On the Hoof - Livestock Trade in Darfur

On the HoofLivestock Trade in Darfur

http://unep.org/Sudan/First published in September 2012 by the United Nations Environment Programme© 2012, United Nations Environment ProgrammeUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeP.O. Box 30552, Nairobi, KENYATel: +254 (0)20 762 1234Fax: +254 (0)20 762 3927E-mail: uneppub@unep.orgWeb: http://www.unep.orgThis publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or non-profit purposes without specialpermission from the copyright holder provided acknowledgement of the source is made. No use of this publication may be made forresale or for any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from UNEP. The contents of this volumedo not necessarily reflect the views of UNEP, or contributory organizations. The designations employed and the presentations do notimply the expressions of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNEP or contributory organizations concerning the legal status ofany country, territory, city or area or its authority, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.Report authors: Margie Buchanan-Smith and Abdul Jabbar Abdulla Fadul,with Abdul Rahman Tahir and Yacob AkliluCover image: © Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency:Fora Boranga livestock market, West DarfurReport layout: Bridget SnowCover design: Matija PotocnikMaps: UNOCHA, SudanPrinted by: New Life Printing Press, KhartoumUNEP promotesenvironmentally sound practicesglobally and in its own activities. Thispublication is printed on recycled paperusing eco-friendly practices. Our distributionpolicy aims to reduce UNEP’s carbon footprint.

On the HoofLivestock Trade in Darfur

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThe authors are extremely grateful to the many traders, government officials, and otherstakeholders whom we interviewed, often at length, for the information they provided and fortheir support and cooperation. Anita Yeomans did an excellent job sourcing and reviewingrelevant literature on the livestock trade and livestock production in Sudan and beyond. Dr.Abdelatif Ahmed Mohamed Ijaimi provided access to invaluable data and analysis of the livestocktrade at the national level. Insights into the dynamics of individual markets in Darfur were madepossible through the tireless work of a team of local researchers. Youssif Abaker was an excellentnote-taker at the analysis workshop with the local researchers, and Edward Howat helped withpreparation of the graphs. The authors would like to thank a number of peer reviewers whocommented on an earlier draft of this report: Roy Behnke, Helen Young, Magda Nassef, OmerHassan El Dirani, Saverio Krätli, Jack Van Holst Pelekaan, and Brendan Bromwich. The study’sconclusions and recommendations were extensively discussed with Salih Abul Mageed El Douma,Omer Hassan El Dirani, Youssif El Tayeb, Afaf Rahim, and Magda Nassef, and were sharpened as aresult. The Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency has facilitated the study in manyways, from logistical support to commenting on the analysis and advising on dissemination.Thanks are also due to Tamreez Amirzada, UNOCHA Khartoum for the production of the maps.Finally, special thanks to Helen Young for her cheerful and unfailing support and encouragementto this study, and to Magda Nassef and the UNEP team for all their support in Sudan.This study was funded by UKAID under their support to UNEP’s Sudan IntegratedEnvironment Project.4

9. Trade in hides and skins............................................................................. 5010. Conclusions and recommendations.............................................................. 5210.1 Conclusions....................................................................................................... 5210.2 Recommendations............................................................................................. 54Acronyms ...................................................................................................... 57References...................................................................................................... 58Annex 1 Research team carrying out the study.................................................. 61Annex 2 Analysis of trading costs in Darfur’s livestock trade................................ 636

Executive SummaryThis study set out to understand what hashappened to the livestock trade in the greaterDarfur region during the conflict years: how it hasresponded to the constantly shifting conflictdynamics since 2003, how it has adapted, and towhat extent (if at all) it has recovered. It also setout to identify how the livestock trade can besupported in order to better sustain the livelihoodsof different groups in Darfur, both whilethe conflict continues and in the longer term tosupport the eventual recovery of Darfur’s economyand to contribute to the national economy. Itis estimated that Darfur’s livestock account forbetween one-quarter and one-third of Sudan’slivestock resources post-secession.Sudan’s national export trade in livestock andmeat, oriented towards the Middle East, is heavilydependent on a small number of markets—SaudiArabia, Egypt, and Jordan—making it vulnerableto changing trade regimes in those markets and tolosing its market share to competitor exportingcountries that have more sophisticated productionand marketing infrastructure, especially as welfare,hygiene, and disease control regulations becomestricter in livestock-importing countries. Duringthe years of petroleum wealth in Sudan, thelivestock sector received rather little attention interms of government policy and investment,although this now seems to be changing, withrenewed government interest in the livestocksector and the role it can play in future economicgrowth in Sudan post-secession.Darfur’s livestock trade was immediately andbadly affected by the conflict. Early on, in 2003–4,when large numbers of rural households weredisplaced, looting of livestock was widespread.Prices plummeted as distress sales of livestocksoared, and many of the looted animals were soldquickly and locally, usually for meat consumption.Many livestock traders went out of business and/or were bankrupted in these early years; othersswitched to trade in less-risky commodities.Large-scale livestock traders from Omdurmanwithdrew from Darfur’s livestock markets becauseof insecurity and the risks associated with trekkinganimals on the hoof, effectively transferringthe risk of trekking livestock to central Sudan tosmaller-scale Darfuri traders. By March 2011,there were signs of limited recovery in Darfur’slivestock trade as some large-scale traders fromOmdurman returned to the region, especially toSouth Darfur, but this recovery is fragile andcould be threatened by shifting conflict dynamics.All traders interviewed for this study recounteda contraction in the volume of livestock tradedduring the conflict years, of at least 50%, sometimesmore, and a deteriorating quality of livestockbrought to the market compared with thepre-conflict years. Most secondary livestockmarkets have contracted in terms of volume ofsales, and many primary village markets in Darfurhave been closed since the conflict began. Therehas been a sharp fall in the number of livestocktraders operating in Darfur, as well as an ethnicconcentration of livestock traders during theconflict years, reported in all markets in Darfurvisited for this study. In some parts of the region,agreements have been forged between otherwisehostile groups to secure access to trade wherethere are mutual livelihood and economic interests,showing how trade can be a bridge torebuilding relationships between otherwise hostilegroups, and of the benefits to all concerned and tothe economy when this succeeds.Livestock traders have adapted to the conflictenvironment by switching to more secure yetlonger and more circuitous trekking routes. Theyhave reduced the number of animals moving in asingle herd to reduce exposure to looting andnow employ armed guards to accompany theherds. Each of these adaptations has substantiallyincreased the transport costs per head of livestock.Overall, trading costs have soared during theconflict years, rising by 100 to 700% comparedwith 2002, not only due to the hiring of armedguards for protection but also due to the paymentof fees at numerous checkpoints on many routes,and due to substantially increased formal taxes. AJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 7

major grievance amongst livestock traders is thatthey see little benefit from paying inflated taxes interms of improved market infrastructure orservices. Instead, much of the market infrastructurein Darfur and along the trekking routesappears to be deteriorating.No livestock traders interviewed for this studyin Darfur had accessed formal credit, a majorconstraint to livestock trading, as the amount ofcapital needed to trade has soared during theconflict years. Although the livestock marketingsystem in Darfur and Omdurman has longdepended upon informal credit arrangements,these carry their own risks, and some traders havegone out of business when others have defaultedon payments on credit.Cross-border trade with Libya, Chad, andCAR has long been a feature of Darfur’s livestocktrade, much of it informal. Although Egypt isofficially Sudan’s most important market for theexport of camels, in Darfur the export trade toLibya is currently preferred, mainly because of theinformality of the trade and lack of regulation.Recent political upheavals in both Egypt andLibya temporarily disrupted the camel trade,although it has since resumed. Cross-border tradein livestock between West Darfur and Chad wasalso disrupted by political hostilities between therespective governments, but has resumed since2010. There has been some shift in market activityduring the conflict years away from the longdistancetrade of animals, with its associated risks,to the local slaughter of livestock to meet Darfur’sgrowing demand for meat. The rapid and distortedprocess of urbanization in Darfur during theconflict years has triggered an emerging andimportant local meat industry.Despite Darfur’s prominence as one ofSudan’s most important livestock-producing areasand as a major contributor to livestock exports,the region has only one poorly functioningslaughterhouse, located in Nyala. Plans to constructa new abattoir in Nyala are progressing veryslowly, and an abattoir constructed in Geneina hasnever been completed, yet such facilities couldplay a critical role in stimulating Darfur’s livestocktrade and in efficiency gains if livestock no longerhad to be trekked on the hoof to Omdurman,especially during the dry season.Trade in hides and skins, an importantby-product of the livestock trade, has flourished inDarfur during the conflict years, mainly focusedon West Africa. Most of the hides and skins areexported directly, for example through El Fasherand Geneina, and transported overland.Although there are some such positive trendsto report, the overall picture that emerges is ofmany inefficiencies in the way that Darfur’slivestock are currently traded, exacerbated by themuch-increased trading costs associated with theconflict, which further reduces the competitivenessof Sudan’s livestock exports. The livestocksector and livestock trade will be critical to theeventual recovery of Darfur’s economy and to therecovery of rural livelihoods. Planning on how tosupport such a recovery, as inclusively as possible,can start now.8

SUDAN: Darfur - Markets covered under this studySeptember 2012LibyaEgyptChadSudanEritreaEthiopiaC.A.R.South SudanNORTH DARFUREl MalhaCHADEl GeneinaSaraf Omra!El FasherWEST DARFURZalingeiTeraijNORTHKORDOFANFora BorangaCENTER DARFURSilgoUmlabbasaNyalaSOUTH DARFURMarkundiAssalayaEd DaienUmm DukhnRehaid Al BerdiRajajAboriEl TomatEl FurdosAbujabra AbumatarigAbusenaidraSOUTHKORDOFANCAREAST DARFURLEGENDMarkets coveredPrimary RoadSecondary RoadState boundaryInternational boundaryAbyei AreaUndetermined boundarySOUTH SUDAN30 kmCreation date: 11 September 2012 Sources: Boundary(CBS,IMWG), Settlement(OCHA).Map created by OCHAThe boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 9

1. Introduction1.1 Why this study?Livestock is one of Darfur’s main economicassets and a central component of most rurallivelihoods. It is estimated that the region accountsfor one-quarter to one-third of Sudan’s livestockproduction. 1 The greater Darfur region has longbeen a major exporter of camels, cattle, and sheep,while goats are mostly traded and consumedlocally. The outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003has badly affected the livestock sector. There waswidespread looting of livestock in the early yearsof the conflict, affecting traders as well asproducers, as so much of the livestock tradeinvolves trekking animals over long distances. Thisbecame a risky business. As the conflict continued,other constraints have affected the livestock trade;for example, a heavy taxation burden, althoughsome trading opportunities have also opened up.The significance of the livestock sector to Darfur’seconomy at the macro level, and to livelihoods atthe micro level, means that recovery of thelivestock sector and of livestock trade will be keyto the long-term economic recovery of theregion. Since the secession of South Sudan andthe loss of oil revenue, the livestock sector is ofincreasing importance to Sudan’s economy at thenational level.The purpose of this study is to understandwhat has happened to the livestock trade inDarfur during the conflict years, and to identifyhow trade can be supported. The specificobjectives are, first, tracking how the livestocktrade has been impacted by the conflict in Darfursince 2003, how trade has adapted, and the extentto which it has recovered, in order to betterunderstand the impact on the livelihoods ofdifferent groups in Darfur and the implications forDarfur’s future. The second objective is to identifyways in which the livestock trade can besupported to better sustain the livelihoods ofdifferent groups in Darfur while the conflictcontinues, and, in the longer term, to support theeventual recovery of Darfur’s economy, andcontribute to the economy at the national level. Itbuilds on earlier studies during the conflict yearsthat have looked at the livestock sector andlivestock trade. 2The study is part of UNEP’s “SudanIntegrated Environment Project” (SIEP). Led bythe Feinstein International Center (FIC) of TuftsUniversity, the study feeds into Tufts’ overallresearch program on livelihoods in Darfur thatbegan in 2004. Carried out over a twelve-monthperiod between February 2011 and February2012, this in-depth study of the livestock tradecomplements ongoing monthly monitoring oftrade and markets that the non-governmentalorganization (NGO), the Darfur Developmentand Reconstruction Agency (DRA), is managingin North and West Darfur through localcommunity-based organizations (CBOs) withadvisory input from Tufts University. Together,both of these market research initiatives aim todeepen understanding and analysis of how theconflict is impacting on trade and thus to identifyhow livelihoods can be supported through marketinterventions and how market infrastructure canbe maintained through the conflict years to speedDarfur’s eventual economic recovery when thereis greater peace and stability. These initiatives alsoaim to identify peace-building opportunitiesthrough trade. This livestock trade studycomplements a parallel initiative by the FeinsteinInternational Center on pastoralism, which aimsto promote understanding of pastoralist livelihoodsystems among local, national, and internationalstakeholders and to strengthen the capacity ofpastoralist leaders, organizations, and otheradvocates to articulate the rationale for pastoralismin Sudan. The livestock trade study in Darfur andthe project on pastoralism are being carried out inclose collaboration, both being components of theenvironment and livelihoods theme of the SIEP.1Based on 2011 figures from the Ministry of Animal Resources, Fisheries and Range, for Sudan after the secession of SouthSudan.2See, for example, Young et al. (2005), El Dukheri et al. (2004).10

Sustainable livestock production is critical tolivestock trade, domestically and internationally,and thus to economic growth. Well-managed andsupported by clear and coherent policies, both cancontribute to sustainable natural resourcemanagement. Poorly managed, both canundermine the sustainable management of naturalresources and be destructive. Indeed, whereotherwise hostile groups have overcome theirdifferences in order to continue livestock trading,there may be potential to extend thiscollaboration to the co-management of naturalresources.This report presents the findings of thelivestock trade study. It begins with an overviewof the livestock trade in Sudan, its significance tothe economy, and provides a description of theevolving policy context—section 2. Section 3describes the livestock trade in Darfur pre-conflictand provides an overview of how the livestocktrade has contracted during the conflict years.Section 4 analyzes how market activity has shiftedin Darfur in response to the conflict, both interms of the market network and in terms oflivestock trade routes, drawing on primary datacollected during the study. The changing profileof livestock traders in Darfur is presented inSection 5, which shows the concentration ofmarket power during the conflict years. Section 6shows how the costs of trading have soared since2003 based on an analysis of data collected during2011. Section 7 draws out the implications of thestudy’s findings for livestock production, andpresents a couple of hypotheses about howlivestock production and ownership in Darfurappears to have changed during the conflict years,according to feedback from traders and otherstakeholders interviewed during 2011. Section 8assesses how cross-border livestock trading fromDarfur has been affected during the conflict yearsand shows the growing significance of domesticmeat consumption within Darfur. Trade in hidesand leather from Darfur appears to be growing inimportance; this is reviewed in Section 9. Finally,section 10 presents the conclusions from the studyand makes recommendations about how thelivestock trade in Darfur can be supported in theimmediate and longer-term future.1.2 MethodologyThis study builds on previous research intothe livestock trade in Darfur and how it has beenimpacted by conflict, in particular “LivelihoodsUnder Siege,” (Young et al, 2005), whichprovided an account and analysis of the earlyimpact of the conflict on the livestock market, anda subsequent study carried out in 2007 in Darfur’sstate capitals: “Adaptation and Devastation,”(Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008) which beganto show how the livestock trade had adapted fouryears into the conflict. This most recent studyprovides an overview of how nine years ofwidespread conflict have impacted on thelivestock trade, with a particular focus on the stateof the livestock trade in 2011.The first step was drawing up a set of researchquestions to guide the study. See Box 1.Subsequent steps in carrying out the study were asfollows:1. A review of secondary documentation onlivestock trading, principally from Sudanbut also more broadly, for example, fromthe Horn of Africa, to ensure this studyprovides added value by building onprevious work and existing knowledge.2. A period of fieldwork to collect primarydata in Darfur’s state capitals: El Fasher,El Geneina, and Nyala. This was carriedout in March 2011 by four seniorresearchers, each with existing knowledgeand experience of the livestock trade inDarfur. (See Annex 1). Key informantinterviews were conducted with differenttypes of livestock traders in each marketvisited, purposively selected to berepresentative of the range of traderscurrently engaged in the livestock trade.Interviews were also carried out withgovernment officials who administer thelivestock market and collect taxes, withherders employed by traders on the mainlivestock trading routes throughout andbeyond Darfur, and with otherstakeholders and resource people,including academics, who have data andinformation about the sector.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 11

3. A review of official statistics andgovernment policy on livestock trading wascarried out by a national consultant inKhartoum, in order to identify trends andto understand the macro policyenvironment within which Darfur’slivestock trade is operating (Ijaimi, 2011).4. A second period of more detailed fieldworkin 14 markets across the three Darfurstates was completed between April andJune 2011. (See the map for marketsresearched during this study). Ten localresearchers were recruited to carry outthis phase of the study, most of whomwere agricultural officers and assistant vetsin Darfur, familiar with their local marketand having strong contacts with livestocktraders and producers. See Annex 1. Thisteam of local researchers was trained in a2-day workshop in El Fasher in March2011, provided with questionnaires and ashort report form to complete, and metagain for a 3-day analysis workshop inKhartoum in June 2011.5. Interviews with livestock traders andexporters in Omdurman were carried outin January/February 2012.6. The final analysis of all the data andmaterials gathered was carried out inFebruary/March 2012.This study relies on both quantitative andqualitative data, some of it drawn from secondarysources, while much of it is primary data collectedduring the respective periods of field work.Quantitative data cover indicators such as prices,trading costs, and estimates of numbers of tradersand numbers of livestock traded. We haveindicated where these are estimates, and thereforethe numbers need to be treated with caution.Qualitative data cover issues such as trade routes,trader profiles, and evidence of geographical shiftsin market activity. In order to capture the impactof the conflict on trade, interviewees were askedto make comparisons between the livestock tradein 2011 and in 2002, before conflict in Darfur waswidespread. These comparisons often rely onrecall, as reliable written records are scarce.Carrying out primary research in the currentDarfur environment is challenging and subject tomany constraints. Principal amongst these are:(1) insecurity and restricted access to anumber of markets within Darfur: a teamof local researchers based in each of thesemarkets was therefore recruited andtrained to overcome this constraint;(2) the dynamic and fluid situation in Darfur,which means that data and analysis canquickly become outdated: where possiblethe team has done follow-up monitoringto ensure that early findings are stillrelevant or to update them, but therapidly-changing environment should beborne in mind when considering thefindings of this study;(3) traders being suspicious of questions andin-depth interviews and thereforereluctant to participate. The team usedlocal networks and trusted personalrelationships to overcome this constraint;(4) at the national level, the lack of officialstatistics on some aspects of livestocktrading, for example, the relative share ofdomestic versus international trade andnumbers of livestock exported fromDarfur, has been a constraint. Also, officialstatistics prior to July 2011 refer to Sudanincluding South Sudan, although thisstudy is being completed after secessionand therefore makes recommendations forthe newly defined (northern) Sudan. Thelack of official statistics is even more acuteat the Darfur level, constraining thequantitative analysis that was possible.In carrying out a study of this kind, it hasbeen important to generate support for the workfrom government and other stakeholders: the factthat it has been carried out at a time whengovernment is giving increased attention to thelivestock sector and its potential as a source ofeconomic growth has intensified interest in, andsupport for, the work.The study aims to address an ambitious list ofresearch questions. Where it was not possible toprovide conclusive answers, the findings are posedas hypotheses that require further investigation; forexample, in response to question 3 in Box 1 onthe main producers of livestock currently tradedin Darfur.12

