ISSUE 4 : May/Jun - 1977 - Australian Defence Force Journal
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ISSUE 4 : May/Jun - 1977 - Australian Defence Force Journal

MAY/JUNE 1977No. 4

I Defence Public Relations)The Silver Jubilee Parade for Her Majesty the Queen in front of Parliament House, Canberra, on 8 March, 1977. The final salute, showingthe fly-past of 54 aircraft of the three services, the Army's 62 Colours, five Banners and seven Guidons, the Navy's Queen's Colour and theRAAF's three Colours and 17 Squadron Standards. Music for the Parade was supplied by a 100-man massed band from all three Services.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 5Any genuine attempt to allow servicemento "air their views on matters profoundlyinfluencing themselves, the Services and Australia,"is bound to cause a fair amount ofheartburn.iiA. R. PittVictoria Barracks,Warrant Officer,Melbourne, Vic.RAAFOBSERVATION BY A UN OBSERVERI wish to comment on, and add to the article'"Put Your Head in the Sand — Here ComesTheir Armour" by Captain R. J. Linwood.(D.F.J. No. 1, November/December 1976.)Firstly, the often used term "Yom KippurWar". This is the Israeli name for that battle,while the Arabs call it the "War of Ramadan"after a month long Muslim feast which fell atthat time in 1973. The United Nations termwhich is impartial, and more correct for us"outsiders" to use, is the "October 1973 War".Unaware of any policy decision on the name, Ishall use the latter.I almost totally agree with Captain Linwoodin his observations, particularly with his highlightingof the general ignorance of Australiansof armoured warfare and anti armour defence.Arab ArmourFirstly allow me to enlarge on Arab armour.The main tanks used on the Northern GolanHeights were the T54 and T55, very similarvehicles equipped with a 100mm cannon. Thisweapon fired only solid shot, and used themost primitive of sights. The effective rangeof this gun, tank to tank, was not observed tobe over 1000m, mostly less.The other tank used, in smaller numbers,was the T62. Merely an updated T55, it wasslightly more streamlined, had a multi-fuelengine and was equipped with a 115mm smoothbore gun. The projectiles from this weapon,of course, had to be fin stabilised. In anattempt for accuracy it used a massive propellantcharge to add velocity. The extra sizeof the case meant that fewer rounds could becarried.The 115mm APFSDS round, for some reasonwas not the success its users hoped for. Iobserved some hits at between 1000 and 2000metres, but none over. To quote one example,dug in T62s were used on one occasion, overa range of 3000m onto an Israeli position halfway up a hill, 250m high. Less than 30% ofthe rounds even hit the hill, the balance goingover or falling short.All three tanks suffer the same "bad" points.That is, poor ventilation for the crew of four,engine cooling hatches had to be left open inthe desert heat or the motors would seize, fueltanks are mostly on the upper deck unprotectedeven from small arms, and the fact thatthe main armament could only depress 4degrees. (Centurion depresses 10 degrees.) T64tanks, to my knowledge, were not used inthat war.Even allowing for size, T52/T62 (mediumtanks at around 35 tons and 35 rounds) werenot near the capabilities of the Centurion (50tons and 62 rounds). Crew skill was alsomarkedly on the side of the Israeli, as wasthe logistic back up.Anti Armour DefenceOn anti armour defence, the first point Imake is that the Israeli tank ditch which runsfor fifty kilometres along the Golan was not,as claimed, a deterrent. It might have been,it could have been, but the extreme slownessof the Israeli reaction on the first day (October6) allowed the Syrians to cross almost at will.At no point along the entire line did I see anymore than the odd one or two caught in theditch.The ditch was not correctly used as anobstacle, i.e. was not covered by effective antiarmour fire. The Israeli armour, two understrengthbrigades, was in the main, ten kilometresbehind the line with most of the crewsdispersed all over Israel celebrating the Jewishfeast of Yom Kippur.Most of the one hundred fires to my immediatefront on that first night were Syrian AFV's"brewed up" by artillery fire, mines, 106mmRCL and platoon weapons.Comments by Captain Linwood on the effectof infantry weapons on tanks were well borneout. However the most effective anti armourweapons seen in the theatre was undoubtedlythe Russian "Sagger" ATGW. The Saggermust stand out. It offers mobility, camouflageand a withdrawal route suitable to a singlesoldier, with the killing power of a tank round

6 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALand a range greater than that of the 106 RGLThe accuracy of this weapon is such that theoperator may place the projectile through theopening of a bunker at 1000m.Israeli General Gonen lost his entire 190Tank Brigade in the Sinai, mainly to dismountedEgyptian infantry equipped with theSagger.The time-worn statement that a tank is theultimate weapon to use on another tank is onewhich Observers of the October War no longerbelieve.Our Anti Armour WeaponsOur Infantry needs a medium to long rangeman packed anti armour weapon, and we justdo not have it. Up to 50(1 metres is well providedfor. Beyond that range, it could be saidthat the 106 RCL takes up the slack, andfinally the tank and large missile weapons completesthe defence.I don't doubt the effectiveness of theseweapons, but I do question for instance, theability to manpack an RCL to an alternateposition under fire after its first shot at a tankproved abortive.The Sagger, fired from a remote position,had none of these disadvantages of its largercousins. It is carried by one man in a smallsuitcase, looks basically like a miniatureENTAC and works on the same principle asthat outdated rocket. An effective range offrom 400 to 1500m gives great flexibility. Afterfiring and guiding the missile to the target, the"suitcase" becomes yet more battlegroundjunk, and the operator either drops down intohis trench, or melts into the countryside, providingno return target. Indeed, our "powersthat be" could and should give the weapongreat thought.Although improving over the years, the useof armoured fighting vehicles reached boththeir peak, and I believe, the start of theirdecline in the Arab-Israeli October War. Bearin mind that Israel came into that conflict withsome 1700 tanks, while the Arab countries hadsome 2700. Both sides were heavily resuppliedduring and immediately after the war withAFVs by their benefactors. It was estimatedthat, had there been no resupply. both sideswould have ended the war with practicallynone serviceable.Again 1 complement Captain Linwood on hisarticle, and finish with an observation: In viewof figures stated in the last paragraph, whatprice our 50 new Leopards?Q(7. A. Mayes, EDMaj< >rSlade Point. Queensland. Army ReserveTHE WRITERMajor Mayes joined as a member of the RegimentalCadets in February 1950. After National Service atWacol in 1956, he served in Maryborough, Innisfailand Mackay. Commissioned in 1963 he served inrifle company and support company postings. In1972 he was selected to join the V.N. Truce SupervisionOrganisation in Palestine.When the October War commenced Maj Mayes wasat a V.N. post (OP X RAY) on the Syrian side ofthe Golan Heights. He was on that post for 19 daysbefore relief. He later served on the V.N. Staff HQbefore returning to Australia in 1974.He is currently serving with II Training Group.Townsvillc. In civilian life Maj Mayes is withTelecom Australia in Mackay.1 COMMANDO ASSOCIATION1 Commando Association, open to all Regular Army and Army Reserve soldiers whohave served or are serving in 1 Commando Company, based on Georges Heights. Mosman.NSW. was formed recently.Anyone interested in joining the Association should contact:The Honorary Secretary7 Coben StreetBELMORE NSW 2192There is a joining fee of S5.00 and an annual subscription of S5.00.The Association produces a three-monthly newssheet "Strike Swiftly".

JirInterdictionperspectiveGroup Captain F. R. Lome, B.A., M.Pol. Sc,Royal Australian Air ForceThe Rolling Thunder OperationsBY late 1^64 the United States, in consultationwith her allies, had determined thatthe communist enemy should no longer bepermitted to move men and supplies into thearena of South Vietnam without paying a price.This decision launched "Rolling Thunder." theprogramme of air strikes against the north.Four years later, the bombing programmehad come to a temporary halt in the face ofnational divisions on the issues involved. Asthe United States began to de-escalate the militaryeffort, a host of vocal critics were decryingthe apparent failure of the most intensiveair interdiction campaign since Korea. Vietnamis perhaps not yet far enough removed in timeto allow definite conclusions to be drawn.Sufficient evidence is available, however, toallow a broad assessment to be made of thesuccess or failure of the "Rolling Thunder"interdiction operations.The campaign against communist lines-ofcommunication(loc) in Southeast Asia falls intotwo broad periods. The first extends from theGroup Captain Lonie enlisted in the RAAF in 1951and has flown as a navigator on transport, maritimeand bomber aircraft. A good deal of bomber flyingoccurred in South East Asia, an experience whichprompted a keen interest in the subject of this article.He is a graduate of the RAF's Specialist NavigationCourse and completed the RAF Staff College coursein 1968. In 1974/75 he attended the USAF's AirWar College Course at the Air University. He holdsthe degree of Bachelor of Arts (Queensland) andMaster of Political Science (Auburn). Operationalflying experience includes service with transports inJapan Korea and a tour as Navigation!BombingOfficer with No. 2 Canberra Squadron. South Vietnam1969J70. He is currently Director of Air ForcePlans in Air Forte Office.implementation of "Rolling Thunder I" in 1964to the major bombing pause which accompaniedthe Presidential election campaign of1968. The second phase covers the period upto the cessation of in-country operations byAmerican air power and includes the "second"interdiction campaign of 1972/73. This studyconcentrates on the first period from 1964 to1968 because the first campaign, in the view ofthe author, illustrates many of the lessons ofearlier interdiction campaigns. Furthermore,the discussions underlying the majority of theimportant policy decisions made during thisperiod are covered in some detail in readilyavailable,unclassified sources. 1 The extent towhich the lessons of the 1964-1968 period wereappreciated and applied in later interdictionoperations is properly the subject of a related,but separate study.The Lessons of HistoryInterdiction — strikes launched against linesof communication, aimed at reducing theenemy's ability to maintain his combat effectivenessin the field — is a traditional role ofair strike forces. The history of air combatcontains many lessons from interdiction campaignsof the past: the 1943 "OperationStrangle" in Italy, the "Transportation Plan"of 1944 which aimed to deny the enemy thelogistic support necessary to withstand theallied invasion, the drawn-out "bridge-busting"campaign in Burma and USAF operationsagainst the Korean transportation system, arerepresentative. Throughout these campaignsruns a pattern of tactical lessons which wereto be demonstrated again in Vietnam.Chokepoints. Perhaps the most importantof these lessons relates to the tactical importanceof "chokepoints": places or elements in

8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALthe transport system which are vital to theflow of men and supplies and which are diflicultor impossible to bypass. Bridges, forexample, are obvious chokepoints, particularlywhere the terrain makes bypass impracticable.During the Second World War Sir SollyZuckerman, the British scientific advisor, correctlydrew attention to the importance ofrailway marshalling yards, repair and supportfacilities and these elements received muchattention in the "Transportation Plan," competingto some extent with bridges as primarytargets in the transport system. Besides physicalstructures, other resources essential to theflow of transport serve as chokepoints: Petrol,Oil and Lubricants (POL) is an obviousexample. There is, however, a danger that inthe consideration of chokepoints, a particularelement can assume the proportions of apanacea, in the minds of planners. Historyadequately demonstrates the perils of panaceatargeting.Bridges. Bridges are traditionally mostattractive interdiction targets and most majorcampaigns have included a "bridge-busting"effort. The official historian succinctly summarisesthe frustrations inherent in bridgestrikes with this classic comment on the Burmacampaign:Nothing caused more headaches . . . thanthe difficulties of bridge-busting . . . and ifthey were difficult to hit, they were infinitelymore difficult to destroy. 2 (Australian War Memorial)Cologne, showing the destroyed road bridge (lowercentre! . Above the railway bridge can be seen theCathedral and Railway Station.The Vietnamese experience, at least until 1968,reinforced this particular lesson of the past.Weapons and Techniques. The "iron" or"dumb" bomb remains the cheapest way fora strike aircraft to carry a useful amount ofhigh explosive. However, while unguidcdbombs are easy to carry, they are relativelyineffective against defended point targets, suchas bridges. To damage a steel bridge member,for example, a 750- or 1000-lh bomb must hitwithin about 15 feet. Daylight dive-bombtechniques, even with radar and computerassistance, cannot guarantee the consistentaccuracy required to cut a bridge effectively.At night, or in poor weather, the situationhas historically been somewhat worse. Thevisual strike aircraft which has a limited capabilityagainst most loc targets by day is considerablyless effective by night, despite theuse of flares. Traditionally, night and poorweather have forced a relaxation of the 24-hourpressure essential to effective interdiction.Principles of War. Several traditional principlesof war are implicit in the concept ofair interdiction — notably, flexibility, surpriseand concentration of force. Another, perhapsmore important and frequently overlooked, isselection and maintenance of the Aim. TheSinanju-Yongmidong bridges operation, aclassic of air interdiction, had the commendablysimple aim of cutting twelve road andrail bridges in a limited geographic area andkeeping them cut for some eight days. Thisaim was achieved, at a cost in terms of sortierate, division of effort between strike and flaksuppression sorties and aircraft loss rate, veryclose to that which had been pre-calculated. 3The aim of the 1943 "Strangle" operation inItaly was considerably broader and success wasconsequently more open to subjective appraisal.The Tactical Air Force directive called on theair forces to:Reduce the enemy's flow of supplies to alevel which will make it impracticable forhim to maintain and operate his forces inSouthern Italy.*Official American histories describe"Strangle" as a success, while British historiansgenerally regard it as a failure. The level ofdisagreement is significant and illustrates acardinal fact of interdiction. Where the aimis limited, preferably both in geographic extent

AIR INTERDICTION VIETNAM IN PERSPECTIVE 9and time, ihe degree of success achieved isgenerally self-evident. Where the aim is broador ill-defined, assessments of the result becomehighly subjective.For those engaged in the planning of interdictionoperations, the lessons may be readilysummarized:• Pressure must be maintained equallyacross the entire transport system for theduration of the campaign, without regardto night or poor weather. This conceptis generally described by the expression:""maintaining a belt of interdiction".• Chokepoints in the transport system mustbe carefully identified and will generallyprovide the most rewarding targets. However,a "'panacea" approach to particulartarget elements must be carefully avoided.• Above all, the aim of the campaign mustbe clearly stated and limited as far aspossible in terms of geographic extentand time.The Perils of Escalation. The appeal ofinterdiction is simple and self-evident. It ismore difficult for the enemy to maintain hiseffectiveness when he is short of supplies orlacks reinforcements; if this process is takenfar enough, he may not be able to fight at all.However, in operations designed to deprive theenemy of essential support, there comes a pointat which the scope of operations widens beyondthe essentially limited tactical objectives ofinterdiction and embraces the broader objectiveof destroying his ability to wage war.There is a level of effort beyond which "interdiction"becomes "limited war" and as thislevel is approached, political considerationsincreasingly dominate military assessments. Abasic dilemma often becomes evident. On theone hand military planners, acutely aware ofwhat should be done in purely military terms,are increasingly frustrated by political constraints.The administration, on the other hand,attuned primarily to political considerations,nevertheless look for concrete military achievementson which to base future political strategy.Mutual recrimination is more or less inevitable.Rolling Thunder ObjectivesThe pattern for later controversy betweenthe nation's administration and its militaryadvisors was undoubtedly set with the declara-Bombing in World War II.tion by the President of a broad and ill-definedaim for US air operations in North Vietnam.The national aim was:To convince the communists that wecannot be defeated by force of arms or bysuperior power. 5Within this broad statement of national purpose,air strikes were to be launched againstthe north with a three-fold objective:• to demonstrate that 'sanctuaries' on thecommunist side would not be tolerated,• to impose a 'cost' on North Vietnam forthe conduct of illegal offensive operationsin the south,• to limit the level, or raise the cost to theNorth Vietnamese of men and suppliesbrought to bear against the south.The third "objective" provides the rationalefor the interdiction campaign in the north.Ostensibly, the aim was strictly limited; a totaldrying-up of supplies between north and southwas never contemplated. The practical effectof this imprecise definition, however, was totransform an apparently limited aim into onewithout effective limit and this was a developmentof the utmost importance. A fire hosecarrying a good flow of water will serve asanalogy. The task assigned US air could beequated with a directive to restrict the flow ofwater by applying pressure to the hose, butwith the knowledge that no matter how muchpressure is applied, the hose will continue to

II)DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALdeliver a supply of water more than adequateto meet the demand at the other end. Thosegiven the task will naturally apply as muchpressure as possible, at as many different pointsas can be reached, unmindful of the practicalfutility of the attempt. The interdiction objectivesof "Rolling Thunder", seen this way,were unlimited with regard to the degree ofpressure the planners would seek to bring tobear against the transport system althoughtotal success — effective interdiction — wasnever practicable.Secretary McNamara attempted to refinethis broad objective by seeking from the JointChiefs of Staff a campaign that would involve:Strikes at infiltration routes to impose aceiling on what North Vietnam amid moveto South Vietnam, thereby putting a ceilingon the size of the war that the enemy canwage there. 6The level of this ceiling was never preciselystipulated, although the Secretary requested an"optimum" interdiction programme that wouldreduce "to the maximum extent" the supportthat could be provided for VC and PAVNforces in the south. The Joint Chiefs soughtfrom the outset a "hard-knock" programmeof strikes against the entire loc target system,designed to achieve the rapid destruction ofthe system, fdeally, the programme wouldinclude mining of harbours in the north andsimultaneous pressure against all transportelements, particularly the rail lines linkingHanoi with China, inland and coastal waterwaysand chokepoint elements, including POL.Political considerations, however, dominatedand "Rolling Thunder" was launched insteadas a programme of gradually-increasing presureagainst a range of targets limited in natureand geographic location. Only gradually wasthe strike pattern extended to cover targetsacross the 19th parallel, later the 20th paralleland finally, most of North Vietnam. Vitalelements of the transport system were, however,inviolate in "sanctuary" areas, particularlythe important logistic bases of Hanoi andHaiphong and few targets were permitted inthe critical north-east quadrant. Furthermore,there was to be no mining of northern ports.In view of the restrictions imposed "RollingThunder," by comparison with the campaignsof the Second World War and Korea, was from1965 to 1968 an interdiction campaign in nameonly.Doubts and Second ThoughtsIt is Beared) surprising, therefore, that by1966 serious doubts had been raised as to theeffectiveness of "Rolling Thunder." A numberof Defence Studies, notably the JASON studyof Summer 1466. directed searching criticismat the programme. Secretary McNamara, evidentlyinflicted with growing doubts, directedthe attention of the Defence Departmenttowards consideration of alternative interdictionmeasures, particularly the "Barrier" proposal.The Joint Chiefs, drawing attention totheir well-documented criticisms of the "gradualist"approach adopted in "Rolling Thunder"and the debilitating tactical effects of sanctuariesand other political constraints, neverthelesscontended that even this partlyhamstrungcampaign had already made it "substantiallymore costly and difficult" for NorthVietnam to support the southern insurgents/The evident cost to the enemy, they argued,of itself justified continuation of the programme.However, they again emphasized the militaryassessment that effective interdiction could notbe achieved in the face of crippling politicalconstraints.This predictable disagreement betweenadministration and military professionals wasaired in hearings before the Preparedness Subcommitteeof the Senate Armed Forces Committee,chaired by Senator Stennis. The Secretary'sdoubts were made public with hisassertion that:The capacity of the loc and of the outsidesources of supply so far exceeds the minimalflow necessary to support the present levelof North Vietnamese effort in South Vietnamthat the enemy operations in the south cannot. . . be stopped by air bombardment —short, that is, of the virtual annihilation ofNorth Vietnam and its people*The aspirations of the Joint Chiefs, reinforcedby the laudatory observations of the StennisCommittee report, now embraced even widerobjectives. They referred to:An air campaign [which had] made amarked impact on the capability of NorthVietnam to prosecute the wur. 9

AIR INTERDICTION — VIETNAM IN PERSPECTIVE 11To accelerate this effect, an extended targetlist was sought, to support "a co-ordinated andsustained air campaign [which would] hamperseverely the North Vietnam war effort'", forexample, by destroying "war supporting facilitiesas well as those producing items vital tothe economy." 10Thus by 1968 the uniformed advisors, frustratedby the inevitable failure of an interdictioncampaign with poorly-defined objectives,were seeking for "Rolling Thunder" limitedwar targets reminiscent of the Second WorldWar bombing offensive against Europe. Thesebroader objectives invited even more stringentpolitical constraints, which further compoundedthe basic dilemma. By the end of the yearthe nation's Commander-in-Chief had decidednot to run again for office; the Secretary forDefence, apparently isolated from the politicalobjectives of government and the forcefuladvocacy of the top military professionals, had50 kilometres west south west of Hue.resigned his high office. These momentousdevelopments were due, at least in part, to theessential dilemma imposed by the ill-defined,unlimited aims of "Rolling Thunder".Developments in DoctrineIt is one of the ironies of the Vietnam experiencethat while the interdiction campaign wasproducing results far short of the expectationsof its most optimistic supporters, the weaponsand techniques of interdiction were being perfectedto a level thought scarcely possible inearlier campaigns.Chokepoints. Vital chokepoints were asreadily identifiable in the Southeast Asiantransport system as they had been in Europeand Korea. They included particular facilities,bridges, marshalling yards, repair and supportfacilities, as well as critical resources, particularlyPOL. From the outset, bridges exercisedthe fascination of the past. All of these pointtargets were to prove just as difficult to hitwith iron bombs as they had in earlier wars,and as difficult to destroy. Furthermore, they"grew" defences at a sobering rate. Strikesagainst chokepoints took a dramatic turn,however, with the introduction of the guidedbomb, in some respects the most importantdevelopment of the Vietnam war. The twogreat bridges of Hanoi, the Paul Doumer andthe Thanh Hoa had, for example, provedvirtually impossible to cut effectively despitehundreds of strikes against them, until USAFcrews dropped two spans of the Thanh Hoain August 1967 with a 3000-lb laser-guidedbomb delivered by an F-4 and a 2000-lb TVguidedweapon was steered into the criticalsouthern abutment of the Paul Doumer.Guided bombs had been used in earlier wars,but the potential of the RAZON and TARZONweapons employed in Korea was finally realizedwith this new generation of guidedweapons.Night/Poor Weather Operations. Before thewar in Southeast Asia, night and poor weatherhad always forced a relaxation of the 24-hourpressure essential to effective interdiction. Withthe technological advances spurred by theVietnam war, this is no longer true. Thedegree of success achieved is typified by theAC-130 gunship with an array of sensors andweapons whose combined potential, in the viewof some who used this weapon system in South-

12 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALeast Asia, has not yet been realized. 11 In eitherof its later versions, Pave Pinto and PaveSpectre, the AC-130 represents an impressivenight poor weather interdiction weapon system.The Pinto combines low light-level televisionand infra-red sensors, laser target designatorand radar target tracker in a computermanaged,integrated avionics system whichallows all or selected elements of the aircraft'smassive firepower, including 7.62mm, 20mmand 40mm weapons to be brought to bearquickly and accurately against otherwise invisibleinterdiction targets. The Spectre incorporatesa massive 105mm howitzer in a trainablemount and proved a redoubtable truckkilleralong the roads of the Ho Chi Minh trail,individual crews are said to have destroyedas many as 30 trucks in a single night. 12Other developments which pushed the effectivenessof a wide range of strike aircraft toimpressive heights include the ECM pod,operational in early 1967 which in the wordsof 7th Air Force commander, "had a revolutionaryeffect not only in the employment offighters in heavy defences but also in reductionof losses." 13 Electronic warfare techniqueswere developed further, with the introductionof a number of aircraft specially equipped forthe role of detecting and neutralising enemyradar-directed defensive systems. In a typical"Wild Weasel" operation, two specialized, twoplaceF-105Fs would cover four F-105 "raiders"in strikes against loc targets, looking andlistening for SAM and other air defence radarsfrom a patrol line. The SHRIKE AR missileproved so effective against enemy radar systemsthat their operation was restricted to a fewmoments at a time. 11 The effectiveness of theentire air defence system was correspondinglydowngraded.Ironically, the United States was committedto an interdiction campaign in Southeast Asiawhich, for the reasons discussed, could neverbe effective. Nevertheless, in pursuing thisfrustrating campaign, the air strike force developedthe weapons and techniques of air interdictionto a peak of effectiveness never previouslyattained. Historians will no doubtspeculate if this impressive tactical capabilitycould not have been employed to greater effectin some other way. Was an effective "Strangle"ever possible in Southeast Asia from 1964 to1968?Rolling Thunder AlternativesIt may be argued that the whole weight of"Rolling Thunder" should have been directedfrom the outset towards achieving effectiveinterdiction in a limited geographic area, asan alternative to spreading air strikes acrossthe entire target spectrum of North Vietnam.A specialized interdiction-oriented programmeof this kind was in fact proposed in a DefenceMemorandum circulated in May 1967. 15 Thisstudy noted that the panhandle between 20°Nand the DMZ represented "a funnel, throughwhich men and supplies to the South mustflow." As one of three options for future airstrike programmes the study proposed that all"Rolling Thunder" sorties be directed againstlines of communication in the funnel. TheJoint Chiefs, however, pointed out the futilityof such a programme at that time, noting that:fRAAF Photo)Photo taken by the author on 4 Moy 1970 of theTiger Mountain area of the Ho-Chi-Minh Trail, inihe same area as the photo on the previous page.

