SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980No. 24Lg!H -WW nBK^.'— tuUll.l W W M B Bnil m- - CLIf—.iafl 1•StSBMJOURNAL
DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALBoard of ManagementManaging EditorAir Commodore R. C. Rowell RAAF (Chairman)Captain A. L. Beaumont RANColonel F. P. Scott DSOGroup Captain J. M. Chesterfield RAAFMrR. H. MillsMr M. P. TraceyIllustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by RuskinPress, North Melbourne.Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 words isthe ideal length. Articles should be typed, double spacing, on one side of thepaper and submitted in duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:The Managing EditorDefence Force JournalBuilding C Room 4-25Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(062) 65 2682 or if unanswered 65 2935
DEFENCEFORCEJOURNALNo. 24ISSN 0314-1039SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980A Journal of the Australian Profession of ArmsContents3. Editor's Comment4. Letters to the Editor.6. A Concept for Australia in Mid and High Intensity Operations.(Counter Armour Operations)Major P. M. Coleman RAAC25. Defence Sales: Pith and PotentialMajor Bruce Cameron MC, RAAC28. Aborigines and the ArmyMajor R. A. Hall BA, RAINF42. An Outline of the Australian Military Involvement in VietnamMajor Ian G. McNeill psc, BA, RAINF54. Teddy Roosevelt: America's Greatest Statesman?Major G. G. Middleton, R. A. Sigs.58. Book ReviewPermission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readily given by the ManagingEditor after consultation with the author. Any reproduced articles should bear an acknowledgementof source.The views expressed in the articles are the authors' own and should not be coastrued asofficial opinion or policy.Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: theBoard of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.© Commonwealth of Australia 1980
o»-Fremantle Class Patrol Boat(Defence PublicRelations)
"^ \Editors Comment[ DEFENCE)FORCE JOURNALOTHE Royal Australian Air Force hasprovided two Iroquois helicopters toassist with a census being conducted by thePapua New Guinea Government. Thehelicopters are from No. 9 Squadron, RoyalAustralian Air Force Base Amberley,Queensland. They will operate from Mendi andTari in the southern highlands. Their task willbe to transport members of the Papua NewGuinea Defence Force engaged in carrying outthe census in remote areas. During their stay inPapua New Guinea the helicopters will also beengaged in a training programme.The following four senior Armyappointments have been announced. BrigadierH.J. Coates has been appointed Deputy Chiefof Operations, replacing Brigadier D. A.Drabsch, who has been promoted to the rank ofMajor-General and appointed Chief ofOperations. Brigadier Coates was previouslyDirector General of Operations and Plans.Colonel J. A. Sheldrick has been promoted tothe rank of Brigadier and appointed DirectorGeneral of Operations and Plans. Brigadier A.D. Powell, formerly Director General ofElectrical and Mechanical Engineering, hasbeen appointed Deputy Chief of Logistics.Colonel J. E. Faulks has been promoted to therank of Brigadier and appointed DirectorGeneral of Electrical and MechanicalEngineering. He was previously the DeputyDirector.I would like to extend my personal thanksand best wishes to Mrs Gwen Lawless, who,after fifteen years as a Public Servant, hasretired. Mrs Lawless was the Supervisor incharge of the Typing Pool in Building C atRussell. She has been extremely helpful duringthis, my first year as Editor of the DefenceForce Journal. Gwen and her husband will beliving in Molymook on the South Coast of NewSouth Wales. On behalf of the ladies of theTyping Pool 1 wish them both a long and happyretirement.I would also like to take this opportunity towelcome Betty Martin who replaces Gwen asSupervising Typist. Betty was previouslySupervisor in charge of the Typing Pool inBuilding F Russell.On the subject of typing, I have received anumber of hand-written, and a few almostunreadable, photocopies of manuscripts. Itwould be greatly appreciated if all manuscriptscould be typed, double space, leaving a 3 cmmargin on each side of the page. Pages shouldbe numbered. I do not have my own typist andthe ladies of the typing pool are much too busyto undertake tasks such as retypingmanuscripts.The keel has been laid for the RoyalAustralian Navy's new underwayreplenishment ship at the Vickers CockatooIsland Dockyard in Sydney Harbour. The shipwill replace the present Fleet oiler, HMASSupply and is scheduled for delivery in 1983.The Minister for Defence, Mr Killen announcedthat the new ship would be named HMASSuccess.W
THE EQUITY OF CONSCRIPTIONDear Sir,To briefly prolong what is becoming anacademic argument on Captain Nicholson'sarticle 'The Equity of Conscription' (DFJ No.15 Mar/Apr 79) and to support LieutenantColonel Summers reply, I must comment onJohn's answer to the good Colonel in DFJ No.21 Mar/Apr 80.Colonel Summer's contention that equity ofconscription depends on how and how long it isapplied cannot be destroyed by argument that"it (conscription) imposes a regressive tax on aminority regardless of which system is beingconsidered." "Indeed, universal conscriptionpractised indefinitely, (the how and how long)as is the case in several countries of both Eastand West, automatically ensures that allsections of a society at some point in life sharethe same experience".Neither can it be argued that "an allvolunteer force, financed by those who paytaxes is equitable and efficient". That it is"equitable" might be the case if we all paid taxon a common scale, but that is not the case inthis country. And anyway, why should thosenot taxed not share the common burden? Weall live in the same life raft don't we? That anall volunteer force is necessarily more'efficient" because it is volunteer is not onlyirrelevantbut could provide endless hours ofquite unproductive debate.OYours faithfully,J. E. DeanMajorAUTHORS REPLYDear Sir,In reply I would ask Major Dean his ownquestion, ". . . why should those not taxed notshare the common burden?" The answer issimply that they should not. With an allvolunteer Army the burden is shared, whereaswith conscription it is isolated to a smallminority.In one form or another everybody pays taxes.The amount they pay will be closely correlatedwith their levels of wealth and income, andsimilarly the benefits they derive from theexistence of the nation's defence force will alsobe correlated to their wealth and income. Thisis the case providing we assume that theindividual's income elasticity of demand forpublic goods is positive, ie. As an individual'sincome goes up, his demand for the good alsogoes up. There is considerable evidence tosupport this argument.That conscription imposes a tax on thoseconscripted cannot be denied. That it alsoimposes costs on society as a whole equallycannot be denied. Whilst the latter may not beas tangible as the former, their existence is quitedefinable. (Refer to my original paper).Consideration of all alternative taxationmethods in order to achieve a desired goaltheoretically should be based on the relativeefficiencies of the proposed policies(empirically it would appear that it's morelikely to be based on the political ramificationsof such a policy — an unforturnate reflectionon our society).Even if "universal conscription" was areality, (the existence of which has never beenevident in Australia) it does not follow that it isthe most efficient solution. If the resultant totalcosts to society are greater than the budgetarycosts of an all volunteer force, (and there isconsiderable evidence that this is so) thenconscription cannot be defended on economicgrounds and proponents must rely on naiveargument of what is "best" for society.Finally I ask yet again. What is so inherentlydifferent about defence that we have toconsider compulsion? Certainly our state ofmilitary preparedness is vital to our futuresecurity, but is not the level of crime in thiscountry also cause for concern? What about thefact that many hospitals are severelyunderstaffed? And prisons need more prisonofficers? What do we do? Conscript? I hopenot. v . °Yours sincerely,John NicholsonCaptain
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5"The Forgotten War in North Russia"Dear Sir.Thank you very much for the copies of theD.F. journal, Issue No. 22, that you forwardedto my son. They were greatly appreciated.The article by Mr P. Burness on the abovesubject was both factual and interesting.Of course, my connection with the campaignceased when I was wounded in August 1919 andevacuated to England on the Naval HospitalShip "Garth Castle", thence to Netley MilitaryHospital, near Southampton, from where I wasdischarged on the 16th March 1920.Under instructions from A.I.F.Headquarters in Australia, I reported to Aust.H.Qtrs in Horseferry Rd, London, and on thesame day was re-enlisted in the A.I.F., beingcompletely reinstated as if I had never left it.This was owing to my parents objecting to mybeing discharged in England to join the RussianRelief Force when still a minor, being just over18'/2 when I left Australia in August 1918.Therefore, 1 could have been the last man tojoin the 1st A.I.F.After further hospital treatment in CaulfieldMilitary Hospital in Melbourne, 1 was finallydischarged on 1st October 1920.UAgain thanking you,Yours faithfully,W. J. ROBINSONMILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OFAUSTRALIADear Sir,The Military Historical Society of Australiawill celebrate its silver jubilee in 1981. Createdin 1956, the society retains its effective aims offostering interest in Australia's military past,providing assistance and support for historicalresearch and acting as a focal point for militaryhistorians and militaria collectors throughoutAustralia.At present, members include manyrepresentatives of the Defence communityranging from retired Generals to civil servicetypistes. The spectrum of members' interests isjust as broad and includes uniforms, weapons,badges, memorabilia and even restored militaryvehicles. The more dedicated historians in thesociety can advise you with eloquent authorityon any number of military topics. Indeed, forthe newcomer to the society, these people are aninvaluable aid when it comes to research for anunusual acquisition to your collection.Membership of the society permitsenthusiasts, collectors and historians to meetothers with similar interests at regular monthlymeetings. Many of the meetings are addressedby guest speakers who are experts in their fieldand add to a member's overall knowledge ofmilitary history. Of major benefit to the societymembers is the quarterly journal"Sabretache", a high quality publication whichincludes many authorative articles on a widerange of subjects and updates members' accessto society news, trade discounts and members'swap offers.The society also has access to a wide range ofmilitary publications some of which arepublished by the society as a result of amember's research activities, for example"Gallant and Distinguished Service —Vietnam" by Major Ian Barnes of the GeelongBranch. i*B. M. ROGERSFlight LieutenantP.S. If you wish to become a member of the society orwould like further information about its activities pleasecontact your nearest branch secretary:ACT: B. Rogers, 14 Karney Street, Kambah, ACT 2902.VIC: R. Kirk, 19 Osborne Crt, Hawthorn, Vic. 3122.QLD: S. Wigzell, 17 Roval Street, Alexandra Hills, Qld4157.SA: K. Stanley, 40 Deborah Gve, Modury, Nth SA, 5092.WA: P. Shaw, 37 Coomoora Road, Boorasoon, WA 6154.GEELONG: J. Maljers, 4 Stork Ave, Belmont, Vic. 3216.ALBURY/VVODONGA: R. Wiltshire, Creek St, Jindera,NSW 2640.
a concePT FORm mm BADflIGfl ItlTEflSOP€BflTIOflSCOUNTER ARMOUR OPERATIONSByMajor P. M. ColemanRoyal Australian ArmouredCorpsI wish to preach the simple rulesWe preach in anti-tankAlthough they are not often taughtIn rhyming verse or blank.The first important rule to learnIf knowledge you desire,Is always hit him in the flank —And never frontal fire.(For it is quite the usual thingTo face the way you run.And if you shoot him in the flankHe will not see the gun.)But shooting tankers in the flankIs only one trap laid;To solve the school solution youMust find some defilade —By which I mean that you must tryTo site the b gunSo that the tanks behind the oneYou've hit, won't see the fun.Major P. M. Coleman graduated from the OCS in June'66. Since graduation regimental postings include I ArmedRegt, 3 Cav Regt (SVN) 2 Cav Regi and as a Sqn Comd at 4Cav Regt (1976-78). In 1978-79 attended the CanadianForces Command and State College in Toronto. Currentlyserving as SO Policy in Armoured Directorate, ArmvOffice.Article received October 1979.Now if you choose to site the gunUpon a forward slope.You'll never live to tell the tale;There's not the slightest hope.For all the OP's for miles aroundWill spot you pretty quick —A ranging round upon the groundThen bags and bags of stick!So if you'll take a tip from meAnd live to fight again —You'll bank your hopes on rear of slopesAnd save the lives of men.Lt-ColC. D. W. Court, MCRoyal Artillery(Extract from "Hard Pounding" 1946)INTRODUCTIONIT began at first light on 15 September, 1916,with the advance of a solitary tank Dl.under the command of Captain H. W.Mortimore, along the eastern outskirts ofDelville Wood. Mortimore's advance was, in away, prophetic of the tanks' progress in futurebattles — the balance of his success justoutweighing failure. His tank reached itsobjective and took prisoner a number ofGerman infantry, but it might have done morehad not a shell hit the starboard sponson,killing two of the crew and breaking the track.The whole operation may well have met withgreater success had Mortimores' superiors
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 7followed "Notes on the employment of tanks"issued by Swinton in February, 1916', whichstressed the tank's vulnerability to artillery fireand the need for his machines to co-operatewith artillery and infantry.WORLD WAR IOn 9 April, 1917, 26 tanks attacked theHindenburg Line at Arras. Although notdesigned to be tank proof its deep belts of wireand ditches, closely co-ordinated machine-gunnests (firing armour piercing bullets) andskilfully located field-guns all combined tocanalize, hamper and finally kill the slowmoving tanks. Tanks were defeated again on 16April at Chemin des Dames. The Germans,forewarned of the attack, let 180 French tanksenter a trap. A wilderness of shell holes anddeep trenches, especially widened, wassufficient to defeat those early machines.In April 1918, just 19 months after thehistoric action by Dl, the Germans introducedthe first anti-tank gun, the 13 mm Tankgewear18. The fight against the tank had begun inearnest. 2WORLD WAR II AND THE 1973ARAB/ISRAELI WAR"In this year, 1929, I became convinced thattanks working on their own or in conjunctionwith infantry could never achieve decisiveimportance (sic). My historical studies, theexercises carried out in England and our ownexperiences with mock-ups had persuaded methat tanks would never be able to produce theirfull effect until the other weapons on whosesupport they must inevitably rely were broughtup to their standard of speed and cross-countryperformance." 3Guderian, the architect of the blitzkrieg,studied the writings of Hart and Fuller andappreciated the need for co-operation betweentanks, infantry and artillery. British experts,however, ignored the lessons of Cambrai andAmiens. They did not stress the need for allarms co-operation and as a result Britishtheories of armoured warfare tended to swingin favour of the "all tank" concept. Britainentered the war ten years behind Germany inthe development of tank, and consequentlyanti-tank, concepts.Field Marshal Lord Wilson has described hisefforts to train the 7 Armoured Division inEgypt in 1939-40 thus:"In the training of the Armoured Division Istressed the need of full co-operation of allarms in battle. One had to check a perniciousdoctrine which had grown up in recent years,aided by certain civilian writers, that tankunits were capable of winning an actionwithout the assistance of other arms . . . thechief agents in debunking this and manyother falacies of our pre-war pundits were theGermans." 4So it was in the Western Desert, in late 1941,on the eve of CRUSADER that General Gotttold his troops that the battle would be a "tankcommanders' battle. No tank commander willgo far wrong if he places his gun within hittingrange of the enemy". 5 Gotts' commanders didas he wished, but by placing themselves withinhitting range of the enemy they courteddestruction by German anti-tank guns. In oneaction four 88 mm anti-tank guns decimatedthe attack of 7 Armoured Brigade; the otherBrigades of 7 Armoured Division fared littlebetter.After the battle, in an analysis in which heattempted to draw lessons from CRUSADER,Gott wrote:"The German will not commit himself totank versus tank battle as such. In everyphase of battle he co-ordinates the action ofhis anti-tank guns, field artillery and infantrywith his tanks, and he will not be drawn fromthis policy". 6It had become fundamental to the Britishmethod of fighting to virtually rely on tanksalone; they failed to make use of their fieldartillery and regarded the anti-tank gun as adefensive weapon.A German panzer division, on the otherhand, was a highly flexible formation of allarms which relied on artillery both in attackand in defence. Rommel's panzer groups werequite clear that whereas tanks dealt primarilywith the enemy's infantry and soft vehicles, thedestruction of the enemy armour was mainlythe job of weapons designed for just thatpurpose, the anti-tank gun.Although this theory was put into practice itwas not at the expense of a further fundamentalfeature of German tactical doctrine — closeand permanent integration of tank, gun andinfantry teams. ". . . With our twelve anti-tankguns we leap-frogged from one vantage point toanother, whilst our panzers, stationary and hulldown if possible, provided protective fire. Then
8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT.'OCT. 80we would establish ourselves to give themprotective fire whilst they swept on again." 7So the British dashed themselves against thetank, gun and artillery of the Africa Corps,ultimately to learn, and finally to successfullyapply themselves, the principles and techniquesof combined arms operations. Principles thathad been espoused by Hart and Fuller since theearly 1920's and so devastatingly employed bytheir German disciples.In the Yom Kippur War, not 600 km to theeast, Israelis charged with unsupported tanksinto the missile defence of the Arabs, forgettingthe lessons so bloodily learned by the British 29years earlier. The Egyptians in their turn werealso to rediscover another fundamental tacticaltruth; that a defence that is overly dependent onany one weapon, in this case the missile, willultimately fail.The Israelis quickly recast their tactics tointegrate infantry into their tank formations,and to employ covering fire to suppress theSagger and RPG7. Thereafter the tide of battleturned. "On the modern battlefield the tankhas no independent, practical and effectiveanswer to the long range anti-tank missile. Onthe other hand the anti-tank missile has nopractical way to fight an artillery batterypouring fire on it. The artillery has only a verylimited answer to the plane attacking itsposition ... It is a vicious circle. We must getused to the fact that there is no longer anyweapons system on the battlefield that has sucha big advantage over other systems that it doesnot need to be employed with other weaponssystems." 8 At longer ranges "the tank has lostits superiority as an anti-tank weapon to thelong-range missile and in the future will lose itto the anti-tank artillery" 9 .Whether it be the Mark I Mother or the XMI,the Tankgewear 18 or the TOW, thefundamental principles of the employment of,and the defence against, armour have notchanged since Captain Mortimore's advance atDelville Wood. Our challenge for the future isour ability to draw the lessons from the pastand apply them to current tactics andtechnology.AIMThe aim of this article is to postulate aconcept of counter-armour operations for theAustralian Army in a mid and high intensityconflict.DISCUSSIONI have used the term "counter-armour" asopposed to "anti-tank" or "anti-armour". Ibelieve that the term anti-armour brings tomind pictures of a man in a foxhole with hisbazooka, gritting his teeth and "carrying on".Most seem to automatically adopt the defensivephase of war when considering anti-armouroperations. This defensive attitude is likely dueto a combination of factors:a. historical conditioning,b. uncertainty as to how to handle thesituation, andC. the term itself.The first we can do nothing about, exceptdraw from its lessons. The second is the topic ofthis article. The third can be easily rectified.We do not refer to air-defence as anti-air, norcounter-bombardment as anti-artillery, yet itcould be argued that both weapon systems presentjust as big a threat on the battlefield astanks. Armoured-defence, like air-defence, isan all arms responsibility that, if we are to besuccessful, must be conducted in all phases ofwar. Anti-armour weapons are to "counterarmour"what anti-aircraft weapons arc to"air-defence"; the tool required to execute theoperation."Counter-armour" is a term better suited toall phases of war and is less likely to produce adefensive frame of mind.1 plan to discuss the subject of counterarmouroperations under the followingheadings:a. the threat,b. current technology,c. the tank,d. missile versus gun, ande. a concept for Australia.THE THREAT"Some recent wars between small nationshave developed intensities formerly consideredto be only within the capabilities of largenations. It must, therefore, be assumed inplanning to meet possible and more seriousthreats of the future, that enemy forces will beequipped with modern weapons . . . improvedtactical mobility through developments intanks, mechanized infantry, self-propelledartillery and rapid gap crossing facilities."
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 9Any power considering offensive operationsin Australia will require an industrial infrastructure capable of mounting and sustainingoperations over very long strategic and tacticaldistances. Such an operation could only besuccessfully undertaken by a nation with, orsupported by, such an industrial capacity.It is fatuous to suggest that such an invasionforce would be predominantly infantry.Obviously the landed force by dent of itsmission, the Australian environment and thesophistication fo the industrial base required tomount and sustain such an undertaking, will betechnically sophisticated and highly mobile.A study of the divisional organizations ofindustrialized countries shows that thetraditional "infantry" division has all butdisappeared. With the exception of specialistformations (airborne, airmobile, commando)divisions structured for mobile operations arenow mostly "armoured" or "mechanized".Both have large numbers of AFV; differencesare more a matter of grouping dictated bymissionMBTLtTksOtherAFVMBTLttksOtherAFVARMOURED DIVISIONUSSR USA WGER BRIT. FRA. INDIA PAKISTAN3252231426622633360 495NilNil696156 152 22072 Nil 19630 186 286MECHANIZED DIVISION17636138288 270 No mech Nil No mec h No mechNil Nil divs 36divs976 360divsCombat and combat support arms are bothmounted. The battlefield is awash withcommand vehicles, tanks, APC, self-propelledartillery, tank destroyers, tracked air-defenceweapons and armoured bridgelayers; as well asvarious combat engineer and maintenance andrecovery vehicles. (Indeed it is the fulfilment ofGuderian's dream).Firepower and manoeuvre are the basicelements of combat power. The ability todestroy AFV is now a major part of the combatpower equation.If we intend to take seriously our mission ofdefending the Australian mainland we mustaccept, and plan to meet, a realistic threat."The army will require good tactical mobilityto fight a fluid mobile battle in the extensiveareas over which the battle could range." If weare to be successful on the battlefield we willalso need the ability to defeat large numbers ofAFV. We should equip and organizeaccordingly.CURRENT TECHNOLOGYThe last ten years has seen significantdevelopments in the field of anti-armourweapons, both in their lethality and in theirmode of delivery. Such weapons have thepotential to substantially influence thetechniques and effectiveness of counter armouroperations.A few of the more significant developmentsare:a. Artillery(l) Cannon Launched Guided Projectile(CLGP)(a) The CLGP, or Copperhead, systemconsists of a 155 mm laser guidedround and a laser designator operatedby a Forward Observer (FO). Theround weighs about 135 pounds andcarries a HEAT warhead. A laserseeker is fitted in the nose.(b) In operation the Copperhead fliesballistically to the target area where itdetects the energy reflected by the laserdesignator. The round's guidancesystem then manoeuvres the roundonto the target. 10 (Diagram 1)(c) The Copperhead can be fired from thestandard 155 mm self-propelled ortowed howitzer which means that every155 mm within a range of 12-15 kmwill be able to concentrate its anti-tankfire on a given area.(d) Like all high technology weapons,however, Copperhead has itslimitations. Skilful use of ground bythe tanks, combined with battlefieldobscuration, will limit the "designation"time available to the observer.Laser sensing devices will warn crewcommanders who may well be able totake evasive action beyond themanoeuvre capabilities of the missile,or suppress the source of designation.
