Controlling small arms andlight weapons in Kenya and UgandaProgress so farSAFERWORLDMAY 2011
AcknowledgementsThis paper was researched and written by James Ndung’u and Manasseh Wepundiwith contributions from Richard Nabudere. Thanks also go to Saferworld’s Kenya teamfor their additional editorial and advisory support, to Hesta Groenewald for overallco-ordination of this research, to officials and stakeholders in the countries selectedas case studies for their feedback and analysis and to the Kenya and Uganda NationalFocal Points.This paper was made possible by funding from the Governments of the Netherlands,the United Kingdom and Sweden.© Saferworld May 2011. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the materialincluded in this publication.
ContentsAcronyms1. Introduction 12. Origins and mandate of SALW control structures 23. The Regional Centre on Small Arms 4RESCA’s strategy 5Progress towards strategy implementation 6Progress to date 74. National Focal Points 8The Kenya National Focal Point 8Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons 115. Conclusions 156. Recommendations 18References 19
AcronymsDTFKIDDPKNFPNAPNFPPTFRECSARTFSALWSASUNFPUNPOAUPDFDistrict Task Force on SALWKaramoja Integrated Disarmament and Development ProgrammeKenya National Focal Point on SALWNational Action Plan (for SALW Management and Control)National Focal Point on SALWProvincial Task Force on SALWRegional Centre on Small ArmsRegional Task Force on SALWsmall arms and light weaponsSmall Arms SurveyUganda National Focal Point on SALWUnited Nations Programme of ActionUganda People’s Defence Force
1Introductiona c c o r d i n g t o n a t i o n a l r e p o r t s submitted to the United Nations Office forDisarmament Affairs, as of 2005 at least 89 countries worldwide had establishedNational Commissions for the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW),while 133 countries had nominated a National Point of Contact. 1 While the overallnumber of commissions already established appears encouraging, the mandate andeffectiveness of these institutions may vary significantly from one country to another. 2The establishment of effective co-ordination bodies is a crucial first step towards thedevelopment and implementation of national SALW control strategies that effectivelyaddress small arms proliferation. 3This working paper is written against a background of continued formation of nationalco-ordination mechanisms for the control of SALW globally and the persistentquestion as to whether existing and emerging structures are living up to expectations.It assesses the achievements and challenges faced by two such structures, namely theNational Focal Points for SALW (NFPs) control in Kenya and Uganda, while alsoexamining the record of a supporting regional body, the Regional Centre on SmallArms (RECSA). Preliminary conclusions and recommendations are drawn at theend of the paper targeting RECSA, the two governments and also external actors likedonors and civil society. A combination of desk research and selected interviews withNFP staff and external stakeholders informed the research.Kenya and Uganda have been selected for analysis because they were among the firstcountries in the East African region to establish co-ordination bodies following agreementof the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of the Illicit SmallArms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa (the ‘NairobiDeclaration’) in the year 2000 and as such have had sufficient time to demonstrateboth successes and failings. The paper does not claim to be a comprehensive study onthe effectiveness of NFPs in the region as this would require more substantial researchand many more case studies. It does however provide an overview of the issues affectingSALW control efforts in the region which can be built on in subsequent research.1 Kytömäki E and Yankey-Wayne V, Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms andLight Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2006),www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-resume92-9045-181-5-en.pdf, 13 April 2011.2 United Nations Development Programme, How to Guide The Establishment and Functioning of National Small Arms andLight Weapons Commissions, (Geneva: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2008).3 South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of SALW, Guide to RMDS/G, 1.10 4th Edition (SEESAC,2006b), www.seesac.org/resources/RMDS%2001.10%20%20Guide%20to%20RMDS%20(Edition%204).pdf,13 April 2011.
2Origins and mandate ofSALW control structuresp r i o r t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s a l w s t r u c t u r e s in East Africa likeRECSA and the Kenya and Uganda NFPs, SALW initiatives were largely under thedockets of foreign affairs ministries and law enforcement agencies at regional andnational levels. At the regional level, the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs CooperationOrganisation 4 founded in 1998 and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Developmentwere particularly active in peace and security issues.The establishment of the various SALW control structures can therefore be seen asan offshoot of various international and regional initiatives that emerged around theworld in the late 1990s as the lethality of SALW became more appreciated. SALWproliferation was initially given attention by the United Nations through the SecretaryGeneral’s 1995 Agenda for Peace, with a focus on ‘micro-disarmament’. Subsequently,SALW initiatives were initiated by the United Nations, individual governments,regional and sub-regional organisations and non-governmental organisations. InAfrica, an African Union heads of government meeting adopted a decision concerningco-operation in the search for solutions to the problems posed by the proliferation ofSALW in Africa. At the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Governmentsheld in Algiers, from 12–14 July 1999, the Summit endorsed the holding of aContinental Conference of African Experts on Small Arms in 2000. The signing ofthe Nairobi Declaration on 15 March 2000 was followed nine months later by that ofthe Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation,Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (‘Bamako Declaration’).The Bamako conference (and Declaration) in 2000 developed an African CommonPosition on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW in preparationfor the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects from 9–20 July2001 in New York.The above initiatives all underscore the importance of establishing regional andnational bodies to co-ordinate action against illicit SALW proliferation 5 and providethe mandate for NFPs. They include the United Nations Programme of Action(UNPOA) 6 , the Nairobi Declaration, the Nairobi Protocol 7 and the Bamako4 East Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation’s mandate of joining police efforts against trans-national and organisedcrime, qualifies it to address SALW-related security concerns.5 Recently, the UN has embarked on developing International Standards for SALW Control (ISACs), which include standardsrelated to national co-ordinating mechanisms on SALW control. However, the various UN ISACs are work in progress and donot yet constitute UN international standards on SALW control.6 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW of July 2001.7 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and theBordering States signed in April 2004 and entered into force, following ratification by two-thirds of its signatories, in May 2006.
