UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Securities Class Action Services
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Securities Class Action Services
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT - Securities Class Action Services
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IN THE <strong>UNITED</strong> <strong>STATES</strong> <strong>DISTRICT</strong> <strong>COURT</strong><br />
FOR THE <strong>DISTRICT</strong> OF DELAWARE<br />
--------------------------------------x<br />
GERALD LEVINE, individually and :<br />
on behalf of all others similarly :<br />
situated, :<br />
:<br />
Plaintiff, :<br />
:<br />
v. :<br />
:<br />
METAL RECOVERY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., : C.A. No. 96-525<br />
formerly known as MALVY TECHNOLOGY, :<br />
INC., JACK ALEXANDER, MICHAEL LUCAS, : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED<br />
MICHEL RABHI, GARY SALTER, SGA :<br />
GOLDSTAR RESEARCH, INC., BARRON :<br />
CHASE SECURITIES, INC., EURO- :<br />
ATLANTIC SECURITIES, INC., LA JOLLA :<br />
CAPITAL CORP., COHIG & ASSOCIATES, :<br />
GRUNTAL AND COMPANY, INC., LARRY :<br />
TURRELL, DONALD HENDERSON, TOM :<br />
BROZEL, SIMON D. BAIER, DAVID W. :<br />
D'ANDREA, JOSEPH MICELLI, JR., and :<br />
NICOLAS J. GIANDOMENICO, :<br />
:<br />
Defendants. :<br />
--------------------------------------x<br />
follows:<br />
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT<br />
Plaintiff, by his counsel, alleges for his Complaint as<br />
JURISDICTION AND VENUE<br />
1. This action seeks redress on behalf of plaintiff and all<br />
others similarly situated for losses they sustained as a result of<br />
defendants' manipulation of the market in and misleading statements<br />
and omissions of material facts relating to the stock of Malvy<br />
Technology, Inc. ("Malvy" or "the Company")(now known as Metal<br />
Recovery Technologies, Inc. or "MRTI"). This action is brought
pursuant to Sections 9, 10(b), and 20 of the <strong>Securities</strong> Exchange<br />
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. sections 78i, 78j(b), and 78t, and Rule 10b-<br />
5(1)-(3) promulgated by the <strong>Securities</strong> and Exchange Commission<br />
("SEC") thereunder.<br />
2. Beginning no later than early 1993, defendants Michael<br />
Lucas, Michel Rabhi and Jack Alexander conspired with others<br />
identified below to swindle open market purchasers of the stock of<br />
Malvy (then known as Sphinx Natural Resources, Inc.). Their scheme<br />
ultimately defrauded investors of many millions of dollars, much of<br />
which eventually lined the pockets of defendants and their co-<br />
conspirators.<br />
3. The scheme was a simple one. First, the conspirators<br />
caused Malvy to enter into an agreement to acquire 100% of the<br />
stock of a French Company, Malvy France, for $32,500,000. In fact,<br />
defendants acquired Malvy France from an entity which they<br />
controlled, and most of the purported purchase price in reality<br />
came back to them.<br />
4. In order to pay for the acquisition of Malvy France,<br />
defendants Alexander, Lucas and Rabhi purportedly caused the<br />
Company to issue 16,250,000 shares under SEC Regulation "S" to<br />
foreign investors for $2 per share. In fact, much of that stock<br />
was purchased by defendants through various affiliates. Defendants<br />
then pumped up the price of Malvy's stock through a series of acts<br />
including false and misleading public statements and also bribes to<br />
stock traders and brokers. As the price of Malvy's stock soared in<br />
late 1993 and early 1994, defendants unlawfully dumped their<br />
2
unregistered stock on unwitting investors, reaping huge profits.<br />
Ultimately, Malvy's stock price crashed, leaving the investing<br />
public holding stock of little value.<br />
5. This Court has jurisdiction of this action under Section<br />
27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. section 78aa, and pursuant to 28<br />
U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1337.<br />
6. Malvy is incorporated under the laws of the State of<br />
Delaware. Certain of the omissions and misrepresentations<br />
complained of herein were omitted from or contained in documents<br />
and/or wires disseminated within this jurisdiction. In addition,<br />
by knowingly manipulating the market in, and misrepresenting facts<br />
relating to, a Delaware corporation, defendants have transacted<br />
business within this jurisdiction. Accordingly, venue is proper in<br />
this District.<br />
7. The fraud alleged herein was perpetrated in large measure<br />
by means of the mails, the telephone and other instrumentalities of<br />
interstate commerce. During the class period, Malvy's common stock<br />
was traded on the NASDAQ National Market System.<br />
PARTIES<br />
8. Plaintiff, Gerald Levine, is an individual who resides in<br />
Brooklyn, New York, and is a citizen of the State of New York.<br />
Plaintiff Levine purchased 16,000 shares of Malvy common stock at<br />
various times during the period from November 1, 1993 through and<br />
including May 24, 1995 (the "<strong>Class</strong> Period"), beginning with the<br />
3
purchase of 2,000 shares on November 1, 1993 and ending with the<br />
purchase of 10,000 shares on October 18, 1994. As a result of the<br />
fraud alleged herein, plaintiff Levine purchased Malvy stock at<br />
prices that were artificially inflated and he thereby sustained<br />
substantial damages.<br />
9. Defendant Malvy, now known as Metal Recovery<br />
Technologies, Inc., is a corporation organized under the laws of<br />
the State of Delaware with its principal executive offices<br />
presently located in East Chicago, Indiana. Over the last five<br />
years, the Company has engaged in a number of businesses, none of<br />
them profitably.<br />
