In October 1977, Reliance had gone public, with a public offer of 2.8 million equityshares of Rs 10 each at par, taken from the holdings of Dhirubhai and his youngerbrother Nathubhai. With its shareholding thus broadened to meet listingrequirements, Reliance was listed on the stock exchanges in Bombay andAhmedabad in January 1978.<strong>The</strong>reafter Reliance expanded its equity base through frequent rights and bonusissues to shareholders, while financial institutions converted 20 per cent of theirloans into equity in September 1979. But it was through the use of convertibledebentures that Dhirubhai made his big splash in the capital markets. Indeed,Dhirubhai had anticipated Sen Gupta’s policy with the Series I issue of partiallyconvertible debentures by Reliance in October 1979, raising Rs 70 million.Reliance was not alone in trying the long disused instrument promoted by SenGupta. <strong>The</strong> Tata group’s automotive firm Telco raised Rs 230 million with a fullyconvertible issue in 1980, followed by the Gujarat Narmada Fertiliser Corp with a Rs430 million issue. But from late 1980 the issues of partially convertible debenturescame from Reliance in quick succession, raising Rs 108 million in September from itsSeries 11 and Rs 240 million from its Series 111 the next year, and Rs 500 millionfrom Series IV in April 1982. Dhirubhai capped that by obtaining from Sen Guptaclearance to do what should normally be legally impossible: converting the nonconvertibleportions of the four debenture issues into equity.By this method, dubbed a ‘brilliant and unconventional move’s by the magazine ‘<strong>The</strong>Economic Scene’s in a September 1984 cover story on Dhirubhai-Reliance was ableto chop Rs 735 million off its debt book in 1983, and turn it into comparativelymodest equity of Rs 103 million, while reserves were raised by Rs 632 million.Instead of an annual interest bill of Rs 96.5 million on debentures, the dividendburden from the extra equity was only around Rs 36 million. This transmutationallowed Reliance to continue raising more quasi-debt, with its E Series of partiallyconvertible debentures in October 1984 which raised another Rs 800 million.Sen Gupta denies that he was unduly permissive to Reliance, or that he everreceived any benefits from Dhirubhai such as share allotments. ‘In my firstencounter with him I had to say no,’ Sen Gupta recalled. With the third series ofdebentures, Dhirubhai had put in a request that the holders be entitled to renouncerights attached to their implicit share entitlements. Sen Gupta insisted that thedebentures were not shares until converted.But Reliance was highly persuasive. On another occasion, Sen Gupta rejected thepremium that Reliance was seeking to put on an issue, on the ground that projectedprofitability had not been indicated. Without a pro-forma balance sheet for thecurrent year an extension of results to date-it could not be accepted.It was 1 pm that day; Sen Gupta was due to fly that evening to Bombay for ameeting of his seven-member committee on capital issues the next morning.Obviously it would be impossible to have the paperwork ready for this meeting. Hetold Reliance.Coming out of the arrivals hall of Bombay Airport at 7 pm, Sen Gupta was met byaccountants from Reliance, and handed a copy of the pro-forma balance sheet andresults for each of the seven committee members. ‘I had no option but to take upthe matter at our meeting,’ Sen Gupta said. .