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 3Declaration 8 . The Nairobi Declaration in turn urges member states to support subregionalco-operation among police, intelligence, customs and border control officialsin combating the illicit circulation and trafficking in SALW and suppressing criminalactivities related to the use of weapons.Bound by the Nairobi Declaration, the signatories agreed in 2001 to the CoordinatedAgenda for Action and an Implementation Plan. NFPs are mandated to monitor theratification, implementation, execution and evaluation of the Nairobi Protocol at thenational level in liaison with law enforcement agencies. They are also to ensureadherence to the standards set out in the document and inform the RECSA Secretariaton a regular basis of progress made. This mandate was reaffirmed during the 2ndRECSA Ministerial Review Conference of 2004 and continues to guide action onSALW by NFPs at national level.Under the UNPOA every country has committed itself to establish or designatenational co-ordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsiblefor policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicatethe illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. States are also committed to establish ordesignate a point of contact within sub-regional and regional organisations to liaise onmatters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action. Article 4(d) of theNairobi Protocol requires member states to establish or enhance inter-agency groups,involving police, military, customs, home affairs and other relevant bodies, to improvepolicy co-ordination, information sharing and analysis at national level. This provisionis reiterated in the Bamako Declaration, which was largely influenced by the NairobiProtocol.8 Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW of1 December 2000.
3The Regional Centre onSmall Armst h e r e g i o n a l c e n t r e o n s m a l l a r m s (r e c s a ) started as the NairobiSecretariat on SALW following the Nairobi Declaration in 2000. Member states 9designated the Government of Kenya to co-ordinate follow-up to the Declaration,the result of which was the setting up of the Nairobi Secretariat in 2002, located withinKenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 10The Nairobi Secretariat was moved from the ministry to an independent office in 2003.In June 2005, member states established RECSA under Article 2 of the AgreementEstablishing the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Hornof Africa and Bordering States. 11 On 23 October 2006, RECSA and the Governmentof Kenya signed a Host Agreement. The new-found independence of RECSA wassignificant in several ways. First, the secretariat achieved autonomy by being freedfrom the government bureaucracy of any one host country – for instance, the officecould operate its own accounts separate from the national treasury. Second, thesecretariat gained a truly regional outlook by ceasing to exist as a unit within a (host)member state’s ministry and by adopting a name reflecting its status: the RegionalCentre on Small Arms. RECSA also now enjoys diplomatic status and obtainedobserver status at the UN General Assembly in December 2007. 12RECSA has three organs, namely: the Council of Ministers, the Technical AdvisoryCommittee and the Secretariat. The Secretariat derives its mandate from Article 18of the Nairobi Protocol. It is responsible for developing and issuing implementationguidelines and instructions, monitoring implementation and evaluating the NairobiProtocol in liaison with law enforcement agencies. The Secretariat is also responsiblefor co-ordinating the joint effort by NFPs in member states to prevent, combat anderadicate illicit trafficking and build-up of uncontrolled SALW, ammunition andrelated material in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa.Table 1 below shows some areas of co-operation between RECSA and key regionaland international partner organisations.9 Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.10 RECSA, Nairobi Secretariat Information Tool Kit 2002–2004.11 Member states signed this agreement during the Third Ministerial Review Conference held in Nairobi on 20–21 June, 2005.12 RECSA, Annual Review Report, July 2007–June 2008.
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 5Table 1: RECSA’s collaboration with partnersPartnerAfrican UnionEuropean UnionEast African CommunityInternational Conference on theGreat Lakes RegionInter-Governmental Authority onDevelopmentCommon Market for Eastern andSouthern AfricaUnited Nations Centre for Peaceand Disarmament in AfricaUnited Nations DevelopmentProgramme – Bureau for CrisisPrevention and RecoverySaferworldInstitute of Security StudiesSmall Arms SurveyMines Advisory GroupEast Africa Action Network on SALWArea of co-operationEstablishment of a Continental SALW Steering CommitteeContinental SALW control programme in AfricaArms marking, public awareness, research and capacitybuilding.RECSA mandated to implement the SALW project, addingfour other states that are not members of RECSA, namely:Angola, Zambia, Central African Republic and Republic ofCongoCo-operating in disarmament projectsAdopted the Nairobi Protocol to guide issues of SALWBrokers and dealers electronic softwareNational action plan development, capacity-building andpublic awareness.Research on harmonisation of firearms laws, capacitybuildingResearch, capacity-buildingResearch, capacity-buildingStockpile managementCivil society mobilisationSource: RECSA 2009 13RECSA’s broad base of partnership is based on the spirit and letter of both the NairobiDeclaration and Nairobi Protocol, which underscore the necessity of informationsharing and cooperation between governments, inter-governmental organisations andcivil society. 14RECSA’sstrategyThe Coordinated Agenda for Action and its Implementation Plan, established underthe Nairobi Declaration, are the broader frameworks that guide implementation ofSALW action by RECSA. In practice though, RECSA has implemented its activitiesbased on periodic strategic plans and implementation strategies. The current implementationstrategy runs from 2009–2014 and sets the various milestones that NFPsshould achieve during this period. The milestones highlighted in this strategy lie inthree main thematic areas, namely: strengthening of institutions, effective informationprovision and promotion and facilitation of SALW management. 1513 Wairagu F, ‘Progress in the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol’, paper presented during RECSA’s Implementing PartnersForum, Nairobi, 16 February 2009.14 Nairobi Protocol, Article 2(c); the Nairobi Declaration recognises the same.15 RECSA, Regional Implementation Strategy, 2009–2014, Nairobi, 2009.