10. Defendant Michael Lucas ("Lucas") became a Director and<br />
Chairman of the Board of Malvy on or about October 20, 1994 and<br />
continued to hold those positions through the end of the <strong>Class</strong><br />
Period. Prior to October 20, 1994, defendant Lucas did not<br />
formally hold a position with the Company, but at all material<br />
times he had the ability to and did in fact significantly influence<br />
the Company's affairs.<br />
11. Defendant Jack Alexander is a Fort Smith, Arkansas based<br />
promoter who owned a controlling interest in Malvy (then known as<br />
Sphinx) until April 1993. Thereafter, he continued to control Malvy<br />
through his beneficial ownership of 100% of the Company's Series A<br />
Preferred Stock, which gave him the power to elect a majority of<br />
the Company's Board of Directors. Two members of that Board, David<br />
Hoyle and Tony Viele, were his associates and nominees.<br />
4<br />
12. Defendant Michel Rabhi, with defendant Lucas, owned a
controlling block of Malvy's common stock through their ownership<br />
and control of Vaughan Investments. Although Rabhi never served as<br />
an officer or director of Malvy, he and defendant Lucas had the<br />
ability to and in fact controlled the Company's affairs. At all<br />
relevant times following April 1993, a majority of Malvy's Board of<br />
directors, as well as its executive officers, were appointed by and<br />
served at the behest of defendants Lucas and Rabhi.<br />
13. Each of the foregoing individual defendants, by reason of<br />
their management and board positions and ownership of stock, were<br />
"controlling" persons of Malvy within the meaning of Section 20 of<br />
the Exchange Act and had the power and influence to control Malvy<br />
and exercised same to cause Malvy to engage in the acts complained<br />
of herein.<br />
14. Each of the foregoing individual defendants, because of<br />
their respective positions, had access to adverse non-public<br />
information about the business and finances and the future business<br />
prospects of Malvy and acted to conceal the same in violation of<br />
their statutory and common law duties, as particularized below.<br />
15. Defendant Gary Salter ("Salter") was a stock promoter who<br />
worked through a Boca Raton, Florida company called Corporate Asset<br />
Management, Inc. ("CAM"). In or about March 1993, defendant Salter<br />
conspired with defendants Lucas and Rabhi to manipulate and inflate<br />
the price of Malvy stock by means of false and misleading public<br />
statements and also bribes to stock traders and brokers.<br />
16. Defendant SGA Goldstar Research, Inc. ("Goldstar")<br />
5
publishes a Nashville, Tennessee based stock newsletter service<br />
called "SGA Goldstar Whisper Stocks." Goldstar's principals<br />
conspired with defendant Salter to fraudulently promote Malvy's<br />
stock and were paid for doing so.<br />
17. Defendant Barron Chase <strong>Securities</strong>, Inc., is a Boca Raton,<br />
Florida stock brokerage firm that made a market in Malvy stock. At<br />
least one of the firm's traders, Larry Turrell, and a number of its<br />
brokers, including David W. D'Andrea, Joseph Micelli, Jr. and<br />
Nicolas J. Giandomenico, were bribed by defendant Salter to<br />
manipulate the market for Malvy's stock.<br />
18. Defendant Euro-Atlantic <strong>Securities</strong>, Inc. is a Boca Raton<br />
based stock brokerage firm that made a market in Malvy stock. A<br />
number of the firm's brokers, including Simon D. Baier, and one of<br />
its traders were bribed by defendant Salter to manipulate the<br />
market for Malvy's stock.<br />
19. Defendant La Jolla Capital Corp. ("LJCC") is a San Diego<br />
based investment firm that made a market in Malvy stock. A number<br />
of the firm's brokers were bribed by defendant Salter to manipulate<br />
the market for Malvy's stock.<br />
20. Defendant Cohig and Associates ("Cohig") is a Chicago<br />
based brokerage firm. At least one of Cohig's brokers, Donald<br />
Henderson, was bribed by defendant Salter to manipulate the price<br />
of Malvy's stock.<br />
21. Defendant Gruntal and Company, Inc. ("Gruntal") is a New<br />
6<br />
York City based brokerage firm. At least one of Gruntal's brokers,<br />
Tom Brozel, was bribed by defendant Salter to manipulate the price
of Malvy's stock.<br />
22. Defendants Gary Salter, Goldstar, Barron Chase, Euro-<br />
Atlantic, LJCC, Cohig and Gruntal are sued individually and as co-<br />
conspirators, and the liability of each arises from the fact that<br />
each conspired to and engaged in all or part of the unlawful acts,<br />
plans, schemes or transactions to defraud alleged herein.<br />
23. The acts in furtherance of the conspiracy by<br />
representatives of defendants Goldstar, Barron Chase, Euro-<br />
Atlantic, LJCC, Cohig and Gruntal were all ones which those<br />
representatives had the actual and/or apparent authority to<br />
perform, were within the scope of their employment, were of the<br />
kind they were authorized to perform, and were actuated at least in<br />
part by a desire to serve their employers, and therefor the entity<br />
defendants are liable for their acts pursuant to the doctrine of<br />
respondent superior.<br />
24. Defendants Goldstar, Barron Chase, Euro-Atlantic, LJCC,<br />
Cohig and Gruntal were in a position to control the fraudulent<br />
conduct in question, but failed to do so.<br />
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS<br />
25. This action is brought as a class action under Rules<br />
23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.<br />
26. The <strong>Class</strong> is defined as and consists of all persons or<br />
7<br />
entities who purchased the common stock of Malvy on the open market<br />
between November 1, 1993 and May 24, 1995, inclusive ("the <strong>Class</strong>").
