ISSUE 145 : Nov/Dec - 2000 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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ISSUE 145 : Nov/Dec - 2000 - Australian Defence Force Journal

A U S T R A L I A NDEFENCEForceJOURNALJOURNAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN PROFESSION OF ARMSNO.145NOVEMBER/DECEMBER2000


Australian Defence Force JournalBoard of ManagementBrigadier Steve Ayling, AM (Chairman)Air Commodore Ken BirrerGroup Captain Allan CroweColonel Roger DaceCaptain James V.P. Goldrick, RANColonel Michael GoodyerBronwen GreyKaren GriffithDr Ron HuiskenLieutenant Colonel Neil F. JamesMr Darryl JohnstonColonel Paul McGraneContributions of any length will be considered but,as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articles should betyped double spaced, on one side of the paper, or preferablysubmitted on disk in a word processing format. Hardcopyshould be supplied in duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should beaddressed to:The EditorAustralian Defence Force JournalR8-LG-001Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(02) 6265 1193Fax (02) 6265 6972CopyrightThe material contained in the Australian Defence Force Journalis the copyright of the Department of Defence. No part ofthe publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the consent of the Managing Editor.Email: adfj@spirit.com.auwww.defence.gov.au/pacc/dfj/© Commonwealth of Australia 2000ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2000


1A U S T R A L I A NDEFENCEForceJOURNALManaging EditorMichael P. TraceyEditorIrene M. CoombesContributors are urged to ensure theaccuracy of the information contained intheir articles; the Board of Managementaccepts no responsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journalwill generally be readily given by theManaging Editor after consultation with theauthor. Any reproduced articles should bearan acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are theauthor’s own and should not be construed asofficial opinion or policy.NO. 145NOVEMBER/DECEMBER2000CONTENTS3. Letters to the Editor5. The Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare tothe Australian Army in the InformationAgeMajor David McGuire, RAE15. Some Aspects of the Revolution inMilitary Affairs and the Impact on theADFColonel M. Goodyer, Director Future Warfare23. Leadership Skills for APS Managers inDefenceJacinta Carroll, Department of Defence35. Non-Combat Occupational Stress andFatigue: A Review of Factors andMeasurement Issues for the ADFCaptain S.K. Brooks, DSPPR, Professor D.G.Byrne, ANU, and Major S.E. Hodson, ARTC51. Tiltrotors and the Australian DefenceForceLieutenant Commander Tim Leonard, RAN55. Annual IndexFront Cover: East TimorPhotograph by Sergeant W. GuthriePrinted in Australiaby National Capital Printing,Fyshwick, ACT 2609


2AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Farewell to our Managing EditorMr Michael P. TraceyMichael Tracey is leaving the staff of the Australian Defence Force Journal on 22 Decemberafter twenty-one years of outstanding service as Managing Editor.The Board of Management wishes to acknowledge the significant contribution that Michaelhas made with the publication of 127 separate editions of the Journal.Michael has also been responsible for Australian Defence Force Journal Publications, havingwritten ten books including Australia Remembers 1939-45, Australian Prisoners of War andAustralians in Vietnam. He has also edited and designed seven other publications including AFeeling of Belonging (a collection of poems), Images from the Back Seat and The Flight of the Pig.Michael Tracey has displayed vision, imagination and determination in his work over theyears. The many readers of the Journal and the other publications have appreciated his efforts. Wewish him well in his future endeavours.


4AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000in-depth analysis of re-raising a PacificIslands Regiment or that Regiment's pasthistory. It is an option worthy ofconsideration if Australia wishes to increaseits commitment to Melanesia and increaseour contribution to regional stability. Thebenefits are numerous, to Australia,Melanesia, and the region. If examined(without the neo-colonial rhetoric) from anobjective viewpoint the benefits to theregion quickly become obvious. The supportof Melanesian governments, the veryinstitutions at risk, would most likely besecured with some qualification. Instead ofwaving the chequebook; let's get pro-activeand directly contribute to a stable, secureMelanesia.George BaileyCaptainMeeting the ChallengeDear Editor,The ADF is increasingly pressured to “domore with less" whilst adapting itself to thecomplex post-Cold War world. Whilst thefocus of change up to now has been onefficiency and structural change, the nextlogical step for Defence (and other publicagencies) is to find innovative ways tomanage individual performance by betterattention to the “softer” aspects oforganisational behaviour.We have written two articles dealingwith ways of meeting this challenge in theADF. The first analyses how jobperformance is affected by the Services’approach to job rotation. Its title is “JobRotation and Military Capability: benefits,certainly – but is anyone counting thecost?”The second article deals withperformance management, in terms of howto develop and sustain "high performancecultures". Its title is "Leading Thirsty Horsesto Water: high performance cultures andADF capability".Both articles are based on both empiricaland theoretical analysis and show thatindividual productivity and henceorganisational capability can besignificantly improved by “smarter" ways ofmanaging the ADF’s human resources.Both articles have been submitted to theAustralian Defence Force Journal forpossible publication. In the meantime,interested readers can find them athttp://www.sigmaconsultancy.com/publications.htm.Nick Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans


The Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to theAustralian Army in the Information AgeBy Major David McGuire, RAE5When force is necessary, there it must be applied boldly, decisively and completely. But onemust know the limitations of force; one must know when to blend force with manoeuvre, a blowwith an agreement. Leon Trotsky 1The general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war: all action takesplace, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make thingsseem grotesque and larger than they really are. Whatever is hidden from full view in this feeblelight has to be guessed by talent, or simply by chance. So once again, for a lack of objectknowledge, one has to trust to talent or to luck. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. 2Amanoeuvre concept suitable for theemerging Australian Army is the subjectof much debate, especially at the CombinedArms Training and Development Centre(CATDC). Some proponents of manoeuvre haveattempted to heighten its value by establishing,then denouncing, an alternate position ofattrition. 3 Attrition is often portrayed as theindustrial age method of warfare wherestrength is pitted against strength in a war ofannihilation, while manoeuvre is seen as thepanacea, as strength is directed againstweaknesses – the indirect approach. 4 Trotskyimplies that the real nature of war liessomewhere in between, recognising that bothphilosophies may be relevant. He also alludesto another dimension of manoeuvre warfare,the manoeuvre of agreement or diplomacy.Trotsky’s insights into the nature of warcould be dismissed as products of the industrialage, and not relevant to the emergingAustralian Army. However, the concepts ofattrition and manoeuvre are not products ofthe industrial age. Sun Tsu wrote of theimportance of manoeuvre over two thousandyears ago. 5 Yet, as the world moves into theinformation age the relevance of manoeuvrewarfare is again being questioned. Theinformation age has predicted a new style ofwar characterised by concepts such as theempty battlespace, network-centric warfareand multi-dimensional rapid nodal takedown. 6To most these terms mean little, restrictingdebate to the “buzzword intelligencier” 7 .Nevertheless, the principles behind these termsmay be highly relevant to the Australian Armyand its concept for manoeuvre warfare in thefuture.Land Warfare Doctrine One (LWD1) hasadopted the tenets of manoeuvre theory as thebasic principles by which the Australian Armywill fight and win the future land battle. Theinformation age has the potential to changethe face of manoeuvre warfare and presentsthe Australian Army with new and uniqueopportunities to “fight above its weight”. 8 Thiswill only be possible if the Australian Armycan integrate the new ideas and opportunitiespresented by the information age technologiesinto its concept of manoeuvre warfare.Aim and ScopeThe aim of this article is to propose aconcept of manoeuvre warfare suitable for theemerging Australian Army. The concept willincorporate those information age ideas andopportunities that will assist in winning theland battle of the future. It will also emphasisethe importance of a “whole of nation”approach to manoeuvre warfare. Beforeevaluating these issues, I believe it is essentialto provide an explanation of manoeuvre


6AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000warfare, the information age, and therelationship between the two. This will formthe foundation for the development of anAustralian Army concept for manoeuvrewarfare.Manoeuvre WarfareThe essence of manoeuvre warfare is thedislocation of the enemy through the indirectapproach. In adopting a manoeuvrist approach,the Australian Army must seek to defeat anenemy by shattering their will and cohesion.This is achieved by focusing on the enemy’scentre of gravity via “gaps” and criticalvulnerabilities, rather than through attrition byattacking their strengths or “surfaces”. The goalof manoeuvre warfare is to nullify one’s ownweaknesses, produce synergy of effort, presenta dilemma to the enemy, deny the enemy ofone or more of their capabilities, and thenexploit their weaknesses. 9 In effect, it offers theAustralian Army a means of fighting above itsweight.Manoeuvre warfare aims to exploit enemyweaknesses through speed (of decision andaction), offensive action, and mental agility;where forces fight-to-move rather than moveto-fight.10 This allows a force to maintaintempo and out-manoeuvre the enemy.Manoeuvre warfare emphasises that lines ofoperation may involve military, political,moral, social, economic and humanitariandecisive points. The manoeuvre force must beable to achieve simultaneity in concentratingthe effects of these to pre-empt, disrupt ordislocate the enemy. A concept of manoeuvrewarfare for the Australian Army mustemphasise tempo, simultaneity and concentrationof effects in order to defeat anenemy in the future.Typically, manoeuvre requires the use oftwo types of forces to defeat the enemy: theordinary (or holding) force and the extraordinary(or mobile) force. 11 The ordinary forcemay need to fight an attritionalist style battleto hold the enemy and must be equippedaccordingly. The extraordinary force providesthe manoeuvre that will dislocate the enemyand therefore must be mobile and lethal. Theseconcepts illuminate the need for a balancedforce when designing an Australian Armyconcept for manoeuvre warfare.Even with a balanced force “manoeuvrewarfare will continue to be filled withsurprises, friction, and chance making coordinationafter contact with the enemy almostunworkable”. 12 Consequently subordinatesmust be entrusted, through directive control, touse initiative to seize opportunities whichachieve the higher commander’s intent.Directive control has been in Australiandoctrine for a number of years though itspractical application has been hindered by agrowing culture of risk aversion and distrust. 13Directive control is essential to the successfulimplementation of manoeuvre warfare in theAustralian Army, but trust and confidencemust first be re-established.In summary, the concepts of manoeuvrewarfare emphasise the indirect approachthrough attacking an enemy’s centre of gravityvia critical vulnerabilities. Manoeuvre is not aproduct of the industrial age, rather it is aconceptual approach to warfighting. Therefore,the new ideas and opportunities offered by theinformation age should been seen asopportunities to enhance the Australian Army’sability to fight a manoeuvrist war, not as achallenge to it.The Information Age and Manoeuvre WarfareIf the industrial age battlefield wascharacterised by mass production and largescalearmies, then the information age could beviewed as an opportunity for smaller, hightechnology armies to dominate the battlespaceusing new concepts of manoeuvre warfare. 14William Perry, ex-US Secretary for Defense,stated that “…we now live in an age that isdriven by information. Technologicalbreakthroughs…are changing the face of warand how we prepare for war.” 15 In his


THE RELEVANCE OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 7statement, Perry refers to two distinctcomponents of the information age – theinformation revolution and rapid technologicalchange.The information revolution refers to therapid expansion of internet, telecommunicationsand satellite systems that hasoccurred during the last part of this century.These systems now allow the collection,collation and dissemination of informationfaster and in greater quantities than everbefore. The end result and full implications ofthese ongoing developments are highlyuncertain, though their potential to improvesituational awareness and tempo within thebattlespace is enormous. 16The second component referred to by Perryis rapid technological change. The militaryapplications of these technologies includesmart munitions, night vision technology,lasers and microprocessors, just to name a few.These offer a force greater lethality than everbefore, especially when the effects areconcentrated simultaneously using informationtechnologies. The combined effect of thesedevelopments is forcing the Australian Armyto reconsider how it should fight a manoeuvrewar in the information age.These technologies are already having aneffect on the modern battlefield. The concept ofasymmetric warfare, 17 though not new, hasevolved as a result of technological advances.Conventional forces now face a wider varietyof threats requiring greater dispersion to reducethe risk of detection and destruction byprecision weaponry, as witnessed in Kosovo.Equally, digital communications, globalpositioning systems and enhanced targetacquisition systems assist force dispersion andallow the simultaneous concentration of effectswithout the need to concentrate forces.Command of dispersed forces is beingsimplified by linking all systems – thenetwork-centric battlespace. 18Networking the battlespace, (referred to assystems integration, network-centric warfare,or the system of systems approach) 19 will beachieved through the digitalised linking of allthe component systems. It will involve theapplication of information technologies toacquire, exchange and employ timely digitalinformation throughout the battlespace. Such asystem would be tailored to the needs ofdecider (the commander), shooter (combatsystems) and supporter (combat support andservices), allowing each to maintain a clear andconcise vision of the battlespace necessary tosupport planning and execution. 20 The result isshared situational awareness, which wouldallow the Australian Army a means ofachieving manoeuvre dominance against anenemy over vast distances.While the development of information agewarfare systems has the potential tosubstantially increase the fighting power of theAustralian Army, it can also be a two-edgedsword. 21 The linking of systems also makesthem vulnerable to attack through cybermanoeuvre.22 The relative low cost of cybermanoeuvreallows small countries to achievedisproportionate effects on a much largerenemy. 23 While the Australian Army must nowprotect its systems from this new threat, it alsopresents an opportunity for the Army to fightabove its weight. Therefore, in developing amanoeuvre warfare concept for the AustralianArmy in the information age, a balance mustbe struck between offensive and defensivecapabilities.A Concept of Manoeuvre Warfare for theEmerging Australian ArmyTo fight and win on the future battlefieldthe Australian Army must apply the ideas andopportunities offered by the information age toits concept of manoeuvre warfare. AustralianArmy doctrine states that its capacity to fightand win is dependent upon its fighting power. 24The Army generates its fighting power throughthe combination of three interdependentcomponents; the intellectual, moral andphysical. The intellectual component provides


8AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Figure 1. A Proposed Concept for Manoeuvre Warfare for the Australian Armythe knowledge to fight; the moral componentprovides the will to fight; and the physicalcomponent provides the means to fight. 25The concept of manoeuvre warfare for theAustralian Army, modelled in Figure 1,highlights the central importance ofmanoeuvre theory to the Army’s fightingpower. The model has been developed throughthe combination of ideas and concepts that arerelevant to the Australian Army in the future.Manoeuvre theory, being the conceptual basisfor the Australian Army’s warfightingphilosophy, is placed centrally. The modelshows manoeuvre theory being integrated intothe three components of fighting power,providing a unity of focus across the Army.This, combined with the new ideas andopportunities of the information age, providesa means of countering the corrosive effects ofthe “fog of war”.While simplistic, the model emphasises theimportance of manoeuvre theory in theinformation age. Information age ideas andopportunities are seen to enhance manoeuvretheory and the Army’s fighting power,allowing it to fight above its weight. While allmanoeuvre concepts and tenets are relevant,the three tenets of manoeuvre most suited tothe Australian Army are tempo, simultaneityand the concentration of effects. These tenetsare chosen as they incorporate most othermanoeuvre ideas (see Table A), they suit theneeds of a small army with a large area todefend and they meet a critical requirement -they are potentially inexpensive to develop.There is no reason to believe that theAustralian Army of 2030 will be funded anybetter, in relative terms, than now. Therefore,the Army should embrace tenets that allow itto maximise effect while minimising mass.Tempo is important as it allows acommander to “get inside” the enemy’sdecision cycle and offset some of the potentialdisadvantages of a smaller force. 26 Tempo canbe achieved through a variety of means.Improved situational awareness, via battlefieldsensor systems and a networked battlespace,leads to decision superiority and faster decisiveaction. Decisive action requires a fast, mobileand lethal force. While this requires suitableequipment and training, it is equally dependentupon organisational groupings that allow theformation of “combined arms teams” bestsuited to the task at hand. Directive controlaids tempo as it gives commanders theflexibility to seize opportunities while


THE RELEVANCE OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 9Table: A.The Australian Army Tenets of Manoeuvre and Other Related Ideas and ConceptsANNEX A TO OPS ESSAY DATED 2 NOV 99The Australian Army Tenets of Manoeuvre and Other Related Ideas and Concepts*AUSTRALIAN ARMYRELATED IDEAS, CONCEPTS AND OPPORTUNITIESTENETS OF MANOEUVRE MANOEUVRE THEORY INFORMATION AGETEMPO Maintenance of advantage Network-centric warfareProfessional mastery/battle cunning Battlespace sensor integrationHigh velocity – low massDigitisation – C3ISRSpeed and synchronisationBattlefield combat identificationBoyd Cycle – OODA LoopCyber-manoeuvreEffective C2/decision superiority Light, lethal combat forceReach back logistics/Enhanced situational awarenesssanctuary battlespaceFight-to-moveDirective controlCOG/key vulnerabilitiesForce compatibility and tailoredorganisationIntegration with National ManoeuvreSIMULTANEITY Shock action Network-centricSurpriseDigitisation – Sensor/shooter/Boyd Cyclesupplier linksReach back logisticsCyber-manoeuvreMulti-dimensional rapid nodal Digitised stock controltakedownPerception managementForce compatibility and tailoredorganisationCOG/key vulnerabilitiesIntegration with National ManoeuvreCONCENTRATION OF Massing for Decision Enhance platformsEFFECTS Multi-dimensional rapid nodal Smart/brilliant munitionstakedownBattlespace sensor integrationShaping the battlespaceSatellites, attack helicopters, PGMEmpty battlespace/dispersion Volumetricssignature reductionEMP, NBC, HPMTailored lethal and non-lethal force Laser technologyDetect and inform/precision Cyber-manoeuvre – Soft forceengagement(knowledge based force)SurvivabilityInformation operationsIntegration with National ManoeuvreCOG/key vulnerabilitiesForce compatability and tailoredorganisation*Terms and concepts drawn primarily from LWD1 and FLWD 2000 (Draft) – grouping by the author.


10AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000minimising force losses – an importantconsideration for a small force such as theAustralian Army. 27Simultaneity, the synchronisation of anumber of effects at the same point in time,compliments tempo. It can allow a small forceto have a disproportionate effect within thebattlespace through the synchronisedapplication of a number of actions against theenemy, while simultaneously resupplying,manoeuvring and preparing for futureactions. 28 These actions may incorporate acombination of physical and cyber manoeuvredirected against key enemy vulnerabilities.These attacks do not necessarily require a largeforce, simply a well-balanced force that isintegrated through a networked command andcontrol system. Once again, directive controlwill provide commanders with the flexibility tomeet the intent while minimising cost.The “punch” is provided by the concentrationof effects, not the force, against theenemy. The use of information age advancessuch as surveillance sensors, networkedbattlespace systems and smart munitions allowthe effects to be concentrated accurately andrapidly. Force dichotomy is important, as theenemy force may need to be fixed in order totarget key vulnerabilities. 29 This may require aforce with superior lethality, though this doesnot necessarily imply a heavy combat force.Information age advances in weapontechnology have the potential to give a light,mobile force the ability to fix a larger, heavierforce through the combination of manoeuvreand lethality. Cyber-manoeuvre, alreadydescribed as cheap and relatively simple, canbe used to lessen a larger force’s advantagethrough disrupting communications, andpotentially their national support base. 30In summary, these tenets require abalanced and modern combat force capable ofhigh mobility, speed and lethality. The forcewould be dependent upon modern sensors todetect the enemy, allowing commanders tomake timely decisions and take decisive action,thus maintaining tempo. This would require anetworked battlespace that links the deciderwith the shooter and supporter, allowingsimultaneity of action and the concentration ofeffects, rather than forces. The integration ofinformation age technology with manoeuvreconcepts would allow the future AustralianArmy to have a disproportional effect withinthe battlespace, as emphasised in Figure 1.Information age technology has alsoopened up the modern combat force to fargreater scrutiny and influence than ever before.The media, politicians and public can nowobserve, and potentially influence the tacticalbattle, as evidenced in East Timor in recentmonths. The Australian Army of the future willoperate in a complex environment that willrequire it to synchronise its efforts in a widerarena. Therefore, a concept of manoeuvrewarfare for the Australian Army would beincomplete and ineffective without placing itinto the wider context of national manoeuvre.National ManoeuvreThe Australian Army will not fight the nextconflict in a vacuum, and it is thereforenecessary to adopt a “whole of nation”approach to manoeuvre, as shown in Figure 2.Sun Tsu stated that, “to subdue the enemywithout fighting is the acme of skill”. 31 Toachieve this, a commander must exploit allavailable assets to pre-empt, disrupt anddislocate the enemy forces. These assets mayinclude political and diplomatic manoeuvre,manipulation of public will (both friendly andenemy) and the application of creative andinnovative leadership. 32 Manoeuvre on multiplelevels requires training and national securitystrategies that help commanders focus on themain effort. When all these assets arecombined with a modern combat force that istrained in the tenets of manoeuvre, theemerging Australian Army will have acomprehensive concept for manoeuvrewarfare.


THE RELEVANCE OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 11Figure 2. Manoeuvre at the National LevelTo be successful in future the AustralianArmy must be capable of manoeuvring onmultiple levels, making best use of all itsnational assets. Figure 2 has been designed forthis article to model the relationship betweenthe components of national level manoeuvre,relevant to the Army. It uses the familiaranalogy of a formation in the advance. Theobjective, in this case is a 21st centuryadversary who in military terms may be ourequal, or superior. The vanguard representsnational level leadership that provides theguidance for Army policy. Manoeuvre warfaredepends upon leaders who are willing to bebold and innovative in their use of tactics,while confident in applying directive control. 33These concepts are equally as important forAustralia’s national leaders if it is to besuccessful in future conflicts.The main body is made up of a moderncombat force, incorporating all three Services,that is trained in manoeuvre warfare and cansynchronise its forces to achieve aconcentration of effects. To achieve this, theforce itself must also be suitably structured andequipped. The threat facing Australia in thefuture is unclear and tomorrow’s Army musthave the flexibility to meet a number ofstrategic threats. It must also be equipped withthe technologies previously discussed to defeatthe enemy. Funding for such technologies isultimately dependent upon national will.As in the past, the success of militaryoperations will depend largely upon “winningthe hearts and minds” of the people. The publicsupport a military force is able to engender andpreserve through its media image, is in somecases as important as its actual accomplishments.34 Future commanders and strategicthinkers must be alert to the potential of beingout-manoeuvred by the media who can distort,exploit or even plainly fabricate reality to meettheir own ends. 35 Alternatively, the media canbe used as an effective medium for winningpublic support while attacking the enemy’ssupport base. Public support will be a powercomponent of any future concept formanoeuvre warfare for the Australian Army.“Presidents and Prime Ministers learn whatis happening (in the war) from TV beforediplomats or generals can report back tothem…creating a sense of unreality about realevents”. 36 Military commanders at all levelscannot afford to be dislocated from theirpolitical commanders in this manner. Politicsand diplomacy are therefore key elements ofmanoeuvre. Politicians provide the resourcesand direction for the military commander tofight the battle; diplomats provide “manoeuvreby negotiation”. 37 Therefore, politicaldiplomacy, combined with a clear nationalsecurity policy, provide the flank protection forthe military component. In the future,manoeuvre warfare will be dependent upon


12AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000achieving tempo, simultaneity, and aconcentration of effects at all levels.ConclusionManoeuvre warfare will continue to remainrelevant in the information age. The new ideasand opportunities that the information agepresents should be seen as a means ofenhancing manoeuvre rather than replacing it.Information age technology has the potentialto provide a small and mobile force such as theAustralian Army with the means to have adisproportionate effect upon the battlefield,enhancing its ability to fight above its weight.The concept of manoeuvre warfare for theAustralian Army modelled in Figure 1 buildsupon the current doctrine of fighting power.Manoeuvre theory is placed central to thecomponents of fighting power, continuouslyfeeding in new ideas and concepts. Theadvances of the information age are integratedinto the manoeuvre concept, enhancingsituational awareness, decision superiority andallowing a commander to take decisive actionbefore the enemy. In effect, the integratedmodel shields the modern fighting force fromthe corrosive effects of the “fog of war”.The three tenets of manoeuvre theoryidentified as having the most relevance to theAustralian Army are tempo, simultaneity andconcentration of effects. These tenets providethe Army with a simple, achievable andrelatively affordable goal in restructuring itsforces to fight a manoeuvre war in theinformation age. They should be viewed asbeing inclusive of other manoeuvre ideas andconcepts while being well suited to suchinformation age concepts as network-centricwarfare and cyber-manoeuvre. The integratedconcept of manoeuvre warfare would providethe Australian Army with a means ofenhancing its fighting power and increase itsability to fight above its weight.In the future, the Army’s concept mustincorporate a national manoeuvre strategy, asshown in Figure 2. Successful manoeuvre inthe operational environment will be dependentupon, and must be supportive of, political anddiplomatic objectives, public support andnational policy. Most importantly, strong andflexible leadership is required at all levels toensure that the Army is focused, trained andequipped to fight and win the manoeuvre warwhile making the best use of information ageadvances.NOTES1. Quoted in, Combined Arms Training andDevelopment Centre, 1999, FLWD 2000Warfighting in the 21st Century (Draft),Puckapunyal, piii.2. Clausewitz, On War, Edited by Michael Howardand Peter Paret, 1976, Princeton, New Jersey,p.140.3. D.P. Bolger, 1993, “Maneuver WarfareRecognised”, in Hooker, R.D. (Ed.), ManeuverWarfare – An Anthology, Presidio, Navato CA,p.21.4. N.K. Quarmby, (Lieutenant Colonel) 1999,Presentation to The Headline ExperimentParticipants, Combined Arms Training andDevelopment Centre, Puckapunyal.5. Sun Tzu, circa 500 BC, The Art of War, Clavell,J. 1989, Hodder & Stoughton, London, p.23.6. J. Kelly, (Lieutenant Colonel) 1999, Presentationto The Headline Experiment, Combined ArmsTraining Centre, Puckapunyal.7. Buzzword Intelligencier – A phrase coined bythe author to describe those theorists thatcomplicate the debate by inventing buzzwordsthat add more to their self-esteem than to thetopic of the debate.8. T.J. Welch, 1997, “Technology and Warfare”, inThomas, K (Ed), The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs: Warfare in the Information Age,Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra,pp.33-5.9. R.R. Leonhard, 1991, The Art of Manoeuvre -Manoeuvre Warfare and Air-Land Battle,Presidio Press, Novato, pp. 91-106.10. Often referred to as the Boyd Cycle where acommander aims to maintain tempo and theinitiative through a faster decision cycle thanthe enemy – leads to decision superiority andfaster decisive action.11. Force dichotomy was introduced by Sun Tzu,op.cit., and is explained by Leonhard, op. cit.,pp. 90-91.12. T.J. Shobbrook, 1997, “Synchronisation andManoeuvre Warfare: There’s a Place for Both”,Marine Corps Gazette, January, p. 61.


THE RELEVANCE OF MANOEUVRE WARFARE TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1313. D.J. McGuire, (Major) 1999, “Building Creativityand Innovation in the Australian Army”, ArmyC&SC Monash Paper, Fort Queenscliff, p.3.14. D.A. Macgregor, 1997, Breaking the Phalanx,Praeger, Conneticut, p.37.15. W. Perry, 1996, quoted in the introduction to,Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly,Volume XXVI No.3, Autumn, p.3.16. R. Molander, et al. 1996, “Strategic InformationWarfare: A New Face of War”, in Parameters,US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXVINo.3, Autumn, p.81.17. Asymmetric Warfare – Warfare characterised bythe absence of a clear FEBA or rear area. On thefuture battlefield combatants will useconventional and unconventional means todestroy the enemy’s ability to sustain operationsthrough attacks on command and control,logistics and public support, just to name a few.(As explained in FLWD 2000, Ch.7).18. R.J. Harknett, 1996, “Information Warfare andDeterrence”, in Parameters, US Army WarCollege Quarterly, Volume XXVI No.3,Autumn, p.94.19. Quarmby, op. cit.20. Harknett, op. cit., p.94.21. ibid, p.93.22. Cyber-manoeuvre – An information orknowledge based conflict that seeks to shapehow an adversary perceives himself and thesituation, how the wider global communityunderstands the nature of events, and how theadversary views our forces. (As explained inFLWD 2000, Ch.9).23. T.J. Czerwinski, 1996, “Command and Controlat the Crossroads”, in Parameters, US ArmyWar College Quarterly, Volume XXVI No.3,Autumn, p.128.24. LWD1, op. cit., p.5-2.25. ibid, p.5-2.26. Leonard, op. cit., p.124.27. FLWD 2000, op. cit., Ch.7.28. ibid, Ch.1.29. Headquarters Australian Theatre, DecisiveManoeuvre: Australian Warfighting Concept toGuide Campaign Planning, Second InterimEdition, October 1998, Defence Publishing andVisual Communications, Canberra, p.3.2.30. FLWD 2000, op.cit., Ch.9.31. Sun Tzu, op. cit., p.23.32. G.R. Sullivan, (General) and M. Coroalles, 31March 1995, The Army in the Information Age,(An essay listed on the US Army C&SCHomepage).33. G.R. Sullivan, and M.V. Harper, 1998, Hope isNot a Method, Random House, Toronto,p.223.34. P. Cosgrove, (Brigadier), 1997, “Warfare in theInformation Age – An Australian Perspective”,in, Malik, M., The Future Battlefield, DeakinUniversity Press, Geelong, pp.162-3.35. A & H. Toffler, 1993, War and Anti-War:Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century,Little-Brown and Company, New York, p.173.36. Toffler, op. cit., p.173.37. P.J. McNamara, (Brigadier) 1997, “StrategicManoeuvre”, in, M. Malik, The FutureBattlefield, Deakin University Press, Geelong,pp.93-4.DoctrineBIBLIOGRAPHYAustralian Army, LWD One, The Fundamental ofLand Warfare, 1999.Australian Army, LWD Three, Operations, 1998.Australian Army, MLW One 1.1, The Fundamentalsof Land Warfare, 1993.Australian Army, MLW One 1.2, Command andControl, 1991.Australian Army, MLW One 1.9 (Interim),Campaigning, 1996.Australian Army, Glossary of Operational andTactical Terminology, Command and StaffCollege, Queenscliff, Ed 7, 1998.Australian Defence Force, ADFP 6, Operations, 1996.British Army, ADP Volume 1, Operations, 1994.Combined Arms Training and Development Centre,FLWD 2000 Warfighting in the 21st Century(Draft), Puckapunyal, 1999.Headquarters Australian Theatre, DecisiveManoeuvre: Australian Warfighting Concept toGuide Campaign Planning, Second InterimEdition, Defence Publishing and VisualCommunications, Canberra, 1998.US Army, FM 100-5 Operations, US GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington DC, 1996.US Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXIOperations, Headquarters US Army Trainingand Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, 1994.USMC, FMFM 1, Warfighting, US GovernmentPrinting Office, Washington DC, 1989.BooksBolger, D.P., 1993, “Manoeuvre WarfareReconsidered”, in Manoeuvre Warfare: AnAnthology, Hooker, R.D. (Ed), Presidio Press, SanFrancisco.


14AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, Howard, M. andParet, P. (Ed) 1976, Princeton University Press,USA.Hackett, J.W., 1983, The Profession of Arms,Sidgwick and Jackson Limited, London.Leonhard, R.R. 1991, The Art of Manoeuvre –Manoeuvre Warfare and Air-Land Battle,Presidio Press, Novato.Lind, W.S., 1985, Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook,Westview Press, Boulder.Macgregor, D.A, 1997, Breaking the Phalanx – ANew Design for Landpower in the 21st Century,Praeger, Westport Connecticut.Simpkin, R.E. 1985, Race to the Swift – Thoughts onTwenty-First Century Warfare, Brassey’s DefencePublishers, London.Sullivan, G.R. and Harper, M.V. 1998, Hope is Not aMethod, Random House, Toronto.Sun Tzu, circa 500 BC, The Art of War, Clavell, J.(Ed) 1989, Hodder & Stoughton, London.Weston, B.G. (Air Vice-Marshal), 1997, “The FutureBattlefield: The Joint Application of Force”, in J.Mohan Malik (Ed), The Future Battlefield,Directorate of Army Research and Analysis andDeakin University Press, Geelong.Articles and PapersAntal, J.F., (Major), 1993, “Manoeuvre VersusAttrition: A Historical Perspective”, MilitaryReview, October.Australian Army Doctrine Centre, 1994, “ManoeuvreTheory”, (a discussion paper), AustralianDefence Force Journal, No 111, March/April.Crawford, S.W. (Lieutenant Colonel), 1995,“Manoeuvre Warfare – A WarfightingPhilosophy for the 21st Century”, (British) ArmyDoctrine and Training News, No 3.Czerwinski, T.J., 1996, “Command and Control atthe Crossroads”, Parameters, Autumn.DePuy, W.E., 1984, “The Case for Synchronisation:Towards a Balanced Doctrine”, Army, Vol 34,No 11, November.Elder, D. (Colonel), 1993, “Force Projection andCombined Arms”, Armour, November-December.Hooker, R.D., 1993, “The Mythology SurroundingManoeuvre Warfare”, Parameters, Vol XXIII No1, Spring.Jablonsky, D., 1994, US Military Doctrine and theRevolution in Military Affairs, Parameters,Autumn.Kagan, F., 1997, “Army Doctrine and Modern War”,Parameters, Spring.Lemelin, D.J., (Captain), 1994, “MisunderstandingSynchronisation: An Army Perspective”, MarineCorps Gazette, May.Liddell, D.E. (Major), 1998, “Operational Art and theInfluence of Will”, Marine Corps Gazette,February.MacMahon, M., (Major), 1994, “The Tenets ofManoeuvre Warfare and their Application toLow Intensity Conflict”, British Army Review,No 105, 15 March.McGuire, D.J., (Major), 1999, “Building Creativityand Innovation in the Australian Army”, ArmyC&SC Monash Paper, Fort Queenscliff.McKenzie, K.F., (Major), 1994, “Fighting in the RealWorld”, Marine Corps Gazette, March.Morningstar, J.K., (Major), 1995, “Creating theConditions for Manoeuvre Warfare”, MilitaryReview, March-April.Owens, W.A., 1995, “The Emerging System ofSystems”, Proceedings, May.Schmitt, J.F., (Major), 1994, “Manoeuvre Warfare”,Marine Corps Gazette, August.Spiszer, J. (Major), 1997, “FM 100-5 andInformation Age Warfare”, Military Review,September-October.Sullivan, G.R. (General) and M. Coroalles, 31 March1995, The Army in the Information Age, (Anessay listed on the US Army C&SC Homepage).Vandergriff, D.E., (Major), 1998, “Without the ProperCulture: Why Our Army Cannot PracticeManoeuvre Warfare”, Armour, January-February.Major David McGuire is an RAE officer, currently posted as a Career Advisor, Directorate of Officer CareerManagement – Army. Major McGuire has had a variety of regimental and non-corps postings and is a graduate of theArmy Command and Staff College, Queenscliff. Major McGuire is to be promoted and posted to the CATDC in 2001.Major McGuire has had articles published on Industrial Relations in Defence, Landmine Clearance Operations,Engineers in Peacekeeping Operations and Manoeuvre Warfare. This is his third article to be published by theAustralian Defence Force Journal.


Some Aspects of the Revolution in MilitaryAffairs and the Impact on the ADFBy Colonel M. Goodyer, Director Future Warfare15The Gulf War of 1991 is recognised by military institutions worldwide as a turning point inmilitary affairs and a practical demonstration of another Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 1From an historical perspective an RMA has been occurring approximately every 30 years thiscentury beginning with the use of tanks and new tactical techniques in the final year of World War Ito overcome the linear stalemate of trench warfare. In the decade leading to World War II newtechniques and weapons continued to be developed. The synthesis of these innovations emerged asthe Blitzkrieg doctrine in Nazi Germany. Using massed Panzer divisions, which embodied theintegration of the tank, radio communications and attack aviation, the German Army restoredmanoeuvre to a pre-eminent position as a battle winning strategy. This approach to warfare wasfurther exploited by the Soviet approach to mechanised warfare where tank and mechanisedformations, airborne forces and air armies, conducted deep battle and successive operations toachieve the destruction of an enemy force throughout the depth and breadth of an immensecontinental battlefield.Another RMA was also occurring on theother side of the world in the inter-waryears, this time led by the United States andJapan. Both nations developed carrier aviationand amphibious warfare capabilities anddoctrine. The wartime experience, especiallyfor the United States, brought about amaturing of the concepts, tactics, organisationsand instruments which allowed the revolutionto reach a climax in the amphibious warfarewaged by General Douglas MacArthur in thePacific, and some years later in the KoreanWar. Following the Korean War the UnitedStates languished in Vietnam as that nationsought to develop another doctrine that wouldallow the exploitation of emergingtechnologies such as rotary wing aircraft andlaser guided bombs.The AirLand battle doctrine subsequentlydeveloped by the United States is analogous tothe manoeuvre warfare and amphibiousdoctrines developed and adopted in the WorldWars. With its genesis in the airmobile cavalryassaults of the Vietnam Conflict, it wasAirLand battle doctrine and not onlytechnology that was the blueprint for UnitedStates-led coalition forces’ success in the GulfWar. The huge mechanised operations, thesurgical use of air-power, overwhelming firefrom the artillery and missiles fired by theMultiple Launch Rocket Systems, and the finalencirclement of Iraqi forces marked what couldbe considered a near perfect synergy betweenRMA technologies and AirLand battle. 2In all RMA examples this century, it isimportant to note that although there wasevidence before the World Wars and the GulfWar that new warfighting doctrines were beingdeveloped, an RMA was not recognised untilthe combination of new doctrine, technologyand organisation had been proven on the fieldof battle. In situations such as the recent NATOair operations in Kosovo where a limitedmilitary campaign showcases particular RMAtechnologies, it is difficult to recognise whetheranother RMA has occurred or whether it is acase of evolutionary development.


16AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Critical IssuesAgainst this historical backdrop the ADF isgrappling with some of the perceptions andlegacies of the Gulf War, the NATOinvolvement in Kosovo and ADF operations inEast Timor, while at the same time trying todevelop a technologically adept anddoctrinally versatile force for the 21st century.At present the best intellectual minds of theADF are engaged in examining the nature offuture conflict and assessing who our likelyadversaries might be and where the nextbattlefield may lie. Out of this examinationshould emerge a coalescing of technologiesand ideas into a suitable doctrinal frameworkfor prosecuting war. This is quite a challengefor the ADF and the aim of this article is toassist the reader in understanding some of thecomplex issues facing the ADF.The Gulf War, Kosovo and Bloodless WarfareOne of the trends of thought that emergedfrom the Gulf War was an expectation fromthe citizens of Western countries that wars inthe future may be relatively bloodless affairsand this has been reinforced by the recentKosovo conflict. In Kosovo NATO adopted adeliberate strategy that ruled out the use ofground forces. The strategy of adopting an“air" campaign is still being analysed but itseems clear that the air campaign failed toprevent widespread ethnic cleansing inKosovo. NATO nonetheless proclaimed victorysolely on the basis of the use of air power, atthe cost of only two aircraft and the loss of nopersonnel. 3 Many potential adversaries thoughwould have noted that the “wish to avoidcasualties appears to have become anoverriding principle when deciding rules ofengagement". 4Ground combat is now seen as politicallyunpalatable due to the inevitability ofcasualties and collateral damage. The NATOoperation in Kosovo highlighted an increasingpreoccupation in Western societies for thedevelopment of highly legalistic, procedural,rule-constrained forms of military violencewhere the two major (unwritten) rules are zerocasualties and zero collateral damage. This ispartly for moral reasons that have to do with50 years of increased emphasis on humanrights, partly because of the GenevaConventions and partly because of technology,but it is technology which is the key driverhere. As Michael Ignatieff said in an ABCRadio National program on The Future of War,“What becomes technically feasible quicklybecomes morally desirable.” 5 The Gulf War andthe Kosovo conflict have undoubtedly led tothe belief that war in the future may simply bea case of “Select enemy. Delete" as suggestedby an article in the Economist in March 1997. 6Professional military officers consider itextremely unlikely that a confluence oftechnology, surprise, organisational skill,military intellect and doctrine (all theingredients of an RMA), and a correspondinglack of these qualities on the part of anopponent, will present themselves again, asthey did in the Gulf War. However, militaryprofessionals do foresee future conflicts asbeing more complex, more intense and morelethal than ever before. Since the Gulf War andas demonstrated in Kosovo there have beenfurther technological advances in weaponrywith emphasis on increased range, lethalityand precision, along with increased complexityof digitally based command and controlsystems amid a growing demand forinformation.The Futurist’s ViewTrying to predict the nature of futurewarfare is therefore a largely speculativeendeavour. Noted military futurists Alvin andHeidi Toffler have postulated that the postindustrialinformation society has produced thepotential for “Third Wave Warfare"transcending industrial wars in the same waythat the former displaced agrarian warfare. 7 Asto what form “Third Wave Warfare" will takein the future there is a great deal of uncertainty


SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE IMPACT ON THE ADF 17due to the fact that it is going to be muchharder to define concepts of vital interests andsovereignty. As nation-state economiesbecome increasingly interdependent throughthe onset of globalisation they inevitablysurrender part of their sovereignty toincreasing cultural and economic intrusion.Military theorists have the view that allwarfare through the ages has operated in acloak of uncertainty and often refer to thegreat Prussian military theorist/philosopherCarl Von Clausewitz who recognised the roleuncertainty plays in war. Clausewitz did notdescribe in detail how future wars would befought, but he was a futurist in his own right.In constructing a theory for thinking aboutwar, he assumed that warfare’s essentialingredients would be “fog" and “friction". 8Most military forces occupy a large amount oftheir time trying to pierce the fog of war andreduce friction through a combination of newtechnologies, new operational techniques ortactics. Unfortunately, these new technologiesbring with them their own “fog" and “friction".One example maybe an information glut thatwill create its own fog of war. The professionalmilitary officer is therefore continually facedwith an increasingly difficult predictive task.Future Conflict and the Nation StateFuture conflicts will still retain someaspects of traditional warfare, (althoughprobably not the same scale as the Gulf War of1991) with sporadic outbreaks on the Asianlandmass, central Europe, the Middle East,Africa and within our own region as evidencedby East Timor. We may see an increasingnumber of civil wars with their associatedsavagery prosecuted by forces who areirregular in nature but who have access tosome modern weaponry. These forces willresist any attempt by the United Nations orcoalition forces to bring them to a closurewithout significant commitment of groundforces. We have already seen demonstrated inKosovo, nervousness on the part ofgovernments to committing ground forces;haunted by the spectre of large numbers ofcasualties.One aspect of the future the militaryprofessional can predict with some certainty isthat conflict will remain an inevitable part ofthe ongoing transformation of the nation state.Today we seem to be approaching the 21stcentury where the incompetence of the nationstate has been demonstrated along the faultlines of the former Yugoslavia, a famineplagued North Korea and onto Zaire, Sri Lanka,Rwanda, Liberia, Afghanistan, Algeria,Chechyna and East Timor. Future wars andconflicts will inevitably be shaped by theinability of governments to function as aneffective entity, to control the distribution offood, and the failure of many ethnic andnationalist groups to compete in the postmodern world as they break away from theirhost nation state. Where the breakaways andreordering occurs are the attendant populationflows, feeding humanitarian crisis andsparking class and ethnic warfare as evidencedin Rwanda, Kosovo, and the formerYugoslavia, more brutal than anythingimagined since the end of World War II. Out ofthis nation state catharsis, we are beginning tosee evidence that irregular forces are likely tobe, along with nation state conventionalforces, the most prevalent.Irregular Forces-Potential AdversariesIrregular forces have always existed in theirvarious forms as insurgents, militias, freedomfighters or terrorists, but the increase globallyof ethnic rivalry, religious bigotry, terrorismand heavily armed crime cartels is likely toforeshadow an increase in irregular warfareand make intervention in future conflictsbrutal, casualty causing affairs. Whether theADF is involved in peacekeeping operations ormore conventional military operations, there isevery likelihood these irregular forces may bethe adversaries. Irregular forces can beparticularly tough opponents, as they do not


18AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000usually conduct their fighting underinternational codes of humanitarian law andlook to cause casualties to both civilian andmilitary forces as a means of furthering theiraims.For irregular forces there are no rules, nouniforms, no front lines, no inhibitions orlimitations and at times, no territory to defend.Irregular forces can in most instances choosewhere and when to strike, when to appear anddisappear, all the while using quitesophisticated commercially availablecommunications. History suggests thatirregular forces will try to broaden thespectrum of conflict in an asymmetric manner;failing to find decisive victory at one levelcontributes to greater effort at another. Theattraction of resorting to this form of warfarewould be particularly appealing to terroristorganisations, drug cartels, revolutionaryforces, militias and ethno-nationalist forces. Ofcourse, the spectre haunting all governmentsand military forces is that of an adversaryresorting to biological and chemical warfare.How to adapt and successfully prosecutewarfare against an adversary prepared to wagewar in an asymmetric manner is a significantchallenge facing the ADF.Technology and the RMATechnology may give our military forcesnew capabilities in the form of robotics,protection for the individual soldier and accessto precision weaponry but there are sharplimits at present as to how technology can addto effectiveness in asymmetric conflicts. Theway many nations overcome this difficulty,particularly for their armies, is to prize highlythe individual initiative and leadership of thecommander and soldiers of a small team. Inthe past there was a need for large numbers ofsoldiers doing what they were told en masse,and used quite literally, as cannon fodder. Thiswill not be the case on the future battlefield,where every person (male and female) willhave a role to play and be capable of makingdecisions and taking action so that, by virtueof the relatively small numbers in the team,and the degree of firepower they will eachcontrol, they will have a significant effect onthe outcome of the battle.The ability of small highly lethal teams ableto control battle outcomes over a significantdistance suggests that the concept of abattlefield will no longer be relevant. Instead,military professionals will be using the term“battlespace" to encompass land, sea and airdomains. Every commander within abattlespace, from the junior corporal to thegeneral in command, will be connectedelectronically within a network with the abilityto synchronise all weapon platforms withintheir battlespace and bring coordinatedprecision fire on the adversary in conjunctionwith the overall manoeuvre plan. It is likelythat fire will be delivered from air, land or seaplatforms outside the battlespace (in order toreduce vulnerability and minimise casualties).Such an approach would suit an Australianway of warfare where “economy of effort" willbe the overriding consideration.If we look ahead to 2020 some of thetechnologies available to a future battlespacecommander would reveal that the RMA hashad a profound effect. Uninhabited aerialvehicles will have replaced some inhabitedplatforms and provide a variety of functionsfrom surveillance to delivery of effects byusing a mix of sensors that detect and track alltypes of targets in all weather conditions. 9Other on-board sensors will be able to sniff outthe release of chemical agents or detectradioactivity. Other forms of these craft willcarry ammunition payloads of various typesand, using special encoding and decodingtechniques, the battlespace commander may beable to call on those platforms for precisionstrike. A battlespace commander of the futurewill also have access to precision weaponsfired from ship platforms offshore, andstealthy, highly manoeuvrable air platforms.The type of weaponry will vary compared to


SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE IMPACT ON THE ADF 19that carried by uninhabited aerial vehicles,being heavier in nature and able to be firedfrom greater stand-off distances withunparalleled precision. As deadly and asaccurate as these future weapons may be, askilful and shrewd adversary may look tourban areas to negate the effects of ourtechnology. Urban warfare is expected to bemore prevalent in the next century as theworld’s population migrates to urban areas. 10Approximately 300 cities, with more than onemillion people will be in existence in the nextcentury. 11Urban BattlespaceIt will be within this urban environmentwhere Western military forces of the future willhave to apply their technological andintellectual power if they are to avoidunacceptable consequences. There are twoaspects to the problem for Western militaryforces. First, they will be looking to minimisecasualties to their own forces, and secondly,they would be looking to reduce collateraldamage. Leveraging technology to advantageand developing a new form of “Network-Centric Warfare" that links the “sensor" to the“shooter" through a combination of advancedsensors and fail-safe communications, may bethe key battle winning factors in this type ofconflict. The forms that “sensor" and “shooter"technology may take are, “see through wall"radars, sensors that can sniff out nuclear,biological, and chemical contamination, microuninhabited aerial vehicles (fixed and rotarywing) and robots of all types to assist thecombat teams in fighting close battles. Theindividual soldiers of the combat teams willalso operate from a protected platform (similarto the tank of today, but with vastly superiorprecision weaponry, sensors and protection)and when outside the platform in a protective“exoskeleton" providing protection againstsmall arms projectiles and nuclear, biologicaland chemical contamination. 12From a military professional’s point of viewthese are times of great expectations, but weshould treat with caution expectations thatsuch technological advances will lead tobloodless victories. A great deal will depend onthe development of cost-effective weaponplatforms for the sea and air domains.Scientists will also need to explore ways forthe electromagnetic spectrum to carry all thedata needed to prosecute future war in avariety of different environments, and providethe means for electronic strike. There maysimply not be enough bandwidth available forall requirements, but it will be vitally importantfor this problem to be solved so that smallmilitary forces like the ADF can achieve a levelof synchronisation not possible in pastconflicts. The cost of digitising military forcesto achieve this end state will be an enormousbut essential undertaking, particularly if theADF wishes to remain interoperable with allies,like the United States. There is also noguarantee that in a future conflict with all themass of data available, the commander will getthe vital piece of information needed at theright time.A New Doctrinal ParadigmIn order to deal with the difficult andcomplex issues of the future, militaryprofessionals need to link the promises oftechnology and increased levels of knowledgeof all types into a new paradigm forprosecuting war. We already know that ourbattlefield combat team leaders of the futurewill be masters of information technology andbe capable of assessing complex situations andacting quickly and decisively. As for thegenerals, admirals and air marshals of thefuture, they will have to be mentally tough,physically robust and highly trained in theever-increasing political and diplomaticsituations into which they will be thrust. Afuture general, admiral or air marshal will haveto be the absolute master of the business ofwar in all its forms in order to cope with the


20AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000more complex and fast moving battlefield ofthe future. These future leaders will also haveto find the right paradigm in which to operate,and success on the future battlefield will mostlikely go to the military force that has beenable to make this shift in thinking. Oneprediction is that that those militaries thatmove from a structuralist, hierarchicalapproach to a networked, knowledge-basedapproach to future war will be in a distinctlyadvantageous position.The shift to an information andknowledge-based warfare paradigm means thatin the future, components of the ADF will nolonger be defined in terms of amphibiouswarfare, armoured warfare and strategic strike.Instead, the ADF will move toward thedevelopment of future warfare conceptsembracing; C4, ISR, force projection, forceprotection, tailored effects, and forcesustainment. Exploitation of these conceptsrelies heavily on the fusion of information intointelligence and situational awareness thatallows commanders to introduce concepts ofwarfighting that would otherwise be the realmof fantasy. It is therefore quite important formilitary concept writers to now exploit thesefuture warfare concepts so that the ADF canrespond rapidly and decisively to a complexand changing environment. The RMA is notonly about platforms, sensors and weapons – itis about developing a concept of future warfarethat links the technological shifts with theintellectual power of the organisation in orderto produce a new effects-based doctrine.ConclusionHaving developed the appropriate doctrineand invested selectively in technology may atbest only begin to pierce the Clauswitzian “fogof war". The future battlefield will still holdmany dangers, even to the most technologicallyadept and doctrinally soundmilitary forces. Uncertainty is inevitable in warand the best the ADF and other professionalmilitary forces can do is reduce uncertainty tomanageable proportions through experimentationat all levels. Small economy ofeffort forces like the ADF, will rely heavily onsupport from organisations like DSTO toselectively pursue some areas of thetechnology revolution including intelligence,command systems and surveillance, while atthe same time investing substantially in themilitary education of future battlefieldleaders. 13For the ADF, investment in the educationand training of junior leaders will be vitallyimportant. The ingredients for achievingvictory in the future will reside in these futurecommanders understanding the nature offuture war, and sensibly and selectivelyapplying RMA technologies to a new doctrinefor prosecuting war. Additionally it will beessential to preserve and nurture a core ofmiddle ranking military thinkers and doctrinewriters who will be the engine room ofdoctrinal change in the ADF. 14The Gulf War was an example of aparticular doctrine, AirLand battle, where theconfluence of technology, geography andmilitary intellect came together in a successfulconclusion. Like the architects of AirLandbattle doctrine, it is only military professionalswho have been schooled in militaryoperational art that can develop andimplement new doctrine ready for the nextconflict. Given the complexity of conflicts suchas Kosovo and East Timor, any new doctrine islikely to be constantly changing shape andemphasis for some time into the future. Aselusive as the search may be, we must persistotherwise as an ADF we may fall into the trapof entering the next war without a cleardoctrine. The choice for the future should beclear: while it may be dangerous to enter thenext war with outdated technology, it willalmost certainly be fatal to enter the next warwith outdated ideas.


SOME ASPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE IMPACT ON THE ADF 21NOTES1. Much of the literature on the RMA has comefrom United States Military sources. For usefuloverviews see Earl H. Tilford, Jr., TheRevolution in Military Affairs: Prospects andCautions, Carlisle, Pa., US Army War College,June 1995. Also the collection of essays entitled“Perspectives on The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs", Parameters: US Army War CollegeQuarterly, Vol. Xxv, no.ii, 1995, pp. 7-54. Foran Australian perspective see also J. MohanMalik (ed), The Future Battlefield, DeakinUniversity Press, Geelong, Australia. AndrewKrepinevich, in “Cavalry to Computer: Thepattern of Military Revolutions", The NationalInterest, Fall 1994 describes a militaryrevolution or RMA as “what occurs when theapplication of new technologies into asignificant number of military systemscombines with innovative operational conceptsand organisational adaptation in a way thatfundamentally alters the character and conductof conflict" p. 30.2. Christopher Bellamy, Expert Witness: A DefenceCorrespondents View of the Gulf War 1990-91,Brassey’s, London, 1993, p. xxviii.3. “Kosovo’s Lessons in TMD: Serb Missiles CouldHave Changed Outcome", Defense News,August 9, 1999, p. 21.4. ibid.5. Michael Ignatieff, “The Future of War"(Transcript) Radio National’s WeeklyInvestigative Documentary, 11 June 2000, p. 4.Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo andBeyond, Chatto and Windus, London, 2000.6. “The Future of Warfare", The Economist, March8, 1997, pp. 21-23.7. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War-Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Little,Brown and Company, Boston, 1993, p.24.8. Michael Howard, Clausewitz, Oxford UniversityPress, New York, 1983, p. 25.9. “Sanders, Skunk Works To Develop Micro AirVehicle" Defense News, 15 March, 1999, p. 20.In this article a group of engineers areproposing to develop small UAVs that can beused for over-the-hill and urbanreconnaissance and surveillance, battle damageassessment, targeting, emplacing sensors,communications relays, or for sensingchemical, nuclear or biological substances.10. Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, TheUrbanisation of Insurgency: The PotentialChallenge to US Military Operations, SantaMonica, California, RAND, MR-398-A, 1994,pp. 12-15.For sobering views on these trends see: EugeneLinden, “The Exploding Cities of theDeveloping World," Foreign Affairs, January-February 1996, pp. 52-65; and William G.Rosenau, “Every Room is a New Battle: TheLessons of Modern Urban Warfare," Studies inConflict and Terrorism, Vol 20, 1997, p. 374.11. “US Studies New Role for Old Weapons in CityCombat", Defense News, March 15, 1999, p. 8.12. For a good overview on the utility of aerospacetechnologies for the urban environment seeAlan Vick, John Stillion, David R. Frelinger,Joel Kvitky, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Jefferson P.Marquis and Matthew C. Waxman, AerospaceOperations in Urban Environments: ExploringNew Concepts,” RAND, California, MR-1187-AF, 2000.13. “Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997",Commonwealth of Australia, 1997, pp. 55-66.14. Robert O’Neill, “Australia’s Security Dilemmas,"Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 143,July/August 2000, p. 48.Colonel Michael Goodyer graduated from the Royal Military College, Duntroon in 1976 into the RoyalAustralian Infantry Corps. His regimental service has been in light infantry units (1RAR and 3RAR)specialising in parachute operations where he has served as a platoon commander, company commander,battalion second-in-command and instructor. His regimental service has also included a posting as Adjutant ofthe Western Australian University Regiment.In addition to his regimental experience he has served in staff postings within Army in Materiel Branch,responsible for combat clothing and equipment development, Land Headquarters as SO1 Training and inTraining Command as the Director, Army Battle Simulation Group. He has also served on exchange duty withthe United States Army National Simulation Centre, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His most recent appointmentin Army has been as Military Assistant to the Chief of Army. His current appointment is Director FutureWarfare, Military Strategy Branch/Office of the RMA, Australian Defence Headquarters.He is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Science, UK; Australian Army Command and Staff Collegeand the Joint Services Staff College. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Military Studies and a GraduateDiploma and Masters Degree in Defence Studies from Deakin University.