6 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s in k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a rProgresstowardsstrategyimplementationRECSA’s progress in implementing is best considered along the three thematic areaslisted above. As we shall see, while some have criticised RECSA for the narrow focusof its strategy, this does have the merit of clear focus and attainability, certainly incomparison to some NFPs whose plans can be quite wide-ranging and costly.Institutional and legislative measuresn RECSA has overseen the ratification and deposit of instruments of ratification at itsSecretariat by member states, namely: The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,Republic of Uganda, The State of Eritrea, Republic of Rwanda, Democratic Republicof Congo, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Djibouti, Republic of Burundi, and theRepublic of Sudan, from 2004–2007. 16n RECSA has also organised regular Ministerial Review Conferences and GovernmentalExpert Meetings. This has ensured that SALW discussions maintain relevance at thetop levels of government in the member states. (However, considering the challengesrelated to lack of political will among member states to honour their commitments,the utility of these meetings is frequently questioned by sceptics.)n Facilitating and co-ordinating establishment of NFPs by member states is perhapsRECSA’s most significant achievement under this theme. The challenge is however,that the structures in most countries are not functioning as effectively as hoped due toa myriad of institutional and political problems (see below). The organisation has alsoprovided technical support to states on the review of SALW legislation in a numberof countries linked to the development of Best Practice Guidelines. However, evenwhere progress has been made to review legislation, the application of the best practiceguidelines has been minimal. Apparently most countries have not proactively soughtassistance from RECSA to assist in the process. 17 Further, despite the progresshighlighted above, the pace of harmonisation of laws and policies across the region(considered by many to be an ‘easy win’) has been slow. There seems to be consensusthat this is one area where RECSA needs to redouble its efforts. 18Research and informationIn the area of research and information, various best practice guidelines and actionplans have been developed by RECSA, as follows:n Best Practice Guidelines on Arms Control and Management adopted by the Groupof Government Experts in May 2005 and endorsed during the 3rd Ministerial ReviewConference in June 2005n Best Practice Guidelines on Practical Disarmament (2009/2010)n Guidelines for Regional Harmonisation of Legislation on firearms and ammunition(2005)n Researchers’ Manual on SALW (June 2010) 19n In addition, RECSA has co-ordinated the development of National Action Plans onSmall Arms in member states, most notably Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi,Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia.Overall, this appears to be one of the areas where good progress has been made.For example, the Best Practice Guidelines have been developed through wideconsultations with various actors and they embrace international best practice.16 See www.recsasec.org/ratification.htm, 30 January 2011.17 For more information on harmonisation of legislation, see Saferworld, Harmonising Small Arms Legislation: Selected CaseStudies, (London: Saferworld, 2011).18 Ibid.19 RECSA, Small Arms and Human Security Research: A Manual for Researchers in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Regionand Bordering States, (2010).
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 7Although in many cases states do not fully adhere to them, it could be argued that thisis the prerogative of national governments and not RECSA.Small arms and light weapons control and managementDuring the period in question, RECSA has also:n overseen the destruction of 309,735 SALW; 55,300 landmines and 6,371 tons ofammunition and unexploded ordinance in the regionn facilitated the supply of 27 marking machines to member states, many of which arenow reported to be in usen together with partners, developed software to track arms brokers and dealers andprovided a number of computersn initiated an African continental SALW control programme in collaboration withthe European Union. 20Progress todateConsidering the context in which it operates – a region in which a number of stateshave struggled with armed conflict (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo,Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) – RECSA’s achievements are noteworthy.In this light, more efforts need to be put in areas of technical and capacityweaknesses of RECSA member states:n Regional harmonisation of SALW control legislation: RECSA has used diplomaticchannels to secure members’ commitments to harmonisation of their laws on SALW(e.g. through the Nairobi Declaration, Nairobi Protocol and the Best PracticeGuidelines). As noted above however, progress on harmonisation has been slow.It is doubtful that RECSA’s engagement with the legislatures in the region has beeneffective. As such, the pace of harmonisation of these laws has been slow.n Improved border management: RECSA is yet to effectively mobilise regional supportfor tangible inter-state efforts aimed at securing borders and combating cross-borderarms trafficking. Border control mechanisms are often resource-intensive and RECSAitself under-resourced. For instance, there is a need to improve human and technicalcapacity at border points, improve arms detection gear and techniques, invest insurveillance systems and scanners and enhance policing and patrols at key borderpoints. RECSA should now begin to prioritise this area, supporting and encouragingmember states in their own efforts.20 For information on these milestones, see RECSA, Regional Implementation Strategy, 2009–2014, (Nairobi: Regional Centreon SALW, 2009).
4National Focal Pointst h e n f p s within t h e r e c s a r e g i o n can be categorised into three distinctgroups: 21n independent commissions mandated to oversee the implementation of SALWagreements within their respective countries, e.g. in Burundi and DRCn autonomous NFPs with full-time staff and specific mandates on SALW controle.g. in Kenya, Rwanda and Ugandan semi-autonomous NFPs located within national police services, mandated to addressSALW issues alongside their routine police duties e.g. Djibouti, Tanzania, Ethiopia,the Seychelles and Eritrea.The focal points were established under the Nairobi Protocol with functions andresponsibilities that include:n co-ordinating with the Nairobi Secretariat in the implementation of the Agenda forActionn co-ordinating and interacting with other NFPsn co-ordinating and interacting with civil societyn facilitating exchange and dissemination of informationn conducting and facilitating researchn identifying and applying lessons learnedn building capacity for a sustainable approach to the problem of SALW.The KenyaNational FocalPointThe Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) was established in January 2003. It is aninter-agency body bringing together ministries and departments of government aswell as civil society. These institutions include the State Law Office (Attorney General’sOffice), National Crime Research Centre, Central Firearms Bureau, National Securityand Intelligence Service, Kenya Police, Administration Police, Ministry of Trade,Kenya Wildlife Service, Department of Defence, Department of Mines and Geology,ballistics and forensic experts from the Criminal Investigation Department and civilsociety organisations. The KNFP has two main organs, namely the Secretariat and theTechnical Steering Committee.21 See RECSA, Implementation of the UNPoA: Status Report on the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol,(Nairobi: RECSA, 2010).