AIR INTERDICTION — VIETNAM IN PERSPECTIVE 13The concept of a funnel is misleading,since in fact the communists are supplyingtheir forces in South Vietnam from all sides,through the DMZ, Laos, the coast, Cambodiaand the rivers in the Delta. 16By 1967, what might earlier have been a loc"funnel" in the classic interdiction sense hadbecome instead a massive hydra with a thousandthroats which no amount of air attack couldhope to cut simultaneously, or permanently.Had this always been the case? Hindsightevaluations are dangerous, particularly at soshort a remove in time. Nevertheless, it maybe argued that a "sharp knock*' programme,directed against lines of communication in thesouthern panhandle in 1964/65, without regardto sanctuaries and with appropriate forces couldhave achieved a level of effective interdictionwhich by 1967, taking account of imposedpolitical constraints, was beyond the capabilityof the most powerful tactical air force in theworld.Lessons and ConclusionsMilitary historians will debate the tacticallessons of Vietnam for as long as others arguethe political and social issues and few wouldventure to predict an end to that debate. Nevertheless,some broad conclusions are, in theview of the author, worthy of consideration,(n particular, nothing happened in the 1965-68interdiction campaign that negates any of thelessons of the past. As already discussed, the"belt of interdiction" approach, in which theaim is to sever all transport arteries simultaneously,was precluded from the "RollingThunder" programme planning by politicalconstraints, particularly the imposition of sanctuaries.The results of the campaign confirm,however, that where the aim is to "strangle"rather than merely to reduce or to make morecostly, the establishment of a belt of interdictionis essential. United States air achieved itsstated aim in Vietnam; it must be rememberedthat this aim was not effective interdiction.Chokepoints continue to dominate tacticaltargeting. After Vietnam, which saw the deve-* *lopment of a whole new generation of weaponsand techniques, they will in future be targetedwith greater confidence, hit with certainty anddestroyed more frequently. Furthermore, darknessand poor weather will no longer force,as they have in the past, a relaxation of thecontinuous pressure necessary for effectiveinterdiction.Above all, Vietnam demonstrated again thateffective interdiction is achievable only whenthe aim is clearly defined and limited in scope.Success becomes less likely as the aim becomesbroader and impossible, when political constraintsbecome so pervasive that military actionbogs down. However, no act of war is evereither entirely political or entirely military.Nowhere is this truth more evident than in thedetermination of that point where primarilymilitary"interdiction" broadens into primarilypolitical"limited war." Military professionalsmust take care that, in seeking to broaden toofar the scope of operations, they do not enmeshthemselves more deeply in the morass of unduepolitical constraint. Too great a degree ofsingle-mindedness in pursuing the militaryobjective can, conversely, make it unattainable.This could well be the most useful lessonto be learned from the first great interdictioncampaign in Southeast Asia.QNOTES1 Principally, The Defense Department History ofUnited States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, publishedas The Pentagon Papers (The Senator GravelEdition), Vol. IV, Boston, Beacon Press.2 Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in theSecond World War.Stewart, J. T., Airpower the Decisive Force inKorea.4 Craven and Cate, op. cit.A letter from President Johnson to Senator Henry5M. Jackson, 01 May 67, reprinted in Air Forceand Space Digest, April 1967.Pentagon Papers (PP). p. 28.• PP, p. 59.PP, p. 202.°PP, p. 199.PP. p. 207.1-ehnert, Major Richard A.. The Ghost Rider inthe Sky, September 1973.12 ibid.Momyer. General William W.. The Evolution ofFighter Tactics in Southeast Asia. April 1974.Carson, Captain Don. Flying the Thud, April 1974.PP. p. 160.* *The Art of War is like that of Medicine, murderous and conjectural.—Voltaire.

14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALARMY STUDY OF OFFThe Army has commenced a detailed stud)into the professional development of regularofficers. The analysis is being undertaken b\a full-time project team titled the RegularOfficer Development Committee (RODOchaired by Brigadier P. J. Norton. Theremainder of the Committee consists of acolonel, three lieutenant colonels plus a majorand secretarial staff, assisted part-time by anumber of advisers.The Committee's terms of reference state:"Taking account of all stages of officer developmentfrom first appointment to the pointof promotion to colonel . . . determine themilitary and civilian education qualificationsand levels of training and experience RegularArmy officers need . . . prepare a programmefor the professional development of RegularArmy officers ..."The Army's HO Training Command is con-ICER DEVELOPMENTducting a parallel study into the promotionof officers in the Army Reserve.The RODC is to submit its report to theChief of the General Staff during 1978. Ithas already undertaken several surveys ofArmy officers and will visit all Army formationsduring the year. The Committee willalso examine officer development systems ofother armed services and executive developmentsystems used by public and private organizations,and has commenced detailed analysisof future sociological and technological trends.The RODC welcomes views and submissionson officer addressed to:Submissions shouldThe SecretaryRODCDept of Defence (Army Office)CANBERRA ACT 2600o. . . Russian policy is really to push down Southward and command what every writer— and every thinking man from the most ancient times knows perfectly well is the greatthing to possess, namely, "the Command of the Seas," and Russia, in my opinion, is determinedupon possessing "the Command of the Seas."Captain Bedford Pirn. Royal Navy1884.The aim of the [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] is the total destruction of allaspects of capitalism and that freedom of choice and liberty of the individual which is theheritage of the Christian ethic; and the substitution for these beliefs of an atheistic scientificsocialism.Vice Admiral Sir Louis Le Baillyin The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (UK)1976.

E FIELD^^Bf"—-•-**-It Col J. ViksneR< >yal A ustraliun Corps of SignalsIT is no longer a question of whether wewill use computers in command and controlapplications in the field; it is a questionof when and to what extent. Even this isdifficult to forecast with any degree of certainty.Since the extent of computer application is afunction of time — that is, new uses are developedwith advancing technology — forecastsare almost out of date as soon as they aremade.Nevertheless, we have to come to grips withthis problem. There are two compelling reasonsfor this: firstly, computer systems take a considerabletime to develop, and secondly, theyare somewhat expensive. 1 Well, after havinggiven this warning, I have accepted the challengeand will set out my own thoughts onhow I see the application of computer technologydeveloping in the Australian Army.In achieving this aim:• I will first indulge in some philosophy onthe relationship between command andcontrol, and computers;• I will then look from whence we havecome and try to project where we aregoing (as I warned a hazardous venture);Lt Col Viksne graduated from RMC Duntroon in1960. He attended Royal Melbourne Institute ofTechnology for a Fellowship Diploma in CommunicationsEngineering. He has held a variety of regimentaland staff appointments in Australia, andcommanded a Signals Detachment in Vietnam.He attended the RAAF School of Languages in 1966and was posted as Assistant Services Attache toCambodia in 1971-72. On his return he attendedthe Australian Staff College, served as an Instructorat RMC in 1974. He served in a post in DefenceCentral from 1974-6 and is currently CO, School ofSignals. Watsonia. Melbourne.• After exploring the paths that severalother countries have trod in this area:• 1 will attempt to project a path for us.A PHILOSOPHICAL DIVERSIONIn some functional areas, the use of computersin the field has been readily apparent— such as artillery and logistics; in other areasthere is an apparent reluctance to employthem. Of these, the most important is thearea of command and control. This may partlystem from a lack of our awareness that aproblem may exist. I will explain this ingreater detail. We have increased the size ofcommand elements in proportion to our perceivedsense of increase in the size and complexityof the command problem. However,have we a true measure of the problem, particularlytaking into account the fact that wefought our last divisional size battles in theSecond World War — now more than 30years ago?The following table gives some measure ofrate of increase of the problem:DIVISIONAL ASSAULT (2)FRONTAGEFirst World WarSecond World War1970 (approx.)First World WarSecond World War1970 (approx.)(KM)1-2220-30OPERATIONALDEPTH/DAY (KM)2-410-2035-40In the First World War the area of interestin a divisional operation rarely exceeded 8 km 2per day. By the early 1970s this area hadincreased to in excess of 600 km 2 per day.

16 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThis means that in any one day the divisionalstaff has to maintain complete detail on friendlyand enemy activities in this sized area. Sinceoperations generally last well in excess of oneday, this activity has to be continued overdifferent terrain and possibly changed orbitover the following days.There is no measure of how effectively theheadquarters staff can cope with this task.Decreased performance is difficult to judge,particularly in active operations, until of coursethe ultimate end point is reached — in defeat.However, there is reason to believe that ourcurrent staff structures, whilst adequate forlow scale operations, would find it increasinglydifficult to cope with increased tempos ofoperations.The following diagram illustrates theinformation loss that may occur on operations.their advantages and disadvantages. Manualinformation handling is more flexible, butlarger staffs tend to become less efficient asa whole and hence to a degree, counter productive.Automatic information handling isless flexible, but results in a more uniforminformation flow. 4However, regardless of other relative merits,the cost factor in choosing the type of systemwill most likely eventually become a determiningfactor. It is difficult to compare directlyCOMPUTER PROCESSING Vs MANPOWERS/MIPSlOOM-iCOST TRENDSfRIENDLY ACTIVITIES ENEMY ACTIVITIESIt reflects the findings of a command postexperimental exercise (Exercise CP-3) conductedin the United States. 3It showed that very little of the informationgathered on enemy at the lower levels reacheddivisional headquarters. The situation waseven worse with friendly activities.The lateral flow of messages was only 10per cent of those dealing with events withintwo kilometres of operational boundaries.Downward flow from division to battalion waspractically non-existent. Moreover, time takenfor passage of information was high. Averagetime for information flow from company todivision was 60 minutes on friendly activitiesand up to 100 minutes for enemy. Whilst inmost cases this can be accepted, there aretimes when the opportunity to react in orderto seize advantage of the situation, is lost.In order to achieve better informationmanagement, one may increase the staff orincrease the decree of automation. Both have1960 1970 1980 1990Note: MIPS—Million Instructions Per SecondFIGURE 1the costs of manual and automatic data processing.However, the trends are readilyapparent as shown in the diagram.I must however note here, that costing isvery difficult when related to computer operation.Another method of comparison of effectivenessof two systems is in terms of unitefficiency which can be expressed as the comparisonof manpower costs with and withoutcomputer, by taking into consideration assignedvalues to transaction errors, reduced labourin transactions and the computer's lack ofinherent intelligence. I have adopted thesimpler method because data on the moresophisticated methods is just not available.For our purposes the simplified cost model isnear enough.The costs shown in the diagram are net costsof processing. The total system costs depend

COMPUTERS IN THE FIELD 17very much on how much it is decided to automate.In any system, a stage is generallyreached beyond which automation becomesuneconomical. This is illustrated in the followingcost-effectiveness analysis. The sectionA-B is within reasonable bounds of cost.As the cost curve rises towards B, the costof improving the quality of information beginsto rise rapidly, and therefore the use of automationfor information processing at this pointbecomes increasingly less cost-effective. 0COST EFFECTIVENESS OFINFORMATION PROCESSINGQUALITY OF INFORMATIONCOST WITHIMPROVEDTECHNOLOGYFIGURE 2It is therefore important to make a consciouscost-effectiveness determination in regard toany planned computer operation.There are a number of other importantaspects to be considered in relation to computerization.These are:• personnelG organizationcdecision making• communicationsA survey of 23 civilian companies conductedin the late sixties indicated that the introductionof computers generally resulted in a largereduction in clerical, a slight reduction in supervisory,but no significant change in managerialstaff. 7 Since the staff is relatively small atdivisional level, the scope for staff reductionsis small. Any reductions in clerical staffshould be offset by increases in computingstaff. This could involve some retraining.Command and operations staff officer manninglevels should be affected little by the introductionof computers. The significant pointto note is, however, that though the overallstaffing may remain relatively stable, the capacityfor information handling will increase outof all proportion to the staff commitment.The majority of civilian firms have foundthat as they become more familiar with theircomputer systems, they gradually switch froma level organization to a functional organization.8 A thorough analysis of the existingsystem before introducing computers may haveavoided this. Advice in the military field issimilar; that is a thorough analysis of existingstructures should be carried out with a view toadapting them to computer operations and notvice versa. Unfortunately military experience sofar does not follow this approach. The BritishWavell system is being adapted to the currentorganizational structure and in project MAS-STER experiments conducted so far. TacticalOperations System (TOS) utilization has alsobeen limited to 'a one-for-one applicationagainst manually performed activities'. 9 Thislimits the full utilization of facilities a computeroffers and will invariably result in achange of concept as the system develops.Computers should provide more accurateand timely information and thus ease decisionmaking. However, experience in civilian industryindicates that they also tend to move decisionmaking to higher levels in the hierarchicalstructure. 10 This should accentuate the alreadyapparent trend in the military sphere broughtabout by improving communications.The current field radio systems, being basicallydesigned for voice and telegraph operation,are not able to fully exploit the capabilitiesoffered by automatic data processing.The multiplexing arrangements in analoguesystems are not entirely suitable for data transmission11 nor is transmission quality generallyacceptable for data transfer. 12The area communications systems beingdeveloped overseas for fielding in early to mid1980s will incorporate a full data transmissioncapability. These include the US TRI-TAC,the British PTARMIGAN and French RITA.These systems will overcome the current deficienciesin physical data transmission andenable real-time data exchange: this exploitsto the full the ability to process informationby computer rapidly.The arguments for introducing computersin command and control are convincing. Yetwe should be conscious of some of the drawbacks,and these should be taken into accountin system planning. We should also be aware

ISDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALof the characteristics of computer systems andthe consequences of their introduction intoservice. Only this will result in the most appropriatesystem for our needs.WHENCE WE HAVE COME:WHERE ARE WE GOINGI will briefly cover the major computercharacteristics and trends which are importantto us as users of such systems in the field andwhich should indicate the way in which weshould proceed. These I believe are the physicalcharacteristics, selected performance characteristicsand input/output equipment.Advances in computer technology in thesixties led to a reduction of 20 : 1 in cost;20 : 1 in size; 12 : 1 in weight and 10 : 1 inpower consumption. It is interesting to notethat the cost of military computers remainedrelatively stable in the same period at about$100,000 for a typical equipment, but with therecent increase in use of military standardcomputer components in non military applications,the price should drop significantly. 13A particularly significant trend to be noted isthat reliability (expressed in Mean TimeBetween Failures (MTBF)) has improved somuch that commercial computers can now beconsidered for certain military applications.COMPUTER IMPROVEMENT(TO 1990)PROJECTIONMTBF(X2000 HRS)VOLUME ICU INxlO)WEIGHT (LB)POWER (WATTSxlO)This diagram gives the projections of physicalcharacteristics of command and controlcomputers into the 1980s. 14 Although theimprovements are not as dramatic as in thepast 10 years, further considerable reductionsin all areas are anticipated.A notable feature of computer developmentis the trend towards the greater use of mini-{Ferranti Digital Systems Division)The FM 1 600D is typical of the small computers withlarge capacity being developed in this case in anairborne application.computers. Since 1963 they have captured asignificant portion of the computer market.They are of particular interest in the militaryfield because of their reliability, cost, size andweight. Moreover, their computing capacityis suited to the more modest needs of fieldunits.A minicomputer is generally described asbeing a small electronic digital computer whichcan run a high level programming language,accept data or set of instructions, process themunder internally-stored program control andproduce results without operator interventionin a real-time mode. 15 Typically a minicomputerwith a fast central processor and amemory of 16,000 characters costs aroundS6000, and can be programmed for tasks whichuntil a few years ago were seen as requiringa machine costing twenty times that amount. 1 ' 5Trends in evolution in physical characteristicsare equally applicable to minicomputers.Increased flexibility is provided by an increasingvariety of peripheral devices being offered,more sophisticated addressing structures andexpandable memories.

COMPUTERS IN THE FIELD 19An even more interesting development isthe micro computer which made its appearancein 1972-73. It meets the need for a processorin a system too small or too slow towarrant the use of a minicomputer and fillsthe gap between a desk calculator and minicomputer.Their cost range is S800-S2000. 17The reduction in size of central processingunits has been accompanied by their increasingcapability to utilise memory units ofincreasing capacity. For instance minicomputermemory capacity today typically expands to256K or even to 1024K compared to the 4Kin the first minicomputers. The increasing useof higher memory capacities has reversed theThe workhorse of current displays is thecathode ray tube (CRT); this represents some13% of the cost of a typical computer installation.23 A typical CRT costs about S2.000in a commercial version; a MILSPEC versioncosts about twice this amount. Three colourterminals are now becoming available.A principal advantage of the CRT is itsability to readily display both written andgraphic information. This makes it particularlysuitable for command posts where mapdisplays are essential. The advantage isenhanced by the ability of the operator to communicatewith computer and other usersthrough the display by means of indicatingMAIN MEMORIES — RAM CHARACTERISTICSREAD/WRITE POWER CONSUMPTION COSTTime (ns) (mW/bit) (Cent/bit)100 15 .011 .001 .5 • .25ACCESS TIME(ms)2 .02cost relationship between the central processorand the memory unit. Since 1963, the memoryunit has increased from 22% of the cost ofthe computer to some 70% today. 18 On theother hand, memory cost/per unit is dropping.The following table summarizes the forecasttrends in the time frame 1975-1990. 19As far as the non specialist use is concerned,probably the most important part of the computersystem is the input and output equipment.Since human speech is 4-5 times faster thanhandwriting or typing the ultimate aim forsuch peripheral equipment is for direct voiceoperation. Whilst the first generation of automaticspeech verification equipment is wellestablished,- 0 computer understanding andreproduction of sufficiently large vocabulariesis unlikely until at least the 1980s. 21 - 22Until that time, it appears that we are likelyto continue to use the input techniques suchas keyboards, tapes, card and direct electricaldata transfer currently available. An area ofdevelopment of particular importance in militaryapplications is that of display devicesand here major break-throughs in technologyare forecast.CHARACTERISTICSMASS MEMORY10 s 10 11 10 100CAPACITY(bits)TRANSFER RATE(M bits/sec)COST/BIT(cent).3 .0001devices such as the light pen. The operatorcan use it to indicate points or draw symbolson the display.However, the CRT has several severe limitations.Firstly, a permanent record is notprovided and this needs to be sought throughother means. Although it can be obtained bymeans of line printers or tape in the case ofwritten information, and plotters or microfilmin the case of graphic information, nevertheless,additional equipment is required. Moreover,there is a time penalty; a CRT display requiring5-20 seconds, depending on complexity toproduce, takes about 2 minutes to reproduceon paper. 24A second disadvantage is the small size ofscreen which is practicable today. The 24inch CRT screen commercially available onlygives a display area of 16 x 16 inches. 25 Theaverage human eye is not capable of takingadvantage of the hiah resolution available(4000 discernible lines^on the face of CRT). 20This is particularly critical when informationis displayed to a group of people. The problemcan be partly overcome by enlarging aportion of the display, or projecting the displayon a screen.

