousliterature on the topic). This point ong>ofong> view is seemingly shared by the wider publicopinion, who view the events ong>ofong> 1998 also focus on the mix ong>ofong> poverty, economiccrisis ong>andong> pernicious political practices as the most remarkable cause ong>ofong> migration(for instance Pereda ong>andong> De Prado 2003). The main economic ong>andong> social indicatorsin those years present an almost catastrophic situation: after a decade ong>ofong>continuous positive economic growth (average 2-3% per year), GDP dropped -6.3%in 1999, ong>andong> did not start recovering until the end ong>ofong> 2000: the fall ong>ofong> GDP in thelast years ong>ofong> the century almost completely erased all the growth ong>ofong> a decade147

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010before. Unemployment rates almost doubled between 1997 (about 8% ong>ofong> activepopulation) ong>andong> 1999 (more than 15%); ong>andong> public budget for social issues(education, health) dropped about 37% between 1996 ong>andong> 1999 (De la Vega 2006:172). By 2000, 6 ong>ofong> every 10 Ecuadorean households were below the level ong>ofong>poverty, the highest rate in several decades. Rosero ong>andong> González state that theaverage effects ong>ofong> El Niño events in Ecuadorean economy are about a 5,3%reduction ong>ofong> GPD from the beginning ong>ofong> the event, ong>andong> that usually take 1,3 yearsto be recovered (2003:9).However, when we turn to the work ong>ofong> experts in the economics field, wecan find that most ong>ofong> the researchers coincide in explaining the drastic increase inmigration levels as a result ong>ofong> a concurrence ong>ofong> circumstances, one ong>ofong> which wasthe effects ong>ofong> 1997-1998 El Niño event, that hit forcibly the production ong>ofong>agriculture ong>andong> fisheries - the first economic sector in Ecuadorean exports. Threeother events noted were:(1) The financial crisis after a general failure ong>ofong> the credit system ong>ofong> thecountry, after a general financial crisis in the whole Latin American bank system(although triggered in SE Asia), that led to a decrease ong>ofong> credit funds available toboth public ong>andong> private banks;(2) The striking collapse ong>ofong> the international prices ong>ofong> oil - the second mostimportant income for Ecuador's international balance ong>ofong> trade - that reachedhistorically low levels, thus diminishing the Ecuadorean state budget by about 4%ong>ofong> GPD in 1998 ong>andong> 1999;(3) The political instability ong>andong>, thus, the lack ong>ofong> a well-defined economicpolicy to face the crisis ong>andong> the increase ong>ofong> the huge external debt.From the literature therefore, we can conclude that it is likely thatenvironmental factors influenced the Ecuadorean migratory explosion ong>ofong> the lastyears ong>ofong> 20th century (Goycoechea ong>andong> Ramírez Gallegos 2002: 34-35). There isalso some research available in which a link between the 1997 El Niño event ong>andong>migration has been established in other regions ong>ofong> Latin America (Retana ong>andong>Villalobos Flores 2003). As these authors pointed out in their conclusions thatmigration tends to appear when the impact ong>ofong> the climatic event damages the levelong>ofong> "social comfort" ong>ofong> the most vulnerable populations -understood as a mix ong>ofong>household income level ong>andong> regularity, ong>andong> the capacity ong>ofong> the whole society todeal with the damage inflicted on public infrastructures.148