Box 1.Research questions that the study sets out to answer(1) Overall, how has the livestock trade been affected by, and how has it responded to, theconstantly shifting dynamics of conflict in Darfur since 2003? How has it adapted, and towhat extent (if at all) has the livestock trade recovered?(2) Specifically, how has the volume and value of the livestock trade in Darfur been affectedby the conflict, and how has this impacted on livestock exports from Sudan? How doesthis compare with other factors affecting the livestock trade in the last decade?(3) Who are the main producers of livestock currently traded in Darfur, and how does thiscompare with the pre-conflict years?(4) How has the market chain for livestock been affected by the conflict, from producers toconsumers/exporters?(5) How has the concentration of market power amongst different livestock traders changedduring the conflict years; for example, geographically and ethnically? Who trades withwhom? What determines access to the livestock market (in order to become a trader),and how has this been impacted by the conflict context?(6) How have trading routes changed throughout the period of the conflict, and why? Whatdoes this tell us about security and conflict dynamics?(7) How have trading and transaction costs in the livestock trade been affected by theconflict? What are the increased risks, and who bears the cost of those risks? What canwe learn from an analysis of trading costs about current inefficiencies in livestock tradingand how these could be resolved?(8) How significant is cross-border trade in livestock from Darfur (eg., into Chad, CentralAfrican Republic, and Libya), formally and informally, and who is involved?(9) What are the implications of all of the above for the livelihoods of different groups inDarfur, including current and former (ie., pre-conflict) pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, andfarmers?(10) What are the implications for all of the above for sustainable livestock production andtrade in Darfur’s economy in the future?The livestock trade in Sudan is almost entirelydominated by men. Therefore, this study hasmainly been carried out through interviewingmale traders. Because of lack of access to livestockproducers, few women were interviewed as keyinformants, which is clearly a gap. The commercialinvolvement of women in the livestock sector ismainly in the trade of livestock products, such asmilk and leather. Trade in hides and skins has beenexplored briefly, but it was beyond the resourcesof the study to carry out a full analysis of trade inlivestock products. This is a gap which needs to befilled for a truly gendered analysis of the trade inlivestock and associated products.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 13

2. An overview of Sudan’s livestock trade and the policy context2.1 The significance of livestock productionin SudanSince the discovery of oil in Sudan in themid-1990s, petroleum has been hugely importantto Sudan’s economy. As a result, Sudan enjoyedone of the highest growth rates in Africa between2000 and 2009, of almost 8% p.a. But even duringthis period, agriculture was significantly moreimportant to GDP (Gross Domestic Product) thanpetroleum, and much of this was due to thelivestock sector. See Figure 1. In terms of exports,however, petroleum eclipsed the agriculturalsector. Having accounted for about 80% ofnational exports before oil was discovered, thecontribution of crops and livestock combineddropped to between 5 and 10% of nationalexports after 2000. See Figure 2.This has changed abruptly with the secessionof South Sudan in July 2011. With 75% of knownoil reserves in South Sudan, the loss of revenue tothe economy of Sudan is serious. It has rapidlyreverted to an economy much more dependenton agriculture, with its fluctuating levels of annualproduction. The loss of oil revenue is associatedwith a rapid deterioration in macro-economicindicators, as oil accounted for 75% of Sudan’sforeign exchange. Foreign exchange reserves arelow and inflation is running at around 30%,according to official data at the time of writing.This has contributed to renewed governmentinterest in the livestock sector and the role it canplay in future economic growth in Sudan. SeeSection 2.3 below.Indeed, the significance of livestock relative tocrop production in Sudan’s domestic economy hasincreased. According to the Central Bureau ofStatistics (CBS) (quoted in Behnke, 2012),livestock now accounts for more than 60% ofagriculture’s total contribution to GDP and cropproduction less than 40%, despite the fact that thelatter has been given most attention bygovernment and in policy initiatives. See section2.3 below. As a proportion of agricultural exports,the rising contribution of livestock is striking.Between the late 1950s and early 1970s, livestockaccounted for 3 to 6% of all agricultural exports.Between the late 1990s and 2009, livestockaccounted for 27 to 47% of agricultural exports,depending on the year (Ibid.).Before the secession of South Sudan, it waswidely quoted that the greater Darfur regionaccounted for one-fifth of Sudan’s livestockresources; the proportion was believed to be verysimilar for camels, cattle, sheep, and goats (WorldBank, 2007). It is now believed that Darfur’slivestock resources account for approximatelyone-quarter to one-third of Sudan’s livestockresources post-secession. However, such estimatesshould be treated with caution, as the last livestockcensus was carried out in 1975, more than 35years ago. Since then, official statistics on livestockproduction have been extrapolated, based onprojected growth rates and models that indicatelivestock numbers increasing rapidly during the1990s. Bennke’s (2012) recent comparison of thefindings of state-level exercises to count livestockand projections based on the 1975 censusillustrates why it is important to treat theseextrapolated figures with caution. In the three,now five (East, South, Central, West, and North)Darfur states, there have been no attempts toupdate livestock figures since 1975. Not only havethere been significant droughts since 1975, the lastnine years of violent conflict have had a seriousimpact on livestock holdings and onconcentration of ownership. In thesecircumstances, it is unwise to attempt an estimateof current livestock numbers.2.2 An overview of the livestock trade inSudan, with a focus on livestock exportsLivestock are a key component of most rurallivelihoods in Sudan, and especially in Darfur,whether as a productive asset for meat and milk,and/or as a form of capital. Trade in livestock andlivestock products is an essential part of rurallivelihood strategies. Sometimes livestock andlivestock products may be traded betweenlivelihood groups; for example, betweenpastoralists and farmers as the former sell animalsto purchase grain and other foodstuff and as thelatter invest in animals, often with income from14

Figure 1. Contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP in SudanSource: Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data, taken from Behnke (2012)Figure 2. Contribution of the agricultural sector to national exports in SudanSource: Central Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data, taken from Behnke (2012)selling part of the harvest. Livestock are also soldto butchers for domestic meat consumption.Long-distance trade in livestock has long been apart of Sudan’s economy: the “40 Days Road”—Darb El Arbaein—for trekking camels from Darfurand Kordofan to Egypt, for example, is believed tohave existed for centuries. Official figures do notindicate the relative significance of domesticversus international trade, 3 although the growth inlivestock exports in recent decades—see below—may have acted as a stimulus to livestockproduction, especially to sheep production.Indeed, Behnke (2012) suggests that there hasbeen a reorientation of livestock production tosatisfy external markets.3Informally, experts estimate that the value of domestic trade in livestock is many times greater than the international tradein livestock in Sudan.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 15

The main methods for exporting livestock andmeat from Sudan are as follows:• shipping live sheep, goat, camels, and cattleto the Middle East through Port Sudanand Suakin• trekking camels on the hoof to Libya andto Egypt• trekking cattle from Sudan (Darfur) toChad and the Central African RepublicFigure 3. Sudan’s export of live sheep and goats• flying chilled meat (from small stock, cattle,and camels), mainly from abattoirs aroundKhartoum, to the Middle East, andoccasionally from Nyala in South Darfur.(ICRC, 2005a)While most of this is formal trade, recorded inofficial statistics, there is a significant component ofinformal cross-border trade, particularly fromSource: MoARF&RFigure 4. Sudan’s export of live cattle and camelsSource: MoARF&R16

Darfur, for example the camel trade to Libya.Live sheep are Sudan’s most importantlivestock export and the volume of trade hastrebled since the early 1980s, although there is highvariability year on year. See Figure 3. Indeed, theexport of live sheep and goats accounts for morethan 90% of Sudan’s total livestock export earningsaveraged over a number of years. This is followedby the export of live camels, which increasedrapidly in the mid- to late- 1990s as demand forcamel meat increased in Egypt. See Figure 4. Amuch smaller number of live cattle are exported;instead, most are slaughtered within Sudan and themeat is exported. Official statistics on Sudan’s meatexports only date back to 2003, although Sudan hasbeen exporting meat since the 1970s. Beef nowaccounts for approximately 65% of Sudan’s totalmeat exports. See Figure 5.Most of Sudan’s livestock and meat exportsare destined for the Middle East, particularly SaudiArabia, which accounts for over 90% of Sudan’sexport of live sheep and goats. 4 The export of livesheep peaks during the two months prior to theannual Hajj festival. Saudi Arabia is a rapidlygrowing market for meat and for live animals asthe population becomes more urbanized, asincomes rise, and as the immigrant workerpopulation increases (Dirani et al., 2009). TheSaudi market for live animals is estimated to begrowing at a rate of 8% p.a.Although Saudi Arabia is Sudan’s mostimportant export market for livestock, Sudan ismuch less significant to Saudi Arabia. Between1998 and 2009 Sudan accounted for an annualaverage of 24% of Saudi Arabia’s total imports oflive sheep and goats (by value). Between 2000 and2007, Sudan accounted for 18% of Saudi Arabia’stotal imports of mutton (by value). 5 The mainexport market for Sudanese beef has been Jordan,and, since 2010, also Egypt. This reveals Sudan’sexposure to a small number of export markets—three in particular, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, andEgypt. This leaves Sudan highly vulnerable tochanging trade regimes and/or demand withinthose markets. The consequences of such highexposure have been evident on at least twooccasions since the beginning of the 2000s. In2000/01, Saudi Arabia banned the import ofsheep from eight African countries, includingSudan, because of an outbreak of Rift Valley Feverin the southern part of the kingdom. This wasrepeated in 2006/07 because of an outbreak ofviral hemorrhagic fever (VHF). The devastatingimpact on Sudan’s export earnings can be seen inFigure 6. Overall, Sudan is in danger of losing itsshare of the market, in Saudi Arabia in particular,Figure 5. Sudan’s export of meatSource: unpublished data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade4According to unpublished data from the Ministry of ForeignTrade.5According to unpublished data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 17

as other exporting countries with moresophisticated production and marketinginfrastructure emerge as major competitors.Australia has become a major competitor in thelive sheep market. Sudan lost its market share ofsheep meat to Saudi Arabia in 2008 and 2009, tothe benefit of Pakistan, Ethiopia, and India. SeeFigures 7a and 7b.Sudan’s imports of live animals and of meatare minimal: in 2002 this represented less than 2%of the value of its exports for live animals and justover 1% of its exports of meat (FAO, 2005).2.3 The policy contextSince independence, the livestock sector hasbeen relatively neglected by government policy inSudan, which has long favored crop productionFigure 6. Sudan’s export earnings from livestockSource: Central Bank of SudanFigures 7a. and 7b. Sudan’s market share of Saudi sheep meat imports, 2007 and 2009Source: unpublished data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade18

and especially the expansion of semi-mechanizedrainfed agriculture, often at the expense oflivestock production and pastoral livelihoods. 6During the years of oil production before SouthSudan seceded, the attention given by governmentto both crops and livestock diminishedconsiderably. Although there have been a numberof ambitious government plans and strategies,most recently the Agricultural RevivalProgramme (ARP) covering the period 2008 to2011, implementation of these plans has tended tobe weak and their impact limited. The ARP,which has just entered a second phase from 2012to 2016, aimed at modernizing livestockproduction, improving market efficiency, andadding value through processing. 7 However,progress has been limited (although it didrehabilitate Suakin quarantine facilities in the firstphase); this study did not pick up evidence of howthis has benefited the livestock trade in Darfur.Government policy on livestock hastraditionally emphasized animal health andvaccination programs, often at the expense ofwider concern for animal production issues andlivestock marketing. The control and eradicationof Rinderpest through vaccination has been ahigh priority. 8 Initially, vaccinations were providedfree of charge, but during the 2000s this switchedto an emphasis on cost recovery and the role ofthe private sector in supplying veterinary drugs(ICRC, 2005b). While some commentatorslament declining government support to diseasecontrol (Ibid.), others highlight how Sudan’s livequarantine system has served its export trade,especially compared with parts of Somalia(Somaliland and Puntland), which had no statesanctionedquarantine system and were thereforeunable to export live sheep to Saudi Arabiabetween 2001 and 2009, while Sudan faced theban for just one year (Behnke, 2012).One of the most significant changes ingovernment policy affecting Sudan’s livestocktrade was the disbanding of the Livestock andMeat Marketing Corporation (LMMC) in 1992.A government parastatal and service provider, theLMMC had supported livestock trade through thedevelopment of market infrastructure, especiallyduring its first phase, running certain markets andattempting to introduce an open auction system(see below), the provision of market informationand support to the livestock export trade. Withinthe greater Darfur region, the LMMC managedNyala and Ed Daien livestock markets in SouthDarfur, El Fasher and Mellit livestock markets inNorth Darfur, and El Geneina livestock market inWest Darfur. It also ran subsidized trains carryinglivestock from Nyala to Omdurman. When theLMMC was dissolved in 1992, its assets werepassed onto the Animal Resources Bank (ARB),which had a commercial livestock marketingarm—the Animal Resources Service Company.However, the bank has since become acommercial high street bank and all livestockmarketing is now done by the private sector(ICRC, 2005b). This change in governmentpolicy is still lamented by many livestock tradersand is associated with a concentration of marketpower since. Whereas many traders had worked asagents of the LMMC, the number of exportersappeared to decline when the LMMC wasabolished; for example, the number of live sheepexporters declined from 350 in 1985 (many wereagents of the LMMC) to 21 in 1995 (Dirani et al.,2009), and are believed to be even fewer today.This concentration of market power wasexacerbated by the government’s decision in 2003to allocate authority for Sudan’s livestock exportsto the Gulf countries to only one trader. Fivemajor traders had previously dominated theterminal livestock market in Sudan, butgovernment decided to restructure the exporttrade following the 2000/2001 collapse oflivestock exports, effectively removingcompetition and creating a monopoly (Fahey andLeonard, 2007). This continued until 2005. Anumber of Sudan’s livestock exporters have gonebankrupt over the years, and were jailed for theirinability to pay back bank loans (Aklilu, 2002a).Without the LMMC, there is no singlegovernment body at federal level with a strategic6See, for example, Fahey and Leonard (2007).7See the Executive Program for Agricultural Revival, April 2008.8Pioneering work by researchers from Tufts University who developed a rinderpest vaccine that could be transported torural areas without refrigeration was critical to this achievement. See http://vet.tufts.edu/pr/20110629.html (lastviewed 22 June 2012).June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 19

mandate for promoting the livestock trade,domestically and internationally, despite theimportance of this sector to the national economy.Instead, a range of government bodies have someresponsibility for livestock marketing, includingstate and locality administrations, the Ministry ofForeign Trade (MoFT) and the Ministry ofAnimal Resources, Fisheries and Range(MoARF&R). Livestock traders have to deal withall of these bodies as well as banks, customs,transport companies, etc. (Aklilu, 2002a). TheMoFT created a Live Animals and Meat ExportPromotion Council in 2004, which wasapparently effective in easing some governmentrestrictions on exporters, but livestock producerswere not well-represented on the Council (Ibid.).The ARP established a series of commoditycouncils, including a livestock council comprisingthree committees for livestock, meat, and leatherrespectively. The objective is to promote strategiesand policies for developing livestock, particularlythrough coordination of all activities in thecommodity chain up to the point of consumption,from research through production, processing, andquality control. It is judged to be one of the moreeffective of the nineteen councils established bythe ARP 9 and has drawn government decisionmakers’attention to some of the constraints tolivestock marketing, including high taxation andfees and poor animal health services, as a result ofwhich government has taken action to rehabilitatethe quarantine facilities in Port Sudan and inKhartoum North, and to establish an exportpromotion fund held by the Bank of Sudan. Atthe time of writing, the World Bank MDTF(Multi-Donor Trust Fund) project is workingwith MoARF&R to develop a strategy fordeveloping the livestock sector.With the demise of the LMMC, livestockmarkets became the responsibility of therespective locality in which they were located.Effectively, responsibility for managing livestockmarkets has been decentralized to state andlocality levels, where they are regarded primarilyas a source of income, and there is little evidenceof those tax revenues being reinvested to supportthe livestock sector (Dirani et al., 2009). As withtrade in most other agricultural produce,numerous taxes and fees are applied to livestock.An analysis of available studies in 2002 showedthat “taxes and fees constitute up to 27% of thecost of the exported animal and may go up to40% if fodder is included” (Aklilu, 2002a, 69).A more recent World Bank study records taxesand fees accounting for 14 to 20% of totalmarketing costs when animals from westernSudan are transported on the hoof and sold onthe domestic market, and averaging around 13% iftransported by truck (Mina and Van HolstPelekaan, 2010). This is further explored inrelation to the livestock trade in Darfur in section6 below, which shows the extent to which locallyimposed taxes have risen. It is widely acceptedthat Sudan has one of the heaviest and mostcomplex taxation regimes in the region (Aklilu,2002a).There have been various attempts over theyears to introduce an auction system for Sudan’smain livestock markets, widely regarded as anefficient method for livestock trading because ofthe transparency of market information associatedwith open auction. 10 The LMMC establishedeleven market centers with weighing scales andauction yards before it was disbanded, but thesefailed, apparently because the system wassabotaged by brokers who did not support it, andan auction system required immediate cashpayments whereas Sudan’s livestock trading systemhas traditionally been based on trust and credit(Aklilu, 2002a). More recently, a projectsupporting livestock markets, funded by theMDTF and administered by the World Bank, hasonce again attempted to introduce an auctionsystem into six markets that it is rehabilitating,although none is in Darfur: the closest is Ghibeishmarket in West Kordofan, important for sheep. 11In terms of livestock production, a majorpiece of legislation that could affect the livestocktrade is the 2010 Agriculture and AnimalProducers’ Act. If endorsed by the GeneralAssembly, this would effectively cancel theOrganizations of Farmers and Pastoralists Act of9According to the ARP report on the performance of the councils in 2011.10This contrasts with the “Silent Auction System” that prevails in Sudan, which means that livestock prices are hard to obtainand market information is not readily available (Aklilu, 2002b).11Ghibeish, El Nihood, El Khowei, Abo Zabad in North Kordofan state, El Damazeen in Blue Nile state, and Sinja inSinnar state.20