20 DEFENCE FORC E JOURNALThe electronic tactical display using a CRT developed fcr TACFIRE.(Litton DataSystems)However, perhaps the most serious limitationof the CRT is the undesirable radiation whichit produces. This poses a security problemwhich could be overcome at some cost; andalso it may cause interference with other electronicequipment, particularly in a 'crowded'equipment environment.There are a number of technologies currentlybeing developed which promise to bringabout measurable improvements in group displaysfor tactical command and control computersystems. Amongst those receiving thegreatest exposure are light emitting diodes(LED), plasma panels and liquid crystals. Ihave summarized their major characteristicsin the following table.- 7 CRT technology projectionsserve as a basis for comparison.Although they olfer a number of advantagesover CRTs, these devices are prohibitivelyexpensive at the present time. ForCRTLEDPlasmapanelsLiquidcrvstalsPracticalAvailability14711^7119711974CompetitivePhase Out19851980Practicalmax size25"2"/substrate15"15"Presentwritingspeed\"ln secline/N secline/5 ^ secIine/2m secVolumemillionelm (cufl i~>0.50.62Costmillionelm (SI0.5—2.525020Projectedcost millionHm ($10.4—2.511.50.5

COMPUTERS IN THE FIELD 21(Owens—Illinois)Digivue gas-filled display unit — capable of displaying4335 characters.instance the LED display measuring 4 ft x4 ft being developed for TACFIRE is estimatedto cost between $75,000 and $85,000for a single colour display."" However thesecosts will drop dramatically once they receivewider usage.This brief summary should serve to illustratethe broad trends which are particularlyapplicable to command and control systems.Today's computers are highly reliable, andpack an immense computing capacity in asmall volume at an ever decreasing cost. Aproblem area still to be solved is that of groupinformation displays. In the meantime we willhave to be satisfied with the more modestdisplay capabilities with their inherent limitationsin the field. Finally, the expandingrange of equipments at the lower end of thecomputer spectrum will make it increasinglydifficult to choose between dedicated andmulti-user computers.WHERE OTHERS HAVE TRODIn this section I will briefly summarise someof the major developments in armies overseas.This should give an insight into approachestried by other countries and perhaps helpavoid some of the pitfalls. I will have a lookat United States (including the Marine Corps),United Kingdom and France.United States ArmyAs United States has been the leader in thisfield, it is most fruitful to examine her systemdevelopments in somewhat greater detail.Understandably, because of the rapidchanges in technology in the initial years ofcomputer development, the period from themid-fifties to the late sixties was marked byduplication of effort, under-utilization ofresources and organizational difficulties. However,from this evolved the initial plan, theCommand and Control Information System(CCIS 70). It recognized the necessity for asystems approach and called for studies ofpossible application of Automatic Data Processing(ADP) in the five functional areas ofoperations, fire support, intelligence, administrationand logistics.The initial studies resulted in the plan forapplication of systems in the field — the AutomaticData Support for the Army in the Field(ADSAF). Under the plan, the five CCIS 70functions were combined into three systems:-"• Tactical Operations System (TOS)• Tactical Fire Direction System (TAC­FIRE), and{General Instrument Corporation)The LED display unit can display 800 characteristicsviewable from a distance of up to ]0 metres.

7 市 町 村 別 小 児 う 蝕 の 現 状表 Ⅱ-7-1 市 町 村 別 小 児 う 蝕 の 現 状市 町 村 名3 歳 児一 人 平 均 むし 歯 数5 歳 児一 人 平 均 むし 歯 数12 歳 児一 人 平 均 むし 歯 数平 成 19 年 度 平 成 20 年 度 平 成 20 年 度 平 成 21 年 度 平 成 20 年 度 平 成 21 年 度県 平 均 0.95 0.84 2.54 2.31 0.88 0.80新 潟 市 0.87 0.80 2.08 1.87 1.02 0.92長 岡 市 1.00 0.95 2.42 2.05 0.75 0.69三 条 市 0.71 0.73 2.53 2.51 1.29 0.89柏 崎 市 0.66 0.70 2.88 2.47 1.01 0.91新 発 田 市 0.98 0.73 2.18 1.84 0.74 0.85小 千 谷 市 0.70 0.59 2.24 1.96 0.35 0.26加 茂 市 0.77 0.77 2.74 2.10 1.05 1.12十 日 町 市 1.50 1.33 3.95 3.29 0.65 0.53見 附 市 0.87 0.63 2.64 2.58 1.15 1.01村 上 市 ( 新 ) 1.02 3.11 3.22 0.79 0.63村 上 市 ( 旧 ) 0.83荒 川 町 1.33神 林 村 1.43朝 日 村 1.35山 北 町 2.34燕 市 0.99 0.89 2.86 2.56 0.65 0.65糸 魚 川 市 1.28 0.98 3.79 3.47 0.58 0.68妙 高 市 1.02 0.51 2.90 2.65 0.22 0.18五 泉 市 1.32 1.25 3.56 3.02 1.63 1.33上 越 市 1.01 0.66 2.58 2.35 0.66 0.59阿 賀 野 市 1.15 1.15 3.41 3.33 0.89 0.77佐 渡 市 1.06 1.19 3.06 3.09 1.03 0.81魚 沼 市 0.90 0.80 3.03 2.99 0.75 0.60南 魚 沼 市 0.94 0.86 2.86 2.38 0.70 0.67胎 内 市 1.24 1.05 3.00 3.07 0.80 0.76聖 籠 町 1.02 0.66 2.61 4.08 1.27 2.04弥 彦 村 0.18 1.02 1.48 2.05 0.18 0.17田 上 町 1.22 0.41 2.52 2.34 1.39 1.43阿 賀 町 1.64 0.77 4.76 4.24 0.39 0.57出 雲 崎 町 0.17 0.79 2.68 1.55 0.45 0.23川 口 町 1.12 0.74 3.32 2.53 0.58 0.37湯 沢 町 0.59 0.75 2.96 2.66 0.68 0.69津 南 町 1.21 1.11 2.68 2.52 0.55 0.49刈 羽 村 0.55 1.71 2.38 2.39 0.95 1.02関 川 村 1.96 1.39 4.09 4.05 0.80 0.84粟 島 浦 村 0.00 * 1.00 * 1.00 1.50( 当 該 年 度 の3 月 末 現 在 の 市 町 村 数 ) ( 当 該 年 度 の5 月 1 日 現 在 の 市 町 村 数 )( 母 子 保 健 事 業 報 告 )* 非 公 開注 1) 3 歳 児 一 人 平 均 むし 歯 数 :3 歳 児 歯 科 健 康 診 査 結 果 ( 母 子 保 健 法 )注 2) 5 歳 児 一 人 平 均 むし 歯 数 : 保 育 所 における 定 期 歯 科 健 康 診 断 結 果 ( 児 童 福 祉 施 設 最 低 基 準 )及 び 幼 稚 園 における 定 期 歯 科 健 康 診 断 結 果 ( 学 校 保 健 安 全 法 )注 3) 12 歳 児 一 人 平 均 むし 歯 数 : 学 校 における 定 期 歯 科 健 康 診 断 結 果 ( 学 校 保 健 安 全 法 )

COMPUTERS IN THE FIELD 23the first mobile Report Platoon in 1951. By1962 each division had an organic mobile DataProcessing Platoon which handled a varietyof functions. By the mid-sixties, largely as aresult of the Vietnam experience, it becameapparent that a systems approach to data processingin the field was necessary and theMarine Tactical Command and Control Systems(MTACC) concept was formulated.This concept calls for the development ofthe following elements: 36• Marine Integrated Fire and Air Support(MIFASS)• Marine Combat Operations (TCO)• Marine Integrated Personnel (MIPS)• Marine Integrated Logistics (MILOGS)• Marine Air Command and Control(MACCS)• Marine Air-Ground Intelligence (MAGIS)• Communications (COMM)It is intended to develop MTACCS bystages by commencing work on the moreimportant elements first but at the same timetaking advantage of research and developmentresults of US Army, Navy and the Air Force.The system is planned to be completed in lateseventies or early eighties. 37As with US Army's TACFIRE, MIFASSwill be the first sub-system developed, later tobe followed by TCO and then others. Broadparameters for their application have, or arebeing written. These will be refined intorequirements as a result of controlled CommandPost tests and exercises conducted in a'test bed' facility at Camp Pendleton. Thetests have a wide charter and not only willthey examine ways and means of applyingADP to the current command structure, butalso determine whether some of the presentstructures and procedures should change inorder to gain the maximum benefit from automation.38 For instance during the test ofMIFASS, the desirability of combining FireSupport Co-ordination Centre and Direct AirSupport Centre functions will be examined.The Camp Pendleton tests will use commercialcomputers and will result in a SpecificOperational Requirement (SOR) for each subsystem.This will be used to write the specificationsfor the production and operationalversion of the sub-system.Great BritainThe British approach is more segmentedthan that of the United States and this hasinhibited the development of an integratedfield ADP system. The segmentation can beattributed to an evolutionary rather than asystems approach, as well as to changes inpolicy. However, now with Wavell, an integratedsystem is being developed.Project Windsor, the initial feasibility studyto investigate the automation of commandand control in a European war was completedin 1967, but work was subsequently stoppedbecause the project was found to be too expensiveand needed too long a time to develop.The project team then went on to ProjectJellicoe which was a feasibility study of introducinga transportable computer system foruse in limited war, internal security and counterinsurgency roles. Though the report issued in1968 showed it feasible, the project was abandonedas a result of a change in governmentpolicy.The same team then went on to study theapplication of ADP systems to planning andmounting of operation from UK under projectTrenchard. The feasibility report issuedin 1969 envisaged a static computer with a(Ferranli Digital Systems Division)Part of a developmental system supplied to RARDEfor WAVELL/BATES system showing a map displayunit (MDU) and a VDU. The MDU allows the coverageof a corps area of interest of 300 x 200 km.Conventional map symbols are also displayed.

COMPUTERS IN THE FIELD 25their range is extremely limited. The majorityof the hardware, 41 if not all, will have to bepurchased overseas. Our software 15 capability,on the other hand, is fairly advanced by worldstandards, both in government and civil industry.This situation is to our advantage. Hardwareto software ratio has seen a completereversal to a stage where software costs representsome 80% of the overall system coststoday. This trend is shown in the followingdiagram. 46Because of differing command and controlphilosophies with our allies, it can be anticipatedthat we will need to develop themajority of our software requirements — andthis is the area in which our strength lies.There is just one note of caution; apart fromDefence, the software effort is distributed overmany companies and therefore in any suchventure, a co-operative effort would appearto be necessary.The development of such a system can notbe undertaken on a part-time basis. It requiresthe attention of a dedicated project team ofa size adequate for the task. United StatesArmy experience indicates that from two toin excess of six years pass between the preparationof first documentation describing acomputer requirement and its installation. 17Australian experience would tend more towardsa ten year interval. There are dangers in alengthy development period; firstly the requirementsare likely to change, and secondly costinflation and equipment obsolescence mayendanger the project. For these reasons it isdesirable to reduce the development period asmuch as possible; this implies a greater expenditureof resources in the initial stages.In the earliest part of the paper I outlineda technology forecast. However, to be at theforefront of technology is expensive. It is onlythe research and development costs have beenamortised, that the new technology will producea more cost effective solution than previously.To be at the tail end of computertechnology is also costly. At this stage computeroperations become more expensive thanwith newer equipments. This particularlyapplies to software, and unless the programminglanguage is well established a shortageof qualified programmers may develop towardsthe end of the computer's lifetime. 48 A compromisesolution should therefore be sought.(Sanders Associates,Inc.)A severe environment version of a standard commercialcomputer.A commercial graphics terminal with a compatiblecopier.It is common to refer to computers bygenerations. Market projections indicate thatthe next generation equipment should belaunched in the very near future. 40 It may beadvantageous to establish a prototype commandand control system with this next generation.This would take advantage of new technologyand extend the useful life of the equip-

26 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALment. Use of commercial computers, wherefeasible, also promises significant cost savings.I can only stress that other countries have triedthis approach and found it successful. Interms of peripheral equipment, it is feasibleThere are certain functions which need computersfull-time for their operation. Typicalof these are artillery and communicationswhich require a system separate from others,but capable of interacting with multi-userCOMMAND AND CONTROLFORCE HO^ nBACK IIPCOMPUTER^ \ CENTRAlPROCESSINGFACILITY0SATELLITEPROCESSORISF /^\ SATELLITEPROCESSORCOMBAT SUPPORTDEFENCEEDPSYSTEMDEPOTISF^nMEDCENTRA!PROCESSINGFACILITYMEDMEDDEPOTSATELLITEPROCESSORSATELLITEREAR| | J ^PROCESSOR 'DIYnivI—\rMAINSUPPORTAREAFORCE LEVEL DIV TFFIGURE 5to employ current technology equipment; thatequipment can be readily replaced at somefuture date.Now to look at what may be practicablefor us.I can see the following broad groupings ofcomputers in the field:• multi-user dedicated;• special purpose dedicated;• multi-user general purpose.Multi-user dedicated would represent thelargest and most important grouping coveringsuch common-user functions as command,personnel and combat support. Althoughcommand adapts itself readily to a level structure,personnel and combat support tend tofavour a functional system in which centraliseddata treatment is more practical. Datacould still be distributed to the various levelsas required.dedicated systems. These are covered by thespecial purpose dedicated category.There are a number of tasks which areadaptable to computer operation but whichcannot gainfully employ a computer full time.Typical of these are engineering calculations,movement calculations, frequency allocation,etc. For these computer centres could be used.Multi-user general purpose category coversthese.I will now cover these categories in greaterdetail, and apply them to our organizationalstructure in the field. First, command andcontrol.Command and ControlThe majority of command and control systemsare based on the division. Consideringthe volume of information being handled atthis level, the decision is logical. This impliesthat a smaller processor or at least a concen-

COMPUTERS IN THE FIELD 2"trator, depending on the quality of communicationsystem, would be necessary at taskforce level.In considering where we should locate themain processors, the question of survivabilitybecomes particularly important. Two principalthreats need to be considered; firstly, destructionby ground attack or attack by fire, andsecondly through the effects of the electromagneticpulse (EMP) which accompaniesnuclear explosions.The possible damage to EMP, not only tocommand and control but all computer basedsystems (including fire control), has receiveda wide exposure overseas. Since EMP canaffect equipment over a significant area faroutside the area of immediate destruction,considerable research has been conducted onmethods of avoidance of such damage. However,no inexpensive solution is apparent.Hardening costs associated with EMP havebeen estimated at 10-300% of RDT & E and5-200% for procurement above the basicequipment cost/ 0 This would indicate that acompromise solution may be necessary —some hardening within the practical costrestraints and some redundancy in terms oftarget avoidance.To provide redundancy I could see a parallelcomputer system deployed at Force level whichwould automatically maintain a second datafile and be ready to update the principal(Litton Data Systems)Variable Format Message Entry Device.(Litton Data Systems)Digital Map Plotter.computers in the combat area. This solutionhas two main advantages over the traditionalmanual back-up system:• it is potentially much faster in responsetime; and• it avoids the need to maintain a manualskill which would not otherwise be practisedvery often.At battalion or equivalent level, I wouldonly see variable format message entry devices(MED). They enable the transmission ofinformation to and from task force. Messageinput can be by keyboard and reception onan associated cathode ray tube (CRT). Therecould also be a need to maintain a writtenrecord of all transactions.I would anticipate that the lowest data entrypoint, at least initially will be at company orequivalent level at which a fixed formatmessage entry device (FFMED) would belocated. This enables the company commanderto enter information into the computer in apre-determined format, but information receiptis not possible. Sensors may also be deployed

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALat this level and would feed directly into thecomputer.At headquarters at task force level andhigher, the central computer links staff officersby means of visual display units (VDU).Through these, they can:cupdate information in the central processor;• call up information from a central processor;or• pass written, graphic information or mapdata to other staff officers. This informationcan be discussed with the same displayshowing on both officers' VDUs.Change of data can be made by meansof keyboard or light pen.An immediate advantage is that the staffofficers need no longer be concentrated andthus vulnerable. Each can be located withhis VDU in widely separated areas or even indifferent locations if communications permit.This allows the commander for the first timeto set up a small tactical headquarters separatedfrom his housekeeping elements and stillretain access to all information he requires.Where the display of information on a scalelarger than is practicable on VDUs is required(such as a situation map for a conference),the central processor can be tasked to printout information on a map display unit. Wherepermanent record is required, a high speeddata printer or visual display copier is used.Combat SupportThis grouping comprises the personnel,administrative, supply and logistics functions.Principal differences to the command andcontrol system which would demand a slightlydifferent scheme are that:• it is primarily rearward orientatedwhereas the command and control systemis forward orientated;• its speed of response is not as critical;and• it routinely handles large volumes of data.The nature of these functions indicates thatthe system should preferably be interoperableor at least compatible with Defence ElectronicData Processing (EDP) systems. M The centralprocessing facility can well be located at theheadquarters of the Logistic Support Forcewith satellite processing facilities, or data entrydevices, depending on size, in depots in theCommunication Zone. A satellite processormay be deployed at divisional level. At task(Schlumberger Instruments & Systems)A military and track cassette loaded digital recorderwith a capacity of 30.1 0 6 bits.force headquarters, message entry devices withthe principal logistics and personnel officersmay suffice. At battalion or equivalent level,fixed format entry devices may be all that isnecessary.The large volume of data to be transmitteddemands a large channel capacity in the communicationssystem. Since speed is not a primerequirement, a majority of data transmissioncan be carried out by means of a computertape. This would significantly reduce costs.In 197e the US advanced Research ProjectsAgency costed the transmission of a megabitof information over 1400 miles at $(US)8.20through AUTOD1N (equivalent to a fullyautomatic transmission system), $3.30 by airmail letter, and only S0.034 by IBM tape.'-By 1973 the cost of transmission over theARPA NET had been reduced to S.30 permegabit but this still exceeded transmissionby tape by a factor of something like 10.

COVIPITERS IN THE FIETD 29General PurposeApart from command, control and thecombat support functions, there are a numbeiof others which readily adapt themselves toautomatic processing, but which do not readilyfit into the functional system. They includeterrain intelligence, survey calculations, engineer-designanalysis and others. 53Two alternative approaches may be adoptedto cater for these needs: computer centresmay be established at central locations tocater for units in the area; or major user unitsmay be provided with electronic calculations inthe price range SI00-500, or microcomputerscosting some $1000-52000 — according toneed.DedicatedFinally, there is the dedicated computerfamily. This includes weapon systems suchas the artillery computer and communicationswitching computers which are an integral partof a system. Their part in the overall schemeis well recognized and further discussion isnot necessary.I will diverge slightly if I may on the pointof fire control. As we are aware, a high degreeof co-ordination between the Services is practisedin the field of fire support and air defence.The Navy has an automated fire control systemfitted in a number of ships. The question is— would it not be logical to assist this co-ordinationby means of automatic data links withground forces?One could extend this form of reasoning toother dedicated systems, but perhaps someoneelse might take up this subject for discussion.CONCLUDING REMARKSWe will enter the computer era in the fieldby design or through inertia. Indeed, we arein the process of doing so already. A systematicapproach will lead to a better utilizationof resources and significant cost savings.The key factor to note is that we can notbuy a field computer system off-the-shelf.Hardware can be procured readily, but systemand software development demands expertise,resources, investment and time. Australia isfortunate that it possesses a relatively developedsoftware industry. However, this industryis on a small scale and fragmented; a projectof this magnitude therefore will requiremanagement co-ordination of a high order.This will be a test of our project managementability.I have not touched on work which alreadyhas been done in the Army for a particularreason — I wished to discuss the subject froma detached view-point and thus perhaps suggesta different approach.Regardless of the approach, however, Ibelieve the benefits of introducing data processingsystems in the field are well worth theeffort. I could see a system integrated withthe Defence EDP giving the field commandaccess to information sources and indeedproblem solving power well in excess of whatis within the capacity of his staff. I could notsee this detracting in any way from his functionof command; on the contrary I could seeit making his decisions more authoritative, yNOTES1 Computer system expense may be more apparentthan real. As we generally do not effectivelycost the manual systems they replace, the cost ofthe computer system as a bulk costing appearsto be large.• A. A. Sidorenko, 'The Offensive' (A Soviet View),p. 31, Col. Gen. N. A. Lomov (Editor), ScientificTechnical Progress and The Revolution in MilitaryAffairs (A Soviet View), p. 145.3 Col Alan B. Abt, 'Battlefield Computers', Army,April 1973, p. 25.4 It does not depend so much on individual judgementand thus avoids changes in informationmanagement criteria as a result of change in personnel.« RAND Report R-1011-PR Air Force Commandand Control Information Processing in the 1980s.Trends in Hardware Technology, p. 40. UNMonthly Bulletin of Statistics.6 National Computing Centre Limited, 'EconomicEvaluation of Computer Band Systems', p. 39.7 Thomas Whisler, The Impact of Computers onOrganizations,' p. 50.8 Whisler, op. cit., p. 62.'•> Abt. op. cit., p. 25.10 Whisler, op. cit., p. 93.11 'Data Loading for Military Communications,' TheLenkurt Demodulator, luly 1968.12 Maximum error rates of 1 in 10 8 or 10 9 are beingaimed, but higher error rates are becoming acceptablewith improvements in technology.« RAND Report R-1011-PR, p. 71.14 ibid, p. 75.15 C. S. Smythe. 'Minicomputers: Four-fold growthby 1975', New Scientist, 9 September 1971, p. 569.16 Private communication from Mr I. Sewell.17 George Sideris. 'Minicomputers Muscle In', ElectronicsInternational, 1 March 1973, p. 65.18 Harold, op. cit., p. 6.49 Rand Report R-1011-PR. p. 29. 174.20 lames L. Flannigan, 'Computers that Talk andListen: Man-machine Communication by Voice',Proceedings of the IEEE. April 1976, p. 414.