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010The 1997-1998 El Niño in the province ong>ofong> Los Ríos. Fieldwork resultsThe results ong>ofong> the fieldwork seem to indicate that, at least in the casestudied in the province ong>ofong> Los Ríos, El Niño transformed migratory patterns. Half ong>ofong>the surface ong>ofong> the province, including a large part ong>ofong> the long>andong>s used for agricultureong>andong> farming, is located in an area with high level ong>ofong> risk ong>ofong> floods. One ong>ofong> the mainclimatic outcomes ong>ofong> El Niño episodes in Ecuador is the increase ong>ofong> precipitationong>andong> the intensification ong>ofong> flood risk. 4 ong>ofong> the 11 cantons ong>ofong> the province sufferedthe maximum level ong>ofong> damage, 6 the medium, ong>andong> only 2 minor overflowing ong>ofong>rivers (Vos, Velasco ong>andong> Labastida 1999:5). During 1997 ong>andong> 1998, a series ong>ofong>recurrent floods were experienced in the province, with two main features: theirextremely high intensity, stronger than other previous floods; ong>andong> their persistence- as they lasted two years. As a consequence, crops were lost ong>andong> most ong>ofong> thelivestock were drowned or killed by the spread ong>ofong> diseases caused by water-relatedvectors. As noted by Vos, Velasco ong>andong> Labastida (1999):The rural population ong>ofong> the province ong>ofong> Los Ríos, where many farmers are engagedin the production ong>ofong> rice ong>andong> corn, was hardest hit by El Niño. Foregoneagricultural income amounts to 25% ong>ofong> mean consumption ong>ofong> rural households inthis province. We estimate a rise in the incidence ong>ofong> rural poverty ong>ofong> 18.6percentage points, increasing the number ong>ofong> poor by 53,000.All the interviewees stated in the surveys that they had previousexperiences ong>ofong> migration in their ong>andong>/or their families' lives. In the first case, wheninterviewees were giving an account ong>ofong> their own personal experiences, all ong>ofong> themclaimed to have participated in previous internal migratory movements withinEcuador, mainly in two forms:- ong>Migrationong> from rural to urban areas within the same province, from smallsettlements or caseríos to the small- ong>andong> medium-size urban centers ong>ofong> theprovince (especially the capital, Babahoyo, ong>andong> other towns like Quevedo orVinces). These movements have tended to be permanent.- ong>Migrationong> out ong>ofong> the province to other regions ong>ofong> Ecuador, mainly toGuayaquil - only 75 km away from the town ong>ofong> Babahoyo -, but also to Quito or tothe Oriente. These movements have tended to be temporary or even circular. Forinstance, two ong>ofong> the interviewees declared that they worked half ong>ofong> the year intheir town ong>ofong> origin, Palenque, as farmers or agriculturalists, but spent at least fivemonths every year in Guayaquil, working on the construction.149

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010It is very interesting to note the timing ong>ofong> these low-distance ong>andong>pendulating migratory movements. All ong>ofong> those who were undertaking circularmigration recognized that they started migrating - or migrating more ong>ofong>ten, in thecase ong>ofong> those that claimed previous migratory experiences - "cuong>andong>o lo del Niño"("by the time the El Niño happened"), in reference to the 1997-1998 event. Alsoremarkable is the use ong>ofong> the Spanish expression quoted above, that somehowseems to convey an implicit acceptance ong>ofong> the links between the climatic event ong>andong>the decision to migrate. At the same time, all the interviewees claim to haverelatives living abroad. In all the cases, the departure ong>ofong> the international emigrantshad happened after 1998; none ong>ofong> them before. Another interesting feature is thegreat number ong>ofong> women that participated in this international flow; in contrastwith the internal one, mainly protagonized by males: according to INEC, 59.95% ong>ofong>Los Rios migration abroad (2001) was composed ong>ofong> women. A bit surprisingly,almost none ong>ofong> them stated, in the first instance, a link between environmentalproblems ong>andong> their migratory experience. In fact, the only one that agreed with thisidea, actually accepted the environment as a cause, not to emigrate but to comeback, when he explained that he had decided to return from Guayaquil "because ong>ofong>the noise ong>andong> pollution, life was very hard for me. I earned a lot there, but I didn'tlike it at all so I