By the end of 1986, Dhirubhai was to raise an unprecedented Rs 9.4 billion from thepublic over eight years, including Rs 5 billion from one debenture issue alone. ‘In factthis one company, Reliance,’ wrote Sen Gupta, ‘made significant contributions to thegrowth of the debenture market in the country through its successive issues ofconvertible debentures, a new experiment in running a big business undertakingentirelyon the resources drawn from the public at large without being backed by anymultinational, large industrial houses, or without taking term- loans from financialinstitutions on a significant scale.It was not entirely true that Dhirubhai did not tap the banks, as we shall see, but hisheyday in the capital markets did coincide with the rise of what Indian businessmagazines came to call the, ‘equity cult’s and Dhirubhai can rightly claim some ofthe credit for it.Between 1980 and 1985, the number of Indians owning shares increased from lessthan one million to four million. Among those, the number of shareholders inReliance rose to more than one million by the end of 1985. It was by far the widestshareholder base of any Indian company - and, until the privatisation of majorutilities like British Telecom or Nippon Telephone & Telegraph, probably in the world.It was evidence of a popular following that made many politicians, especially inGuiarat where Dhirubhai had earned local hero status-think twice before denying himanything.Sen Gupta put the sharemarket craze down to the entry of three non-traditionalclasses of investors. One was the Indian middle class, who had forgotten about theirmisadventure in the stockmarket in the Second World War. Another was theexpatriate Indian communities, prospering rapidly in Britain, North America andSoutheast Asia after their miserable expulsion from East Africa in the 1960s, andaugmented by direct migrants qualifying for professional and skilled entry toadvanced economics. Since Pranab Mukherjee’s 1982 budget, these non-residentIndians or NRIs and their companies had been able to invest directly into Indianequities. <strong>The</strong> third class was the larger landowning farmers, prosperous after thehuge crop-yield increases of the Green Revolution during the 1960s and 1970s, whocontinued to enjoy tax exemption on their income.<strong>The</strong> equity cult spread from nearly 20 major exchanges. <strong>The</strong> premier bourse was thecentury-old Bombay Stock Exchange located in Dalal Street, one of the teemingnarrow streets of the city’s Old Fort district where brokers, businessmen,accountants and lawyers crammed into tiny offices in old stone buildings with theremnants of charming wooden and wrought-iron balconies.Although surmounted by a 28-storey office tower of cement, steel and glass, thetrading floor in the podium operated until the mid-1990s much as it had done in the19th century. Some computer monitors flickered on the periphery but no oneexpected them to keep up with the frenetic trading done by brawling, shouting,gesticulating ‘robbers’ in blue jackets, or with the thriving after-hours kerb marketwhere shares were traded informally.<strong>The</strong> paperwork was also miles behind the action. Share transactions were recordedon scraps of paper at brokers’ offices, but transfers were not necessarily lodged withcompany registrars immediately. Settlements came every second Friday, causing a
- Page 2: AcknowledgementsIntroduction: an in
- Page 7 and 8: several years. I sent off some clip
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- Page 11 and 12: A PERSUASIVE YOUNG BANIAAmong all t
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- Page 15 and 16: looked far beyond their immediate p
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The committee asked Reliance at lea
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To clinch a prosecution under the F
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operators of the Indian havala trad
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While the law enforcers were closin
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the obligatory disclosures in the p
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On 5 December, the Central Excise a
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LETTING LOOSE A SCORPIONDhirubhai A
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identified himself as an inquiry ag
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But the CBI’s two investigating o
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had been booked into the hotel unde
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dismissing Rajiv and appointing ano
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extended and gruelling interrogatio
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BUSINESS AS USUALDhirubhai Ambani w
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udget for the year starting April 1
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asket from UTI (by value) were Lars
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on the Financial Times of London. A
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1988, two allied activists, journal
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But just as the opposing forces see
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had continued social meetings with
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they recorded Babaria calling Kirti
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arrests on 1 August. When a reporte
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After the initial appearance of Kir
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Though he could not avert the storm
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Dhirubhai’s new newspaper, launch
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and indifferent to the bloodshed in
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temple at Ayodhya, he put off the f
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arriving at Rajiv’s heavily guard
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Securities and Exchange Board of In
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The shouting continued for half an
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The 1991-92 boom helped Dhirubhai q
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Because of this burden, any other n
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the proceeds of the previous Euro-i
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The telephone licences covered near
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HOUSEKEEPING SECRETSOn 29 November
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compliant bank to give in return fo
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According to sources close to the M
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Merrill Lynch. Jain had meanwhile c
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put on its screens. On 29 November,
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1992 into the tax evasion aspects o
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At least one former fund manager, a
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and avoids a prosecution in court.
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Reliance could no longer look eithe
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other hand, the ANZ Grindlays bank