30 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL21 Rand Report R-1011-PR.p. 78.-'- European and Russian languages possess a redundancyof some 50%. This means that humans canextract the information content of doubtful elementsof a message by reference to the context.Computers can only recognize sound by referenceto and comparison with tables of digits. It willbe some time before this analytical ability inherentin humans can be incorporated into computers.( Mandrover. 'CRT Graphic Terminals'. 'Proceedingof the Computer Communications & DisplayConference (Proc CCDC), Sydney, 29 June1970. Sessions 2 — Paper 1. p. 1.-' Private Communications. Mr J. Sewell.25 Mandrover. op. cit., p. 18.26 Smythe, op. cit., p. 3.27 RAND Report R-1011-PR. p. 79.28 Electronics International. 16 August 1973 (A threecolour unit is estimated to cost some $125,000).2! > Abt. op. cit.. p. 23.30 Eric C. Ludvigsen 'Lifting the Fog of War', Army,July 1972. p. 30.31 Ludvigsen. op. cit., p. 31.32 Abt. op. cit., p. 24.33 Report of the Blue Ribbon Defence Panel.USACGSC Pam RB 20-5, Vol N. 1971. pc 13.Lt Col J. J. Meibusch, Automated Tactical Commandand Control; Army Journal, January 1973,p. 36.35 Electronics International, 2 August 1973. p. 44.3fiMaj James J. Stewart and Capt Merrill L. Bartlett,'Test Bed for MTACCS'. Marine Corps Gazette,January 1973. p. 26.37 'I 2 S + ADP = Marine C & C System for 1980s',Armed Forces Management, July 1970, p. 43.* *CURRENT DEFENCE READINGSReaders may find the following articles of interest.As you were strategy for Australia. (Reaction toWhite Paper on Defence) Far Eastern EconomicReview, 19 Nov 76: 15-16. (Defence systems —Australia; planning).Kangaroo two: Orange fought Blue but the Greenieswon. Aircraft, Nov 76: 14-20. (Military exercises;joint military activities).Japan opts for quality. Far Eastern EconomicReview, 19 Nov 76: 10, 15. (Defence Systems —Japan).The political role of the Army: alternating politicalallegiances (China). China News Analysis, 8 Oct 76:7p. (Army — China; Communism).U.S.: Arms — a tale of two reports. Defense andForeign Affairs Daily, 18 Nov 76. 1. (Arms control).The military in Ghanaian politics. Armx Quarterlyand Defence Journal, Oct 76: 428-439. (Defencesystems — Ghana; military forces — Ghana).Intensified Soviet civil defence seen tilting strategicbalance. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22Nov 76: 17. (Defence systems—USSR: civil defence).Russia in the Pacific. Navy International, Nov 76:12-13. (Military operations — USSR; Pacific Ocean).Disarmament issues at the UN. Backgrounder (Dept.of Foreign Affairs). 12 Nov 76: 14-16. (UnitedNations; disarmament).Hijacker, terrorist extradition sought by Council ofEurope. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 22Nov 76: 23. (Terrorism; security; international law).International terrorism; threat to U.S. security?Armed Forces Journal International. Sep 76: 38-39.(Terrorism; guerilla warfare; security).ss Stewart and Bartlett, op. cit., p. 26.'"'•'International Defence Review, February 1973, p.105.40 CII —• Compagnie Internationale pour L'lnformatique.41 Commissaire en Chef de la Marine R. Durand.'Les Armees et L'Informatique'. Forces ArmeesFrancoises, Feb 1973. p. 17.42 'Le Serpel', L'Armee, No. Ill, November-December1971, p. 94.43 Satory V Issue Forces Armees Francoises, Mav1975. p. 30.41 Hardware. The physical equipment or devicesforming a computer and peripheral equipment.4 " Software. The totality of programs and routinesused to extend the capabilities of computers suchas compilers, assemblers, narrators, routines andsubroutines."•RAND Report R-1012-PR.17 Report of the Blue Ribbon Defence Panel. USACGSC Pam RB 20-5, Vol IV. 1971. p. c5.4S There are many advantages in using current commercialprogramming languages.40 Earl Joseph. 'Towards a Fifth Generation". ScienceJournal, October 1970. p. 192.30 Rand Report R-1011-PR. p. 218.51 It is desirable on the other hand, to have the commandand control system compatible with thoseof potential allies.52 L. G. Roberts and B. D. Wessler, 'Computer Developmentto Achieve Resource Sharing', Proc CCDCSession 3 Paper 3.M A more complete listing is given in a separatepaper, prepared in 1973 entitled 'Field ADPS forthe Australian Army'.* *Defense budget to spur clash. (DOD spending planthat tops Administration target by nearly S8 billionto face stiff OMB opposition). Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 15 Nov 76: 14 + (Budgets; planning;Defence systems — US).Key decision on cruise missiles near. Aviation Weekand Space Technology, 15 Nov 76: 24-25. (Cruisemissiles; Defence systems — US).Think tanks overhauled. (A dramatic overhaul ofDoDs S279 million Federal Contract Centers hasbeen ordered . . .) Armed Forces Journal International,Sep 76: 28. (Research and development).Required reading, or expensive 'perk'? (How necessaryis it for senior defense personnel to have theirnewspapers bought for them? The Pentagon spends569,000 a year this way) Armed Forces JournalInternational, Sep 76: 20-21. (Newspapers; readingrequirements).Rationality and politics: the case of strategic theory.British Journal of International Studies, Oct 76: 293-310. (Strategic intelligence).The game of disarmament. Sweden Now, 5'1976:61-67. (Arms control; international agreements).How's Carter on defense? Air Force Times, 15 Nov76: 4. (Defence policy — US).CIAs Soviet market forecast: mixed. (Short-termprospects of the Soviet economy appear to provideno cause for substantive changes in the balancebetween military investments and consumer goods,but there is indication that the USSR's economicpicture could worsen in the next decade and thusbring on fundamental changes of the system.) AirForce Magazine, Nov 76: 64-68. (Economy — USSR;defence systems — USSR).

DEFENCE PROCUREMENTAUSTRALIAPHD. H. Eltringham, Deputy Secretary,Department of DefenceIntroductionUT^vEFENCE PROCUREMENT" is a_L/ broad and sometimes controversialtopic. Most discussion is confined to what isto be procured; little has been written on thephilosophy and methodology involved in theprocurement process in Australia. A look atthe 'how', the 'when' and the 'where' of procurementrather than the 'what', should providesome background to the problems involved.For completeness of presentation, such a lookwill include reference to the procurement"aberrations", introduced by the need to sustainand develop Australia's defence industry,and include some comment on the feasibilityof 'smoothing' Defence purchases to matchmore precisely industry's appetite.At the base of the procurement process arethe organisation created in the re-organisedDepartment of Defence and the proceduresdeveloped over the past few years to deal withthe problems of equipment procurement. Theprocedures are designed so that full value isobtained from the Defence dollar and allreasonable safeguards of propriety are observed.In all, a system of considerable complexityhas been quite deliberately established toensure that a variety of professional opinion,both military and civilian, including an 'outside'purchasing agency, and incorporating thenecessary checks and balances, is brought tobear on the equipment procurement process.Mr Eltringham joined the Department of Civil Aviationas an electronics engineer in 1946, after 3\ yearsservice in the Australian Army. After a period (1963-1969) working in the Department of Supply asDirector and then Assistant Controller of the GuidedWeapons and Electronics Branch, in 1969 he tookup the new position of First Assistant Secretary,Logistics Division (now Defence Industry & MaterielPolicy Division) in the Defence Department. He waspromoted to his present position as Deputy SecretaryC, Department of Defence, in August 1975.Defence procurement is an activity of considerablemagnitude. This can be expressedsimply in monetary terms. Defence industryoriented expenditure is incurred in the categoriesof Capital Equipment, ReplacementEquipment and Stores, and Repair and Overhaul,amounting to some $300-$400m p.a. overthe last five years, and rising to some $560mfor 1976/77. Of the total, some 60-70% wasplaced in Australia. These categories comprise:• CAPITAL EQUIPMENT, both majorand minor;• REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT ANDSTORES, including:—• WEAPONS: armaments, ammunition,explosives;— RATIONS: provisions for the Services;—• FUEL: liquid fuels and lubricants;— OTHER: spares for electrical, electronicand communications equipment,barracks equipment, clothing, airstores, transport, medical, dental, engineeringand general stores, hire ofequipment; and• REPAIR AND OVERHAUL of Serviceequipment and stores.At Figure 1 is shown a comparison of relativeexpenditure by major categories as a percentageof total expenditure on Defence Functionin recent years. Expenditure in the industry-relatedcategory since 1970/71 is shown atFigure 2.Future ExpenditureAs for future levels of procurement activity,the Minister announced on 25 May 1976 thatexpenditure on defence over the next five yearswill be about $ 12,000m at January 1976 prices.While this provides for a significant increaseover present levels, there is intensive internalcompetition for funds. Expenditure on thecategories mentioned is in competition withmanpower costs (50-60% of the total), operatingcosts and other defence function costs.

32 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALHowever, a planning objective is to increasethe amount of money spent on capital equipmentfrom a low of about 69£ in 1974/75 toabout 20% in Year 5, 1980/81.It is on the major capital equipment programthat this discussion of Defence procurementwill concentrate. This is not to say thatthe other segments are unimportant. Minorcapital items cover a wide range of acquisitionsand contribute significantly to local industryworkload. The importance of rations, fuel,munitions, spares, and the overhaul and repairof equipment is obvious. But the major equipmentcategory includes the big money itemswhich shape the capability of our forces. TheBy reason of their high cost alone, majorprojects should attract close and careful scrutinvin their formulation and execution — and theydo. Two of the criteria for determining whatconstitutes a major capital equipment arefinancial, i.e. where the estimated total projectinvestment cost, including Research and Developmentand capital cost, exceeds S5m, orwhere the unit costs of individual equipmentare estimated to exceed 5250,000. Additionally,projects are identified as major, notwithstandingthe estimated cost, where there aresignificant Defence Policy or Joint Serviceimplications or where significant capabilityimprovements or increases are provided.%1009C80706050Oilier ExpenditureEquipment Repair and _OverhaulReplacement Equipmentand StoresAdministrationDefenceNew CapitalFacilitiesEipensesEquipment3141551714135____—1331412512311123"^~-~»«912~l81191165^^^~7 __7^"""-—i12 ^ / *683 *8 *11 *6 *14*J-a403020ManpowerCosts4347505261575854*1069/7070/71 71/72 72/73 73/74FINANCIALYEAR74/75 75/76 76/77a Total Other Running Costs* Estimated ExpenditureFigure 1 : Expenditure by category as a percentage ef total expenditure on Defence Function,terms the estimated expenditure for 1976/77 will be about $2000m.Indollarprocurement decisions are different and theproblems encountered diverse. A major equipmentprocurement must not only be justifiedin terms of force structure and capability development;it should also be procured in sucha way as to maximise opportunities forDefence Industry development with emphasison future support arrangements.Defence OrganisationSome understanding of the organisationalarrangements developed within Defence tofacilitate a logical and balanced process ofconsideration of projects is a necessary prerequisiteto a discussion of considerations whichbear on the flow of a project through theDefence procurement system. As well as the

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA 3370/71CAPITAL EQUIPMENTTotal 144(Local) (67)REPLACEMENT EQUIP­MENT AND STORESTotal 162(Local) (106)REPAIR AND OVERHAULTotal 31(Local) (31)71,72140(81)170(123)39(38)72/73152(66)144(115)44(43)(SM)73/74102(50)126(96)44(43)74/75102(44)140(111)58(52)75/76162(57)171(129)67(66)76 77318 *(101))*186*(145)*72 *(65)*TOTAL(LOCAL)337 349 340 272 300 400 576 *(204) (242) (224) (189) (207) (252) (310)** Estimated ExpenditureFigure 2: Industry related expenditure on Defence Function —ture in Australian Industry is indicated in brackets1970/71-1976/77. Expendi-Locol) .three Services which originate equipmentrequirements, there are a number of departmentalDivisions involved in equipment matters.Those Divisions of particular importance inthe shaping and development of major equipmentprojects are the Force Development andAnalysis Division, the branches headed by theChiefs of Materiel for the Services and theDefence Industry and Materiel Policy Division.FDA and DIMP are responsible to the Secretaryof the Department; the Chiefs of Materielare 'two hatted' in that they have dual responsibilitiesto their individual Service Chief and tothe Secretary. At Figure 3 are brief summariesof the functions of these Divisions.FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSISDIVISIONPolicy advice for Service DepartmentalCommittees on the force structure as a wholeand on the capabilities required, includingthe nature of the forces, their support andactivities: the initiation of objective analysisof proposals for these capabilities, particularlyfor major weapon systems: advice on thebases for proposals to be brought forwardrelating to force structure and equipment:drafting of capabilities papers.DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND MATERIELPOLICY DIVISIONThe formulation and implementation ofpolicies for the development of defence capabilitiesin industry: general oversight, in consultationwith the Chiefs of Materiel, of theequipment acquisition process includingformulation of procurement strategics andmanagement arrangements, standard proceduresand guidelines; participation in theevaluation of proposals, and contractual negotiations,including responsibility for DefenceSource Definition Committee considerations,and development and implementation ofindustry involvement proposals: developmentof procurement policies including negotiationswith other Government authorities on purchasingmatters; development of stockholdingpolicies for materiel, strategic materals andequipment.CHIEFS OF MATERIELResponsible both to the Secretary (throughthe Deputy Secretary) and to the respectiveChiefs of Staff for ensuring the timely submissionof projects for Service equipment tothe various processes of analysis and presentationup to point of Government decision,working in concert with relevant divisions ofthe Department. Responsible to respectiveChiefs of Staff for management of all capitalequipment projects.Figure 3: Functions of Force Development and AnalysisDivision, Defence Industry and MaterielPolicy Division and Chiefs of Materiel.Committee StructureA number of committees figure prominentlyat key points in the progress of a projectthrough the system from initial operationalrequirements to purchase.DORCThe Defence Operational RequirementsCommittee has only recently been established.This Committee, chaired by the Assistant Chief

MDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALof Defence Force Staff, considers Service stafftargets and staff requirements against forcecapability objectives, and endorses selectedproposals for further definition and development.DFSCAnalysis leading to inclusion in the FiveYear Defence Program is initiated when theDeputy Chief of the Service concerned presentsa project Brief (DPI) for considerationby the principal Defence committees. This isa major document which sets out the equipmentsought, the basic argument for its procurement,the force capability increment provided,the timing sought, and the likely financialand manpower implications. The DPI isrequired to take account of consultation withDefence Science and Technology (DS&T) onany innovative and developmental aspects, andwith the DIMP Division on the possibleinvolvement of industry. The project is thenexamined by the Defence Force StructureCommittee (DFSC) individually and in thecontext of the FYDP.The DFSC is chaired by Deputy SecretaryB and reports to the Defence Force DevelopmentCommittee (DFDQ.DFDCThe Defence Force Development Committee(DFDC), chaired by the Secretary for Defence,has as its members the Chief of Defence ForceStaff and the three Chiefs of Staff. It considerseach of the more substantial projectsseparately and in the context of the FYDPand makes recommendations to the Minister(and he to Cabinet) on what should be includedin the FYDP. Projects in the first year of theFYDP (or Year 1) are submitted for Governmentapproval in the annual Budget Estimatesin mid-year.DSDCThe Defence Source Definition Committee(DSDC) makes recommendations on brandselection to the DFDC. This Committee'simportant role in the procurement process isdescribed in more detail below. Its chairmanis the First Assistant Secretary of the DIMPDivision and membership includes the Chiefof Materiel responsible for the project beingconsidered. The Purchasing Division, Departmentof Administrative Services is representedand a representative of the Crown Solicitor'sOffice attends as necessary.Five Year Defence ProgramNo presentation of Defence Procurementwould be complete or comprehensible withoutreference to the Five Year Rolling Program(FYRP) System which each year results in anupdated Five Year Defence Program, theFYDP. The FYDP is submitted for the considerationof the Government each year atBudget estimates time. It is the result ofdetailed consideration concerning developmentof particular force capabilities •— for the nextfive years in specific terms and more generallyfor 3 years beyond that.In order to have a basis upon which theDepartment can rationally establish priorities,options are submitted to the Government andguidance is sought as to the annual financialand manpower resources which it considersshould form the basis for planning defencefinancial allocations in each of the budgetyears over the period of the five years. Thisguidance is an essential discipline in programdevelopment.Through October to December and againin March and April of each year, the DFSCand the DFDC examine the major equipmentproposals of the Services, assessing prioritiesand implications for force capability withinthe constraints of the guidance. The Servicerequirements are refined in terms of essentialityand cost, with other options beingpursued as appropriate. Implications for thebroad infrastructure, taking account of defenceindustry, dockyards, living and working accommodation,training institutions, and forces inreadiness are assessed: and balances betweencapital and manpower, and capability contributionsare judged.An important product of this considerationis the New Major Equipment component ofthe FYDP. In this are identified the generictypes of equipment it is proposed to acquire,the year in which Government approval fora particular project will be sought, and theforecast annual expenditure phasings for eachproject.DSDCReturning to the DSDC and its importantrole in procurement, this Committee enters

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA 35ihe life of an equipment project at twoimportant points. The first is to consider theEquipment Acquisition Strategy (EAS), andthe second is to recommend a brand selectiondecision following a Single Service evaluationreport. The DSDC is responsible for therendering of objective advice on alternativesources of supply of defence equipment,including assessment of proposals for Australianindustry involvement where these aresignificant in the broader context of Defenceindustrial policy. The DSDC also acts toensure that complete propriety is, anil isdemonstrably seen to be, maintained throughoutthe tendering and selection process.Equipment- Acquisition Strategy (EAS)Past experience has shown that there is aneed to marshal those elements of the Departmentinvolved in the equipment acquisitionprocess, and have them all working in concerttoward a common objective. To do this adocument called Equipment AcquisitionStrategy (EAS) is developed by DIMP in consultationwith the Service concerned and otherDefence Central Divisions, having regard tothe special requirements of the particularproject.The primary purpose of the EAS is toestablish the strategy and general frameworkwithin which all participants are to work andall procurement activities are to be undertaken,in order to maintain the Government's bargainingposition until the final brand selectiondecision and negotiation of a contract, and soto achieve the best overall result in terms ofoperational performance, cost, delivery timescale,product support and Australian industryinvolvement. The EAS approach is flexible.It is tailored to optimise results obtainablefrom competitive situations, sole source andGovernment to Government procurement suchas the US Foreign Military Sales arrangements.The EAS defines and sets target completiondates against the major events and activitiescritical to the achievement of the plannedin-service date for the equipment. It alsoestablishes the authority and responsibility foreach step in the procurement process, andprovides the basis for the development of amore detailed Project Management andAcquisition Plan. The PMAP is developedby the Service Project Directors and coversthe project management arrangements, thespecification of particular tasks, and thenomination of those responsible for their performance,the funding and delivery programs,and major milestone review points.DSDC — Brand RecommendationSince late 1974, recommendations to theDefence Force Development Committee(DFDC on equipment brand selection havebeen the province of the Defence Source DefinitionCommittee. It is in this context that theDSDC again enters the project flow, usuallyafter completion of the detailed evaluation ofsuppliers' proposals by the Service concerned.Defence equipment, as is well known, isbecoming ever more complex, sophisticated andexpensive. The assessment of relative technologicaland contractual risks has becomeboth more important and more difficult Therelative value of competing proposals in establishingindustry support arrangements and indeveloping our industrial base needs to beconsidered. The application of detailed lifecycle costing analysis with its requirement foritem management costs, training, operating andmaintenance costs and reliability assessment,as an important factor in the selection process,has added appreciably to the complexity ofthe evaluation and review tasks.The source selection activity of the DSDCcovers a broad scope indeed. Its deliberationsinvolve complex issues which need to beresolved by those with relevant expertise, bothmilitary and civilian. At its least level ofoperation, the DSDC is a review body, attestingto the adequacy of Service evaluationrecommendations within the framework ofwider Defence policies and the comprehensivenessand objectivity of contractual negotiations.The Procurement ProcessThe chart at Figure 4, which presents theprocurement process in a little more detailis by no means exhaustive in its treatment ofactions and processes leading up to the acquisitionof new major equipment, particularly aseach project places its own specific demandson the system. It does, however, provide anoverflow in simplified terms of the proceduresinvolved in the consideration and approval ofmajor equipment projects. Individual projectswill not necessarily proceed through each stepnor is the order shown on the chart invariable.

36 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALURATES CDSCOMEHTS•.•!>•;'" • IIIDFFFNCSCttTMlMINISTEI APPIIIES \ / EOVERNMENT APPROVES \1UIPMENT PROPOSALS \ - U ACIIISiT'ON Of (EI \• twnn it w / \ CAPABILITIES /UPDATE «•:!PROJECTSH : FOB.rCTI»ESrig iitan1 J STAFF"STRAT'tV-y\PI0IEC1KmtPMn iF ROC UBEMF NT| SINGLE SERVICEEVALUATIONDSD!Ml MIST E* i \(PPRJVAl/FEASIBILITY STUDIESmccsiiv ' •*• »ADDITIONALINDUS1RIINFORMATIONPROJECTDEVELOPMENT" IIFINAL INDUSTRYPROPOS LSFINAL CONTRACTN:;OT:«TIONSORDERIPLACEDCONTRACTPERFORMANCE tCUSTOMERFigure 4: Simplified Equipment Procurement Process.As the chart shows, the Service CapabilitySummaries are derived from the StrategicAssessment and the Defence Capability Documents.The Capability Summaries set theframework from which Staff Objectives, StaffTargets and Staff Requirements are developed.These documents are progressively refinedthrough DORC, taking account of appropriatefeasibility studies, and information obtainedfrom industry.A project will enter FYRP considerationsthrough presentation of the project brief (DPI).The chart illustrates the cyclic nature of theprogram processes through which annualhigher level approval and endorsement of theFYDP by the Defence Committees, the Ministerand Cabinet are sought. It is in this annualprogram review that the detailed analysis ofthe requirement, costs, numbers and all of themany factors which go into the selection ofan equipment are considered and reconsideredin detail. It is only after successful negotiationof this critical path that machinery to obtainGovernment approval is initiated.Once Government approval to proceed withthose projects reaching the first (or Budget)year of the FYDP has been obtained, themanagement and administrative machinery ofthe Equipment Acquisition Strategy is reviewedby the DSDC and the Project Managementand Acquisition Plan updated. The finalacquisition phase is then initiated by theappropriate Chief of Materiel in concert withDIMP. This will generally involve the solicitingof formal tenders from industry, evaluationof the response by the single service andrecommendation to the DSDC, thence toDFDC, the Minister and the Cabinet. Whenall requisite approvals have been obtained theequipment is contracted on behalf of theGovernment.The placement of the order is by no meansthe end of the acquisition process. Often thetask of evaluating and progressing contractperformance and maintaining an efficient andeffective customer interface requires considerableingenuity and effort. Service ProjectDirectors, workins closely with the appropriateChief of Materiel, DIMP and the Chief ofSupply play a major role in taking a projectsuccessfully from the 'initiation' stage throughthe often difficult and complex phases to finaldelivery.Procurement and Defence IndustryIn the introduction, I mentioned the need tosustain and develop Australia's defence indus-

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA 37try. Like the equipment proposals themselves,this derives from the Strategic Assessment.wfakfa has identified a need for greaterindependence and self-reliance in Australia'sdefence. The objective is to ensure that theDefence Force can be supported and maintainedfrom within Australia in the executionof its current and foreseeable tasks.To achieve this objective, the DefenceDepartment utilises a combination of relianceupon local industry, stockholdings and relianceon overseas sources of supply judged as safe.Particular attention is given to the developmentand maintenance of a range of basictechnologies and capacities within Australianindustry, both in the Government and privatesectors. The implementation of this policy isclosely linked with equipment procurement.Our ability to achieve our objective, however,is not without constraints.Preference for Local ManufactureIn Figure 2 is shown an amount of someS400m spent on Defence equipment, storesand repair in 1975/76, of which some $250mwas spent with firms in Australia. To put thisamount in perspective, the latest availablefigures (1974/75) from the Australian Bureauof Statistics on Manufacturing Industry as awhole, show that the turnover for the industry(goods valued at factory door) was about$35,400m and value added (turnover less costof inputs or basic materials used in the manufacturingprocess) was about $15,400m. Clearly,even if all of the available Defence funds forindustry related expenditure ($400m) had beenspent in Australia, the ability to influence thedirection of industry for Defence reasons is,in economic terms at least, quite limited. Whilewe cannot support whole industries, we areable to assist small but strategically significantcapabilities in sectors of industry by beingselective.The selective application of these relativelylimited Defence equipment funds to and withinlocal industry is a primary means of implementingDefence industrial policy. Additionallythere are instances where the strategicargument for self-reliance of supply is strongenough to direct the purchase of equipmentfrom local sources. Such higher costs anddelays as may be incurred through using localsuppliers are, in both cases, accepted as alegitimate and deliberate consequence of theseactions.The penalties Defence is prepared to acceptare assessed on a case h\ case basis. Carefulconsideration is given to such factors as thereliability of the overseas source, importanceof the item to the maintenance of operationalcapabilities, lead times for supply and re-supply,technologies involved and the adequacy ofcurrent and future workload for maintenanceof the Defence industrial capability concerned.To expand a little on the question of costdifferentials, the Defence Department is sometimescriticised for purchasing from the lowestcost source to the detriment of local industry.It is argued that if we would only declareour acceptance of a specific cost penalty fromlocal industry then it could plan and competesuccessfully for orders. This proposal seemsto be loosely based on economic argumentsfor a stated level of preference for manufacturingindustry across the board.There are, of course, existing measures whichprovide some preference to Australian industry.The Government does not pay duty onits purchases but it has been the policy ofsuccessive governments and was formalised inthe early 60s that overseas bids should beweighted with the cost of freight, insuranceand the appropriate amounts for duty andprimage. This concept of applying a nationalduty is implemented by all government departmentsand instrumentalities. Also, discretioncan be exercised by a Committee of Ministersin favour of a more expensive product fromAustralian industry if this is considered to beessential to assist a depressed area or forreasons of national security.The greater part of non-specialised defencerequirements is provided from the normalcommercial production of local industry andrepresents only a small proportion of totaloutput. Here procurement need not be selectiveand source decisions can be based onnormal competitive tendering processes. Butfor specialised requirements having no commercialequivalents, or for capabilities withonly limited commercial attraction but highdefence importance, special arrangements mustbe made. Extreme examples of such arrangementsare the Government Munitions andAircraft factories and Naval dockyards.

