5Conclusionst h i s p a p e r s t a r t e d b y h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e s e r i o u s n e s s with which the<strong>in</strong>ternational community, regional <strong>and</strong> national governments have attempted toaddress the problem of SALW proliferation. Follow<strong>in</strong>g the UN Agenda for Peace <strong>and</strong>more recently the UNPOA a lot of work has been done to lay the foundation for coord<strong>in</strong>atedaction. The East African region has also witnessed development of a numberof political, legal <strong>and</strong> policy frameworks <strong>and</strong> guidel<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> this area. Unfortunatelypractical action at the regional <strong>and</strong> national level has not always followed.As has been noted, the m<strong>and</strong>ates of the various SALW structures are well articulated<strong>and</strong> the criteria for establish<strong>in</strong>g them well developed. The East African structuresanalysed seem to have done well <strong>in</strong> the areas of stockpile management, as exemplified bythe thous<strong>and</strong>s of SALW collected <strong>and</strong> destroyed, <strong>and</strong> the application of best practicesrelated to mark<strong>in</strong>g of state-owned fire<strong>arms</strong>. However, most of the commitmentsunder the <strong>Kenya</strong>n <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an NAPs were not implemented dur<strong>in</strong>g the first years ofthese plans. Some progress on national policy <strong>and</strong> legislative development, as well asresearch can be demonstrated. However, success is less clear <strong>in</strong> other areas of the NAPs<strong>in</strong> <strong>Kenya</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a such as <strong>in</strong>stitutional development, border management <strong>and</strong>develop<strong>in</strong>g co-operative <strong>and</strong> practical approaches to <strong>arms</strong> control <strong>in</strong> the region.Similarly, RECSA has made important progress <strong>in</strong> some areas, but also faced significantchallenges <strong>in</strong> others. In a climate where donors are under more pressure to prove valuefor money to their domestic constituencies, there is currently a danger that donorswill reduce or withdraw fund<strong>in</strong>g from those aspects of RECSA <strong>and</strong> the NFPs that theydon’t deem to be mak<strong>in</strong>g enough progress. 50National level challengesA number of challenges fac<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Kenya</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a at the national level can be identified:n Limited resources: the NAPs developed by both <strong>Kenya</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a were quiteambitious <strong>and</strong> the resources required to implement them have not been forthcom<strong>in</strong>g.Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s NAP for <strong>in</strong>stance required €1,832,205 to fully implement it with<strong>in</strong> a periodof five years (2004–2008). With their governments committ<strong>in</strong>g little or noth<strong>in</strong>g at all,NFPs have not been able to fully implement all planned activities <strong>and</strong> have had to relyon external support, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g from non-governmental organisations.n Limited <strong>in</strong>stitutional <strong>and</strong> human capacity: NFPs often contend with staff<strong>in</strong>glimitations. For <strong>in</strong>stance, NFP co-ord<strong>in</strong>ators are mostly over-stretched <strong>and</strong> underresourcedas they struggle to execute their m<strong>and</strong>ate locally, nationally, regionally <strong>and</strong>50 Interviews with, representatives of the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> UK Embassies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Kenya</strong>, January 2011.