1992. Producer Associations would replace thePastoralist Union and Farmers Union and wouldinclude traders. There is concern that this wouldreduce the voice and representation of small-scalelivestock producers (Young et al., 2012).Since the secession of South Sudan and theabrupt fall in oil revenues, federal government inKhartoum has once again turned its attention tolivestock (as well as agriculture) as a potentialdriver of economic growth and source of foreignexchange. 12 However, lack of resources appears tobe constraining efforts and at the time of writingthere is no evidence in the three Darfur states ofany new government investment.2.4 Livestock exports: the major constraintsAlthough Sudan’s export trade in livestockand livestock products shows an upwards trendoverall, it faces many constraints, which could haltfuture growth and development in the face ofincreasing and more aggressive competition fromother major livestock exporting countries in thefuture. This in turn could impact on futuregrowth of the livestock trade in Darfur, of whichexports are an important component. Dirani et al.(2009) have explored some of these constraints inrelation to exports of live sheep and sheep meat,while other authors have documented the factorsconstraining livestock exports more generally.Some of the most significant constraints arethe following:(1) Globalization of trade regimes is resultingin increasingly strict welfare, hygiene, anddisease control regulations in livestockimporting countries in Europe and theMiddle East (ICRC, 2005b). In SaudiArabia, Sudan’s main export market, thereis increasing demand for chilled andfrozen meat, which demands morerigorous inspection and certificationsystems. Sudan does not currently haveadequate policies, veterinary services, orphysical infrastructure to support itslivestock trade in responding to thesemore rigorous requirements, especiallywhen competing with new suppliers likeAustralia, Brazil, New Zealand, and theEuropean Union (EU) that are betterequipped to comply with such regulations(Idriss, 2008).(2) High dependence on a small number ofexport markets, particularly Saudi Arabiaand Egypt, leaves Sudan’s export tradevulnerable to national bans and/orchanging trade regimes. There is also ahigh level of variability in Saudi’s demandfor live sheep annually, which in turnaffects Sudan’s export trade (Ijaimi, 2011).(3) Sudan’s major livestock producing areasare located far from Khartoum and farfrom its main export markets. Lack ofinfrastructure means that most livestockare trekked on the hoof to Khartoum.During the dry season, when water andgrazing are scarce, this is an inefficientform of transportation that takesconsiderable time and has negativeconsequences for the health and qualityof the animals and for the quality of themeat (Dirani et al., 2009).(4) The extent to which Sudan’s livestocktrade is broker-dominated is said to be“without any parallel in the region”(Aklilu, 2002a, 57). Animals may changehands between two and six times betweenthe point of purchase and the final pointof sale, between Darfur and Khartoum,for example (Ibid.). How this impacts onmarket efficiency of the supply chain forlivestock, however, requires furtherinvestigation.(5) For live sheep, Sudan’s main livestockexport, the screening and testing ofanimals for export happens late in thechain, resulting in a high level ofrejection: 31% of sheep offered for exportbetween 1997 and 2005 were rejected.This increases costs and reducescompetitiveness. Lack of capacity toscreen and test animals at the primaryinspection stage thus contributes tomarket inefficiency (Dirani et al., 2009).12See, for example, the 2011 National Salvation Plan, and the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 21

(6) Limited or no access by livestock tradersto formal credit is another constraint,further discussed in relation to traders inDarfur in section 6.2 below.(7) Official exporters of livestock must usethe official exchange rate, although this iscurrently far below the black marketexchange rate and means, for example,that sheep cannot be sold in Saudi Arabiaprofitably. This is driving some exportersout of the livestock trade andencouraging informal export trading/smuggling.Many of these constraints relate to the policycontext for livestock trading, and/or could beaddressed through government strategies andpolicies that support the livestock trade. Ways ofaddressing some of these constraints are exploredin section 10.2 below.22

3. An overview of the livestock trade in Darfur, and its contractionduring the conflict years3.1 A description of the livestock trade inDarfur, pre-conflictThe greater Darfur region has long been oneof the most important sources of livestockproduction in Sudan, alongside the Kordofanregion, supplying both the export market andinternal markets within Central Sudan. South andWest Darfur are major cattle producing states,while North Darfur is important for camel andsheep production, although there has been a shiftfrom cattle production to sheep production sincethe 1970s, especially in North Darfur. While this ispartly a response to the drought of the mid-1980sand rainfall variability since, it also appears to beexport-driven: sheep from North Darfur and fromNorth Kordofan are particularly sought after inSaudi markets, and the numbers of sheep exportedhave been increasing as described above(Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008; Behnke, 2012).North and West Kordofan are the main sources ofsupply of exported sheep—mostly the hamaribreed. The popular hamari breed has also replacedthe traditional zaghawa breed of sheep in NorthDarfur in the export trade to Omdurman. Westand South Darfur are important sources of supplyof cattle, especially bulls, which are tradeddomestically in Central Sudan, and cattle meat,partly for export (El-Dukheri et al., 2004). SouthDarfur is famous for the nyalawi (western baggarashorthorn zebu) breed of cattle, prized for its beefand performance in feed lots. North and WestDarfur are important sources of supply of camelsexported to Egypt and Libya.The market structure for livestock in Darfur isbased on a hierarchy of primary, secondary, andterminal markets (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul,2008). Primary markets at the village level areusually held weekly and are the first assemblypoint for livestock sold by producers. Small-scaletraders and agents of large-scale traders may usethese markets to buy small numbers of livestock.However, many livestock sales happen “in thebush.” In other words, livestock traders or theiragents approach livestock owners where theanimals are grazing outside the village or town, orat water points, and a deal is negotiated. This iscommon in all three Darfur states, for sheep, cattle,and camels. Small-scale traders buy the livestockand then bring them to the market for onwardssale to gallaga (small-scale traders operating withinDarfur) and larger-scale traders. Secondarymarkets are intermediate town markets, usuallyheld twice per week, where small-scale livestocktraders will trade with the agents of larger-scaletraders. Terminal, or urban, markets in Darfur’smajor towns of El Geneina, El Fasher, and Nyalaoperate on a daily basis and are a point of export:each has a major livestock market with dailytrading activity, although there are usually one ortwo days which are the main market days forlivestock. These, along with some importantsecondary livestock markets such as Fora Boranga,Ed Daien, Mellit, and Seraf Omra, were the pointof export for most of Darfur’s livestock preconflict.Livestock were gradually bulked intolarger lots through the market hierarchy untilthere was a herd ready to be transported on thehoof (Young et al., 2005). If these were cattle, thenthey would usually be destined for Sudan’s mainterminal market—El Muweli in Omdurman. Ifcamels, then they would be transported on thehoof direct to Libya, or through Dongola toEgypt. Sheep were usually bulked into herds of250 to 300 and trekked to Omdurman, either bya Darfuri trader or by an agent of one of thelarge-scale Omdurman traders. The livestockmarket chain is shown in Figure 8.There is a seasonality to Darfur’s livestocktrade. For cattle, most trading activity takes placeat the beginning of, and throughout the rainyseason, which is the preferred time to assembleand trek cattle out of Darfur because of thegreater availability of water and pasture; this meansthat the animals can be grazed and fattened enroute to the terminal market. Cattle are alsotrekked out of Darfur in the winter season,between January and February when temperaturesare lower (Young et al., 2005). In contrast, thecamel trade to Libya and Egypt peaks in the dryseason. Most traders exporting camels, sheep, orcattle from Darfur managed just two shipmentsper year pre-conflict because of the lengthyprocess of purchasing and assembling the livestock,June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 23

Figure 8. The livestock marketing chain in Sudan, from Young et al. (2005)and because of the time it takes to trek theanimals from Darfur to their destination—45 to70 days, depending on the season. Some largerlivestock traders managed as many as fourshipments per year, thus exporting more.Box 2 shows the major trade routes out ofDarfur pre-conflict. The livestock market inDarfur has generally been well-integrated withlivestock markets in Central Sudan because it issuch an important source of supply to CentralSudan. Thus, livestock prices in Darfur usuallyfollowed the same trends as livestock prices inOmdurman.Although the export of livestock from Darfurhas long been one of the major components ofDarfur’s economy (along with groundnuts andgum arabic—Darfur’s other major traditionalexports), in the past, the livestock trade withinDarfur was almost as important as its export trade(Morton, 1985).3.2 Trends in livestock trading post-2003Darfur’s livestock trade was immediately andbadly affected by the conflict. 13 See Box 3 for abrief overview of Darfur’s conflict. Early on, in2003/04, when the violence was at its worst, largenumbers of rural households were displaced andlooting of livestock was widespread. Livestockbecame a liability, and a household or individualwith livestock holdings was vulnerable to attack.Those displaced with their livestock sold themquickly before they died and/or to avoid looting.Distress sales of livestock were high and pricesplummeted. In these early years of the conflict,many of the looted animals were sold quickly andlocally, usually for meat consumption. During thisperiod livestock traders were also vulnerable toattack; livestock herds being trekked from onemarket to another were frequently looted,sometimes on a massive scale. Young et al. (2005)document how 3,500 camels were seized fromtraders in September 2003 as they were beingtrekked from Darfur to Libya. As villages wereabandoned and security deteriorated, the primarymarket network virtually collapsed.From 2006 onwards, inter-tribal fighting hasbecome a significant cause of conflict withinDarfur, with numerous incidents of local clashes,causing heavy casualties and displacement of localpopulations.During these early years of the conflict, manylivestock traders went out of business, somebecause they went bankrupt if they suffered largecapital losses when livestock herds were looted.Others chose to switch trade to less-riskycommodities such as crops and groceries. Seesection 5.1 below. Most of the large-scale livestocktraders from Omdurman withdrew from Darfur’slivestock markets because of insecurity and therisks associated with trekking animals on thehoof. 14 This had a massive impact on Darfur’slivestock trade. There was a serious drop indemand for livestock that were exported to13See Young et al. (2005), and Buchanan-Smith and Fadul (2008).14In Nyala, there had been 40 to 50 agents working for large Omdurman traders pre-conflict and even into the early conflictyears. This had dropped to around 10 by 2011.24

Box 2.The major livestock trade routes in Darfur pre-conflictCattle and sheep – Muweli terminal market (Omdurman)• The northern route:- Sheep from Kebkabiya, Seraf Omra, and West Darfur were trekked through ElFasher, Um Keddada, Hamrat Elsheikh, Bara, Jabra, and then to Muweli. Smallnumbers of cattle were also trekked on this route.- Sheep from Mellit were trekked through Wadi Ousher and Maraiga toUmbetateekh, Jabra, and then to Muweli.- From Malha, trekkers passed through Hamrat and Al Sheikh to reach Jabra.• The southern route:- Sheep and cattle from Fora Boranga, Raheid El Bedri, Bhar Al Arab, and Tulusconverged at Nyala. They then followed the “early rain” route north of the railwayline to Mahartya and El Lait, reaching Muweli through Foja or El Obeid.• The “late rain” route ran south of the railway line, crossing it at Ed Daien. The routethen ran towards Guebesh and branched either to Foja or El Obeid, before proceedingto Muweli.Camels to Egypt• Id Ahmed was the converging point for camels from Darfur destined for Egypt. FromMellit, camels were trekked through Mareiga or Umbetateekh. From West Darfurcamels were herded through Kebkabiya and Seraf Omra to El Fasher, and then to IdAhmed. From Id Ahmed the camels were taken to Dongola (where official documentsare processed) and then to Wadi Halfa, the border point.Routes to Libya (Kufra)• Mellit was the merging point for camels coming from West Darfur (through Kutum),South Darfur (through El Fasher), and North Darfur. From Mellit, the camels weretaken to Kufra through Karab Altom, the last converging point for camels comingfrom points further north, such as Malha.• To a lesser extent, camels from West Darfur were trekked through Tina on the Chadianborder and through Chad to Kufra.Source: adapted from Young et al., 2005Central Sudan and beyond, particularly cattle andsheep; there was a fall in available capital as theOmdurman traders had previously provided theirDarfur agents with cash in advance; and many ofthe Darfuri agents lost their jobs, although somecontinued trading independently. The large tradersfrom Central Sudan continued to buy Darfurilivestock but no longer in Darfur, instead buyingwhen they reached Omdurman, having beentrekked by other smaller-scale traders. Effectively,Darfuri livestock traders who wanted to stay inthis business had to carry the risk of buying andtrekking livestock from the three Darfur states toCentral Sudan; the large traders in Omdurman,with other options available to them, were nolonger prepared to take this risk.All traders interviewed for this studyrecounted a contraction in the volume oflivestock traded during the conflict years, of atleast 50%, sometimes more. Examples of this areshown in Table 1, which illustrates the overalldecline in the numbers of animals traded, as wellas the fall in business for individual traders.(Official statistics on the volume or value of thelivestock trade in Darfur in recent years have beenhard to obtain). After the period in 2003/04 whendistress sales of livestock were high, many agropastoralisthouseholds no longer had livestockJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 25

Box 3.A brief overview of the conflict in DarfurThe history of the conflict in Darfur goes back many years and is rooted in long-heldgrievances about the economic and political marginalization of Darfur and a crisis ofdevelopment. In 2003, the conflict became violent and widespread across most of the Darfurregion when armed attacks by Darfur’s rebel movements triggered a major counterinsurgencyresponse by government, taking advantage of existing ethnic rivalries. In 2003/04, largenumbers of the rural population became displaced, and the livelihoods of many weredevastated. Since then the conflict dynamics have been fluid, constantly shifting. For example,inter-tribal fighting has escalated since 2006 and become a significant factor triggering furtherdisplacement. One way of understanding Darfur’s conflict is to consider three different levelsof conflict: local, national, and regional. At the local level, conflict is taking place betweendifferent ethnic and livelihood groups, competing for power and for access to resources, oftenland, sometimes fuelled by longer-term grievances. At the national level, the conflict isbetween Darfuri rebel movements and the political leadership of the federal government inKhartoum, fuelled by long-term inequalities between the center and the periphery in Sudan.At the wider regional level, the conflict involves Sudan’s neighboring countries, especiallyChad, as struggles for political power in Khartoum and in N’Djamena became closelyintertwined, each supporting rebel movements from the other’s country, fighting proxy warsacross the Darfur–Chad border. An analysis of the Darfur conflict in 2011 stated that:Several different levels of conflict have continued unabated in parts of Darfur, includinginter-tribal fighting, ongoing fighting between the government forces and SLM/JEM,fighting along the disputed north-south border between the Sudan People’s LiberationArmy and Darfuri Arab tribes, rampant banditry and generalized insecurity, and continuingclashes between Chadian and Sudanese forces along the Chad border. (Researchers at FIC,2011, 7)These different levels of conflict are also intertwined; for example, grievances betweengroups at the local level may be fuelled and/or manipulated by competing political agendas atthe national level. Despite various efforts to find resolution to Darfur’s conflict since 2004, atthe time of writing none has yet been wholly successful. Indeed, after the signing of the DarfurPeace Agreement (DPA) in 2006 by the government of Sudan and some (but not all) rebelmovements, insecurity in parts of the Darfur region escalated, and many of the rebelmovements fragmented. Peace-keeping troops have been present in Darfur since 2007, at thetime of writing provided by the hybrid United Nations-African Union Force (UNAMID).Based on Bromwich (2008); De Waal (2007); Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti (2009); andResearchers at FIC (2011)holdings that they could sell, either because theyhad become displaced or because they haddivested of this asset that had become a liability.(See section 7 below on livestock producers). Forthose who still had livestock, the risks of bringingthem to the market in such an insecureenvironment were high. As a result, livestockprices have risen substantially during the conflictyears, also a consequence of the much- increasedcosts associated with livestock trading. See section6. Nyala market has been particularly badlyaffected since 2006/07, when the areasurrounding Nyala became increasingly insecure.Traders could no longer safely graze livestockaround the town while they built up their herdready to trek to Omdurman, but instead incurredsubstantial additional costs by employing armedguards to protect the herd. 15 Although livestock15One cattle trader in Nyala reported that four guards are required to protect a herd of 200 cattle in the area around Nyala,at a cost of SDG20 to 25/day/guard in March 2011.26