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 9Mandate of the Kenya National Focal PointThe KNFP Secretariat is charged with co-ordinating action on SALW at the nationallevel. 22 Its roles and functions include:n co-ordinating national policy and action to address the problem of the proliferationof illicit small arms and light weaponsn co-ordinating the development and implementation of the National Action Plan forArms Control and Managementn together with regional and international bodies and other NFPs, co-ordinating theimplementation of the international and regional declarations and protocolsn co-ordinating and interacting with civil societyn co-ordinating research on the problem of illicit SALWn monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of measures to address the problem ofillicit SALW proliferationn facilitating the exchange and dissemination of information with regard to the SALWproblem.Kenya National Focal Point strategyThe work of the KNFP is guided by the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Controland Management (NAP), which was approved in June 2004. 23 The Kenya NAPprovides an activity framework designed to comprehensively address the SALWproblem in Kenya. It was initially designed to cover a period of five years, starting on1 July 2004, after which it was envisaged that a further assessment would take place togauge the status of implementation and inform the development of a follow-on plan. 24The NAP has ten key pillars that are supposed to be implemented by the KNFP.These pillars are:1. Institutional framework related to building the capacity of KNFP and formation ofprovincial and district task forces to operationalise action on SALW at the grassrootslevel.2. Policy and legislation outlining the process to be undertaken to develop Kenya’sSALW policy and to review Kenya’s SALW legislation.3. Stockpile management related to record keeping, stock-taking and collection anddestruction of illicit SALW.4. Public education and awareness seeking to promote awareness of key aspects of theNAP and its implementation, e.g. on new firearms policy and legislation and theintroduction of educational programmes in schools to promote a culture of peace.5. International and regional co-operation and information exchange outlining specificprovisions to improve Kenya’s ability to co-operate and share information withneighbouring states and to conduct joint planning and operations.6. Border control and refugees with provision for establishment of a Movement ControlWorking Group to examine how to establish better controlled commercial ports ofentry. Other provisions include creation of targeted developmental arms reductionprogrammes around Kenya’s main refugee communities and enhancing co-ordinationof government responses to refugee management and arms control.7. Human development planning focusing on issues fuelling the demand for SALW inKenya as well as seeking to link the NAP to some of the broader causes of insecurityand violence that relate to SALW control and linking these with wider governmentdevelopment plans and strategies.22 Nairobi Declaration of 15 March 2000 and its Agenda for Action of November 2000.23 Government of Kenya, Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management, (Nairobi: Oakland Media, 2006).
10 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s in k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a r8. Training and capacity building on technical issues related to arms control andmanagement targeting KNFP, senior officials, law enforcement agents and civil society.9. Research setting out a number of issues that need further investigation includingdynamics of the illicit SALW trade and law enforcement agents and proliferation ofSALW in selected areas representing urban, rural and pastoralist contexts.10. Critical areas support to enhance the ability of law enforcement agents to carry outtheir duties in critical areas of performance. This would include formation of aNational Firearms Unit and enhancing the capacity of the Crime Intelligence Unitand the National Crime Research Centre.Progress to dateAn analysis of the above-mentioned aspects of NAP shows that most progress hasbeen made in the areas of research, stockpile management and information exchange.Comparatively little has been achieved in most other areas. Below we focus on themost notable areas of intervention.Research: The KNFP conducted its national mapping of SALW between March andApril 2004, informing the development of the NAP immediately afterwards. 25 Kenya’sfirst NAP was approved in June 2004 and was set to run for five years. The KNFP withthe support of the Small Arms Survey (SAS) is conducting an update survey in 2011/12to help renew its strategy on SALW in Kenya.Policy and legislation: The development of a national policy on SALW and the reviewof SALW control legislation were identified as priorities and feature as objectives ofKenya’s NAP. 26 The development of the national policy began in 2005. The process ofdeveloping the policy was well conducted and involved a wide variety of stakeholders.A final draft national policy was submitted to the minister in charge of ProvincialAdministration and Internal Security in December 2009, and is now awaitingsubmission to cabinet and official sign-off. 27 The process has taken six years howeverand there is no agreed timeframe within which to complete the task.Institutional framework: The KNFP has successfully established and trained 8Provincial Task Forces (PTFs) 28 and 53 District Task Forces (DTFs) 29 on SALW.However, lack of follow-up and resources to implement the DTFs’ work plans meantthat most have not been able to carry out planned activities. A second key problem isthat frequent transfers of district and provincial officials have left most of themwithout the technical skills to implement SALW programmes at community level. 30In some districts it would appear that provincial administrators and security officersare not fully aware of the existence of the KNFP. 31Stockpile management: By March 2010, Kenya had destroyed over 25,000 illegalSALW and thousands of rounds of ammunition and explosives (see table 2 below).In addition, by May 2010 the country had marked 25,000 arms using two markingmachines supported by RECSA. But arms destruction exercises should be measuredagainst the benchmarks set for civilian disarmament exercises over time. 3224 At the end of the NAP’s implementation period no new national plan was developed but the KNFP Secretariat formulated afive-year institutional strategic plan. KNFP, with support from SAS, also carried out a national mapping exercise of SALW inKenya, the findings of which are expected to inform further action on SALW in Kenya.25 Op cit Government of Kenya (2006).26 Ibid, pp 57–58.27 Government of Kenya, Draft National Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons, (Nairobi: Office of President, Ministry ofState for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, June 2009); Interview with Isiolo DTF member on 20 March 2011 inIsiolo.28 There may be need to create 47 County Task Forces to align KNFP structures with the new administrative structures under thenew constitution.29 There are over 200 districts in the country.30 Interview with DTF members in Upper Eastern Region on 13 March 2011.31 An interview with a key security official in Garissa, on 23 April 2011 underscored their lack of knowledge of the roles ofRECSA and KNFP and how they can help the police to computerise databases on arms registers. Another informal interviewon the same day revealed that even where computers have been distributed, in some cases provincial administration officeshave benefited at the expense of police stations.32 For more information on civilian disarmament in Kenya and Uganda, see Saferworld, Lessons from the Frontiers: CivilianDisarmament in Kenya and Uganda. (London: Saferworld, 2011).