The <strong>Class</strong> is specifically defined to exclude defendants, their<br />
affiliates, members of the families of the individual defendants,<br />
any entity in which any of the defendants has a controlling<br />
interest, and the legal representatives, heirs, successors or<br />
assigns of any of the foregoing.<br />
27. In excess of fifty million shares of Malvy were traded<br />
between November 1, 1993 and May 24, 1995 ("the <strong>Class</strong> Period").<br />
Upon information and belief, plaintiff alleges that there are in<br />
excess of 1,000 geographically dispersed members of the <strong>Class</strong>.<br />
Thus, the <strong>Class</strong> is so numerous that joinder of all of its members<br />
would be impracticable.<br />
28. Plaintiff is a member of the <strong>Class</strong>, has sustained<br />
damages, is committed to pursuing this action, and has retained<br />
competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature.<br />
Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the <strong>Class</strong> in that he has<br />
the same interests as all of the members of the <strong>Class</strong>, and he will<br />
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the <strong>Class</strong>.<br />
29. The claims asserted on behalf of plaintiff are typical of<br />
those asserted on behalf of the <strong>Class</strong>.<br />
30. There are questions of law and fact common to the <strong>Class</strong>,<br />
including the following:<br />
(a) whether the defendants herein made misleading<br />
statements and omissions of fact regarding Malvy's business,<br />
finances and prospects during the <strong>Class</strong> Period;<br />
were material;<br />
8<br />
(b) whether the defendants' misstatements and omissions
Malvy's stock;<br />
(c) whether defendants manipulated the market for<br />
(d) whether defendants acted with scienter;<br />
(e) whether defendants' acts had the purpose and effect<br />
of artificially inflating the market price of Malvy stock<br />
throughout the <strong>Class</strong> Period;<br />
(f) whether defendants, in order to effectuate and in<br />
connection with such course of conduct, engaged in acts or conduct<br />
in violation of Sections 9, 10(b) and/or 20 of the Exchange Act;<br />
and<br />
claims.<br />
(g) the measure of damages applicable to plaintiff's<br />
31. The aforesaid questions of fact and law are common to the<br />
<strong>Class</strong> and predominate over questions affecting only individual<br />
members. A class action is superior to other available methods for<br />
the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.<br />
32. The likelihood of members of the <strong>Class</strong> prosecuting<br />
separate individual actions is remote due to the relatively small<br />
losses suffered by each <strong>Class</strong> member as compared to the losses<br />
suffered by the <strong>Class</strong> as a whole and compared to the burden and<br />
expense of prosecuting litigation of this nature and magnitude.<br />
Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the management of this case.<br />
9<br />
OPERATIVE FACTS<br />
33. Malvy was incorporated in Delaware as Sphinx Mining Inc.<br />
on May 4, 1990. The Company changed its name to Sphinx Natural
Resources, Inc. on June 28, 1991 and changed its name to Malvy on<br />
June 14, 1993. It adopted its present name, MRTI, on June 30,<br />
1995.<br />
34. Until mid-1993, the Company, then known as Sphinx Natural<br />
Resources, Inc., was engaged primarily in the businesses of mining<br />
and developing precious metals in Alaska, the production of oil and<br />
gas in Oklahoma and New Mexico, and the transmission of gas through<br />
a pipeline in Oklahoma. Those businesses were not profitable. The<br />
Company was controlled at that time by defendant Alexander, who<br />
served as its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.<br />
35. In or about early 1993, defendants Lucas and Rabhi<br />
entered into a conspiracy with defendant Alexander (collectively,<br />
Lucas, Rabhi, and Alexander are referred to as "the insider<br />
defendants") to take control of Malvy (then known as Sphinx),<br />
promote the price of the stock, and swindle unsuspecting investors.<br />
Their scheme ultimately defrauded investors of many millions of<br />
dollars, much of which lined the insider defendants' pockets and<br />
those of their co-conspirators.<br />
36. In furtherance of their conspiracy, in or about April,<br />
1993, defendant Alexander sold 790,000 shares of Malvy common stock<br />
to Vaughan Investments, a British company controlled by defendants<br />
Lucas and Rabhi. At or about that time, defendant Alexander<br />
resigned his positions with the Company, and defendants Lucas and<br />
Rabhi, with Alexander's consent, appointed Stephen Smith, William<br />
10<br />
Greenwood, and Roy Pearce as their nominees to the Company's Board.<br />
37. Although Alexander resigned his positions with the
Company, two of his nominees, Tony Viele and David Hoyle, remained<br />
as officers of the Company and on Malvy's Board. Moreover,<br />
defendant Alexander retained beneficial ownership of 100% of the<br />
Company's Series A Preferred stock, which entitled him to elect a<br />
majority of the Company's Board. Alexander thereby retained<br />
control of the Company.<br />
38. In or about April 1993, the insider defendants caused the<br />
Company to issue 800,000 shares of unregistered stock to certain<br />
"offshore entities" at the price of $1.00 per share. Most, if not<br />
all, of that stock was purchased by affiliates of defendants Lucas<br />
and Rabhi.<br />
39. In furtherance of their scheme, the insider defendants<br />
caused the Company to enter into an agreement to acquire control of<br />
Malvy Technology S.A. ("Malvy France"), a French corporation<br />
engaged in the development of an anti-theft device for the<br />
automotive industry (hereinafter the "Malvy Device" or "the<br />
Device"). In June 1993, the Company changed its name to Malvy<br />
Technologies, Inc. and announced that it was refocusing its<br />