Table 1. Anecdotal evidence of contraction in the volume of Darfur’s livestock tradeMarket Feedback SourceNyala There has been a 50% reduction in the number of cattle Cattle gallaga, Nyalabrought to Nyala per market day, compared with preconflictnumbers.The number of cattle sold per day in Nyala market fellfrom 500–600 per day in 2006, to 100–200 in 2011.Pre-conflict, 200 sheep were sold per market day. In 2011,the number was just 50 per market day.One trader used to trek 1,200 cattle per year, pre-conflict,from Nyala to Omdurman, in four shipments. He now treksa total of 480 cattle per year, in two shipments, because oflack of capital and lack of supply.Agent to Omdurmancattle trader, NyalaSheep trader, NyalaCattle trader, NyalaEl Fasher Cattle shipments to Omdurman from El Fasher market are Quarantine Dept., Eldown by more than 50% compared with pre-conflict years. FasherOne trader used to buy 1,000 to 2,000 sheep per week fromlocal markets in North Darfur, pre-conflict. It now takes himtwo months to gather that number, because of a fall in thesupply of sheep and because local traders can no longer movewith cash to grazing areas and water points to purchase sheepbecause of insecurity, especially banditry.El Geneina Cattle supplied to Geneina market have fallen by about 40%compared with pre-conflict levels. The cattle market used tooperate on a daily basis; it is now weekly. Most cattle areconsumed locally; few are of adequate quality for export.Sheep trader, El FasherCattle trader, ElGeneinaSource: Research team interviews with livestock traders, March 2011looting peaked in the early years of the conflict,the risk of looting is still high, although it is lessclear what is happening to the looted animalsnow. Livestock traders in Nyala consistentlyreported a decline in market activity since2006/07.Traders interviewed for this study widelyreported the deteriorating quality of livestock—cattle, camels, and sheep—now being brought tothe market in Darfur compared with the qualitypre-conflict. This is attributed to a range of reasons.First and foremost, the concentration of animals inconfined areas because of insecurity restricts theirgrazing and results in a shortage of pasture andwater. In some cases, it is also to do with whichgroups are now supplying livestock to the marketand their orientation to the export market—seesection 7 below on production. According toMOARF&R officials in West Darfur, very fewcamels of adequate export quality are currentlybeing supplied to Geneina market.This has had a direct impact on Darfur’scontribution to national livestock exports.According to the Chamber of Commerce inKhartoum, Darfur used to account for around30% of Sudan’s livestock exports before theconflict; this has now fallen by at least 15%. Otherstates appear to have filled the breach: White Nile,Eastern Sudan, and the Kordofan states. WhiteNile and Blue Nile states are increasing their shareof the export market of live sheep in particular.The export of live sheep from Darfur has beenJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 27

particularly badly hit by the conflict, because thesheep cannot endure the longer trekking routesthat many traders have had to use in order to finda safer passage to Omdurman. As small stock,sheep are also more vulnerable to looting thanlarger animals like cattle and camels.Consequently, the sheep trade in Darfur appearsto have re-oriented to meeting local consumptionneeds first and foremost. Meanwhile, sheep tradersin Omdurman are lamenting the fall in supplyfrom Darfur. One sheep exporter interviewedexplained how the number of sheep he nowexports to Saudi Arabia has fallen by 40%compared with the number exported before theDarfur conflict: the collapse in the supply of sheepfrom Darfur is a key reason, forcing prices up.Regression analysis carried out on volumes ofmeat exported from Sudan indicates a negativegrowth rate of 52% between 2002 and 2008. Thishad been positive at 23% between 1994 and 2000(Ijaimi, 2011). This may be partially caused by thedecline in Darfur’s livestock trade since theconflict began.When the fieldwork commenced for thisstudy, in March 2011, there were signs of somelimited recovery in the livestock trade. Mostnotable was the return of the large and significantHadoub livestock trading company to SouthDarfur, to Nyala, and to Fora Boranga. See Box 4.Not only did this give a boost to demand inNyala’s livestock market, it was also a sign ofrecovering confidence in Darfur’s livestock trade.Some local livestock traders who had withdrawnfrom Fora Boranga also returned to the livestockmarket when security improved after 2008.However, this recovery is fragile, and deterioratingsecurity and shifting conflict dynamics couldquickly extinguish any such hope.One of the consequences of the contractinglivestock trade has been a decline in imports ofcertain goods into livestock-producing areas. Forexample, when meat was no longer being flownout of Nyala to Jordan, the import of electronicgoods into Nyala fell. See Section 8.5 below.Box 4.The Hadoub Brothers and their involvement in the livestock trade in SouthDarfurThe Hadoub family has been trading livestock in Sudan for four generations. MohamedModawi Hadoub and Brothers is one of Sudan’s major livestock exporting companies. Itsinvolvement in Darfur has been mainly in the cattle trade in South Darfur, buying cattlethrough agents in markets such as Nyala, Fora Boranga, Zalingei, Rajaj, Murkundy, and UmmLabasa, and trekking the cattle to Omdurman, where the company has its own slaughterhouseand meat exporting business. Egypt is one of the main export markets for its beef. Pre-conflict,the company ran a ranch, some 80 km south of Nyala, for collecting and fattening cattle beforethey were trekked to Khartoum on the hoof, or transported by train. The Hadoub Brotherswithdrew from South Darfur in 2006 in response to deteriorating security, but returned inJanuary 2011 to some markets, including Nyala and Fora Boranga, for three main reasons:because of some improvement in security in South Darfur, because of government’s renewedemphasis on livestock as a driver of economic growth in Sudan, and because the livestocktrade had resumed with Egypt in 2011. The Hadoub Brothers used to trade around 25,000cattle from South Darfur per year before the Darfur conflict. In 2011, they were trading 4,000to 6,000 per year. Their return to South Darfur had an immediate impact on Nyala market: thenumber of bulls supplied to the market increased substantially.Source: interview with one of the Hadoub brothers, March 201128

4. Shifting market activity in response to the conflict4.1 IntroductionConflict and trade dynamics are usuallyclosely intertwined, and tend to become more soif the conflict becomes protracted. The emergenceof a “war economy” is a prime example of theinter-dependence of conflict and trade, when thewarring parties engage in trade, often illicit and innatural resources, in order to fund the conflict;their livelihoods can thus become dependent onperpetuation of the conflict. 16 Examples of this inDarfur include trade in four-wheel drive vehicleslooted from humanitarian organizations and fromDarfuri citizens, usually by militias, and trade inhardwood and firewood by the military or bygroups operating in areas formerly managed bycommunities now displaced (UNEP, 2008, Younget al., 2009). A “parallel economy,” or “shadoweconomy,” is also common in protracted conflictenvironments, operating on the margins of theconflict where there is little regulation. And thenthere is the coping economy, which is how themajority of the population engage in the market;for example, selling livestock and firewood andengaging in petty trading, in order to sustain theirlivelihoods during the conflict, when the overalleconomy may be highly distorted and their“normal” pre-conflict livelihood strategies are nolonger available or viable.In terms of the livestock trade in Darfur,much of the looting done by militias and rebelmovements is clearly part of the war economy,used to fund the conflict itself. Examples of theshadow economy include livestock bought andsold in markets in IDP camps, which are beyondthe reach of government to regulate and tax. Thisis most significant for livestock that are killed forlocal consumption, and this has been one way inwhich looted livestock could be disposed of. Forlivestock that are transported from one market toanother, and particularly livestock that areexported out of Darfur, the IDP camp markets arerarely used, as the animals have to pass throughgovernment-held territory and therefore cannotbe exempt from regulation and taxation. In termsof the coping economy, as livestock ownershipappears to have become more concentratedduring the conflict years, as explained in section 7below, fewer households are engaging in livestockproduction and in livestock trade compared withthe pre-conflict years.Many of the ways in which the conflict hasimpeded the livestock trade in Darfur have alreadybeen described. However, traders are creative andentrepreneurial and will seek ways around theseimpediments wherever they can. Monitoring andunderstanding how traders have adapted to theconflict and to constantly shifting patterns ofinsecurity can thus be insightful in terms ofmonitoring shifting conflict dynamics.This section explores how the marketnetwork has changed during the conflict yearssince 2003 and how trading routes have changed.4.2 Changes and adaptations in the marketnetworkAs well as the closure of many primary ruralmarkets, there have been major shifts in marketactivity between secondary markets in all threeDarfur states. Table 2 is a snapshot of how theseshifts had affected Darfur’s main livestock marketsby 2011, almost all of which were visited andresearched during the fieldwork for this study. Themajority of secondary markets had contracted:twelve in Table 2, including Mellit in NorthDarfur, and Ed Daien and Rajaj in SouthDarfur—all of which were major livestockmarkets before the conflict began. Interestingly,some other livestock markets have grown insignificance as market activity has been displaced,usually to more secure areas. For example, Tomatmarket in South Darfur has replaced Rajaj as themajor cattle market in Dimso locality—see Box 5.Seraf Omra has become the center of NorthDarfur’s camel trade as market activity has beendisplaced from other nearby centers. Of all thelivestock markets visited in 2011, only two were16See Collinson (2003) and Lautze and Raven-Roberts (2006) on war economies, shadow economies, and the copingeconomy.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 29

continuing to function relatively unchangedcompared with the pre-conflict years: Markundiand Rahed El Birdi in Rahed El Birdi locality.This area has generally remained calmer and moresecure than most other parts of South Darfursince 2003.The reasons for the shifts in market activitybetween secondary markets in Darfur’s three statescan be summarized as:(1) insecurity in certain areas affecting thesupply of livestock to the market and thewillingness of traders to trek livestock out ofthe area, for example, affecting Ed Daien;(2) greater security in other areas wherepastoralists and agro-pastoralists can grazetheir livestock more securely. This hasboosted market activity in some placessuch as Tomat in South Darfur;(3) certain ethnic groups not having access tocertain markets due to tribal conflict. This isa particular feature of livestock trading inSouth Darfur, affecting many markets,including Assalaya near Ed Daien, AbuMutarig, and Rajaj markets (see Table 2). In2011, during the period of field work, itwas striking that the Habbaniya had lostaccess to many markets that they wouldhave used before the conflict because oftribal hostilities; they no longer had accessto markets in Rizeigat or Fellata territoryand were using Gareida market instead. Atthe time of writing in 2012, access to somemarkets had improved due to localagreements between different ethnic groups,but these are constantly shifting dynamics;(4) small rural markets collapsing and allmarket activity shifting to one secondarymarket, for example to Seraf Omra inNorth Darfur;(5) some localities charging high rates oftaxation, driving traders to markets wheretaxes are lower, for example from AbuMatarig market (Abu Matarig locality) inSouth Darfur to El Meiram in SouthKordofan.For some markets, trading activity has waxedand waned according to fluctuating conflictdynamics. (See Box 3 for an overview of theDarfur conflict). This may be the result of localconflict dynamics as hostilities between ethnicgroups intensify or subside. For example, inAssalaya market, some 40 km west of Ed Daien,the livestock trade declined in 2004 when theBirgid–Rizeigat conflict was at its height and theBirgid no longer brought their animals to themarket. It was again negatively affected in 2006when the Rizeigat–Habbaniya conflict meant thatthe Habbaniya stopped using the market.However, reconciliation between the Rizeigat andBirgid, and between the Rizeigat and Habbaniyain 2008 triggered a revival in market activity as allthree groups used the market once again.Fluctuating trading activity may also be affectedby higher-level political and conflict dynamics atthe national or regional level. See Box 6 on ForaBoranga market, where trading activity has waxedand waned according to the state of relationsbetween the Sudanese government in Khartoumand the Chadian government in N’Djamena.Table 2. Shifts in market activity in Darfur’s secondary livestock markets during the conflictyears, until 2011Change in Name of marketmarketContracting El Fasher, N. DarfurmarketsMellit, N. DarfurMalha, N. DarfurReason for change during the conflict yearsReduced supply of livestock and fall in export trade.Limited access for certain ethnic groups supplying livestock.Very high taxes. No banking facilities. Kordofan marketsreplacing Mellit.Groups that used to supply the market have stopped eg.,Zayadia, Kababish. Omdurman traders withdrew.Continued on next page30

Continued from previous pageChange in Name of marketmarketNyala, S. DarfurEd Daien, S. DarfurAssalaya, S. DarfurReason for change during the conflict yearsReduced supply of livestock. Insecurity around Nyala townsince 2007/08. Withdrawal of Omdurman traders.Most Omdurman traders withdrew in 2004, and avoided EdDaien completely after a well-known livestock trader who hadsupplied much capital to Ed Daien market was killed in 2008.From 2004 affected by Birgid-Rizeigat conflict and Birgidstopped using the market.From 2006/07 affected by Rizeigat-Habbaniya conflict, so noHabbaniya cattle brought to the market. Tribal reconciliationbetween the three ethnic groups led to some recovery of themarket after 2008.Abu Matarig, S. Darfur From 2007/08 affected by Rizeigat-Habbaniya conflict, alsoincreases in taxes have encouraged pastoralists from Bahr ElArab to use El Meiram market in West Kordofan instead.Omdurman traders withdrew.Rajaj, S. DarfurUm Labasa, S. DarfurGeneina, W. DarfurInsecurity. From 2006 affected by Fellata-Habbaniya conflict.Reduced supply of livestock due to insecurity and displacement,although some recovery in recent years.Reduced supply and quality of livestock. Decline in the exporttrade.Fora Boranga, W. Darfur Reduced supply of livestock, although evidence of somerecent recovery in the livestock trade.Zalingei, W. DarfurExpanding Seraf Omra, N. DarfurmarketsSaiyah, N. DarfurTomat, S. DarfurReduced supply of livestock because areas of production are farfrom Zalingei and the routes are insecure.As nearby markets have declined or closed, market activity incattle and camels has shifted to Seraf Omra. Trade agreementsbetween Arab and Zaghawa traders.Trade shifted from Mellit and Malha to Saiyah. Reconciliationbetween Meidob, Zayadia, and Berti.Shift of market activity from Rajat to Tomat, which is moresecure and unaffected by tribal conflict.Markets Markundi, S. Darfur Security and good pasture.that havechanged lessRahed El Birdi, More secure, supplied by surrounding area. Small decrease inS. Darfur volume of livestock traded and cross-border trade with CARsuspended until 2010.Source: field work in March to May 2011June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 31

Box 5.A case study of Tomat, an expanding market in Dimso locality in South DarfurThe volume of cattle passing through Tomat market per year has more than doubledduring the conflict years compared with pre-conflict market activity. For sheep and goats, thegrowth in trade has been even higher and has increased approximately five-fold. High levels ofsupply are maintained throughout the year, although most market activity takes place duringthe rainy season. The livestock trade that used to be channelled through Rajaj, a majorlivestock market pre-conflict, has now shifted almost entirely to Tomat. The main areassupplying livestock to Tomat market are Kateela, Idd El Firsan, Um Takaina, Um Dafoug,Dimso, Rahed el Birdi, and the area immediately surrounding Tomat. These are relativelysecure grazing areas. However, the Habbaniya can no longer access Tomat market as a result ofthe Habbaniya–Fellata conflict. The number of livestock traders working in Tomat market haddoubled between 2003 and 2011. Livestock traders from Zalingei and El Fasher are nowbuying cattle in Tomat; there were around 30 agents working for larger-scale livestock tradersin 2011 compared with around 13 agents pre-conflict.Source: local researcher in Tomat marketBox 6.A case study of Fora Boranga market, West Darfur: Fluctuating market activityrelated to shifting conflict dynamicsIn Fora Boranga market, one of Darfur’s major livestock markets, there were initially highlevels of distress sales in the early years of the conflict. Livestock supplies fell thereafter,particularly cattle and camel supplies due to insecurity, but the numbers of sheep and goatstraded in the market have increased, partly reflecting a change in herd composition as sheepand goats are less vulnerable to looting at the level of the producer (although they arevulnerable to looting when being trekked over large distances between markets). Since 2008,improved security in the area, partly related to improved relations between Sudan and Chad,has resulted in an increase in livestock trading activity, further encouraged by the return of theHadoub brothers to Fora Boranga market in 2011.Source: local researcher in Fora Boranga market4.3 Changing trade routesWhen the conflict erupted, livestock tradersadapted rapidly to a more insecure environmentand began to change some of their trade routes inorder to find the most secure route. A secondadaptation was reducing the number of animalsmoving in a single herd to reduce exposure tolooting and to losing all their capital. The thirdadaptation was employing armed guards to travelwith the livestock herds as protection, anadaptation that livestock producers have alsoadopted. All three strategies have substantiallyincreased the transport costs per head (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008).Certain trade routes that were used preconflicthave stopped altogether since 2003; forexample, the trekking of sheep from Geneina toOmdurman. Others have been closed for most ofthe conflict years but occasionally re-open; forexample, the route from Geneina throughKebkabiya to El Fasher and Central Sudan.Tracing the new trade routes that livestock tradershave chosen indicates which areas are regarded asmore secure, and/or where agreements have beenmade between ethnic groups that may otherwisebe hostile to one another in order to allow thesafe passage of the livestock.A number of the livestock trade routes fromDarfur to Omdurman have shifted substantially.Two examples are:(1) Trekking cattle from Geneina toOmdurman: the most direct route wasthrough Kebkabiya to El Fasher, Umm32