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 11Unfortunately these operations have never yielded anything near their target levels ofSALW. For example, in Kenya’s Operation Dumisha Amani (Sustain Peace), a disarmamentinitiative of 2005/2006, the government had a target of 50,000 arms to recover,but only netted 2,298 arms. 33 Therefore a comparison of total arms destroyed againstdisarmament targets actually suggests modest progress.Table 2: Number of SALW and ammunition/explosives destroyed in KenyaNumber Ammunition/Year of SALW explosives2003 8,2892005 38392007 8,008 50,0002009 2,4982010 2,545Total 25,179 50,000Source – KNFP, NairobiIn addition, to improve record-keeping, the Central Firearms Bureau received astandardised electronic register for managing arms brokers and dealers from RECSAand United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The software willmanage information on arms brokers and keep records of brokering licences inaccordance with the RECSA Best Practice Guidelines.International and regional co-operation and information exchange: The Kenyangovernment and civil society actively participated in the global Control Armscampaign, dubbed the ‘Million Faces Petition’ (fronted by Amnesty International,Oxfam and the International Action Network on Small Arms), in 2002 followingagreement on the UNPOA. Kenya, through KNFP co-ordination and the support ofOxfam GB collected and presented about 100,000 faces to the UN Secretary-Generalat the UNPOA Review Conference 2006 to lobby for tough global controls on the armstrade. In addition, Kenya and six other like-minded states (i.e. Argentina, Australia,Costa Rica, Finland, Japan and the United Kingdom) co-sponsored and lobbied for theadoption of a draft resolution to establish an Arms Trade Treaty. The Resolution wasadopted by the UN General Assembly on 6 December 2006. The KNFP co-ordinatedpreparation of a submission on this by the Kenyan Government. This was a verysignificant diplomatic contribution to an international process that has potential toimprove controls over the global trade in SALW.UgandaNational FocalPoint on SmallArms and LightWeaponsThe Uganda National Focal Point on SALW (UNFP) was established by the Governmentof Uganda in 2001 to co-ordinate activities to prevent, combat and eradicatethe problem of the proliferation of illicit SALW. 34 This action was in line with theprovisions of the Coordinated Agenda for Action of the Nairobi Declaration.Mandate of the Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light WeaponsThe UNFP is an inter-agency body comprising government ministries and agencies,as well as civil society organisations that have some role in addressing the small armsissue. The UNFP functions as the link between regional and national level institutions.The Secretariat of the UNFP is located within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.33 KNFP, ‘Disarmament in Kenya’, presentation delivered during RECSA Practical Disarmament Validation Workshop inMombasa Kenya, 30–31 August 2010.34 www.unvuganda.org/saahw.html, 5 February 2011.
12 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s in k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a rThe NFP is administered by a co-ordinator, under the supervision of the PermanentSecretary and the political direction of the minister. It has the following roles: 35n implement the Nairobi Declaration, Nairobi Protocol and other Protocols,Programmes of Action and Declarations pertaining to SALWn develop, implement, resource and monitor the NAPn co-ordinate implementation and operational activities with the Regional Task Forceson SALWn co-ordinate activities related to SALW with all stakeholders to ensure compatibilitywith the national objectivesn co-ordinate and interact with civil societyn conduct and facilitate research on issues pertaining to SALW in all its aspectsn facilitate exchange and dissemination of informationn identify and apply lessons learnt aimed at developing best practicesn build and maintain the capacity of all stakeholders to ensure effective and sustainableaction to deal with the SALW problem in all its aspects.Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons strategyLike the KNFP, the UNFP’s strategy is guided by the Uganda NAP. Because thedevelopment of both NAPs happened concurrently and was supported by the samepartners using the same methodology, the two documents have much in common.Indeed, the commencement dates of both Kenya and Uganda NAPs were the same,i.e. July 2004. The Uganda NAP focuses on four main themes:n Control and management of existing stock of SALW. This addresses the capacitybuilding of law enforcement agencies, stockpile and surplus management, developmentof a national policy on SALW, regulating civilian ownership and controllingand managing brokersn Reduction of the volume of SALW already in circulation, focusing on collection anddestructionn Prevention of future proliferation of SALW focusing on licensing controls andprocedures, end-user certification and monitoring, reporting (for transparency andaccountability), marking and tracingn Institutional framework development and capacity building of the main institutions,namely the National Security Committee, the Uganda NFP and 12 Regional TaskForces (RTFs). 36Uganda’s NAP consists of ten components that were to be undertaken jointly bygovernment and civil society, implemented in phases over a period of five years.The ten components fit within the above-mentioned themes and are as follows:1. Establish and/or operationalise the required inter-agency institutional framework toimplement the various international, regional and sub-regional action programmesand protocols as well as the NAP in a comprehensive and sustainable manner. In thiscase, Uganda’s National Security Committee, the UNFP and Regional (or District)Task Forces are the relevant institutions.2. Develop an integrated and comprehensive National Policy on SALW, review nationallegislation, administrative procedures and regulations followed by implementation ofthe new provisions and harmonisation within the sub-regional framework.35 www.mia.go.ug/page.php?1=nfp_functions&&2=National%20Focal%20Point%20Functions, 5 February 2011.36 The RTFs were originally mandated to take forward the NAP at the sub-national level, but it was subsequently recognisedthat DTFs are much better suited to Uganda’s administrative structures. The only administrative structures that functionregionally are the police administrative regions, while all other local government structures operate at the district level. Theexistence of DTFs is therefore recognised in the national small arms policy.