10 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT. OCT 80T\T^\ V ^v^ .'4 r• F 'W OEPLoyTARGET ACQUISITIONACCURATE-KILL REGION»';^r>.;4 •£' A^L^M*-'^'*'*^- •' FORWARDOBSERVER' I^l^JdtfijP^'jJfyT « ^ - WITH DESIGNATORThe high unit cost ($10,000) combinedwith the physical limitation of theobserver to designate only one target ata time will limit the practicalemployment of the weapon to one gunfiring per observer,(e) However, sensibly and skilfullyemployed the Copperhead should takea heavy toll of key vehicles (commandvehicles, bridge-layers etc) before thearmour reaches the range of our directfire weapons. It offers a newdimension to field artillery in that, forthe first time since World War I,artillery is capable of destroying ratherthan just harassing or neutralisingtanks. (Diagram 2)General Support Rocket System(GSRS), or lesser ranges by the155 mm howitzer, are obvious. It willbe possible to lay large numbers ofmines amongst and in front of enemyarmour, to thicken-up existingminefields, to close gaps and to blockdefiles and crossing places.''(b) Despite the fact that the mines will beabove ground, and will be unlikely tobe large enough to "knock out" atank, when mixed with smoke and VTthey will certainly have the capacity todisable, and by doing to disrupt andslow' the enemies momentum, thuspresenting excellent targets forCopperhead and FGA.(Diagram 2)(2) Remotely Delivered Mines(a) The practical application of an antitankmine that can be delivered overranges in access of 30 km bv theb. Thermal Night Sights(1) Thermal imaging, the third generation ofnight observation devices, or as it issometimes known Forward Looking InfraRed (FUR), provides the ability to see, inreal time, in total darkness.'-(2) Thermal devices are currently beingproduced for the XM1 tank, the LeopardTwo and the TOW missile system. Thermalimagery can penetrate smoke, haze, thinfoliage and camourflage under mostcircumstances. It will give armour, andanti-armour, the ability to fight moreeffectively at night.
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 1!c. Attack Helicopter (AH)Although not a new concept by any meansthe NATO countries and the Soviets areconvinced that there is a place on the battlefieldfor helicopter borne anti-armour systems. TheAH should not be expected to go forward andhunt tanks but should be integrated into theoverall anti-armour plan. It is especially suitedto counter unexpected penetration whilstground forces manoeuvre and, as such, is avaluable asset in any counter-armour plan.d. Fighter Ground Attack (FGA)FGA play an important role in the combinedarms battle as our first line of defence againstthe enemy armour. Counter-armour operationsare liable to be hazardous and costly in aircraft.Aircraft, if they are to survive, will need tomove in low and fast and deliver their weaponswith pinpoint accuracy. There have been, andare continuing to be significant developments inthe area of air delivered anti-armour weapons.Some of these are:(1) First Echelon. Air attacks against theenemy first echelon armour will be mosteffective if conducted whilst the enemy isconcentrated for an attack or whilstpassing through defiles, minefields or gaps.FGA will not have the ability to seriouslydeplete the enemy first echelon withoutthemselves suffering debilitating losses.The Maverick missile is laser guided and isespecially suited, in conjunction with FO's,for the destruction of those key vehicles inthe enemy first echelon, the loss of whichwill cause the most disruption.(Diagram 3)(2) Second Echelon. In order to deplete thesecond echelon armour as it concentratesprior to battle the L'SAF is currentlydeveloping a new family of Wide AreaAnti-Armour Munitions (WAAM). 13WAAM's will be delivered from tacticalaircraft flying at very low altitudes acrossor around the FEBA into the enemy secondechelon area. Four weapons concepts arecurrently being considered. They will utilisea new generation of warheads to defeatadvanced types of armour. They are:(a) Anti-Armour Cluster Munitions,(b) Dual Role Attack Weapons,(c) Cyclops, and(d) Wide Area Special Projectile.(Diagram 4;THE TANKThe characteristics of the tank are wellknown, however, recent technologicalimprovements have markedly improved itsfighting effectiveness and its ability to survive.a. Mobility. The last few years have seensignificant improvements in tank enginesand suspensions. The horsepower toweight ratio has trebled when comparingXM1 to Centurion. This power whencombined with automatic transmissionsallows the tank to maintain a high speedover relatively rough terrain thus reducingits exposure time between bounds.b. Protection. The successful developmentand imminent deployment of tanks fittedwith special armour will have a profoundeffect on counter-armour operations.(XM1, Leopard Two, T80 and Shir Iranversion of the Chieftan 14 ). Special armouris a composition of steel, ceramics, glassand glass contained explosives. 15 TheBritish Ministry of Defence claim thattheir Chobham armour, one of the firstspecial armours to be developed, is proofagainst all known chemical energymunitions (HEP, HESH, HEAT) andalso provides a high degree of protectionagainst kinetic energy rounds. 16 (APDS,APFSDS)c. Firepower. Thermal night sights, laserrange-finders, computers, automaticloaders and improved ammunition haveall contributed to a significant increase inthe firepower and the accuracy of the tankgun. Soviet T62 are reported to have beenretrofitted with a combined laser
DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT./OCT. 80ANTI ARMOURCLUSTER MUNITION (ACM)WASPMINI-MISSILECYCLOPSL.DUAL ROLE **ATTACK WEAPON (DRAW)(Diagram 4)rangefinder and target illuminator, thelatter to be used to designate targets forthe seven km range laser aiming anti-tankmissile; (AT6) tube launched from theHIND-D helicopter."The main effect of these improvements willbe an overall increase in tank effectiveness, itsalmost complete immunity to chemical energywarheads and its reduced vulnerability tokinetic energy rounds. The larger ATGW suchas HOT, TOW and Swingfire should still beable to penetrate the sides and rear of thevehicle where the armour is thinner, but it isunlikely that smaller weapons such as M72,Carl Gustave, Dragon or Milan will have anyeffect. 18The development of depleted uranium coreAPFSDS and improved chemical energy roundswill restore the balance, however, the shortterm (four to five years) loss of the ATGW andsmaller HEAT weapons as an effective tankkiller will, with the exception of the highvelocity gun, leave us virtually defencelessagainst the latest, or retrofitted, tanks withspecial armour.MISSILE VERSUS GUNImprovements in tank armour and thesubsequent increase in calibre, velocity and sizeof gun required to penetrate that armour hasshifted the emphasis of infantry armourdefecting weapons away from the battalionanti-tank gun to the lighter and more portablemissile. The last 10-15 years have seen asignificant increase in the number and type ofanti-armour missile; missiles that vary from theindividual light anti-armour weapon (LAW) tothe long-range crew served long-range antiarmourweapon. (LRAW). 1 intend to restrictmy remarks mainly to the gun and the mediumand long-range missile.The Defencea. In defence the long-range anti-armourmissile has a theoretically high hitprobability. (For the TOW missile firingfrom a static position the detection to killratio is in the order of 98%). However,studies have shown that the possibility ofthe crew detecting a target for the timenecessary to track and engage successfullydecreases, as with all direct fire weapons,dramatically with range. (Fig 1)b. As can be seen in Fig 1 the missile has ahigh hit probability with targets that canbe detected and tracked for the timerequired, but due to battlefieldobscuration, ground and enemy tacticsthe detection rate is a good deal below the98% hit capability of the missile.c. At shorter ranges the Leopard, with betteroptics, has a higher detection rate than theTOW but because of the guncharacteristics the kill rate drops off over1,500 metres. (Fig 2)d. Both weapons when unsuppressedcomplement each other, the missile havinggreater accuracy over the longer ranges.(Fig 3)
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 13TOW-DETECTION/KILL PROBABILITY(DEFENDING UNSUPPRESSED)100-,90-80-70-60-50-40-30-20-10-DETECTI0N0 300 600 1000 Si" loOO 2500 5 "RANGEFigure 1(Note: The low kill rate in the first 600 meters of flight is the period when the crew is "gathering-in" themissile)LEOPARD DETECTION/KILL PROBABILITY(DEFENDING-UNSUPPRESSED)100-190-80-70-60-50-40-30-20-10-DETECTI0NT 1 1 r0 300 600 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000RANGEFigure 2
14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SI IT ()(. I MlLEOPARD/TOW KILL COMPARISON(DEFENDING-UNSUPPRESSED)1009080706050403020LEOPARD0 300 600 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000RANGEFigure 3When both are suppressed the tank,because of its armoured protection,maintains a higher detection to kill ratiothan the TOW at the shorter ranges. Theobvious solution is to maximize thecharacteristics of both weapons. That is,if possible, to have the Leopard engagingwhilst suppressed, the TOW whilstunsuppressed. (Fig 4)This theory is reinforced by the findingsof a war game study conducted at theUnited States Naval College Centre forAdvanced Research:'^ "The TOW andtank were a particularly complementaryand deadly defensive team . . . Mostoften, commanders place TOW platoonsapproximatley 1,000 metres behind thetank platoons. Depending onintervisibility, this allowed the TOW'sand tanks to open fire simultaneouslywith the TOW's firing at 2,200 to 3,000metres and the tanks firing at 1,500 to2,200 metres. The tanks at the nearerrange attracted most, if not all, of theSoviet direct fire while the TOW'sreceived little or no fire and could tracktheir missiles with little distraction . . .Then as the Soviet battalion closed towithin effective range of the T62's theM60 platoons backed into total defiladeand allowed the TOW's at greater rangesto complete the destruction of the SovietBattalion."g. At shorter ranges the superiority of thegun over the medium-range anti-armourmissile is overwhelming and whensuppressed in battle the effectiveness ofthe shorter range missiles is severelyreduced. (Fig 5)h. The U.S. Naval Research study alsofound that Dragon and tanks werecomplementary at the shorter ranges, butthat the combined rate of fire of TOWand Dragon, without tank support, wasnot sufficient to prevent the enemy fromover-running their position. Additionallythe smaller infantry anti-armour weapons(M72, Dragon) could not be movedaround the battlefield quickly enough tobe employed against an armouredbreakthrough.The Attack. In the advance and attack theaccuracy of the missile is further reduced. TOWhas a very low hit probability whilst moving
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 15LEOPARD-SUPPRESSED DEFENDINGTOW-UNSUPPRESSED DEFENDING100-190-80-70-60-50-40-30-20-10-0 300 600 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000RANGEFigure 4LEOPARD COMPARISONWITH SHORT RANGE ANTI ARMOUR WEAPONSDEFENDING SUPPRESSEDH'.LEOPARD100-190-80-50-t m »2Q. DRAGONin- CARL'" IGUSTAV0RANGEFigure 5
16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT OCT. 80KILL PROBABILITY(ATTACKING-STATIC)2H?RANGEFigure 6and in its present configuration it is not capableof firing on the move whilst under suppressivefire. The smaller man-portable weapons haveno ability to fire on the move and like infantryin the open are affected by suppressive fire.In the advance, and certainly in the attack, itwill not always be possible to pick the fireposition that gives the missile protection whilstallowing it to engage at its most effective range.Detection and kill rates will, therefore, be lowerthan they would be in prepared defensivepositions. (Fig 6)The missile then, far from being the panaceafor all our counter-armour problems also hasmany other practical limitations:a. The relatively slow time of flight out to3,000 metres (17 seconds for TOW) meansthat a vehicle moving at 40 kph will havetravelled nearly 200 metres during themissiles flight. Wire guided missiles can- ,not be fired through falling artillery ortrees, or over high fences and powerlines. 20 The skilful use of ground andobstacles by AFV, combined with rapidand erratic movement whilst exposed, alllessen the chances of a successful engagement.b. The U.S. Centre for Advanced Researchalso found that many TOW weapons willexpend their basic load, of ten rounds,before the battle against a first echelontank regiment is complete. 21 Compared toconventional munitions missiles are complexand expensive, (TOW $4,000 each),and even if available in unlimited numbersthe weight of fire of missiles, without gunor counter-armour artillery support, is insufficientto halt an attack before themissiles' positions themselves aresuppressed and overwhelmed. 22Missiles with HEAT warheads, minimumranges, back blast danger areas and wireguidance have severe limitations withinbuilt-up areas. In this situation there is aneed for a rapid firing gun of high velocitywith the ability to punch through wallsand knock out tanks at close range.Whereas the tactical employment of themedium-range missile (1,500 metres) is inharmony with the normal grouping anddisposition of an infantry battalion, boththe Soviet Union with the BMP/Saggerand the U.S. Army in Europe with theM113AI/TOW, are finding that thelonger range weapons are not compatiblewith the role of the infantry. 2 -' In the
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSE! > OPERATIONS 17defence the missile requires clear lines offire and observation out to 3,000 metresso that it may, whilst in a reverse slopeand defilade position, be used to engagethe enemy at maximum range from theflank. In the advance and attack themissile carriers need to be constantlyredeployed to apply their firepoweragainst the main enemy armoured threat.Both actions should ideally take place atranges in excess of 2,000 metres.On the other hand, the anti-tank gun requiredfor both FIBUA and close battlefieldengagement of enemy armour, in order to beeffective (at 1,000 metres) against tanks withimproved armour, will need to be of very highvelocity (5,000 fps) and at least 105 mm indiameter. 24 It follows that such a large gun, if itis to be responsive to the battle and capable ofsurviving, will need to be self-propelled and armourprotected.Summary. Before advancing my concept forcounter-armour operations I will summarizemy argument so far. It is:a. that a hostile force landed in Australiawill contain large numbers of AFV's,b. that counter-armour operations will beconducted in all phases of war,c. that the best counter-armour plan is onebased on a comprehensive combined armsteam,d. that both guns and missiles are necessaryand complementary,e. that infantry units must have the ability todefend themselves against armour but arenot anti-armour units, andf. that we need to adapt our organizationsand tactics to take cognisance of thechanges in armoured vehicles and antiarmouredweapons.CONCEPT FOR COUNTER-ARMOUROPERATIONSa. Concept. As a doctrinal base our infantrydivision must be organized and equippedso that it can defeat a mechanizedbrigade. Similarly a mechanized divisionshould be able to defeat an armouredbrigade.b. The Counter-Armour Plan. The counterarmourplan must be based on a matrix ofmutually supporting guns, missiles, minesand obstacles all dedicated to canalizing,disrupting, slowing and finally destroyingthe enemy armour. Diagramatically theplan will appear as follows:ROCKETROCKETLAW3 kmMAW5 kmMISSILEGUNMISSILEHELIOARTYARTYMRAW•i 1.5km105 mm-AP-I 2kmCounter-Armour LRAWAttack Helicopter LRAW155 mm How-Copperhead155 mm How-RDMH3km4 3.6 km15km15 kmARTYGeneral Support Rocket System RDM30 kmFGAFGAPGM weapons — first echelonWAAM weapons — second echelon60 km150 kmI1 km 2 km 3 km 4 km
18 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT. OCT. 80This matrix is obviously far removed fromthe weapons which are currently held w ithin, oravailable to, the infantry division.The divisional commander is most likely toretain control of his tank regiment. Brigades,therefore, should not rely on tanks to form thebasis of their counter-armour plan. Indeed,even if they were to be allocated for a specifictaskthey should be superimposed so that theirsudden withdrawal, for instance forredeployment or to the divisional counterattack, would not decimate the Brigade plan.In view of the portrayed threat a similarsituation applies in the case of a mechanizeddivision. (Assuming at this point that anarmoured division is beyond our resources).The tank regiments of the mechanized brigadesmay well be engaged on flanking, enveloping orreserve missions, most likely supported by oneof the battalions, leaving the brigade base opento attack by armour. This will be particularly soin defence when the tank regiments form thebasis of the counter penetration and counterattackforce.Both mechanized and infantry divisions,therefore, must be structured so that theirarmoured units are free to manoeuvre withoutdestroying the anti-armour credibility of theformation. Both divisions require a basiccounter-armour capability independent of theirtank elements.A suggested scale of anti-armour resourceswithin, and available to, the division is:a. Brigade(1) Infantry battalion:(a) section: M72 per man,(b) platoon: 84 mm CarlGustav,(c) company: two MRAW, and(d) battalion: 16 MRAW(2) Counter-armour squadron:(a) Gun tp: eight 105 mm antitankguns, and(b) Missile tp: eight LRAW.b. Division(1) Counter-armour squadron,(2) Attack helicopter squadron (aspart of the divisional aviationregiment),(3) Four medium artillery regimentscapable of deliveringCopperhead and RDM,(4) One general support rocketregiment capable of deliveryRDM, and(5) Engineers as presently allotted.c. Armour Tanks and APC depending onthe type of division.d. Air Supporting FGA to deliver both PGMand VVAAM weapons.Counter-Armour Squadrona. One of the main features of this concept isa manoeuvre unit at both brigade anddivisional level specifically designed todestroy armour.b. The counter-armour squadron is based ona combination of mutually supportingguns and missiles which, working inconjunction with other arms have theability to locate enemy armour by day ornight and to manoeuvre regardless of theair situation. The squadron has integralFO's to provide anti-armour artillerysupport and a security troop to protect theguns from short range anti-armourweapons.c. A suggested organization for such a unitis:(1) Organization (See page 19)(2) Role: to destroy enemy armour(3) Allocation: four per divisiond. The squadron would be fought by thesquadron commander and would deploytactically in four troop/groups, eachgroup consisting of:(1) two 105 mm anti-tank guns,(2) two LRAW,(3) oneLLAD,(4) one RADAR, and(5) One lnf sect.Counter-Arm our Operationsa. The counter-armour operation beginswith FGA delivering WAAM weaponsdeep into the enemy rear area to destroyhis second echelon armour in hides andharbour areas before it can move toinfluence the battle.b. If the ground is suitable and theopportunity presents itself the enemy firstechelon armour should also be attackedby FGA. Such operations are liable to becostly in aircraft and would need to becarefully considered to ensure their costeffectiveness. These attacks should bedirected against command and specialistvehicles when concentrated in FUP's,assemble areas, defiles and gaps.