Keddada, and then through NorthKordofan to Omdurman. This used totake 45 to 60 days. During most of theconflict years, this route has been tooinsecure and cattle have been trekkedthrough South Darfur, via Idd El Fursan,Buram, Ed Daien, and into Kordofan andthen Omdurman. This southern routetook at least four months. During theperiod of field work for this study, inMarch 2011, some traders had started tore-use the Kebkabiya route, although ithad closed again at the time of writing in2012.(2) Abu Mutarig and Ed Daien to Omdurman:the route used pre-conflict was from AbuMutarig to Ed Daien to Abukarinka toGrainshatta to Wadbanda to Alkowaikeetato Algammama to Jebailat Zaghawa toJabra to Abutabra to Omdaraba toFattasha and finally to El Muweli inOmdurman. When one of the rebelmovements (SLA—Minni Minawi) tookcontrol of part of the route, the tradersfound an alternative: Abu Matarig and EdDaien to Abujabra to Um Shiwaika to AlTuboon Al Majroor to Taira Hemaira toAburay to Al Saata to El Obeid to UmRuwaba to Tandulti-Wad Ashana to Kosti,and then from Kosti to Al Gazeir or toOmdurman. However, conflict betweenthe Missiriya and Rizeigat in 2008resulted in the new route becominginsecure and closing, and traders resumedtrekking cattle along the original route.There are a number of livestock trade routesfrom Nyala to Omdurman. Some of these havebeen more consistently used throughout theconflict years; for example, the route from Nyalathrough Shearia to Hassan Jadeed to Kalimundoto Jabir to Forja in Kordofan and eventually toOmdurman. This route takes between 45 and 60days as it did pre-conflict, but the costs ofprotecting a herd of cattle have gone upconsiderably. One trader described hiring threearmed guards at a cost of SDG20 per day whilethe herd is being accumulated in Nyala, and oneof these armed guards will accompany the herd tothe area where one of the rebel movements is incontrol. At this point, the rebel movement mustbe paid SDG10 per head of cattle for protectionto the Kordofan border. Checkpoint fees andlocality taxes are all additional to these protectioncosts.This implies that livestock traders must havean intimate knowledge of the conflict dynamics,and in particular who is controlling which area.They must also build up a relationship withdifferent ethnic groups and individuals affiliated todifferent movements in order to hire the rightguards for the right territory.In order to trek camels from Seraf Omra—now Darfur’s major camel market—agreementshave been made between particular ethnic groups.The route that camels destined for Egypt used totake, via Kebkabiya and Tawilla, is now tooinsecure, so the camels are trekked further north,via Kutum and Korma instead, to reach Dongolaand then travel along the Nile to Egypt. SeeFigure 9. However, there had to be an agreementwith the Zaghawa in control of the portion of theroute from Gurra to Serafaya to ensure that thecamels could be trekked safely. Section 5.3 belowdescribes the extent of some of these local tradingagreements between different ethnic groups tofacilitate the livestock trade out of Seraf Omra.Figure 9 also shows how the trade routes for cattleand sheep from Seraf Omra to Omdurman havechanged during the conflict years.On some routes where animals are beingtrekked on the hoof, it has become a priority tomove them faster to reduce the risk of looting.For example, cattle used to be trekked from SerafOmra to El Fasher market at a leisurely pace toallow them to graze, usually over a 12-day period.Now they are moved at speed, over just five days,so they are less at risk of banditry. Both sheep andcattle from Seraf Omra follow the same routedescribed above for camels, through Kutum andKorma to reach El Fasher in order to avoid themore direct but insecure Kowra to Tawila route.While it is relatively safe to truck livestockfrom some parts of Darfur, from Malha toOmdurman for example, it is not from others.Both sheep and cattle used to be trucked from EdDaien before 2003, but this stopped during theconflict years, because the trucks were at risk ofbeing stolen. In contrast, in Malha in the northeastof North Darfur, traders bringing goods fromOmdurman are loading up with sheep for thereturn journey as a more secure means of carryingtheir wealth in kind, rather than returning withJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 33

34cash, which leaves them vulnerable to attack.Approximately 50% of Malha’s sheep exports toOmdurman are now being taken by truck, a newdevelopment since the conflict began; theremaining 50% are still being trekked on the hoof,as happened pre-conflict.It is not only the routes for livestock beingtrekked out of Darfur that are affected by theconflict; the routes that producers use to take theirlivestock to market have also been affected. Asdescribed in section 4.2 above, some ethnicgroups are no longer able to access markets inareas controlled by other ethnic groups; thisparticularly affects the cattle trade in SouthDarfur. Generally, livestock are supplied from areasclose to the market; it is too risky for producers tomove over larger distances to the market.

Darfur - Livestock trade routes from Saraf OmraFor CattleLIBYALIBYANorthernNorthernCHADNORTH DARFURCHADWESTDARFURZalingeiZalingeiCENTRALDARFURKassKoroleiSOUTH DARFURNORTH DARFURKumaEAST DARFURSOUTH SUDANCARCARSOUTH SUDANCreation date: 11 September 2012 Boundary(CBS,IMWG), Settlement(OCHA).Map created by OCHAThe boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.!Seraf OmraSarafayaOmKaworaSeraf OmraTawilla ShagraUmmkeddadaNORTH KORDOFANKebkabiyaShagraKaworaKebkabiyaAl Nahoodto UmDurmanSOUTH KORDOFANWESTDARFURCENTRALDARFURSOUTH DARFUREAST DARFURNORTH KORDOFANSOUTH KORDOFANCARSOUTH SUDANSOUTH SUDANEGYPTLIBYANorthernDonglaCHADNORTH DARFURUm SuntaNORTH KORDOFANWESTDARFURSeraf OmraKutumKormaTawillaShagraKumaCARBefore Conflict route to LibyaSOUTH During SUDAN Conflict route to LibyaBefore Conflict route to EgyptDuring Conflict route to Egypt!KaworaKebkabiyaFor Sheepto UmDurmanAbyei AreaAbyei AreaFor Camelto Egyptto LibyaTinaKarnoiAbu GamraJebel MoonCENTRALDARFURSOUTH KORDOFANSOUTH DARFUR EAST DARFURAbyei AreaKormaIdd Al NabagAl ZawiyaOmJebel SiTawillaEl GeneinaNyalaAl FasherEd DaeinEl GeneinaZalingeiNyalaAl FasherEd DaeinSOUTH SUDANLegendBefore ConflictDuring ConflictLegendBefore ConflictDuring ConflictSOUTH SUDANLegendeAl ZawiyaJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 35

5. The changing profile of livestock traders5.1 The falling number of livestock tradersThere has been a sharp fall in the number oflivestock traders operating in Darfur. Table 3captures this in Nyala market, where the numberof livestock traders has fallen by 50% or moresince 2003. In North Darfur, there used to bearound 20 traders engaged in exporting sheepfrom the state; in 2011, there were only three, ofwhich one was an agent for an exporter inCentral Sudan. In Fora Boranga, the number oflocal livestock traders halved from around 150pre-conflict to about 70 in 2008, and the numberof agents more than halved from around 50 toonly about 20; since late 2010, however, there hasbeen some recovery in the market, and thenumber of traders and agents has started to riseagain. Similarly in Ed Daien, another majorlivestock market pre-conflict, the number of locallivestock traders more than halved from around170 pre-conflict to around 80 in 2011, and thenumber of agents also halved.There are a number of reasons for so manytraders leaving the livestock business:(1) the increased risks of livestock tradingsince the conflict began are a majordisincentive. If a herd is looted whiletrekking between markets, the trader maylose a large part of his capital, sometimesall of it in the case of a gallaga or smallscaletrader. Most livestock tradersinterviewed for this study recountedstories of how their livestock had beenstolen at some time (sometimes morethan once) during the conflict years whiletrekking from one market to another. Asdescribed in section 3.2 above, Darfuritraders have had to carry the risk oftrekking livestock on the hoof when thelarge-scale Omdurman traders withdrewfrom Darfur. For some traders, the lootingof a herd forced them out of business ifthey went bankrupt as a result. Othertraders who had a choice have switchedto trading in less risky commodities, suchas agricultural crops, groceries such assugar, or servicing the large presence ofthe international community: forexample, one sheep trader interviewed inEl Fasher is now supplying UNAMID asa supplement to livestock trading;(2) as livestock prices have shot up duringthe conflict years and as the taxationburden has increased, livestock tradersnow need more capital. Without access toformal credit (see section 6.2 below), thishas squeezed a number of traders out ofthe business, especially smaller-scaletraders and gallaga who simply don’t haveenough cash to trade any more. This hasbeen another reason for former livestocktraders switching to other commoditiesthat require less capital to trade;(3) in these circumstances, Darfuri tradershave found it hard to compete withTable 3. Numbers of livestock traders in Nyala, pre-conflict and 2011Type of trader Approximate number pre-conflict Approximate number in 2011Cattle traders 150 to 200 40 to 50Sheep traders 100 50Camel traders 40 10Gallaga 60 20Source: Trader interviews, Nyala market, March 201136

large-scale traders and companies based incentral Sudan, many of which havepreferential access to credit and services.Darfuri camel traders in El Fasherdescribe how the camel export businessto Egypt has been taken over by tradersfrom Dongola and companies fromNorthern State. Political affiliation canbring certain benefits such as taxexemption, and makes it hard for Darfuritraders to compete, resonating with thefindings of an earlier study:The danger is that the Darfuri privatesector is being gradually weakenedand squeezed out by more favouredcommercial interests from CentralSudan, undermining Darfur’s capacityto recover from the conflict oncepeace is restored. (Buchanan-Smith etal., 2011, 11)(4) the drop in livestock supplied to themarket compared with the pre-conflictyears is another reason why there arefewer traders engaged in this business.This is partly a consequence of manyformer livestock producers becomingdisplaced and no longer owningsignificant numbers of livestock.Small-scale livestock traders are most likely tohave gone out of business, and many exampleswere raised during interviews for this study.Larger-scale livestock traders are also at risk ofgoing out of business. The cameo of a formersheep trader from El Fasher, who went out ofbusiness in 2008, is a good example of thechallenges faced. See Box 7. Some livestocktraders have chosen to “downshift;” for example,to become sebaba or butchers, which also reducestheir need to be mobile. For traders of certainethnicities who no longer feel able to move safelybetween markets or to trade on a significant scale,this option has enabled them to stay in thelivestock business but to operate out of onelocation.Exceptionally, in three markets there appear tobe more livestock traders in 2011 compared withthe pre-conflict years. In Geneina market, asubstantial increase in traders in camels and cattlewas reported, most of whom are from differentArab tribes, some of whom have become livestocktraders for the first time. A number of these newtraders made their money renting houses andvehicles to members of the internationalcommunity and have then invested in thelivestock trade; some have the backing ofgovernment. However, as the number of livestocktraded in Geneina has fallen during the conflictBox 7.Cameo of a sheep trader who went out of business in North DarfurThis sheep trader started business in 1993 and used to export between 1,000 and 2,000sheep per year from North Darfur to Omdurman. One of the long-term constraints facingDarfuri (and other) traders who trek animals to Omdurman is the system of payment at theterminal market. Payments are often deferred by as much as six months. Negotiating powerbetween the trader and exporter in Omdurman is highly unequal. It is not unusual forexporters to ask the trader to wait with his animals for 10 to 15 days before a deal is secured,thus incurring feed and water costs for the Darfuri trader. The animals often lose weight in theprocess, and the trader is eventually forced to agree to the terms dictated by the exporter.Before the conflict years, on two occasions in the 1990s (1997 and 1998) this trader lost over$50,000 in total when the exporter to whom he sold the sheep in Omdurman defaulted onpayments. In the 1990s, he was able to survive these setbacks, but during the conflict years theadditional pressures of insecurity, increased taxes and levies in different localities, and instabilityin the export market, as well deferred payments by exporters, meant that sheep trading becameuntenable. In 2008, he stopped trading in livestock and is now involved in the grocery tradeinstead.Source: interview in El Fasher, March 2011June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 37

years—see section 3.2 above—this implies muchgreater competition between traders, although itshould also be noted that Omdurman traders areno longer present in Geneina, so local tradersappear to have taken over their market share. InSeraf Omra the number of local traders and gallagahas doubled during the conflict years. This is aconsequence of the growth in market activity inSeraf Omra as other neighboring markets havecontracted or closed, and a consequence ofagreements being made between different groupsthat allows the livestock trade to continue—seesection 5.3 below. The number of traders has alsoincreased in Tomat market. See Box 5 above.5.2 The ethnic concentration of livestocktradersIn all the Darfur markets visited for this study,an ethnic concentration of livestock traders wasreported during the conflict years. In other words,former livestock traders of particular ethnicgroups were no longer operating, and a muchsmaller range of ethnic groups is now representedin the livestock market. Examples include:(1) In the cattle trade in El Fasher, there usedto be traders of many different ethnicgroups, including Fur, Berti, Tunjur,Gimir, and Zaghawa, operating in themarket before the conflict. Now thelivestock traders are almost all from Araband Zaghawa backgrounds.(2) In Ed Daien and Abu Mutarig markets,there were traders from the SouthernRizeigat, Birgid, Masaleet, Habbaniya,Salamaat, Missiriya, and Ma’aliyabackgrounds before the conflict. In 2011,there were only Southern Rizeigat tradersoperating in the market; some Birgidtraders were returning to the market as aresult of the reconciliation between theSouthern Rizeigat and Birgid, but therewere no traders of other ethnicities.(3) In Seraf Omra, despite the overall increasein the number of livestock traders, someethnic groups appear to be excluded fromtrade on a significant scale, namely theFur, Masaleet, and Bergo, some of whomhave downshifted from being traders tobecoming gallaga or agents of traders ofother ethnic groups. The livestock trade isdominated by groups of Arab origin,mainly the Northern Rizeigat, includingthe Mahriya, Shatiya, Mahameed, Ereigat,as well as the Awlaad Zeid, Jellool, AwlaadJanoob, and the Zayadia. Some Arabgroups are entering the livestock trade forthe first time, namely the Nawa’yba,Awlaad Murmur, Eteifiyoon, and Korobat.There are also Zaghawa, Beni Hussein,Tama, Gimer, and Missiriya traders.The overall picture is of the livestock tradedominated by particular ethnic groups. In WestDarfur, and in Geneina in particular, it appears tobe dominated by Arab groups to anunprecedented extent, many of whom are new tolivestock trading, having formerly been involvedonly in livestock production. In North Darfur,livestock trading is dominated by Zaghawa andArab groups. Before 2003, Zaghawa and Meidobtraders dominated the camel trade to Libya; forexample, by 2011 the trade was dominated byZaghawa and Arab abbala groups, particularly theNorthern Rizeigat. In South Darfur, there appearsto be a greater range of ethnic groups still tradingin livestock, but geographically segregated: in anyone livestock market there are a smaller numberof ethnic groups present, and hostility betweengroups means that some groups can no longeraccess particular markets.5.3 Trade and access agreements betweendifferent ethnic groupsIn the greater Darfur region, there have beena number of agreements between hostile groupsduring the conflict years to grant access to tradewhere there are mutual livelihood and economicinterests. Sometimes these appear to have beensanctioned by decision-makers at the politicallevel; for example, to allow the trade in orangesbetween Jebel Marra and El Geneina, asdocumented in 2007/08, crossing betweenSLA-controlled and government-controlledterritory (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008).Sometimes they appear to be informal agreementsbetween traders of different ethnic groups; forexample, “secret agreements” between Zaghawaand Arab traders that enabled the export of camelsfrom Seraf Omra to Libya, as documented byYoung et al. (2009).38

These latter agreements are no longer sosecret, but they are essential to the continuedfunctioning of certain livestock trading routes andhelp to explain how Seraf Omra has developedinto such an important market for livestock,especially camels, during the conflict years.Initially many of these agreements were betweenindividual ethnic groups, for example:(i) between Arab groups and Zaghawagroups to allow Arab traders to trek theircamels through Jebel Moon and Tina—both of which were under Zaghawacontrol—north to Libya;(ii) between Zaghawa groups and the Gimrand Missiriya so that Zaghawa traderscould pass through Gurji Gurji near JebelMoon, and into Dar Zaghawa.Towards the end of 2008, there was acollective agreement involving many differentethnic groups, facilitated by the Nazir of the BeniHussein, to promote safe access of livestock acrossthe land controlled by each respective ethnicgroup. After approximately eighteen months, thishad the dramatic consequence of closing many ofthe checkpoints that had hindered the movementof livestock and that had contributed to such hightrading costs (See section 6 below). First,checkpoints between Seraf Omra and Zalingeiwere closed, then between Seraf Omra andGeneina, and finally between Seraf Omra andKebkabiya in early 2010. At the time of thefieldwork for this study, in May 2011, thisagreement was still holding. The well-respectedNazir of the Beni Hussein had initiated thisagreement, and the sheikhs and omdas (local triballeaders) of a number of different ethnic groupshad participated in the negotiations and signed upto the final agreement.In addition, there are interesting examples of“business agreements” between traders of differentethnic groups around the export of camels toLibya (although this trade was suspended duringthe Libya crisis at the end of 2010/2011). Twocame to light during fieldwork for this study. First,for the route through Kutum to Libya, Arab andZaghawa traders cooperate closely. Thus, Zaghawaand Arab traders purchase the camels in SerafOmra; Arab drovers trek the camels to Kutum, atwhich point Zaghawa drovers take over for thetrek across the desert to Kufra in Libya. The Arabtraders fly to Kufra to meet the caravan and to selltheir share of the herd in Libya. Second, for theroute through Jebel Moon, the businessarrangement may be more complex, involvingtraders from more groups: Arab groups, Zaghawa,and Missiriya. Traders from the three differentgroups will bulk their animals into one herd of120 to 150, and each group will take responsibilityfor trekking the herd through their respectiveterritory. Thus, Arab groups will take the leadfrom Seraf Omra to Girji Girji, Missiriya will takethe lead to Jebel Moon, Zaghawa will take thelead to Tina, and onwards to Wadi Hawa andeventually to Subh in Libya. Once again, the Arabtraders may fly to Libya to meet the herd when itarrives.Similar agreements exist between Zaghawaand Arab traders for trading sheep and cattle fromSeraf Omra. Zaghawa would sometimes givemoney to Arab traders to buy the sheep and cattle,Arab drovers would trek the animals to El Fasher,and Zaghawa drovers would then trek themthrough Dar Meidob and Kordofan toOmdurman, but avoiding Zayadia territory andthus the normal pre-conflict route through UmmKeddada because of tribal hostilities.These are encouraging signs of how trade canbe a bridge to rebuilding relationships betweenotherwise hostile groups and of the benefits to allconcerned and to the economy when thissucceeds. Around the world and within Sudanthere are examples of trade providing peacebuildingopportunities. 17 In the words of Briand’Silva in the Foreword to a study of PeaceMarkets in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in the early2000s:When evidence exists that trade can flourishin times of war and can provide a forum forcommunication, interaction, and an exchangeof goods, a tremendous feat has beenaccomplished. In such a context, traderepresents a mutually beneficial activity thatcan coalesce warring peoples and can provideoutlets for communication, while requiringthat each side realizes that the other’s productsare necessary to carry on with day-to-dayactivities. (SUPRAID et al., 2004, v)17See, for example, SUPRAID et al. (2004) and Yusuf (2009).June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 39