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 133. Undertake stockpile management, record keeping, collection and destructionactivities.4. Develop and implement a national awareness and education programme to curbproliferation, reduce demand and promote responsible management of SALW.5. Develop international and regional co-operation, facilitate co-ordination, of regionaland sub-regional activities across borders and information exchange.6. Facilitate the control of cross-border movement of people and goods at all entrypoints.7. Mainstream and integrate the NAP activities into the Human Development Plan forthe country, poverty reduction programmes and the existing peacebuilding structures.8. Train and build capacity of all agencies and civil society actors interacting with theNAP or any of its activities.9. Carry out action-oriented research to promote co-operation and interaction with civilsociety in order to build support for the NAP and secure civil society involvement inits implementation.10. Identify and facilitate action on critical areas of control such as cross-border entrypoints, joint and cross-border operations, capacitating the Crime Intelligence Unitand formation of a multi-disciplinary National Firearms Unit.Progress to dateCompared to Kenya, Uganda seems to have made better progress, especially in the areaof policy and legislation and integration of its SALW programmes into the broaderdevelopment policies of the government. 37Research: Uganda carried out a national mapping of SALW in 2002–03 leading todevelopment of an NAP. 38 Different components of this plan have been implementedas outlined below.Policy and legislation: Uganda has ratified the Nairobi Protocol 39 and developedand adopted a national policy on SALW – in October 2010, the cabinet approved thepolicy, making Uganda the first country to finalise an official government policy onSALW within the RECSA region. In addition, the UNFP Secretariat constituted theLegal Drafting Committee in late 2010 and started undertaking the national legislativereview process.Importantly, in 2007, Uganda developed the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament andDevelopment Programme (KIDDP) aimed at creating conditions for promotinghuman security and recovery in Karamoja. The UNFP played a leading role during theKIDDP’s development, by chairing the technical team that developed the programmedocument and co-ordinating the consultations with key stakeholders, although thislevel of involvement has not been maintained by the UNFP during the implementationphase. 40 However, implementing the KIDDP has been challenging, with criticismsbeing levelled at the pace with which development assistance has been brought to thearea as disarmament efforts were implemented. In addition, forceful disarmamentoperations have occurred repeatedly over the last years, undermining the intentionsof the KIDDP to address the factors that encourage people to acquire and useweapons and to conduct disarmament in a way that ensures community buy-in andparticipation. 4137 Based on the analysis of the KIDDP and the progress with the national SALW policy.38 Government of Uganda, Uganda National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management, (Kampala, 2004).39 The government, in compliance with Section 3 (a) of the Ratification of Treaties Act and the Constitution of the Republic ofUganda authorised the Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the instrument of ratification, dated 15 February 2005, depositedwith the Secretariat on 10 May 2005. www.recsasec.org/ratification.htm, 20 February 2011.40 Interview with Richard Nabudere, former UNFP Coordinator.41 Saferworld, Lessons from the Frontiers: Civilian Disarmament in Kenya and Uganda. (London: Saferworld, 2011).
14 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s in k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a rStockpile management: By May 2010, Uganda had destroyed 75,783 SALW, 6,300landmines and 738 tons of ammunition 42 and had marked over 35,000 arms. In theKaramoja region, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) led a disarmamentexercise that has seen the collection of over 28,000 illicit SALW to date. 43 In onerespect the figures are impressive, and to some degree this has contributed to securityin Karamoja. Yet security problems persist in Karamoja and more work is needed toaddress the reasons why people want to retain their weapons. Moreover, accountsof excessive use of force and human rights violations by the UPDF definitely marthese achievements. 44 However, Uganda’s new initiative to develop an approach thatintegrates disarmament and development (as discussed below under human development)does have potential to address deeper problems if applied countrywide.Progress however in the area of record-keeping has been slow. So far the NFP hasacquired an assortment of equipment to facilitate the setting up of the Central FirearmsRegistry within the Uganda Police Force. A Firearm Information Management Systemhas also been developed and is now ready for deployment to make the Central FirearmsRegistry operational. 45 The NFP is also planning to organise a series of trainings forofficers responsible for managing the Central Firearms Registry. 46Institutional framework: This component of the NAP aims to ensure that the nationalagencies that are responsible for implementing the NAP are set up and have thenecessary resources, authority and skills to ensure that the NAP is effectivelyimplemented. In 2007 a Functional Analysis commissioned by RECSA for both KNFPand UNFP highlighted the challenges faced by the NFP in implementation of theNAPs and recommended measures to strengthen organisational capacity, rationaliseorganisational structure and staffing of the NFP Secretariats. In the case of Uganda,these have not yet been implemented.On the basis of the NAP, 12 RTFs on arms management were initially created, based onthe country’s twelve police administrative regions. 47 However, since the establishmentof the institutional framework, the police regions have increased in number. And as inKenya, it appears that follow-up on these structures by UNFP has been minimal andlittle is being done at this level.Human development: Uganda provides a good example of an integrated programmefor arms reduction. In accordance with the objectives of the 2004 Poverty EradicationAction Plan, Uganda developed the KIDDP. 48 The Poverty Eradication Action Planwas the principal guide to all Government of Uganda development activities, whichin Pillar 3 on ‘Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management’, highlights theimportance of a secure environment for the achievement of recovery and development.It has since been transformed into the National Development Plan, which alsocontains some commitments on small arms control, thereby making disarmamentan integral part of development planning. The KIDDP has also been taken up as theprincipal guiding framework for Karamoja in the Peace, Recovery and DevelopmentPlan for Northern Uganda. 49 However, as noted above, the KIDDP’s implementationhas been slow and sometimes conflict-insensitive.42 RECSA, Implementation of the UNPoA: Status Report on the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, (Nairobi: RECSA,2010), pp 20–21.43 Uganda Country Report, ‘Reporting on The Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action (UNPOA) to Prevent,Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects’, at the 4th Biennial Meeting of States, 14–18 June 2010,New York, p 4.44 See ‘Uganda Human Rights Commission Press Release’, New Vision, 23 May 2010, www.newvisionuganda.info/D/526/532/720586, 2 May 2011; Amnesty International, ‘Uganda: Failure to investigate alleged human rights violationsin Karamoja region guarantees impunity’, public statement, 1 November 2010, www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR59/013/2010/en/ea3be8fc-07a3-4010-8d80-7faad5229e2e/afr590132010en.html, 23 May 2011.45 Statement by UNFP Coordinator Mr A Wafuba on ‘The Implementation of the United Nations Program of Action (UNPOA)to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects’, at the 4th Biennial Meeting of States,14–18 June 2010, New York, p 3.46 Op cit, Uganda Country Report, p 5.47 These were: Kampala Extra Region; Central Region; South Eastern Region; Eastern Region; Mid East Region; North EastRegion; Northern Region; North West Region; Western Region; Mid Western Region; Southern Region; South West Region.48 Republic of Uganda, Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: Creating Conditions for PromotingHuman Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2007/2008–2009/2010, (Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister, 2007).49 Ibid, p viii.