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 19SQNHQGUNTP LRAWTP SPTPADMIN TP8105mmANTI-TANK GUNS8LRAWAD SECTSURVSECTSECURITYSECT4LLAD 4 RADAR 4 INF SECTOrganisationGeneral Support Rocket Regiments(GSRS) acting on information receivedfrom screens, reconnaissance units andaircraft may fire RDM to seal gaps andblock defiles. The RDM is the longestrange weapon under the divisionalcommanders control with which he cansignificantly affect the enemy armour.Artillery observers well forward withscreens, covering troops and advanceguards, armed with laser designators andsupported by medium artillery firingCopperhead, will be well placed tocommence the detailed destruction ofcommand, headquarters and specialistvehicles and may operate as part of, or inco-ordination with, the brigade counterarmoursquadron.The brigade headquarters is the lowestpractical level at which counter-armouroperations can be executed. The speed ofthe modern AFV combined withsophisticated communications gives thearmoured commander the ability torapidly change the direction and emphasisof his thrust. A carefully co-ordinatedand skilfully timed and executed plan is afundamental prerequisite for success.The primary task of the brigade counterarmoursquadron is to destroy the enemytanks and to separate them from theirsupporting infantry. The squadron shouldbe manoeuvred by the brigadecommander so that, like artillery, itsentire weight may be switched to the pointof decision. The FO's of the squadron willmove with each troop/group supplementingthe guns and missiles of thesquadron with anti-armour artillery fire.The enemy may be further disrupted ifthese fires are augmented with RDM,smoke and VT.g. The infantry battalions perform a vitalfunction in the counter-armour plan byforming the pivot around which thecounter-armour battle is fought. Thebattalions must be able to withstanddirect and sustained attack from tanksand mounted infantry whilst the armourbattle is being decided. Once the enemytanks are defeated it will be the task of theinfantry to complete the detaileddestruction of the enemy. For this role thebattalions will need to be equipped withlarge numbers of short and medium rangeanti-armour weapons to destroy hisremaining tanks and APC/MICV.h. The divisional counter-armour squadronwould, when grouped with the attackhelicopter squadron, tanks and infantryform a powerful reserve or counterattack/penetration force.Counter-Armour Operations In The Advancea. With Tanks. Tanks when allotted, or evenwhen organic to the brigade, are unlikely
20 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. OCT. 80THE ADVANCE•SECONDPOSITIONAFIRSTPOSITIONDiagram 5(With the "step forward" technique the shorter range weapons advance under the protection of the longrange missiles until they reach the limit of the supporting weapons effective range. The supporting weapon then"steps forward". The whole technique is supported by Anti-armour artillery. AH may secure the flanks and FGAattack the enemy in depth).to be available in such numbers that theywill, of their own volition, be able todestroy all the enemy armour. Brigades,therefore, must:(1) advance with well balancedbattle groups supported by atank based reserve, and(2) advance so that their antiarmourweapons are mutuallysupporting and each is engagingat its most effective range. Thisis best accomplished with the"step forward" technique. (Seediagram 5)Without Tanks When advancing withouttanks the brigade commander must makean assessment of the most likely armouredthreat and place his counter-armoursquadron accordingly. Battalions whencontacting armour must stand firm whilstthe squadron manoeuvres. The squadronmay either:(1) reinforce the battalion andattempt to hold and destroy asmuch armour as possiblepending divisional manoeuvre,or(2) establish itself to the rear orflank of the battalion and, using
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 21the technique so successfullyemployed by the Africa Corps,have the battalion draw theenemy into a prepared killingground where, once halted, theymay be attacked by the division.Counter-Armour In The Attacka. In the attack tanks and infantry shouldassault together with artillery FO'smoving well forward in the assaultechelon to engage defending armour withCopperhead.b. FGA, if available, should be used todestroy depth echelons and to disruptenemy counter penetration/attack forces.c. The brigade counter-armour squadron,from a supporting position, may engagethe defending armour with guns andmissiles and interdict the counterpenetration force. At the completion ofthe assault phase the squadron must movequickly into a position from which it candefeat, assisted by anti-armour artilleryfire, the enemy counter attack force.d. The divisional counter-armour and attackhelicopter squadrons are an excellentcombination to secure a flank. (SeeDiagram 6)Counter-Armour In The Defence. It is in thedefence that the full range of anti-armourweapons can be co-ordinated with devastingeffect.a. The divisional counter-armour squadron,supported by tanks, FGA, AH and antiarmourartillery should commence itsoperations as far forward as possible,even forward of the screen position if theground is suitable.b. As the screen withdraws the counterarmourbattle should continue back bysuccessive bounds until it passes over andthrough the main position. The divisionalanti-armour units once through theposition may then move to counterpenetration/counter attack tasks.c. The defence is a splendid opportunity toco-ordinate the obstacle plan with thecounter-armour plan. Copperhead mayXTHE ATTACK.RDM.RDM+ DFCOPPERHEADDiagram 6
22 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT. OCT. 80be used to destroy vehicles which areespecially vulnerable when slowing tonegotiate obstacles.Within the main position the brigadecounter-armour squadrons mustreconnoiter primary and secondarypositions for the most likely armouredapproaches. This may well mean that thesquadron may not be in the position itselfbut could be a flank or even behind theposition if, as at Tobruk, the best tankkilling ground is actually on the position.Infantry battalions must integrate theirdefences into the brigade plan and coordinatetheir artillery DF's so that RDMfire may be brought down into likelyarmoured assembly areas and onto hisassaulting formations.The divisional counter-armour and AHsquadrons are well suited to counterpenetrate. Tanks at all levels should bereserved for the counter attack wheretheir speed, firepower and armouredprotection may be used to the best effect.(See Diagram 6)Counter-Armour In The Withdrawal. In thewithdrawal all available counter-armourresources must be grouped in the rear guardand step back systematically so that eachweapon may disengage whilst under the coverTHE DEFENCE, RDM+ DF. RDMT DF^ 5 5 ^ ^&OZ&COPPERHEADOFCOUNTERPENETRATIONm |£|COUNTERATTACKDiagram 7
A CONCEPT FOR AUSTRALIA IN MID AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS 23THE WITHDRAWALFIRSTPOSITIONtSECONDPOSITIONDiagram 8of a longer range weapon to the rear. (SeeDiagram 7)CONCLUSIONThe evidence is there for those who wish tosee it. Whether it be Delville Wood, NorthAfrica or the Sinai a consistent theme has beenrunning through counter-armour operations.Sometimes our view has been distorted by aneasy victory consequent to bad tactics or by anew weapon promising a quick victory. But thefact remains that in the end event ultimatesuccess against armour can only be achievedwith a well balanced and comprehensivecombined arms team.For this task our equipment is inadequateboth in quantity and quality and our doctrine,and organizations supporting that doctrine,seems to be based on the proposition that if theenemy has armour it will somehowmiraculously disappear or that he will neveremploy it imaginatively. We must develop arealistic doctrine that suits our situation.As a doctrinal base our infantry divisionmust be organized and equipped so that it candefeat a mechanized brigade. This doctrinemust be supported by a long range andcomprehensive plan for the raising of new unitsand the purchase of equipment.Australia is a continent tailor made formobile warfare, ninety per cent being suitablefor armoured operations. The enemy will comeequipped to fight in our conditions, we must beready for that battle.U
24 DEFENCE FORCE JOL RNAL So. 24. SLPT OC I MiNOTES1. Macksey, Tank Facts and Feats P30.2. Macksey, Tank Warfare, P59.3. Guderian, Panzer Leader, P24.4. Strawson, The Battle for North Africa.5. War in the Desert. In Strategy and Tactics No. 401973.6. Strawson, Op. cit.7. Ibid.8. ROTEM, Thoughts on Desert Warfare, P12.9. Ibid PI4.10. Doughtv, Copperhead P45.1 I. Merritl, Field Artillery in the 1980'sP544.12. Boyle, Thermal Imaging P997.13. Furlong, WAAM. The U.S. Airforce's next Generationof Anti-Armour Weapons. PI379.14. Improved Chieftan for Iran. IDR Aug 1976 P641.1?. Weddle. Component Development Test of CeramicComposite Armour Configurations. P21.16. Tank Armour in NATO's Fifteen Nations Aug/Sep1976 P91.17. International Defence Review 9/1978 PI 315.IX. Internation Defence Digest. IDR 9/1978.19. A Dynamic Analysis of the Medium Tank Bt. PR-1.20. LTC Zamir, Gol'ani Bde, IDF. (Note: Although thisstudy was conducted with M60AI, Dragon and TOW Ibelieve that the lessons would be equally valid forother tanks and missiles with similar characteristics.)21. A dynamic Analysis of the Medium Tank Battalion PR-9.22. Ibid. PR-3.23. Donnelly. Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet ArmsPI 40.24. Armament NATO's Fifteen Nations Feb/Mar 19^7P67.1(11(1 KK.KXPinArmameni. NATO's Fifteen Nations. Feb/Mar 1977.A Dynamic Analysis of the Medium Tank Battalion.United States Nasal War College for AdvancedResearch. June 1978.Boyle, D. Thermal Imaging — Rapid Growth in NightVision. International Defence Review 6/1976.Cooper, B. The Ironclads of Cambrai, Pan Books, London1967.Donnelly, C. N. Tactical Problems Facing the Soviet ArmyInternational Defence Review. 9/1978.Douuhtv. R. A. Major, Copperhead. Armour Mar/Apr1978.'Furlough. \\ AWL The Next Generation of U.S. Air ForceAnti-Armour weapons. Internation Defence Review.p!379.Guderian, H. General. Pan/cr Leader. Futura PublicalionsLtd. London 1977.Improved Chieftan For Iran. International DefenceReview. Aug. 1976.Macksey, K. Tank Warfare. Panther Books Ltd. Great Britain1971.Macksey. K Tank Facts and Feats. Guinness SuperlativesLtd. London 1976.Merritt, J. N. Major-General. Field Artillery in the I980's.In National Defence May/Jun 1978.Rotem, A. Major-General. Thoughts of Desert Warfare.Israeli Defence Force Director of Military- Training.1977.Tank Armour. NATO's Fifteen Nations. Aug/Sep 1976.War in the Desert. Strategy and Tactics No. 40 Sep/Oct1973.Weddle, A. L. Component Development Test of CeramicComposite Armour Configurations. Aberdeen ProvingGrounds. Maryland. 1967./amir. I. Lt-Col. Golani Brigade. Israeli Defence Force,An Address to the U.S. Arms Infantry School.
DEFENCEPITHANDPOTENTIABy Major Bruce CameronRoyal Australian ArmouredCorps"England must expect everyman to do his duty,to sell arms to foreign countries'".THIS was the cynical comment used todescribe the involvement of Britishservicemen in the promotion of military sales("the squalid business of flogging arms to theThird World 2 ") at the 1979 Royal NavalEquipment Exhibition.It is a growing opinion that the overseas saleof military equipment contributes tointernational instability, and is thereforemorally wrong. Such political implications wererecognized by President Carter who, soon aftertaking office, announced that United Statesparticipation in the arms market would beconfined to that of "promoting its own securityand the security of its close allies 3 ". In the newpolicy the United States would not, forexample, ". . . be the first supplier to introduceinto a region newly developed advancedweapons which would create a new or highercombat capacity 4 ".Following the Cambodian catastrophe itwould indeed be encouraging if such moralconsiderations were to be applied to the exerciseof military influence and foreign policy. Shouldtherefore, exhibitions such as that atMajor Cameron graduated from OCS in 1969. Followingservice with I Armd. Kegt. in Vietnam, he attended theLong Armour Infantry Course in U.K. Included in subsequentappointments was that of trails officer for the FSV(Scorpion). This article was written prior to his presentposition as S02 A Veils., DYGEM. Materiel Branch. ArmyOffice.Article received January 1980.Portsmouth be condemned (". . . a tragedy foranyone with pride in British navaltraditions"'), and public conscience be urged tovent its outrage?It must be assumed that the moralist whoagrees with such sentiment, also opposesAustralia's purchase of HMAS Fremantie andHMAS Otoma. Fortunately most peoplerecognize that these purchases, as with othersfrom overseas countries, are essential to themaintenance of Australia's national security.What might not be recognized, or evenconsidered however, is how much supportshould be given to the reverse argument — thatof the necessity of Australia's transition fromthe status of 'customer' to that of 'producer'.Should an Australian Defence Industriesdisplay be a part of the Asian Defence Expo tobe held in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980?Self Reliance and Defence IndustriesMilitarily there is no doubt that Australia'sdefence capability would be greatly enhanced ifarms procurement was not dependent onoverseas supply. Not only would the burden ofprotecting supply lines be removed, but also,and more importantly, the source would beguaranteed. The principle of national selfsufficiency and self reliance has received muchpublicity recently.Regrettably full achievement of this principleis not immediately possible. Australia does nothave the technological expertise and industrialcapacity to develop and manufacture, in thenecessary time frame, many of the items thedefence inventory is presently deficient —tactical fighters, guided missile frigates, andship to ship missiles. In compensation however,
26 DEFENCE FORCE JOLRNAI No. :4. SEPT OCT. 80the defence capability of local industry issupported by such overseas orders through thepresent Australian Industrial Participation andOffset policies. Ideally for example, theaerospace industry should receive offset orderstotalling 5300m from the TFF purchase alone.Despite obligatory overseas procurement,dependency is slowly being reduced andpositive contributions to self reliance are beingmade. When capacity exists, greaterresponsibility is presently being granted toAustralian manufacturers. This is seen in theconstruction of the specialist vessels HMASTobruk and HMAS Cook, and the localcontract arrangements for the Fremantle Classpatrol boats. In the 1978/9 defence budget,equipment contracts totalling S337m weredirected to Australian industry, and it wasstated that this amount would increase in thefollowing year. Recently it has been reportedthat tax and financial incentives are likely to bedeveloped to further attract industry support.Development of Technological BaseIt will be seen and understood that theincreasing complexity of military equipmentsmakes a high technological base (particularly inthe fields of electronics and advancedconstruction techniques) essential to theachievement of the necessary industrialcapability. This requirement has also beenrecognized by present policies. "In 1976/7Defence spent $23m in the localelectronics/telecommunications industry, outof a total of $54m on this type of equipment 6 ".The last budget announced that $19.1 m hadbeen allocated to phase 2 of DISCON (DefenceSecure Communications Network), and a $15mcontract had been awarded for HF communicationsterminals. It has been estimatedthat the total local expenditure oncommunications in the next 10-15 years will beapprox $400m.The importance of Research andDevelopment (R&D) has not been overlookedeither. $24m was allocated this year to thedevelopment of the "Jindalee" overhorizonradar. Such a project is in keeping with thepolicy of 'shared R&D' suggested by the UnitedStates as being necessary for the best utilizationof funds available to NATO countries and theirallies. This concept "assigns principal R&Dtask areas to those countries most concerned bya specific area of warfare. R&D in oceancontrol (for example) would be assumed byJapan, Australia, and New Zealand 7 ".Cost Effective SolutionsIn light of the foregoing it is regretful that thekeel has not been completely laid for the future.Even with the necessary industrial andtechnological skills and capacity, defencecontracts cannot be awarded to Australianindustry if they are not 'cost-effective', ic it theproduction run is not sufficient in size tocompensate for design, tooling, andmanufacturing costs. "No subject so readilyattracts oversimplified solutions as the dilemmaas to how much added cost we should accept inorder to divert money to Australian industry tohelp raise its production in high technology, asagainst importing it at lower prices because ofthe advantage of large scale production inmajor allied countries"". Will there besufficient demand for example, to make itfeasible for Australian industry to manufactureaircraft to replace the Caribou and Macchi?The need for a market is obvious.Marketing TechniquesOne of the most outstanding examples ofAustralian development and manufacture is the"Ikara" anti-submarine system. It appearshowever, that it will only be through themarketing skills of Hawker Siddeley that ordersfrom Brazil and other South Americancountries may be expected. Similarly onewonders if the British Defence Salesorganization will be relied upon to recoup thedevelopment costs of the "Barra" Sonabuoy. Itwould be a disappointment if these projects, aswith the "Jindivik" target aircraft, were not torealize their full potential through lack ofmarketing support.One of the few successful ventures in defencesales would seem to be that of Dart TargetSystems, manufactured by AustralasianTraining Aids Pty. Ltd. Having used drive andinitiative to design and develop a first classproduct, this company employed the samequalities in its sales promotion to establish aworld-wide market. With professionaladvertising, overseas sales offices, andcustomer 'servicing' policies, it is not surprisingthat success has followed. It is hard to imagineany other Australian company involved withdefence industry, that might be eligible for boththe Australian Design and Export Awards.
DEFENCE SALES: PITH AND POTENTIAL 27Whilst considering achievement rewards, mightnot an Annual Defence Industry Awardprovide additional incentive and be justrecognition for such companies that contributeto Australia's defence?In the ruthless world of business, everyindividual and organization is considered a'suspect'. When a 'suspect' is identified ashaving both a need and the ability to pay, he isreclassified as a 'prospect'. At this stage fullsales resources are employed to ensure thatcustom is not lost. 'Prospecting' is consideredto be the key to success. It is hard to understandwhy the sale of Australian defence equipment isnot undertaken with the same enthusiasm andimagination found in the commercial marketplace. Is it because of a lack of 'prospects'?Potential Customers and Product DesignUnfortunately the answer appears to be that'prospects' have indeed been identified,however they have not been actively sought. Itis well recognized for example, that ASEANnations constitute considerable market potentialin the wake of diminishing UnitedStates involvement in the region. "Asconsumers of military equipment the ASEANcountries, Papua New Guinea, and NewZealand have substantial needs in the field ofmedium technology, high performance andtropicalized equipment, which need to beobtained from secure sources 9 ". In additionmany countries in the near Pacific have recentlyproclaimed new sea boundaries and have a needfor increased surveillance and patrolcapabilities. To these countries, in addition tothe advantage of avoiding the threat of politicaldomination, it has been suggested thatAustralia is one of few feasible sourcesavailable. "With the exception of Japan to thenorth, Australia is the only regional nation withan industrial infrastructure capable of assistingits neighbours to improve their levels of selfreliance 10 ".If the techniques of professional marketingwere to be applied, a survey would beconducted of these countries to determine their'need'. The first consideration after anequipment requirement had been identified,would be to evaluate the magnitude andstrength of a likely order. If favourable,information that would then be examinedwould include: role in which equipment is to beemployed, likely threat it is to encounter,anticipated operating conditions, and requiredcapabilities. The result would be a rating of thecustomer requirement, coupled with a priorityof design characteristics.If the market potential was strong enough,independent manufacture may be considered.More likely however, the market survey resultswould be considered in relation to the knowndesign and development requirements ofAustralian defence equipment. Quite probablymany overseas design priorities will be met bythe Australian requirement. Others may bereadily achieved by an acceptable compromiseor slightly modified production. Whatever theoutcome, the possibilities of cost-effectiveAustralian manufacture would have been fullyassessed. Only in this way is the principle of selfreliance able to be made a reality.Conclusion and CommissionIt would be easy to conclude in the words ofthe 1974 Senate Standing Committee onForeign Affairs and Defence, "... the exportof Australian defence equipment should beconsidered whenever possible.". As it has beenshown however, despite real achievements inthe development of defence industries, afurther step must be taken. It is believed that itis essential that a specialist defence salesorganization be established to assist industry inthe marketing of Australian defenceequipment. Australia's self reliance must not bejeopardised because of unsought markets orunskilled salesmen.IINOTES1. Sampson, A., "Senior service turns salesman"; "TheBulletin", September 25, 1979.2. Ibid.3. Gray, A., "Study Techniques in Foreign ArmsSales"; "Triad". Spring 1979.4. Ibid.5. Sampson, Op. eit.6. Eltringham, D. H., "The Electronics andTelecommunications Industry: The Defence View","Triad".7. Chamberlain, B., "New Dimensions in R & D in theUnited States", "Pacific Defence Reporter",February, 1978.8. Defence Review Statement bv the Honourable D. J.killen, 24 October 1979.9. Powell, B., "Industry in the tender trap", "TheBulletin", July 3, 1979.10. "Daedalus", "Australia as a Regional TechnologyCentre", "Pacific Defence Reporter".
BBORIGMES BAD ThE BBHYTHE SECOND WORLD WAR EXPERIENCEMajor R. A. HallRo\al Australian In Ian tryTHE relationship between the Army and theAborigines and Torres Strait Islanders hasbeen a long one beginning at least as early as theFirst World War. 1 It was during the SecondWorld War however that relatively largenumbers of Aborigines and Islanders wereenlisted or developed other forms ofassociation with the Army, during a periodwhen white relations with Aborigines andIslanders were largely characterised by racismand brutality.The relationship which emerged from thisassociation is of interest to the Army today inview of our continued interest in northerndefence and surveillance, Australia's growingcultural diversity, and the unfortunate fact thatracism continues to exist in today's Army. 2During the Second World War, twodocuments laid down the criteria for enlistmentinto the Australian Army, the Defence Act andAustralian Military Regulations and Orders.The Defence Act placed no limitations uponthe racial origins of voluntary enlistees butrequired that all personnel take an oath ofallegiance, thereby restricting enlistment toBritish subjects. Torres Strait Islanders andAborigines were British subjects and thereforewere not excluded from voluntary enlistment bythe Act. Persons not substantially of Europeanorigin or descent were, however, exemptedfrom call-up for war service under section61(l)(h) of the Defence Act, and fromcompulsory training under section 138( 1 )(b).Contrary to the Defence Act, AustralianMilitary Regulations and Orders No. 177 statedthat only persons who were "substantially ofEuropean origin or descent" were to be enlistedvoluntarily. This did not affect the legalpredominance of the Defence Act, however,Major Hall graduated from RMC in 1968. He served as aplatoon commander in 8 RAR and then in a variety ofappointments includiang I PIR, ~ PIR, HQ I Div. andDCAD (Army). His current posting is with ManagementAdvisory Services Branch, Defence Central.A rticle rcceii ed Feb. 1980.and could be varied or waived to suit therequirements of Land Headquarters. 3As the war progressed, the threat to thesecurity of Australia increased, causing greaterdemands for Army manpower. As a result, theArmy manipulated the discriminatory sectionof the Australian Military Regulations andOrders to allow the enlistment of someappropriately qualified Aborigines and TorresStrait Islanders.As early as September 1939, and contrary toAustralian Military Regulations and Orders,Aborigines were to be enlisted into the Army,though in small numbers. The then Minister forDefence, Mr. G. A Street, had authorised theCommandant 7th Military District to beginenlistment of a limited number of selected part-Aborigines into units stationed in the NorthernTerritory. 4 The Darwin Infantry Battalion, forexample, had its own small contingent ofAboriginal servicemen. 5Despite these and other isolated caseshowever, while hostilities remained centered inEurope, the Army showed little enthusiasm forAboriginal volunteers. 6In response to an increasing number ofrequests by part-Aborigines and full-bloods toenlist, and confusion created by the fact thatsome Aborigines were already serving contraryto the previous orders, Military commandssought clarification of the policy on enlistmentof Aborigines and other non-Europeans. On 6May 1940 a Military Board Memo was issuedstating that the enlistment of persons of non-European origin or descent was "neithernecessary nor desirable" 7 As Aborigines beganto be turned away from the recruiting officesthroughout Australia, various agencies such asthe Queensland Department of Native Affairsand the Aborigines Uplift Society took up theissue of Aboriginal enlistment. Their maingrievances centered round the inconsistency ofArmy policy.As a result of pressure applied by theseagencies, the matter of Aboriginal enlistmentwas reconsidered by the Military Board and itsdecision, promulagated on 13 August 1940, wasthat:
ABORIGINES AND THE ARMY 29A squad of Torres St rait Light Infantry Battalion training in their company lines, Thursday Island.