38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThere are, as well, other not quite so specialisedrequirements generally involving hightechnology and related skills, for which somecommercial demand exists but for whichoverall demand may be so low as to threatencontinuity of production. Subsidised capabilitiesin some private firms such as themicroelectronics facility at AWA Ltd fall intothis category. To provide some relief, selectivityis exercised in directing such defenceprocurement as can be, toward the particularbeleaguered segments of industry concerned.Widely varying levels of cost disabilities maybe accepted as a legitimate cast of achievingdefence industrial objectives — penalties whichmay range from 0% to in excess of 100%.The effect of the policy of selectivity couldbe seen by some as highly distorting and prejudicialto the orderly development of industrystructure and resource flows. I wouldargue that, for defence industry, the reverseis true. Should a fixed level of preference beapplied indiscriminately, a principal means ofimplementing Defence Industrial policy wouldbe eliminated. Local production of equipmentitems of low defence significance and minimalcost disability would be encouraged, but wewould be precluded from entering into localdevelopment or limited manufacture of thestrategically more important, but significantlycost-disadvantaged items. Not only wouldthis result in misallocations of scarce Defenceresources, but our ability to introduce strategicallyimportant and industrially desirable hightechnology skills and capabilities into Australianindustry would be lost.This does not mean, of course, that any costpenalty is automatically accepted, no matterwhat the level. It was decided, for instance,not to manufacture the Leopard tanks inAustralia. Not only would the cost penaltieshave been great, but there was no prospectiveflow-on workload to exercise a very costlycapability. But serious consideration will begiven to local involvement in the proposedTactical Transport Aircraft, the replacementJet Trainer and the Tactical Fighter ForceAircraft, although cost and time penalties aremost probable.Where equipment must be purchased fromoverseas sources, strenuous efforts are madeto obtain a useful level and nature of localindustrial involvement, with emphasis ondefence industry. This may be directed towardspartial manufacture of the equipment, manufactureof less complex items, the productionof subsystems and ammunition, and the provisionof high usage spares. Where localinvolvement in the project itself cannot beaccomplished, provision is made, throughparticular contracting arrangements, for suitableoffset work to be offered to Australianindustry on a competitive basis. The pursuitof these objectives is in keeping with theGovernment's policy of seeking AustralianIndustry Participation (AIP) in overseas purchasesby government departments and instrumentalities.Stability of Defence ProcurementNow, as mentioned at the outset, I willtouch on the problems sometimes created inindustries which are largely dependent onDefence workload by "unsuitable" orderingschedules. The resultant peaks and troughsin workload militate against the retention ofskills and efficient operation.The FYDP system, with its capability offoreshadowing the initiation of projects up to5 years ahead, is of considerable value in thatit allows projects, to a certain extent, to betimed to take account of workload fluctuationsin industry. But the primary purpose of theFYDP system is to facilitate the developmentof force capabilities in response to strategicassessment.As well, there are the difficultiesinherent in reprogramming projects such asthe Tactical Fighter Force or the FFG whichwill make substantial demands on the resourceslikely to be available. It should be clear thatthere are limits to the variations in timingpossible to assist industry which are set byboth capability requirements and resourceconstraints.Another point of concern to industry is theapparent lack of stability in Defence procurement.There will inevitably be a number ofprojects where the information which can bereleased early in the program cycle will bevaried as the project matures. Some projectswill be cancelled. Our dilemma is to bringlocal industry in early enough to give it everyopportunity to participate allowing for thelong lead times inherent in most defence equip-

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT IN AUSTRALIA 39ment projects and yet avoid the generation ofexcessive momentum too early. Competitivefunded contract definition exercises are usedincreasingly in large projects to cover explorationsof feasibility and project developmentby industry to reduce nugatory work andrefine the requirement. There is no simple orabsolute answer to the problem, but it isessential that means be adopted to ensure thatboth industry and Defence understand andrespond, each to the problems of the other.ConclusionOver the years the word 'procurement' hascome to embrace a considerable breadth ofactivity. It spans the totality of actions andconsiderations involved in the many stages ofa project. It starts at the 'gleam in the eye'stage; carries through the generic identificationof equipment based on the force capabilityrequirements; development of staff requirementsand specifications; program acceptance:generic approval; tendering; evaluation; sourcedefinitions; brand name recommendations andapproval; production; trials and finally deliveryto the Service.CURRENT DEFENCE READINGSReaders may find the following articles of interest.Foreign policy decision making: the case of Canadaand nuclear weapons. World Politics, Oct 76: 29-66.(Foreign policy — Canada; nuclear warfare).Russia's "relentless" arms build-up. (Interview withGen. Haig, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe).U.S. News and World Report, 17 Jan 77: 35-37.(Strategy — USSR; arms control; military forces— USSR).The Soviet threat and US strategic alternatives. (USAir Force Chief of Staff expresses concern overemphasis placed by Soviets on military expansion,and discusses implications of US strategic posturealternatives.) Air Force Magazine, Nov 76: 38-41.(Strategy — USSR; defence systems — US; threats).Soviet naval doctrine and Soviet politics. 1953-1975.World Politics, Oct 76: 90-113. (Navy — USSR;defence policy — USSR).Civilian combat casualties: our moral and legalresponsibilities. Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 76: 43-46. (Civilian population; casualties; military law;human rights).Is military unionization an idea whose time hascome? USNI Proceedings, Nov 76: 36-44. (Unions;naval personnel).USAF's crusade to streamline industrial production.Air Force Magazine, Oct 76: 62-67. (Air force —US; defence industry — US; aerospace industry).The educational background and training of Sovietair force officers. Roval Air Forces' Quarterly.Winter 1976: 333-341. (Air force — USSR: militarytraining).Defence procurement raises many problemsin seemingly unrelated areas. Simplistically, itis concerned with acquiring for the Servicesthe equipment best able to meet operationalrequirements. But. to be effective, an equipmentmust also be provided with necessarysupport and maintenance throughout its inservicelife. An independent defence capabilityrequires that such support and maintenanceshould, as far as possible, be provided by ourown industry, which must therefore also besupported. And, of course, at the same timewe are constrained by budgetary limitations.The selection of equipment for the Servicesis a complex, demanding and time-consumingactivity, requiring expert consideration from avariety of disciplines. The procedures set upwithin the Defence Department are designedto ensure that recommendations made to theMinister and the Government on the purchaseof a particular item of equipment, its supplyby a particular organisation, and its suitabilityto meet an assessed requirement are all exposedto thorough scrutiny by the various elementsof a system established within the Departmentof Defence to carry out these tasks. Q• *Officer training in the Royal Air Force. Royal AirForces' Quarterly, Winter 1976: 324-330. (Air force— UK; military training; group dynamics; attitudes(psychology)).Women and their new role in the Air Force. AirForce Magazine, Oct 76: 56-60. (Women; air force— US).Dynamic doctrine for dynamic defense. (In praiseof FM 100-5, and with comments on the Lindcritique) Armed Forces Journal International, Oct76: 28-29.The Need to know. Military Review, Sep 76: 45-55.(Intelligence; Military intelligence).The geostrategic triangle of North-East Asia. Nato'sFifteen Nations, Aug-Sep 76: 68-73. (Defence missions— U.S.: Pacific Ocean).Danish security policy. Nato Review, Oct 76: 3-5.(International securitv; Defence systems — Denmark:NATO).The "militarization" of Soviet society. Problems ofCommunism, Sep Oct 76: 34-51. (Civil defence;Communism; Military training).The Defence White Paper. (Dr F. A. Mediansky)Pacific Defence Reporter. Dec'Jan 76/7: 9-13.(Defence systems — Australia; Strategic assessment;Planning).Military surveillance. Part 1: means and methods.(Barracudaverken AB of Sweden) Pacific DefenceReporter, Dec'Jan 76/7: 82-84. (Combat surveillance;Military equipment).NATO and the dawn of new technologv. Defenseand Foreign Affairs, 11 '1976: 18-25. (NATO; Nuclearweapons.

40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL/"*/r rV./"V.v—./.^... Wrf 1 *Peking* CT ,%**-Tsmgtaoy^^LienPEOPLES REPUBLICOF CHINAShanghai^ -. . *«0i«Chousnan oTahsiehtao \^FLEETITAIWAN1//aft.m

THE NAVY OF• -"-3^. „-THE PEOPfcES REPUBblGOF CHINA 1976-1977Lieutenant A. H. I.onghurstAustralian Intelligence CorpsTHE maintenance and exercise of navalpower is one of the prime forces in thehistory of Europe and the Western World.Indeed, the use or display of naval strengthhas traditionally evoked reactions of an ordernot accorded other forms of conflict. Westernnations have long held the seas, and theirstrength upon them, in an emotional and almostmystical regard. The Navy is the personificationof national pride and power. Chinais a great power and a maritime nation butshe is not a great naval power. By Westernstandards this is a contradiction in terms.Chinese naval philosophy and conduct mustbe considered in relation to her historicalexperience and her present territorial andregional requirements. The aims of this articleare:° to discuss the evolution and present stateof the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)Navy and to give some considerationto its future needs and tasks; and• to summarise current statistics concerningthe PRC Navy.The Maritime TraditionMagellan, Da Gama, Columbus and Drakeare all names that have a special place in theEuropean naval tradition. Their expeditionsprompted five centuries of continuous maritimeinvestment by the nations of Europe andincidentally assured European world domina-Lieutcnant Longhurst joined the Army in 1968 andserved in the Australian Intelligence Corps. Heattended OCS Portsea, graduating in 1970 into theAust Int Corps. In 1971172 he served on regimentalattachment with the 1st Battalion Royal AustralianRegiment as Platoon Commander, Company 2icand Battalion Intelligence Officer. In 1973 heattended the RAAF School of Languages, PointCook. He is currently S03 (Int) 4 Military District,Adelaide.tion for much of that time. Naval science asit is today can trace its lineage back to thefrail craft that crossed the oceans in thosedays. These 15th and 16th century voyagesare often thought to mark the world's firstproper nationally sponsored voyages of discoveryand thus the beginnings of a true navaltradition. In fact China can claim to have theworld's oldest continuous naval tradition,albeit a coastal one, dating back some twothousand years. In more recent times, threegenerations before Columbus' discovery of theAmericas, the Chinese conducted voyages ofexploration, some as far distant as East Africaand northern Australia.In the 15th Century, China, under the MingEmperor Yung Lo, reversed the policy ofcenturies and actively used the sea as a mediumfor imposing Chinese influence on the landsof South East Asia. Between AD 1405 and 1433at least seven major expeditions of explorationand power projection were mounted underthe command of Cheng Ho, a eunuch of theMing Court. The first voyages were restrictedto the South East Asian region where Cheng Hosucceeded in demanding submission and tributeof the local rulers. It is from this time thatthe important port of Malacca on the MalayPeninsula came under direct Chinese influence.For almost a century, until the comingof the Portuguese. Malacca served as a forwardmerchant and naval base for the Chinese.These early versions of gunboat diplomacywere no mean affairs; no expense was spared,vessels suitable for the high seas were constructedand the fleets carried upwards of sixtyor seventy thousand men. Later these expeditionsextended as far west as East Africa andas far south as Timor and Darwin. For a fewyears the Chinese were virtual masters of theTndian Ocean. Had these expeditions beenfollowed through by colonisation or some

42 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALother more permanent form of political oreconomic activity, Asian history would havebeen taken a different course. However, thesemaritime achievements were an aberration notto be repeated. A concerned Civil Service,which for its own reasons did not favour thesepolicies, instead guided Imperial attention backto its "correct" view — inwards.Despite these early expeditions the Chinesenever really developed a true deep sea traditionin the Portuguese or British sense. Navalscience and modern shipping are the inventionsof nations with great maritime interestsand investments. As European influence grewin Asia and because China under the Manchusignored the sea, Chinese maritime trade increasinglybecame the province of foreign exploitiveforces. In more recent times and in contrastto China, Japan tried to catch up with foreigntechnology and became a force in the region.A history of internal preoccupation, economicand military domination by foreigners andlatterly, a regional dominance by ImperialJapan are all factors which have inhibitedChinese naval power and only in recent timeshas this changed.The People's NovyIn 1949 the new regime in Peking was leftwith very little in the way of naval forces. Thewithdrawal of Kuomintang naval forces toTaiwan had been accomplished in good orderand most vessels left behind were those thatwere either too old and decrepit or disabled(by war action or by being in dockyard hands).Indeed, the withdrawal of what was in effectthe Chinese Navy to Taiwan left the mainlandregime with few experienced personnel andthis resulted in the wholesale transfer ofsoldiers of all ranks to a new service — thePRC Navy. The PRC appreciation of immediatenaval tasks was twofold. First the navyhad an urgent requirement to defend the coastsagainst any Kuomintang and US militaryefforts against the mainland. The second wasa security and coastguard force for what washenceforth to be a closed border. This appreciationreflected the most immediate nationaldefence task in relation to the Navy. It wasin fact a recognition that there was no otherrealistic alternative in view of the inventoryavailable and potential. This reasoning tooreflected a continental psychology, where theocean was regarded as a barrier rather thana tactical and strategic medium. Such anappraisal was in keeping with the MiddleKingdom's traditional continental preoccupationand with Mao Tse Tung's land-basedstrategy of war.The Chinese attitude towards naval poweris worthy of further comment. China hasalways had maritime trade links within herregion. At various times in the past she hasextended these links to Europe via the Arabworld. In contrast to the European experienceChina has never felt obliged to provide supportand protection to the merchant marineby means of effective naval forces. China hasalways been insulated and self sufficient andin the past has never felt that national survivalis dependent on maritime trade. The minorplace accorded naval power as an ingredientof national power is a theme seen throughoutthe past and Mao's China is not completelyfree of it (in this sense it is ironic that Maowas called the "Great Helmsman"). In theirdealings with the rest of the world the Chineseexhibit the continuity of an ancient self-centredvision of themselves. "Within the four seasall men are brothers" is a Confucian epigramwhich obtains today. The seas are of coursethose of the China shore, not those which inthe European culture would be taken to meanthe seas that enclose all Mankind. Beyondthe physical and cultural bounds of China isBarbarism, and the oceans have long servedas tangible evidence of this barrier. Mao'swar carries with it the authority of centuries,a proven conviction that the land is the deci-Golf SSBM(Jane's FightingShips)

THE NAVY OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 1976-1977 43sive arena and that the sea is a minor theatrewhich will do little to shift the balance andfortunes of war (the generic term for the PRCmilitary forces is the Peoples liberation Arms(PL.A), in itself an illustration of this attitude).A Navy is a technological instrument and onethat is not readily open to improvisation andexpansion as are the ground forces. This jarredwith the classic Maoist dictum that the Peoplecan surmount almost any threat — that peopleare more important than machines. When theCommunist forces won the Chinese Civil Warthe leadership were acutely aware of the needto transform a massive semi-guerrilla armyinto a modern military force with effectiveground, air and naval services. How this wasto be achieved has been a source of continuingtension and argument within the military/political establishment. This subject is a conflictbetween the military and the politicalelements of the establishment, between generationsand differing views as to what are thecorrect directions of military doctrine andpractice. History is a heavy burden particularlyfor old cultures, the above are someaspects of China's historical experience andmilitary philosophy affecting the developmentof the PRC Navy.The PRC could not dispute the need fornaval power and the demands of modern warand urgent attempts were made to obtain combatants,including western units. Soviet Russiaassisted in the development of the PRC Navyand it was with its aid and advice that thefleet expanded. Russian experience and doctrinestressed that as a first requirement thehome coasts must be secured (i.e. primarilya task for light forces) before more ambitiousnaval building could be undertaken. In accordancewith this advice, the Chinese initiallyconcentrated upon equipping the navy withlight patrol and submarine forces. Severaltypes of combatant vessels were transferred toChina from Russia but the main emphasis wason self sufficiency. Soviet vessels, their Chinesecopies and derivations, now form the bulk ofthe fleet and China now has a potent navyreasonably well equipped to carry out thebasic task of defending the mainland. It is,however, an overwhelmingly defensive forceof light combatants and patrol submarines andit is only in the last few years that China hasseriously attempted to augment her deep seaRiga FFijane's Fighting Ships)capabilities. In tribute to this defensive policyit is probably true to say that the Soviet andChinese (as well as the North Korean) coastlinesare the most intensely defended in history.Soviet guidance did tend to play down theneed for larger combatants in the PRC Navy.It is significant that a large proportion ofmajor combatants built since 1949 were builtafter the Sino-Soviet split. This is in part dueto the state of the Chinese shipbuilding industryat the time and the economic situation ingeneral, but also possibly because of China'sinterpretation of her naval role. A morecynical view is that the Soviets did not want tocreate a navy commensurate with China'sstature and potential and that it was preferablethat China did not exert too much navalinfluence in her regional sea and ocean areas.Certainly the spilt was to some extent due toa Chinese conviction that Russian interestswere not necessarily those of China and thatthis was evident in many areas of their relations.Conventional Naval Developmentsafter the Sino-Soviet SplitBy modern standards most major PRC navalunits are fairly old and out of date, both inage and design, some units date back to beforethe Second World War. In line with theChinese and Maoist preference for self sufficiency(Mao's "walking on two legs"), mostof these vessels have undergone extensivemodernisation and most are still in service.A shift towards larger combatants and a true"blue water" capability (although in no wayimplying a global capability or ambition)became noticeable in the late sixties when Lin

44 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALPiao, the then Defence Minister, initiatedseveral far reaching defence development programmes.The PLA had been aware of its militaryshortcomings for some time and by the latesixties these could no longer be ignored. TheChinese attempt at preserving territorialintegrity in the face of Soviet provocationduring the Damanski Island and other borderincidents in 1969 ended in humiliation forthe Chinese. Mao's war had its limitations —modern war against a modern enemy requiredmodern weapons and doctrines. This fact wasbrought home to Mao Tse Tung and the PRCleadership. It was apparent that defence capabilitieswere woefully inadequate, especially inrespect of equipments and technology. Althoughthe border troubles were yet again a continentalexperience for the Chinese their resulting"War Preparations Campaign" did bearsome fruit for the navy. However, inherentlylong lean times in construction together withpolitical developments, significantly reducedthe original scope of the conventional buildingprogramme.The construction programme stressed thebuilding of larger combatants and provensmaller class designs. Newly built units nowin service include Luta Class Destroyers(described in Jane's as a Guided MissileDestroyer DDG), the Kiangtung Class Frigate.Ming Class patrol submarines as well as moreof the older Soviet Romeo patrol submarines.The light forces saw an increase and improvementespecially in guided missile and hydrofoilfast patrol boats (FPB) as well as theChinese designed Hainan Class light corvette— a replacement for the older Soviet KronshtadtClass. The PRC probably has thelargest force of small combatants in the worldand the third largest submarine force.Some observers have rated various newdesigns e.g. the Luta DD and Ming SS as verygood. While true within certain limits thesejudgements should be tempered with caution.The Luta Destroyer for example borrowsGeneral StaffDepartmentArmy Navy AirfcNaval HQPekingP R C NA FXNorth Sea FleetrEast Sea Fleet11South Sea FleetTSHORE ESTABLISHMENTS AND FORCES AFLOATBASIC ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PRC NAVY