returned". Pollution, for instance, was for many a key reason whyliving in rural areas was preferable to living in urban areas, even thoughcontamination because ong>ofong> fertilizers in pesticides is a crucial problem in agriculturalareas ong>ofong> the Costa.After further questioning, it became apparent however that crops ong>andong>livestock were the key to the relationship between environment ong>andong> migration.When they were asked about the reasons that impelled them or their relatives tomigrate, there was unanimity in citing the failure ong>ofong> crops, massive deaths ong>ofong>livestock ong>andong>, thus, the dramatic decrease ong>ofong> the family income ong>andong> the availabilityong>ofong> economic resources as the main factor that made them take the decision. Evenin the only case in which the survey was not answered by an agriculturalist or afarmer but an artisan from Palenque, the same problems lay behind, as the generallack ong>ofong> purchasing capacity ong>ofong> their clients also hit him strongly ong>andong> obliged him togo away to find supplementary income: "... lots ong>ofong> my clients got totally ruined, sothey couldn't buy the tools I made anymore. Sales dropped ong>ofong>f ong>andong> I had to give upworking for a time. Wait for better times. So I went to Quito to work with a brotherong>ofong> mine that has a shop there". So we can deduce that these migrations were150

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010caused by an economic problem with underlying environmental factors. It wasneither the El Niño event itself, nor their effects in some aspects that can lessen lifequality such as the destruction ong>ofong> infrastructure like roads or the spread ong>ofong>infectious diseases, the main driver ong>ofong> migration, but its effect on local ong>andong> familyeconomies.Actually, the 1997-1998 El Niño event was not the first time when floodshad hit the province. Because ong>ofong> this, the local population had developed ways toadapt to the recurrent floods for a long time. In the words ong>ofong> Mayte Labayru fromthe Basque Country-based NGO Elizbarrutietako Mixioak (Interview, August 2008),long time established at the region, referring to the floods that happened in March2008 in Los Ríos.Even though the most damaged people have been obliged to take refuge in severalprovisional camps, most ong>ofong> the inhabitants haven't needed such aid, as they use tobuild palafitos (stilt houses or pile dwellings) or two-floor houses to live in; sowhen the flood comes, they just remain upstairs until water backs down. Peopleknow how to face flood: if they need to go out from home, they just swim, or usetheir canoes, or construct puentes-balsa (raft bridges) to cross the flooded areas.Even for the kids these are amazing times, as they don't have to go to school ong>andong>can go swimming just in front ong>ofong> home. Usually livestock doesn't suffer very much,if there is a normal flood, as they are also used ong>andong> can keep eating the plantsunderwater. (..) If the flood doesn't last very long, no major damage is done tocrops.The main difference between the 1997-1998 El Niño ong>andong> other previousevents lay in the intensity ong>andong> duration ong>ofong> the floods that extended beyond thecoping capacities ong>andong> the limits ong>ofong> the traditional ways ong>ofong> adaptation. For instance,the accumulation ong>ofong> successive losses ong>ofong> crops for two years finally drained thehouseholds' reserves prepared to prevent the damages based on the outcomes ong>ofong>previous, shorter floods. So this could explain the delay ong>ofong> approximately one yearbetween the El Niño event ong>andong> the outbreak ong>ofong> massive migration. Moreover, someexperts also highlight the increase ong>ofong> deforestation from the 1970s, a process thathas worsened the effects ong>ofong> extreme events as droughts ong>andong> floods (Interview toJuan Ramon Etxebarria from Elizbarrutietako Mixioak, October 2008).The acquired experience ong>ofong> previous floods also made migration happen intwo stages. At first, the redistribution ong>ofong> the population was driven throughtraditional patterns, intensifying internal flows within Ecuador, from rural to urbanareas, ong>andong> from small to big or growing cities. Since the environmental problems151