30 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. OCT. 80"...the provisions of Section 61(l)(h) and 138(l)(b) of the Defence Act and AMR&O177(1) must be adhered to.This precludes the enlistment of fullbloodedaborigines, but, in deciding whetheror not a person with some aboriginal blood isor is not substantially of European origin ordescent, medical officers will be guided bygeneralsuitability of the applicant and by thelaws and practices of the State or Territory inwhich the enlistment takes place 8While the Army required a means of excludingunsuitable applicants from enlistment, the useof the applicant's race as a means of exclusionwas bound to lead to the charge that the Armywas practising racism. The Military Boarddecision however, did possess an importantasset from the Army point of view; flexibility.The Army could adjust the acceptability ofAboriginal recruits to meet changes in thedemand for manpower and in this regard theMilitary Board decision represented animprovement over the earlier completeexclusion of Aborigines.Protest at the decision came however, on 4January 1942, when a Sydney newspaperpublished an article concerning an Aboriginefrom Murwillumbah who attempted to join theAIF and was passed medically fit at theMurwillumbah recruiting centre. He and twoother Aborigines from Grafton were sent toSydney, but on arrival were immediatelyreturned without explanation. Public reactionto the incident resulted in pressure beingapplied to the Army and the CommonwealthGovernment, to accept Aboriginal soldiers 9By early 1942 the Japanese advance and thedwindling availability of manpower werebeginning to apply a more effective pressure tothe Army. On 19 February 1942, Darwin wasbombed and fear of a Japanese invasionreached a peak. By March, the demand foradditional manpower to meet the threat ofinvasion had become so acute that theremaining classes of men; those of the mostmarginal military value, were called up'" Atthis stage, the Army began to relax its attitudeto the enlistment of Aborigines and althoughthe wording of the orders did not change,Aborigines began to be enlisted in relativelylarge numbers. Despite the discriminatorynature of recruiting policy, those Aborigineswho succeeded in becoming enlisted membersof the Army, and who served in raciallyintergrated Army units, enjoyed an equalitymany of them seldom experienced in the prewarcivilian evironment. Pay and conditionswere identical with those enjoyed by whitesoldiers while opportunities for advancementexisted for Aborigines possessing leadershipqualities. Reg Saunders, for example, rose fromthe rank of private soldier to that of lieutenantduring the course of the war though his was anexceptional case.Though up to this time the Army had usedthe orders to restrict the entry of Aboriginesand part-Aborigines into most parts of theAustralian Army, it had simultaneously beenraising racially segregated units manned almostentirely by persons of non-European origin ordescent. The Torres Strait Defence Force andthe Northern Territory Special ReconnaissanceUnit were examples of this inconsistency.The Torres Strait Defence Force wasmanned, below the rank of sergeant, by TorresStrait Islanders, mainland Aborigines and someAustralian Malays. War Establismentauthorised the raising of the following:UnitTorres Strait Light Infantry BattalionCoast Artillery-Torres StraitHQ of a Water Transport Group (Small Craft)32 Australian Water Transport Maintenance Company (SmallCraft) Royal Australian Engineers14 Australian Water Transport Operating Companv (SmallCraft) Royal Australian EngineersTorres Strait Pioneer CompanyTOTAL 12TotalStrength48841363Native"Strength44033543WhiteStrength487820206 67 39346260776239231135510729421
ABORIGINES AND THE ARMY 31These figures represented the ideal and werenever actually achieved. Native strength of thetotal force fluctuated but never reached morethan about 900.While the Army was manipulating therecruiting regulations, similar manipulationwas occurring with the regulations governingrates of pay. Pay scales for the AustralianArmy were governed by War Financial(Military Forces) Regulations and MilitaryFinancial Regulations. Neither regulationmentioned special rates of pay for Torres StraitIslanders or Aborgines. Though legally entitledto the same pay rates as white soliders, thenative members of the Torres Strait Force,again in breach of the relevant regulations,received considerably less pay. 13 The WarEstablishment laid down the following payscales for Islander and Aborigine servicemen:Private, 1st year of service2nd year of service3rd year of serviceLance CorporalCorporal£3.10.0 per month£3.15.9 per month£4. 0.0 per month£4. 7.6 per month£4.15.0 per monthBy comparison, a private soldier in anyintegrated 14 unit of the Australian MilitaryForces was paid at the rate of about £8.0.0 permonth in his first year of service, regardless ofhis race.This led to great dissatisfaction amongst theIslander and Aborigine troops and theyeventually mutinied in January 1944.On 1 February 1944, as a result of themutiny, a conference was held in Melbourne todiscuss the employment of natives in the Army.Representatives from the Department of theArmy, External Territories, Interior, Navy,Repatriation and Treasury and from theQueensland Government attended, and themain question under discussion was the pay ofthe native troops.The conference recognised that paying thenative troops at a lower rate than white troopswas illegal and estimated that the amount ofunder-payment, together with repatriation was£30,000,000. However, it was decided thatpayment of full rates of pay should not be madebecause the sum involved was too large, andjp^- .. , i
3: DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT. OCT. 80paying the natives their legal entitlement wouldput into their hands more money than theycould have hoped to earn in civil life. It was feltthat this would cause trouble when the soldierswere eventually discharged from the Army. 15 Itwas inappropriate for the Army to countenanceeither of these arguments.A payrise was given however, but to a levelstill short of the amount paid to white soldiers.Another exception to the official recruitingpolicy was the Northern Territory SpecialReconnaissance Unit. Like the Torres StraitDefence Force, this unit was raised to performa particular task in a closely defined geographicarea and its task was one that could not easilybe performed by white units.It had been recognised early in the war thatDarwin would be particularly vulnerable toattack if Singapore and the Netherlands EastIndies fell into Japanese hands. Because of therelatively small size of the military force whichcould be allocated to the defence of Darwin, itwas imperative that the effectiveness of theforce be maximised by providing early warningof any Japanese attack. The Northern TerritorySpecial Reconnaissance Unit was thereforeraised in 1941:a. To provide flank protection for Darwin byorganising the natives of the coastline toform an efficient coastwatchingorganisation based on their own localorganisation.b. To organise the natives into a potentialmobile force or patrol to carry out guerrillawarfare in the event of a landing by enemyforces...c. To gather together a small unit of theaborigines who possess special prowess inhunting, in craftsmanship and bushcraft,and who are skilled in guerrilla warfare andambush, and to use these natives for theinstruction of members of the IndependentCompanies in tropical bushcraft. I6Squadron Leader Donald Thomson 1 " wasseconded to the Army from the RAAF for thepurpose of raising and commanding the unit.He patrolled Arnhem Land and recruited about50 full-blood Aborigines mainly from knownfighting bands. Many were renowned warriorsand some had already killed Japanese 18 and hadserved gaol sentences as a result.Recruits were given regimental numbers as asign of their enlistment. "Pay" consisted of aweekly issue of three sticks of tobacco andequipment issued to the soldiers includedtomahawks, knives, fishing lines and hooks.These items improved the efficiency of foodgathering, thereby enabling the soldiers tospend more time training and fighting theJapanese.The fifty Aborigines of the unit representedonly the nucleus of the force, as each soldier'stask, should the Japanese invade, was toorganize and lead the other warriors of his clanin guerrilla attacks against the Japanese. Toattack the Japanese they were to use only theirtraditional weapons — the spear and the spearthrower."Thomson felt that the issue of firearms andindeed, any other type of military stores, wouldindicate to the Japanese that these Aborigineswere in fact an organized military unit and thatthis would lead to severe Japanese retaliationagainst all Aborigines, whether fighting theJapanese or not.This unusual unit was manned almost entirelyby full-blood Aborigines at a time when officialArmy policy was that only people ofsubstantial European origin or descent could berecruited. Officially the idea of recruiting fullbloodswas not entertained.The reason why both the Torres StraitDefence Force and the Northern TerritorySpecial Reconnaissance Unit were treated as exceptionsto the general Army policy can be seenin the nature of the organizations themselves.Both were restricted to closely defined remotelocalities. There was minimal chance of eitherorganization fighting alongside predominantlywhite units and there was no possibility that theorganizations would be deployed outside theirdefined area.Despite this however, individuals from theTorres Strait Defence Force did venture outsidethe Torres Strait area to north Queensland andNew Guinea but this was for training purposesor for brief visits involving the loading andunloading of ships and aeroplanes. 2 "Individuals from the Northern TerritorySpecial Reconnaissance Unit however may havebeen sent on "covert" missions to Timor andMalaya 21 Despite these cases, neither organizationdeployed formed bodies of troops outsideits local area and both thus remained out of thepublic eye.Both organizations were given tasks whichthe Army considered were essential, and for
ABORIGINES AND THE ARMY 33which the natives were peculiarly suited. Thomsonstated that no white soldiers "however welltrained" 22 could match his Aboriginal soldiersin guerrilla warfare and it would obviously havebeen impossible for white troops to mobilizethe other Aborigines in Arnhem Land as Thomson'sAboriginal soldiers could. For the TorresStrait Defence Force, the situation wassomewhat different. White soldiers could haveperformed the tasks of that force, but thedefence of the Torres Strait Islands, thoughhighly desirable, was not of such strategic importanceas to warrant the deployment there ofa force of white soldiers for the duration of thewar, particularly as trained bodies of troopswere always needed elsewhere. There was alsothe matter of cost to consider. It should beremembered that the figure of £30,000,000 inunderpayment and repatriation liability leftowing to Islander soldiers represented a significantsaving to the Army which would have beenforgone had white troops been employed.The recruitment of Aborigines and Islandersinto these organisations obviously suited theArmy whereas the recruitment of full-blood orpart-Aborigines into white units did not. Theorders were therefore manipulated by the Armyto cloak discrimination against Aboriginal andIslander recruits on one hand or their exploitationon the other.This ambivalence in Army policy was alsoreflected in the Army's perception ofAborigines as a security threat. By early 1942,isolated white communities in north Australiabegan to feel threatened by Aborigines as aresult of the guilt whites felt at their treatmentof Aborigines, and the Japanese attemptsthroughout South East Asia to undermine theprestige of white colonial powers and to assertthe interests of indigenous populations. Earlierhowever, wartime propaganda decrying theconcept of a master-race had resulted in initialimprovements in inter-racial relations. TheJapanese advance brought these improvementsto an end leaving Aborigines frustrated anddisillusioned and whites threatened and defensive.While frustration induced manyAborigines to make public statements supportinga Japanese victory, whites accusedAborigines of actively assisting the Japaneseand used the Aborigines' statements to justifytheir opinions.The white preception of the security threatposed by Aborigines was endorsed by theArmy, and became indiscriminately applied toall Aborigines. An intelligence report onAboriginal stockmen in the gulf country, forexample, claimed that Aborigines there were"largely" influenced by communist and anticapitalistpropaganda and were almost invariablyswayed by agitators. Many Aboriginesit claimed, would willingly help the Japanese 21The tendency of white security personnel tolabel all Aborigines with the sins of a few, asdemonstrated by the above report, resulted inthe worst excesses of the Army's relations withAborigines throughout the war. In WesternAustralia, the Army imposed controls over themovements of Aborigines and compiled aregister listing all Aborigines in the state. InAugust 1942, the Army issued orders controllingAborigines between the mouth of the MurchisonRiver and the northern boundary of thePerth metropolitan area. Employed Aborigineswithin this area were to reside on the propertyof their employers who were made responsiblefor their conduct and movements. UnemployedAborigines were confined to the Moore RiverAboriginal settlement or, if living north of theDongara-Mingenew Line, were forced to camppermanently on Aboriginal reserves under thedirection of the police. Despite the objectionsof the Western Australian Government, thisscheme was put into effect, sometimes with theuse of physical force to coerce the Aboriginesinvolved. In January 1943 the Army sought toextend this scheme to other areas of WesternAustralia, but opposition from the StateGovernment and police, and the diminishingthreat of invasion by that time led to the abandonmentof the idea but the Army continued toimpose harsh controls more suited to themanagement of enemy aliens than Australiancitizens, in isolated areas such as PortHedland 24The poor estimation of the loyalty ofAborigines may also have influenced the willingnessof the Army and Government to armsome Aborigines. The perception ofAborigines, doubtful loyalty and the possibilityof renewed post-war inter-racial violence mayhave contributed, for example to the decisionnot to arm the Aboriginal soldiers of the NorthernTerritory Special Reconnaissance Unit. Inaddition, Biskup seems to suggest that doubtfulsecurity may have been the underlying motivefor the Government's refusal to issue weaponsto a group of Aborigines who underwent
34 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT./OCT. 80military training in the Kimberleys in April1942 but who were never recruited or formallyraised as a unit. 25Yet another area in which the Armyestablished a relationship with Aborigines, wasthat of civilian employment. From early as 1933Aborigines had been employed by the Army ina civilian capacity, 26 and although theAboriginal civilians were employed throughoutAustralia, the Northern Territory fromDecember 1941 onwards saw the highest levelof Aboriginal employment achieved, and themost significant contribution to the war effortmade by Aboriginal civilians.After the entry of Japan into the war on 7-8December 1941 the size of the defence force atDarwin grew rapidly. By late 1942 the combinedstrength of the Army, Navy, Air Force andCivil Construction Corps throughout theNothern Territory had reached over 100,000. 27Most of this force was stationed near Darwin,though some units were stationed atvarious centres along the length of the StuartHighway. By 1943, Army strength alone betweenDarwin and Mataranka was estimated at50,000. 2 *Most of the white civilian populationhowever, had been evacuated after the firstJapanese raid and would have numbered nomore than about 1,000 29 in the Darwin-Mataranka area by early 1942.As for the Aboriginal population, on 30 Junethat year the total Aboriginal and part-Aboriginal population for the Northern Territoryhas been 14,488.-'° Though some part-Aboriginal children were evacuated, most ofthe Aboriginal and part-Aboriginal populationremained in the Northern Territory.The huge influx of white servicemen meantthat thousands of men from the cities of southeastAustralia came into contact withAborigines for the first time. They broughtwith them a new attitude to Aborigines whichwas a mixture of the more liberal ifdisinterested approach to Aborigines commonat that time in south-east Australia, a generalAn Aboriginal orderly of 121 Australian General Hospital, bandaging the arm of a man wounded during an air raidon Katherine, 24 November 1942.
ABORIGINES AND THE ARMY 35ignorance of pre-war racial attitudes and conditionsin the north, and the egalitarian influencesof the Army society. This peculiarly Army approachto Aborigines replaced the pre-warwhite attitudes in the Northern Territorybecause the Army, due to its sire, became thedominant social organism in the north, while atthe same time, white civilian influence declineddue to evacuation. This huge influx of 100,000servicemen required support in an area in whichthe industrial infrastructure had been designedfor about 2,000 whites. Consequently manyjobs were created to which Aborigines,representing the largest pool of available labourremaining in the Northern Territory, were inevitablyattracted.As a result of the threat of a Japanese attackon Darwin, Aborigines were evacuated fromcoastal settlements to settlements establishedfurther inland, just prior to the first bombingraid, both the Army and the Native AffairsBranch believed the evacuation necessary so asto ensure the Aborigines' safety in the event offurther bombings or a Japanese landing; to easethe rationing situtation, since many Aboriginespreviously employed by white civilians now requiredrations; to prevent contact with thetroops; and lastly, to prevent the "disseminationof contagious diseases". 31An unforeseen result was that some of thesesettlements came to be located near ArmyLogistics units such as bakeries, hospitals,workshops, stores and depots and the like,which required local labour.On 5 April 1942, officers of the Native AffairsBranch asked the Commanding Officer ofan Army workshop located at Mataranka ifemployment could be given to some of theAborigines. 32Army employment ofNorthern Territory.He agreed, so began large scaleAborigines in theWork performed by the Aborigines atMataranka was cement work, carting andshovelling sand and gravel, timber cutting, andcartage and stacking of ammunition. TheAborigines worked a ten hour day and the opinionof those in charge was that they workedharder than either soldiers or civilian labourersin the Middle East.Aborigine labourers tending a pineapple plantation on a farm run by No. 1 Farm Company, Australian ArmyService Corps.
36 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT./OCT. 80MELVILLEISLANDDARWIN.ADELAIOE RIVERpCALEDON BAY.KBLUE MUD BAYCATHERINEMARANBOYMATARANKALARRIMAH..BIRDUMELLIOTTBANKA BANKATENNANT CREEKW.A.BARROW CREEKMOUNTISAALICE SPRINGS|SCALE IN MILES.JO..LTHK NORTHKRN TKRRITORYShowing the North-South Line fo Communications and the sites of principal Army labour camps.
ABORIGINES AND THE ARMI:•-This initial experiment was so successfulfrom the Army's point of view that 20 moreAborigines and a part-Aborigine were soughtfor enlistment into the Army as supervisors ofAboriginal labour gangs which the Army anticipatedwould be formed. These additionallabour organizations were requested on 26 July1942 and resulted in the establishment of a newlabour settlement at Springvale Station, aboutfour miles from (Catherine.Shortly afterwards, similar labour settlementswere also set up at Koolpinyah andAdelaide River in 1942 and at Cullen in early1943. Aborigines from existing settlements atBarrow Creek, Banka Banka and Elliott werealso employed.By May 1943, the Army was employing 724Aborigine men and women in the Darwin andAlice Springs areas." Aborigines remained inArmy employment until after 1946 but byFebruary that year the number employed haddropped to 396.For each man or woman employed by theArmy, food, housing, and clothing for his orher dependants were provided by the Army.Thus the number of Aborigines brought intodirect contact with the Army as a result of Armyemployment was considerably higher thanthe above figures show.As the war progressed, Aborigines employedby the Army were utilized in increasingly morediverse jobs. Semi-skilled work such asassembly and cleaning of carburettors and gearboxes,driving, slaughtering, timber cutting,and sorting and reconditioning of tools andstores was performed by Aborigines as well asthe general labouring tasks mentioned above.Female Aborigines performed gardening,hygiene, maintenance tasks around settlements,and were employed in hospitals as orderlies andpersonal maids to matrons as well as providingstaff for washing, ironing, and other householdduties. Similar work was performed inAustralian Women's Army Service barracks,hostels and messes.Both the scale and nature of Army employmentof Aborigines was to have important consequencesnot only amongst the Aborigines, butalso amongst other employers. Although manyof the tasks performed by Aborigine labourerswere mundane, some, such as driving and strippingand assembling of vehicle parts,represented a departure from the "traditional"style of Aboriginal employment in the north.which prior to the war, had almost exclusivelybeen limited to stock work.The conditions of employment which theArmy offered its Aboriginal employees weregenerally better than those provided by thepastoral employers. The conditions of employmenton \ estey's properties provide an interestingcomparison. Wages there were 5/- perweek of which 2/- was held in trust by theDepartment of Name Affairs. With the remaining3/-, the stockman was expected toclothe himself and feed his dependants.Employers were exempted from paying thesewages if they undertook to maintain the dependantsof the stockmen, but this understandingwas often ignored. Besides poor wages,Vestey's stations also provided the Aborigineswith a poor diet consisting mainly of meat(mostly offal), flour, sugar and tea. This contributedto sterility, infant mortality, and a highrate of stillbirths, most of which could havebeen overcome by the addition of vegetables. Inaddition. Aboriginal stockmen worked no fixedhours and were given poor, if any, sanitaryfacilities.By contrast, Aborigines employed by theArmy were paid at the rate of 5/- per week andwere provided with free clothing, medical treatment,and full rations for themselves and fortwo dependants each. 34 Rations were similar tothose of soldiers except that in the native rationthere was more meat. The ration also includedvegetables which were grown in Army gardensmaintained by Aborigines. Army style messesand hygiene facilities including showers, wereprovided. At Tennant Creek the Armyestablished an Aboriginal hospital which gavefree hospitalization to Aboriginal patientswhether employed by the Army or not 35 , and toreduce unscheduled absenteeism, Aborigineswere given a "walk-about" period on full payand rations after each period of twelve monthswork. 36Throughout its employment of theAborigines, the Army had remained largely unconcernedabout its own impact on the traditionalculture of its employees. Though Armypolicy attempted to maintain the authority oftribal elders, encouraged cultural events such ascorroborees and consented to the practice oftraditional medicine, the act of establishing thelabour settlements, and moving the Aboriginesaway from the coast to areas further inland,overwhelmed even the best attempts to protect
38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. -OCT. 80Soldiers of the Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion servicing a truck.