The Defence Science and TechnologyOrganisation (DSTO) invites registrations ofinterest from the Australian Defence Organisationfor attendance at the annualTakari SeminarTheme: Experimentation for CapabilityDevelopmentWednesday, 14 March 2001, 9 am - 4 pm,including lunchRussell 1 Theatrette, Russell Offices, CanberraThe seminar will include:• Takari Executive presentation and review ofhighlights• A structured panel session - Experimentationfor Force Development• Demonstrations ofDSTO’s C4ISREWresearchFor informationand registrationform go to,http://web-sa.dsto.defence.gov.au/DSTO/divisions/takari/ by 16 Feb 2001


Leadership Skills for APS Managersin DefenceBy Jacinta Carroll, Department of Defence23In order to assess the leadership skills required by a middle manager in the public sector, it isnecessary to probe the following questions:• What is leadership?• What leadership skills are needed by managers?• How do these leadership skills translate into:a. the public sector; andb. middle management?After addressing the theoretical concepts above, this article will examine the Department ofDefence as a case study and focus on some of the challenges and issues faced by this public sectororganisation in developing leadership skills. Strategies, initiatives and opportunities to addressthese issues will be drawn both from the literature and from the experience of Defence.LeadershipWhat is Leadership?When examining leadership, it isimportant first of all to define whatexactly leadership is and identify itscomponent skills. This, however, provides thefirst stumbling block. There are many differentdefinitions of leadership, and scholars havebeen unable to agree on what exactlyconstitutes leadership in the managementcontext.Klenke (1996) identifies these differences instages of the development of leadership theoryshown at Figure 1, and these four basicapproaches continue to underlie mostleadership theory.Klenke concludes her analysis ofcontemporary leadership literature unconvincedof the value that it adds to ourFigure 1. Stages of Leadership Theory (Klenke, 1996)understanding of leadership in management, asall appear to focus on the “leader” beingsomehow different from other managers andabove their day-to-day concerns.Leadership Skills: Leadership vs ManagementWithin the framework of managementstudies, the issue of leadership revolves arounddefining how leadership skills differ frommanagerial skills. Zaleznik (Gabarro, 1992),for example, sees leaders and managerscarrying out completely different roles in anorganisation, falling “naturally” into differentpersonality types that are deemed to be largelynon-interchangeable: leaders and managers aredifferent types of people. While managers areday-to-day or routine operators, according tothis theory, leaders look for new approachesand envision new areas to explore.Traits (1930s and 1940s) – individuals have distinct personality traits of leadershipBehaviours (1950s) – behaviour shows leadership, rather than character traitsSituation (1970s) – interaction between leadership traits and specific situationsCharismatic/Transformational (1980s/1990s) – leaders motivating followers


24AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Figure 2. Kotter (1990) Management and Leadership Core Differences(Mellors 1996, p5; Davies 1997, PSMC, 1999)ManagementLeadershipCreating an agenda Planning and budgeting EstablishingDeveloping people to Organising and staffing Aligning peopleachieve the agendaExecution Controlling and problem Motivating andsolvinginspiringOutcomes Produces predictability Produces change, oftenand orderuseful and dramaticCommentators such as Yukl (1989, inKarpin, 1995) have criticised this differentiationas artificial and contrived. Bycomparison, they see leadership is demoted tobeing a sub-set of management – themanagement of human resources (Mellors,1996).Research by Kotter in 1990 (Mellors, 1996)on the main differences between leaders andmanagers against management functionsproduced the information at Figure 2.While at first glance Kotter’s list may seemto run at odds with the notion of leadershipskills as a part of management skills, it shouldbe noted that Kotter does not identify theseattributes as mutually exclusive personalitytraits, in the manner of Zaleznik (Mellor, 1996;Gabarro, 1992).The 1995 Report of the Task Force onLeadership and Management Skills (hereafter“the Karpin Report”) builds upon this work,finding that most contemporary authors andmanagers agree that the main point ofclarification between the two roles isleadership’s primary focus on “the peoplefactor”. Goleman (1998) adds that this focuson people highlights the importance of “EQ” oremotional intelligence as a leadership quality.Whilst management skills cover a range ofactivities, leadership skills can be said to focusspecifically upon other people in theorganisation, and upon motivating them tofollow where the leader directs. The KarpinReport summarised the generally understooddifferences between leadership andmanagement thus:Leadership is about people. It involvesproviding strategic direction, identifying acompetitive edge and motivating andempowering employees to deliver on thepromise of the business.Management is seen to be aboutresources. It is seen to be concerned aboutthe allocation and distribution of materialand human resources to support thestrategic direction of the business. There iswide acknowledgement that the managementrole is not viable by itself, withoutleadership, in Australia’s competitiveenvironment.(Karpin, 1995, p134)This is how the Karpin Report sawindividual managers fitting into thesecategorisations:A manager is an individual who achievesenterprise goals through the work of othersAt the senior executive level, a leader is agood steward of the enterprise’s future.At all other levels, a leader is an individualwho achieves enterprise goals through thework of others without relying upon her orhis position or power.(Karpin, 1995, p14)


Heifetz and Laurie (1997) identify adaptivechallenges as the major challenges facingorganisations today and therefore the ability tomeet, adapt to or chart a new course through atime of change are crucial elements ofleadership. In the current climate of constantchange, this aspect of leadership is aprerequisite for survival, let alone success ofany manager in the current workingenvironment. A working environment thatallows for a manager to deal solely withroutine tasks, in the manner of Zaleznik(Gabarro, 1992) is not only a luxury, but ananachronism.In terms of management, therefore,leadership should be seen not as the definingsum of a stand-out individual, but as a discreteset of people-related skills that fall within abroader suite of management skills (Karpin,1995; Craig & Yetton, 1994; Mant, 1997;Barker, 1997; Barrie, 2000). Effectivemanagement requires effective leadership.Using Karpin’s broad definition ofleadership and the principles and insights fromHeifetz and Laurie (1997), Blount and Joss(Barrie 2000), Goleman (1996) and Mant(1997), we can summarise general leadershipqualities for managers as follows:• Judgement;• Ability to identify and adapt to challenges;• Systems Thinking;• Broad Capability (training and experience);• Strong People Skills including motivationand empathy; and• Innovation.This list is neither comprehensive norconclusive, but can provide a general point ofreference for this examination of leadership.Developing LeadershipWhile it may be relatively simple toidentify leadership skills and qualities, andeasy to acknowledge their value, the challengefor any organisation is in developing theseskills in future leaders and being able tomeasure the effectiveness of this development.LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR APS MANAGERS IN DEFENCE 25The Karpin Report (1995) concluded thatleadership training was vital for thedevelopment of leaders, and noted researchshowing leadership training to be mosteffectively provided through a combination ofcourses and on-the-job training. Otherresearch in this area has shown that effectiveleadership development can be obtainedthrough managing a combination of courses,cooperative education programs, on-the-jobtraining, higher manager involvement,challenging experiences for individuals andmentoring (Karpin, 1995; Davies, 1997 andBates & Murdoch 1996 in PSMC, 1999). Ifleadership is to be taken seriously in anorganisation, then the organisation mustdisplay commitment to ongoing leadershipdevelopment and broader managementdevelopment.Public SectorHow does the list of general leadershipskills above compare to the specific leadershipskills that are required by middle managers inthe Australian Public Service (APS)?Understanding the differences between thepublic and private sectors forms a great part ofthe literature on public sector management(Allison, 1983; Mellors, 1996). The difficultiesinherent in analysing leadership theory in thecontext of the public sector is well noted byMellors (1996, p.124),…questions arise as to the scope in practicefor the independent exercise by publicofficials of skills such as developing avision for the future or decisive decisionmaking,which the practical relevance ofleadership attributes such as charisma andself-reliance for public officials…is arguablyzero.Some authors state that, while public sectormanagement is different from private sector,many of the skills are interchangeable (e.g.Wanna, O’Faircheallaigh and Weller, 1999, inPSMC, 1999); others go further to argue thatthe process of governance needs a distinct set


26AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000of abilities not required in the private sector(Wamsley, 1990; Goodsell, 1990 in PSMC,1999).Research by Morley and Vilkinas (1997; seealso Hughes, 1992, in Mellors, 1996) onleadership competencies in federal and stateagencies identified a succinct list of thefeatures of public service that have a majorimpact upon public sector leadership:• Relationship with the public;• Complexity;• Relationship to politics;• Accountability; and• Policy.The public sector has matched the privatesector in recognising the importance ofleadership, but the peculiarities of publicservice identified by Morley and Vilkinas andFigure 3.SENIOR EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP CAPABILITY FRAMEWORKAchieves Results• Builds organisational capability and responsiveness• Marshals professional expertise• Steers and implements change and deals with uncertainty• Ensures closure and delivers on intended resultsCultivates Productive Working Relationships• Nurtures internal and external relationships• Facilitates cooperation and partnerships• Values individual differences and diversity• Guides, mentors and develops peopleShapes Strategic Thinking• Inspires a sense of purpose and direction• Focuses strategically• Harnesses information and opportunities• Shows judgement, intelligence and commonsenseCommunicates with Influence• Communicates clearly• Listens, understands and adapts to audience• Negotiates persuasivelyExemplifies Personal Drive and Integrity• Demonstrates public service professionalism and probity• Engages with risk and shows personal courage• Commits to action• Displays resilience• Demonstrates self-awareness and a commitment to personal development(PSMPC 1999)


others such as Mellors (1996) andKoracKakabadse (1996) nonetheless remain,and this will be discussed further.There are a number of principles that guidethe performance of a public servant within thisenvironment, such as those contained in theAustralian Public Service Values, and these arecomplemented by policies and guidelines. Asignificant and recent example of guidance onleadership in the APS can be found in thePublic Service and Merit ProtectionCommission’s (PSMPC) Senior ExecutiveLeadership Capability Framework, which placesleadership skills in the context of themanagement skills and values required of apublic sector manager. The Framework listsfive areas of required leadership competencyfor senior public servants:• Achieves Results;• Cultivates Productive WorkingRelationships;• Shapes Strategic Thinking;• Communicates with Influence; and• Exemplifies Personal Drive and Integrity.(PSMPC 1999)While the Framework was draftedspecifically for Senior Executives, it provides auseful reference for leadership at lower levelsin the APS. Perhaps more importantly, inflagging the leadership skills required of seniorpublic servants, the Framework provides aguide to leadership development for middlemanagers as they progress toward more seniorpositions (Kemp, 1999).While the public sector context providessome challenges in defining leadership, theabove experiences show that abilities and evencompetencies for public sector managers canbe articulated. Far greater challenges lie indetermining performance indicators to evaluatethe presence or absence of leadership and theeffectiveness of leadership training anddevelopment and in determining how muchautonomy a public servant can exercise intheir leadership role.LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR APS MANAGERS IN DEFENCE 27Middle ManagersThe paucity of information and criticalanalysis of the leadership skills required ofpublic sector managers is matched by thelack of understanding of leadership formiddle managers. A significant body ofleadership literature has maintained its linkswith “great man” leadership notions, bylimiting itself to leadership at the top, anddoes not address leadership at lower levels.An example of this is Scholtes’ Leader’sHandbook (1998), which purports to be adaily guide for leaders. The only mentionmade of middle management leadership inthis work is to blame poor middlemanagement leadership performance on aleadership failure by senior managers(Scholte, 1998). It is easier to theorise aboutleadership at the top and without constraints.For all but the few, however, leadership mustbe carried out within significant constraints.These constraints may be in the form of suchthings as higher management, peers, policyand regulation. While leadership theorytends to focus on senior managers, therefore,it has practical utility only when it begins tofactor in the constraints that also affectmiddle managers and other managers at anylevel.Middle Managers in the Public SectorThe defining feature of middle managementis that it is neither autonomous norpossessed of the level of absolute authoritythat the term “leadership” suggests. As wehave seen, this is not far removed from thepublic sector context and the constraints thatexist for Senior Executive Service (SES) andother managers in carriage of their leadershiproles, through ministerial direction andpublic accountability.Effective leadership skills for middlemanagers in the APS do not differsubstantially from those of their privatesector equivalents or SES except in thebreadth and depth of authority (and freedom


28AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000to enact change). The main differences lienot in leadership skills required, but thatthese skills must co-exist with the skillsrequired of middle managers in their role assubordinate-follower in a highly regulatedenvironment. An example of this isdevolution of delegation. The Government’sindustrial relations policy has seen increasedemphasis on leadership and individualperformance for public servants, mostnotably through performance agreements;but the question remains as to how muchauthority non-senior public servants havebeen delegated to exercise.Statutory limitations shouldn’t, however,be an excuse for public sector middlemanagers to not display leadership: anattitude that the Secretary of Defence hasrecently criticised as “learned helplessness”(Hawke, 2000, p.6). The five main elementsof the PSMPC’s Framework provide a broadreference point for leadership qualities thatmanagers at every level should be able toadopt.A 1996 MAB/MIAC report (PSMC, 1999)placed responsibility for developing futureleaders firmly with senior managers. Thereport stated that leadership development inorganisations should have the following rolesfor senior managers:• Establish clear expectations;• Assist managers to develop;• Provide ongoing guidance and support;and• Provide human resource support.KoracKakabadse (1996, p.18) goes furtherto examine the role of senior managers asproviding perhaps their most significantleadership development role through beingan example – both good and bad,Poor example from the top spreadsthrough the organisation likeuncontrollable flames, inducing unhelpfulbehaviour and undermining moraleinternally and image externally. Undersuch circumstances, people retreat to onlydoing the familiar basics because to doanything else is to take risks. Suchnegative cycles are promoted by poorleadershipThe key to leadership in middle managersis that leadership skills should be identifiedand actively nurtured and developed by theorganisation and its senior managers. Ratherthan leaving leadership development to therather chaotic concept of individualsmanifesting leadership qualities because ofindividual traits or a crisis situation (e.g.Barker, 1997), organisations and theirmanagement should pursue leadershipdevelopment and succession as part of theirown leadership activities.Portfolio Case Study: Department of DefenceThe Department of Defence provides afascinating focus for the study of leadershipin the public sector. A few general statisticsabout the organisation provide an indicationof the challenges facing leaders in theorganisation:• With almost 100,000 personnel, Defenceis the largest public sector employer andthe second largest single employer inAustralia (second to Coles Myer) (Hawke,2000; COA, 1999a).• The organisation is spread over manyestablishments in every state and territoryin Australia, and has personnel employedin a number of overseas posts.• The Department includes employees fromfour different “Services” – the RoyalAustralian Navy, the Australian Army,the Royal Australian Air Force and theAPS, each of which have differentconditions of service, training, careermanagement and promotion systems,remuneration and culture.Issues emerging have meant that carryingout this case study is more akin to currentaffairs reporting than an academic study. Inrecent months the Chief of the Defence Force


(CDF) and the Secretary of Defence, whojointly head the organisation, have eachspoken out publicly about lack ofperformance in the organisation.On 17 February 2000, Dr Allan Hawke,the Secretary for Defence, gave a speech onthe state of the Department. Within hiscritical analysis of the current state of play,Hawke condemned senior leadership skills inthe Department,…too many of our people lack confidencein many of Defence’s senior leaders.Justified or not, Defence’s leadership isseen as lacking coherence, as failing toaccept responsibility and as reactive.There are certainly elements of what Iwould call a culture of learnedhelplessness among some Defence seniormanagers … (Hawke, 2000, p.6)Five days after Hawke’s presentationAdmiral Chris Barrie, CDF, gave a speech onthe leadership skills and actions that areneeded to increase the effectiveness andefficiency of the Defence Department, statingthat “[t]he essential task for Defenceleadership is fundamental renewal of ourorganisation from within. And this will onlyhappen through strong direction and ourpeople owning the process” (Barrie, 2000,p.5).In his speech, Barrie drew effectivelyupon the discrete leadership skills of themilitary as a reference point for leadership inthe combined ADF/APS DefenceOrganisation. This contrast betweenleadership in the ADF and the APS is useful.While both the military and APS elements ofDefence have knowledge of the “what” ofleadership, the ADF can provide some usefulexperience in the “how”. In particular, thegood example of leadership development thatexists in the Australian Army provides auseful point of intra-departmentalcomparison for public servants in Defence.LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR APS MANAGERS IN DEFENCE 29Following are individual case studies ofleadership development in the Army and forpublic servants in Defence. The latter shallinclude a focus on particular leadershiptraining programs for Defence publicservants.These factors, then, form some of thebackground to the “learned helplessness” thathas been identified by Hawke. These are alsothe factors that, if left unchallenged, willimpede the progress of the new way aheadthat he and Barrie envisage.Both in his speech and subsequentbriefings, Hawke has marked out a new wayof doing business that emphasises a need forleadership action:Our agenda will revolve around a “resultsthrough people” approach. A simplerperformance framework will be introducedfrom the end of March that will spell outexpectations, roles and the developmentneeds of all our people so that we canimprove performance, accountability andcommunication across the wholeorganisation.An important aspect of this activity issatisfying the Minister and ourselves thatwe are improving our management andleadership. (DPAO, 2000).It will be interesting to see both theemployees’ reaction to a new performanceframework and senior management’sallegiance to it, given that during 1999, aspart of the requirement for workplaceagreements, Defence introduced the CivilianPerformance Management System (CPMS).While a dateline for completion of CPMSagreements was imposed (and extended),there has been no subsequent requirement tofollow through with the CPMS three-monthlyreviews, using CPMS reports as a tool fortraining or promotion or otherwise linking itto work.While Hawke and Barrie have criticisedthe lack of leadership in Defence they havefailed to realise that this is perhaps the only


30AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000result that can be had in an organisation thathas no career management for its publicservice employees. Their vision of areinvigorated Defence Department based onsuperlative leadership skills will remain justthat until they can carry out the sine qua nonof leadership – motivate and inspire theirpeople.All of the empowered, motivated, teamedup, self-directed, incentivized, accountable,reengineered, and reinvented peopleyou can muster cannot compensate for adysfunctional system. (Scholtes, 1998,p.17).ConclusionLeadership skills are essential for effectivemanagement in the current and the futureworking environments, both in the publicand private sectors. The general skillsrequired for managers at all levels can besummarised as:• Judgement, including the ability toidentify the challenge;• Ability to identify and adapt tochallenges;• Systems Thinking;• Broad Capability (training andexperience);• Strong People Skills includingmotivation and empathy; and• Innovation.In order to meet their obligations toGovernment and the public, public sectormanagers must factor in the statutory anddelegated limitations to their ability toexercise these leadership attributes andmiddle managers everywhere must be able tobalance leadership with the ability to followsenior management.Senior managers in organisations can talkof the value of the notion of leadership andthe importance of leadership skills, but theseskills must be developed in middle managersand other levels and fostered for anorganisation, whether public or private, tobenefit from them. Leadership skills can bedeveloped within an organisation if thesenior management:• identifies required skills;• endorses their appropriateness foremployees; and• develops a training and developmentframework.The Department of Defence is fortunate in anumber of factors that can enable it toeffectively develop leaders, such as:• examples and experience of leadershiptraining and development from non-APSelements of the organisation; and• currently undergoing a substantial reviewthat is focusing on leadership andmanagement amongst other things.The challenge is for Defence to takeadvantage of these opportunities in anholistic way to ensure that leadership iseffectively developed within both the APSand military elements of the organisation.Case Study 1:The Australian ArmyThe Australian Army has a particularly sophisticated understanding of leadership that iscombined with ongoing training. Leadership of soldiers is essential to being a senior soldier oran officer and therefore leadership training is carried out throughout career progression in theArmy, and is reinforced as underpinning all training and the carriage of duties. For “middlemanagers”, – middle ranking officers – full-time training at Staff College provides the generalskills and expertise required for transition to a senior command role. Staff College is a prerequisitefor promotion to such a position of command, management and leadership. Everylevel of theoretical leadership training is balanced with on-the-job responsibilities for staff toapply and reinforce the learning.


LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR APS MANAGERS IN DEFENCE 31Case Study 2: APS Defence EmployeeSome management/leadership training is offered to Defence public servants through coursessuch as the Public Sector Management Course, Senior Women in Management and somesupport for attendance at university management courses at the Australian Defence ForceAcademy as well as one or more civilian positions on most Service Staff Courses. Until recently,Defence had a civilian equivalent of the Service Staff Courses in the Defence ManagementDiploma Program (DMDP), a middle management course (See Case study 2.2 below).There is, however, no form of leadership/management training that:a. Focuses on developing leaders in the Defence public service;b. Is widely available and known to public servants;c. Forms part of a career management plan for Defence public servants; ord. Is actively supported by senior management.Case Study 2.1:Graduate Development ProgramThe GDP is a year-long training and development program designed to give graduaterecruits to Defence the skills and knowledge necessary to prepare them for a successful career asa manager within the Department. It is the only non-SES development program for publicservants in Defence.The year consists of:• three work placements in different work areas;• an Australian Study Tour designed to enhance the graduates’ understanding of the ADFworking environment and the size and scope of the difficulties facing the DefenceOrganisation;• training in areas including financial management, parliamentary processes and personaltraining in job seeking skills and managing their career.(JET, 2000)A review of the GDP in 1998 (JET, 1998), observed that there was no formal leadershiptraining for program participants, or career management for graduates in the Departmentafter the course was completed.Case Study 2.2: The Defence Management Diploma ProgramThis year-long course combined Graduate Diploma level instruction and assessment inmanagement with on-the-job rotations in a variety of work areas in the Department and amentoring program. The DMDP ceased in 1999 and there is no sign of a replacement course.The official reason for the cessation of the DMDP was lack of interest in the course – participantnumbers declined from 25 in 1998 to two in 1999. Opinions put forward by two senior Defencemanagers suggest the following reasons for its demise:• lack of senior management support;• although the course was referred to as the APS equivalent of Service Staff College,completion of the course did not lead to transition to a leadership/management role;• neither the mentoring program nor the work rotations were managed by the course toensure appropriate work tasks, responsibilities and guidance to complement the course’stheoretical instruction in management;• lacking formal recognition and value, the course became seen as a “hiding place for peoplenot wanted in their normal workplace for a variety of reasons” (personal interview withauthor March, 2000) rather than as a valued and respected development opportunity.


32AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000REFERENCESAllison, G.T. 1983. “Public and Private SectorManagement: Are they Fundamentally Alikein All Unimportant Respects?” in PublicManagement, Public and Private Perspectives,Eds. J Perry & K. Kramer. California:Mayfield Publishing, pp. 72-92.Barker, R.A. 1997. “How Can We Train Leaders IfWe Do Not Know What Leadership Is?”,Human Relations, 50(4) pp. 343-362.Barrett, P.J. 1999. “Leadership in a ChangingEnvironment”, Presentation to DEWRSBLeadership Development Program, Sydney,16 June 1999. [online] URL: http://www.anao.gov.au/speeches/leadership.doc[accessed 4 March 2000].Barrie, Admiral C. 2000. “Reflections onLeadership: Address to the AustralianInstitute of Management 22 February 2000,Canberra” personal notes from authorattendance and [online] URL:http://www.aimcan.com.au/-barrie.speech.htm [accessed 28 February2000].Bright, Dr J. & Halse R. 1998. “ManagementTraining in a Public Service Organisation: AnEvaluation of Trainee Reactions, Learning,Behaviours and Absenteeism”, Training andDevelopment in Australia, Vol. 25, No. 2,April 1998.Commonwealth of Australia 1999. Are We EthicalLeaders in Defence?, Canberra: DefencePublishing Service.Commonwealth of Australia 1999. DefenceAnnual Report 1998-1999, Canberra:Defence Publishing Service.Commonwealth of Australia 1999. PortfolioBudget Statements 1999-2000: DefencePortfolio – Budget Related Paper No. 1.4A,Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.Conger, J. 1993. “The Brave New World ofLeadership Training”, OrganisationalDynamics, 21, pp. 46-58.Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 2000. “JulyTarget For Defence’s Renewal Agenda” MediaRelease 3 March 2000. [online] URL:http://www.dod.gov.au/media/2000/index.html [accessed 9 March 2000].Department of Defence 1998. Defence – OurPriorities: from the Defence Executive,Canberra: Defence Publishing Service.Department of Defence 1999. Defence – OurPeople and How We Work: from the DefenceExecutive, Canberra: Defence PublishingService.Gabarro, J.(ed) 1992. Managing People andOrganizations, Boston, Massachusetts:Harvard Business School Publications.Goleman, D. 1998. “What Makes a Leader?”,Harvard Business Review, Vol. 76, No. 6,November-December 1998, pp. 93-102.Hawke, Dr A. 2000. “What’s The Matter? A DueDiligence Report” Delivered to the DefenceWatch Seminar 17 February 2000. [online].URL: http://www.defence.gov.au/media/2000/-index.html [accessed 18 February2000].Hawke, Dr A. 2000a. “Address to the DefenceLeadership Wollongong Retreat 27-29February 2000”. Unpublished – internalDepartment of Defence circulation.Heifetz, R. & Laurie, D. 1997. “The Work ofLeadership”, Harvard Business Review, Vol25, No. 1, January-February 1997, pp. 124-134.Joint Education and Training, Department ofDefence, 2000. Graduate DevelopmentProgram. [online] URL: http://defweb.cbr.-defence.gov.au/jet/gdp/ [accessed 3 February2000].Josefowitz, N. 1986. Paths to Power: A Woman’sGuide from First Job to Top Executive,London: Columbus Books.Karpin, D. 1995. Enterprising Nation: RenewingAustralia’s Managers to Meet the Challengeof the Asia-Pacific Century: The Report ofthe Task Force on Leadership andManagement Skills, Canberra: AGPS.Kemp, Hon. Dr D. 1999. Speech at Launch of theSenior Executive Leadership CapabilityFramework, 16 May 1999. Canberra. [online]URL: http://www.psmpc.gov.au/media/-minister-speech19may.htm [accessed 4March 2000].Klenke, K. 1996. “Contemporary LeadershipTheories: The Conceptual Thicket”, Ch. 3 inWomen and Leadership: A ContextualPerspective, New York: Springer Publishing,pp. 55-86.KoracKakabadse, A & N. KoracKakabadse. 1996.“The Leadership Challenge for the AustralianPublic Service (APS): An InternationallyComparative Benchmarking Analysis”[online] URL: http://www.psmpc.gov.au/publications-96/kakabadse.htm [accessed 4March 2000].McDougall, M & Briley, S. 1994. DevelopingWomen Managers: Current Issues and GoodPractice. Edinburgh: HMSO.Mant, A. 1997. Intelligent Leadership, StLeonards: Allen & Unwin.


LEADERSHIP SKILLS FOR APS MANAGERS IN DEFENCE 33Maxwell, J.D. 1995. Developing the LeadersAround You: How to Help Others ReachTheir Potential. Nashville:INJOY.Mellors, J. 1996. “Managing and Leading in theNext Century”, Australian Journal of PublicAdministration, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 83-89[online] URL: http://webct1.cc.flinders.edu.au:-8900/PSMC/PSMC/LKE/Mellors.htm[accessed 10 December 1999].Morley, K & Vilkinas, T. 1997. “Public SectorExecutive Development in Australia: 2000and Beyond”, International Journal of PublicSector management, Vol. 10, No. 6. pp. 401-416.Mumford, A. 1993. Management Development:Strategies for Action. 2nd ed. Wimbledon:Institute of Personnel Management.Pagram, Dr R. 1999. “Shifts in EmergencyManagement Service Provision: A Case forNew Innovative Leadership”, AustralianJournal of Emergency Management, Autumn,pp. 28-30.Public Sector Management Course. 1999.Leadership in the Knowledge Era. Canberra:Public Sector Management Course.Public Service and Merit Protection Commission.1999. Senior Executive Leadership CapabilityFramework. [online] URL: http://www.psmpc.-gov.au/leadership/ gatefold.pdf [accessed 4March 2000].Scholtes, P. 1998. The Leader’s Handbook: AGuide to Inspiring Your People andManaging the Daily Workflow. New York:McGraw-Hill.Sinclair, A. 1998. Doing Leadership Differently:Gender, Power and Sexuality in a ChangingBusiness Culture. Carlton South: MelbourneUniversity Press.Still, L. 1993. Where to from Here? TheManagerial Woman in Transition.Chatswood: Business and ProfessionalPublishing.Watts, T. 1999. “Managing: Engineered Powerfrom the Outer”, Business Review Weekly,Vol. 21, No. 17, 7 May 1999 [online]. URL:http://www.brw.com.au/newsadmin/stories/brw/19990507/2103.htm [accessed 9 Dec.1999].Jacinta Carroll joined the Department of Defence in 1995. She has worked in a variety of positions in Sydney andCanberra, including Operations Support and Training Services in DCSC-Sydney Central, Navy’s Asbestos Litigationand National Support Division, ADHQ, all of which were integrated military-civilian environments. Currently, she isworking in International Policy Division as a member of the East Timor team. Ms Carroll is also a member of theArmy Reserve.Ms Carroll has completed tertiary studies in politics, history, international studies and management. This article wasoriginally prepared while undertaking the Public Sector Management Course.


Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue:A Review of Factors and Measurement Issuesfor the Australian Defence ForceCaptain Samantha K. Brooks, Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and ResearchProfessor Don G. Byrne, Australian National Universityand Major Stephanie E. Hodson, Army Recruit Training Centre35While the field of occupational stress research in civilian settings has burgeoned in recent years,very little has occurred in non-operational military work settings. The concept of military stress ismost commonly described in the literature as an operational or combat issue, and much energy hasbeen given improving the means by which we measure and treat it. In comparison, there appears tohave been little interest in how to measure non-operational, occupational stress, and few attemptsto systematically identify its effects. The following article seeks to explore this imbalance via adiscussion of measurement issues for the study of occupational stress in the military, and isintended to provide a point of reference from which investigations of non-combat stress may begin.Stress has become a common currency inthe past few years, yet it is oftenmisunderstood and even stigmatised.Soderberg (1967) argued that stress was “themost grandly imprecise term in the dictionaryof science”, as the word is used for differentpurposes to describe numerous situations andbehaviours.Throughout the 20th century, models ofstress have varied in terms of their definition ofstress, their differing emphasis on physiologicaland psychological factors, and their descriptionof the relationship between individuals andtheir environment. The study of stress inmilitary settings has burgeoned, although ithas been largely limited to combat settings. Asa result, theoretical perspectives on noncombatmilitary stress are sparse. Nevertheless,MacDonough (1991) reviewed the most recentmajor issues in stress research, and hasattempted to classify civilian stress models fortheir application to military settings and stressissues. He highlights the need for civilian stressmodels to be classified so that they can beevaluated for application to military settings,and a more complete classification of militarystress models. It is appropriate that thesemodels be considered, as does Cox (1978), interms of the three widely recognisedapproaches to the study of stress:1. response-based definitions and models,2. stimulus-based definitions and models, and3. interactional/transactional definitions andmodels.MacDonough (1991) has examined thedegree to which civilian stress theories such asthese can be applied to military settings. Herefers to the work of Snow (1984a, 1984b,1984c), who argues that interactional modelsmay have greatest relevance, given that“Effective performance, particularly understress or dangerous conditions, is most likely afunction of personal characteristics and theirinteraction with training and task situationalfactors”, (Snow, 1984a, pp. 597). Despite this,he emphasises that there are not necessarilydirect correlations between military motivationand morale, and performance under stress or indanger.Stress or Strain?In the occupational stress literature, stress isnormally referred to either as an externalstimulus or a job demand, or as an affective orattitudinal response. These two definitions are


36AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000differentiated by Lazarus’ (1966) appraisalfactor. Arnold (1960) distinguished emotionalresponses such as psychological strain, fromthe objects with which they were associated,such as job demands. He saw appraisal as theintervening process between the two. Newton(1989) argues that most researchers have notfully comprehended this distinction betweenthe existence of a demand, and the evaluationof that demand. Newton also points out thatappraisal is not the same as strain, since strainis concerned with the affective feelings orattitudes associated with the appraisal. Mostresearchers investigating occupational stresshave employed measures of psychologicalstrain which either focus on the affectiveresponse to a stressful demand, typicallyanxiety, by employing anxiety scales such asthe State-Trait Anxiety Scale of Spielberger(1983). As this raises the concern of semanticoverlap between questionnaire measures ofoccupational stress and strain (Newton, 1989),occupational stress questionnaires must focussolely on evaluations of the environment,while strain questionnaires focus solely onreported feelings.Models of occupational stress have likewiseproliferated, yet it seems that there are somedisagreements concerning the definition ofoccupational stress or strain in researchinvestigations. The lack of conceptualagreement stems partly from the fact that someresearchers have focused on the pressures of aparticular job, while others have been moreconcerned with behavioural and healthconsequences of work stress. However, it seemsthat the lack of a universally acceptedcategorisation of work-related stressorsremains the greatest source of contention.Measurement of Stress in the MilitaryEnvironmentRecent debate and discussion over thedesirability and feasibility of identifyingappropriate stress measurement instruments foruse in the Australian Defence Force (ADF)indicates an increased recognition of a need toassess the impact of non-combat occupationalstress in the military, (see Goyne, 1998;Chapman, 1999a; Chapman, 1999b; Chapman,2000; Office of the Surgeon General, 1999).While much of this discussion has centred onthe utility of various stress measurementinstruments and methods to the military, thereis recognition that there is scope to focus bothexclusively on occupational stress and morebroadly on life and job satisfaction, (Chapman,1999b). The Office of the Surgeon General(Senate Legislative Committee Brief, 7-8 Jun99) has identified the following factors asindicative of occupational stress:1. work characteristics (task design; workquantity, diversity and complexity;resources and equipment; time availabilityand deadlines);2. the physical work environment (noise,light, ventilation, temperature, space,working hours);3. the nature of the work and its relation toemployee temperament, training skills andexperience; and4. the human environment (organisationalstructure, management styles, methods andpractice, clarity and perceived fairnessof conditions, conflict resolution,communications, training and support,relations with peers and clients, the clarityof roles, reasonableness of exceptions andoutcome, the usefulness of the work,stability of employment).The capacity of any one measure orresearch design to measure each of thesepotential occupational stressors is limited.Indeed, the occupational stress literature haslong purported that the ability of currentmeasures to determine levels of occupationalstress is heavily dependent on item content.Chapman (1999b) offers a number oflogical conclusions to the issue of stressmeasurement in the ADF. First, she points outthe need for researchers to avoid criterioncontamination by attempting to measure stress


NON-COMBAT OCCUPATIONAL STRESS AND FATIGUE: A REVIEW OF FACTORS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 37using a combination of objective physiologicaldata, self-report of psychological and/orphysiological debilitation and sources ofoccupational stress. Secondly, she also cautionsagainst the Defence research communityendorsing a stress measure as “the instrumentof choice”, as the requirements of a givenresearcher will vary according to researchdesign, preferred methodology and targetpopulation.Occupational StressFactors that are consistently linked with jobstress include task demands, workload, jobsecurity, organisational structure, participationin decision-making, locus of control, andutilisation of employee skills. The findings in anumber of studies also suggest that the nature,frequency and severity of organisationalstressors may differ as a function ofoccupational level and the type of workperformed (e.g. Axelrod & Gavin, 1980;Marino & White, 1985; Turnage & Spielberger,1991). Despite the rapidly increasing researchinterest in the topic and the identification ofmore stressors, there is still no clearly accepted,universally used categorisation of stressors.Clearly, there are many opinions about thenature of occupational stressors and more thanone way of categorising them. However,theories of occupational stress have recentlytended to be based on transactionalconceptualisations of stress.Person-Environment fit (PE-Fit) theory(French & Caplan, 1972; French, Caplan &Harrison, 1982) is a widely endorsedconceptualisation of occupational stress whichhas guided the majority of recent research inthe field (Chemers, Hayes, Rhodewalt &Wysocki, 1985; Edwards & Cooper, 1990). Thetheory adopts the interactional view of stress inthat stress and strain in work settings areattributed to the interaction of an individualwith his/her work environment. Occupationalstress results from an incompatible personenvironmentfit that produces psychologicalstrain and stress-related physical disorders. Incontrast to the interactionist approach, Lazarus(1991) conceptualised occupational stress bydescribing stress as a process that involves atransaction between an individual and his/herwork environment. He distinguishes betweenstressful antecedent conditions, how these areappraised by individuals, and the moderatingeffects of individual coping resources.Assessment of Specific Occupational StressFactorsAlthough it is clear that such models doprovide a highly useful frame of reference tothe analysis of stress in a host of organisationalenvironments, their applicability islimited by the requirement to adopt a highlyidiographic approach to the quantification ofstress in each unique occupational context.This issue was highlighted by Turnage andSpielberger (1991), who point out that “Inorder to ameliorate job stress, thecharacteristics of a job that are perceived asmost stressful by particular occupationalgroups must be identified”, (p. 165). Theidentification and categorisation of stressorsneeds to be peculiar to the situations in whichthey occur, and to the persons whom theyeffect. Given the diversity in role and structureof many Defence establishments, this may be aparticularly salient issue for investigatingoccupational stress in the ADF.Assessment of Non-specific Factors:Chapman’s (2000) review of some of themost widely used generic occupational stressmeasurement tools highlights that while thereare a host of instruments which are ofpotential utility, this utility is limited by thelack of Australian military normative dataSpielberger and Vagg’s (1994) Job StressSurvey (JSS) is a relatively new instrumentwhich is currently being investigated withinthe confines of a focused study. Initialexperience in using this instrument indicatesthat it may be a useful measure of nonoperationalmilitary environments which often


38AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000result in psychological strain, while alsoassessing the intensity and frequency of jobstress.Morale and Job SatisfactionMediators of the relationship between stressand performance, such as appraisal style andpersonality are traditionally referred to bymilitary scientists by terms such as morale andesprit de corps. The mental, emotional andspiritual state of the individual has long beenrecognised as factor crucial to the effectiveperformance of a soldier, and has long been aconcept which is central to leadership trainingin the military.MoraleManning (1991) asserts that, for themilitary, “high morale seems to be both afunction of and a result of success in wartime”,and is “vitally important in keeping stresscasualties minimal” (p.453). Motowidlo et al(1976) attempted to summarise definitions ofboth industrial psychologists and militarywriters by arguing that most definitionsinclude some aspects of satisfaction,motivation and group membership. Inquestioning the applicability of concepts suchas job satisfaction to wartime contexts,Manning (1991) offers a definition of moralerelevant to both wartime and peacetime,emphasising membership in a group andwilling participation in the group’s work:“Morale is the enthusiasm and persistencewith which a member of a group engages inthe prescribed activities of that group”, (p. 455).Labuc (1991) attempts to develop aworking model of morale and performance,based on different attributes of the soldier’sbackground, the soldier, and the battle. Thesoldier’s background include the quality oftraining and leadership, together with unitcohesion and support. Factors specific to thesoldier concern his/her psychological andphysical well being, his/her confidence inhimself/herself, his/her equipment and his/hercommanders, and his/her identification withgroup goals. Labuc’s model refers to the“battle” as the situational context of morale inthis model. If the situation was peacetimerather than war, then morale may bedetermined by factors such as the social ororganisational climate. Thus, while thereappears to be scope for the use of socialclimate scales in military stress research, anyattempt to gain an indication of militarymorale as an intervening variable betweenstress and performance would be a worthyendeavour.Job SatisfactionJob satisfaction, the extent to whichemployees like their work, has long been animportant concept in the organisational studyof the responses employees have to their jobs.There have been numerous reports in theliterature that high levels of perceived workstress are associated with low levels of jobsatisfaction. While the precise relationship withoccupational stress is complex, generally thosewho are experiencing stress also have negativeattitudes towards their work. Although therelationship between organisational stress andsome organisation variables may not beentirely obvious, their relationship with jobsatisfaction is well-documented (Cooper &Payne, 1988). While being considered as anoutcome in its own right, job satisfaction canbe regarded as a related work attitude of stress(Bogg & Cooper, 1995).In a broad overview of military research onmotivation, morale and performance, Snow(1984b, p.599) identified four basic dimensionsof morale: confidence in commanders,confidence in equipment and in self as user,unit cohesiveness and perceived legitimacy ofthe mission. Snow (1984a) also emphasises theneed to sub-divide types of motivation “toserve, enter, stay, and fight in the armedforces” (p.593).Dissatisfaction in the ADF has grown inrecent years, not only with conditions ofservice and with the way in which the Service


NON-COMBAT OCCUPATIONAL STRESS AND FATIGUE: A REVIEW OF FACTORS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 39family is affected by Service life, but also withmanagement. The results of the 1999 ADFsurvey provide insight into current levels ofmorale and job satisfaction in Defencepersonnel. This is reflected in responses by theArmy respondents, as reported by DSPPR(1999), a selection of which is listed in Table 1.The items serve to highlight that membersof the Armed Forces in non-operational rolesare subject to many conditions which do notusually confront civilian workers. They aresubject to military law and discipline as well ascivilian law. They may work irregular hourswith no change in remuneration for overtime,and they lack the right to withdraw labour orengage in industrial disputation to achievechange. They may experience lengthyseparations from family and friends on fieldexercises and operations, and are liable to havefrequent postings, sometimes at short notice,with disturbance of social, educational andother ties. These conditions of service createthe potential for psychosocial stress andreduced satisfaction.Stress and PerformanceAlthough the requirement for effectiveperformance under stress has been presentsince our ancestors had to fight for basicsurvival, the impact of stress on performance isperhaps greater now than at any other time inour history. Modern high technology systemshave increased both the stress under which wemust perform and the consequences of poorperformance. Therefore, the impact of stress onperformance has become a primary concern inindustry (Spettell & Liebert, 1986), the military(Driskell & Salas, 1991), aviation (Prince,Bowers and Salas, 1994), and other appliedsettings in which effective performance understress is required. On the other hand, stress isalso of concern in everyday settings, such asorganisations where stress can lead to poorproductivity, reductions in job satisfaction andhigh employee turnover. Whether a highdemand performance environment or anTable 1: Percentage Distributions of selected 1999 ADF Attitude Survey attitude and belief items (DSPPR,1999)Item Strongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly MissingDisagree Agree or NAQ84: I get insufficient reward forwhat would be considered overtimein the civilian community. 4.6 18.0 8.2 33.8 32.2 3.3Q88: There are insufficientpersonnel in units to do the work 0.8 12.1 12.4 39.2 30.6 4.9Q110: The demands of my workinterfere with my home andfamily life 1.8 23.2 10.7 43.0 19.1 2.2Q11: The amount of time my jobtakes up makes it difficult to fulfillmy family responsibilities 1.6 32.5 16.2 32.9 14.1 2.6Q112: Things I want to do at homedo not get done because of thedemands my job puts on me 2.3 33.3 13.8 34.8 13.2 2.5Q 113: Due to work-related duties,I have to make changes to plansfor family activities 1.2 15.6 8.3 51.8 20.5 2.6


40AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000everyday organisational setting, it is in the bestinterests for all types of workers that they areable to perform their jobs effectively underconditions of high demand. Whether ineveryday settings, or more critical environmentssuch as the military, people may besubjected to various stressors that have beenshown to disrupt task performance. Theseinclude noise (Cohen & Weinstein, 1981),performance pressure (Baumeister, 1984),anticipatory threat (Paterson & Neufeld, 1987;Wachtel, 1968), time pressure (Wright, 1974),task load (McLeod, 1977), group pressure(Mullen, 1991), fatigue (Bonner, 1997),technology enhancements (Little, 1998), andother stressors.The deleterious effects of stress onperformance are profound. Stress may result inphysiological changes such as increasedheartbeat, laboured breathing, and trembling(Rachman, 1983), emotional reactions such asfear, anxiety, frustration (Driskell & Salas,1991), and motivational losses (Innes &Allnutt, 1967); cognitive effects such asnarrowed attention (1952, Easterbrook, 1959),decreased search behaviour (Streufert &Streufert, 1981), longer reaction time toperipheral cues and decreased vigilance(Wachtel, 1968), degraded problem solving(Yamamoto, 1984), and performance rigidity(Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981), changes insocial behaviours such as helping (Matthews &Canon, 1975); and even lowered immunity todisease (Jemmott & Locke, 1984). Performanceoutcomes that are typically examined in theresearch literature include performanceaccuracy, performance speed and performancevariability.In the context of this review, there is littlesense in assigning significant relevance to anynomothetic or universal theories of stress andperformance, when the current context ofinterest clearly requires an idiographicapproach. Salas, Driskell & Hughes (1996)provide a consistent argument which assists inany attempt to make greater sense of thestress-performance literature:“…there is little value in assuming acoherent body of stress literature, [and that]one would be better off by examining specificvariables, such as the effect of noise onperformance, without evoking the idea of stressat all”, (p.10).To illustrate this point, Salas, Driskell andHughes (1996) propose a model which specifiesa number of factors which commonly have animpact on performance, yet which stillprovides a basic framework for examiningstress causes, moderators and responses. Figure1 illustrates this model as a four stage process:(a) an environmental stimulus becomes salient,(b) it acquires a positive or negative valencethrough the appraisal process, (c) this leads tothe formation of performance expectations,and (d) these in turn determine a number ofphysiological, cognitive, emotional and socialconsequences.The cognitive effects of stress have oftenbeen of interest in research focusing onanxiety and individual differences, whereFigure 1. Four stage model of stress and performance (Salas, Driskell & Hughes, 1996)EnvironmentalstressorsAppraisalPerformanceexpectationsStress outcomesNoiseTime PressureTask LoadThreatGroup PressureEvaluation of theextent of the threatand the resources tomeet the demandPositive or negativeexpectations ofperformancecompetencePhysiologicalEmotionalSocialCognitivePerformance


NON-COMBAT OCCUPATIONAL STRESS AND FATIGUE: A REVIEW OF FACTORS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 41anxiety is clearly defined as an organismicstate consistent with the state-trait tradition.Eysenck (1983) conceptualises the basicinterrelationships among the factors of traitanxiety, state anxiety, environmental stressorsand performance, as shown in Figure 2.Eysenck (1983) reviews the experimentalwork on the effects of anxiety on taskperformance, and highlights some of the mostwidely replicated findings:1. Anxiety leads to increased task-irrelevantcognitive activities, such as worrying.2. Anxiety leads to increased effort duringtask performance most of the time.3. Anxiety reduces digit-span performance(working memory capacity).4. Anxiety interacts with task difficulty, withadverse effects of anxiety growing as taskdifficulty increases.5. Adverse effects of anxiety are moreapparent on subsidiary or incidental tasksthan on main or primary tasks.6. Anxiety interacts with type of feedback(neutral versus failure), with high anxietysubjects being more detrimentally affectedthan low anxiety subjects by failurefeedback.7. There is a closer relationship between stateanxiety and performance than there isbetween trait anxiety and performance.While both models provide a frame ofreference for the measurement of performance,they highlight that while generic measures ofstress and strain have their use, themeasurement of performance outcomes needto be both highly specific to the population ofinterest, and can be quantified in meaningfulways.Figure 2. The basic state-trait conceptualisation (Eysenck, 1983)Trait anxietyMilitary Stress ResearchThe effects of stress on task performance,and the mitigation of these effects are areas ofcritical concern to the military (see Driskell &Olmstead, 1989). The concern with effects ofstress on task performance is of central interestto the military mostly for operationalapplications, as the military operationalenvironment is, by definition, an extremestress environment. Combat is inherentlystressful, and all wars have resulted inconsiderable numbers of psychiatric casualties(Ingraham & Manning, 1980). Battle shock,post traumatic stress disorder, and combatstress reaction are stress-related syndromesthat result in the loss of trained combatmanpower in the short term, and a potentiallychronic medical problem for the affectedindividual and society in the long term.In addition to these severe reactions tostress, civilians and soldiers are likely toexperience stress-related performanceimpairments. In a soldier, errors in judgement,accuracy and timing affect performance incombat and non-combat settings. Whetherperformance or health is the outcome of focus,military stress research is mostly restricted tothat which arises in combat. As Alpass, Long,MacDonald and Chamberlain (1996) explain,“recent research into the mental and physicalhealth of military personnel has tended tofocus on exposure to combat”, (p.1). Theirinvestigation of work stress and health in noncombatmilitary personnel is unfortunatelyunique in the military stress literature. Theirstudy highlights that in the military, like anyorganisation, work stress is likely to existamongst all employees, regardless of their roleEnvironmental State anxiety Information PerformanceStressor processing measures


42AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000or the operational status of their postinglocation. For example, a July 1997 survey ofAustralian Army officers revealed that stresslevels exceeded the national average, and wereeven higher than the results expected fordisaster victims (MacIntyre, 1998). The stresslevels for Army soldiers, while not as extremeas the results obtained from the officer sample,were also excessive.A similar survey of senior Australian Armyofficers conducted by MacIntyre (1998) foundthat this sub-group also experience high stresslevels, as measured by the GHQ, whileSpielberger & Reheiser (1994) found that seniorUS Military officers perceive a high frequencyof work-related stressors. These findings areconsistent with those of Fullerton (1984), inthat members of Pentagon staff and drillsergeants in training roles perceive low workgroups support, lack of control, excessive workhours and evaluation stress. However,MacIntyre (1998) also found that senior Armyofficers are loyal to the Army, have a highdegree of job and career satisfaction, and arecommitted to serve. Farrell’s (1990) study ofRegular Army personnel working inquartermasters’ stores also indicated higherlevels of stress than in other workingpopulations, with higher stress in the lowerranks and designations, and higher jobsatisfaction among the higher ranks.The 1999 ADF Attitude Survey includedfive stress items in the topical issuessupplement. These items are best described as“crude”, with little construct validity, and areof limited interest in a clinical context.Table 2: Summary of responses of Army respondents’ to the stress items in the 1999 ADF Attitude SurveyItemHow much stress is there in your life rightnow?Over the past week, the stress I have beenexperiencing has affected my personal life.Over the past week, the stress I have beenexperiencing has affected the performance ofmy military job.Over the past week, how well have you copedwith these stressors?How do you rate your current health?Percentage Responses• 43 per cent of respondents said there is“quite a bit” or “extreme” amounts ofstress in their life right now• 25.5 per cent of respondents said thatstress is affecting their personal lives“quite a bit” or “extremely”• 10.4 per cent of respondents said that stressis affecting their performance of theirmilitary job “quite a bit” or “extremely”• 6 per cent of respondents said that theyhave coped with these stressors“somewhat poorly” or “very poorly”• 61 per cent of respondents said that theyhave coped with these stressors “quitewell” or “extremely well”• 23.7 per cent of respondents said that theyrated their current health as “fair” or “poor”


NON-COMBAT OCCUPATIONAL STRESS AND FATIGUE: A REVIEW OF FACTORS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 43Additionally, the items only seek informationon respondents’ recent rather than long-termexperience of stress, and no contextualinformation on the characteristics, prevalenceand severity of stressors is gathered.Despite these problems, given the paucityof “Army-wide” information on stress levels,particularly in training establishments, andother non-operational units, the items mayprovide a useful general indication of theprevalence of stress among ADF personnel, asillustrated by the summary of data from Armyrespondents in Table 2.FatigueFatigue is a term used to describe aconstellation of adverse, unwanted effects thatcan be traced to the continued exercise of anactivity. Despite the great number of papersexisting in the literature about the issue offatigue – both in the clinical medicine and inthe human factors field – it remains acontroversial matter. This difficulty depends onthe complexity of defining, recognising andmeasuring the phenomenon of fatigue and ofevaluating its effects on performance. Broadlyconsidered, fatigue can imply: (1) musculartiredness because of sustained strenuousphysical activity, (2) feeling and acting tiredafter repeated performance of routine tasksbecause of boredom at the lack of novelstimuli, or (3) feeling weary or sleepy becauseof the effects of sleep deprivation. It isimportant, moreover, to divide physical fatiguefrom psychological fatigue. Bills (1934)distinguishes sharply between subjective,objective, and physiological fatigue. Bartleyand Chute (1947) concur, asserting thatmeasures of work output are performance data,which include declines in all types of overtactivity. They reserve the term impairment forphysiological changes at the tissue level,including changes in neural and motorfunctions. All that remains to be designated asfatigue proper is the subjective residue offeelings of bodily discomfort and aversion toeffort. Their position is consistent with that ofHolding (1983) who observes that as “thereexist no observable criteria for fatigue… it ispossible for research purposes to regard fatigueas an intervening variable, or perhaps as ahypothetical construct, with a status similar tothat of psychological variables”, (p. 145). Whilefatigue can be typified in terms of temporalpatterns of acute, cumulative, and chronic, themost common approaches to fatigue refer to itas either physical or subjective/perceptual.Fatigue, performance and safetyBennet (1998) refers to fatigue in livingthings as being a deterioration of theirperformance over time. This deterioration, heasserts, is inherent in impairments ofconcentration, simple errors and forgetfulness,faulty judgements and perceptions, anddisorganisation and psychological breakdown.Bennet (1998) also specifies sleep deprivationas the most common cause of fatigue. He addsthat although highly motivated people – suchas doctors on duty, soldiers in battle,adventurers in a hostile environment – are ableto function with less sleep, even someaccumulation of sleep debt does affect theirability to function. Most adults require 7.5 to8.5 hours of sleep a day to cope with theeveryday demands of life. Demanding jobs,high mental workload, circadian disruption,sleep debt and physical exercise will increasethe minimum amount of sleep needed tomaintain performance (Rodgers, 1999). A lossof 2 hours prime sleep over a couple of daysleads to the development of acute sleep debt(Purficato, 1997). Bonnet and Arand (1995)also report that reducing sleep periods by aslittle as 1.3 to 1.5 hours for one night results inreduction of daytime alertness by as much as32 per cent. Dawson and Reid (1997) reportthat after 17 hours of sustained wakefulness,cognitive psychomotor performance decreasesto a level equivalent to the performanceimpairment observed at the blood alcohol


44AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000concentration of 0.05 per cent. Therefore,moderate levels of sleep loss equate tomoderate levels of intoxication (Dawson &Reid, 1997).Sleep deprivationThe profound negative effects of sleepdeprivation have been found by a number ofresearchers (Joy & Goldman, 1964; Manning,1979, 1985; Naitoh, Englund & Ryman, 1986;West et al, 1962; Williams, 1964). A systematicseries of sleep deprivation studies was reviewedby Murray (1965, pp.169-184, pp. 207-208,and pp. 220-224). Naitoh, Englund and Ryman(1986) examine the symptoms of sleep loss andhave identified a host of resulting performancedecrements. They note that symptoms of sleeploss vary between individuals but generallybecome more prevalent as sleep debtaccumulates. Tolerance to sleep loss, severityof physical workload and time of day are alsoimportant factors. When someone is deprivedof sleep, the physiological response issleepiness, which is the brain’s signal to obtainsleep. Eventually, when deprived of sleep, thehuman brain can involuntarily shift fromwakefulness to sleep. The more tired theperson, the more rapid and frequent are theintrusions of sleep into wakefulness. Suchspontaneous sleep episodes can be very short(microsleeps that last only seconds), orextended (lasting minutes). During theseperiods individuals disengage perceptuallyfrom the environment and cease to integrateoutside information. These episodes can occurregardless of motivation, professionalism,training, pay or whether inattention would putan individual at risk (Rosekind et al, 1996).Signs of performance degradation due to sleeploss include:1. Mood and motivational changes,2. Impaired attention,3. Memory loss for recent events,4. Variable and slowed responses,5. Vision illusion/hallucination,6. Failure to complete routines,7. Impaired task performance,8. Exaggerated feelings of physical exertion,9. Lack of insight in impaired behaviours, and10. Failed verbal communication.There is a general view that sleepdeprivation is a stressor like any other. Forexample, Alluisi (1972) notes that there are fewdifferential performance effects betweenstressors such as demanding work/restschedules, sleep loss and illness. He thoughtthat it is most likely that the behaviouraleffects of, or performance reactions to,stressors such as sleep loss are for the mostpart general effects, independent of the specificstress. However, when a specific function isdirectly affected then the general behaviouralreaction will show an overlaid effect based onthe impairment of that function.Sleep deprivation experienced by anindividual may largely be dependent on theindividual’s work schedule. Many workschedules reduce or eliminate the opportunityfor normal sleep and recovery by employees.These schedules often require individuals towork when their bodies are biologically drivento sleep. Additionally, as noted by Fletcher andDawson (1997), many work schedules producecumulative sleep deprivation, not continuoussleep deprivation. This is because the sleepdeprivation occurs over a number of nights ofshortened sleep as opposed to a single night ofno sleep. Cumulative sleep deprivationgenerally occurs due to reductions in sleepopportunities. The extent of such sleepdeprivation is most measurable when nightwork is being performed. This is because sleepobtained at night has the most value in termsof recovery.Fatigue after-effectsThe notion of after-effects refers to the ideathat prolonged exposure to a stressor mayproduce effects that appear after the stressor


NON-COMBAT OCCUPATIONAL STRESS AND FATIGUE: A REVIEW OF FACTORS AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 45has ceased. After-effects are the costs ofadaptation to demands. The after-effects ofwork have long been considered under therubric of “fatigue”. Prolonged work or stresscommonly gives rise to a general state,reflected in feelings of subjective tiredness orfatigue, due to increased effort to meet taskdemands by maintaining adequate performance.Broadbent (1979) noted the extentto which after-effects may affect theorganisation of complex performance. Someparts of a performance may be omitted, orperformed out of sequence with the wholeperformance. In particular, greater attentionneeds to be paid to the problem of fatigue withrespect to safety procedures at work. Fatiguemay limit an individual’s field of perceptionand attention, and his/her judgement may beimpaired to the extent that risk-takingbehaviour could result.The theme of performance protection as acause of fatigue is clear, and is particularlyrelevant to populations in which it is notacceptable nor safe to give up in a crisis, wherethe maintenance of life or objective aparticularly salient goal. However, in theprocess of adjusting to the demands of a task,costs are accrued for an individual’s physicaland psychological health. Fatigue is not likelyto be considered a problem until normal restand sleep do not lead to full recovery beforethe onset of the next set of demands. Chronicfatigue is fatigue which does not dissipateduring the normal processes of rest andrecuperation. The protection of performance oractive coping cannot be maintainedindefinitely in the face of repeated or chronicdemands, irrespective of the individual’s will topersevere (Bartlett, 1953). Clearly, the durationof the stress response is a critical variable,particularly for those who work particularlylong or irregular hours and may have littletime in which to recover between workperiods.Prediction modelling of fatigueWhile fatigue related to long and irregularwork hours are known to be associated withreductions in alertness and cognitivepsychomotor performance, few policy-makersor organisations have adopted managementpractices that allow quantitative assessment ofwork-related fatigue to occur. Fletcher andDawson (1997) argue that laboratory-basedstudies of workplace environments havelimited generalisability, as they typically assessonly a small number of work schedules at atime. Therefore, they propose an appliedmodelling approach of fatigue that wouldenable organisations to estimate and predictthe work-related fatigue in a worksite, drawingon a comparative study of performance levelswhilst sleep deprived and under the influenceof alcohol (Dawson & Reid 1997). Fletcher andDawson’s (1997) model conceptualises workrelatedfatigue as a balance between the forcesthat produce fatigue, and forces which reversethe effects of fatigue, or “recovery”. Thecircadian timing, duration and recency of workperiods are classified as fatiguing forces, whilethe circadian timing, duration and recency ofnon-work periods are classified as recoveryforces.Duration and timing of work periods:Fletcher and Dawson’s model asserts thatfatigue increases as a function of hours of priorwakefulness. In addition, work-related fatigueis also determined by the duration andcircadian timing of work shifts, as the rate atwhich fatigue accumulates is likely to begreater when the work period occurs duringthe subjective night than during the subjectiveday. Similarly, the recovery value of a nonworkperiod is also likely to be dependent onthe duration and circadian time at which itoccurs. Therefore, by knowing the circadiantiming and duration of work and non-workperiods, Fletcher and Dawson’s (1997) modelallows us to predict the amount of sleep anindividual is likely to obtain. This, in turn,


46AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000provides fatigue and recovery values for aspecific work or non-work period.Recency of work periods: Work and nonworkperiods that occurred months or yearsago are unlikely to contribute to fatigue levelsto the same extent as periods in the last week.Functionally, the fatigue or recovery value ofprevious work or non-work periods will tendtowards zero the further in the past theyoccurred.Saturation: The model has a saturationfunction which limits the total value ofrecovery that can be accumulated at any time,so that recovery values are not stored beyondfull recovery. This saturation of recoveryreflects the fact that sleep and recovery cannotbe stored because individuals find it difficult toextend sleep beyond 10-11 hours in length,irrespective of the amount of priorwakefulness.A recent study (Dawson & Reid, 1997)indicated that scores between 80 and 100 (highfatigue) are equivalent to the predicted level ofwork-related fatigue achieved after 23-24hours of continuous sleep deprivation. Thisresult was observed when the sleep deprivationstarted at 0800h on a Monday, following aweek working Monday to Friday 0900-1700h,and with Saturday and Sunday off.Performance impairment at such a level ofsleep deprivation has been associated with ablood alcohol concentration over 0.05 per centBAC.Similarly, another recent study (Lamond,Fletcher & Dawson, in press) investigated therelationship between fatigue, sleep deprivationand alcohol intoxication. This study used arange of performance tests as opposed to asingle test as used by Dawson and Reid (1997).The results of the study again indicated thatfatigue scores between 80 and 100 (highfatigue) were associated with performanceimpairment that would be seen in individualswith blood alcohol concentrations greater than0.05 per cent. Such a level of alcohol-relatedimpairment would not be acceptable at work.The Dawson and Fletcher (1997) fatiguemodel provides an analysis for potentialfatigue levels that is both meaningful andpractical, particularly in reference to theirprovision of a much needed frame of referencefrom which to base various work schedules.This frame of reference offered by Dawson andFletcher is that “standard” fatigue representsfatigue scores up to the maximum fatigue levelproduced by a Monday to Friday 9am to 5pmwork week, that is, a score of 40. “Moderate”fatigue scores are those which are up to 200per cent of the maximum scores produced bythe standard work week, that is, a score of 80.“High” fatigue scores are those which arebetween 200 and 250 per cent of themaximum scores produced by the standardwork week, that is, a score of 100. “Very high”fatigue scores are those which are between 250and 300 per cent of the maximum scoresproduced by the standard work week, that is, ascore of 120. Fletcher and Dawson’s model islikely to be a useful tool in the analysis of thework and rest schedules of staff from a widevariety of establishments, particularly for theidentification of occupational health and safetyissues in shiftwork and continuous andsustained operations.ConclusionsA broader approach to the study of stress inthe military is required to acknowledge theunique demands inherent in Australian DefenceForce’s primary peacetime role of training. Thishighlights the need to re-conceptualise the term“military stress”, such that it is as readilyidentifiable with stress in non-operationalcontexts as it is in operational contexts. Thereis also a need to develop a profile of soldiersserving in non-operational environments,including their physical and psychologicalhealth, their morale and their behaviours. Theon-going assessment of the utility of variousoccupational and clinical stress measures foruse within the ADF is therefore imperative,along with increased investigation of the


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Tiltrotors and the Australian Defence ForceBy Lieutenant Commander Tim Leonard, RAN51In this age of shrinking (relative) defence budgets, increasing procurement and support costs, ashift towards “purple" operations and greater scrutiny of defence acquisitions, it is imperative thatDefence dollars are “smart" dollars. Commonality of equipment (and by this I mean realcommonality, not glossy brochure, lip service commonality like Black Hawk / Seahawk) is onemethod to reduce cost of ownership through efficiencies in logistic support, training and personnelwhilst purchase of already existing systems will reduce developmental risks (Collins, SuperSeaSprite).Anumber of defence acquisition projects(some active, some looming) may benefitfrom a detailed study of the feasibility of usingcommercially available, relatively maturetiltrotor technology. Roles such as tacticaltransport, troop insertion / extraction,amphibious support, maritime Search andRescue, combat SAR, maritime patrol, Air-to-Air refuelling and special operations can all beachieved with tiltrotor aircraft. These roles,which are currently carried out in the ADFutilising 7 types (DHC4, CH47, S-70A-9, SK50,S-70B-2, AP3C, B707) could be conducted (tovarious levels of effectiveness) utilising the onebasic type, modified for role specificrequirements.The V22 – What can it do for us?The V22 Osprey is an aircraft thatcombines the flexibility inherent in a helicopterwith the higher speed and performance of aturboprop aircraft. It is a fairly large aircraft,slightly smaller than a CH47. It possesseshelicopter performance similar to a CH47 1 andturboprop performance similar to a CN235, oneof the contenders for the Light Tactical AirliftCapability (LTAC) project. It can carry 24combat troops approx 500 nm (and return) at amaximum speed of 275 Kts, can self deployover 2000nm, and with inflight refuelling anoption these ranges can be extended evenfurther. It can operate from any cleared arealarger than about 100 feet diameter in“helicopter" mode, or from short airstrips ifrequired. It can operate from vessels at sea forextended periods due to its ability to be foldedand can even refuel from ships underway ifrequired using a Helicopter In Flight Refuelling(HIFR) rig. It can be fitted with a vast array ofsensors and equipment specific to a number ofroles (FLIR, TFR, surveillance radar, ESM,rescue hoist, cabin guns, acoustic processors,air-surface missiles, buddy refuelling rigs),most of which have already been fitted toUSMC and USAF V22's in production.The V22 is an aircraft with demonstratedperformance, is already in production andtherefore presents reduced development risk.Tactical TransportCurrently this role is conducted utilising theDHC4 Caribou Light Tactical Transport. It hasbeen long recognised that this aircraft wouldrequire replacement due to reducingavailability and increasing logistic supportoverheads. Project Air 5190 aimed to do justthat but has since run into significant problemsas a result of Defence budget difficulties.Despite the impressive short fieldperformance of the Caribou, it still requires aprepared airstrip of at least 450 metres toland/takeoff at Maximum All Up Weight(MAUW). With a full load of combat troops(20) the Caribou can fly for approx 1.5 hours,covering approximately 180 nautical miles.The V22 Osprey outperforms the Caribou inall respects, and satisfies most of therequirements laid down for the LTAC aircraft.


52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000It fails to meet the requirement for internalcarriage of some Army vehicles, however thislack of capability must be weighed up againstthe flexibility provided (and only the soldierswho use these vehicles can do that).Troop Insertion / ExtractionWhilst there is some small overlap betweenTactical Transport and Troop Insertion/Extraction, I intend to discuss in this role theVietnam conflict style “hot LZ" type ofoperations.Currently this role is undertaken by theS-70A-9 Black Hawk. The Black Hawk,although a capable aircraft, suffers from anumber of shortcomings inherent in allhelicopters; it is relatively short range (100nmradius of action), relatively slow (120 kts) andhas relatively small payload (10 combattroops). These shortcomings can be overcomeby increasing the number of aircraft involvedand pre-positioning fuel, but this adds to thecomplexity of a mission and increases thenumber (and cost) of assets required forsuccess. Add to this the large noise footprinthelicopters project in all directions and we seean aircraft that is quite exposed to detectionand interdiction. An aircraft that caninsert/extract more troops, can transit furtherat a higher speed and therefore remain in“bandit country" for a shorter period of timeand has a much reduced acoustic footprint (inaircraft mode, it provides the enemy with onlyone-eighth the audible warning time given bya helicopter) 2 has an increased chance ofmission success and survival. This would resultin a more rapid buildup of troops where theyare needed with less risk of detection (andtherefore interdiction) by enemy forces.Special OperationsThis role is currently undertaken in arudimentary fashion by the S-70A-9 BlackHawk. The aircraft used are not well equippedto undertake long range, complex Special Opsmissions of the Iranian Hostage crisis type.Once again a number of the shortcomingsoutlined in the previous paragraph apply,perhaps more so in the Special Ops scenario.Possessing the ability to fly long-range sorties(particularly with AAR) at relatively highspeeds gives a Theatre Commander a veryflexible capability, and gives the aircrew moreoptions for ingress and egress routes, therebyincreasing their chances of successfullycompleting the mission and surviving!Amphibious SupportAs yet no plans are in place (to myknowledge) to acquire an aircraft specificallyfor this role. It is expected that the S-70A-9 orthe SK50 will be able to assume this role.Neither aircraft is particularly well suited tothis role however, the S-70A-9 for reasons ofpoor “marinisation" and structural problemswith operating from a ship, the SK50 forreasons of battlefield survivability and almostnon-existent capability to operate over land atnight (non-Night Vision Goggle compatiblecockpit). Indeed it could be argued that theSK50 is an aircraft searching for a role nowthat its designed role of active sonar AntiSubmarine Warfare has been removed.The support of the infantryman on theground is arguably the raison d'etre of theentire ADF. The two LPAs operated by theRAN perform a critical role in this capabilityby transporting and then supporting thesetroops wherever they are required. The aircraftoperated from the LPAs must therefore be wellsuited to the role of accurately and quicklylodging the troops ashore and enabling a rapidbuildup of force, thereby reducing the risk tothe troops. The V22, with its larger troopcarrying capacity, its ability to operate for longperiods from an afloat base and its high transitspeed makes it ideal. Additionally, with itslarge cargo lifting capacity it can support thosetroops well once they are ashore. The ability toself deploy long distances and operate fromsmall areas ashore gives the theatrecommander the ability to rapidly build upessential stores where they are needed, and to a


certain extent reduces the reliance uponsuitable logistic support facilities in theatre.Maritime Search and RescueThe Southern Ocean rescues of 1995 and1996 (as well as countless other rescues beforeand since) highlighted the requirement for along-range Search and Rescue capability inAustralia. The resources expended in theSouthern Ocean rescues were not insignificantwhen you consider the number of P3, C130and S-70B-2 hours flown, plus the cost ofsending a frigate four days steaming south(and back) and a replenishment ship to refuel iton the way back. These long-range rescuescould have been performed much moreefficiently and effectively by a V22 aircraft,although no doubt airborne refuelling wouldhave been required. The improved responseand deployment time offered by the V22would increase significantly the chance offinding and recovering survivors at sea.Combat Search and RescueThis highly specialised role is one thatAustralia as yet does not possess. It could beargued that the ADF was particularly fortunatethat operations in East Timor were relativelybenign, as we did not possess (and still do not)any effective means of carrying out anopposed extraction of downed aircrew ortroops deep within enemy controlled territory.The considerations applicable to SpecialOperations are arguably also relevant withrespect to Combat SAR.Maritime Patrol / Anti Submarine WarfareThe P3C aircraft carry out a significantamount of maritime surveillance. These large,expensive and labour intensive aircraft providea major capability to the ADF. As yet thereappears to be no system designed to replacethe capability provided by these aircraft underdevelopment anywhere in the world. Indeed,most operators of large MPAs are upgradingtheir existing airframes and systems to extendthe life of these increasingly valuable assets.With this in mind it will become imperativeTILTROTORS AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE 53that the ADF preserves the airframes itcurrently possesses for as long as possible.The V22 can undertake a significantamount of the tasking currently provided bythe P3. True, it does not have the very longrange of the P3, but for closer patrols, maritimestrike and even ASW, a suitably modified V22will be entirely adequate. This will free up theP3 fleet to undertake the long-range work,reduce fleet usage and therefore extending lifeof-type.The RAN’s S-70B-2 helicopters provide aflexible ASW, surface surveillance, fleet utilityand Search and Rescue capability to the fleet.These aircraft are currently undergoing amodification program under Project SEA 1405.Phase 3 and 4 of this project involves a midlife upgrade, and is expected to occur (if at all)somewhere around 2007. Given the inherentflexibility and greater performance of the V22,it would be worth considering cancelling themid life upgrade of the S-70B-2 and replacingthem with a suitable number of V22s. If theseaircraft would be expected to embark in thesame manner as the S-70B-2, thenconsideration would have to be given to thesize of the aircraft when contemplating anyfrigate modification / acquisition project.Air-to-Air RefuellingWhilst not advocating that the V22 is inany way a replacement for larger strategictankers, it can provide an air-to-air refuellingcapability that is easily deployed with far lessstringent support requirements (runways, GSEetc) than the current generation of tankers. Therelatively high speed of this aircraft wouldmake it suitable to refuel fighters and otherV22 aircraft when required. This addedflexibility and increase in tanker capacitygreatly increases the “force multiplier" effect ofair-to-air refuelling aircraft, whilst reducingthe operating tempo of our existing B707s.Advantages to “Commonality"One of the most obvious advantages islogistic support. If one aircraft type can


54AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000undertake a significant portion of ADF aviationtasks, then a significant portion of ADFaviation logistic support is common. This couldlead to improved availability of airframes dueto a larger pool of spares and improvedleverage with manufacturers/suppliers due toincreased market value.A further advantage would be commontraining. With simulators now being anintegral part of any equipment purchase, thepossibility of building a small number ofsimulators (in a central location) to train allADF V22 crews in the basic operation of theaircraft is now presented. With advanced,software driven cockpits now the norm, thesesimulators would be able to be configured forthe “type" specific missions required. Byhaving a number of simulators available (andrequired given the number of aircrew requiringtraining) they could be linked for the morecomplex missions.By having a large pool of aircrew trained tooperate the aircraft, the ADF would have theflexibility of deploying these people wherethey are needed, thereby having a truly“purple" workforce. This would go some waytowards alleviating the ever present problem ofaircrew shortages (always has been a problemand I suspect it always will be!) by enablingsome “shuffling" of people to occur. In fact, byallowing this cross-pollination of skills androles to occur the flow of disgruntled aircrewfrom the Services to the airlines may wellreduce.ConclusionThe V22 is not a perfect aircraft. It cannotconduct all tasks. It is not a fighter, it is not astrategic transport, it is not a long-rangemaritime patrol aircraft, and it is not a strategictanker. It is, however, a very flexible platformthat offers the ADF a greatly increasedcapability in many areas. The rationalisation oftraining and logistic support across much ofthe ADF’s aviation assets (which do/willrequire replacement or expensive upgradesanyway) will go much of the way towardsreducing the sting of the price tag that willcome with this aircraft.NOTES1. Although it cannot lift the same external loadas a CH47 (15 000lbs versus approx 25 000lbsfor the CH47).2. Frank Colucci, “Special Ops Osprey" Vertiflitemagazine Spring 1999Lieutenant Commander Tim Leonard is a naval aviator currently serving as the Chief Pilot Examiner in CommanderAustralian Naval Aviation Group. He served as a seaman officer prior to commencing flying duties.The Board of Management and Staff of theAustralian Defence Force Journal wish our readersSeasons Greetings and a Happy and Prosperous New Year


Index 2000INDEX 55No. 140 January/February 2000 – No. 145 November/December 2000Title IndexTITLE ISSUE PAGEAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Analysis of the NATO Information Campaign – In the War Against Yugoslavia 140 Jan/Feb 49Architectural Framework for the Australian Army’s Tactical Communication System, An 142 May/June 27Are We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Better than Monash? Compare the Performance of Monash, Currie and Russell on the Western Front 140 Jan/Feb 55Challenge of "New Times": Developing Doctrine for an Uncertain Future, The 142 May/June 49Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Cooperative Security: A China Perspective? 141 Mar/Apr 11Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Critical Assessment of the Relevance of a Concept of Cooperative Security, A 140 Jan/Feb 25Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Dragon Looks South, The 142 May/June 21Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Examination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Humanitarian Role and Capability Enhancement for the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility, A 142 May/June 45Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism and Aceh in the Twentieth Century 141 Mar/Apr 29Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Leadership Skills for APS Managers in Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23"Maritimeness" of Australia – But How Maritime is Australia?, The 140 Jan/Feb 41Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35"Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Force, The 141 Mar/Apr 37RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Tiltrotors and the Australian Defence Force 145 Nov/Dec 51Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9Value-Adding in the Military: Three Australian Army Case Studies 140 Jan/Feb 9What Are Information Operations? Why Should I Take Any Notice? 140 Jan/Feb 31What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45


56AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Subject IndexTITLE ISSUE PAGEADMINISTRATIONAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45AIR MATTERSRise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Force, The 141 Mar/Apr 37Tiltrotors and the Australian Defence Force 145 Nov/Dec 51DEFENCE REVIEW 2000Alliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9EDUCATIONAustralian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37


TITLE ISSUE PAGEINDEX 57HISTORYAnalysis of the NATO Information Campaign – In the War Against Yugoslavia 140 Jan/Feb 49Better than Monash? Compare the Performance of Monash, Currie and Russell on the Western Front 140 Jan/Feb 55Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism and Aceh in the Twentieth Century 141 Mar/Apr 29Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Force, The 141 Mar/Apr 37HUMAN BEHAVIOURAustralian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism and Aceh in the Twentieth Century 141 Mar/Apr 29Leadership Skills for APS Managers in Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35INTELLIGENCEAnalysis of the NATO Information Campaign – In the War Against Yugoslavia 140 Jan/Feb 49Architectural Framework for the Australian Army’s Tactical Communication System, An 142 May/June 27Examination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41INTELLIGENCE (continued)Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15What Are Information Operations? Why Should I Take Any Notice? 140 Jan/Feb 31INTERATIONAL RELATIONSAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Analysis of the NATO Information Campaign – In the War Against Yugoslavia 140 Jan/Feb 49Are We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Cooperative Security: A China Perspective? 141 Mar/Apr 11Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Critical Assessment of the Relevance of a Concept of Cooperative Security, A 140 Jan/Feb 25Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Dragon Looks South, The 142 May/June 21Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Humanitarian Role and Capability Enhancement for the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility, A 142 May/June 45Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Indonesian Islamic Fundamentalism and Aceh in the Twentieth Century 141 Mar/Apr 29Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57“Maritimeness" of Australia – But How Maritime is Australia?, The 140 Jan/Feb 41Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90


58AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000TITLE ISSUE PAGEINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (continued)RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9LEADERSHIPLeadership Skills for APS Managers in Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45LOGISTICSTiltrotors and the Australian Defence Force 145 Nov/Dec 51Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9MANAGEMENTAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Examination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Leadership Skills for APS Managers in Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9What Are Information Operations? Why Should I Take Any Notice? 140 Jan/Feb 31What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45


TITLE ISSUE PAGEINDEX 59MEDICALHumanitarian Role and Capability Enhancement for the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility, A 142 May/June 45Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35MILITARY PROFESSIONALISMAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Are We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Better than Monash? Compare the Performance of Monash, Currie and Russell on the Western Front 140 Jan/Feb 55Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Examination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Humanitarian Role and Capability Enhancement for the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility, A 142 May/June 45Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9What Are Information Operations? Why Should I Take Any Notice? 140 Jan/Feb 31What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45NAVAL MATTERSHumanitarian Role and Capability Enhancement for the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility, A 142 May/June 45“Maritimeness” of Australia – But How Maritime is Australia?, The 140 Jan/Feb 41ORGANISATIONAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Architectural Framework for the Australian Army’s Tactical Communication System, An 142 May/June 27Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45


60AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000TITLE ISSUE PAGEORGANISATION (continued)Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Leadership Skills for APS Managers in Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23Measurement of Stress in Australian Defence Personnel: A Discussion, The 141 Mar/Apr 19Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45PEACEKEEPINGAre We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5PLANNINGArchitectural Framework for the Australian Army’s Tactical Communication System, An 142 May/June 27Are We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45POLICYAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Are We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Australian Population and Workforce Trends: The Strategic HR Challenges and Opportunities for Army 140 Jan/Feb 17Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Challenge of "New Times": Developing Doctrine for an Uncertain Future, The 142 May/June 49Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Cooperative Security: A China Perspective? 141 Mar/Apr 11Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Critical Assessment of the Relevance of a Concept of Cooperative Security, A 140 Jan/Feb 25Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4


TITLE ISSUE PAGEINDEX 61POLICY (continued)Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Leadership Skills for APS Managers in Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23“Maritimeness" of Australia – But How Maritime is Australia?, The 140 Jan/Feb 41Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Reflections on Leadership 141 Mar/Apr 53Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9What’s the Matter? – A Due Diligence Report 141 Mar/Apr 45POLITICSAre We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Critical Assessment of the Relevance of a Concept of Cooperative Security, A 140 Jan/Feb 25RECRUITINGImproving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRSExamination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70“Not the size of the dog in the fight…” RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15SECURITYAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Are We Going to Fight Again? 141 Mar/Apr 5Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Challenge of "New Times": Developing Doctrine for an Uncertain Future, The 142 May/June 49Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Cooperative Security: A China Perspective? 141 Mar/Apr 11Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Critical Assessment of the Relevance of a Concept of Cooperative Security, A 140 Jan/Feb 25


62AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000TITLE ISSUE PAGESECURITY (continued)Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Dragon Looks South, The 142 May/June 21Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Examination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57“Maritimeness" of Australia – But How Maritime is Australia?, The 140 Jan/Feb 41Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9What Are Information Operations? Why Should I Take Any Notice? 140 Jan/Feb 31STRATEGYAlliances: Two-way Streets 143 July/Aug 43Australia’s Defence Posture 143 July/Aug 15Australia’s Security Needs Dilemmas 143 July/Aug 47Australian Government’s Major Responsibilities and the Principles Underlying Defence Force Development 143 July/Aug 39Balanced Force, A 143 July/Aug 23Challenge of "New Times": Developing Doctrine for an Uncertain Future, The 142 May/June 49Choosing to Make Choices 143 July/Aug 25Clever Deception, A 143 July/Aug 35Crafting a National Defence Policy 143 July/Aug 45Defence of Australia and its Interests, The 143 July/Aug 31Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force 143 July/Aug 3Defence Review 2000: Public Discussion Paper Executive Summary 143 July/Aug 4Educating Cabinet 143 July/Aug 29Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Force Structuring for Uncertainty 143 July/Aug 52Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Improving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Indonesian View, An 143 July/Aug 61Information Capabilities: An Unofficial American View 143 July/Aug 57Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70New Directions for Australia’s Defence 143 July/Aug 49New Directions for Defence: Ten Key Issues To Get Right 143 July/Aug 11“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Security Regionalisation and the Future of the Australian Defence Force 143 July/Aug 21Survival of the Fittest?, The 143 July/Aug 19Territorial Integrity and Regional Stability 143 July/Aug 37Tiltrotors and the Australian Defence Force 145 Nov/Dec 51Transforming the ADF’s Force Structure for the 21st Century 143 July/Aug 27Upholding Regional Security? 143 July/Aug 9


TITLE ISSUE PAGEINDEX 63TECHNOLOGYArchitectural Framework for the Australian Army’s Tactical Communication System, An 142 May/June 27Examination of the Relationship Between Information and Technical Advances and the RMA, An 140 Jan/Feb 5Fabrizio’s Choice: Organisational Change and the Revolution in Military Affairs Debate 144 Sept/Oct 78Future Warfare Concepts: Designing the Future Defence Force 144 Sept/Oct 5Impact of RMA on Command and Control – An SAF Perspective 144 Sept/Oct 21Network-Enabled Force Synchronisation 144 Sept/Oct 70“Not the size of the dog in the fight…" RMA – The ADF Application 144 Sept/Oct 65Rapid, Decisive Operation: A Construct for an American Way of War in the 21st Century, The 144 Sept/Oct 12Relevance of Manoeuvre Warfare to the Australian Army in the Information Age, The 145 Nov/Dec 5Revolution in Military Affairs: A New Guide for China’s Military Modernisation 144 Sept/Oct 41Revolutionising Australia’s Approach to Revolutionary Times 144 Sept/Oct 90RMA in ASEAN: The Alternatives to Security 144 Sept/Oct 60RMA in South-East Asia: Security and External Defence, The 144 Sept/Oct 30RMA, C2 and Coalition Operations, The 144 Sept/Oct 27Some Aspects of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the Impact on the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 15Tiltrotors and the Australian Defence Force 145 Nov/Dec 51Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9What Are Information Operations? Why Should I Take Any Notice? 140 Jan/Feb 31TRAININGImproving the Development and Use of Human Resources in the ADF: Key Concepts for Strategic Management 142 May/June 11Measuring the Value of the Australian Services Cadet Scheme 140 Jan/Feb 37Non-Combat Occupational Stress and Fatigue: A Review of Factors and Measurement Issues for the ADF 145 Nov/Dec 35Rich Organisation, Poor Organisation: Defence Performance and Military Leadership 142 May/June 5Value-Adding in the Military 140 Jan/Feb 9WWIIRise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Air Force, The 141 Mar/Apr 37ReviewsTITLE ISSUE PAGEBOOKSAngau 142 May/June 58Australian Prisoners of War 141 Mar/Apr 62Battle after the War: The Story of Australia’s Vietnam Veterans, The 141 Mar/Apr 57Bill Newton V.C. (The Short Life of a RAAF Hero) 142 May/June 55Borneo: Australia’s Proud but Tragic Heritage 140 Jan/Feb 61Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, A 144 Sept/Oct 98Brothers from Bataan: POWs 141 Mar/Apr 59Darwin Bombed 140 Jan/Feb 59Deadwater Deep 142 May/June 55Issues in Regional Martime Strategy: Royal Australian Navy Maritime Studies Program 141 Mar/Apr 59Mitrokhin Archive, The 141 Mar/Apr 61Neville Howse: Australia’s First Victoria Cross Winner 140 Jan/Feb 60New Guinea Volunteer Rifles NGVR 1939-1943: A History, The 142 May/June 56Other Enemy, The 141 Mar/Apr 57Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, 1944-1978 142 May/June 59Remote Control 144 Sept/Oct 98Silent Men 141 Mar/Apr 60Three Spirits of Leadership: Seeking the United Voice of the Entrepreneur the Corporation and the Community 142 May/June 57Trends in Australian Defence: A Resource Survey 140 Jan/Feb 59Vanguard Against Japan: RAAF First to Strike 144 Sept/Oct 100Victors, The 141 Mar/Apr 61Words of War 140 Jan/Feb 61VIDEOSBattle of Maryang San, The 140 Jan/Feb 64Forgotten Force, The 140 Jan/Feb 64In Search of the Tiger: The Vietnam War 1968 140 Jan/Feb 63Last God-King: The Lives and Times of Cambodia’s Sihanouk, The 140 Jan/Feb 63Niagara’s Gold: The Epic Story of the Greatest Gold Salvage in History 141 Mar/Apr 63Time Life Videos from the series, “The Century of Warfare” 141 Mar/Apr 63Tom Uren, Politician 142 May/June 60


64AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 145 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2000Author’s IndexAUTHOR ISSUE PAGEAkiyama, M., Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA 143 July/Aug 9Alsop, B., HQ Air Command 140 Jan/Feb 31Ayling, Brigadier S.H., Office of the RMA 144 Sept/Oct 5Babbage, Dr R., Director, Centre for International Strategic Analysis 143 July/Aug 11Baker, General J., AC DSM (Retd.) 143 July/Aug 15Barrie, Admiral C.A., Chief of the Defence Force 141 Mar/Apr 53Bateman, Commodore S., AM, RAN (Retd.) 143 July/Aug 19Bell, Dr C., Australian National University 143 July/Aug 21Bergin, Associate Professor A., Australian Defence Force Academy 143 July/Aug 23Blackburn, Air Commodore J.N., AM, DG Policy and Planning – Air Force 144 Sept/Oct 65Brooks, Captain S.K., DSPPR 145 Nov/Dec 35Byrne, Professor D.G., Australian National University 145 Nov/Dec 35Carroll, J., Department of Defence 145 Nov/Dec 23Chapman, Lieutenant S., RANR 141 Mar/Apr 19Cheeseman, G., University of New South Wales 143 July/Aug 25Cheeseman, G., University of New South Wales 144 Sept/Oct 90Cordner, Commodore L., DG Navy Strategic Policy and Futures 144 Sept/Oct 65Dibb, Professor P., Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University 143 July/Aug 27Dobell, G., Radio Australia/ABC Foreign Affairs/Defence Correspondent 143 July/Aug 29Durell-Young, T., Naval Postgraduate School 143 July/Aug 57Evans, Air Marshal S.D., AC DSO AFC RAAF (Retd.) 143 July/Aug 31Evans, M., Australia’s Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon 144 Sept/Oct 78Flynn, Lieutenant Commander P., RAN 141 Mar/Apr 29Frater, Dr M.R., Australian Defence Force Academy 142 May/June 27Garran, R., Foreign Affairs and Defence Writer, The Australian 143 July/Aug 35Goodyer, Colonel M., Director Future Warfare 145 Nov/Dec 15Harris, Lieutenan Colonel D.A., (Retd.) 140 Jan/Feb 5Harris, Major S., ARA 140 Jan/Feb 9Hawke, A., Secretary Department of Defence 141Mar/Apr 45Heron, Lieutenant Commander W., RAN 141 Mar/Apr 11Heron, Lieutenant Commander W.M., RAN 140 Jan/Feb 25Hill, Rear Admiral R., (Retd.), Editor, The Naval Review 143 July/Aug 37Hodson, Major S.E., Army Recruit Training Centre 145 Nov/Dec 35Hudson, Admiral M.W., AC, RAN (Retd.) 143 July/Aug 39Jans, Brigadier N. (Retd.) 142 May/June 5Ji, Dr Y., School of Political Science, University of New South Wales 144 Sept/Oct 41Jones, Dr W.H., Squadron Leader, AIRTC (Retd.) 140 Jan/Feb 37Jones, Lieutenant L.T., ARA 142 May/June 11Krepinevick, Dr A., Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington DC, USA 144 Sept/Oct 3Leary, Lieutenant Commander P.J., RAN 140 Jan/Feb 41Leonard, Lieutenant Commander T., RAN 145 Nov/Dec 51Lim, Lieutenant Colonel H., SAF 144 Sept/Oct 21Lim, Professor R., Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan 143 July/Aug 43Mak, Mr J.N., Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs 144 Sept/Oct 30McGavin, Rev. P.A., Associate Professor, Australian Defence Force Academy 140 Jan/Feb 9McGavin, Rev. P.A., Associate Professor, Australian Defence Force Academy 142 May/June 11McGuire, Major D., RAE 145 Nov/Dec 5McLaren, Lieutenant Colonel A.B., ARA 140 Jan/Feb 9Mejia, R.C., Defence Analyst to the Office of the Armed Forces Attache Philippine Embassy 141 Mar/Apr 37Moore, J., MP, The Hon., Minister for Defence 143 July/Aug 3Murray, Lieutenant D.J. , ARA 142 May/June 11Nugroho, Captain A., Indonesian Armed Forces 142 May/June 21O’Connor, M., Australian Defence Association 143 July/Aug 45O’Neill, R., University of Oxford 143 July/Aug 47Orme, Lieutenant Colonel C.W., CSC 141 Mar/Apr 5Ozolek, Colonel D.J., US Army (Retired) 144 Sept/Oct 12Purcell, Lieutenant F. RANR 142 May/June 45Quigley, The Honourable D., Consultant, New Zealand 143 July/Aug 49Rolin, Captain X., French Joint Staff 144 Sept/Oct 27Ryan, Dr A., Land Warfare Studies Centre 142 May/June 49Ryan, Dr M.J. Australian Defence Force Academy 142 May/June 27Sanderson, Lieutenant General J., (Retd.) 143 July/Aug 52Schmidtchen, Major D., AA Psych 140 Jan/Feb 17Scholz, Dr. J.B., DSTO 144 Sept/Oct 70Smith, Lieutenant Colonel P., AA Avn 140 Jan/Feb 9Smith, Major M., RA Sigs 140 Jan/Feb 49Swan, Brigadier M.A., DG, Future Land Warfare AHQ 144 Sept/Oct 65Wanandi, J., Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta 143 July/Aug 61Waranon, Rear Admiral W., RTN 144 Sept/Oct 60Watts, Major S.J., RAR 140 Jan/Feb 55

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