Óscar ÁLVAREZ GILA, Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI, Virginia LÓPEZ DE MATURANAJIMS – Volume 4, number 1, 2010were not the only problems effecting the country however, which by that time wasinvolved in a more serious economic crisis, the capacity ong>ofong> Ecuadorean economy tocope with the internal redistribution ong>ofong> the population diminished quickly. Themigratory pressure finally gave way a sudden start ong>ofong> international migration,primarily to Spain, helped by other two circumstances: the exceptional good shapeong>ofong> Spanish economy within the EU, that had recently commenced an ascendingcycle, ong>andong> the actual reduction ong>ofong> the prices ong>ofong> international air transportation fromthe start ong>ofong> the 1990s, that improved the access ong>ofong> wider sectors ong>ofong> Ecuadoreansociety to the use ong>ofong> this travel system. Finally the possibility ong>ofong> an easierintegration in the host society also resulted in Spain being a main destination forEcuadorean emigrants.In consequence, the 1997-1998 El Niño acted as a trigger for the outbreakong>ofong> migration to Europe from the province ong>ofong> Los Ríos. As a result ong>ofong> the damage tothe economy produced by the extreme features ong>ofong> this climatic event, exacerbatedby the general downturn ong>ofong> the Ecuadorean economy, internal redistribution ong>ofong>population was no longer sufficient for improving the livelihoods ong>ofong> the peopleaffected. Europe, or more precisely, Spain, emerged as a new solution. Once the ElNiño event ong>andong> its outcomes disappeared, migration did not cease but continued,because ong>ofong> the implementation ong>ofong> new, successful migratory networks that startedoperating autonomously from the external triggers that had created them, dueespecially to the pull effect exerted by the economic differential between Ecuadorong>andong> the new places where Ecuadorean immigrants had become rooted. So thepersistence ong>ofong> migratory networks between Los Ríos ong>andong> other regions ong>ofong> Ecuadoror Europe, even if they were eventually frozen because ong>ofong> an adverse economicsituation, could be reactivated in the future when other environmental dangermake them necessary again. In fact, it seems that they have already beenreactivated at least once again so far, if the statement made by the NGO volunteersin Los Ríos is true ong>andong> the floods ong>ofong> March 2008 have really "caused migrations totowns ong>andong> cities."ReferencesAierdi, X, N. Basabe, C. Blanco, ong>andong> J.A. Oleaga (2008). Población latinoamericana en la CAPV 2007,Zarautz (Spain), Ikuspegi.Albornoz Guarderas, Vicente ong>andong> José Hidalgo Pallarés (2007). Características provinciales de lamigración ecuatoriana, paper presented at the Encuentro Nacional Historia del Azuay, Cuenca(Ecuador), May.152

ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> Environment in Los Ríos, EcuadorJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Álvarez Velasco, Soledad (2007). Oyacoto, Calderón y el DMQ en el marco de la relación migraciónciudad,paper presented at the Congreso de Sociología organised by the Pontificia UniversidadCatólica del Ecuador, Quito, May.Anguiano Téllez, María Eugenia (2002). Emigración reciente de latinoamericanos a España: Trayectoriaslaborales y movilidad ocupacional, Gaceta Laboral, Venezuela, 8(3): 411- 424.CAF [=Corporación Andina de Fomento] (2000). El Fenómeno El Niño, 1997- 1998. Memoria, Retos ySoluciones, Caracas, CAF-CEPAL . IV.Camacho, Gloria (2004) Feminización de las migraciones en Ecuador, in Hidalgo, Francisco, ed.Migraciones: un juego con las cartas marcadas, Quito, Abya-Yala/ILDIS/PMCD.Dalmasso, E. ong>andong> P. Fillon (19729. Aspectos de la organización espacial del Ecuador, Revista Mexicana deSociología, México