THE NAVY OF THE PEOPLES REPl BLIC OF CHINA. 1976-1977 43heavily for inspiration from the Soviet KotlinClass of destroyers. The Kotlin was built inthe mid fifties and was regarded as the workhorseof the fleet; it is now out of date. TheLuta represents a new Chinese unit based ona proven design and in Chinese terms is astep forward. The Ming submarine appearsto be an indigenous design but only two appearto have been built in the last six years. Inconstruction terms this is almost a standstillespecially when considering the older RomeoClass is being built at a rate of at least six peryear. This may be due to a lack of suitablyexperienced construction personnel and facilities(submarine construction is a specialisedbusiness and most resources may be investedin the Romeo SS and strategic submarine constructionprogrammes) or, because the Minghas not been a satisfactory design. Almostall Chinese combatant designs have theirgenesis in the nineteen fifties (if not before).Osa PTGThe naval building programme has sloweddown appreciably in recent years and it maybe significant that 1972 is said to mark thebeginning of this reduction. Lin Piao"s deathin late 1971 meant several changes for thePL A as a whole and the naval expansionappears to have been a casualty of that atlairand the reappraisal it engendered. There wereother reasons too. Ideological disputes withinthe PRC hierarchy resulted in confusion inthe lower echelons of government and industry.The effects of the Cultural Revolution are stillfelt in industry. The defence area too hasbeen an ideological battleground betweenthose that favour professional expertise andthose that put a premium on political "redness";the former supported by Chou En Laiand his protege Teng Hsiao Ping who werethemselves exponents of pragmatism at theexpense of dogma. These are all factors thathave led to a slowdown in the defence technologicalsector. There appears to be a shiftback to pragmatism in the post Mao era. HuaKuo Feng, the new Chairman, has put emphasison efficiency, diligence, more work and lesspolitics as watchwords for the future. Theseare in effect the same sentiments the presentlydisgraced Teng Hsiao Ping put forward. Thechanging status of the "moderates" and thepossible rehabilitation of Teng all hint towardsthis trend. A conundrum that has plaguedChinese military theorists since at least theKorean War has been the question of howmuch should be borrowed from outside in thedevelopment of the PLA. The death of MaoTse Tung may now make it easier for foreigntechnology and doctrine to be borrowed.Chinese interest in foreign equipments andtechnology has increased in recent times. Ifthis trend continues it bodes well for the PLAand especially the navy.The Strategic Naval Building ProgrammeConcurrent with the conventional constructionprogramme was a continuing efforttowards developing missile carrying submarinesand a nuclear powered submarine force. TheGolf Class SSBM test project started in theearly sixties with either a hull or plans or bothacquired from the Soviets before the split. Itis possible that the Golf Class submarine isa testbed for an indigenously designed submarinerather than being the final design itself.Whether the missile submarine will be nuclearor diesel powered is not yet clear. If it is tobe nuclear powered the vessel may be basedon the Han Class SSN. This Chinese designedsubmarine is thought to have had some developmentproblems which have delayed theattainment of a nuclear powered submarineforce. The Han Class is presently configuredas a torpedo firing craft and a second Hanmay possibly be under construction or undergoingtrials. The strategic missile developmentprogramme is continuing and although all(Jane's Fighting Ship 1 -)Shanghai PGM

46 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALpresent systems are liquid fuelled, attemptsare being made to produce a solid propellant.Some observers expect an operational missilecarrying submarine by at least the mid 1980s.Strategic Force subordinationIt is important to draw a distinction betweenimprovements made to the conventional navalforces and the development of the strategicseaborne missile forces. It is not knownwhether the latter are even a part of the Navyalthough naval personnel and other facilitieswould almost certainly be made available.Land based strategic missiles, their developmentand deployment are the responsibility ofa separate military strategic missile forceknown as the Second Artillery. It is conceivablethat the development, operation anddeployment of seaborne missile forces wouldbe the responsibility of this organisation.Romeo SS..... -^SjsT->S5Mw«»¥~g_^ •_"•"(Jane's FightingShips)Naval AirPRC Naval Air is ground based and whileit may look effective 1 it is not adequate tocarry out its job. The naval air force at presentis predominantly a defensive coastal arm andlacks a proper ASW capability. Naval fightersare integrated into the PRC air defence systemand this must throw doubt on their trainingfor and their availability to naval operations.Many aircraft were never designed for a navalrole. Some aircraft types are old and comingto the end of their operational lives.As the Chinese perceive their naval responsibilitiesextending to the deep waters of theirown region and near areas of neighbouringoceans, so a requirement for a ship borneaircraft presents itself. The P.R.C. have showninterest in several types of helicopter as wellas the Hawker Harrier VTOL aircraft both ofwhich may be used to satisfy this role. TheVTOL Harrier has many advantages on its1 Naval Airforces: 500 MiG-17, MiG-19/F-6 andF-9 fighters, 100 11-28 torpedo and Lu-2 lightbombers, 50 Mi-4 Hound helicopters as well asa variety of flying boats and other aircraft.side particularly the fact that it is well suitedto a maritime environment where normal airfieldfacilities are not available. VTOL aircraftand helicopters generally offer navies suchas this a convenient and reasonably cheapavenue to embarked airpower. At a pinch(and as a very temporary measure) it wouldbe possible to embark the Harrier on unitsalready on the inventory with few majorchanges to their configuration.Future extended naval missions, antisubmarinewarfare considerations and coastaland offshore island patrol roles all demandnew choices of naval aircraft and doctrines.Present ConsiderationsWhat China is and what happens inside itis almost all known by a process of inference;conclusions are often drawn upon circumstantialevidence — it is truly a picture of reflections.Travellers' tales, press reports, Chineseinterests and enquiries are all examined fortheir potential information and insights. Fromthe evidence, the following areas can be definedas those that require greater emphasis sincethey are areas of continuing naval weakness:• PRC offshore interests and territorialclaims in the South China Sea requirean expansion of large combatant forcesor at least a qualitative improvement;• nuclear force survival depends on thedevelopment of a submarine borne missileforce;• submarine forces need to be modernised;• anti-submarine forces and equipmentsare ineffective;° logistic and amphibious warfare forcesare not sufficient or effective for futureresponsibilities in offshore areas or, toprovide a military solution to the Taiwanproblem; and• Naval Air forces need to be modernisedand integrated with naval tactical doctrines.In other words, the inadequacies perceived inthe sixties remain.Many of China's naval shortcomings wereglimpsed in the naval action which confirmedher sovereignty over the Hsisha (Paracel)Islands in January 1974. In this action againstSouth Vietnamese forces, militia and armed

THE NAVY OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 1976-1977 47fishing junks apparently augmented regularnaval and air forces. The presence of theseparamilitary elements was probably a case ofnecessity rather than as a result of some formof propaganda motive or altruistic display ofPeople/Soldier solidarity. The Paracel's Incidentprobably represented the limits of effectivePRC military operations. China does nothave very much experience of naval combinedoperations and the action in the Hsishas wasprobably the first "live" action of this sortsince the '"liberation" of Hainan Island duringthe Civil War, neither of which are truly representativeof the art. That China does not havethe expertise is almost solely due to her militaryhistory and her continental experience.Since this incident other islands in the SouthChina Sea, notably the Nansha (Spratley)Group, have been a point of public contentionbetween the PRC and other nations in thearea. Elsewhere, the Senkaku Islands locatedbetween Okinawa and Taiwan, have beenclaimed by the Japanese, Taiwanese andChinese. Any military solution by the Chinese,of the Spratley situation for example, wouldrequire an improvement of their existing forcesand capabilities.The present inventory of major forces andunits of the PRC Navy is shown as Table 1and selected statistics of the vessels are givenin Table 2. It is evident from the figures thatthe great strengths of the navy rest with thelight forces; for example there are at least 120missile guided missile FPBs deployed along theChinese coast. Modernisations and new constructionsfavour a missle/gun mix and it isnot unreasonable to expect, given freer contactwith western technology, that weapon qualityand potency will improve markedly. Theseunits however, in western terms, are out ofdate and highly vulnerable since they appearto lack any realistic concession to countermissileor ECM facilities. Further, althoughsome vessels may qualify as guided missileunits (e.g. Luta or Gordy Class DD) theirdesignation as such would be a courtesy only.Little is known of their target acquisition andfire control systems but a safe generalisationwould be that they are not up to modernWestern or Soviet standards. The basic missilesystem employed is the SSN-2 (Styx) typewhich, although widespread and used by manynavies, is fairly old and not the equal of modernsystems. Speed, reliability, flexibility and potencyof offensive weapons, especially missiles,must be suspect or at least considered inferiorto those in service with most modern navies.Any confrontation with a "state of the Art"naval force would very likely result in someembarrassment for the PRC units involved.This possibility is distant at present since theonly resident forces in the region that couldoffer this kind of expertise are the US 7thFleet, and possibly Taiwan and Japan, noneof which should expect such a confrontationin the near future. One force which doesworry China is the Soviet Far East Fleet basedat Vladivostok. 2 This fleet has not really madeits presence felt in the China seas although theubiquitous Intelligence Collection vessels (AGI)are no doubt active there as elsewhere.The FutureTable 3 gives a breakdown of combatanttransfers by China to various navies aroundLuta DD(Jane's FightingShips)the world. If these figures are read in conjunctionwith the construction rates given inTable 1 the following may be inferred:• the Chinese believe the Huchwan ClassPTH and Shanghai Class PGM to beproven craft; these are now being builtsurplus to requirements;° the 599-ton corvette (Hainan Class PC)and guided missile FPBs (Osa/Hola andKomar/Hoku Class) building programmeshave not yet satisfied localdemand. Transfers of these craft toother navies may indicate that buildinghas caught up with demand; and- The Soviet Far East Fleet. Strength can vary andestimates differ but lie somewhere between thefollowing;A Japanese Naval Source: 2.300 aircraft; about110 submarines including some 36 nuclear poweredand about 48 missile submarines; about 60 GuidedMissile major combatants; about 47 AGI someof which may be other subordinations co-optedfor the task.IISS London: 74 submarines (about 30 nuclearpowered); 57 major combatants.

48 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL° apart from a continuing effort to upgradelogistic/amphibious warfare forces andthe winding down of the Luta DD programme,the Chinese appear to haveopted for a policy of qualitative improvementof existing major combatants ratherthan a quantitative expansion.China's Merchant Marine is extensive. Forprobably the first time in her history Chinamust consider the safety and continued operationof her merchant fleet as being directlylinked with the national safety and wellbeing.Within the region at least, China is on theverge of being realistically able to offer supportand protection to her merchant marine.The potentials of a new militancy shown bysmall coastal states regarding the use of thesea and latent tensions with her regionalneighbours are not lost on China. Recentmaps published by the PRC show territorialclaims in the South China Sea extending almostto the Malay Peninsula (see map). Oil andmineral exploitation of the coastal and continentalshelf areas demand naval participationand protection. Some of the areas of the SouthChina Sea are being exploited by other regionalnations i.e. Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan and thePhilippines: these areas are within the seazone claimed by China. In fact, the claimedarea is potentially rich in all manner of naturalVessel Type(a)Destroyers DDFrigates FFPatrol EscortsSubmarines NCorvettes PCSSBMPatrolFast Patrol Boats GMTorpedoFast Patrol Boat GunMinesweepers OceanCoastalAmphibious Warfare,'Logistic MajorInService(b)81013(?)11613912024043816648Minor 465441451111221362415606010060803455040316j415Vessel Class(c)LutaGordyKiantungRigaKiangnanVariousHanGolfEx Soviet M-V.. „ S-lMingSoviet Whiskey„ RomeoSoviet KronshtadtHainanOsa'HolaKamar/HokuHuchwanSoviet P-4P-6ShanghaiSwatowWhampoaShantungSoviet T-43Ex Japanese AMSEx US YMSLST18 LSM15 LSIL15 LCT450 LCMUnderConstruction(d)31AssumedAnnualRate(e)Remarks(f)Commissioned 1971-731939-43 transf'dfrom USSR 1954-519741958-591967-69WWII vintage, most in serviceand in good conditionSecond Han in constructiontrials assumedAn operational SSBM (or SSBN?)is anticipated by mid 1980sover 30 yrs old, for trainingentered service 1974-5?assembled in China 1956-646 building began early/mid 60s6 Sov 1950-3, rest in Chinatill 19574 building started 1963-410 Soviet/PRC, first in svc 196510 ., /10 PRC design, first built 195610-20 several versions, 1959-built late 1950spossibly one or two moretwo transferred toVietnam4 indigenous design hasbeen built since 1971Comment: The above does not include numerous minor coastal'river patrol craft, oceanographic researchvessels, many auxiliaries and paramilitary craft e.g. armed junks.TABLE 1—VESSELS AND UNITS OF THE PRC NAVY

THE NAVY OF THE PEOPLES REPL BLIC OF CHINA. 1976-1977 49MANPOWER: Navy estimates vary 114-217,000 personnelMarines „ „ 28-38,000Naval Air „ „ 20-30.000DEPLOYMENT: North Sea Fleet. Extending from the Yalu River to Lienyun Bay (i.e. coasts of Liaoning.Tientsin and Shantung provinces). Main bases at Luta, Lushun and Tsingtao. The LushunLota military industrial area on the Liaotung Peninsula is close to the Chinese industrialheartland of north eastern China. The Pohai Gulf, almost enclosed by the Liaotung andShantung peninsula arms, offers a secure sea area. These factors tend to make the NorthSea Fleet one of the main centres of naval research and development. At least 150 combatantvessels of various types are deployed in the fleet area. There are shipyards on theLiaotung Peninsula.East Sea Fleet. Extending from Lienyun Bay to Chaoan Bay (i.e. coasts of Chiangsu.Chechiang and Fuchien provinces). Main bases are in the Shanghai area at Shanghai.Tashich and Choushan. This fleet area, which faces the Taiwan Straits, has been knownin the past as the "front line fleet" and at least 400 combatant vessels of various typesarc deployed in the area. There are shipyards in the Shanghai area.South Sea Fleet. Extends from Chaoan Bay including offshore islands to the Vietnameseborder (i.e. coasts of Kuangtung, Kuanghsi provinces. Hainan Island and the Hsisha Archipelago).Main bases are at Huang Pu (Kuangchou Canton), Chanchiang and Yulin. Thisfleet has the most extensive patrol responsibility of the three fleets. Fleet responsibilitynow extends over 400 miles south from the mainland to the Hsisha Group. If and whenChina realises her claims in the South China Sea, so the importance of the fleet willincrease and so too the number of combatants allocated to it. There are at least 150combatant vessels of various types deployed in the fleet area and there are shipyards atKuangchou.(Jane's Fighting Ships iUS 1 Class LSTresources and China must become a navalpower in the region at least to the extent thatshe has the ability to resolve the situationmilitarily if needs be and, subsequently, assumethe inherent naval supervisory roles and tasks.To achieve this, "blue water" capabilities willbe emphasised and naval and other militaryforces will be improved to make them operationallyeffective at least to the limits of territorialclaims.There is no doubt that the Soviet Indianand Pacific Ocean fleets concern the Chinese.There is too the ever present possibility thatVietnamese shore facilities may be allowedthe Soviets at some time in the near future.Vietnam lays claim to part of the HsishaIslands archipelago and also to some of theislands in the Spratley Group and they donot consider as valid some of the sea claimsmade by China. Add to this hints of tension(Jane's Fighting Ships)Huchwan PTHand bad relations on the land border andthere is great potential for trouble in the area.Chinese freedom of manoeuvre may be limitedif there is a permanent Soviet naval forcebased on the Vietnamese coast. The Chinesedo not as yet appear to have reacted to theSoviet naval presence in Asia in naval terms.It would seem that they believe it does notaffect their situation vis-a-vis their landborders. To react to any Soviet naval activitywould not help matters and merely open upanother dimension of potential conflict.In comparison with other world powersChina is the most introverted and reluctantto assume a global military presence. ModernChina has proved in the past that when sheis able she will prosecute her territorial claimsto the fullest military extent, at the same timeshe has shown very little interest in what shedoes not feel she can legitimately claim. Chinahas displayed little inclination to extend hernaval forces beyond her own coastal watersand apart from possible future activity in the

50 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALChina seas does not appear to wish to. It isdifficult to see what may change this state ofaffairs. India fears an "out of region" Chinesenaval base, for example one in Pakistan. However,it is doubtful if any subsequent Sino-Pakistani naval venture would decisively alterthe fndo-Pakistani military balance (or serveChinese interests). An offer of a base on theIndian Ocean littoral (e.g. Tanzania or Pakistan)would tempt many other great powersbut would probably find the Chinese uninterested.Threats to territorial claims or maritimelines of communication (unless close to home)would in all probability have to be solved bynon military means. The classic enticementsfor external military (naval) policies andactions such as those above would be unlikelyto find favour with the Chinese. Past andpresent indications would rule out such radicalchanges to PRC foreign and naval policies.There is one possible near term exceptionto the proposition that the PRC will not involveitself in any overt use of naval power (for theforeseeable future at any rate) and that is thequestion of the South China Sea claims. Chinaattempts to resolve her international problemsin a legal manner utilising the recognizedchannels and forums for this purpose. In theHsisha conflict China was hampered by thefact that she did not recognise the South Vietnameseregime. The normal political processeswere not available and yet the situation hadVesselLuta DDDisplacementstd full3250 3750Spec(kts)32-d Range (est)(miles)4000 at15 ktsArmamentMissiles2xtwinSSN-2Gun2 x twin 130mm8 x 57mm8 x 25mmASW2 x AS RLTorpedoGordy DD16572040362600 at19 kts2 x twin SSN-24 x 5.1 in.4 x twin 37mm8xDCTkiangtungFF180028?2 x twin SAM2 x twin 3.9 in.8 x 37mm2 x AS Mortars2xDCTKiangnanFF13501600283x3.9 in.3 x 56 cal6 or 8 twin 37mm4 or 8 twin 25mmDepth chargesRiga FF 1200 16002500 at 1\ twin SSN-2 3 x 3.9 in.15 kts 4 x 37mm4 x DC ProjectorGolf SSBM 2350 2800 20 22700 3 x vertical tubessurf'd dived surf'd17 surface (no msls atdived cruising present)Romeo SS 1100 1600surf'd dived17surfd14dived16000 at10 kts surf'd10x21 in.bowtuhes6x21 in.bowtubes18 x torpedoesHainan PC 500 25? 1500+at12 kts?Osa PTG 165 200 32 800 at25 kts2 x 3 in.2 x twin 57mm2 x twin 25mm4 x SSN-2 2 x twin 30mmHuchwan PTH 45 55Shanghai PGM 120 155 30500 2 x twin 12.7mm2 x twin 37mm 8 X DC1 x twin 25mm2x21 in.TABLE 2 — SELECTED STATISTICS OF THE COMBATANT VESSELS

THE NAVY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 1976-1977 51to be resolved. The matter was finally settledby a judicial and timely application of force.The Spratley (Nansha) situation is slightlydifferent. All parties are recognised, all partiesare at peace and a political settlement isbeing sought. This solution requires timehowever, and any change in the region (e.g.a Soviet naval facility in Vietnam), which maylimit time or the flexibility of PRC optionsmay force a pre-emptive military action.In naval terms the defensive land-centredstrategy previously alluded to remains, despiteRecipientAlbaniaRomaniaCongoGuineaSierraLeoneTanzaniaNorthKoreaPakistanSri LankaVietnamTotalRomeoSS44HuchwanPTH32346651P-6PT4610ShanghaiPGM416342615125875SwatowPGM85058TABLE 3 — TRANSFERS OF CHINESE BUILTCOMBATANTS TO OTHER NAVIES SINCE THESINO-SOVIET SPLITthe fact that as a world power China is oncentre stage. Soviet Russia is still consideredto be the main enemy and one that is willing,able and well placed. Any final resolution ofthis matters is a continental rather than amaritime affair. To approach the Chinesecoast is to disturb a hornets' nest and in thissense the Navy does comply with the Maoistconcept of war. At the same time the Chineseare attempting to create a modern nuclearforce (albeit a defensive one) and thus caterto both extremes of war. A navy is a reflectionof the national policy. The Chinese Navyin the early 15th Century was an imperialinstrument designed to project Chinese powerand influence upon her region. The modernChinese Navy is designed to protect and defendthe mainland and to project national powerupon those near areas which China deems ashers by ancient right.QThe Author wishes to thank Flight LieutenantBennett, RAAh, for /lis comments andcriticisms during the writing of the article.STATISTICAL SOURCES AND BACKGROUNDMATERIALNote on StatisticsAll statistical data is based on figures given inJane's Fighting Ships 1976-77 edition with variationsdecided upon by the author using other sources e.g.The Military Balance 1976-77. Jane's is consideredto be the most consistent statistical source. In viewof the nature of the subject country and the paucityof direct confirmatory evidence, it must be assumedthat some of the data is out of date or not whollyreliable.BibliographyJane's Fighting Ships 1976-77. edited by CaptainJohn Moore. RN.The Military Balance 1976-77. London. InternationalInstitute of Strategic StudiesR. D. M. Furlong. "China's Evolving National SecurityRequirements'. International Defence Review,August 1976Ellis Jotfe, "Party and Army: Professional and PoliticalControl in the Chinese Officer Corps 1949-1964". Harvard East Asian Monographs No. 19Johan Jorgan Hoist. "The Navies of the Super-Powers: Motives and Prospects". Adelphi Paper No.123. IISSMichael McGwire. "Maritime Strategy and the Superpowers".Adelphi Paper No. 123. IISSAdmiral Stansfield Turner. USN. "Designing aModern Navy: A Workshop Discussion". AdelphiPaper No. 123. IISSJohn P. Craven. "The Future of the Sea-based Deterrent",Adelphi Paper No. 124, IISSAdmiral Kazotomi Uchida. "Naval Competition andSecurity in East Asia". Adelphi Paper No. 124. IISSG. S. Bhargava. "India's Security in the 1980s".Adelphi Paper No. 125. IISSWilliam T. Tow. "China's Nuclear Strategy and USReaction in the Post Detente Era". Militarv Review.June 1976Navy International. London. Issues for May. December1972 and June 1973Asia Handbook, Guy Wint ed.. Harmondsworth.Penguin. 1969Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in South EastAsia". Problems of Communism, September October1974. United States Information ServiceKrishna P. Gupta. "Continuities in Change". Problemof Communism. September October 1974. USISEllis Jotfe. "China's Military" . Problems of Communism,November December 1975. USISA. Doak Barnett. "Peking and the Asian PowerBalance". Problems of Communism. July August1976, USISRichard N. Gardner, "Politics of the Oceans", Dialogue.Vol 17 No 1. USISMap — Territorial Claims: any map published underthe auspices of the PRCPlus many articles and features published by newspapersand magazines such as Time, Far East EconomicReview. International Defence Review. Flightand Aviation Week and Space Technology, as wellas syndicated writers such as Dennis Bloodworthand Drew Middleton.