operations on the production and sale of the Malvy Device.<br />
40. On or about July 13, 1993, Malvy announced that it had<br />
agreed to acquire 100% of Malvy France for some $32.5 million from<br />
Bondlumi Investments Ltd., an entity with legal situs in the British<br />
Virgin Islands. A report in the July 14, 1993 Daily Oklahoman<br />
11<br />
stated that the Company intended to finance the purchase in stages<br />
by placing 16.25 million shares of stock with overseas investors
over a six-month period. The article further reported that the<br />
Company stated that the Malvy Device already had been recommended by<br />
one French insurer to policy holders, that production of the device<br />
in France could begin as early as September, and that Malvy was<br />
talking to General Motors and other car makers about installing the<br />
device during the automobile production process.<br />
41. Defendants Lucas and Rabhi failed to disclose the facts<br />
that Bondlumi was controlled by them or that Bondlumi had acquired<br />
the stock of Malvy France for a tiny fraction of the $32.5 million<br />
price paid by Malvy for that stock. In fact, Malvy's acquisition<br />
of Malvy France from Bondlumi was a scheme through which Lucas and<br />
Rabhi enriched themselves at the expense of the Company and its<br />
investors.<br />
42. Malvy then proceeded to sell some 16.25 million shares of<br />
its stock at $2 per share to finance its acquisition of Malvy<br />
France. The unregistered shares were sold to "overseas entities"<br />
pursuant to Regulation S through an underwriter called Sinenvest<br />
Limited Corp. ("Sinenvest"), a company with legal situs in Panama<br />
and offices on the Isle of Man. In fact, Sinenvest was controlled<br />
by defendants Lucas and Rabhi. Moreover, most of the 16.25 million<br />
shares "sold" through Sinenvest were "purchased" by affiliates of<br />
Lucas and Rabhi.<br />
43. In or about March 1993, defendants Lucas and Rabhi<br />
entered into a conspiracy with defendant Gary Salter, a Boca Raton,<br />
12<br />
Florida based stock promoter, who operated through a company called<br />
Corporate Asset Management, Inc. ("CAM"), to manipulate and inflate
the price of Malvy's stock. In the fall of 1993, CAM began issuing<br />
press releases and investment reports, described below, touting<br />
Malvy to potential investors.<br />
44. In addition, in furtherance of his conspiracy with Lucas<br />
and Rabhi, Salter bribed stock brokers and traders at various<br />
brokerage firms to stimulate trading activity in and inflate the<br />
price of Malvy's stock. Cash payoffs were given to brokers,<br />
typically in the amount of 15% of any sales the brokers made of<br />
Malvy stock. The brokerage firms involved included defendants<br />
Barron Chase, LJCC, Euro-Atlantic, and Gruntal. Defendants also<br />
began a campaign of touting Malvy's prospects in order to drive up<br />
the price of its stock.<br />
45. On or about August 15, 1993, the London Sunday Telegraph<br />
reported as follows:<br />
A month ago, when just back from Cannes, I brought you<br />
news that all France was talking about a revolutionary<br />
anti-car theft device invented by former Citroen engineer<br />
Michael Malvy.<br />
At the time, Malvy Technology's Nasdaq-listed shares<br />
stood at $2. Since then, news of this invention, which<br />
disengages steering wheels by employing a specially-coded<br />
ignition key, has hit the United States. It has<br />
generated so much interest that Malvy is the largest<br />
traded stock on Nasdaq. The shares are now $5.<br />
46. Beginning at the latest with an October 7, 1993 CAM press<br />
release, which is described in paragraph 47, below, and continuing<br />
until at least May 24, 1995, the insider defendants knowingly<br />
issued and/or caused Malvy to issue a series of highly favorable<br />
public statements which touted Malvy and its stock in, inter alia,<br />
13
press releases, SEC filings and shareholder reports. Such public<br />
statements by the insider defendants were misleading by virtue of<br />
their failure to include material facts relating to the finances,<br />
management, and business prospects of Malvy, or by their failure to<br />
correct earlier favorable statements that had become misleading by<br />
virtue of later negative developments. Included among defendants'<br />
false and misleading favorable statements concerning Malvy were<br />
statements touting the existing state of development and the<br />
current commercial prospects of the Malvy Device. The favorable<br />
statements disseminated by the defendants consistently conveyed the<br />
false and misleading impression that Malvy had the rights to a<br />
workable technology which would be commercially viable in the near<br />
term, and that there would likely be rapid and substantial near-<br />
term growth in the Company's revenues and earnings. In fact,<br />
defendants' statements were false and misleading and were part of a<br />
course of business and scheme to defraud, which operated as a fraud<br />
and deceit upon the investing public because of the misstatements<br />
in and omissions from those documents detailed below.<br />
47. Defendants initiated their fraudulent touting of the<br />
stock by causing defendant Salter, through CAM, to issue a grossly<br />
misleading piece on Malvy on or about October 7, 1993. The release<br />
stated, inter alia, that Malvy "has created a 'better mousetrap,'<br />
and the world is beating a path to it's [sic] door;" that the use<br />
for the Malvy Device "doesn't stop at just vehicles, it also<br />
applies to industrial valves, pipelines, buses, heavy equipment<br />
(such as bulldozers, tractors, earth-movers, etc.), as well as<br />
14
oats;" that the Company scheduled the introduction of the Malvy<br />
Device in the United States for Spring 1994 and estimated that it<br />
would generate $100,000,000 in sales on 200,000 locks at $500.00<br />
per lock in the first full year of U.S. operations (1995); and that<br />
such projection was "indeed conservative" because of the Malvy<br />
