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Principles and practices of EU external representation - Asser Institute

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The principle <strong>of</strong> loyal co-operation: A ‘master key’ for <strong>EU</strong> <strong>external</strong> <strong>representation</strong>?On the one h<strong>and</strong>, the principle <strong>of</strong> loyal co-operation has gained a recurrentpresence in the Court’s terminology concerning the <strong>external</strong> relations <strong>of</strong> theUnion (also in cases that do not address issues <strong>of</strong> mixity). In fact, a considerablenumber <strong>of</strong> recent judgments <strong>of</strong> the Court <strong>of</strong> Justice regarded cases wherethere was some problem concerning the respect <strong>of</strong> loyalty duties, <strong>and</strong> wherespecific questions on the implications stemming from that principle have arisen.The details <strong>of</strong> such decisions will be spelled out later. 8 At this point, suffice itto recall the MOX Plant ruling, 9 where the Court ultimately clarified that theco-operation duties between the Member States <strong>and</strong> the <strong>EU</strong> institutions in<strong>external</strong> relations represent a specific application <strong>of</strong> the loyalty clause set outin the founding Treaties (in Article 192 TEAEC <strong>and</strong> Article 10 TEC, respectively). 10Symbolically <strong>and</strong> substantively, such ruling marks a major advance in the judicialdiscourse on loyal co-operation. Indeed, despite early cases which maysuggest otherwise, the Court has made it clear that the co-operation dutiescannot represent self-st<strong>and</strong>ing commitments flowing from the ‘requirement’ <strong>of</strong>unity in the international <strong>representation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Union, the former being just amanifestation <strong>of</strong> loyal co-operation. 11On the other h<strong>and</strong>, the Lisbon Treaty has reshaped the pre-existing loyaltyclause, <strong>and</strong> introduced three major innovations in this respect. First, it has incorporatedthe clause <strong>of</strong> sincere co-operation into the new common platform<strong>of</strong> <strong>EU</strong> policies (Article 4(3) T<strong>EU</strong>). Secondly, it has codified the fact that thisclause constitutes a (general) principle <strong>of</strong> <strong>EU</strong> law. As a result, the duty <strong>of</strong> loyalco-operation represents today a general principle <strong>of</strong> the <strong>EU</strong> legal order, whichcovers, inter alia, all the branches <strong>of</strong> the <strong>EU</strong> <strong>external</strong> action (including the CommonForeign Security Policy). 12 Third, the Lisbon Treaty has emphasized themutual nature <strong>of</strong> the principle: indeed, according to its new formulation, loyalco-operation shall be exercised by the Member States <strong>and</strong> the <strong>EU</strong> institutions‘in full mutual respect’.In the light <strong>of</strong> the foregoing, this paper starts by giving a general overview<strong>of</strong> the recent case-law concerning the joint <strong>representation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Union <strong>and</strong> itsMember States at international level, such a context being, as already men-8 See sections 2, 3 <strong>and</strong> 4, infra.9 Case C-459/03 Commission <strong>of</strong> the European Communities v Irel<strong>and</strong> [2006] ECR I-04635.10 Ibid. paras. 174-175.11 See in this respect the Opinion <strong>of</strong> Advocate General Maduro in Commission v. Sweden,where he stresses that ‘[t]he unity <strong>of</strong> international <strong>representation</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Community <strong>and</strong>its Member States does not have an independent value; it is merely an expression <strong>of</strong> the duty<strong>of</strong> loyal cooperation under Art. 10 EC’. Case C-246/07 European Commission v Kingdom <strong>of</strong>Sweden [2010] ECR I-03317; Opinion <strong>of</strong> Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 1 October 2009,para. 37. See also C. Hillion, ‘Mixity <strong>and</strong> Coherence in <strong>EU</strong> External Relations: The Significance<strong>of</strong> the “Duty <strong>of</strong> Cooperation”’, CLEER Working Paper 2009/2, (last visited 25 July 2012), at 5, <strong>and</strong> M. Cremona,‘Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), Judgment <strong>of</strong> the Court <strong>of</strong> Justice (Gr<strong>and</strong> Chamber)<strong>of</strong> 20 April 2010’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) 1639, at 1652.12 C. Hillion, ‘Cohérence et action extérieure de l’Union européenne’, <strong>EU</strong>I Working Papers Law2012/14, (last visited 30 July 2012), at 7. Co-operation duties between the Union <strong>and</strong> itsMember States in <strong>external</strong> relations are (directly <strong>and</strong> indirectly) stressed in many provisions <strong>of</strong> the<strong>EU</strong> Treaties: see, for instance, Art. 24(3), 32, 34, 35 T<strong>EU</strong>, <strong>and</strong> Art. 221 TF<strong>EU</strong>.13CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2012/5

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