16 c o n t r o l l i n g s m a l l a r m s a n d l i g h t w e a p o n s <strong>in</strong> k e n y a a n d u g a n d a : p ro g re s s s o f a r<strong>in</strong>ternationally. 51 The capacity of sub-national task forces (e.g. RTFs, PTFs <strong>and</strong> lowerlevel units) also tends to be limited. In many cases even where they have receivedtra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g these local structures are still not able to effectively bridge the local <strong>and</strong>national level gap or to co-operate smoothly with their peers with<strong>in</strong> peace (e.g. DistrictPeace Committees) or security structures (e.g. District Security Committees). 52 NFPshave ma<strong>in</strong>ly been managed by officials seconded from the police or related securityagencies. They have moreover been supplied with a limited number of staff. These staffoften do not have the skills required for the full range of tasks the NFPs are responsiblefor, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g conduct<strong>in</strong>g research, draft<strong>in</strong>g policy recommendations, projectmanagement <strong>and</strong> fundrais<strong>in</strong>g. Frequent transfers have also h<strong>in</strong>dered cont<strong>in</strong>uity.Among other th<strong>in</strong>gs follow-up <strong>and</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g the work of devolved NFP structureshas not been possible <strong>in</strong> these circumstances.n Bureaucratic challenges: Bureaucratic procedures often hamper SALW structures.For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Kenya</strong>n case, the KNFP’s f<strong>in</strong>ances are channelled through thenational treasury, which means there could be delays <strong>in</strong> disbursement.n Compet<strong>in</strong>g national priorities <strong>and</strong> limited political support: With many compet<strong>in</strong>gnational priorities, SALW control is ma<strong>in</strong>ly left as a national security issue to bemanaged by various security agencies with little reference to NFPs. Unfortunatelys<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>in</strong> both <strong>Kenya</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a the NFPs have not been accorded a high profile orstatus <strong>in</strong> government circles, this has impeded their efforts to secure funds <strong>and</strong> otherforms of support from their own governments. In truth while NFPs have beenestablished, they are treated as peripheral departments <strong>and</strong> often seen by other partsof government as a conduit for external resources.n Superficial ownership by governments: Although the formation <strong>and</strong> development ofNFPs was led by the governments of the region, the process was also externally driven<strong>in</strong> some sense <strong>in</strong> the wake of many <strong>in</strong>ternational <strong>in</strong>itiatives for SALW control. Perhapsas a result the <strong>Kenya</strong>n <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>an governments seem to rely more on externalsupport as opposed to directly committ<strong>in</strong>g resources <strong>and</strong> high-level political supportto national <strong>in</strong>itiatives.n Politicisation of SALW issues: The KNFP <strong>and</strong> UNFP have to their credit developedevidence-based NAPs which, if fully implemented, would yield significant benefits <strong>in</strong>both national <strong>and</strong> human security terms. Unfortunately, disarmament operations <strong>and</strong><strong>arms</strong> reduction <strong>in</strong>itiatives are sometimes political, a fact that is beyond NFPs giventheir status <strong>in</strong> government. Political leaders sometimes approach SALW issues <strong>in</strong> asubjective fashion, seek<strong>in</strong>g to protect constituency <strong>in</strong>terests (e.g. through disarmamentof political rivals). The required balanc<strong>in</strong>g of regional <strong>and</strong> ethnic concerns <strong>in</strong> lawenforcement is simply beyond the NFPs’ m<strong>and</strong>ates <strong>and</strong> capacities. Such cases can beseen <strong>in</strong> both <strong>Kenya</strong> <strong>and</strong> Ug<strong>and</strong>a. In the case of the disarmament processes <strong>in</strong> Karamoja,the NFP was marg<strong>in</strong>alised as the UPDF took over what was a high profile operationpolitically, even though the KIDDP was a more fruitful way to conduct the process.Regional level challengesAt the regional level RECSA faces its own challenges:n Resource mobilisation: Until recently when it secured <strong>in</strong>ternational support from theEU, resourc<strong>in</strong>g was an ongo<strong>in</strong>g problem.n Keep<strong>in</strong>g pace with regional developments: Nowadays there is the challenge of furtherdevelop<strong>in</strong>g RECSA <strong>and</strong> shift<strong>in</strong>g its focus as others’ capacity <strong>in</strong>creases. RECSA’sadaptation to chang<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong>s on the secretariat <strong>in</strong> the face of growth of NFPs’capacity will be a major test. With <strong>in</strong>creased regional co-operation <strong>and</strong> harmonisation51 Maze K, <strong>and</strong> Rhee H, International Assistance for Implement<strong>in</strong>g the UN Programme of Action on Illicit Trade of Small Arms<strong>and</strong> Light Weapons <strong>in</strong> all its Aspects: Case Study of East Africa, p 12, www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf4-act313.pdf,28 March 2011.52 Interviews with a DTF member <strong>in</strong> Isiolo on 13 March 2011.