Device's "modest price," the high auto theft rates, and the number<br />
of new and expensive vehicles. The release also stated that in<br />
France the Company had a "projected production rate of 100,000<br />
locks annually, generating $50,000,000, and a gross profit of<br />
$20,000,000 in the second year." It further stated that the Malvy<br />
Device had recently been subjected to "a rigorous 'real world'<br />
laboratory test" and that the Malvy Device permitted "Malvy<br />
Technology engineers" to observe that the Malvy Device operated<br />
"flawlessly" under driving conditions that were unusually extreme<br />
and arduous. In fact, as subsequently revealed, the original<br />
equipment market (OEM) device could not even be produced and had not<br />
reached a stage of production where estimates of its sales had any<br />
reasonable historical or other basis.<br />
48. In furtherance of their scheme, in or about the fall of<br />
1993, the insider defendants prepared and distributed to the<br />
investing public a so-called Focus Report on Malvy in conjunction<br />
with CAM. The Focus Report stated that the French insurance<br />
industry had been conducting "extensive tests" on the device and<br />
"will shortly recommend it to policy holders" and that the Company<br />
had reached agreement with French vehicle giant Peugeot MTC "to<br />
develop the Malvy anti-theft device for use on motorcycles," thus<br />
15
purportedly expanding the Malvy Device's "uses from automobiles,<br />
buses, trucks, boats, planes, industrial valves, and heavy<br />
equipment." The Focus Report stated that this development<br />
strengthened the Company's sales projection of 40,000 units<br />
(yielding gross sales of $20 million and gross profits of $8<br />
million) for the French market in 1994, and further noted that for<br />
its first year in the United States, "Malvy figures it will achieve<br />
a highly conservative 75,000 installations of its anti-theft lock,<br />
which translates into $37,500,000 in sales." The Focus Report<br />
further stated that the Malvy Device could be manufactured for<br />
almost the same price as the Neiman lock generally used by<br />
automobile manufacturers; that it therefore could replace the<br />
Neiman lock in auto production lines for minimal cost; and that<br />
"this development is in progress with a major European luxury<br />
automobile manufacturer."<br />
49. Defendant Lucas, pursuant to the conspiracy described<br />
above, again fraudulently touted the Company by providing a staff<br />
writer at The Daily Oklahoman with Company literature and an<br />
interview with Company President Smith that led to the publication<br />
of an article on Malvy on or about October 14, 1993. The article<br />
stated, inter alia, that Smith said the Malvy lock was "the only<br />
device, mechanical or electrical, which fully protects and prevents<br />
a vehicle from being stolen" and that it would similarly protect<br />
anything with a wheel, including cars, boats, motorcycles and<br />
tractors. The article further stated that the Malvy Device would<br />
start selling in France and Germany in November of 1993, that the<br />
Malvy Device would cost $500 in the United States and about $700 in
Europe, and that Company literature predicted "first-year [1994]<br />
sales of 40,000 units, generating revenue of about $20 million in<br />
Europe alone."<br />
16<br />
50. On October 22, 1993, and again on October 25, 1993,<br />
defendant Lucas, pursuant to the conspiracy described above, caused<br />
the stock to be touted through the "SGA Goldstar Whisper Stocks"<br />
newsletter, a widely distributed investment newsletter, which<br />
stated that the Company very conservatively projected 75,000<br />
installations in its first full year of U.S. operations. The later<br />
article stated that the Company "has started up production and<br />
projects to sell approximately 100,000 units in FY 1994."<br />
51. In early November 1993, the Company held a show for<br />
analysts, brokers and others at the Waldorf Astoria in New York,<br />
where it displayed a BMW fitted with the Malvy Device. At the<br />
show, the insider defendants reiterated the projections referenced<br />
above, and continued to tout the Company's and its stock's<br />
prospects.<br />
52. In November 1993, defendant Lucas, pursuant to the<br />
conspiracy described above, also caused an article on the Company<br />
to appear in "Individual Investor." The article stated, inter<br />
alia, that commercial production of the lock would begin in France<br />
that month, that the U.S. introduction would occur at the Detroit<br />
Motor Show in February, and that Peugeot had agreed to buy the<br />
locks for use on its motorcycles. The article quoted Mr. Malvy as<br />
projecting sales of "a minimum of 40,000 units" in the European<br />
accessory market in 1994, creating sales of $20 million. Also in
November 1993, defendant Lucas, pursuant to the conspiracy<br />
described above, caused market analyst Dan Dorfman to tout the<br />
stock on his widely followed television show.<br />
17<br />
53. In late 1993, the insider defendants took advantage of<br />
Malvy inflated stock price to dump much of their indirect stock<br />
holdings on the market. Such sales were illegal because the stock<br />
was unregistered and not saleable in the U.S. market. Nonetheless,<br />
the insider defendants sold much of their holdings, thereby reaping<br />
enormous profits from the fraud they had perpetrated.<br />
54. In addition, defendants Lucas and Rabhi "lent" Malvy<br />
money through other affiliates, including Clearwater Enterprises<br />
Limited and Monarch Asset Management Limited. These loans were<br />
repaid with Malvy stock, which defendants Lucas and Rabhi then<br />
caused their affiliates to dump on the market at considerable<br />
profit.<br />
55. An April 1994 news release by the Company announced that<br />
distributors of Caterpillar construction equipment in France<br />
successfully exhibited the Malvy Device on their best-selling<br />
