GOLD Report I - UCLG

233I. IntroductionThis chapter compares local governmentand decentralization in Canada and theUnited States. These two North Americancountries share important, parallel inheritances.Both are settler societies that emergedout of British colonialization. The similaritiesin their local government systemshave frequently led to their classificationtogether (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Sellers2006, 2007), and with other countries withsimilar legacies such as Australia and NewZealand.Both countries are established constitutionaldemocracies with federal structuresof government. Both possess highly developedeconomies and have in commonlegal, institutional and cultural legaciesfrom British colonization from the seventeenthto the nineteenth centuries. Othercolonial and pre-colonial legacies alsomark the practice of local government incertain areas of each country. Most notably,French influences have been strongin the Canadian province of Québec, andhave also affected aspects of institutionalpractice in Louisiana in the U.S. In partsof each country, indigenous traditions remainimportant to local government practice.Local government in both countries wasestablished in the original British coloniesprior to the creation of a national government.The arrangements for local governmentin what would become New Englandin the United States grew directly fromthose in early colonial settlements. InCanada, provincial acts of the 1840s and1850s established the framework of localgovernment prior to the Constitution Actof 1867.Although present-day local government inthese countries can possess considerablepowers, it lacks either national constitutionalprotections or a legislated grant of autonomy.What powers local governmentshave received have come from either nationallegislation or measures taken byindividual states or provinces. In bothfederal countries local government is acreature of federal states, provinces, orterritories. In Canada and a number of U.S.states, state legislatures determine thecontent and powers of local government.The main exceptions are provisions insome U.S. state constitutions for localgovernment powers. In the United States,approximately half of these documentsspecify some general power for localgovernments.Institutional practice in these countriesalso reflects the legacies of the Britishultra vires principal that limits the generalpurpose authority of local governments.The “Dillon Rule” in the United States –theprinciple that local governments cannotclaim powers beyond those specificallygranted by the state legislatures—providesa good example. Thirty-one of the fiftyU.S. states continue to apply Dillon’s Ruleto all municipalities, and eight further statesapply it to some but not all types ofmunicipalities (Richardson, Gough andPuentes 2003: 17). Increasingly, however,exceptions to this principle have beenintroduced. Beginning in the nineteenthcentury, U.S. states legislated guaranteesof general local government authority in“home rule” legislation as well as in stateconstitutions. This trend continued up tothe 1990s. As a result, local governmentin all but three states has some degree ofhome-rule powers, and 28 U.S. stateshave broad powers that in some casesamount to grants of full local autonomy totreat local affairs (USACIR 1993). InCanada, in 1994 in Alberta, in 1999 in BritishColumbia and, since 2000 in Ontarioand Québec have also given broaderpowers to localities, even as larger citiescontinue to call for additional institutionalizedlocal powers.These variations reflect another way thatlocal government in the United States, andto a lesser degree Canada, differs fromthat of many other countries. Because dif-Institutionalpractice in thesecountries alsoreflects thelegacies of theBritish ultra viresprincipal that limitsthe generalpurpose authorityof localgovernments