6. The costs of trading and access to credit6.1 The rising costs of tradingAnalysis of trading costs carried out for thisstudy shows how they have soared during theconflict years, well above the rate of inflation. 18 Atthe very least, they have doubled; for example, forcattle trekked from Nyala to Omdurman, for whichthe trade route has changed the least. In the case ofcamels trekked from Seraf Omra to Dongola enroute to Egypt, and sheep trekked from El Fasher toOmdurman, trading costs have increased by wellover 200%. For cattle trekked from El Fasher toOmdurman, the costs have increased by 600%, andfor cattle trekked from Geneina to Omdurman onthe long circuitous route through South Darfur, thecosts have increased by 700% compared with 2002.See Annex 2.There are two main reasons for these soaringcosts: first, the cost of protecting the livestockherd since the conflict began. Traders must nowpay for armed guards to accompany their herds,and must also pay numerous checkpoint fees oncertain routes to ensure the herd’s safe passage. 19Table 4 illustrates the impact of this on the costof trekking cattle from Seraf Omra to El Fasher:these two components alone— informal fees atcheckpoints and the cost of armed guards—accounted for over 50% of the total trekkingcosts. Second, formal taxes have increasedsubstantially, within the main markets and also atthe locality level. See Table 5, which showsformal taxes on cattle in Abu Matarig market inAbu Matarig locality in South Darfur. Theformal taxation burden had almost doubled byTable 4. Trading costs for trekking cattle from Seraf Omra to El Fasher, pre-conflict comparedwith 2011: Herd of 50 cattleItem Cost before the Cost in 2011 (SDG) % increaseconflict (SDG)1. Formal taxes 12 per head 33 per head 175%2. Other costs (eg., zakat 3–4 per head 6 per head 71%(alms), animal health)3. Informal fees at 5 3,000 (60 per head)checkpoints, per herd4. Lead drover, for 4 herds 300 (1.5 per head) 1,000 (5 per head) 233%5. 2 drovers per herd 300 (1.5 per head) 1,000 (5 per head) 233%6. Supplies for drovers 100–150 (2.5 per head) 500 (10 per head) 300%7. 2 armed guards, Not required 2,000 (10 per head)for 4 herdsTotal 21 per head 129 per head 514%Source: Group interview with cattle traders in El Fasher market18Inflation has increased most rapidly in the last 12 to 18 months. By July 2012, it was around 37% (Sudan’s Central Bureauof Statistics).19At the time of writing there is some evidence of a reduction in checkpoints and in the fees that they are charging,particularly across North Darfur (see DRA Trade and Market Bulletin for North Darfur, vol. 1, no. 4).40

2011 compared with 2002. Most individual taxeshave increased substantially, and a number ofnew taxes have been introduced. This was acommon pattern reported across all the livestockmarkets covered by this study in the three Darfurstates, with some experiencing an even steeperrise. It is partly a consequence of the de factodecentralization of responsibility for livestockmarketing to the locality level (see section 2.3)and a lack of standardization of the taxationregime between localities. 20 At the same time,the number of localities has increased. In SouthDarfur, for example, the number of localitiesincreased from 12 (demarcated in 1995) to 30 in2010. There is evidence of traders, and in somecases producers as well, now selecting the marketwhere they will do business according to thelocal tax regime—high taxes in Abu Mutarigmarket in South Darfur, for example, drovepastoralists from Bahr El Arab to use El Meirammarket in West Kordofan, where taxes are lower.Traders are also adjusting the trekking route fortheir livestock in order to avoid the localities thatare charging the highest taxes. Livestock tradersin Nyala reported a 300% increase in formaltaxes on camels in the Nyala market, fromSDG10 to 15 per head for camels pre-conflict toSDG40 per head in 2011. Previously, taxes werepaid only in the market where the animals werepurchased; now localities are charging taxes allalong the trekking route, at an estimated cost ofSDG200 per head of cattle just to reach theborder of South Darfur, according to livestocktraders in Nyala. The cost of a licence to tradelivestock has also increased, by 400% or more inNyala market. Large-scale livestock traders mustnow pay SDG185 per year to trade in Nyalamarket, whereas the licence used to cost SDG27per year pre-conflict. For small-scale traders, thelicence fee has risen from SDG15 per year toSDG60 per year by 2011.In five of the analyses of trading costs fordifferent routes presented in this report (in Table4 above and in Annex 2), informal fees paid atTable 5. Formal taxes imposed on cattle trading, Abu Matarig market, South DarfurType of formal tax Pre-conflict, 2011, tax per head % increasetax per head (SDG) (SDG)1. Fee on animal sale 5 112. Development fees 1 23. Education tax 0.5 24. Native administration fee 2 25. Security fee 0.5 0.56. Other taxes 7 107. Agricultural services 0.58. Stamp duty 29. Regulation of nomadism 210. Zakat 10% of price 10% of price11. Veterinary fees 3.5 6Total 19.5 38 95%Source: field work in South Darfur, March to May 201120One livestock trader described how the union of traders had lobbied state government in Kordofan to reduce the taxationburden, but state government was unable to influence the localities.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 41

checkpoints were the number one cost. Thiswas particularly the case in North and WestDarfur. Either the costs of paying herders toaccompany the animals or formal taxes rankedsecond.A major grievance amongst livestock tradersis that they see little or no benefit from payinginflated taxes; in other words, the revenue is notinvested in market infrastructure and services,nor in improving the quality of livestockproduction. Instead, much of the marketinfrastructure is deteriorating; for example,water points along the trekking routes are notbeing rehabilitated, nor are new water pointsbeing developed. Before the demise of theLMMC, trains were used for transportinglivestock from South Darfur to Omdurman.Since then, the condition of the railway hasdeteriorated due to lack of investment, in turnincreasing the amount of time it takes to makethe journey. Some large traders like the HadoubCompany have occasionally used the train totransport livestock (usually cattle) to CentralSudan during the conflict years, but have had tobuy their own train to do so and have toemploy 50 security guards to protect the train.As mentioned in section 5.1, rapidly risinglivestock prices has resulted in many tradersleaving the business because they do not haveadequate capital. Another problem of having totrek livestock from Darfur over large distancesto terminal markets is that traders’ capital is tiedup in the livestock herd for weeks or evenmonths. Not only does this carry the risk oflooting or losing livestock en route, but thecontinued rise in livestock prices—both in realterms and because of inflation—has a ratcheteffect: by the time the trader has sold theanimals in Omdurman and returned theproceeds to Darfur, the cost of purchasing thenext herd may have increased significantly,while the trader’s purchasing power has not.Darfuri livestock traders must also face the riskof Omdurman traders defaulting on a payment,which is often done on a credit basis in the firstinstance—see examples of this in Box 7 above.As a consequence of all of the above,traders’ margins have been squeezed during theconflict years. A number of traders interviewedindicated that their profit margins had fallen by50% or more. It has been beyond the scope ofthis study to carry out a value chain analysisfrom the point of livestock production to theterminal market, and therefore to calculateaccurately the percentage of the final pricereceived by the producer. Earlier studies,however, report livestock producers in Darfurreceiving approximately 50% of Omdurmanprices and 30% of export prices (ICRC, 2005b).6.2 Access to creditThe entire livestock marketing system inDarfur and in Omdurman currently dependsupon informal credit arrangements; no livestocktraders interviewed for this study in Darfur hadaccessed formal credit. This is a striking findingand a major constraint to livestock trading. Thelarger livestock traders/exporters were morelikely to have accessed formal credit in the past,but are reluctant to do so now because of thehigh risks of livestock trading in the last nineyears and the well-known cases of livestocktraders imprisoned in Khartoum because oftheir inability to pay their debts. Many otherlivestock traders indicated they did not haveaccess to formal credit. Indeed, a study carriedout in 2010 demonstrated the inadequacy offormal financial services in Darfur, particularlyfor micro-finance: “only two of the 16 banks(present in Darfur) provide microfinance at anyvolume” (Khojali and Hansen, 2010, 5), mostlyin South Darfur, where it reaches just one percent of the estimated number of householdsdemanding micro-finance. Two of the branchesof the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) closedduring the conflict, in Garsila and Mukjar. Thegeneral availability of formal financingcontracted considerably during the conflictyears and the head offices of both the ARB andthe Islamic Cooperative Development Bank(ICDB) limited the authority of their respectivebranch mangers to loan approvals of SDG50,000 (Ibid.).Yet the provision of credit, especially onfavorable terms, would appear to be of benefitto livestock traders who are clearly constrainedby lack of capital in an era in which livestocktrading has become increasingly expensive, notjust because of rising livestock prices, but alsobecause of the steeply rising trading costsassociated with livestock marketing during theconflict years. The informal credit arrangementsthat traders have entered into instead carry their42

own risks. Some Darfuri traders reportedregularly having to wait 50 to 60 days to receivepayment from livestock exporters inOmdurman, sometimes much longer. Theunequal negotiating power between Darfurilivestock traders bringing animals toOmdurman and the exporters is a major factordisadvantaging the Darfuri trader, some ofwhom have gone out of business as a result oflarger Omdurman traders defaulting on theirpayments on credit.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 43

7. Livestock production and market supply within thegreater Darfur region7.1 Livestock producersMost livestock production systems in Darfurare based on varying degrees of livestock mobilityin order to make use of seasonally availableresources. There is little information or dataavailable about the relative significance of differentproducer groups as suppliers of livestock toDarfur’s markets, although in the past some tradershave indicated the relative importance of settledagro-pastoralists and investors in livestock assources of supply. 21Livestock production by all groups has beenimpacted by the conflict in some way, althoughthere is very limited data and analysis thatdocuments this. A recent consultative socioeconomicmapping exercise with nomadic andpastoralist groups in 2010 across the three Darfurstates spells out how their livelihoods have beennegatively affected by the market constraintsdescribed in this study. In North Darfur, they fedback that:Many markets have been closed or marketaccess has been blocked. Cattle have been lostto theft and banditry activities. These losseshave led to poverty amongst the nomads andcreated the inability to meet their daily needsfor health, education and other basic services.This has resulted in continued displacementto other areas to look for alternativelivelihood options. (FAO and UNDP, 2010a,13)Young et al.’s study of the Northern Rizeigat(2009) documents their loss of local andtransnational markets, although tradingarrangements between ethnic groups, described insection 5.3 above, have been an interesting andpragmatic approach to being able to stay engagedin the livestock trade.During the conflict years in Darfur overall,livestock producers have fed back that many ofthem are avoiding supplying animals to themarket because of high taxation and other levies,which reduce the profitability of selling livestock(FAO and UNDP, 2010b). 22 Other conflictadaptations by livestock producers may have alsonegatively impacted the livestock trade; forexample, the reduction in herd sizes to reduce riskin the face of banditry and looting. Thus, theItalian NGO, Coopi, found it hard to buy largenumbers of quality goats in North Darfur fortheir restocking program: producers are nowmoving with much smaller herds. 23 Differentethnic groups are said to have adapted differently.For example, while the Ta’aisha and Fellatareduced their holdings of cattle early in theconflict, the Southern Rizeigat apparently did not.The veracity of these perceptions and theirconsequences deserve further attention andfollow-up: how have different livestock producersadapted to the changing conflict context, andwhat are the consequences of these adaptationsfor social relations, the natural resource base, andfor the recovery of livelihoods and the economyin Darfur? In short, efforts to boost livestockproduction must be fully informed by a thoroughanalysis of livestock producers and theirproduction and marketing strategies in order toknow “who will gain and who will lose.”7.2 Changing patterns of livestock productionand market supply during the conflictyears—perceptions of market tradersAs it was beyond the scope and resources ofthis study to access and interview livestockproducers, the findings in this section are based oninterviews with livestock traders. It presents theirfeedback on who is now supplying livestock to21See Aklilu and Catley (2009), quoting Aklilu (2006), which reports one of Darfur’s big livestock exporters saying that theysourced 60% of sheep and cattle and 40% of camels from the settled population, from agro-pastoralists and investors.22Other constraints that affect the livestock market, identified by nomadic and pastoralist groups consulted in Nyala in SouthDarfur, include: scarcity of grass and fodder for animal feed; lack of processing and industry; lack of storage facilities; insecurityon the roads to access the markets due to banditry and cattle theft; lack of investment in the livestock sector; and thepoor quality of the animals, which cannot compete in the markets (FAO and UNDP, 2010b).23According to a Coopi internal report of April 2011.44

different markets in Darfur, as well as theirperspective on how livestock ownership andproduction has been affected by the conflict.The most consistent feedback from traders inall three states is a shift in supply of livestockduring the conflict years from livestock producersengaged in more settled farming with livestock aspart of their livelihood strategy who becamedisplaced, to groups that still have access to ruralareas. This trend applies to sheep and cattlesupplied to El Fasher market, sheep supplied to ElGeneina market, and sheep and cattle supplied toNyala market. This implies that livestockownership may be more concentrated now ingroups that have greater freedom of access in ruralareas. This was also explained by traders in termsof an ethnic concentration of livestock ownershipduring the conflict years. The case of ForaBoranga, one of Darfur’s major livestock markets,illustrates this: pre-conflict, the market wassupplied by producers from a range of differentethnic groups, including many Arab groups,Zaghawa, Fur, and Masaleet. Now the market isonly supplied by Arab groups, such as the Jalul,Beni Halba, Beni Hussein, Missiriya, Salamaat, andKhozam; there is little or no evidence of Zaghawa,Fur, and Masaleet livestock producers in themarket. This pattern was repeated in othermarkets, including Zalingei. Whether this meansthat certain ethnic groups have lost or reducedtheir livestock holdings, or whether it means thatthey are selling their livestock to producers andtraders from other groups that may be able tomove more securely between markets, requiresfurther investigation.Generally, there are fewer ethnic groupssupplying any one market now compared withthe pre-conflict era, often reflecting how politicalfactions are organized on a tribal or ethnic basis,with privileged access to certain areas but accessdenied to others. In Malha in North Darfur, forexample, livestock producers from the Meidob,Kababish, Zeyadia, and Berti tribes all used tobring livestock to the market; now only Meidobproducers bring livestock to the market. In EdDaien and Abu Matarig markets, livestockproducers of certain ethnicities no longer haveaccess because of the conflict, in particular theHabbaniya; for extended periods since the conflictbegan only Southern Rizeigat producers havesupplied livestock. Umm Labasa market used to besupplied by livestock producers from the BeniHalba, Fur, Turjam, and Southern Rizeigat tribes.Now only the Beni Halba are supplying andaccessing the market; many of the Fur producershave become displaced. Even in livestock marketsin more secure locations such as Rahed el Birdiand Markundi, the number of ethnic groupssupplying the market has fallen. In Rahed el Birdi,Ta’aisha, Salamat, Bergo, Sharafa, Fur, Missiriya,and Berno producers used to supply the marketwith cattle before the conflict; the Fur, Missiriya,and Berno producers are no longer present. Twotrends are distinguishable here: first, there aresome groups of livestock producers that have beenparticularly badly affected by displacement, thatused to supply the market but who have now lostor sold their livestock and are no longer livestockproducers; for example, many Fur and Masaleethouseholds. Second, there are groups who stillown livestock as a major component of theirlivelihood strategy, but who no longer have accessto certain markets that they used to supplypre-conflict, because of the ethnic polarization ofthe conflict, for example the Habbaniya in SouthDarfur.For camels, there appears to have been less ofa shift in patterns of production and supply duringthe conflict years: most are still Arab abbala groups,Zayadia, Zaghawa, and Meidob, although sometraders in Nyala reported more camels beingsupplied to the market since the conflict began asmore abbala are now concentrated in the Nyalaarea. Meanwhile, traders in Geneina described thedeclining quality of camels brought to the marketduring the conflict years, at least partially aconsequence of the fact that certain livelihood/ethnic groups who used to fatten and add value tothe camels before they were sold are now living asIDPs.Changes in the main suppliers of differenttypes of livestock to different markets are alsoassociated with changes in the geographicaldirection from which livestock are brought to themarket. The case of Nyala market illustrates thiswell. Farmers north and east of Nyala used to bemajor suppliers of cattle, sheep, and goats. Theseare the areas and groups of people that havesuffered violent conflict and displacement. Nyalamarket is now heavily dependent on cattle, sheep,and goats being supplied from the more secureareas south and southwest of the town, from IddEl Fursan, Markundi, and Tomat. As alreadymentioned, the extended presence of abbala in theJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 45

46Nyala area has increased the supply of camels tothe market.This analysis of how livestock production andmarket supply has changed during the conflictyears is partial, based on interviews with livestocktraders across the three Darfur states. To fill thisgap in knowledge about how livestock productionand ownership has been impacted by the conflictand therefore to complete the analysis requiresfurther research and interviews, with former andwith current livestock producers. Such researchcould test the hypothesis emerging from this studythat there has been a concentration of livestockownership within certain groups, in turnimpacting on which producers are now supplyinglivestock to the market.