Backhoe loader and would offer it as an option on that equipment.<br />
56. On or about April 21, 1994, the Company filed its Form<br />
10-K with the SEC for the year ended December 31, 1993. The Form<br />
10-K stated, inter alia, that the Malvy Device was being<br />
developed for three markets -- the auto accessory and replacement<br />
markets, as well as the original equipment market. The Form 10-K<br />
further stated that it was anticipated that the cost of manufacture<br />
for the original equipment market would be "comparable with
existing steering wheel locks." The Form 10-K added that<br />
manufacturing and fabrication problems were being worked out and<br />
18<br />
improvements were being made to the production process. It stated<br />
that a production rate of 2,000 locks per month was anticipated<br />
during the second half of 1994 and that shipments to distributors<br />
were anticipated to commence in August. The Form 10-K additionally<br />
stated that "the Device is designed to work on most automobiles<br />
sold in the world, and can also be adapted to motorcycles, trucks<br />
and heavy construction equipment. . . ."<br />
57. In or about August 1994, Malvy distributed its 1993<br />
Annual Report to Shareholders, which continued to tout the<br />
Company's prospects. The Letter to Shareholders noted that the<br />
Company had experienced some delays associated with the manufacture<br />
of the after-market device, but attributed those delays to "changes<br />
required to the manufacturing process in order to increase the<br />
number of units produced and our insistence on first class quality<br />
and reliability. . . . Despite the initial production problems we<br />
are targeting production of 15,000 units in 1994 and 100,000 units<br />
for 1995." The Letter further stated: "It is anticipated that the<br />
original equipment version of the 'Malvy' will not be available<br />
until 1996, however, the Company is working very closely with a<br />
number of vehicle manufacturers, both in the USA and Europe." The<br />
Letter concluded as follows: "The reception given to the Malvy<br />
products has been very encouraging and I am confident that 1994<br />
will see your company well on the road to an exciting and
profitable future."<br />
58. On October 17, 1994, the Company announced that it had<br />
successfully achieved its first two weeks' production targets and<br />
19<br />
that "[p]roduction is continuing satisfactorily and the Malvy Anti-<br />
Theft device will be launched at the British Motor Show commencing<br />
on the 18th of October."<br />
59. On October 20, 1994, the Company announced that Michael<br />
Lucas had been appointed a director and chairman of the board and<br />
that Smith had resigned from all of his posts with the company.<br />
Lucas was quoted as saying that production of the Device was<br />
"proceeding satisfactorily and that the interest shown in the<br />
product at the British Motor Show has been very encouraging."<br />
60. On November 2, 1994, the Company announced that it had<br />
exceeded its October production target and that it had successfully<br />
completed a financing to raise $2 million for additional working<br />
capital.<br />
61. On December 8, 1994, the Company announced that it had in<br />
fact raised $2.5 million for working capital and that the launch of<br />
the Malvy device in the United Kingdom had successfully commenced,<br />
with interest being shown in numerous other countries.<br />
62. On January 26, 1995, the Company issued a press release,<br />
which quoted defendant Lucas as stating that "dealer and public<br />
demand for the Malvy product is excellent. Malvy dealers are<br />
currently being appointed in England and France. . . . Sales<br />
targets are being met. It [the Device] is budgeted to move to a<br />
profitable sales level during the third quarter of 1995. . . . OEM
(original equipment manufacture) progress is very encouraging and<br />
our engineers believe that the Malvy [Device] will be perfected for<br />
volume manufacture during 1995. . . . We are at last selling and<br />
delivering the product to an enthusiastic market and we have a<br />
realistic objective of being profitable by the third quarter of<br />
1995."<br />
20<br />
63. On February 23, 1995, the Company announced that it had<br />
approved a 20-1 reverse split of its common shares because its<br />
large capitalization and low share price "were an impediment to<br />
investor interest."<br />
64. On April 27, 1995, Malvy announced its acquisition of<br />
Metal Recovery Industries (International) Inc. for $12 million<br />
cash, the issuance of 14 million restricted shares and a<br />
conditional deferred payment of $25 million. Metal Recovery<br />
purportedly owned technology to "upgrade galvanized steel scrap<br />
into clean scrap for steel making."<br />
65. On or about May 24, 1995, Malvy filed its Annual Report<br />
on Form 10-K with the SEC for the year ended December 31, 1994. It<br />
was signed by defendant Lucas. The Form 10-K disclosed for the<br />
first time the following facts: (1) during 1994 the Company's<br />
French subsidiary had manufactured only approximately 3,000 after-<br />
market locks; (2) sales of the Device did not commence until<br />
December 1994; (3) demand for the Device was mixed, "with some<br />
indications that the initial retail selling price, approaching<br />
$1,000, was too high"; (4) "the major problem encountered was an
insufficient variety of hubs being available to enable the Malvy to<br />
be fitted to a broad enough range of vehicles," as a result of<br />
which sales were "limited to a small selection of vehicles." The<br />
Form 10-K further disclosed that the "Malvy Device for the Original<br />
Equipment Manufacturer is still in the design and development<br />
21<br />
stage. Early prototypes have been found to be unsatisfactory after<br />
extensive testing. . . ."<br />
66. Then, on June 30, 1995 Malvy announced that it had<br />
changed its name to Metal Recovery Technologies, Inc. and that it<br />
had changed its business emphasis to the de-zincing of scrap steel.<br />