ABORIGINES AND THE AK\t> 39the cultural groups. Aborigines from differentareas were thrown together in the settlements.Warramunga and Aranda from CentralAustralia for example were taken to Katherine,where, after an initial period of fright andwariness, they lived and worked successfully(from the Army's point of view) with largelydetribalized Wagait 37An even greater cultural shock was providedby the white servicemen. Though the labour settlementswere sited so as to avoid contact withservicemen, were out of bounds and were policedby Aborigines and European supervisors,white servicemen came in search of women.Resultant inter-racial trouble was particularlyprevalent at Koolpinyah which was locatedclose to several Army units only 18 miles fromDarwin.Despite these problems, the establishment oflabour settlements did have some positive effectsfor Aborigines. Many enjoyed better livingconditions and higher wages than they mayotherwise have had, but other less tangiblebenefits occurred also. With the exception ofthose Aborigine labourers from CentralAustralia, the majority of Aborigines in Armyemploy had already begun the process of adjustmentto white society before recruitment bythe Army. The experience of the Army labourcamps assisted this process of adjustment. As aresult, the Aborigines were more employableafter the war, had an understanding of a casheconomy, and had developed a higher selfesteem.Further improvements to the conditions ofemployment were proposed by the Arms inNovember 1943. These were initiated byBrigadier Dollery, Commander of the NorthernTerritory Line of Communications Area, whowas responsible for the recruitment and conditionsof service for Aborigine labourers. Heproposed the raising of an Aboriginal EmploymentCompany and a Native Affairs section forthe Headquarters of Northern Territory Force.This section was for the better administrationof the various Aboriginal labour camps controlledby the headquarters.The formation of the Aboriginal EmploymentCompany was designed to provide an incentiveto Aborigines to rise above the flat wageof 5/- per week, improve their labour skills,and improve their English. Enlistment into thecompany was to be restricted to thoseAborigines who satisified a suitable standard ofintelligence, skill, conduct and knowledge ofEnglish. 38 The 412 recruits were to receive thepay and conditions of white soldiers andspecialized training which would suit them foremployment after the war. Though first proposedon 18 November 1943, it languished inthe Departments of Army and the Interior until27 June 1945 when it was agreed that since theend of the war was approaching there would beno further need for a Native Labour Company.The Native Affairs Section, which wasadopted, consisted of European soldiers, maleand female, who were located at each laboursettlement. Their task was to conduct educationand health training amongst the labourers andtheir dependants. 39Both proposals indicate a changed perceptionof the Army's role in relation to the Aboriginesemployed. Since both proposals were formulatedin late 1943 they can be attributed inpart to the changing war situation. By that timethe crisis of invasion was past and the end ofthe war in sight. These factors, plus thepresence of individuals such as BrigadierDollery, who had a sincere sympathy for theAborigines, led to the consideration of postwarconditions for Aborigines. This concernwas expressed in the proposal to establish theNative Affairs Section of Northern TerritoryForce. It stated that:"It is not possible to over-stress thedesirability of pursuing every possible meansof raising the individual self esteem of theAborigines as a contribution towards theraising of their racial morale. Nothing oflasting worth can ever be accomplished forthese people...unless the Aborigines are ledto believe in themselves and in ourappreciation of them." 40Furthermore, the Army recognized that thefuture development of the natives of the Territorywould demand native leaders and it intendedthe education programme, and the illfatedAboriginal Employment Company as astart in this direction. 41Clearly, official Army policy towardsAboriginal and Islander soldiers and civilianswas confused. In some cases, such as the decisionto underpay the soldiers of the TorresStrait Defence Force, policy was strongly influencedby racism. In other cases, such as thetreatment of Aboriginal soldiers enlisted intointegrated units, or the pay and conditions pro-
40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT./OCT. 80vided for civilian labourers in the Northern Territory,policy was liberal and far-sighted.Those policies which show most signs ofracism can almost always be attributed to aheadquarters located in a major city and thussubject to prevailing racist attitudes in the communityat large. The relatively enlightenedpolicies tended to have originated in headquartershaving less exposure to white civilianideals. For example, policy acquiescing in theunderpayment of Torres Strait Defence Forcesoldiers originated in Land HeadquartersMelbourne, whereas that governing the pay andconditions of civilian labourers in the NorthernTerritory was decided upon by HeadquartersNorthern Territory Force, which owing to thesmall white civilian influence remaining in theNorthern Territory after early 1942, remainedlargely uninfluenced by civilian racist attitudes.The best relations of all however, were thosewhich developed on a personal level betweenblack and white soldiers and civilians. Theserelationships were characteristically marked bya degree of friendship seldom found in the contemporarycivilian environment. This wasbecause the cohesive forces operating within theworking group, for example a rifle section orgun crew, were stronger than the divisive influencesof racism. The situation was differenthowever in segregated units such as those of theTorres Straits Defence Force. While integratedunits tended to promote group cohesion,segregrated units tended to emphasise differences.Segregation also enabled Army policyto discriminate against the Islanders.The Army now retains a tenuous connectionwith Aborigines and Islanders, mainly throughthose Aboriginal or Islander soldiers serving atpresent, occasional assistance to medical teamsworking amongst Aborigines, and throughvarious exercises and other training activitiesconducted with Aborigines, such as recent visitsto Port Keats Mission.As interest is again focusing on thesurveillance of northern Australia, Army interestin Aborigines may grow . Just as in the SecondWorld War skills possessed by Aboriginesliving the traditional life in the north causedthem to be regarded as a valuable military asset,so those same skills may be required in thefuture. Though contact with Europeans haseroded some of their traditional skills,Aborigines remain better suited to some tasksthan most whites. If the Army were to enlistAborigines for a surveillance or coastwatchingunit in northern Australia, or contemplateoperations in areas with a high Aboriginalpopulation, it would do well to remember thelessons of its relationship with Aborigines in theSecond World War.U
ABORIGINES AND THF ARM1 41Mills1. Clark, Lieutenant C. A. "Aborigines in the FirstA IF." Australian Army Journal, No. 286, 1973, p21. Clark suggests that Aborigines may have served inthe Boer War,2. The author has evidence that a number of officershave unofficially proposed shooting as the bestsolution to the Aboriginal "problem".3. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, item 628/1/14. Australian Archives, Accession MP431. item849/3/1644.5. Johnston, G. FL, Australia at War, Svdnev, 1942,p.8.6. Biskup, P., Not Slaves, Not Citizens, St. Lucia,Brisbane, 1973, p.208.7. Australian Archives, Accession MP508, Item275/750/1310.X. Australian Archives, Accession MP508, Item275/750/1310.9. As above.10. The Army War Effort: Australian Military Forcespublication dated 3 1 August 1945. These were marriedmen aged 35-45 and single men or widowers withoutchildren aged 45-60.11. The term "native" was used to describe Torres StraitIslanders, mainland Aborigines and AustralianMalays while the term "white" was used to descibepeople other than "natives".12. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item628/1/1.13. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item422/7/8.14. The term "integrated" has been used throughout thisarticle to denote units other than "segregated" units.15. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item628/1/1/. Minutes of a Meeting held to Discuss theEmployment of Natives in the Army — Melbourne, 1February 1944.16. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item741/5/9. Report on the Northern Territory SpecialReconnaissance Unit by Squadron Leader Donald F.Thomson, RAAF, 1941-43.17. Donald Thompson was an anthropologist IromMelbourne University. Before the war he had beenengaged on extensive field work amongst theAborigines of Cape York and Arnhem Land.18. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item741/5/9. The Japanese referred to were the crews ofJapanese pearling luggers which visited the Arnhemland coast before the war. In 1933 most of the crewsof two Japanese luggers, and a number of Europeans,including one policeman, were killed by theseAborigines.19. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item741/5/9. The only concession to technology was thatthe soldiers were taught how to make and use Molotovcocktails so that they could destroy aircraft on theground and fuel and ammunition dumps.20. Letters from Mr. S. Gela dated 31 July 1978, Mr. LBon dated 6 May, 1978, Rev. B. Pilot dated 6 May1978, and Mr. J. Mooka dated 31 July 1978 to theauthor.21. See Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item741/5/9, and Willey, K., "The Army Pay usNothing", The Bulletin, 24 November 1962. Theevidence is not conclusive.22. Australian War Memorial, CRS A2663, Item741/5/9.23. Australian Archives, CRS A373, Item 5903. JapaneseActivities Amongst Aborigines. It is interesting thatthis report found its way to the USA where it was apparentlyattributed to Western Australian Aborigines.See the National Times, 30 January — 4 Februarv1978.24. Biskup. As above, p.210.25. Biskup. As above, p.209. Total military strength inthe Kimberleys at the time was less than 100 men.Aborigines and whites were trained by the Army as anunofficial "home guard".26. Six Aborigines were employed by the Darwin Garrisonon barracks maintenance duties.27. Abott, C.L.A., Australian Frontier Province, Sydney,1950, p.102.28. Lockwood, D , The Front Door, Melbourne, 1968,p.260.29. Censuses conducted in 1933 and 1947 show Darwin'snon-Aboriginal population to have been 1566 and2538 respectively (Commonwealth Year Books No. 34and 37). No figure is given for 1942 but it is reasonableto assume that had it not been for evacuation, it wouldhave been somewhere between the 1933 and 1947figures, or about 2,000. A reasonable estimate, takingevacuation into account, is about 1,000.30. Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth ofAustralia, No. 35, 1942-43.31. Australian Archives, Accession A431, Item 46/915.Report prepared by the Deputy Director of Native Affairs(V. J. White) for the Administrator for his attendanceat a conference in Melbourne.32. Morris, F.R., "The War Effort of the Northern TerritoryAborigines", Australian Territories, vol.5,no.l, January 1965, p.2.33 As above34 Australia Archives, Accession MP742, Item275/1/123. Letter from the Adjutant General to theSecretary for Defence, dated 27 Feb. 1945.35. Letter from W.A. Long to the author dated 3 June1978.36. Australian Archives, CRS A431, Item 46/915.Minutes of meeting held at the office of the InspectorGeneral of Administration on 8 Janury 1943 to discussthe employment of Aboriginal labour.37. Interview: F.R. Morris dated 14 March 1978 see alsoAbbott, C.L.A., Australia's Frontier Province, p.145.38. Australian Archives, Accession MP742. Item92/1/302. Memo Brigadier Dollery, NT Force toLand Headquarters dated 18 November 1943.39. Australian Archives, CRS A431, Item 46/915. Supplementarynotes to the Preliminary Outline of Proposalsfor Education and Welfare of Natives of NTForce.40. As above.41. Significantly, a number of today's Aboriginal leadersare ex-servicemen.
1962-Vecevde* 1972By Major Ian G. McNeillRoyal Australian InfantryPresentation to British Commission forMilitary History Conference, Sandhurst, 19-23July, 1979.INTRODUCTIONTHE aim of this article is to provide aframework of the Australian military involvementin Vietnam. Reference is made tosome of the conceptual problems the commandershad to face.At the height of the Vietnam war, more thanone third of our available combat strength wasdeployed there. This consisted principally of athree battalion task force with combat andlogistic support, an advisory team, an RAAFelement of Iroquois helicopters, Canberramedium bombers, and Caribou transportaircraft, and a RAN element of one missiledestroyer plus helicopter air crew and groundstaff to operate with the U.S. Army. In theperiod of heaviest commitment, from 1969 to1970, the total strength of the force withinVietnam, not including the destroyer, wasmaintained at approximately 8,000 personnel.Major McNeill graduated from RMC Duntroon in 1954.He has served in a number of regimental and staff appointmentsincluding I. 3 and 5 R. A.R.His overseas service has included Korea, Singapore andVietnam. He is at present Research Officer, DGCO.Article received February 1980.Army Posture Prior to VietnamIn the early 1960s, the Regular Army hadfour battalions. Two of these were largebattalions organized on the pentropicestablishment 1 , one was organized onconventional lines and in Malaysia as part ofthe British Commonwealth Far East StrategicReserve, and the fourth, also organized onconventional lines, was the nominatedreplacement for Malaysia.During this period, the situation in SouthEast Asia was causing increasing alarm toAustralia. There was armed activity in Laos,increasing insurgency in South Vietnam, andthe Indonesian confrontation of Malaysiainspired by President Seokarno. In response tothe deterioration of Australia's strategicposition, it was decided to reorganize from thepentropic back to a conventional battalionorganization. The new 'tropic' battalion, wasregarded as more suitable for Cold War tasks.It was certainly more compatible with those ofour allies.The two pentropic battalions werereorganized in early 1965, forming a strongnucleus for two additional battalions, the Fifthand Sixth Battalions of the Royal AustralianRegiment. This reorganization was not asdisruptive for the battalions as it was for thecombat and logistic support organizations, butit did mean substantial changes to headquartersprocedures. These had to be rethought, triedout, then practised as drills. It was within weeksof the reorganization of the First Battalion(Pentropic) that the Government announced,
AN Ol HIM- OF THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM 43on April 29, 1965, that this battalion togetherwith a logistic support element was to bedeployed to Vietnam the following month.A second response by the Government to thestrategic situation was the introduction ofconscription to increase the strength of theArmy which was unable to reach newmanpower targets by voluntary recruiting. TheNational Service Act, which provided for theselection of 18 year olds by ballot, was passedin 1965. The first national service intake beganthat year. National service was subsequently toprovide approximately one third of the force inVietnam.Political MoodThe commitment to Vietnam was made bythe Liberal/Country Party coalitiongovernment, headed by Sir Robert Menzies,which had defeated the Australian Labor Partyin 1949. Staunchly anti-communist, theGovernment was a strong supporter of SEATOand had only narrowly failed to secure theoutlawing of the Communist Party of Australiain a country-wide referendum in 1951. Thedefence of Australia was based broadly on aconcept of 'forward defence' which, in SouthEast Asia, complimented the United Statespolicy of containment of Communism. Whenannouncing the deployment, the PrimeMinister stated that it was at the request of theSouth Vietnamese Government 2 , inconsultation with the United States, and was inaccordance with Australian obligations underSEATO. 'The takeover of South Vietnam', saidthe Prime Minister,would be a direct military threat to Australiaand all the countries of South and South EastAsia. It must be seen as part of a thrust byCommunist China between the Indian andPacific Oceans.'Although the majority of Australianssupported the Government stand (it continuedin power until December, 1972) there was, evenat this early stage, a measure of opposition ledby the Australian Labor Party. Mr ArthurCalwell, Leader of the Opposition, in reply tothe Prime Minister stated that the Labor Party'firmly and completely' opposed ihe decision tosend troops to Vietnam, arguing that it wasbased on three false assumptions:an erroneous view of the nature of the war inVietnam; a failure to understand the natureof the Communist challenge; and a falsenotion as to the interests of America and herallies 4 .Although opposition to Australia'sinvolvement in Vietnam grew more vociferouswithin and without Parliament as the warprogressed, leaders of anti-war movementsfrom the Opposition Party were careful neverto impugn the general reputation of Australiantroops fighting there.Raising and Despatching of AustralianArmy Training Team to VietnamThe despatch of a battalion to Vietnam,whilst creating most political attention, had, infact, been preceded by the raising anddeployment of a small training group of 30officers, warrant officers and sergeants toVietnam in August, 1962. Expertly trained injungle warfare and with Malayan experience,the group was predominantly Infantry, withsome Signallers and Engineers. They werecommanded by a colonel. With recentexperience in Burma, the scene of communistinsurgency, and a former commandant ofAustralia's Jungle Warfare Training Centre,Canungra, in Queensland, the Commander,Colonel F. P. Serong, was seconded as 'specialadviser in counter-insurgency' to General PaulD. Harkins, commanding U.S. forces inVietnam.The members of AATTV were deployed aspart of the U.S. advisory system and locatedmainly in I Corps.Training Team members, other than twowith the Combined Studies Division, wereunder the operational control of United StatesMilitary Assistance Advisory Group,USMAAG later to be subsumed by UnitedStates Military Assistance Command Vietnam,USMACV. The two in ihe Combined StudiesDivision operated under the control of theUnited States Mission. The superior Australianheadquarters was Headquarters AustralianArmy Forces Far East Land Forces, based inSingapore. This was changed to Commander,Australian Army Force, Vietnam, when IRARand its supporting elements arrived in thetheatre.The iniiial role of AATTV was strictlytraining. They were not to accompanyVietnamese forces on operations.A capitation rate was paid to the UnitedStales who provided all needs, including
44 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT./OCT. 80personal weapons and even uniforms —although in this latter case it was the desire ofboth the American and AustralianGovernments that the Australians berecognized as such by the wearing of their ownuniforms, 'Australia' flashes and the flying oftheir flag above the Saigon headquarters. Thecapitation agreement was the first of its kind. Itproved to be the first of a series of agreementsunder which Australia (and New Zealand), butno other Allies, arranged for logistic support ona repayment basis.Deployment of AATTV provided Australiawith the means of gaining additionalintelligence of the war in Vietnam. Improvedunderstanding of the war led to the recognitionof the serious state of the campaign and, inconsultation with the United States, AATTVwas increased in June, 1964, to 80 personnelwhile their role was extended to operationaladvising in field units. The bulk of the Teamcontinued to be deployed in I Corps, wheremovement began into the United States SpecialForces and advisory teams with ARVNbattalions. At the same time, six RAAFCaribou transport aircraft with crew and supportfacilities were based at Vung Tau.First Battalion The Royal AustralianRegiment Deployment to VietnamFirst Battalion, The Royal AustralianRegiment, together with a cavalry troop,signals troop and Australian Logistic SupportCompany, began moving to Vietnam within 25days of the Government announcement. Itmoved by charter aircraft and the aircraftcarrier HMAS Sydney, and was fullyestablished in Vietnam by 10 June, 1965.IRAR was placed under operational controlof the U.S. 173 Airborne Brigade (Separate) asits third battalion. It was stationed at Bien Hoaairbase north of Saigon, and its initial role wasto conduct operations in defence of the base.By December of that year, its role had beenextended to include operations in the whole ofIII Corps area in conjunction with the Brigade.It was supported by a field battery provided byNew Zealand.The integration of an Australian unit with aU.S. Brigade was highly successful. There weredifferences in operating procedures, tactics,and some resupply problems but these wereovercome. The Australians had to becomeaccustomed to 'skid briefs', where the BrigadeCommander stood by the skids under thewhirling blades of a helicopter to give lastminute coordinating instructions, 'frag orders',these being written supplementary, orfragmentary orders to the main operationorder. There was also a need, in the initialstages, for the Australians to establish an'interpreter' at the U.S. Brigade Headquarterswhile the Americans provided likewise at theAustralian Battalion Headquarters.Along the lines established with the TrainingTeam, Australia paid a capitation rate to theUnited States for the personnel in the battalionand logistic support element. For this, theUnited States provided all combat, logistic andmedical support except vehicles, weapons,clothing and equipment of Australian originand integral to the battalion.The battalion was increased by a battery ofartillery, additional armoured personnelcarriers, engineers, Army light aircraft andlogistic support in September, 1965, thusforming a battalion group. The operationalelement consisted of some 1,300 men at BienHoa.1st Australian Task Force Deployed toPhuoc Tuy ProvinceIn July, 1965, only one month after thearrival of IRAR, the Chief of the General Staffbegan looking at ways to build up the force totask force strength, complete with combat andlogistic support units, in case the Governmentshould so direct. The governments of theUnited States, New Zealand and Australia andtheir military advisers had reached theconclusion at this time that only increasedmilitary effort in South Vietnam could save thesituation. General William Westmoreland,COMUSMACV, always took the opportunitywith Australian visitors to Vietnam to say 'I'dreally like to see an Australian task force uphere!'Military options for increasing Australianparticipation went to the Government, but itwas not until 8th March, 1966, that theannouncement was made that a task force oftwo battalions and support was to be deployed.The Australian requirements for the area ofdeployment in Vietnam were:a. an area of significant enemy activity;b. the area should not be contiguous with theborders of Cambodia, Laos or theDemilitarized Zone;
AN ()l I LINE ()!• THE At SI KM IAN MILITARV INVOL\ EMENT IN \ IETNAM 45c. the area should offer reasonably secureaccess to shipping and overeas aircraft;andd. it should be a geographically distinct areawhich could be left largely to the task forceand with which the Australian nationaleffort could be readily identified.An assessment of certain areas was made,including Phan Rang (rejected because ofisolation and thought to be lacking, at thattime, sufficient enemy) and the Mekong Delta(although COMUSMACV felt that the Deltahad the greatest call on any force becomingavailable, he recognized Australia's nationalinterests and had no hesitation in agreeing toPhuoc Tuy). Phuoc Tuy was chosen because:a. although little was known of the Province,it not having been under Governmentcontrol for several years, it was a fairassumption that it was, or would be, anarea of significant military activity;b. it was not associated with any border area;c. it had good access by sea and air;d. it was an area with which the Australianforce could be readily identified.e. it was an area where it seemed feasible toseparate the enemy from the population;andf. in terrain, it was not unlike that in whichthe Australian Army had trained andfought before.1st Australian Logistic Support GroupThe ease to Australia by which first AATTV,then IRAR Group was provided logisticsupportby the U.S. forces through thecapitation arrangements had lulled theAustralians to the realities of the logisticproblem. The initial maintenance plan for theTask Force was that certain items of clothing,equipment, vehicles and weapons were tocontinue to be supplied from Australia, whilethe bulk of the requirements, in particularammunition, defence stores and rations wouldbe provided by United States authorities in thetheatre again through the payment of acapitation rate. This simply did not work. First,many Australian units had not brought theirfirst 30 days maintenance with them, eitherbecause they had not followed instructions, orbecause time was too short in Australia fortheir demands to be met. Second, theAustralian build-up coincided with the massiveAmerican build-up in the theatre 3 . This createdenormous pressures on the U.S. system, and attimes it was unable to satisfy even its ownrequirements. Of this period, the Armyrecorded:Despite an almost embarrassing level ofpartisanship shown to Australia by theAmericans, many of the requirements of theAustralian force were just unable to be met 6 .The result was the sending back to Australiaof an increasing number of prioritymaintenance demands. The logistic supportforce grew in size, and extra and unforeseentonnages had to be sent to the theatre at shortnotice. Phase Two of the maintenance plan,which provided for the bulk of logistic andadministrative support to be supplied fromAmerican sources after the initial 30 dayperiod, was never fully implemented.The Enemy in Phuoc TuyIn mid 1966 the enemy forces in the Provincewere believed to be:a. Headquarters 5 Division, currently locatedin the May Tao base area in the north eastcorner of the Province;b. 274 Main Force Infantry Regiment (DongNai Regiment) of three battalions with aheavy weapons battalion; its strength wasestimated at 2,000;c. 275 Main Force Regiment of threebattalions was based also in the May Taoarea with an estimated strength of 1,850;d. D445 Regional Battalion with a number ofbattalion and company bases throughoutthe Province; believed to be operatingfrom the Long Hai area in the south of theProvince, it had an estimated strength of550;e. local forces were believed to exist in eachvillage and hamlet making up a small VietCong force and infrastructure; andf. some additional logistic installations andunits were known to be in the mountainareas to the north-west of Baria and in theDat Do area.The enemy had at this time the capacity tomount offensive operations within the Provincewith up to two main force regiments supportedby a regional battalion and local forces.There were other regiments in neighbouringprovinces to the north-west and north but it wasconsidered unlikely that they would operate inPhuoc Tuv in the immediate future.
