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the thrown [sic]’ as far as the VdU is concerned; that they are actually giving Kraus… all orders.” 70What was the VdU agenda? According to Schwarzkopf, “Dr. Kraus and his VdUare completely pan-German in their orientation.” They favored a united Germanyjoined with Austria. Kraus had frequent meetings with members of the DeutscheUnion in Germany, particularly former Wehrmacht officers, who, according toSchwarzkopf, “look upon the founding of the VdU as a trial run for a similarmovement in Germany.” Kraus, meanwhile, was sure that the VdU would gain atleast 30 percent of the vote and that even ÖVP and SPÖ functionaries would defectto the VdU shortly before the election. The victory, he said, would be “of landslideproportions.” VdU intelligence officers including Höttl were “almost exclusivelyNazis,” who followed the tactics to undermine the Austrian government that hadproven successful in 1938. 71 Karl von Winkler told CIC investigators that “…theVdU, as it stands today and has always stood, is pan-German and antisemitic inintent … Dr. Kraus is completely swayed by his Nazi advisors.” 72As the October 1949 elections drew closer, others showed increased concern.Andreas Rohrbacher, the Archbishop of Salzburg, with whom Kraus had beenfriendly, now admonished Kraus. “Your party,” said the Archbishop, “will materiallyweaken the conservative front and thus increase the power of the leftist parties…. Ihave misgivings about some points of your program, which sound rather radical,and then also because of the incorrigible Nazis … you are providing cover for agroup of people now who, sooner or later, will show their real face….” 73The ÖVP launched a press campaign against the VdU hinting that Krauswas a CIC agent and that his party was a front for a Nazi resurgence. The CICworried that Kraus and other intelligence contacts would be compromised. “Sucha campaign,” wrote Major Milano, “can be a serious blow to US intelligence as wellas result in the loss of a large financial investment. Dr. Krause [sic] is definitely along-range proposition.” Milano also worried that Krause could retaliate againstthe ÖVP’s own intelligence connections that had a Nazi taint. The entire feudcould have major repercussions, which, according to Maj. J. V. Milano, could “killone third of the USFA [what is this organization?] intelligence effort….” 74Instead, the CIC managed its own campaign. Dr. Gustav Canaval was theconservative editor of the Salzburger Nachrichten, the first licensed newspaperin the U.S. zone of Austria. He had been a friend of Kurt von Schusschnigg,The CIC and Right-Wing Shadow Politics | 65