It appears from that announcement and the Company's SEC filings<br />
that the Company has substantially curtailed the Malvy operations.<br />
The Company's stock price declined substantially as a result of the<br />
disclosures in paragraphs 65-66.<br />
COUNT I<br />
PURSUANT TO SECTION 10(b)<br />
OF THE EXCHANGE ACT<br />
67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of<br />
paragraphs 1 through 66 of this Complaint as if set forth in full.<br />
68. Throughout the <strong>Class</strong> Period, in connection with<br />
plaintiff's and the <strong>Class</strong>' purchases of Malvy common stock,<br />
defendants issued and caused the Company to issue public reports,<br />
releases, and statements that were materially false and misleading<br />
in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-<br />
5(1)-(3) promulgated thereunder. Those reports, releases, and<br />
statements were materially false and misleading for the reasons
specified in paragraph 68, below. In addition, certain statements<br />
by the Company that may have been true when made became misleading<br />
by virtue of the emergence of the facts set forth in paragraph 64,<br />
and each of the defendants breached his duty to correct when the<br />
prior statements became incomplete and misleading in light of those<br />
subsequent events.<br />
22<br />
69. Defendants' statements in paragraphs 47-62, above, were<br />
materially misleading with respect to the Company's business,<br />
finances and prospects in that they misrepresented material facts<br />
and omitted to disclose material facts necessary in order to make<br />
the statements made not misleading. Defendants omitted to disclose<br />
at least the following material facts:<br />
(a) that the Malvy Device would only work on a small<br />
selection of vehicles because there was an insufficient variety of<br />
hubs available to fit the Device to most vehicles;<br />
(b) that the original equipment device was still in the<br />
design stage, had not been shown to be technically feasible, and,<br />
indeed, that early prototypes were found to be unsatisfactory after<br />
extensive testing;<br />
(c) that the original equipment device could not be<br />
installed for anything close to the modest price of the competing<br />
Neiman lock, which was in general use in the automotive industry;<br />
(d) that the Company did not have a commitment from<br />
Peugeot to put the device on its motorcycles;<br />
(e) that the Company did not have a commitment from a
major European luxury car manufacturer to install the device as<br />
original equipment; and<br />
(f) that, at its projected $1,000 sales price, the<br />
device was not commercially viable for the aftermarket/accessory<br />
markets, even if it were available for a broad range of cars.<br />
23<br />
70. In addition, Defendant Lucas, pursuant to the conspiracy<br />
described above, made projections of Malvy's sales that totally<br />
lacked any reasonable basis, as set forth above.<br />
71. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking<br />
statements under certain circumstances does not apply to any of the<br />
allegedly false and misleading statements pleaded in this<br />
Complaint; those statements were not identified as "forward-looking<br />
statements" when made. Nor was it stated that actual results<br />
"could differ materially from those projected." Nor did meaningful<br />
cautionary statements identifying important factors that could<br />
cause actual results to differ materially from those set forth in<br />
the statements at issue accompany those statements. Further, the<br />
statements were made by Defendant Lucas with knowledge that they<br />
were misleading.<br />
72. Because of their positions with Malvy, defendants Malvy,<br />
Alexander, Lucas and Rabhi had access to and knowledge of the above<br />
facts and other undisclosed information of a material nature<br />
concerning the business, finances and future business prospects of<br />
Malvy and they acted with knowledge or with reckless disregard of<br />
the misleading nature of their statements and omissions regarding<br />
the Company.
73. Plaintiffs and the <strong>Class</strong> purchased Malvy stock in direct<br />
or indirect reliance upon defendants' statements and in reliance<br />
upon the integrity of the market for Malvy securities.<br />
74. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of<br />
reliance established by the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that:<br />
24<br />
(a) defendants made public misrepresentations or failed<br />
to disclose facts in public documents issued during the <strong>Class</strong><br />
Period;<br />
material;<br />
(b) the omissions and misrepresentations of fact were<br />
(c) Malvy met the requirements for listing, and was<br />
listed on the NASDAQ National Market System, a highly efficient and<br />
automated market;<br />
(d) as a regulated issuer, Malvy filed periodic public<br />
reports with the SEC and the NASDAQ;<br />
(e) Malvy's trading volume was substantial, averaging<br />
many thousands of shares per day during the <strong>Class</strong> Period,<br />
reflecting numerous trades each day;<br />
(f) the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would<br />
induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the common<br />
stock of Malvy; and<br />
(g) plaintiff and the members of the <strong>Class</strong> purchased or<br />
otherwise acquired their Malvy stock between the time defendants<br />
failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time<br />
the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or
misrepresented facts.<br />
75. Defendants' course of conduct, as described above,<br />
constituted a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud and operated<br />
as a fraud and deceit upon plaintiff and the <strong>Class</strong>.<br />
76. By reason of defendants' statements and acts, plaintiff<br />
and each member of the <strong>Class</strong> have been injured in connection with<br />
25<br />