8.Cross-border livestock trade and the growing domesticmarket for meat consumption8.1 IntroductionAs well as the formal export channels forlivestock from Darfur, there has long been athriving informal cross-border trade in livestock,mainly to Libya, Chad, and the Central AfricanRepublic (CAR). This is particularly attractive tothe greater Darfur region, bordering as it doeswith each of these three countries. Informalcross-border trade may offer greater returns thansales within the domestic market. During theconflict years in Darfur, there has been some shiftin market activity away from the long-distancetrade of animals with all its associated risks, to thelocal slaughter of livestock to meet Darfur’sgrowing demand for meat. This study has beenunable to estimate the relative scale of informaland formal trading in livestock due to lack of data.Further research is needed to establish the relative(and absolute) scale of informal cross-border trade,as well as to more reliably quantify the formaltrade in livestock. Such information and analysis iscritical for future policy formulation.This section briefly reviews both formal andinformal cross-border trade flows from Darfur:formal with Egypt, and informal with Libya andChad. Each has been negatively affected in recentyears, both by the conflict within Darfur and alsoby unrest in Sudan’s neighboring countries. It alsolooks at the impact of the growing domesticmarket for meat consumption.8.2 Cross-border trade in camels with Egyptand LibyaAccording to official statistics Egypt is themost important market for the export of Sudanesecamels (Idriss, 2003). But this may not be the casefor Darfur. In Seraf Omra, Darfur’s main camelmarket, in 2011 traders estimated that camelexports from that market were split equallybetween Egypt and Libya, although they havesince shifted in favor of Libya, mainly because ofthe informality of the trade and lack of regulation.Younger camels of three to four years old areexported to Libya, while older camels of five yearsand above are exported to Egypt.Since 1991, camels destined for Egypt mustpass through Dongola for the processing of exportdocumentation and for taxes to be paid. Thesemeasures formalized the export of camels toEgypt, although informal smuggling still occurs.Apart from the Darfur conflict, in the last decadethere have been two major disruptions to thecamel trade with Egypt. The first is due to thelong-running border dispute between Sudan andEgypt over the Hala’ib Triangle. As a result, theEgyptian authorities have restricted the movementof Sudanese traders across the border: a cameltrader in Nyala described having to hand over hiscamels to an Egyptian trader on the border andthen fly into Egypt to meet the camels in theirfinal market destination, increasing the transactioncosts. Meanwhile, the Sudanese authorities have, attimes, put quotas on the number of female camelsthat can be exported to Egypt in an attempt toput pressure on the Egyptian authorities. Thesecond and more recent disruption to crossbordercamel exports to Egypt was political unrestin Egypt in early 2011 resulting in the overthrowof the Mubarak regime in February 2011. For ashort time, trade was suspended, although this hadresumed again by March/April 2011.Most of the cross-border camel trade to Libyais informal and particularly attractive to tradersbecause, most of the time, it has not been subjectto high levels of taxation or strict governmentregulations. Although the livestock quarantineauthorities in El Fasher estimate that between3,000 and 6,000 camels per year were exportedfrom North Darfur to Libya before 2003, thisprobably represents only a small percentage of thetotal number of camels exported. Camel exportsto Libya were officially stopped in 2004 aftermore than 3,000 camels en route to Kufra wereconfiscated by rebel movements. However, theunofficial trade in camels to Libya appears to havecontinued. Although it was temporarily suspendedduring the uprising in Libya between December2010 and October 2011, by 2012 camel exportsto Libya from Seraf Omra had resumed and wereincreasing.An important distinction between the cameltrade to Libya and to Egypt is the amount ofJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 47

capital each requires (Young et al., 2009). The oldercamels exported to Egypt cost more, and there aresubstantial costs associated with the formalizationof the trade through Dongola (see Annex 2). Incontrast, the younger camels exported to Libya costless. Although there are fees to be paid to enablethe herds to move securely, the informality of thetrade means the formal taxation burden is less.Thus, less capital is required for trading with Libyacompared with Egypt.8.3 Cross-border trade with ChadThe cross-border trade in livestock with Chadhas long been important to the economy of WestDarfur. Fora Boranga and Geneina livestockmarkets in particular have been supplied withlivestock from Chad and have exported to Chad.During the conflict years, this trade has beenbadly disrupted by political hostilities between thegovernments of Chad and Sudan. Diplomaticrelations between Chad and Sudan have beensevered a number of times during the 2000s,severely impacting trade, as the border was officiallyclosed. In April 2010, the border reopened asSudanese-Chadian relationships improvedfollowing the visit of Chadian President IdrissDeby to Khartoum in February 2010. During theperiod of fieldwork for this study, there were manyreports of livestock being traded between Chad andSudan, especially cattle and camels being suppliedfrom Chad to Darfur. Camels are brought fromChad to Seraf Omra in order to avoid morerigorous market controls imposed by the Chadianauthorities. Through this study it has not beenpossible to establish the extent to which livestockfrom Chad have replaced Darfuri livestock in themarket as local supplies have fallen. This is animportant point to pursue, as there is evidence thatthe direction of trade flows between Geneina andChad have been affected by Darfur’s conflict:whereas many goods and commodities used to beexported from Geneina to Chad pre-conflict,disruption to Darfur’s economy in terms of acollapse of agricultural processing and constraintsto transportation during the conflict years, as wellas rapid urbanization (see below), appears to havereversed this trade flow, and there are manyChadian traders bringing goods into Geneinamarket (Buchanan-Smith and Fadul, 2008).8.4 Domestic meat consumption withinDarfurDarfur has undergone a rapid and distortedprocess of urbanization since the conflict began in2003. 24 Many of Darfur’s towns have doubled ortrebled in size during this nine-year period. Nyala,for example, has grown approximately 2.5 timessince 2003, to a population of around 1.3 millionpeople. This process of urbanization has beentriggered by massive displacement and by theunprecedented international presence ofinternational aid agencies and peace-keepingtroops, which in turn have fuelled the urbaneconomy. Business interests have also relocatedfrom insecure rural areas and villages to thegreater security of Darfur’s main towns.One of the consequences of this burgeoningurban population has been growing demand formeat in all of Darfur’s towns. Indeed, many ofthese newly urban households used to be livestockproducers but have now been displaced or havechosen to move to the towns and have becomeurban consumers, purchasing most of their foodneeds.In Tomat, for example, one of South Darfur’smost thriving cattle markets during the conflictyears, at least 80% of cattle sold used to bedestined for Omdurman. That ratio has fallen toaround 70%, as more cattle are now taken toNyala to meet the growing local demand formeat. In other markets such as Zalingei, El Fasher,Kebkabiya, and Geneina, a much higherproportion of livestock traded are now slaughteredto meet local consumption needs.The shift in Darfur from being a majorsupplier of meat to the rest of Sudan to becominga major consumer of meat through themarketplace is reflected in the rapidly rising meatprices. Pre-conflict, meat prices in Darfur majortowns were approximately half the price of meatin Khartoum, around SDG5 per kg for lamb inNyala and El Fasher compared with SDG10 perkg in Khartoum. In Darfur’s main areas oflivestock production, the price of lamb wasusually around SDG3 to 4 per kg. During theconflict, meat prices in Darfur have risen rapidly,four- or five-fold. In some of Darfur’s majortowns the price of meat has reached almost thesame price as in Khartoum, especially in El Fasher.24See Buchanan-Smith et al. (2011) and UN (2010).48

See Table 6. The market chain for livestock soldfor local slaughter is either from producer to smalltrader to butcher, or directly from producer tobutcher; large-scale traders are rarely involved.The evidence points to an emerging localmeat industry in Darfur. Just as the rapid processof urbanization associated with the conflict yearsis unlikely to be reversed when peace and stabilityare restored, so the increased local demand formeat is unlikely to decline. 25 This implies marketopportunities for the future.8.5 A short history of Darfur’s abattoirsAs one of Sudan’s main livestock producingareas and as a major source of livestock to meetdomestic meat consumption needs in Sudan, itseems extraordinary that the greater Darfur regionhas only one slaughterhouse, in Nyala.Constructed in 1999, it has had a chequeredhistory and has suffered a series of closures duringthe 2000s. It first closed in 2004, when it couldno longer honor an export contract to supplymeat on a weekly basis to Jordan. It wasrehabilitated in 2006, with the support of ShiryanAshamal Company from Central Sudan and witha loan from the federal government and openedin 2007, winning a lucrative contract to supplymeat to the African Union (AU) peace-keepingforces. But it closed again in 2008, apparently dueto a failure to secure export contracts (Shumba,2010). Since then, it has operated intermittently.When it is functioning to full capacity, the abattoircan handle 3,000 sheep and goats per day and 500cattle (Ibid.). However, it generally suffers frompoor infrastructure and has faced problems ofquality control and management issues.There is currently a plan to construct a newabattoir in Nyala, although progress has been veryslow. An abattoir was also constructed in Geneinain 2006, but was not completed and has neverbeen operational. Both of these experiences ledsome to question the commitment to improvethis key facility that could play an important rolein stimulating Darfur’s livestock trade and inefficiency gains if so many livestock no longerhave to be trekked on the hoof to Omdurman,especially during the dry season. The livestocktrade in Sudan is currently controlled fromOmdurman, and there may be concerns thatimproving facilities in Darfur would draw businessaway from Central Sudan.Table 6. Meat prices in Darfur and in KhartoumMarket Price per kg—2002 (dry season) Price per kg—2011 (dry season)El Fasher Beef 4 16Lamb 5 18-20Nyala Beef 3 14Lamb 5 14-16Zalingei Beef 3 15Lamb 3 17Fora Boranga Beef 3 13Lamb 4 14Seraf Omra Beef 3 12Lamb 4 14Khartoum Beef 7 14Lamb 10 22Source: field work in Darfur, March to May 201125Meat consumption in Sudan overall is estimated to be growing by 3.5% per year (between 1994 and 2003), faster than thepopulation growth rate (Idriss, 2008).June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 49

9.Trade in hides and skinsTrade in hides and skins is an importantby-product of the livestock sector, mainly fromcattle, sheep, and goats. Sudan has long been anexporter of hides and skins, but there has beenlittle sustained growth in this business since the1990s: 3.22 million pieces were exported in 1991and in 2010 only 3.25 pieces were exported. 26However, annual variability in the level of exportsis high: in the peak years of 2000 and 2001, morethan 8 million pieces were exported annually(Ijaimi, 2011). See Figure 9 below.Aklilu (2002a) explains how the hides andskins trade in Sudan has long been dominated bythe Raw Hides and Skins Exporters Associationbased in Khartoum, with agents all over thecountry. While the trade in Darfur is part of thisnationally-controlled skins and hides business,there have been some interesting developmentsduring the conflict years. A new trade in hidesappears to have developed between Darfur andWest Africa, in particular with Nigeria, Chad, andCameroon. Most of the hides and skins areexported directly from Darfur, for example,through El Fasher and Geneina, and transportedoverland. The growing trade with Nigeria is aninteresting story, apparently started by AMISNigerian troops stationed in Darfur who saw thepotential. This trade is mainly in cattle hides andcattle heads, regarded as a delicacy in Nigeria. Atthe time of field work for this study, in 2011,Turkish and Syrian companies were also startingto buy direct from Darfur. The state borsa(taxation point) in Nyala estimates that the exportof hides and skins from Nyala has doubled in thelast two to three years. Hides and skins are stilltransported from Darfur to Central Sudan, areused locally; for example, for making shoes andleather bags for water, but perhaps mostsignificantly, are now being exported out of thecountry directly from Darfur.Rising demand for hides and skins in recentyears can be seen in the rapidly rising prices. SeeTable 7. Growth in trade was consistently reportedacross most of the main livestock markets coveredby this study, indicating the potential for theFigure 9. Export of hides and skinsSource: unpublished data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade26Source: unpublished data from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.50

leather industry in Darfur. Unlike most of the restof the livestock market, this industry employswomen; thus, they too can benefit from thislivelihood source. Indeed, in Kebkabiya, an NGO,the Kebkabiya Smallholders Charitable Society(KSCS), has been providing training in workingwith leather as a local income-generating activity.Table 7. The price of hides and skins in selected Darfur marketsMarket Price per piece Price per piece Price per piece(SDG) pre-conflict (SDG) 2008 (SDG) 2011Nyala cattle 15 20 50sheep 5 10 15goat 3 5 10Markundi cattle 2 8 20sheep 1 4 8goat 1 3 5Seraf Omra cattle 15-20 30–35sheep n.a. n.a.goat 2–3 4–5Source: field work in Darfur, March to May 2011June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 51

10. Conclusions and recommendations10.1 ConclusionsThe importance of the livestock trade to theeconomy of Darfur and to the national economyof Sudan is clear. It is Darfur’s major export and,in 2011, Sudan’s most important export afterpetroleum and gold. 27 Yet at the national level ithas not received commensurate attention in termsof policy and investment during the petroleumyears. There has been inadequate investment inthe physical market infrastructure, which hasgenerally deteriorated; for example, water pointsalong the main trekking routes from Nyala toOmdurman. The veterinary services and financialservices needed to support livestock trading inSudan so that it is internationally competitivehave also fallen behind. The consequences of thiscan be seen in Sudan’s falling share of someexport markets, such as the Saudi meat market,during the 2000s. Sudan’s exposure to a smallnumber of export markets means that its exporttrade is highly vulnerable to changing traderegimes and/or demand within those markets.This has a direct knock-on effect on rurallivelihoods. Livestock are a key component ofmost rural livelihoods, in Darfur and beyond, andthose livelihoods are in turn dependent on tradinglivestock.In Darfur, many of the constraints to efficientlivestock trading have been exacerbated by nineyears of conflict, which has disrupted anddistorted the livestock sector. The main ways inwhich conflict has affected the livestock trade inDarfur are the following:(1) the closure of many village markets andmassive disruption to the wide networkof primary markets in all three Darfurstates;(2) shifting market activity betweensecondary markets as trade moves tomarkets in more secure locations andaway from markets that are less accessiblebecause of insecurity;(3) the high risks now involved in livestocktrading, ranging from risks of looting andbanditry while livestock herds are on themove, to the risk of buyers defaulting oncredit-based purchases;(4) livestock traders switching to long andcircuitous routes for trekking livestock, toavoid areas of insecurity;(5) escalating trading costs, mainly due to thecosts of protecting a livestock herd beingtrekked on the hoof and substantialinformal fees that must be paid atcheckpoints;(6) a much increased taxation burden asformal taxes have doubled or even trebledin some locations;(7) large amounts of capital now beingrequired to trade livestock, because ofrapidly rising livestock prices as well ashigh transaction costs, yet the general lackof financial services and credit available tomost traders;(8) many livestock traders going out ofbusiness, either because of bankruptcy orbecause it has become too risky to tradelivestock compared with alternativebusiness opportunities;(9) the withdrawal of large livestock tradersand exporters from Omdurman, many ofwhom now depend upon Darfuri tradersbringing the livestock to Central Sudanwho must now carry the risks and costsof doing so;(10) ethnic concentration of livestock tradersas some ethnic groups have almostentirely left livestock trading and others27Foreign Trade Statistical Digest, October to December 2011, Central Bank of Sudan, Statistics Directorate. Taking accountof informal trade, the significance of livestock exports is probably even greater.52

are substantially curtailed in their abilityto move safely from one market toanother, or to be accepted in certainmarkets;(11) an overall decline in the numbers oflivestock brought to the market, anddeteriorating quality since the preconflictera.Although it is impossible to quantify thecontraction in the livestock trade in Darfur since2003 because of the lack of data, the coreresearchers for this study were of the view that thelivestock trade had probably fallen by about 40 to50%. Omdurman traders interviewed for thisstudy reported a fall in supply of livestock fromDarfur of 20 to 50%. 28 This in turn has impactedon national exports of livestock and meat,although the gap appears to have been filled tosome extent by livestock supplied from otherstates. This could also have long-termconsequences for Darfur—having to re-establishits supremacy in the livestock trade after years oflower level market activity. The overall picture isof many inefficiencies in the way that livestock arecurrently traded in Sudan, exacerbated by themuch-increased trading costs associated with theDarfur conflict. The combined effect is to reducethe competitiveness of Sudan’s livestock exports inthe face of increasing competition from countriessuch as Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand that arecurrently better able to meet ever-stricterinternational standards, including hygiene anddisease control regulations.While most of these trends are negative, thereare some positive stories to be told from Darfur.First, there is evidence of pockets of recovery inthe livestock trade. Most notable is the return ofsome of the large livestock traders fromOmdurman into South Darfur in 2011, at leastpartially encouraged by some improvement insecurity. However, the constantly shifting conflictdynamics in Darfur in recent years warn againsttoo much optimism or generalization from thisdevelopment. Second, there is evidence oflivestock traders from ethnic groups that havebeen hostile to one another during the conflictyears now making agreements with each other inorder to continue long-distance livestock trading.This indicates that there may be peace-buildingopportunities around trade, and the potential forrebuilding relationships between groups wherethey have mutual business/livelihood interests.Third, despite all the barriers to trade during theconflict years, there appears to have beensubstantial growth in the trade in skins and hidesfrom Darfur, indicating a potential yet to be fullyrealized. Overall, many livestock traders haveshown great ingenuity in responding to theconstraints in the current conflict context, and inidentifying and exploiting opportunities.When peace and stability are eventuallyrestored to Darfur, the livestock sector andlivestock trade will be critical to the recovery ofthe economy and to the recovery of rurallivelihoods; planning on how to support such arecovery can start now. And even in the currentcontext there is much that can be done to supportthis important sector. This is consistent withfederal government’s priorities in 2011/12:renewed emphasis is being given to livestock andespecially to boosting livestock exports as oilrevenues decline. This follows a trend across manyAfrican countries, whereby the value andcontribution of the livestock sector and oflivestock trade are increasingly recognized(Scoones and Woolmer, 2006). But this is not justabout boosting the livestock trade; livestockproduction and productivity must also besupported. The opportunities to do so in Darfurare immense. The livestock trade has continueddespite the lack of investment and despite themany obstacles and constraints that producers andtraders face day-to-day. But with efforts to raiselivestock quality (in order to improve the qualityof meat and milk production), to rebuild anddevelop physical market infrastructure, and toprovide improved veterinary and financialservices, the potential of livestock to Darfur’seconomy and to individual households can befully realized. There is also a new local marketdeveloping for Darfur’s livestock: meeting theconsumption needs of a vastly increased urbanpopulation. However, to fulfil both the domesticand export potential requires planning and28Some other sources have indicated that the supply of livestock from Darfur to Omdurman has not fallen during the conflictyears. However, there are no reliable records of the geographical origin of livestock brought to Omdurman, and it hastherefore not been possible to resolve these contradictions.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 53

with a longer-term perspective. For example,could they also be the foundation for exploringthe peaceful and sustainable co-management ofnatural resources involving different livelihoodgroups?(6) These trade agreements should beinvestigated further, yet with greatsensitivity, to see if/how they could besupported and built upon as a peacebuildingopportunity.Issue: Livestock ownership within Darfur appearsto have shifted during the conflict years. Thehypothesis presented by this study is that livestockownership has become more concentrated withincertain groups whilst others have divested oflivestock, and that this, in turn, is impacting whois supplying livestock to the market.(7) Research is needed to understand howlivestock ownership has shifted in Darfurduring the conflict years in order toinform future strategies for rebuilding thelivestock sector and livestock productionin ways that are both sustainable andinclusive of different groups.Recommendations at a strategic/policylevelDARFUR LEVELIssue: Darfur has undergone a rapid process ofurbanization during the conflict years that isunlikely to be reversed. This has created a newlocal market for livestock for meat, yet thephysical infrastructure for a local meat industryand for exporting meat is poor and has receivedlittle investment. Darfur’s abattoir capacity isextremely limited, with only one functioningabattoir in Nyala, which is frequentlynonoperational. While transporting animals on thehoof during the wet season does not appear toreduce the health or value of the animal at theterminal market, covering hundreds of kilometerson the hoof in the dry season is inefficient anduneconomic, and also deprives Darfur of thevalue-added from slaughtering livestock andprocessing meat locally.(8) A clear strategy for developing the meatindustry in Darfur with a longer-termperspective should be developed,including:a. developing Darfur’s abattoir capacityby completing construction of thenew abattoir being built in Nyala andensuring that the Geneina abattoirbecomes fully functional;b. ensuring that improvement of thephysical infrastructure extends toeffective and reliable cold storagefacilities, and improved airtransportation facilities essential fordeveloping the export trade in meat;c. developing processing facilities forby-products such as offal, and linkingthis strategy for developing the meatindustry to development of the leatherindustry using hides and skins (seerecommendation 4 above);d. ensuring that small-scale livestockproducers benefit from a growingmeat industry as well as larger-scalelivestock producers;e. collaboration between all five stategovernments in Darfur in developingand implementing this strategy, withthe support of the Darfur RegionalAuthority.FEDERAL LEVELIssue: Formal taxes on traded livestock are risingrapidly and are being applied indiscriminately atthe state and especially locality levels as a way ofraising income. There is little re-investment of thisrevenue back into the sector. It is crippling toboth livestock producers and traders, distorts thelivestock trade within Darfur as traders try toevade localities with the highest levels of taxation,and ultimately reduces the competitiveness ofSudanese livestock in the international market.(9) Taxation policies should be reviewed andrevised:a. to facilitate the movement of livestockbetween localities and between states;b. to reduce the taxation burden toimprove competitiveness;c. to ensure that revenues are reinvestedin market infrastructure and inimproving livestock production.This will require a process of dialogue withstate and locality authorities.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 55