5Conclusionst h i s p a p e r s t a r t e d b y h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s with which theinternational community, regional and national governments have attempted toaddress the problem of SALW proliferation. Following the UN Agenda for Peace andmore recently the UNPOA a lot of work has been done to lay the foundation for coordinatedaction. The East African region has also witnessed development of a numberof political, legal and policy frameworks and guidelines in this area. Unfortunatelypractical action at the regional and national level has not always followed.As has been noted, the mandates of the various SALW structures are well articulatedand the criteria for establishing them well developed. The East African structuresanalysed seem to have done well in the areas of stockpile management, as exemplified bythe thousands of SALW collected and destroyed, and the application of best practicesrelated to marking of state-owned firearms. However, most of the commitmentsunder the Kenyan and Ugandan NAPs were not implemented during the first years ofthese plans. Some progress on national policy and legislative development, as well asresearch can be demonstrated. However, success is less clear in other areas of the NAPsin Kenya and Uganda such as institutional development, border management anddeveloping co-operative and practical approaches to arms control in the region.Similarly, RECSA has made important progress in some areas, but also faced significantchallenges in others. In a climate where donors are under more pressure to prove valuefor money to their domestic constituencies, there is currently a danger that donorswill reduce or withdraw funding from those aspects of RECSA and the NFPs that theydon’t deem to be making enough progress. 50National level challengesA number of challenges facing Kenya and Uganda at the national level can be identified:n Limited resources: the NAPs developed by both Kenya and Uganda were quiteambitious and the resources required to implement them have not been forthcoming.Uganda’s NAP for instance required €1,832,205 to fully implement it within a periodof five years (2004–2008). With their governments committing little or nothing at all,NFPs have not been able to fully implement all planned activities and have had to relyon external support, including from non-governmental organisations.n Limited institutional and human capacity: NFPs often contend with staffinglimitations. For instance, NFP co-ordinators are mostly over-stretched and underresourcedas they struggle to execute their mandate locally, nationally, regionally and50 Interviews with, representatives of the Netherlands and UK Embassies in Kenya, January 2011.
16 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s in k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a rinternationally. 51 The capacity of sub-national task forces (e.g. RTFs, PTFs and lowerlevel units) also tends to be limited. In many cases even where they have receivedtraining these local structures are still not able to effectively bridge the local andnational level gap or to co-operate smoothly with their peers within peace (e.g. DistrictPeace Committees) or security structures (e.g. District Security Committees). 52 NFPshave mainly been managed by officials seconded from the police or related securityagencies. They have moreover been supplied with a limited number of staff. These staffoften do not have the skills required for the full range of tasks the NFPs are responsiblefor, including conducting research, drafting policy recommendations, projectmanagement and fundraising. Frequent transfers have also hindered continuity.Among other things follow-up and monitoring the work of devolved NFP structureshas not been possible in these circumstances.n Bureaucratic challenges: Bureaucratic procedures often hamper SALW structures.For instance, in the Kenyan case, the KNFP’s finances are channelled through thenational treasury, which means there could be delays in disbursement.n Competing national priorities and limited political support: With many competingnational priorities, SALW control is mainly left as a national security issue to bemanaged by various security agencies with little reference to NFPs. Unfortunatelysince in both Kenya and Uganda the NFPs have not been accorded a high profile orstatus in government circles, this has impeded their efforts to secure funds and otherforms of support from their own governments. In truth while NFPs have beenestablished, they are treated as peripheral departments and often seen by other partsof government as a conduit for external resources.n Superficial ownership by governments: Although the formation and development ofNFPs was led by the governments of the region, the process was also externally drivenin some sense in the wake of many international initiatives for SALW control. Perhapsas a result the Kenyan and Ugandan governments seem to rely more on externalsupport as opposed to directly committing resources and high-level political supportto national initiatives.n Politicisation of SALW issues: The KNFP and UNFP have to their credit developedevidence-based NAPs which, if fully implemented, would yield significant benefits inboth national and human security terms. Unfortunately, disarmament operations andarms reduction initiatives are sometimes political, a fact that is beyond NFPs giventheir status in government. Political leaders sometimes approach SALW issues in asubjective fashion, seeking to protect constituency interests (e.g. through disarmamentof political rivals). The required balancing of regional and ethnic concerns in lawenforcement is simply beyond the NFPs’ mandates and capacities. Such cases can beseen in both Kenya and Uganda. In the case of the disarmament processes in Karamoja,the NFP was marginalised as the UPDF took over what was a high profile operationpolitically, even though the KIDDP was a more fruitful way to conduct the process.Regional level challengesAt the regional level RECSA faces its own challenges:n Resource mobilisation: Until recently when it secured international support from theEU, resourcing was an ongoing problem.n Keeping pace with regional developments: Nowadays there is the challenge of furtherdeveloping RECSA and shifting its focus as others’ capacity increases. RECSA’sadaptation to changing demands on the secretariat in the face of growth of NFPs’capacity will be a major test. With increased regional co-operation and harmonisation51 Maze K, and Rhee H, International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Illicit Trade of Small Armsand Light Weapons in all its Aspects: Case Study of East Africa, p 12, www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf4-act313.pdf,28 March 2011.52 Interviews with a DTF member in Isiolo on 13 March 2011.
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 17between relevant players, RECSA may also have to change its modus operandi in orderto maintain relevance in the face of such regional interactions.n Functionality of NFPs: Action on SALW by RECSA largely depends on how effectiveand operational NFPs in member states are. The NFPs in the RECSA region operate indifferent political, economic and social settings. Unfortunately due to other competingpriorities, providing support to NFPs has been seen as an ‘add on’ to primary governmentfunctions, often rendering them ineffective. Consequently RECSA sometimesfinds itself going beyond the co-ordination role to catalyse action at the national level.n Coordination: Evidently, whereas RECSA continues to issue general guidelines to NFPs,the latter have apparently not proactively sought the assistance from the regional bodyto ensure that implementation of their work is in line with the best practice. 5353 In the area of harmonising legislation, see for example Saferworld, Harmonising Small Arms Legislation: Selected CaseStudies, (London: Saferworld, 2011).