* \AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PLANNING:1901-1914 AND 1918-1939A REVIEW ARTICLEMajor Brian DickeyRoyal Australian InfantryINTRODUCTIONTWO books on the history of Australianforeign and defence policy have recentlybeen published. They are The Search forSecurity in the Pacific 1901-14, Neville Meaney,Sydney University Press, 1976,* and Australiaand Imperial Defence 1918-39: a study in airand sea power by John McCarthy, QueenslandUniversity Press, 1976.t (Hereafter, the formerwill be referred to as M, the latter as McC,followed by page references.)They invite comparison on many points ofgeneral interest in the processes and pressurescontributing to the making of Australianforeign policy. More interestingly to the presentpurpose, both Meaney and McCarthyhave tales to tell about defence planning andpreparation. In both cases the threat of warwas perceived and believed to be real, possible,even imminent — by some, though not by allinvolved. In both cases political leaders andservice personnel were deeply engaged in thedecision making. In both cases debate eruptedas to the relative role and share of the services:navy and army before 1914; navy, army and airforce from 1919 to 1939. Finally, in both casesthe Australian planners, having assessed whatthey believed to be Australian capabilities andneeds, turned to Britain for leadership andprotection. In both cases the interests ofBritain as the principal contributor not onlyprevailed, but prevailed at the cost of Australianinterests.All of these processes have continuinginterest in the 1970s: the definition of threat;the interrelationship of political and profes-Major Dickey contributed to the Army Journal.His prize-winning article "The Development ofAustralia's Military Roles in World War II appearedin February 1975.sional opinion; the relative roles of the services;the question of the nature and degree of relianceon the aid and counsel of other powers.It is the aim of this article to examine theprocesses of defence planning and preparationrevealed by Meaney and McCarthy. The issuesjust identified will be highlighted with a viewto gaining an understanding of the sorts ofjudgements which were made, and hence whichmight again be made.1901-1914At Federation in 1901, legally and technicallyAustralia could have no foreign policy; thecrown held that prerogative, and took advicefrom the ministers of the British government.In practice, however, limited recognition hadalready been conceded to the Australiancolonies that they had interests beyond theirshores over which they should exercise someinfluence, if only by possessing miniscule, leakynavies and a collection of land defence forces.There can be no doubt that the new Australiangovernments — whether led by theProtectionist-Liberals Barton and Deakin, bythe ALP men Watson and Fisher or by GeorgeReid (free trade and anti-socialist) and JosephCook (liberal) — evolved 'consistent, cohesiveand comprehensive defence and external policiesto guide the security of their own country'(M.2). Above all they were acutely aware ofthe Pacific environment in which Australianslived: more so perhaps in days of steam shipsand steam railways, than in an internationalisedage of electronics and jet power. After a periodof initial organisation they were confronted, inthe Japanese victory over Russia in 1905, witha great power within reach. Simultaneouslythey observed Britain reacting to Europeandangers by concentrating its fleet to face Germanyacross the North Sea. Successive governmentsstrove in various ways to confrontBritain with this Pacific issue, but unavailingly.'Failing to gain any enduring concessions eitherin defence or diplomacy from the hard-pressed

BOOK REVIEWS 53British, they fell back on their own resources.They adopted compulsory military training,acquired a fleet unit' and looked forward toa twenty-two year naval building program(M, 2-3). They then found they were engagedin Britain's long-feared European war.The first head of the Australian militaryforces was Major General Hutton, returningon secondment from the British Army. (Hehad been GOC in NSW in the 1890s). Hebrought powerful, self-confident skills to thetask of re-organising and integrating the colonialforces. He also brought an explicit intentionfrom the British defence hierarchy to create anAustralian reserve for imperial service of 20,000horsemen (not 40,000!) That is, his prioritieswere British — or imperial as he put it. Heaccepted the British assessment that Australiawas iess liable to aggression from any foreignpower than most parts of the Empire' (M, 60,quoting the British Colonial Defence Committee).He acted with deliberate cunning toinvolve Australian resources in his imperialscheme by waving before the politicians anEastern Threat he did not himself take seriously.The politicians — Forrest and Deakin inparticular — were not taken in. They insistedon, and gained in the defence act of 1903,explicit civilian control of the army, and specificlimits on its full time (permanent) size. Hutton'stask was to creat a framework for the raisingof a militia for Australian defence, not thegeneration of an unnecessary and expensiveexpeditionary force in being.Naval policy emerged more slowly, becauseit raised imperial problems immediately theunits involved were capable of oceanic operations.Captain W. R. Creswell, long servingas Commandant of successive colonial navalforces, become first Director. Like Hutton —and perhaps any professional chief — he soughtan increased force. He also confronted theexisting subsidy payment towards the RoyalNavy, which helped to defray the costs of thePacific Squadron based on Sydney. He wantedan improved capacity to deal with blackmailraids on Australia's sealanes. He was increasinglyaware that the RN squadron could disappearat the flicker of a telegraphic despatchfrom the Admiralty. He came up with anumber of proposals, always resisted deliberately,both publicly and secretly, by theAdmiralty. Indeed the Admiralty can beshown from the documents deployed byMeaney to have behaved in a narrow, Londonbasedway that seemed to Australian leadersat the time to be prevaricating, and even dishonest.The Admiralty wanted centralisedcontrol above all else. In the end they got it,at the cost of conceding to Australia a fleetunit (battlecruiser, cruisers, destroyers) andthe existence of a Royal Australian Navy.It was the Japanese victories over Russia in1905 which brought the Australian communityto a more willing acceptance of defenceexpenditure. But that same increased Japanesestrength in the Pacific drove the politicians tosharper efforts to gain guarantees of Britishaid in time of war in the Pacific. At the 1907Colonial Conference Deakin strove mightilyto convince the British authorities that theywere wrong. It was of course an impossibletask. Deakin was only a colonial. And anyway,British judgement of British interests inthe end took priority. Even if they had beenwilling to admit the accuracy of Deakin'sassessment of the dangers to Australia andhence the British Empire in the Pacific, thedecade up to 1914 was dominated by a viciousresource-consuming naval arms race with Germany.That was the centre point of Britishplanning. All else should be made to servethat purpose. It is evidence of Deakin's abilitythat he extracted from the British such a highprice administratively and symbolically, forthe commitment of the RAN to imperialdefence. The quid pro quo was a vast increasein Australia's defence expenditure.Imperial experts came and went; LordKitchener, Admiral Henderson; imperial conferencesand consultations also. By 1911Britain had renewed its alliance with Japanand agreed to the RAN fleet unit. Over theMoroccan crisis Britain discovered how poorlyprepared for war she was, and rapidly tightenedher control over outlying imperial defenceresources, even if this meant overriding a clearimperial compact 'without one word of consultation'(M, 232). 'Mystique' and 'bluster'(M, 254-5) were the Admiralty's techniquesin attempting to extract further resources fromthe self-governing colonies.Australian planning turned, in those years

MDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALfrom 1910 to 1914, to an active program ofself-defence as a precaution against Japaneseaggression, in the realization that Britain hadneither the will nor the capability to take thethreat seriously. Not only a fleet unit costingmillions of pounds, but a compulsorily raisedmilitia force was provided, thereby spreadingthe burden of defence very widely indeed.The principal problem in those years perhapslay in the ambiguity of the British Empire.It had no common enemy and to that extentno common unity — at least in terms ofdefence. British and Australian interests werefundamentally at odds. It was only the intenseemotional attachment to Britain, the enormousself-confidence in the British race, combinedwith a self-conscious anxiety to prove themselvesworthy and equal partners with theBritish in that racial Empire that led Australiansso readily into World War One. It wasnever a war fought for Australian interests.Perhaps, therefore, the British won that bout.1918-1939Ironically, time and circumstances conspiredto produce a re-run of the arguments of 1901-l c '14 in the two decades after the conclusionof the 'Great War' in 1918. It is important tonotice that in Australia the awakening recognitionby many that there could be and indeedwas a conflict of interest between empire andnation was expressed in the debate over conscriptionin 1916-17. The nation was deeplydivided. If conscription was not adopted, theconservative, 'imperialist-minded' politicalparties gained power in Australia, and, deeplyangered by the disloyalty they believed hadbeen revealed, carried into the 1920s an intensecommitment to the British Empire. It was acommitment the like of which neither Deakinnor Cook nor Fisher could ever have indulgedin with such blinding intensity as grippedS. M. Bruce and many other conservative politicians.Another new and powerful force not apparentbefore 1914 in anywhere near the sameintensity was pacifism — that desire to avoidwar at all costs, so horrid and destructive wasit, especially to the working classes. Imperialor nationalistic war-hunger would not havethe open go it had in August 1914.However, in 1918, the principal strategicfactwhich Australian leaders focused on wasthe clearly dominant power of Japan in EastAsia. In 1922, in an effort to moderate theproblem, and to spread the burden as theBritish government saw it, an internationalagreement replaced the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance. It involved France and the USA.It was the best the British could do in thePacific. In Australia it was accurately recognisedthat it mereK guaranteed Japanesepower to Australia's north. However, theAustralian government trod softly; they wereunwilling to maintain an independent position,and certainly not one implying heavy expenditure(McC. 14). The Imperial Conference of1923 did little. In 1926 Bruce, the AustralianPrime Minister, reiterated that 'the guidingprinciple on which all our defence preparationsare based, whether for the Sea, the Land,or the Air Force, is uniformity in every respect. . . with the fighting services of Great Britain,in order that in time of emergency we maydovetail into any formation with which ourforces may be needed to co-operate'. (McC, 15).In practice it was worse. The RAAF wasformed in 1921. By 1928 it was thoroughlyand properly condemned by Air Marshal SirJohn Salmond after an inspection tour (McC.21). The navy was the darling of the conservative,imperially oriented Australian politicalparties. The air force was resisted by navyand army as an independent force anyway.The defence planning structure was weak.Aircraft looked improbable in the 1920s.So, amid competing demands, imperialsycophancy and service back-biting, one (airborne)version of a credible defence forcefaded into limbo.As to the navy, it too was starved of funds.Yet it was perfectly obvious that, under theterms of the Washington Conference, Australiacould not alone deal with the Japanese Navy.Therefore Britain would have to commit amain fleet to do the job. Two prerequisitesemerged. One was the existence of an adequatefleet base. The other was a questionof will; the will to despatch a 'Main fleet toSingapore' even in the conditions of a twofrontWorld War. Neither condition was fulfilled.From time to time in the 1920s the Britishgovernment made it possible to query the

BOOK REVIEWS 55reality with which they were pursuing theconstruction of the base at Singapore. InAustralian political and naval circles littleurgency and great trust were evinced. Thebland British assurances were taken as anexcuse to avoid investment in defence works.In 1930, with the depression weakeninggovernment capacity even further, work onthe Singapore base slowed to a crawl. Jn Australia,McCarthy's opinion is that the Admiraltyadvice about ship acquisition, focusing on anaircraft carrier, cruisers and submarines — towork together had been "an expensivebungle' (52) which meant that, with the Singaporebase incomplete, and the army starvedof resources "Australia was defenceless whenthe Lvons sovernment took office in January1932' (McC, 54).As the 1930s wore on the experts reported:Singapore was the key. It was the army whichharbored the clearest thinking critics this time,as if to atone for the imperial myopia ofHutton's proteges White and Bridges. Lavarack(CGS) suspected the Singapore-foundedstrategy and urged an army-based self-reliantprogram. The politicians (Lyons, Parkhill)did not want to listen if it meant questioningBritish bona fides, or spending money ondefence or believing war was possible (McC,62).The RAAF had a worse fate: it became,and remained through 1939-41. a channelthrough which officers and later air-crew werefound for the RAF. Its independent capacityremained at zero, whatever the occasionalcriticism may have intended (McC, 66-7).Even in those last hectic years between 1937and 1939, when finance was made availablefor defence in the fear of German aggressionin Europe, nothing clear or purposeful seemedto be done. The Singapore base was finishedin a sort of a way. Arms were ordered andeven made in Australia. But to what purpose?Air defence and offence based on Australia?Fleet units for the RN in European waters?An expeditionary force? It would appear thatneither imperial nor local needs were properlyassessed or met (McC, 82). The ability ofAustralian industry to provide some of theequipments so belatedly sought — notablyaircraft — was hamstrung because Britishindustrial interests had ensured that no Australiancapacity could be developed. Nor werethe planes ordered in Britain ever delivered.What little air capacity Australia acquired inthose years came, over repeated and arrogant(McC 120) British protests, from the USA(McC, 121ff). Even then the British PrimeMinister (Stanley Baldwin) pontificated: 'Solong as American types I of aeroplane I aremanufactured it would be impossible for u^to regard the Australian factory as an effectiveaddition to Imperial resources'. (McC,125).So these twenty years reveal successive Australiangovernments suffering from "a chroniclack of self reliance. The advice of the UnitedKingdom was usually sought and often followedwithout serious critical thought'. (McC,148). As a result Australia possessed noindependent defence capacity when war brokeout in 1939. Moreover, it was the acceptanceof the imperial framework which negated thepossibility of formulating an alternative policy,and hence an adequate equipment program.Articles of faith proved to be no substitutefor careful analysis and practical action.CONCLUSIONWhat generalisations emerge from this surveyof Australian defence policies 1901-1939?Clearly the treatment has been selective, andof course, reliant on the careful archivalscholarship and interpretation of Meaney andMcCarthy.One point, and an obvious one, is that cleardefinition of threat and interest, from the pointof view of Australia, at least had the benefitof permitting criticism of the alternatives beingproposed by other governments. On the otherhand, no original perception of threat shouldbe allowed to become mere national myth, asperhaps Japan's intentions were treated attimes. Nor is it clear to what extent the Australianexpectation of Japanese aggressioncreated its own answer, ie encouraged Japaneseaggression. By contrast, what is obvious fromboth episodes is the false economy of seekingto influence a great power to see things throughAustralian eyes and for Australia's benefitexcept where the interests of the two partiesspecifically coincided. Britain's and Australia'snever did.At the level of means, rather than ends.

56 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALagain and again the politicians and the servicemenfell in the trap of believing their ownself-interested rhetoric. Further, perhaps onemight say, never believe a foreign politician.Thirdly, press service chiefs to the utmost forrational and honest judgements; better, makethem co-operate with one another. Fourthly,admit that it was the politicians who provided(Deakin, Fisher) or failed to provide (Bruce,Lyons) the necessary strategic guidance. Thatis essentially a political responsibility. Sometimesthe equipment prospects were correctlydiscerned. Sometimes not. Sometimes financialgreed and pride intervened. In many casesit was to be the Australian serviceman whodied as a result.The people I would applaud are those suchas Deakin and Lavarack, who retained theability to question existing assumptions, tochange their own opinions, to take a total view,and to speak out no matter what the mythsand sacred cows were that lay scattered about.One a politician, the other a general: it is atleast a start for the definition of Australiandefence policies in the 1970s and 1980s. y* Reviewed in DFJ No 3, p. 55.+ Reviewed in DFJ No 2, p. 61.THE AUSTRALIANS AT THE BOER WAR,by R. L. Wallace, Canberra, the AustralianWar Memorial and the Australian GovernmentPublishing Service, 1976, 420 pp., SI 1.95.Reviewed by Captain C. D. Coult hard-Clark,Australian Intelligence Corps.THE Boer War had been over for two andhalf years when the Prime Minister ofAustralia, Mr. (later Sir) George Reid, publiclystated his intention to see published an authentichistory of the campaign told from an Australianviewpoint. It was not, however, foranother seven years that any sort of officialaccount appeared and even then what wasproduced was a volume of Defence Departmentrecords, chiefly unit rolls and a miscellanyof facts and figures, in short, a work ofsome antiquarian value but scarcely the'authentic history' which had been promised.Thus it is that more than seventy years haveslipped by before the appearance of the bookunder review. The author is to be warmlyapplauded for turning long overdue attentionto this period of Australian military history.Apparently without the benefit of formalacademic training, Mr. Wallace began thisproject as a labour of love while still a linesmanwith the old Postmaster-General's Department.He has stuck closely to the book's titleand apart from recounting the events leadingup to the war, has mainly confined himself torecounting the deeds and experiences of Australiantroops at the front. This he has donewell, largely by quoting letters written back toAustralia, many of which were published inthe press at the time. This work should benicely complemented by any future study ofthe war's significance for Australia and itsimpact on and within this country. One canfeel some sympathy for the author in writingthis book in that there was obviously quite aproblem because the Australian contingentswere split up and attached to large Britishformations. Consequently at virtually no stageis it possible to focus wholly on Australiansat the war, and the book often reads almostas one would have expected of a British history.Still, by using letters the reader is ableto have accounts from the mouths of participantsand also it is possible to "place" Australianswithin various sections, even wherethey played little part.Not only is material from a range of scatteredsources drawn together in this work, butthe author also devotes a chapter to the Morant-Hancock affair in an attempt to shed new lighton this old controversy. This case, the firstinvolving executions of Australian servicemen,arose out of the murders of Boer prisoners byofficers of the Bushveldt Carbineers in a wildarea known as the Spelonken in Eastern Transvaallate in 1901. The author has uneartheda previously unpublished letter written in 1929by Lieutenant G. R. Witton, one of the accusedofficers who served some three years of a lifesentence after being found guilty, but rightlyquestions Witton's credibility in view of hisembittered frame of mind and failure to makethe same accusations in a 1907 book he wroteconcerning the affair. It seems therefore thatthe suspicions of injustice which surround theexecutions of the colourful "Breaker" Morantand Hancock will remain until the officialrecords are released by the British Government.And anyone who followed in The

BOOK REVIEWS 57Bulletin Kit Denton's efforts in 1973 to gainaccess to these papers will realise the extremereluctance of the War Office to let the truthbe known.This reviewer does have a number of complaintsabout the book. For a start there aremisspellings of names and inaccurate statements,which, although small faults, do detractfrom the book's usefulness as a reference work.A few examples: A. G. Gilpin should readT. J. (Thomas John) Gilpin and it is NursingSister Bidmead, not Bidsmead. The authorevidently did not realise that the Maori Warsstarted in 1861. and to say that 'All the Australiancontingents fought as mounted troopers'is to forget the contribution of the NSW artillerybattery and the Medical Corps, althoughthe author does not overlook these units laterin the text. Similarly to say Chauvel laterbecame Lieutenant General is also not quitecorrect at later again he came a General.Numismatists who have copies of the SecondNSW Infantry Regiment badge of the 1880'swill no doubt dispute that Australians goingto the Boer War were the first to wear therising sun device on their badges. Perhaps too,the author might have referenced his text morefully. The reader is, after all, entitled to knowthe sources being used for the incidentsrecounted.More significant are the gaps in the book'sBibliography. The author was evidentlyunaware that Hutton's letters from South Africaare in the National Library in Canberra andmany other sources, chiefly secondary, mighthave been included. Equally annoying are themaps provided. There are only four, and whilethese are adequate for tracing campaigns andlocating battles they do not allow the readerto follow the narrative of individual actions,no matter how important.Despite these shortcomings the book is welldesigned and attractive, and well illustrated.It is a credit to the publishers, especially inview of the War Memorial's shortage of suitablyqualified staff which caused the releaseof this publication to be delayed by a year.The book is well worth reading by anyoneseeking to gain an idea of the type of warfareinvolved and the hardships and sufferingsendured by our soldiers in the Commonwealthof Australia's first war.UTHE TIGER MOTH STORY, by Alan Bramsonand Neville Birch, London, Air ReviewLimited. 1970.Reviewed by Group Captain Keith Isaacs,Royal Australian Air Force (Retired).CASSELL AND COMPANY Limited firstpublished this book in November 1964.It became a best seller, and Cassell issued asecond edition in August 1965. The copy underreview was printed for Air Review Limited —publishers of the renowned Hayleford seriesof aeronautical books — in November 1970.*This third edition has been revised, enlarged,and updated. The 278 pages of text includeseven pages of technical drawings. The bookis copiously illustrated with 42 pages of photographsfeaturing 80 de Havilland DH.82 TigerMoths and derivations, such as the Queen Bee,Hoppity. Paraslasher, Tiger bomber, DutchTiger with extended fin, Thruxton Jackeroo,and the Cannon; the three DH.82As reconstructedfor the film "Lawrence of Arabia"are also pictured in their roles as two RumplerC.IVs and a Fokker D.VII. The Australianphotographs include rare scenes of locally-builtDHA Tiger Moths in Rhodesia and the UnitedKingdom.The Tiger Moth Story is an excellent exampleof a first class history of a famous aircraft.It is not generally known — nor is it mentioned inThe Tiger Moth Story — that DH.82s were operatedby the Royal Australian Navy, before being used bythe RAAF in 1939. In February 1936, HMAS Australiaacted as the radio-controlled Queen Bee catapultcruiser for the Mediterranean Fleet. One of thefour DH.82B Queen Bee pilotless target aircraft,K5060, is shown about to be launched from HMASAustralia for anti-aircraft gunnery practice. Themocked-up pilot in the single cockpit went by thename of Fearless Fred.