46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT./OCT. 80Despite the efforts of the experienced anddetermined Province Chief and the lone ARVNbattalion in the Province, Government controlin the Province was at an all-time low. The VietCong dominated the whole Province, except theVung Tau Special Zone which was a joint SouthVietnamese/Viet Cong holiday centre. Almostanyone, anywhere, was vulnerable to extortionor terrorism.A high proportion of the population of100,000 was either pro-Viet Cong or neutral,and in this circumstance the Governmentshowed not the intent, nor had the means, toexercise more than a very loose control of thepopulation. Any Malayan solution wasconsidered by the Australian commanders to bebound to fail because of this lack ofGovernment control and because of the apathyor opposition of the people.Selection and Occupation of Nui DatThe base at Nui Dat was selected well inadvance of the arrival of the Task Force. It wasselected by the Chief of the General Staff inconcert with the Commander of AustralianArmy Force, Vietnam, who was to become thefirst Task Force Commander, and staffofficers.The first requirement of the base in PhuocTuy Province was that it be located between theenemy's main force bases and the areas ofdensest civilian population. It had to providespace for an airfield, for a maintenance area,and provide sufficient room to fight should thebase come under heavy attack.It had to be on ground which would be abovewater level during the wet season.It needed to be on relatively open ground andnot too near densely settled areas so thatmaximum use of firepower, rather thanmanpower, could be used for its defence.It should be located close enough to the VungTau/Bara area to avoid diversion of forces forline of communication security duties or,alternatively, maintenance by air.Nui Dat best answered these requirements.On the arrival of the Task Force in the periodApril/June, 1966, units first lodged at VungTau then moved forward to occupy the base.Initial Concept of OperationsThe first step in the concept of operationswas to establish quickly an area surroundingthe base to a line designated as Line Alfa whichwas outside enemy mortar range.The second step was to control an area out toartillery range.The third step in this initial conceptconcerned force maintenance. This was to be bydaily road convoy from Vung Tau, andforward by helicopter from the base.It was anticipated that if these operationswere successful to any appreciable extent, asituation would be created in which the enemymain force and regional units would becomeineffectual. To a large degree they would bedivorced from the local people.In such a situation it was considered that theenemy would have only two choices: remain intheir base areas or attack and attempt todestroy IATF. It was anticipated that the latterwas more likely, even though it would meanfighting the Task Force on its own ground,exposed to the full weight of the extensiveartillery and air support available. Great carewas taken, therefore, to make sure that abalanced force was maintained in the TaskForce base and that, except for the SAS longrangepatrols, ground elements always operatedwithin the range of adequate artillery support.Initial security was based on continuous andaggressive patrolling. Fifty percent of TaskForce infantry resources were out of the baseon offensive patrolling every day and night.This rate was maintained for some two months,despite the onset of the monsoon within a weekof occupying Nui Dat. It was an exhausting andnerve wracking experience for the infantry. Onthe other hand it established IATF presencequickly in the centre of the Province and alsogave a measure of security to what thenappeared a sizeable enemy threat. Commandersalso noted that it had the effect of turning agreen force, the majority of whom had neverheard a shot fired in anger, into a much morebattle worthy team with greatly improvedcommand and control procedures.In the process of establishing the security ofthe base, IATF did something which had notbeen done in Vietnam before and which drewsome criticism at first. With the approval of theProvince Chief, all Vietnamese were evacuatedfrom within Line Alfa and re-settled east ofBaria. This gave IATF a zone around its base inwhich firepower could be used freely andwithout endangering civilians. It provided avacuum which Viet Cong patrols had topenetrate before approaching the base. It gaveIATF patrols much greater freedom of exit
AN OUTLINE OL I HE AI S I RAI IAN Mill fAKI IN\ ()[ VEMENT IN VIETNAM 47from the base, being less likely to be locatedand watched by the Viet Cong.On the other hand, it necessitated carefulexplanation to the civilians concerned andcreated resettlement problems which took sometime to soke.CommandFrom the outset IATF came underoperational control of 2 Field Force Vietnam.An Australian major served as a liaison officer,and. where necessary, an interpreter, on theU.S. headquarters and worked very closely withthe operations staff. The Task Force waspermitted to operate very much according to itsown methods.Summary of Initial OperationsPrior to the forward deployment of IATF,173 Airborne Brigade was given the task ofensuring that 5 Viet Cong Division was notwaiting at Nui Dat. On 24th May, 1966, 5RAR,which had arrived from Australia, was movedby helicopter from V'ung Tau to join 173Brigade in its operations north of Baria.It was operationally necessary to establishIATF forward as soon as possible and on 5thJune, Headquarters IATF moved from VungTau to Nui Dat where 5RAR was operating.By 14th June, 6RAR had arrived fromAustralia, completed its preliminary in-theatretraining at Vung Tau and moved forward tocomplete the 1ATF concentration.Both battalions carried out a settling downoperation. 6RAR completed the job of clearingand destroying the partially cleared Viet Congvillage of Long Phuc and 5RAR cleared the NuiNghe area. The Task Force dug in at Nui Datand established unit defended areas. TaskForce operational procedures were finalisedand rehearsed. The maintenance system wasestablished.Throughout this period, Viet Cong RegionalForces and elements of D445 ProvincialBattalion maintained contact in the patrolbattle, however no really serious resistance wasoffered. Small enemy patrols managed to takeadvantage of pouring rain and pitch darkness atnight to probe the perimeter, especially the gunareas on the southern perimeter and the logisticcompany. Soon, however, IATF was able toput a stop to this.From mid-July to mid-August, battaliongroup operations were conducted to expand thecontrolled area with accent on openingNational Routes 2 and 15 and to take advantageof information from SAS patrolling. Duringthis period of battalion group sized operationsthe Task Force influence was extended to BinhBa to the north, to the Long Tan area in theeast, to the Long Hai mountains in the southeastand to the Nui Thi Vai hills to the west.The operating battalion commander was givenhis complete battalion group as a manoeuvreforce. His artillery fire support bases were givenclose protection by a company from the otherbattalion, which also had to provide a taskforce reaction force of a company group andanother one or two companies to providepatrols within Line Alfa. Task Force patroloperations beyond Line Alfa were conductedby company groups. In this way the Nui Datbase was normally held by unit rear elementsand by only one rifle company. On the otherhand, the maximum effort was exerted outsidethe base and reasonable balance wasmaintained.During the last week of this period there weregrowing indications, in particular from agentreports and communications intelligence, that 5VC Division was in fact preparing to mount asizeable operation on the Nui Dat base from theeast. There had been similar indications beforefrom other areas, however the precaution wastaken of using company sized patrols and SASpatrols to check the area to the north and eastof Long Tan. It was one of these patrols, DCompany of 6RAR, which made contact with275 VC Regiment at 1608 hours on 18 August1966 in a rubber plantation near Long Tan. Asavage and heroic battle ensued which lasteduntil 1910 hours with the arrival of theCommanding Officer, 3 Tp 1 APC Sqn, and ACoy 6RAR.The results of the battle, fought mainly inpouring rain, were 245 enemy killed and anestimated 500 casualties evacuated, with theloss of 17 soldiers killed in action, one died ofwounds and 21 wounded. The company wonthe U.S. Presidential Citation for its action.It was believed that 275 Regiment had beenpreparing for an attack on the Nui Dat base.After the severe mauling it received, it wasforced to abandon its mission. 274 Regiment,which was believed to have moved a reinforcedbattalion from the Hat Dich base south-easttowards Nui Dat, took no active part in theoperations, other than helping evacuate 275Regiment wounded. It was a long time before
48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT./OCT. 80275 Regiment reappeared at any scene ofaction.This fight was a drastic change from thepattern of previous operations and stronglyconfirmed the belief that a well fought riflecompany, provided it had adequate air andartillery support, could, for a limited time,successfully fight a Viet Cong regimental force.It was with a much greater feeling of optimismand security that 1ATF turned again tobattalion and Task Force sized operationsdesigned to expand the controlled area.In these early months there were manyfacilities lacking which prevented 1ATF fromachieving even its tailored aims more quicklyand with less exposure to the considerable risksit was obliged to take. A third battalion wouldhave provided better balance and enabled moreeffective follow up of the enemy; an additionalarmoured element, particularly tanks, wouldhave given the Task Force considerableadvantages especially in the dry season;additional engineer construction resourceswould have enabled the efficient and earlydevelopment of the base; an organic logisticcompany would have been better, for its owntactical defence as well as for efficiency, thanthe ad hoc arrangements which were made inthe forward base. All units required additionalweapons and communications for defence ofthe base by rear parties. Additional staff werenecessary at IATF Headquarters to cope withthe continuous operational pressure. All theseelements, and more, were eventually providedin succeeding years to enable IATF to achieveits peak in operational efficiency.IATF Operations 1966-1971Australian Army operations in Vietnamcould be divided into the following phases:Phase 1 — IRAR Group in the Bien Hoa areaJune 1965-June1966.Phase 2 — security and establishment andestablishment of the Nui Dat baseby 1ATF June 1966-June 1967.Phase 3 — extension of the Nui Dat base andconduct of counter guerillaoperations June 1967-January1968.Phase 4— main force operations February1968-June 1969.Phase 5— counter guerilla/pacificationoperations July 1969-November1971.Although these phases were in part reactionto enemy moves, in particular during the buildup and action surrounding the Tet 1968 and Tet1969 offensives, and a relative lull in main forceactivity in 1970 and 1971, they were also theresult of what commanders found to be acertain ambiguity in the role of the force.Right from the outset, IATF, in commonwith everyone else, faced the dilemma ofsimultaneous requirements to destroy or at leastneutralize the enemy's main and regional forcesand at the same time remove the claws of theViet Cong local forces and infrastructure fromthe towns and villages. The task therefore, wasto fight conventional type operations and at thesame time conduct uninterrupted pacificationand reconstruction programmes. The firstrequired concentration of force including heavyfirepower, the second required continual smallscale operations dispersed over a wide area inwhat could develop into a police type role.In the event, the Task Force commanderswere forced to attempt both roles, yet never atany time were the Australian forces givenresponsibility for the populated area of PhuocTuy. To carry such a responsibility, however,would have required a force with a completeadvisory system to match the United StatesCORDS effort. This advisory system may havehad to include civilian experts in fields in whichthe Army is neither trained nor equipped.As it was the Task Force could best beemployed in operations in depth against enemybase and logistic areas. Nevertheless, with thelocal forces ineffective in preventing enemyaccess to the population, some Task Forceeffort had to be diverted to that role. Therewere indeed many attempts to upgrade theARVN and Regional Forces by retrainingschemes and the leavening of Territorial unitswith Australian troops similar to the U.S.Marine Combined Action Programme. It wasfound, however, that such measures producedno lasting improvements or were only effectivewhilst Australians remained in the units. Thebasic reason appeared to be a lack ofmotivation by the personnel of TerritorialForce units. 7 .A combination of both roles could only beachieved properly with a much larger force,capable of splitting into two properly organizedindependent groups with sufficient flexibility toreact to a changing situation. This could reallyonly be contemplated when the Government
WOI I I. INI: Ol I III U SI RAI IAN Mil II ARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM 49BIEN HOA":.V• ^ ^LONG KHANHj ^/MAYTAflV in A Jn1Iowifft!T >^**' i v rK?-^tSOUTH VIETNAMPHUOC TUY PROVINCE2 0 2 4 6STATUTE MILESconsiders that the threat to Australia's nationalinterests vital enough to warrant the cost ofsuch forces.Operations in Phuoc Tuy became a series ofsearch and destroy operations, cordon andsearch of villages, patrolling and ambushing,route clearance and civic action. After LongTan, rarely was the enemy in Phuoc Tuyprepared to engage company or larger sizedforces in protracted fighting. The war in PhuocTuy for the soldier meant long and painstakingsearches in the jungle, suffering casualties frommines and booby traps, and with onlyoccasional clashes with the enemy. There werenotable successes, as when two companies of5RAR supported by a squadron of tanksaccounted for 43 enemy killed in a 24 houroperation in June, 1969, in the Binh Ba rubberplantation, but minor engagements were therule.Occasionally the Task Force was required foroperations outside Phuoc Tuy. One suchinstance occurred as a result of the Tetoffensive in 1968. The Task Force wasdeployed, in May, at a position north of BienHoa which was astride a main enemyinfiltration route. Before IRAR had time toestablish its position it was attacked on thenight of its deployment by a reinforced NVAbattalion. The attack overran the IRAR mortarplatoon and penetrated the gun position beforebeing repulsed. On subsequent nights attackswere repeated in greater strength but wereunsuccessful. 3RAR established a second firesupport base within gun range to the north andrepulsed similar attacks. It has been intendedthat both fire support bases act as springboardsfor armoured/infantry patrols at companylevel, however the reaction of the NorthVietnamese caused full battalion defensive
50 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. OCT. 80positions to be established for the only time ofthe war. There were 76 enemy killed on thisoperation while the Task Force lost 23.Apart from assisting ARVN and TerritorialForces, the Task Force also carried out anextensive civic action programme. This wasdesigned to improve the health, education,comfort, economy and morale of the villagers.It was always coordinated with securitymeasures in the Province. Civic action sprangnot only from altruism but from a desire toprovide the villagers with some resistance toViet Cong claims and as a means of gaining thegeneral acceptance and support for theAustralian presence.By 1970 and 1971, Viet Cong ability tomount operations by his main force units hadbeen greatly diminished. Main routes had beenopened and market activities and movementbetween centres was flourishing. Localgovernment in the villages had become moreeffective. There was tangible evidence of thecivic action activities of the force in improvedschools, better roads and market places,improved irrigation systems, and increasedmedical and dental facilities.The major role of the Task Force, that ofdestroying the main force units, had been partlyaccomplished. Certainly Viet Cong influenceon the population had been largely reduced andGovernment control had been restored. Suchsuccess, however, was dependent on thecontinuing presence of the Task Force. TheViet Cong always had the capacity to retire intorest areas and reform, their recruits comingfrom within the Province or elsewhere. As well,the Viet Cong infrastructure in the villages, aVietnamese responsibility, was nevereradicated.When the Task Force withdrew, the TrainingTeam remained in Phuoc Tuy. Its membersobserved the gradual return of Viet Conginfluence and the erosion of Governmentcontrol. This process was continuing when theTraining Team, too, departed from Vietnam.Command and Control in Phuoc TuyProvinceThere was a need for joint control of alloperations and civil control measures in PhuocTuy. The whole of the Province lay within theViet Cong Ba Long Province, and the VietCong moved freely between the populated areaswhich was the military responsibility of theProvince, and their base areas, the militaryresponsibility of the Task Force. When IATFoperations were well clear of populated areas,commanders found it was possible to scrape bywith a fairly low level of cooperation, and theSector (the military arm of the Province) andIATF could plan their operations more or lessindependently. With the switch to pacificationsupport and the upgrading of the Regional andPopular Forces a much greater IATF presencebecame necessary in and near the populatedareas, and with it, a greater need for cooperationand control.What commanders felt was necessary was theformation of an Area War ExecutiveCommittee (AWEC) along the lines of theMalayan situation. This was found not to bepossible in Phuoc Tuy. As the Vietnamesecontrolled all civil and military functions in theProvince, other than IATF, any initiativetowards an AWEC would have to come fromthem. The Province Chief held officialauthority, but this was undermined by dissent,cross-currents of loyalties, distrust andcompeting ambitions in the Vietnamese camp.Even had an AWEC been formed, it wouldhave been unlikely to work. Alternativemeasures were therefore instituted such asinformal meetings between the Province Chiefand Commander IATF, the allocation ofdistricts to the battalions for pacificationresponsibilities, an extensive system of liaisonofficers and an attempt to form committees forparticular functions. All, for varying reasons,were only of limited success.One major result of this absence of a centralcoordinating authority was that while the TaskForce was carrying out its operations in depth,the enemy was consolidating in the population.WithdrawalThe growing dissent around the worldconcerning Western involvement in Vietnamwas echoed in Australia. Where formerly it hadbeen restricted mostly to university students,non-conformist groups, other minority groupsas well as those with proven links to theCommunist party, by 1970 the protestmovement had expanded to embrace people inall walks of life. The movement reached itsclimax in the cities of Australia with the firstand second moratorium rallies on 8 May and 18September, 1970.
AN OUTLINE OF THE AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAMAdded io this general feeling, PresidentNixon had announced a troop withdrawal of115,000 Americans by mid-April, 1970. On 21April, 1970, he announced a further withdrawalof 150,000 troops to be completed over thesucceeding 12 months. On the day followingthis latter announcement, 22 April, the PrimeMinister, Mr John Gorton, announced that abattalion of the Task Force would bewithdrawn and not replaced at the end of itstour. The withdrawal was justified in terms ofthe success of Vietnamisation — the moveprogressively towards Vietnamese taking overcomplete responsibility for the conduct of thewar 8 .Consequently 8RAR was withdrawn at theconclusion of its tour on 17 November, 1970.leaving a two battalion task force.On 30 March, 1971, the new Prime Minister,Mr William McMahon, announced a furthergradual withdrawal of 1,000 men spread overthe three services, and to be effective during thefollowing three months.Finally on 18 August, 1971, the PrimeMinister announced that the bulk of theAustralian forces would be withdrawn byChristmas and the remainder, with theexception of the Training Team, shortlythereafter. The circumstances which permittedthis withdrawal were explained as follows:The main Australian effort has been in thegeneral area surrounding Saigon andparticular in Phuoc Tuy Province. There, thesecurity situation has markedly improved.The enemy has lost the initiative. TheVietnamese territorial forces have beensteadily developing their capacity, and in thelast year have gradually expanded their ownareas of operations. The enemy is still thereof course, and some setbacks may yet occur.But it is our view, shared by the Governmentof the Republic, that the existing relativestrengths are such that the territorial forcesshould be able to handle the likelycontingencies 9 .In reply, the leader of the Opposition, MrGough Whitlam, stated:The Prime Minister has announced the endof the Australian commitment. He givesreasons as specious for ending it as weregiven for making it so needlessly for morethan six years. There is one reason whyAustralia is now w ithdraw ing. We are gettingout because the US is getting out'".The Task Force withdrew from Vietnambetween October and early December, the lastbattalion, 4RAR, departing on 8th December,1971. The last of the logistic support elementleft Vietnam on 5th March, 1972.Australian Army Training Team VietnamIn January and February, 1965, theAustralian Army Training Team was built up to100 men. It remained at this strength until late1970 when it was increased to over 200 at thetime of the withdrawal of the first battalion. Itthen gradually reduced in strength until finalwithdrawal in December, 1972.Members of the Training Team wereattached to all of the many types of militaryand para-military forces which the Vietnameseemployed. They also served in Special Forcesalongside the elite USSF teams in borderoutposts. Although the Team was concentratedin I Corps, its members were spread throughoutthe four Vietnamese corps.In 1970, following the policy of theAustralian Government, the Training Teambegan concentrating in Phuoc Tuy Provincealongside the Australian Task Force. Therethey established a Jungle Warfare TrainingCentre to train Vietnamese junior leaders.Their role gradually reverted to training.The Training Team remained in Phuoc TuyProvince on the withdrawal of the Task Forcein December, 1971. There they stayed until,with the election of a Labor Government on 2December 1972, they were ordered to withdrawon 18 December 1972.ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVYNaval support for Vietnam began with theaircraft carrier HMAS Sydney in May, 1965.Sydney transported the vehicles and equipmentand one company of troops of First BattalionThe Royal Australian Regiment to Vung Tau.She made 23 voyages to Vung Tau, finishing on12 March, 1972.Other Naval support, in order of entering thewar, comprised of:Clearance Diving TeamA small team which remained in Vietnamfrom February, 1967 to September, 1967, theunit cleared underwater sabotage charges andlimpet mines from the bottom of ships in VungTau harbour. It usually operated at night, andwas highly successful. The unit also carried out
52 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT./OCT. 80small boat reconnaissance in the Mekong Delta,ambushing, demolition of canal barricades andthe location and demolition of tunnels andbunkers.Ships with the U.S. 7th FleetThe RAN provided one ship with the U.S.7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin and SouthChina Sea as follows:Guided Missile Destroyers:Hobart March-September 1967March-October 1968March-October 1970Perth September 1967-April 1968September 1968-March 1969September 1970-March 1971Brisbane March-October 1969March-October 1971Daring Class Destroyer:Vendetta September 1969-April 1970Duties included the patrolling of the NorthVietnamese coast to prevent seaborne suppliesto South Vietnam, bombardment of enemysupply lines and installations and naval gunfiresupport to units operating in South Vietnam.On more than one occasion ships providedgunfire support to Australians in Phuoc Tuy.RAN Helicopter FlightFrom October 1967 to May 1968, the RANsupplied aircrew and groundstaff for anIroquois helicopter flight in Vietnam operatingwith the U.S. Army 135 Aviation Company,later called 135 Assault Helicopter Company.Its main role was the airborne insertion oftroops into battle. The RAN also providedpilots at intervals for the RAAF 9 Squadron ofIroquois from May 1968.Medical OfficersThe RAN provided a small number ofmedical officers for the 1st Australian FieldHospital at Vung Tau and U.S. hospitals.ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCEApart from the United States, Australia wasthe only outside nation to make a significantcontribution to air operations in Vietnam. Themagnitude of the total air effort, however,made the substantial and effective RAAFcontribution small by comparison.The following RAAF elements were deployedin Vietnam:35 Transport SquadronSix RAAF Caribou aircraft began operationsin Vietnam on 14 August 1964 and werewithdrawn February 1972. This was increasedto seven aircraft and reduced by three with thepartial withdrawal in June, 1971.Initially called the RAAF Transport Flight,its name was later changed to 35 TransportSquadron. Most knew it, however, as theWallaby Flight.The Wallaby Flight was stationed at VungTau and was controlled by the United States834th Air Division.Operating from primitive airstrips in manycases, the Wallaby Flight delivered some100,000 tons of cargo and 300,000 passengers.9 Squadron (Iroquois)9 Squadron consisting of eight Iroquoishelicopters operated in Vietnam from 12 June,1966 to 8 December, 1971.Under the operational control of the TaskForce, the squadron was stationed at Vung Tauand provided airlift, medical evacuation, andlater gunship support, in company with U.S.Army helicopters, for the Australian Armyunits.2 Squadron (Canberra Bombers)No. 2 Squadron of Canberra bombersarrived in Vietnam from Malaysia on 19 April,1967. They were withdrawn on 4 June, 1971.Based at Phan Rang, 2 Squadron servedunder the control of the United States 35thTactical Fighter Wing, itself part of 7th AirForce.Canberras carried out missions throughoutthe four Vietnamese corps. They wereparticularly noted for their precision bombingat low altitude.Hercules AircraftHercules aircraft from 37 and 38 TransportSquadron, based in Australia, were used fromthe initial deployment of IRAR to thewithdrawal of AATTV, to transport troops andsupplies between Australia and Vietnam.Specially fitted and crewed Hercules aircraftwere also used for the medical evacuation ofwounded to Australia via the RAAF hospital atButterworth, Malaysia.