D.F., 24(1): 75-94.De la Vega, Pablo A. (2006). El fenómeno migratorio en el Ecuador, in Informe Interamericano deMigraciones del Observatorio Control Interamericano de los derechos de los y las migrantes,Santiago de Chile, OCIM: 172-185.García-Calvo Rosell, Carola (2006). Las relaciones bilaterales España- Ecuador: situación actual yperspectivas de futuro, Real Instituto Elcano.Gómez Quintero, Juan David (2005). La emigración latinoamericana: contexto global y asentamiento enEspaña, Acciones e Investigaciones Sociales, Madrid, 21: 157-194Goycoechea, Alba ong>andong> Franklin Ramírez Gallegos (2002). Se fue, ¿a volver? Imaginarios, familia y redessociales en la migración ecuatoriana a España. 1997-2000, Iconos, Quito, 14: 32-45.Jokisch, Brad (2002). ong>Migrationong> ong>andong> long>andong>-use change in the highlong>andong>s ong>ofong> South-Central Ecuador, paperpresented at the 3rd European Congress ong>ofong> Latinoamericanists, Amsterdam, July 2002.Pedone, Claudia (2003). ‘Tú siempre jalas a los tuyos’. Cadenas y redes migratorias de las familiasecuatorianas hacia España, Barcelona, Universidad Autónoma.Pedone, Claudia (2006). Los cambios familiares y educativos en los actuales contextos migratoriosecuatorianos: una perspectiva transatlántica, Athenea Digital, 10: 154-171. Available athttp://antalya.uab.ed/athenea/num10/pedone.pdf.Pereda, Carlos ong>andong> Miguel Ángel de Prado (2003). Migraciones internacionales, La Insignia. DiarioIndependiente Iberoamericano, Madrid. Available at http://www.lainsignia.orgPetit-Breuilh Sepúlveda, María Eugenia (2004). Desastres naturales y ocupación del territorio enHispanoamérica, Huelva. Spain. Universidad de Huelva.Pujadas, Joan J. ong>andong> Julie Massal (2002). Migraciones ecuatorianas a España: procesos de inserción yclaroscuros, Iconos, Quito, 14: 67-87.Ramírez Gallegos, Franklin ong>andong> Jacques Paul Ramírez (2005). La estampida migratoria ecuatoriana. Crisis,redes transnacionales y repertorios de acción migratoria, Quito, Centro de InvestigacionesCiudad.Retana, José Alberto ong>andong> Roberto Villalobos Flores (2003). Impacto del fenómeno de El Niño. Unrecuento de 1977-1978, Top. Meteoro. Oceanog., 10(1): 36-40.Rosero, Iliana ong>andong> Manuel González (2003). Indicencia del fenómeno El Niño en la actividad económicadel Ecuador. Un análisis de series de tiempo, Revista Tecnológica, Quito 16(2): 3-9.Vos, Rob Margarita Velasco ong>andong> Edgar de Labastida (1999). Economic ong>andong> Social Effects ong>ofong> El Niño inEcuador, Washington D.C., Inter-American Development Bank.153

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORSÓscar ÁLVAREZ GILA is Visiting Fellow at European ong>Studiesong> ong>Centreong>, St. Antony'sCollege, University ong>ofong> Oxford. Address: 70, Woodstock road, Oxford OX2 6JF;United Kingdom. Phone: +44 (0) 7532268979, Email: oalvarez@euskaltel.netMohamed BENITTO is affiliated with Université du Maine, France. Email :mohamed.benitto@univ-lemans.frBéatrice BOUFOY-BASTICK is affiliated with the Department ong>ofong> Liberal Arts,University ong>ofong> the West Indies, St. Augustine campus, Trinidad ong>andong> Tobago. Email:bboufoybastick@gmail.comTamirace FAKHOURY is a ong>Researchong> Assistant to European-MediterraneanConsortium for Applied ong>Researchong> on International ong>Migrationong> at Robert Schumanong>Centreong> for Advanced ong>Studiesong>, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. Email:tamirace.fakhoury@eui.euNaoto HIGUCHI is an associate prong>ofong>essor ong>ofong> sociology at University ong>ofong> Tokushima,Japan. He is co-author ong>andong> editor ong>ofong> the following books in Japanese: ReflexiveModernization ong>andong> Political Change (Minerva Shobo, 2008), Crossing Borders:Sociological Analysis ong>ofong> Muslims in Japan (Seikyusha, 2007), Invisible Residents:Japanese Brazilians vis-à-vis State, Market ong>andong> Immigrant Network (University ong>ofong>Nagoya Press, 2005), Sociology ong>ofong> Social Movement (Yuhikaku, 2004), SocialMovements in the Public Sphere (Seibundo, 2004). Email: LÓPEZ DE MATURANA