GOLD Report I - UCLG

MIDDLE EAST / WESTERN ASIA216United Cities and Local Governments33. Art. 47 andfollowing.34. The law ofSeptember 1997gives them adiscretionary powerin many sectors.budgets, and the state has always madeup the shortfall with agreeably flexibleloans from the Bank of the Provinces.State supervision of local authority finances.State monitoring of local authority financesis a normal, necessary and healthymeasure as it ensures that finances aremanaged not only efficiently, but also withintegrity. However, this monitoring shouldnot immobilize the decision-making process.In Lebanon, for example, three separateentities monitor public municipalfinances: the comptroller general, the auditor-general,and the State Audit Office. TheState Audit Office carries out a priori and aposteriori inspections of local authorityfinances, focusing particularly on municipalproperty management above a specifiedthreshold, the signing of public contracts,public works, and service provision. Ineffect, such oversight power negates localgovernmental autonomy for municipalities.Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain havesimilar systems; budgets are proposed bymunicipal councils, but the councils can notvote to approve their budgets.With the aim of reconciling decentralizationand the careful management of municipalfinances, Turkey has set up a supervisionsystem based on internal bodies calledaudit committees. These consist of fromthree to five council members who must beelected annually by their respective municipalcouncils in towns with more than10,000 inhabitants, and the SPAs. Theirrole is to provide a check on the incomeand expenditure of local authorities. Assuch, they make up a form of democraticcounterweight to the established authority,particularly in those places where themayor is both the municipality’s highestauthority and the official with the power toauthorize expenditure.A posteriori checks are carried out, as in anymodern country, by the State Audit Office.This lack of resources, combined with theirincapacity to implement the areas of responsibilitythat they have been allocated, makeslocal authorities dependent on the state,transforming them into central governmentgo-betweens. The central government alsomanages in an authoritarian and arbitraryway the money that is actually distributed tolocal treasuries. Unequal distribution isoften the rule rather than the exception. Forexample, the money allocated for streetcleaning in just the city of Amman amountsto a third of the entire budget for all Jordanianmunicipalities. In a similar case, overthe past few years the Lebanese governmenthas withdrawn huge amounts of moneyfrom the Independent Municipal Fund topay for street cleaning in metropolitan Beirut.In the same way equalization is nonexistentin numerous countries,such as Jordanand Lebanon.III.2. ResponsibilitiesIII.2.1. Extensive theoretical areasof responsibilityIn most countries in this region, municipalitieshave official responsibility for a widerange of tasks, including infrastructure andmany human services. On paper, municipalitiesare responsible for highways, publicbuildings and drains, outdoor lighting, andwaste collection, and also health, education,culture, sports, and social services. Lebanon’slaw on municipalities 33 gives municipalcouncils extensive prerogatives in all theseareas, including the support of destitute anddisabled people. Similarly, the Palestinianand Jordanian municipalities 34 are supposedto have, respectively, 27 and 39 differentareas of responsibility.III.2.2. A reality often out of stepwith the legislationHowever, in many countries, there is a gapbetween legislation and its implementation.Many factors prevent municipalitiesfrom meeting their official responsibilities.The overlapping of areas of responsibilitywith central government. In Saudi Arabia,the Ministry of Rural and Municipal Affairshas drawn up a very precise list of munici-