Will I I .INI (II III! U STR-U.IAN MILITARY IN\ OI \ I MI-.VI IN \ II. I'NAM 53CONCLUSIONThe war in Vietnam placed the Australiansoldier into longer periods of contact, orimminent contact, with the enemy than at anytime in our history except the Gallipolicampaign. Towards the end, with thewithdrawal of the third battalion, thirty days inthe jungle followed by three or four days restwas the norm. Even when in the Nui Dat basethe soldier had his share of sentry duty,perimeter clearing patrols and being a memberof a standby force.At home in Australia officers and men couldexpect great posting turbulence as Armyplanners tried to manipulate our manpowerassets having regard to the force in Vietnam,the operational readiness of replacementforces, the two-year period of national serviceand regular soldiers in battalions, and the longperiod of standdown which returning soldiershad accrued. This was done within a peace-timeatmosphere during which one third of theArmy's combat strength was in Vietnam and afurther battalion with support was in Malaysia.Although the article refers to some of theproblems faced by commanders in Vietnam,and to the necessary inconclusiveness of theeffort, it was nevertheless found to beprofessionally satisfying. This was made so bythe quality, expertise and professionalism ofthe men and the smooth running organizationof which they were part. I)BIBLIOGRAPHYA Review of Australian Army Experiences in Vietnam (acollection of papers from the Chief of the General StaffExercise, 1971, not published).Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates.Department of Defence (Navy). An Outline of AustralianNasal History, Australian Government Publishing Service,Canberra, 1976.Major General George S. Eckhardt, Vieinam Studies:Command and Control 1950-1969, Department of theArmy, Washington, DC, 1974.Lieutenant General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr, Vietnam Studies:Logistic Support. Department of the Army, Washington.DC, 1974.George Odgers, Mission Vietnam: Royal Australian AirForce Operations 1964-1972, Department of Defence (AirOffice), Australian Government Publishing Service,Canberra, 1974.Miscellaneous Service Files.NOTES1. The pentropic organization came about in 1960 withthe onset of the nuclear age. It was a five sided system,with five battalions to a division and five riflecompanies to a battalion — but w ith four platoons percompany. A pentropic battalion was half again thesize of a conventional battalion but with tw ice the firepower. The U.S. Army was at the time experimentingwith a 'pentomic' concept.2. This request may be interpreted as the acceptance ofan offer by Australia. The letter, dated 29th April,1965 was tabled in Parliament and reproduced inC.P.D. 19th August, 1971, p. 314.3. Sir Robert Menzies, Commonwealth ParliamentaryDebates, 29 April 1965, p. 1061.4. Mr Arthur Calwell, C.P.D. 4 May 1962, p. 1102.5. The U.S. Forces expanded from 137,400 on 31 Mar 66to 239,400 by 31 Dec 66. Vietnam Studies: LogisticSupport, Lieutenant General J. M. Heiser, Jr, Dept ofthe Army, Washington, DC, 1974, p. 14.6. A Review of Australian Army Experiences inVietnam, compiled from the CGS Exercise, 1971,Chapter 5, p. 5.7. The reasons for this may be more easily understoodwhen it is realised that the Territorial Forces had beenunder the same Viet Cong pressures as the remainderof the population in Phuoc Tuy before the Task Forcearrived, had witnessed and been victims of the samegovernment ineptitude, and very often came fromdivided families where brothers and sisters may be onopposite sides (but nevertheless met amicably underthe family roof). The Territorial Forces seemed tohave some accommodation with the Viet Cong.8. Mr J. Gorton, C.P.D. 22 April 1970, pp. 1456-1459.9. Mr William McMahon, C.P.D. 18 August 1971, p.226.10. MrGough Whitlam, C.P.D. 18 August 1971, p. 229.
AMERICASGREATESTSTATESMAN ?By Major G. G. Middleton,Royal Australian SignalsRECENTLY Americans have pointed to acrisis of confidence in their country, itsleadership and its seeming inability to maintainpolitical and economic leadership in themodern world. They have exhibited a feeling ofhelplessness in their inability to deal with ahandful of militant students holding Americanshostage in Tehran. That they are equallydisturbed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanand their difficulty in formulating an effectiveresponse is also obvious.Many of the factors which have made theUSA a great power now limit its responses. In1980 President Carter, unlike many of hispredecessors, must tread warily in a politicallyaware and volatile world with its ever presentdangers of crossing the nuclear threshold,threats to stability in the Middle East and thepossible destruction of the existing worldeconomic order which a Middle Eastconflagration could trigger. As a result many ofMajor Middlcion graduated from OCS Porlsea in 1968.After appointments in various Signals units, he became Adjutant,School of Signals in 1973 and of 2 Sig Regt in 1975.He was instructor at the School of Signals from 1975-7, andis currently S02 DORG-A in Canberra. He is studying partlimefor a BA degree at the Australian National University.Major Middleton has previously contributed to thisJournal.Article received March 1980the responses have been symbolic or carried outthrough surrogates. That the USSR also mustplay the game by more restrictive rules is oftenoverlooked.In their yearning for past glories and lessfettered leadership Americans recall earlierperiods of great presidential decision. Moreoften than not this evokes memories ofTheodore 'Teddy' Roosevelt, frontiersman, biggame hunter, sportsman, rough rider, author,governor, president and internationalstatesman. It is of interest to examineRoosevelt's presidency and take note of theactions which he was able to take at a timewhen the international limitations on US powerwere less restrictive than today.For the greater part of the 19th century, theUSA had maintained an isolationist stance inworld affairs. The wars which had occurredwith Great Britain and Mexico were primarilyover issues or territory close to home andparticularly following the Civil War theprincipal concerns of Americans werereconstruction, westward expansion, theAmerican industrial revolution and economicmatters generally. The army was a small onescattered across the frontier posts, while thenavy remained small by the standards of thegreat European powers.In 1895 an insurrection had broken out inCuba and the succeeding events forcedPresident McKinley, reluctantly to declare war
TEDDY ROOSEVEl I: AMERICAS GREATEST STATESMAN? 55on Spain. Roosevelt, then Deputy Secretary ofthe Navy, had been instrumental inthe despatch of Dewey's squadron to ManilaBay before resigning his post to become a selfappointedleader with the rough riders. Theresultant publicity made him a national figurewhile his involvement with both naval undmilitary matters fuelled a lifelong interest andthroughout his public career he was to be an exponentof the need for a strong navy. He hadbeen to the forefront in urging Mckinley to intervenein Cuba, believing that intervention wasinevitable if the USA was to retain its selfrespect as a nation. 1 . The war with Spain hadresulted in the US gaining temporary controlover Cuba and the Philippines and control overPuerto Rico; while it had furnished Mckinleywith the excuse he needed to incorporateHawaii into the United States. All of these actionshad been enthusiastically espoused byRoosevelt.The popularity gained by Roosevelt's wartime exploits, notably his dramatic charge upSan Juan Hill in what he called a 'bully fight'had led to his nomination as RepublicanGovernor of New York at a time when the partybosses believed that they could not have won anelection with a less popular candidate. His tooenthusiastic reform initiatives upset hispowerful party backers and he was eased intothe Vice Presidency, an office then consideredto be of little account. When in September 1901President Mckinley was assassinated the nationfound itself with the man party managerSenator Hanna described as 'that damnedcowboy' in the White House.Roosevelt brought a new style to the WhiteHouse and in international affairs his vigour,impetuous enthusiasm and belief in America'sinternational destiny caused him to make agreater impact on the world stage than anypreceding and most succeeding presidents.Soon after becoming president he said:'If we stand idly by' . . . 'if we seek merelyswollen, slothful ease and ignoble peace, ifwe shrink from the hard contests where menmust win at hazard of their lives and the riskof all they hold dear, then the bolder andstronger will pass us by . . . Let us thereforeboldly face the life of strife'. 2I do not intend to give the details of all theinternational initiatives associated withRoosevelt's presidency however the principalevents were:a. The Panamanian rebellion againstColumbia and the resultant agreementbetween Panama and the USA on theconstruction of the Isthmian Canal.b. Re-intervention in Cuba in 1903 and 1906.c. The Roosevelt corollary to the MonroeDoctrine and US intervention inVenezuela and Santa Domingo.d. Mediation following the Japanese-Russian War.e. Mediation in the Moroccan crisis of 1905-1906 in a dispute between France andGermany over conflicting territorialclaims in Africa.f. The doubling of the strength of the UnitedStates Navy and the world cruise of the'Great White Fleet' in 1907-1909.g. The resolution of the Alaska borderdispute with Canada to the advantage ofthe United States.On foreign policy matters he tended to actalone, choosing to work through his cabinetadvisers only when it suited him and consultingCongress only when he was legally obliged toand, even then, often being accused ofoverstepping his executive powers. 3 He wascommitted to what he described as the 'ultra-American spirit of patriotism' 4 and in the 1900campaign had told a Californian audience that'I wish to see the United States the dominantpower on the shores of the Pacific Ocean' 5while in his first presidential message toCongress in 1901 he remarked that no singlework on the continent was more important tothe American people than the building of anIsthmian Canal. 6When the Columbian Government was provingintransigent in its negotiations with theUSA over the terms for ceding a strip ofterritory for the Isthmian Canal a rebellionoccurred in Panama City on 4th November1903. Roosevelt ordered the US Navy to landmarines which prevented Columbia fromrailing troops to the scene. Panamanianindependence was recognized within a few daysand the new government concluded a treatywith the US in December which was ratified bythe US Senate on 23rd February 1904, a totalperiod of less than three months.'" In responseto critics Roosevelt said 'the canal would nothave been built at all save for the action Itook'."The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had deniedEuropean powers the right of military
56 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. OCT. 80intervention in the Americas, the Area whichthe United States saw as its sphere of influence.When in 1902 Venezuela's refusal to honour itsdebts led to threatened use of force by Englandand Germany, Roosevelt agreed to arbitrate theissue to prevent European intervention. SinceEuropean powers claimed that they werewronged by not being allowed to enforce theobligations of debtor nations this placed anobligation on the United States to act.Following this Roosevelt announced hiscorollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his 4thannual message to Congress in 1904. Thecritical passage was:'. . . chronic wrongdoing, or an impatiencewhich results in a general loosening of the tiesof civilized society, may in America, aselsewhere, ultimately require intervention bysome civilized nation and in the WesternHemisphere the adherence of the UnitedStates to the Monroe Doctrine may force theUnited States, however reluctantly, inflagrant cases of such wrongdoing orimpotence, to the exercise of an internationalpolice power . . .' 9He later used the corollary as justification forintervening in Santa Domingo to enforce a debtsettlement and for re-intervening in Cuba torestore order in 1906. Had it not been for thecaution of his advisers there is no doubt that hewould have intervened elsewhere as well.He had believed fervently in the need fornaval strength from before his time as DeputySecretary for the Navy. He believed that for anation to be as rich as the USA but at the sametime to be weak was to invite destruction. At hisprompting the United States Navy doubled itsstrength during his presidency while theconstruction of the Panama Canal increased itspotential still further by enabling it toconcentrate in either the Atlantic or PacificOceans. 10 Roosevelt, as usual withoutconsulting Cabinet ordered the 'Great WhiteFleet' to make a voyage around the world at atime when it was generally believed thatwarships were not sufficiently reliable toundertake such lengthy voyages and in doing soRoosevelt believed that he ordered 'the mostimportant service that I rendered to peace'."Certainly he impressed both the Americanpeople and all international powers withAmerican strength. He thus publiclydemonstrated the belief he had expanded toCongress that:'The strong arm of the government inenforcing respect for its just rights ininternational matters is the Navy of theUnited States . . . There is no more patrioticduty before us than to keep the Navyadequate to the needs of this country'sposition'. 12Following the Russian-Japanese War in 1904Roosevelt offered to mediate between them. Asa consequence the Portsmouth Agreement of1905 was reached and Roosevelt was awardedthe Nobel Peace Prize 1 ' however the longerterm results were not particularly successful.Later, during the Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906he again acted as a peace maker between Franceand Germany notwithstanding the advice ofSecretary of State, Root. He actively directedthe Algeciras Conference and afterwardsboasted of having stood the Kaiser on his head'with great decision'. MAt all times he vigorously defended what heregarded as American interests. He actedstrongly to protect the Alaskan border bystationing troops near it when gold strikes madeit an issue and then through strong diplomacyarrived at a settlement which was favourable tothe US while proceeding in a manner whichsaved Canadian face. 15 The treaty with Cuba in1903 as well as recognizing the right of the USto intervene allowed for US Naval Bases on theisland. Similarly in the Philippines whileestablishing a measure of self governmenteffective power was retained by US appointedgovernor and provision was made for US bases.Overall his role in international affairs wasan extremely active one. Only McKinley of hisrecent predecessors had been heavily involvedand then only slowly and grudgingly. No otherpresident had mediated disputes between othermajor powers and he was the first president toattempt to build the United States into a navalpower ranking with the leading Europeanpowers. His decisiveness over Panama, Cuba,the Philippines and Santa Domingo establishednew forward limits of US power. While hiscritics harped at his impetuousness and theDemocratic Party tried to make antiimperialismthe central plank of their campaignhis great popularity with the American peoplegave him the easiest of victories in 1904 and thispopularity within America enabled him to actwith strength and decisiveness on the worldstage. Notwithstanding that he was Presidentduring the pre-world war era of great
n DDY ROOSEVELT: AMERICA'S GREATEST STATESMAN ?imperialistic rivalry between the majorEuropean powers he was able to establishhimself as a prominent figure on the worldstage and to establish the USA as a great powerin the world. Perhaps the nicest description ofhim was written by a political enemy in theLouisville Courier Journal during the 1904Presidential campaign:'T. R. Roosevelt is as sweet a gentleman asever scuttled a ship or cut a throat'. 16 UBIBLIOGRAPHYB Bailyn el al The Great Republic. A History of theAmerican People. D. C. Heath and Co. Lexington,Massachussets and Toronto 1971.O. T. Barck and N. M. Blake Since 1900. A History of theUnited States in Our Times. MacMillan, N.Y. 1947.Richard B Morris ed., Great Presidential Decisions. StatePapers that Changed the Course of History. Fawcett,N.Y. 1966.G. E. Mowry The Era of Theodore Roosevelt 1900-1912.Harper Brothers, N.Y. 1958.Theodore Roosevelt Theodore Roosevelt anAutobiography. Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y. 1925.A M Schlesinger and F. L. Israel eds., History ofAmerican Presidential Elections. Vol. Ill 1900-1936.McGraw-Hill. N.Y. 1971.E. Stanwood A History of the Presidency 1897-1916Houehton Mifflin Co, Boston and N.Y. 2nd edition.1916.RKFKRKNCF.S1. B Bailvnetal, The Great Republicp. 988.2. ibid. p. 993.3. G. E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore RooseveltI900-I9l2p 143.4. ibid, pi 45.5. ibid, p 146.6. ibid, p 146.7. E. Stanwood, A History of the Presidency 1897-1916pp 89-91.8. Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt anAutobiography p 527.9. Richard B Morris, Great Presidential Decisionsp 341.10. G. E. Mowry, opcit. p 149.11. Theodore Roosevelt, op cit, p 548.12. Richard B. Morris, opcit, p 343.13. Theodore Roosevelt, opcit, pp 540-543.14. B. Bailyn et al, opcit, p 997.15. E. Stanwood, op cit, pp 92-93.16. A. M. Schlesinger and F. L. Israel eds, History ofAmerican Presidential Elections Vol 111 1900-1936p 1986.AWARD: ISSUE NO. 23 (JULY/AUGUST 1980)The Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best originalarticle in the July/August 1980 Issue (No. 23) of the Defence Force Journal to AirCommodore R. G. Funnell, RAAF, M Pol Sc, Grad DIP ADMIN for his article TheProfessional Military Officer in Australia.BOOKS IN REVIEWAll books reviewed in this issue are available in various defence libraries.