their purchases of Malvy stock in that they purchased that stock at<br />
prices that were artificially inflated by defendants' misleading<br />
statements.<br />
77. As to all defendants other than Malvy and Lucas,<br />
plaintiff instituted this action within three years of the<br />
transactions at issue and within one year of the time he was placed<br />
on notice of defendants' fraud. As to defendants Malvy and Lucas,<br />
plaintiffs claims have been tolled by filing of a earlier suit.<br />
COUNT II<br />
PURSUANT TO SECTION 9<br />
OF THE EXCHANGE ACT<br />
78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of<br />
paragraphs 1 through 66 of this Complaint as if set forth in full.<br />
79. Defendants, in concert with others, effected or caused to<br />
be effected a series of transactions in the common stock of Malvy,<br />
which created actual and apparent trading activity in such stock<br />
and raised the price such stock, for the purpose of inducing the<br />
purchase of the stock by others.<br />
80. For the purpose of inducing purchases of Malvy stock by
others, defendants made statements that were false and misleading<br />
with respect to material matters, as more fully stated above.<br />
81. Defendants knew of the falsity of their statements<br />
regarding Malvy and acted willfully at all times relevant hereto.<br />
82. Plaintiffs purchases of Malvy were at prices that were<br />
affected by defendants' manipulative actions and plaintiff and<br />
members of the <strong>Class</strong> were damaged by defendants' acts.<br />
26<br />
COUNT III<br />
PURSUANT TO SECTION 20<br />
OF THE EXCHANGE ACT<br />
83. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of<br />
paragraphs 1 through 66 of this Complaint as if set forth in full.<br />
84. Defendants Alexander, Lucas, and Rabhi were, by reason of<br />
their stock ownership, management positions and/or membership on<br />
the Company's Board of Directors during the <strong>Class</strong> Period,<br />
controlling persons of Malvy within the meaning of Section 20 of<br />
the Exchange Act and had the power and influence, and exercised the<br />
same, to cause Malvy to engage in the wrongful practices complained<br />
of herein.<br />
85. Defendants Alexander, Lucas, and Rabhi are therefore<br />
liable to plaintiff and the <strong>Class</strong> pursuant to Section 20 of the<br />
Exchange Act.<br />
JURY DEMAND<br />
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all claims.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF<br />
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the defendants<br />
and in favor of plaintiff and each member of the <strong>Class</strong> as follows:<br />
27<br />
(a) That this Court declare this action to be a class action<br />
pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil<br />
Procedure;<br />
(b) That this Court order rescission of plaintiff's and the<br />
<strong>Class</strong>' investments and/or award plaintiff and the <strong>Class</strong> the full<br />
compensatory damages, including pre-judgment interest, that they<br />
have sustained;<br />
(c) That this Court award plaintiff reasonable counsel and<br />
expert fees, as well as the costs and disbursements incident to the<br />
prosecution of this action; and<br />
(d) That this Court award such other and further relief as<br />
may be just and proper.<br />
Dated: October 31, 1996<br />
OF COUNSEL:<br />
LAW OFFICES OF DAVID B. ZLOTNICK<br />
David B. Zlotnick<br />
1039 North Sixth Avenue<br />
Tucson, Arizona 85705<br />
ROSENTHAL, MONHAIT, GROSS & GODDESS, P.A.<br />
/s/<br />
By: _________________________________________<br />
Norman M. Monhait (DSBA ID No. 1040)<br />
Suite 1401, Mellon Bank Center<br />
P.O. Box 1070<br />
Wilmington, DE 19899-1070<br />
(302) 656-4433<br />
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
(520) 798-3255<br />
LAW OFFICES OF DONALD B. LEWIS<br />
Donald B. Lewis<br />
5 Cynwyd Road<br />
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004<br />
(610) 668-0331<br />
28<br />
CERTIFICATION OF GERALD LEVINE<br />
PURSUANT TO FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS<br />
Gerald Levine ("Plaintiff") declares, as to the claims<br />
asserted under the federal securities laws, that:<br />
1. Plaintiff has reviewed the Complaint and authorized<br />
its filing.<br />
2. Plaintiff did not purchase the security that is the<br />
subject of this action at the direction of plaintiff's counsel or<br />
in order to participate in this private action.<br />
3. Plaintiff is willing to serve as a representative<br />
party on behalf of the class, including providing testimony at<br />
deposition and trial, if necessary.<br />
4. Plaintiff had the following transactions in the<br />
common stock of Malvy during the <strong>Class</strong> Period alleged in the<br />
Complaint:<br />
(a) on November 1, 1993 plaintiff purchased 2,000<br />
shares for $11,128.75;<br />
(b) on December 30, 1993 plaintiff purchased 2,000<br />
shares for $7,628.75;<br />
(c) on April 5, 1994 plaintiff purchased 1,000<br />
shares for $3,083.75;<br />
(d) on May 13, 1994 plaintiff purchased 1,000
shares for $2,739.75;<br />
(e) on October 18, 1994 plaintiff purchased 10,000<br />
shares for $6,141.25;<br />
5. During the three years prior to the date of this<br />
Certificate, Plaintiff has not sought to serve or served as a<br />
representative party for a class in any action filed under the<br />
federal securities laws other than the related matter of Levine vs.<br />
Metal Recovery, et al. Number 95-960JJF (D. Del.)<br />
6. Plaintiff will not accept any payment for serving as a<br />
representative party on behalf of the class beyond the Plaintiff's<br />
pro rata share of any recovery, except such reasonable costs and<br />
expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the<br />
representation of the class as ordered or approved by the court.<br />
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true<br />
and correct. Executed this day of October, 1996 at<br />
Brooklyn, New York.<br />
3 Aug 1997<br />
/s/<br />
________________________<br />
Gerald Levine