6Recommendationsin v i e w o f t h e c h a l l e n g e s that structures for SALW control in the region areexperiencing, it is important for the following specific recommendations to beimplemented:Recommendations to the governments of Kenya and Ugandan Ownership: Respective governments should own their national SALW controlinitiatives by committing significant resources to NFPs’ programmes. Only then canother partners feel confident that there is sufficient goodwill from governments.n Institutional strengthening: Governments should employ enough staff with therequired skills and experience to run the NFPs’ secretariats on a permanent basis.The functional analysis of NFPs carried out by RECSA 54 identified key challenges toeffective performance of NFPs. The governments of Kenya and Uganda should addressthose challenges at the national level so as to reinvigorate NFPs.n Managing for results: Whereas many SALW interventions are process-based and maysometimes take a long time to bear fruit, responsible ministries and institutions withingovernments should show interest in these processes and speed up their completion.Recommendations to RECSAn Closer monitoring and reporting on NFPs’ work: Although RECSA’s role is mainly toco-ordinate regional action, close monitoring of NFPs’ work will be useful in ensuringthat implementation is happening in accordance with the established best practiceguidelines.n Implementing the recommendations of the functional analysis of NFPs: The functionalanalysis of NFPs carried out by RECSA identified key challenges to effective performanceof NFPs. RECSA should urge member states to address those challenges at thenational level so as to reinvigorate NFPs as early as possible.Recommendations to civil society and other external actorsn Assessing the progress of NFPs: Organisations working or intending to work withNFPs should carefully assess the record of NFPs as well as the challenges they face witha view to identifying potential areas of support.54 The findings of this research are unpublished but are widely shared with the concerned NFPs in the region.
s a f e r w o r l d · w o r k i n g p a p e r 19n Supporting action plans with clear commitments: donors should support NFPs whichhave clear action plans contingent on delivering commitments made. This should bedone by identifying areas of support that have the potential to contribute to thereduction of armed violence.n Capacity-building: The decentralisation of the NFP structures to regions and districtscomes with capacity challenges. Civil society actors can collaborate with the centralSALW structures in building the capacities of these local units.n Monitoring the effectiveness of regional initiatives: Civil society actors can play a rolein tracking cross-border collaboration, their strengths, weaknesses and progress aspart of a co-operative venture to improve regionalisation of SALW initiatives.n Research and advocacy: One of the most important roles that civil society can playis that of conducting research that helps inform the plans and actions of NFPs andpotentially inform advocacy efforts designed to unlock additional support andresources for them.n Harmonisation of policies and legislation: In the face of multiple, and sometimesoverlapping policy and legislative frameworks domestically and regionally, SALWstructures can collaborate amongst themselves and with civil society actors toharmonise efforts.
ReferencesGovernment of Kenya, “Country Report to the first UN Review Conference on the status ofimplementation of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate IllicitTrade in Small arms and Light weapons in all its Aspects,” 26 June 2006.Government of Kenya, Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management,(Nairobi: Oakland Media, 2006).Government of Kenya, Draft National Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons,(Nairobi: Office of President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and InternalSecurity, June 2009).Government of Uganda, Uganda National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management,(Kampala, 2004).Republic of Uganda, Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme: CreatingConditions for Promoting Human Security and Recovery in Karamoja, 2007/2008–2009/2010,(Kampala: Office of the Prime Minister, 2007).Kytömäki, E and Yankey-Wayne, V, Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programmeof Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports,(UNIDIR, Geneva, 2006)Maze K, and Rhee H, International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action onIllicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects: Case Study of East Africa,p 12, www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf4-act313.pdf, 28 March 2011.RECSA, Implementation of the UNPoA: Status Report on the Implementation of the NairobiProtocol, (Nairobi: RECSA, 2010).RECSA, Nairobi Secretariat Information Tool Kit 2002–2004.RECSA, Regional Implementation Strategy, 2009–2014, (Nairobi: Regional Centre on SALW,2009).RECSA, ‘The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms AndLight Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, Horn of Africa and the Bordering States’, signedin April 2004 and entered into force, following ratification by two-thirds of its signatories,in May 2006.RECSA, Small Arms and Human Security Research: A Manual for Researchers in the Great Lakesand Horn of Africa Region and Bordering States, (RECSA, Nairobi, 2010).Saferworld, Lessons from the Frontiers: Civilian Disarmament in Kenya and Uganda,(London: Saferworld, 2011).Saferworld, (2011) Harmonising Small Arms Legislation: Selected Case Studies, (London:Saferworld, 2011).United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade inSmall Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects of July 2001.UNDP, How to Guide The Establishment and Functioning of National Small Arms and LightWeapons Commissions, (Geneva: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2008).Wairagu F, ‘Progress in the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol’, paper presented during theRECSA Implementing Partners Forum, Nairobi, 16 February 2009.
Saferworld is an independent non-governmental organisation that worksto prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approachesto security. Saferworld believes that everyone should be able to leadpeaceful, fulfilling lives that are free from insecurity and violent conflict.We work with governments, international organisations and civil society toencourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy,research and policy development and through supporting the actions ofothers. Saferworld works in Africa, South Asia, Europe and Central Asia andhas offices in London, Brussels, Juba, Kampala, Kathmandu, Nairobi, andPristina, as well as staff based in Bangladesh and Vienna.Saferworld’s regional conflict prevention work in Africa consists of theSudan and Great Lakes programme (including programmes in Uganda andSouthern Sudan) and the Kenya and Horn of Africa programme (includingprogrammes in Somalia and Kenya).u k o f f i c eThe Grayston Centre28 Charles SquareLondon N1 6HTUKPhone: +44 (0)20 7324 4646Email: email@example.comWeb: www.saferworld.org.ukRegistered charity no. 1043843A company limited by guaranteeno. 3015948k e n y a o f f i c ePO Box 21484-00505Adams ArcadeNairobiKenya+254 (0)20 271 3603+254 (0)20 273 3250/6480/6484u g a n d a o f f i c ePO Box 8415KampalaUganda+256 (0)414 231130/+256 (0)414 231150