CONTROLLING AUSTRALIA'S THREATENVIRONMENT. A METHODOLOGY FORPLANNING AUSTRALIAN DEFENCEFORCE DEVELOPMENT, by J. O. Langtryand Desmond J. Ball. Canberra: Strategic andDefence Studies Centre, Australian NationalUniversity, 1979.Revieved by Michael Underdown (ResearchAssistant)THE theme of this book is that "through theproper application of a deterrent posture,Australia can effectively 'control' its 'threat'environment (pp. 7-8)." There is also a secondarytheme, implied in the sub-title, that adeterrent posture policy has implications forthis country's defence force development.Now there is no dispute about the link betweendefence posture and procurement/manpowerdecisions and this aspect of the study isthoroughly covered. At the same time it may,or may not, be possible to control the "threatenvironment" by virtue of the posture weadopt. Whether such a strategy will prove effectivedepends, inter alia, on the correct perceptionof threats.It seems to me that the authors have proceededon the assumption that the assessments ofthe "threat environment" available to thedefence planners is correct. However, thisdenies any impact of force structure, procurementprogrammes, etc. on the threat assessmentprocess itself.Two concepts underlie the defence postureproposed here: deterrence and disproportionateresponse. The former concept is a product ofthe nuclear rivalry between the two superpowers,the basic tenet of which is "to reducethe probability of enemy military attacks, byposing for the enemy a sufficient likely prospectthat he will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack... (p. 11, citing Snyder)." A deterrentposture is thus most efficacious amongstnuclear powers, but becomes less so in the caseof either a conventional or nuclearconventionalmix. Furthermore, other factorsaffect the application of the concept, as theauthors point out (p. 12). These include the environment,troop deployment, force level andthreat perceptions.In this context, the official governmentassessment that there is "no foreseeable threat(to Australia) for 15 years" (White Paper, Nov.1976) is significant, affecting as it does theclimate for the development of an appropriateposture.Disproportionate response, on the otherhand, is a concept much more relevant to theAustralian situation, bearing in mind the factorsenumerated above, and especially perceptionsof threat scenarios. Disproportionateresponse "is intended to progressively incorporateinto the defence forces specificcapabilities that will cause a potential aggressorto respond disproportionately in terms of. . . cost (p. 22)." The task of the defence planneris to decide, subject to budgetary and otherconstraints, what forces and weapon systemsare necessary to oblige (all) potential enemies tomake a disproportionate response and to plancorrect strategies and tactics to meet (all) possiblethreats.The implications for defence planning in theadoption of such a posture are obvious, particularlyin relation to the level of forcesdemonstrably in being. However, fundamentalto the whole policy making process is the assessmentof threats to the country's security, forthe necessary procurement, force structure andlogistics decisions can only be effectively madeafter the potential requirements have beendetermined. The authors quote Dr. O'Neill'sview that "the main defence problems currentlyin front of Australia are not those of limitedfinance but those of limited outlook (p. 58)."This is undoubtedly true, but the outlook is, Isubmit, deficient in the area of threat perception.II
BOOK REVIEWS 59ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSITIONS:MANAGING COMPLEX CHANGE, byR. Beckhard and R. T. Harris, Reading, Mass.,Addison-Wesley. 1977Reviewed by Major N. A. JansALTHOUGH many service officers mightargue that books about "management"are of little relevance to effective command andstaff functioning in the military, there can belittle dispute that "the management of change"is an area which is pertinent to all organizations,regardless of their goals and natures. Unfortunately,most books on this subject arerather thin, in the practical sense, containingtoo many homilies about the need to changeand too few suggestions about how and when toactually do it. Consequently, a recent publicationin the Addison-Wesley series on oganizationaldevelopment, called "OrganizationalTransitions: Managing Complex Change", is amost welcome addition to the literature. It iswritten by two professors of management at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology, whohave had extensive practice as consultants inthis field. The senior author was a pioneerwriter in the area of "organizational development",but in the preface to this book, it is concededthat it was rare for a practical "OD" projectto proceed according to principles andwithout considerable difficulty. This, it isargued, was because early OD practitionerswere lacking in two areas: firstly, in anawareness of the complexity of organizationalbehaviour: it was not appreciated how delicatea plant planned change is; and secondly, in a setof techniques for effecting change which wouldbe both acceptable to managers and successfulin practice. This book represents a solution toeach of these deficiencies. It is structured in theform of a "how to" guide (which the readermust, of course, apply with commonsense basedon local circumstances) of six steps of thechange process in complex institutions:1. diagnosing of the present condition, includingthe need for change;2. setting goals and defining the new state orcondition after the change;3. defining the transition state between the presentand the future;4. developing strategies and action plans formanaging this transition;5. evaluating the change effort; and6. stabilising the new condition andestablishing a balance between flexibility andstability.The most useful concepts in the book, to mymind, are associated with Steps 1-4. Thewriters' advocacy of the need to describe thepresent and the desired future conditions, in alltheir ramifications, is an important reminderthat such conditions comprise not only goalsand technology, but also social groupingsnorms and values, and centres of intraorganizationpower. Since it is a rare change which doesnot have some effect on all of these, ignoringtheir possible influence risks failure of the programmeor the project. It is neglect of thiscareul preliminary diagnosis which has, I amsure, caused problems with many plannedchanges in recent years, both inside and outsidethe services.To handle the complex problems of thechange itself, the writers call for a declarationof "the transition state" and the establishmentof a special management system for it. Thissystem, the task of which to nurse the organizationthrough the change including dealing withthe uncertainty and conflict which most changegenerates, is frequently deliberately quite differentfrom those which are ideal for the oldand final stable forms of management.The book is directed not at academics noreven primarily at consultants but at managersin large complex organizations. Its size (it willtake the average reader not much more thanthree hours to complete) is probably about rightin terms of balancing the requirements ofdegree of explanation/illustration against propensityto be read. There are, in fact, manyanecdotal illustrations of the application of theprocesses, covering varied organizations(businesses, hospitals and schools). Overall, itis very easy to read.I daresay that the military manages change aswell as most other institutions but this is no excusefor ignoring the chance to improve ourability in this area. Consideration of"Organizational Transitions" would, I feel,lead to such an improvement.U
60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24. SEPT./OCT. 80The Pacific War World War II and TheJapanese, 1931-1945 by Saburo Ienaga, NewYork, Pantheon Asia Library, 1978 316pp.Reviewed by Captain P. A. PedersenIN the first chapter of a masterly study of thehistorical method entitled What isHistory?, E.H. Carr enjoins his readers to"study the historian before you begin to studythe facts". As Carr says, this is not veryabstruse: "It is what is already done by the intelligentundergraduate, who, when recommendedto read a work by that great scholarJones of St Judes, goes round to a friend at StJudes to ask what sort of chap Jones is, andwhat bees he has in his bonnet".This relationship between the historian andhis point of view is particularly applicable toThe Pacific War by Saburo Ienaga. The authorwas born in Nagoya in 1913 and from 1949 to1977 taught at the Tokyo University of Educationwhere he is now Professor Emeritus.Ienaga has written over fifty books and is as activein the peace movement as in the academicfield. He is deeply committed to the preservationof civil liberties in Japan and is anoutspoken advocate of international disarmament.Hence it is hardly surprising that Ienagaopposes Japan's policy of sheltering under the»US nuclear umbrella and bitterly condemnedAmerican involvement in Indochina.The Pacific War is a mirror reflection ofIenaga's political philosophy and the principlesthat underlie it. He was concerned that as thewar became a distant memory, future generationsof Japanese would possibly repeat the errorsthat led to its outbreak. Thus the book isintended as a reminder to Japanese that theircurrent peace and prosperity results from thedestruction of the brutal and repressive systemthat prevailed until 14 August 1945.Ienaga considers that the Pacific War did notbegin with the attack on Pearl Harbor butrather, the explosion on the South ManchurianRailway Line near Mukden on 18 September1931. That action by the Kwantung Army led tothe seizure of Manchuria and presaged the outbreakof full-scale hostilities with China in1937. Subsequent American and Britisheconomic sanctions threatened the successfulprosecution of this conflict and so Japan crippledtheir military and naval power in the Pacific,thereby ensuring her access to the rich materialresources of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.Hence the war in China was 'the core of thePacific War' and it remained the principaltheatre even after the outbreak of hostilitieswith Britain and the United States.The factors upon which Japanese policy wasbased were diverse. There were economicmotives: the coal and iron of Manchukuo andNorthern China and Dutch East Indies' oil.Then there was the urge to imperialism; the nationalistquest for an empire as great as any ofthose of the Western powers. Strategic considerationstoo, played a significant role. Whileadmitting the importance of these factors,lenaga says that the ultimate objective ofJapanese policy was the destruction of communism,not only in China, but ultimately inRussia as well. The US and Britain did no morethan issue futile protests at Japanese aggressionbecause they tacitly supported this anticommunistcrusade. Indeed lenaga asserts thatmany members of government in both countriesconsidered Japan "a bulwark againstCommunism in the Far East and felt a fraternalbond with her". Ienaga's contention is nothingif not controversial and resembles the view thatthe policy of appeasement in Europe also wasaimed at turning German ambitions towardsthe East.The Japanese military and the suppression ofcivil rights form the core of Ienaga's work andin his opinion constitute the two basic factors inaccounting for Japan's slide to disaster. Underthe principle of the independence of thesupreme command, the military enjoyed directaccess to the emperor, bypassing the government.Until the end of the Pacific War the serviceministries remained the special preserve ofprofessional military men, thereby crippling theeffective exercise of power by cabinets formedfrom the majority party in the Diet. If thewishes of the military were not met, they couldeither topple the cabinet by having the army ornavy minister resign or prevent its formationaltogether by refusing to provide officers toserve as ministers. In 1912 Army MinisterUehora Yusaka resigned when the Cabinetrefused to sanction an increase of two divisions.The Army Ministry announced that no successorwas available and so the Cabinet itselfhad no choice but to resign. As Ienaga says,control over the appointment of serviceministers gave the military the power of life or
BOOK REVIEWS 61death over any cabinet. Indeed by 1936 cabinetscould only be formed subject to military approvalof the prosposed appointees. Furthermore,the refusal of the military to share informationon service matters meant thatgovernments were often ignorant of the truesituation in China and then after 1941, in thePacific theatre. Hence military control offoreign policy was tightened and the role ofcivilian members of government reduced to littlemore than uninformed spectators.Why did the Japanese people accept thisauthoritarianism? asks Ienaga. The answer lieslargely in the combination of the educationsystem with a series of internal security lawswhich stifled intellectual freedom. After a briefflirtation with Western values and culture,Japanese education was constrained by strictgovernment controls designed to inculcate nationalawareness and instil obedience to thetmperor. The Imperial Rescript on Education,issued in 1890, reflects these objectives. Theuniformity produced by the education systemwas strengthened by the restrictions imposed onfreedom of speech and thought by the internalsecurity laws. The Press Law (1875 and revisedin 1877) made newspaper editors culpable forall material they published and allowed theHome Minister to prohibit publication of anyarticle he deemed offensive. The Peace PreservationRegulations (1887 and thereafter constantlyrevised) allowed police to exile thoseeven suspected of scheming and plotting. ThePublic Order Police Law (1900) curtailed rightsof assembly and association. These measuresstifled the exchange of facts and ideas, removingthe essential basis for informed judgementby Japanese on their nation's foreign anddefence policies. According to Ienaga, an intellectualvacuum resulted which was filled byofficial militarism and 'the public, unaware ofthe truth or of alternatives, automatically cameto support the government position'.Ienaga's detailed treatment of authoritarianismin pre-war Japan is part of hisaforementioned concern to prevent any repetitionof the events of this period by futureJapanese generations. A similar motiveunderlies his lengthy account of what he calls'the horrors of war'. The grisly atrocities committedby Japanese troops in China and thePacific are recounted in full, ranging from theRape of Nanking to the vivisection experimentsconducted on captured US airmen. The onsetof the B29 raids brought the war to theJapanese homeland and inflicted further miseryon a population already suffering acute foodshortages. But despite the growing certainty ofdefeat the military did not waver in their determinationto fight to the end, an attitude condemnedby Ienaga as 'an egregious act of crueltyagainst the Japanese people'.In some respects The Pacific War is a usefuladdition to existing material on Imperial Japan.Its sources are almost wholly Japanese and itcontains a wealth of contemporary accounts bya cross-section of the population who weredirectly affected by the events of those years —soldiers, refugees, housewives and evenchildren. Ienaga's examination of the Japanesemilitary system is interesting, particularly theattitudes of the NCO and the emphasis onbrutality as a leadership technique. He alsodraws parallels between the commitment ofever-increasing Japanese armies to China andthe US involvement in Vietnam, a subjectwhich has attracted several Western scholars ofJapanese history such as Alvin Coox and HilaryConroy.However certain features of The Pacific Wartrouble this reviewer. Though admirable,Ienaga's purpose in writing the book lends itselfto polemicism and tendentiousness, both ofwhich are particularly apparent in the concludingsections. He is extremely critical of theJapanese people for failing to revolt againstmilitary control. This is an extremely simplisticapproach which confuses idealism with practicality,especially as Ienaga himself admits thealmost insurmountable difficulties facing thosewith contrary views. He asserts that thebehaviour of US occupation forces in Japanwas comparable in every way to that of theJapanese Army in China and in fact, regardsJapan as little more than as America's vassal.Finally, lenaga omits certain interpretationswhich conflict with his own. The work ofWestern historians such as Butow and, in particular,Crowley, should have merited consideration.Crowley's Japan's Quest forAutonomy, published in 1966, and the articleswhich preceded it, dispute the influence onpolicy-making exerted by political murders, extremistplots and military factionalism whoseimportance Ienaga stresses.The eloquence of Ienaga's plea to his countrymento remember the past and avoid its errors,cannot be denied. Nonetheless its faults
62 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. OCT. 80detract considerably from the historical valueof The Pacific War and preclude its unqualifiedrecommendation to students of this turbulentperiod of Japanese history.IIABBREVIATIONS DICTIONARY by Ralphde Sola, New York, Elsevier, 1978, InternationalFifth Edition.Reviewed by K.I. TaylorFormer Managing Editor, Defence ForceJournalADICTIONARY is not an easy book toreview. Perhaps the only way to test itsworth is by using it over a period of time.In six months, whilst Managing Editor ofyour Journal, I have found Mr de Sola'sAbbreviations Dictionary truly internationaland extremely useful. I have been frustrated onoccasion. For instance, I could not find mygood friend Major General Dar's Pakistani"TBt" decoration, but then, neither does itshow Commander Peter Shevlin's Australian"AM". Maybe both are too new to be included;perhaps the sixth edition will set mattersright.However, generally, Australia is wellrepresented, though New South Wales peoplemight object to the fact that, while the RACV— Royal Automobile Club of Victoria — islisted, the NRMA is given only as the "NationalRetail Merchants Association".This useful book also includes sections on theAirlines of the World (for the jetsetter), theWorld's Capital Cities, Chemical Elements, theRichter Scale, Proofreader's Marks, theBeaufort Scale and many more, including WeddingAnniversaries. In this latter category, theauthor's sense of humour comes through. Forthe 80th Anniversary he writes — "Consultyour nearest jeweler(sic); contact the media andthe police if you have accumulated all theforegoing wedding anniversary gifts; treatyourself to whatever you want — this is thetime-flies anniversary and may earn you a placein the Guiness Book of World Records."A book no editor, writer or academic shouldbe without, and a suitable present for thatsomeone who has everything.THE IGNORANT ARMIES, The Anglo-American Archangel Expedition: 1918-1919, byE. M. Halliday. Weidenfeld and Nicolson,London 1960. pp. 232, notes, bibliography andindex. Reviewed by MAJ G. G. Pound, RAA.yPETER BURNESS' article "The ForgottenWar in North Russia" (DFJ No 22 May/June 1980) is a concise and objective account ofAustralian participation in allied activities inNorth Russia. The title is perhaps not totallycorrect, the war in North Russia is, toparaphrase Slim, not so much fogotten asunheard of.Halliday dwells on this aspect in the openingchapter of his book even to the point of suggestinga degree of evasiveness on the part ofthe American Government in acknowledgingthat US troops were involved, thereby attemptingto perpetuate the myth that the USSR isone major power with which the US has notbeen in direct conflict.The book concentrates on the activities ofAmerican troops operating under British commandfrom Archangel. It employs the tactic,fashionable in the 1960's, of denigrating somesenior officers (although Ironside emerges as anable and popular commander) and investigatesand reports on the political manoeuvring surroundingthe Allied involvement, including thepersonal attitudes of Woodrow Wilson, Churchilland Clemenceau.It is probably in this latter area that the chiefinterest in the book lies as the author reveals theshift of emphasis from ends to means and backagain.As the story unfolds of political indecision onthe extent to which the conflict should be prosecuted;the underestimation of the enemy'sequipment, morale and fighting ability; growingopposition at home and increasing disenchantmentwith the Government the Allies weresupporting, one cannot but be struck by thesimilarity between these aspects of the wars inNorth Russia and South Vietnam. This comparisonwould obviously not have been possiblewhen the book was written which makes it moretelling than had the author deliberately attemptedso to do.The actions recounted are predominantly atsub-unit level and the way they are describedreveals Halliday's experience as a war correspondent.
HOOK REVIEWS6JThere are no photographs but the book doescontain clear maps and, even though the area ofoperations is limited in area and orientednorth/south, those maps help the reader followthe action through a maze of unfamiliar Russiannames."The Ignorant Armies" is a readable bookthat not only demonstrates the repetitive natureof history but also serves to fill a gap that manymay have in their knowledge of recent militaryhistory. (JDUKW 2'/2 TON 6x6 AMPHIBIAN by JeffWoods, published by ISO Publications LONDON, 1978. 72 pages. 1.25Reviewer: MA.I A. C. G. Welburn, RACTOMOVTLog Br.IF anyone has ever wondered what Dukwswere and what they were capable of, JeffWoods' book provides the answers. Producedby ISO Publications, this edition is one of threeproduced on World War II soft skinnedvehicles — the others deal with the AmericanWeasel and the British Landrover.This book — DUKW — covers the Dukwfrom its inception, through acceptance into serviceand finally its demise in 1974 by way ofbrief narratives and photographs.An introductory historical section outlinesthe initial requirement for the Dukw and givesthe derivatives from which this vehicle wasdeveloped — the GMC CCKW 2Vi 6 x 6 GStruck, the Ford Seep and Weasel. For theuninitiated the name Dukw is explained —from GMC terminology where D means 1942,U is for Utility (Amphibious), K for FrontWheel drive and W for two rear driving axles.This section also includes Dukw systems whichcovers methods of carrying heavy, unusual orindivisible loads — well illustrated withphotographs of Dukws ferrying P-38 aircraft,M4 and M3 tanks, even Dukws rigged to firefieldguns on the move and calliope type rockettubes — in this case ten rows of twelve tubes of4.5" rockets.A technical description of the Dukw is includedin the next outline narrative with mentionbeing made of the difficulties encounteredin modifying normal vehicle parts for use in anamphibious vehicle. In some cases the Dukwwas quite advanced for its time, for example itwas equipped with a centrally controlled inflationsystem for the tyres that worked through apermanent airline connected to a rotating glandin each wheel hub — a type of inflating systemthat is still under investigation in many of today'smodern armies.The final written section deals wth the roleplayed by the Dukw in operations throughoutall the theatres of war. A word of warning is expressedin this section that is still current today:that care must be exercised in amphibiousoperations and such vehicles should never beused too far inland in a conventional truck role.The book contains over one hundred andfifty black and white photographs with a centralcolour section on Dukw camouflage colours.The photographs cover Russian (one only)American and British Dukws carryingcargo, troops, and VIP's, in the Mediterranean,European and Pacific Theatres of warand even include a number of photographs ofDukws participating in amphibious beach andassault river crossings.There are however a number of shortcomingswhich affect the value of this work — there isno table of contents, no index and no apparentorder in presentation of photographs and linediagrams. In particular the photographs aremixed by date and theatre of operations whichtends to become confusing. There is also atendency, in places, to over-statement. Thebook, for example, begins with the following:"In many ways the Dukw exemplifies all thatis best of the American enterprize as seenfrom Europe. Brilliant ingenuity in conceptionallied with overwhelming competence inproductive capability in cracking a near insolvableproblem — the very essence ofdemocracy's flexible response",and closes with the comment that:"no equally effective replacement is in servicein the West today".Whilst the first statement is "excessive", thesecond belies the fact that the LARC (LighterAmphibious Resupply Cargo) V, XV and LX isin service with both the West German andAmerican Forces stationed in Western Europe.Primarily a book for those who havememories of the Dukw, it would also proveuseful to anyone wishing to model this uniqueamphibious vehicle. Overall, a book withlimited potential primarily due to its specializedand somewhat narrow topic.O
M DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL No. 24, SEPT. OCT. 80AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY CADET UNIT1945-1977 — DISMISSAL AND REVEILLEby K. G. Mortensen, Melbourne, GeraldGriffin Press, 1978.Reviewed by P. H. Kitney formerly SeniorAdministrative Officer, Faculty of Military-Studies, DuntroonIhave long believed that there was a fundof material available to form the basis ofhistories of units of the Australian CadetCorps. The wonder is that the impetus did notcome from one of the units which was formedin the mid 1860s when the movement firstbegan in Australia's secondary schools.Though this was not to be, it was no less pleasingto read Brother K. G. Mortensen's bookabout the post-war days of the ChristianBrothers' College, St Kilda, Cadet Unit. I hopehis effort may encourage others to marshal thearticles, reports, routine orders, which nodoubt abound in school archives, into similarlyacceptable form. Perhaps CBC was fortunatein having a chronicler as able as BrotherMortensen to present its story for, in twentyoneyears in 3 Cadet Brigade he spent eighteenof them as Officer Commanding the CBC Unit.In his preface, the author points out that hehas not wished to limit himself to a merehistorical summary of the activities of one unitor one Brigade. This comment has particularrelevance to some of the later chapters wherethe Millar Committee's report is discussedalong with the political decisions of the LaborGovernment of 1975 and the Liberal Governmentof 1976 which respectively disbanded andreinstated the Australian Cadet Corps. The difficultiesexperienced since 1976 are also consideredon a much wider scale than would bereflected at Brigade level.Some aspects of cadet life are treated in moredepth than others. The author discusses trainingin considerable detail, and from a numberof different angles. There are separate chaptersdevoted to each of the specialist activities whichwere available to members of the unit. Theseare all drawn together to illustrate how theycontributed to the common goal each year —the conduct of a successful camp. Most of theCBC camps were in that category despite thedwindling help which the Army was able to givebecause of its commitments to National ServiceTraining and, later, to Vietnam.In a survey which covers some tempestuousyears of the Cadet Corps saga, it is impossiblenot to analyse the events which caused thetempest. Brother Mortensen is objective in hiscomments on the Millar report and he alsodeals fairly with the many detractors of theCadet Corps as a school institution. He provesconclusively, for example, that boys do nothave the desire to turn into killers when theyhave rifles in their hands. He also shows howsafety-minded boys can become, not only whenhandling weapons but in other aspects of trainingand living in the field. However, weaknessesappear in his argument when he puts forwardhis thesis for the retention of cadet units inschools. Not all units remaining in existence areefficient units; the place of the Cadet Corps islower on Army's list of priorities than it hasever been; the demands on teachers' time issuch that few of them, especially in the stateschools, are willing to put in the time to anotheractivity such as Cadets.An Australian Army Cadet Unit, apart fromits obvious appeal to old boys and ex-membersof staff of CBC St Kilda, is recommended as amore than useful guide to schools who still haveCadet units and should be read by all who careabout Australia's capability for its own defenceand the place of the Australian Cadet Corps inthat capability.II