58 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALThe preface of the book was written, appropriately,by Sir Alan J. Cobham, KBE, AFC.Sir Alan used de Havilland aircraft for manyof his record breaking flights in the 1920s. Hewas also one of the first civilians to acquireTiger Moths, four of which performed aerobaticsduring his National Aviation Day Displays,1932-35.The foreword was compiled by the authorswho conclude with the observation "That some8,800 Tigers were built gives us 8,800 goodreasons for writing this book." They then,diligently and accurately, proceed to narratethe history of the Tiger Moth. Their eightchapter headings provide an indication of thebook's contents — The Family Tree. Birth ofthe Tiger, The Colourful Thirties, Growing Up,The Fighting Tigers, Tigers in Training, ThePost-War Tiger, and The Tiger Changes itsStripes.The chapter on the fighting Tigers will, nodoubt, be of special interest to Defence ForceJournal readers. The little known stories ofthe Royal Air Force Tiger Moths equippedwith eight light bombs, or trays of Mills bombs,or being used on anti-submarine coastal patrolflights, are most interesting. Even more intriguingis the account of the Paraslasher. Thisexperimental Tiger Moth was fitted with aningenious weapon, somewhat similar to afarmer's large hand scythe attached to the endof a long tube. When not in use the wholeassembly was slung under the fuselage. In theevent of an aerial invasion, it was envisacedthat the Tiger Moth flying instructors wouldgo into action with this frightening weapondangling from their erstwhile passive aircraft.They would then By amongst the descendingparatroops, slashing the canopies of the parachuteswith devastating results. If any paratroopsescaped this terrible fate, the instructorswould fly after them at low level with themenacing scythe skimming across the groundat high speed. The authors describe this HeathRobinson project with tongue in cheek, andconclude that "the possible effect on the moraleof enemy troops of a wicked looking knifeapproaching at 100 mph needs little imagination."Of necessity, the Australian story of theTiger Moth is presented in a concise form andcentres, mainly, around the military use of thetrainer. During a preliminary check of AppendixIV it appeared that the authors had failedto annotate the RAF-serialled DH.82As sentto Australia for the Empire Air TrainingScheme. Upon reading the book, however,these particular aircraft were found to be listedin a footnote on page 134. The following pagestated that Royal Australian Air Force TigerMoths were identified by the prefix A17, andthe highest serial number was A17-759. Thisstatement is not in accord with Appendix IV,wherein the last aircraft listed is A17-760. Infact, two Tiger Moths were numbered afterA17-759. They were A17-760 and A17-964.and these aircraft were used by both the RAAFand the United States Army Air Force. Theife *The Tiger Moth Story describes the RAF DH.82A ambulance aircraft used in Bengal and Burma, 1944, butfails to provide photographs of these unique aircraft. The two RAAF pictures show a Tiger Moth similarlymodified to carry a stretcher patient in New Guinea. Whereas the RAF Tiger ambulance enclosed the patiententirely, the RAAF version at least provided an opening for the patient's head. Note the spurious application

BOOK REVIEWS 59authors also fail to solve the enigma of theUK-built DH.82A (constructor's number 3227),which is listed as being sent to Australia,although a VH registration is not recorded.In the event, the first DH.82A to appear onthe Australian civil register was VH-UTD (c/n3320), which was donated to the NewcastleAero Club in May 1935. Another four yearsthen elapsed before the first RAAE DH.82A.A17-1. (c n 82555), entered service in May1939.The four comprehensive appendices aredevoted to leading particulars, service andreserve training schools 1937-54. a productionsummary (including productions in Australia.New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Sweden, andPortugal), and a registration list. The thirdedition of the book also contains an addendum,after the index, comprising a log of over 250Tiger Moths around the world that had currentcertificates of airworthiness as at September1970. A thoughtful "Guide for Tiger MothEnthusiasts" even contains factory addresseswhere engines and spare parts can be obtained.a list of the Tiger Clubs (one has since beenestablished in Australia), and the address ofa well known bookseller who specialises inTiger Moth manuals and literature: in fact,the reviewer was able to obtain a 1939 TigerMoth Manual of Instruction for Operation,Maintenance, and Rigging from this bookselleras recently as March 1977.Alan Bramson and Neville Birch have produceda well researched, and fascinating, historyof the deHavilland DH.82. I stronglyrecommend The Tiger Moth Story, not onlyto those who are interested in aviation but toeveryone who enjoys reading a good book.* Available in Australia from Thomas C.Lothian, 4-12 Tattersalls Lane, Melbourne,3000. UON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARYINCOMPETENCE, by Norman F. Dixon,MBE, PhD. DSc, London. Jonathan Cape,1976, $20.95.Reviewed by Ma) W. H. Bishop, Army Office.D R. DIXON, psychologist and erstwhilebomb disposal officer (RE, 1940-1950) haswritten this book to explain his thesis thatmilitary disasters are caused by incompetentcommanders and are, therefore, avoidable.The book is in three parts. In chapter onethe author discusses the difficulties facing commandersin processing and analysing the massiveamounts of information available duringthe planning or execution of a battle. Theremainder of Part one is devoted to a seriesof synopsis of British military disasters coveringthe period from Crimea to World War II.Each, he argues, was caused by the incompetenceof senior officers who ignored information,rejected the advice of their subordinates, orresisted change (e.g. in tactics and equipment).The second part of the book is concernedprimarily with the social psychology of militaryorganizations and why potentially incompetentgenerals survive. His conclusion is thatmilitary organizations have been controlled byofficers who have developed techniques toensure the maintenance of the social of thesocial status quo. The Army in the mid Nineteenthcentury is cited as a convincing example.As warfare has changed over the centuries,officers have found it necessary to foster militarismwhich Dixon sees as "devices to ensuregroup cohesion, to incite hostility to enforceobedience and to suppress mutiny" amongtheir men. These devices are contained incomplex rules and conventions which ossifyinto "outmoded tradition, curious ritual,inappropriate dogma and irrelevant 'bullshit'."Many attracted by the militarism of theServices are "those whose performance is subsequentlydeemed incompetent". To explainthis view Dixon discusses psycho-social developmentand the pathological nature of authoritarianism(as distinct from autocracy).In Part three, with hindsight and its postpriori benefits, Dixon illustrates his view bydescribing some (in)famous military incompetentsand competents, in terms of both personalityand performance. These abstractshave the aim of indicating the traits whichgive good generals the ability to resist, to agreater degree than bad generals, the psychopathologyof the organization in which theyserve. The range of cases is wide — fromWolfe to Haig and Kitchener to Shaka.I found the book disappointing. Dixon useda reductionist approach thereby escaping the

60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALdifficult task of considering the myriad of otherfactors which may have significantly affectedany of the events he has described. For example,he does not make it clear that failure did notresult from the brilliance of the opposing commanders.Secondly, he has resorted to gratuitousdefensive technique of attempting to forestallcriticism by implying that those who disagreewith him will probably be authoritarian.Finally, I would have expected a much morestructured approach to the presentation of thepsychological theory, particularly from oneapparently so well respected in the demandingfield of experimental psychology.Despite all, it would be interesting to observethe reactions of existing and aspiring seniorofficers to the author's assessment of militarismand what it does to people.yTRAFALGAR, by John Terraine, London,Sidgwick and Jackson, 1976, 210 pp.Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander A. H.Craig, RAN, Navy Office, Canberra.V-/F all the battles in which the Royal Navyhas been involved, Trafalgar has probablyattracted more literary attention than any other.This attention has ranged from ponderous andminutely detailed professional works coveringthe whole campaign to simple essays of personalopinion about various facets of the battle.John Terraine (who will be known to manyAustralians as the narrator of the TV series'The Mighty Continent') has successfullytrodden the middle road and produced a bookof great appeal to the student of naval historyand the casual reader alike. It is profuselyillustrated, in colour and black and white, and,whilst fresh pictorial matter is hard to find,the author and publishers have succeeded incomplementing the text with appropriate andwell reproduced illustrations. To support theimmediate story there is a long appendix ofeye witness accounts of the campaign whichmany readers will find as absorbing andinformative as the main text.John Terraine's aim is to display a situationin which a powerful Continental enemy —Napoleon — held the strategic initiative againstBritain and used a battle fleet as a factor inthat initiative, and in which a school of experiencedBritish naval officers checked him bv theremorseless application of sea power. Throughoutthe first chapters, which trace the genesis ofthe Trafalgar campaign from its conception atthe signing of the Treaty of St Petersburg toits opening scenes with the escape of Villeneuvefrom the Mediterranean, one point continuallyarises — the enormous experience, confidenceand tenacity of the Royal Navy. Prior toTrafalgar, the Royal Navy had been mouldedinto a fine fighting force by the campaigns ofthe American and French Revolutionary warsand an unwritten naval 'system' had developedwhich was firmly grasped by admirals andcaptains. It was, in essence, a system of mutualsupport and trust, in which those officersinstinctively kept each other informed andsupported and never doubted that all woulddo so. It was a decisive factor in the Trafalgarcampaign.One of the most complex characters of thisperiod undoubtedly belonged to Lord Nelson.His untimely death, at the peak of his triumph,gave rise to a popular and satisfyingly sentimentaladulation which has continued, in somemeasure, to the present day. The averageBritish reader would still be aghast to hearNelson described as 'An Englishman, cold,hard, cruel and resolute' (a description attributedto a recent French writer) but it isundoubtedly a description a Frenchman of theperiod would have recognised. Mr Terraineshows the reader all sides of Nelson's characterand has stripped the clouds of satisfying sentimentfrom his analyisis to reveal the professionalsailor underneath. He studies the contrastsfrom which a true understanding ofNelson may be obtained and finds that thereis great warmth and icy determination; greatlove and fierce hatred; great affection andgreat prejudice; unquestioned vanity andunsparing dedication to duty and his country.Nelson was also a superb tactician and possessedthe enviable gift of appreciating, andacting upon, opportunities as they arose ratherthan being committed to a preconceived plan.It is noteworthy that his health was not goodat the time of Trafalgar and that this was acause of considerable concern to him. He isshown as almost destroying himself with frustrationand anxiety after twice missing Villeneuve'ssorties from Toulon. The secondsortie led to Villeneuve's escape from the Medi-

BOOK REVIEWS 61terranean which raised the curtain on the dramawhich was to culminate off Cape Trafalgar.The frustrations and disappointments of the"West Indies Chase' preyed heavily upon Nelson.A combination of bad information andill fortune caused him to miss the French Fleetat every turn and the anxiety which beset himin the Mediterranean returned in full measureto the extent that he felt the need to return toEngland to repair 'a very shattered constitution".Victory returned to Gibraltar on 20 July 1805and Nelson went ashore for the first time intwo years.The French fleets had avoided battle withthe Royal Navy (and the associated physicaldamage) until this time but the ever-lastingcross purposes of the French admirals andtheir distant, uncomprehending Emperor, hadtaken their toll of efficiency and morale. Whenthe combined fleet fell in with Caldcr's squadronon 22nd July 1805, the rag-tag action seemedto destroy what vestiges of French confidenceremained. It is a condemnation of the publicspirit of those times that Calder was reprimandedfor not pursuing this action moredeterminedly. The fact that he had 'palsied'Villeneuve and thus ruined Napolean's "grandcombination' (his hope of invading England)was completely overlooked.On 18th August 1805 Victory anchored atSpithead and Nelson's flag was hauled down.He now had less than a month ashore in whichto repair his 'very shattered constitution' beforeembarking again at short notice on 14th September.Word had been received that theCombined Fleet was in Cadiz and the BritishFleet sailed on 15th September determined tofinally bring it to battle. Nelson's longed-forchance to annihilate his enemy seemed to beapproaching at last.Mr Terraine leads the reader step by stepfrom Nelson's departure from England to thedawn of 21st October 1805 when the twoFleets sighted each other at sea. The 'NelsonTouch' is explained as are Nelson's 'tacticalnotes' which were his intentions for the battleand introduced a note of flexibility into thesomewhat rigid rules of engagement of thetime. Nelson hoped for a 'pell-mell' battle inwhich he could concentrate his heavy shipsagainst selected enemy units and destroy themin turn. In the event the battle was certainly•pell-mell' but the concentration of strengthwas never quite achieved and a number ofBritish ships spent some hot minutes, unsupported,in the heart of the enemy's line. Thebattle is described in precise and vivid detailand, in spite of the unfortunate initial formation,it is evident that English seamanship,gunnery and morale more than compensatedfor enemy firepower. Nelson's death, at about1630, very nearly marked the end of the battlewhich may be said to have concluded with theexplosion of the French Achille at about 1730.The Combined Fleet had lost 18 ships, theBritish none; the Combined Fleet lost over4,500 dead and 2,400 wounded with 7000 takenprisoner, the British lost 449 dead and 1200wounded. The Combined Fleet had, to allintents and purposes, been annihilated but atthe cost to Britain of the life of the man whoorchestrated the victory.John Terraine has written an excellent bookon Nelson's last engagement — it will be appreciated,and enjoyed, by both the serious studentof naval history and the interested layman.He has related the story with careful attentionto the movements and objectives of theAdmiral's main opponent, who was not thecolourless Villeneuve but the vain, ambitiousand land-oriented Napoleon: and has shownhow the British naval 'system' and commandof the sea saved England from almost certaininvasion. The reader will also obtain a fineinsight into the workings of the British Fleetwhich, at Trafalgar, ushered in over 100 yearsof unrivalled British naval supremacy. QARMOUR ON WHEELS — TO 1942, editedby B. H. Vanderveen, New York, FrederickWarne, 1976.Reviewed by Colonel Ci. J. MurphyDirector of Operational Requirements,Army Office, CanberraA HIS book is part of the Olyslager AutoLibrary Series, which deals with military andcivilian vehicles under some 26 titles. It hasonly 63 pages but contains 200 illustrations ofsome 175 wheeled armoured fighting vehiclesof 15 nations. There is only brief description,little technical detail, no critical comment and,unfortunately, the one-page index is inadequatefor almost any purpose.

62 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALOne wonders what sort of buyer the bookis intended to attract. It is not for the seriousstudent of armoured warfare as its treatmentis too sketchy. It may have some value forwar-games enthusiasts but does not containenough detail for model-makers. To judgefrom other books in the series, the editor collectsand restores military and other vehicles,so perhaps the book is directed at the "nostalgia"market.Essentially, the book is for browsing ratherthan reading but it is certainly not withoutinterest. It covers more nations in one volumethan other similar books and it includes photographsof many experimental models andprototypes as well as vehicles produced in largequantities. It is easy to follow (from the picturesand sparse text) the evolution from carsfitted with machine-guns and with a fewarmoured plates bolted on, through armouredbodies hung on commercial truck chassis, topurpose-built machines of great complexity,having firepower and mobility characteristicsrivalling those of contemporary tanks. Oneconstant theme which emerges is that wheneverarmour or weapons increase beyond a certainpoint, the vehicle becomes too big and immobileto be of practical use. In general, wheeledarmoured vehicles seem to be competitive withtracked ones only in the lighter ranges.Vehicles hurriedly produced to meet variousemergencies are also interesting. Some of theBritish vehicles improvised to meet the expectedGerman invasion in 1940-41 were most ingenious— one had concrete armour and anotheremployed wooden box-work filled with pebbles.In retrospect, however, it seems very fortunatethat they were not put to the test. It usuallytakes some considerable time to produce asuccessful armoured vehicle — even a simpleone.A short section on Australian-designedvehicles (of only two photographs) is thoughtprovoking.The Australian Army is withouta wheeled armoured fighting vehicle for thefirst time for many years. Would we needwheeled armoured vehicles to defend Australia?From an examination of their undoubted valuein many campaigns one might think so, but itis not a simple question. Readers may enjoythis book because it prompts such a question,even if it provides no answer.tjCOMMAND AT SEA, bv Oliver Warner,London, Cassell, 1976. 188 pp. SI2.95Reviewed by Wing Commander P. J. Rushbridge,Royal Australian Air Force.w HEN the diarist William Hickev calledupon the French Admiral Sutfren in Trincomalee,he asked the sailors rowing him outto the flagship what they though of theiradmiral. The men were bursting with prideand were full of praise. One sailor's eulogyended with the words "Oui, ma foi, e'est unbougre determine!"Thus, with great economy, does OliverWarner, the author of this book, conjure upin a few lines a vivid image of the admiral'spersonality. Unfortunately, he is unable tosustain this effort throughout the book. Afterreading the last page, I was left with the feelingthat the book had not really been worthwhile.'Command at Sea' purports to be a collectionof studies of command at sea exercisedby ten different admirals: six British, twoFrench and two American. The author describesin the prologue some aspects of the quality ofcommand which he deems important. Forexample, Napoleon recommended personalexperience of campaigning, imperturbability,openmindedness and the talent for being ableto choose the right man for the job, amongstothers. Admiral Sir William James mentionedthree aces which a commander must have: theability to inspire loyalty, a fertile and creativeimagination, and an eagerness to make use ofthe ideas of others.Unfortunately, having set down the framework in the prologue, the author fails to showin the individual studies how his chosen subjectsdisplayed these qualities. One can pickout the odd quality here and there. Howeverno convincing picture of the qualities of seagoingcommand emerge, and this is the book'schief weakness.In addition, some of the subjects receiveonly very cursory attention. Lord Howe getsfive pages altogether. What can you tell of aman in five pages? When describing AdmiralSaunders' support for General Wolfe at Quebec,the author seems to pay more attention toWolfe and to Captain Cook, who was alsothere, than to his chosen subject.

BOOK REVIEWS 63The book's failure is disappointing and surprising,because the author is a writer of wideexperience in naval history. Nevertheless,despite this background, he does not manageto bring most of his subjects to life or helpthe reader to understand what it was that madethem great commanders.However, some parts of the book are stimulating.In addition to SutFren, already mentioned,the author has modest success withDavid Farragut, the Union fleet commander inthe American Civil War. Farragut was a simpleand modest man who undertook, without complaint,and at an advanced age, a task whichwould have daunted a much younger man.The author describes the Union attack onMobile, in which the Admiral, Farragut, hadhimself lashed to the mast, far above the deck,so that he could see above the smoke. Soonafter the battle was over, the old man faintedfrom sheer exhaustion.The author comes closest to success whenhe deals with Beatty. The man clearly had anelectrifying effect on those he commanded, andthis comes across well. The Grand Fleet staffofficer, who took Winston Churchill aside,spoke accurately when he remarked to theFirst Lord, 'Nelson has come again*. Beattywas a commander in the Nelsonic tradition,despite his mixed success in war.However, overall, this is a disappointing andineffective book. (JR.U.S.I. and BRASSEY'S DEFENCE YEAR­BOOK 1976/77, edited by the Royal UnitedServices Institute for Defence Studies, London,Brassey's Publishers Limited, December 1976.Reviewed byLieutenant Colonel Adrian R. BlackRegular Officer Development Committee,Army Office\T is difficult to imagine a more comprehensivepublication in the Defence Studies fieldthan the 377 diverse pages of 'Brassey's'. Nowin its 87th year of production, the volume isin three parts. The first 'Strategic Review'includes a series of articles by authors whosecredentials demand respect for their opinions.Topics include accounts of armed conflictthroughout the world during the period June1975-May 1976 and key aspects of globalstrategy and defence policy.Part II 'Modern Weapons Technology'reviews developments and prospects in eighteendifferent weapon systems covering areas ofinterest to professionals in all branches of thedefence organization. In most of these paperssimple tables provide selected comparativestatistics of alternate systems. It is interestingto note that a version of this section of theYearbook was recently bought by the UKServices for issue to young officers as referencematerial — this is one case in which we coulddo worse than imitate the British.The final part of the Yearbook provides abibliography listing over 100 titles in DefenceStudies, conveniently grouped under broadheadings such as 'Defence Policy' and 'Seapower'.Part III also includes a chronologyof events for the year ending May 1976.With so many diverse topics being addressed,it is difficult to review each without writinganother book. Accordingly. I have chosen toselect a small number of articles to discusson the basis of their merit and their relevanceto the Australian defence scene. I have, therefore,excluded discussion of a number ofinteresting papers on conflict or defence activityin Lebanon, Angola, Iran. Spain and Portugal,Oman and Ireland.James Bellini (Head of Political Studies atthe Hudson Institute in Paris), decries the lackof hard-headed, long term objectivity in Britisharms policy in his paper 'National DefencePolicy and Arms Sales'. His comparisons withUS and French policies are telling. The discussionof overseas procurement versus homeproduction, with all the intermediate variantpossibilities, is one of particular relevance toAustralian defence policy makers.I was fascinated to learn from an articleentitled 'Western European Collateral DamageFrom Tactical Nuclear Weapons' (TNW), ofthe disparity between the Soviet and the US/European attitude to anti-nuclear civil defenceprogrammes, the Soviet Union having undertakena long term programme aimed at reducingcasualty levels to about 6 per cent of thepopulation. The advantages of EnhancedRadiation TNW over the high yield weaponsof the post-World War II era are clearly

Mi)I I F.\("E FORCE JOL'RNALexplained and emphasised. This article combineswell with John Erickson's paper on 'TheSoviet Military Effort in the 1970s' a subjectof considerable discussion in this country inthe past year or so. Although Erickson exposesclearly and forcefully the extent of Soviet militarypower, he throws little light on the mannerin which the Soviets must inevitably harnessthat power.In 'Transnational Terrorism' Peter Janke (ofthe Institute of the Study of Conflict, London),makes the critical observation that leadingpolitical figures have "... unwisely . . . felt. . . compelled to involve themselves personallyin actual negotiations . . . ' with the dualeffect of neglecting what are in fact moreimportant affairs of state and of giving maximumpublicity to the terrorist's cause. Onething this article makes quite clear is the comparativevulnerability of democratic nations toterrorist action because of the absence of mediacontrol and censorship. One is left to ponderwhether occasional temporary controls mightbe an essential part of counter-terrorist action.John H. Morse is presently a consultant tothe Department of Defense and a number ofother high-level agencies in the US. His paperon 'The Application of Advanced Technologyin Modern War' should be essential readingfor anyone who really thinks about defencematters. His thesis concerns the rate of changeof military technology and the inability ofdefence experts to continuously review concepts,doctrine and tactics to keep up withtechnological advances. As Australia is oftenthough to be more guilty than most (of theso-called technologically advanced nations) inthis matter, the case he makes for unconstraineddefence concept teams or 'think tanks'is most persuasive and applicable.Of particular relevance to the AustralianArmy at present is a paper entitled 'Trends inthe Mechanization of Armies' written by theCommander of the 7th Panzer Grenadier Division.Major General van Senger und Etterlin,the Bundeswehr's leading authority onarmoured warfare. His article covers all formsof mechanized warfare, including the employmentof helicopter-borne ATGW, and is supportedby useful comparative performancetables.There is simply too much detail in Part IIof the Yearbook to allow a brief summary. Ifound the sections dealing with all missile typesto be most interesting and comprehensive fora non-expert. The sections on Remotely PilotedVehicles (RPV), control of EW systems, satellitesurveillance and communication systemsare all excellent.As a compendium of papers on defencematters, the Yearbook must rate highly withdefence analysts worldwide. Despite someemphasis on European problems, the Yearbookis international in scope and would interestprofessionals of all services at all levels (includingmany of our most professional people holdingwarrant or petty officer rank), and civilianofficers in the Defence groups.If you are really interested in defence it isa must, either for bedside browsing or as adeskside reference.y(FOOTNOTE: Copies of the Yearbook areheld in service or defence libraries in moststates. Stock copies are not held in b(x>kshopsin Australia, but can be ordered throughMethuen of Australia in Sydney, Melbourne.Brisbane and Perth. Cost is about $31).

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