is ong>Researchong>er at Department ong>ofong> ContemporaryHistory, University ong>ofong> the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain. Address: Faculty ong>ofong>Letters, Paseo de la Universidad, 5, 01006 Vitoria-Gasteiz; Spain. Phone: +34609.279.788. Email: vlmaturana@hotmail.comRitendra TAMANG currently teaches in the Department ong>ofong> Anthropology, KwantlenPolytechnic University in BC, Canada. His research interests include internationaldevelopment, migration, multiculturalism ong>andong> mass media. Email:ritendratamang@yahoo.caChuie-Hong TAN is a Lecturer at Faculty ong>ofong> Information Technology, MultimediaUniversity, Malaysia. Her primary research interest includes international migration,demography, focusing on the statistical data analysis. She is a member ong>ofong> IUSSP(International Union for the Scientific Study in Population). Email:

Notes on ContributorsJIMS - Volume 4, number 1, 2010Ana UGALDE ZARATIEGUI is Prong>ofong>essor at the Department ong>ofong> Geography, Universityong>ofong> the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain. Address: Faculty ong>ofong> Letters, Paseo dela Universidad, 5, 01006 Vitoria-Gasteiz; Spain. Phone:+34 945.013.999, Email:ana.ugalde@ehu.esHabiba ZAMAN is Prong>ofong>essor in the Department ong>ofong> Women’s ong>Studiesong> at Simon FraserUniversity, British Columbia, Canada, where she teaches women in the economy,immigrants, women, ong>andong> transnational migration, gender ong>andong> internationaldevelopment, ong>andong> women in cross-cultural perspectives. Zaman is the author ong>ofong>Breaking the Iron Wall: Decommodification ong>andong> Immigrant Women’s Labor in Canada(2006) ong>andong> Workplace Rights for Immigrants in BC: The Case ong>ofong> Filipino Workers (2007).She has published in journals such as Women’s ong>Studiesong> International Forum,International ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Canadian ong>Studiesong>, Atlantis, ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Contemporary Asia,Canadian ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> Development ong>Studiesong>, Asian Prong>ofong>ile ong>andong> ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> DevelopingAreas.155

ong>Journalong> ong>ofong> ong>Identityong> ong>andong> ong>Migrationong> ong>Studiesong>Volume 4, number 1, 2010GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORSManuscripts will be accepted with the understong>andong>ing that their content isunpublished previously. If any part ong>ofong> an article or essay has already beenpublished, or is to be published elsewhere, the author must inform the ong>Journalong> atthe time ong>ofong> submission. Please find below the stong>andong>ard requirements that have tobe fulfilled so that your material can be accepted for publication in JIMS: The ideal length ong>ofong> an article (written in English) is from 4 000 to 8 000words, including a 200-word abstract in English, keywords, ong>andong> a very briefautobiographical note or resume The number ong>ofong> bibliographic references should be within reasonable limits The inclusion ong>ofong> tables, charts or figures is welcome in support ong>ofong> thescientific argumentation All articles should be presented in Microsong>ofong>t Office Word format, TimesNew Roman, 12, at 1.5 lines, ong>andong> will be sent to the e-mail ong>andong> a copy to mentioning"Manuscript Submission: [TITLE OF ARTICLE]" Book reviews are welcomed to be published in JIMS, but no longer than2000 words Contributions are welcomed at any time ong>ofong> the year ong>andong> will be consideredfor the next issues The editors reserve the right to edit the articles or to modify/eliminatesome fragments, observing the original sense. The extensive use ong>ofong> a too technical language or mathematic formulaeshould be avoided Footnotes (no endnotes); References ong>andong> bibliography (Chicago Style ong>ofong> Citation).For more details please visit the Guidelines for Authors page on the website ong>ofong> JIMSat:

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