Issue: For many years there has been littleinvestment in the physical market infrastructurethat supports the livestock trade, especially at theDarfur level. It is deteriorating rapidly, creatingmarket inefficiencies and reducing thecompetitiveness of Sudan’s livestockinternationally.(10) There is an urgent and pressing need toimprove the physical marketinfrastructure for livestock trading,including the following:a. rehabilitating the water points alongthe main livestock trekking routesbetween Darfur and Central Sudan;b. upgrading the railway from Nyala toCentral Sudan so that it can onceagain be used regularly andefficiently for the transport oflivestock from South Darfur;c. the rehabilitation of Darfur’s roadinfrastructure so that livestock canbe transported by road swiftly andefficiently.Issue: Sudan’s veterinary services and inspectionpolicies are inadequate to meet ever moredemanding international hygiene and diseasecontrol regulations. Current policies of relying oninspection of livestock at the point of exportincreases market inefficiencies if animals arerejected at that late stage in the market chain.Combined, these weaken Sudan’s ability tocompete internationally.(11) A clear strategy must be developed toimprove veterinary services, vaccinationcenters, and inspection in areas oflivestock production to reduce livestocklosses late in the market chain, and tostrengthen Sudan’s ability to complywith international standards.Issue: Lack of credit for livestock traders is ageneric constraint to livestock marketing inSudan, beyond the particular limitationsexperienced by livestock traders in Darfur—seeissue 2 above. Innovative ways of providing creditand transferring money have been pioneered inother challenging and remote contexts wherethere is a limited presence of formal financialinstitutions, for example, the m-pesa system innorthern Kenya. 29(12) A national strategy for improvinglivestock traders’ access to credit in thelonger-term must be developed,learning from innovative experiencesand schemes that have been pioneeredelsewhere. 30Issue: Responsibility for livestock marketing iscurrently scattered across a range of institutions atfederal level. Since the abolition of the LMMCthere has been no single government body with astrategic mandate for promoting the livestocktrade, and consequently a lack of overall policy forpromoting the livestock trade, including theexport trade, despite the significance of this sectorto the economy. This study highlights the urgentneed to consolidate institutional responsibility atfederal level.(13) Ways of promoting the livestock trade,domestically and internationally,through a streamlined institutionalframework at federal level should beexplored, drawing on experienceselsewhere in Africa.29M-pesa is an innovative mobile phone-based money transfer service for remote rural populations that do not have bankaccounts. It enables them to: (i) deposit and withdraw money; (ii) transfer money to other users and non-users; and (iii) paybills. See, for example, http://africa.procasur.org/learning-route/our-routes/innovative-livestock-marketingfrom-northern-to-eastern-africa/.30Mina and Van Holst Pelekaan (2010, 8) also recommend preparing “model credit contracts for various types of livestocktrading.”56

ACRONYMSABSAMISARBARPCAPECARCBOCBSDPADRAFICGDPICDBIDPIGADKSCSLMMCMDTFMoFTMOARF&RNGOSIEPSLASLM/JEMOAU–IBARUNAMIDUNEPVHFAgricultural Bank of SudanAfrican Union Mission in SudanAnimal Resources BankAgriculture Revival ProgrammeCommunity-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology UnitCentral African RepublicCommunity-based OrganizationCentral Bureau of StatisticsDarfur Peace AgreementDarfur Development and Reconstruction AgencyFeinstein International CenterGross Domestic ProductIslamic Cooperative Development BankInternally Displaced PersonIntergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentKebkabiya Smallholders Charitable SocietyLivestock and Meat Marketing CorporationMulti-Donor Trust FundMinistry of Foreign TradeMinistry of Animal Resources, Fisheries and RangeNon-governmental OrganizationSudan Integrated Environment ProjectSudan Liberation ArmySudan Liberation Movement/Justice and Equality MovementOrganization of African Unity–Interafrican Bureau for AnimalResourcesUnited Nations–African Union ForceUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeViral Hemorrhagic FeverJune 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 57

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Morton, J. 1985. “A Darfur Compendium. A Review of the Geographical, Historical and EconomicBackground to Development in the Region.” HTSPE, reissued 2005.Researchers at FIC. 2011. “Navigating Without A Compass: The Erosion of Humanitarianism inDarfur.” Briefing Paper. Tufts FIC, Medford, MA. January.Scoones, I., and W. Wolmer. 2006. “Livestock, Disease, Trade and Markets: Policy Choices for theLivestock Sector in Africa.” Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton.Shumba, C. 2010. “The Darfur Value Chain Analyses: Sheep, Cattle, Groundnuts and Oranges.” UNDP.September.SUPRAID, BYDA, and Concern Worldwide. 2004. “Trading for Peace. An Overview of Markets andTrading Practices, with Particular Reference to Peace Markets in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, SouthernSudan.” Edited by Shannon Fraser, Caroline Gullick, Sebastian Ling, and Ka Vang. Funded by USAIDand OFDA. September.UN. 2010. “Beyond Emergency Relief. Longer-term Trends and Priorities for UN Agencies in Darfur.”Office of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Khartoum. September.UNEP. 2008. “Destitution, Distortion, and Deforestation: The Impact of the Conflict on the Timberand Wood Fuel Trade in Darfur.” Authored by M. Buchanan-Smith, A. Abdalla Adam, B. Bromwich, M.El Hafiz Ibrahim, M. Dafalla, A. A. Fadul, A. R. Mohammed Tahir. Geneva.World Bank. 2003. “Sudan Stabilization and Reconstruction: Country EconomicMemorandum. Volume 1: Main Text, Report No. 24620-SU.” The World Bank, Washington, DC.World Bank. 2007. “Darfur. Dimensions of Challenge for Development. A Background Volume.”Young, H., A. M. Osman, et al. 2005. “Darfur—Livelihoods under Siege.” Tufts FIC, Medford, MA.http://fic.tufts.edu/downloads/darfur_livelihoods_under_seige.pdf.Young, H., A. M. Osman, A. M. Abusin, M. Asher, and O. Egemi. 2009. “Livelihoods, Power, and Choice:The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizaygat, Darfur, Sudan.” Tufts FIC, Medford, MA.Young, H., A. Rahim, A. Mohamed, and M. Fitzpatrick. (2012). “Pastoralism and Pastoralists in Sudan. AStakeholder Mapping and Survey.” Short Report. Tufts FIC, SOS Sahel Sudan, and UNEP. June.Yusuf, M. 2009. “New Joint Chamber of Commerce Offers Chance to Promote Cross-LOC Trade inKashmir.” Special Report 230. United States Institute for Peace. August.60

Annex 1. Research team carrying out the studyMargie Buchanan-Smith is a Visiting Fellow with the Feinstein InternationalCenter at Tufts University. She is an independent policy researcher with more than25 years’ experience in the humanitarian sector. She first worked in Darfur in 1987as Agricultural Economics Adviser to the Agricultural Planning Unit of the DarfurRegional Government. During this time, she carried out a study of the grain marketin Darfur and initiated a drought early warning system for North Darfur. Herconsultancy and research work has particularly focused on Sudan and the Horn ofAfrica. She is currently an adviser to the Market Monitoring and Trade Analysisproject run by the Darfur Development and Reconstruction Agency. She is SeniorResearch Associate with the Humanitarian Policy Group at the OverseasDevelopment Institute in London.Dr. Abduljabar Abdalla Fadul is an Assistant Professor at El Fashir University inNorth Darfur State. He has many years’ experience and extensive knowledge ofnatural resources, livelihoods, and conflict in Darfur and has contributed to manyresearch projects and studies in Darfur since the 1980s. He is currently an adviser tothe Market Monitoring and Trade Analysis project run by the Darfur Developmentand Reconstruction Agency. He worked as a government Veterinary Officer inDarfur and as a Provincial Veterinary Inspector between 1975 and 1981. He holds anM.A. in Rural Development and Food Security from the University of East Angliain the UK.Yacob Aklilu is a senior researcher at the Feinstein International Center, TuftsUniversity. He is a livelihoods specialist with in-depth knowledge of humanitarianand development programming and policies in Africa. An agricultural economist, hehas more than 25 years of experience of policy analysis and reform at national andregional levels. He has a specialist knowledge of livestock marketing at domestic,regional, and international levels and was the instigator of the Pastoral LivestockMarketing Groups approach in Ethiopia and Kenya.Dr. Abdul Rahman Mohammed Tahir is Professor of Range Management atNyala Agricultural Research Centre within the Ministry of Agriculture in SouthDarfur. With many years of experience of range and pasture management, he hasworked for the Agricultural Research Corporation for 15 years and for the WesternSavanna Development Corporation for 14 years. He completed his Ph.D. inAgriculture at the University of Khartoum in 2003, and holds an M.Sc. inAgriculture from Cranfield Institute of Technology in the UK.Dr. Abdelatif Ahmed Mohamed Ijaimi works as an expert in the GeneralSecretariat of the Higher Council for Agriculture Revival of Sudan and isChairperson of the Consultative Committee of the Common Fund forCommodities. He was previously Undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture inSudan, and before that Director-General of the General Directorate for AgriculturalPlanning and Economics in the Ministry. He worked as an expert for the ArabOrganization for Agricultural Development. He holds a Ph.D. in AgriculturalEconomics from the University of Hohenheim in Germany.June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 61

The following local team of local researchers also worked on the study across thegreater Darfur Region:Markets coveredFora Boranga andUmm DukhnEd Daien and AssalayaEl Furdos and AbusenaidraZalingei and TeraijEl Tomat and RajajAbu Matarig and AbujabraSeraf OmraRehaid Al Berdi, Markundi,and AboriEl MalhaUmlabbasa and SilgoResearcherMohamed Yousif Bakour MohamedSaeed Abbaker Saeed ArbabAlraiyah Bura AlbeshariAbdalhameed Ibraheem Salih AbdalkareemBabikir Teirab Mohamed OsmanAhmed Mohamed Abukalam JumaShoeib Abdulraheem Ateem AliIbrahim Mohamed Idris AdamAhmed Ali AhmedAdam Mohamed Dahab62

Annex 2. Analysis of trading costs in Darfur’s livestock tradeThe following data were collected during interviews with livestock traders between March and May2011. It should be noted that the data are recorded according to how they were recounted by therespective trader—hence the fact that the cost items mentioned are not always consistent.1. Trading costs for sheep traded from El Fasher to El Khuwei: flock of 300 sheepItem Cost before Cost in 2011 % increasethe conflict (SDG) (SDG)1. Formal taxes and veterinary 3.5 per head 7.5 per headfees:eg., licence registration, zakat,grazing fee, tax, veterinary fees2. Informal taxes 2 per head 10 per head3. Cost of 2 herders per flock 200 (0.67 per head) 1,200 (4 per head)(and per head)4. 1 lead herder for 4 flocks 800 (0.66 per head) 1,500 (1.25 per head)5. 1 armed guard for 4 flocks Not required 1,000 (0.83 per head)Total per head 6.83 23.58 245%Source: Sheep trader, El Fasher, March 20112. Trading costs for cattle traded from El Fasher to Omdurman: herd of 60 cattleItem Cost before Cost in 2011 % increasethe conflict (SDG) (SDG)1. Formal taxes eg., zakat etc. 4–5 per head 15–8 per head2. Informal taxes per herd – 2,000–2,500 ( 40 per head)3. 2 junior drovers per herd 300 (5 per head) 1,500 (25 per head)4. 1 lead drover for 4 herds 1,000 (4 per head) 2,500 (10.5 per head)5. Supplies per herd 150 ( 2.5 per head) 600 (10 per head)6. Armed guard Not required 10 per head until KordofanTotal per head 16 112 600%Source: Cattle trader, El Fasher, March 2011June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 63

3. Trading costs for cattle traded from Geneina to Omdurman: herd of 50 cattleItem Cost before Cost in 2011 % increasethe conflict (SDG) (SDG)1. Formal taxes eg., zakat etc. 5–7 per head 20 per head2. Informal taxes per 100 (2 per head) 3–4,000 (70 per head)herd (per head)3. 2 junior drovers per 600 (12 per head) 2,400 (48 per head)herd (per head)4. 1 lead drover for 4 1,200 (6 per head) 4,000 (20 per head)herds (per head)5. Supplies per herd* 100 (2 per head) 3–4,000 (70 per head)6. Armed guards Not required 3,500 (70 per head)Total per head 28 298 964%* Under the current conflict conditions, supplies include the provision of sorghum and concentrates for cattle, asthey must be trekked at speed to avoid banditry. As a result, 2–3 cattle are said to die from exhaustion from eachherd during trekking. Formerly, cattle were allowed to trek at leisure while grazing.Source: Cattle trader, Ardamata, Geneina, March 20114. Trading costs for cattle traded from Nyala to OmdurmanItem Cost before Cost in 2011 % increasethe conflict (SDG) (SDG)1. Taxes 25 per head 25 per head2. Herding costs 50 per head 60 per head3. Additional costs associated 70 per headwith the conflict: checkpoints,guards for protection, localityfees, etc.Total per head 75 155 106%Source: Cattle trader, Nyala, March 201164

5. Trading costs for cattle traded from Tomat to Omdurman: herd of 50 cattleItem Cost before the Cost in 2011 % increaseconflict (SDG)— (SDG)—rainy season rainy season1. Formal taxes (incl. vet. 12.5 per head 30 per headinspection)2. Guide for herding 40 per head 150 per head3. Drover for herd (per head) 1,000 (20 per head) 2,000 (40 per head)4. Horse for herding (per head) 500 (10 per head) 1,000–1,500 (25 per head)5. Donkey 150 (3 per head) 200–250 (4.5 per head)6. Drugs 500 (10 per head) 1,000 (20 per head)Total per head 95.50 269.50 182%Source: Local researcher interviews with cattle traders, Tomat, April to May 20116. Trading costs for cattle traded from Abu Matarig to Omdurman: herd of 50 cattleItem Cost before the Cost in 2011 % increaseconflict (SDG) (SDG)1. Formal taxes (incl. 19.5 per head 30 per headveterinary fees)2. Lead herder per herd 750 (15 per head) 1,500 (30 per head)3. 2 herders per herd 500 (10 per head) 2,000 (40 per head)4. Horse per herd 700 (14 per head) 1,000 (20 per head)5. Donkey per herd 300 (6 per head) 300 (6 per head)6. Guards per herd 0 700 (14 per head)Total 64.50 140.00 117%Source: Local researcher interviews with cattle traders, Abu Matarig, April to May 2011June 2012 • ON THE HOOF: The Livestock Trade In Darfur 65

7. Trading costs for camels traded from Seraf Omra to Egypt: herd of 50 camelsItem Cost before the Cost in 2011 % increaseconflict (SDG) (SDG)1. Formal taxes 14 per head 26 per head2. Moving to collection point 2 per head 6 per head3. Middlemen fees 3 per head 10 per head4. Costs while bulking 300 (6 per head) 600 (12 per head)the herd, per herd5. Vet. fees per herd 50 (1 per head) 200 (4 per head)6. Guide per herd 1,000 (20 per head) 2,000 (40 per head)7. 2 drovers per herd 1,000 (20 per head) 2,000 (40 per head)8. Guard (one pre-conflict, 500 (10 per head) 2,000 (40 per head)two in 2011)9. Fees in Kuma per herd 150–200 (3.5 per head) 500 (10 per head)10. Umm Sunnta fees per herd 400–500 (9 per head) 1,000–1,500 (25 per head)11. Um Gozein fees per herd 200–300 (5 per head) 700 (14 per head)12. Dongola fees per herd 1,000 (20 per head) 3,000–5,000 (80 per head)13. Checkpoints per herd 0 3,500 (70 per head)14. Water per herd 35 (0.7 per head) 135 (2.7 per head)Total 114.20 379.70 232%Source: Local researcher interviews with camel traders, Seraf Omra, April to May 201166

Further technical information may be obtained from the UNEP Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch website at:http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/ or by email: postconflict@unep.org

http://unep.org/Sudan/Feinstein International CenterTufts University114 Curtis StreetSomerville, MA 02144, USAtel: +1 617.627.3423fax: +1 617.627.3428http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/www.unep.orgUnited Nations Environment ProgrammeP.O. Box 30552 Nairobi, KenyaTel: +254 (0)20 762 1234Fax: +254 (0)20 762 3927Email: uneppub@unep.org