Corruption and large-scale land acquisitions: an analysis of the role ...
Corruption and large-scale land acquisitions: an analysis of the role ...
Corruption and large-scale land acquisitions: an analysis of the role ...
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Senior government <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> politici<strong>an</strong>s ei<strong>the</strong>r being able to acquire lease rights to <strong>large</strong> areas <strong>of</strong>l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> for comp<strong>an</strong>ies <strong>the</strong>y <strong>the</strong>mselves own (frequently this beneficial ownership is not registered <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong>remains secret), or close relatives <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials gaining such rights.b) How judicial <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> accountability mech<strong>an</strong>isms c<strong>an</strong> be corruptedIn addition to corruption distorting legal procedure <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> due process when <strong>the</strong> decision-making around <strong>the</strong>acquisition <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> allocation <strong>of</strong> rights to <strong>large</strong>-<strong>scale</strong> l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> investments is being taken at <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> aproject’s life-cycle, corruption also occurs <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> has impacts throughout project implementation. The mostproblematic way this occurs from <strong>the</strong> perspective <strong>of</strong> victims <strong>of</strong> l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> grabbing is when accountability,regulatory or judicial mech<strong>an</strong>isms responsible for ensuring l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> investment projects are following <strong>the</strong> lawor not violating hum<strong>an</strong> rights, are corrupted. This c<strong>an</strong> occur for example when attempts by communitieswho have lost l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> to file complaints with <strong>the</strong> courts or non-judicial mech<strong>an</strong>isms are thwarted by <strong>of</strong>ficialspaid not to cooperate. Ano<strong>the</strong>r way in which this occurs is when comp<strong>an</strong>ies are well-connected enough toemploy police, military <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong>the</strong> courts to silence or block community activism through threats, wrongfularrest <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> detention, trumped-up charges <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r tactics.A separate impact during <strong>the</strong> implementation phase is when corruption prevents independent monitoring<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> evaluation <strong>of</strong> ongoing projects, enabling <strong>the</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>y to ignore regulations <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> safeguards, operateoutside <strong>of</strong> contractual terms <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> conditions, <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> prevent regulatory authorities from enforcing s<strong>an</strong>ctions or<strong>an</strong>nulling contracts.The experience <strong>of</strong> being displaced from <strong>an</strong>cestral l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> losing <strong>the</strong>ir ability to sustain <strong>the</strong>mselves c<strong>an</strong>worsen community-level disenfr<strong>an</strong>chisement <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> consequently fur<strong>the</strong>r undermine existing accountabilitymech<strong>an</strong>isms. The impoverishment which comes from losing l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> food security, for example, c<strong>an</strong>marginalise households <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> create barriers against <strong>the</strong>m participating equally in local level decisionmaking.In m<strong>an</strong>y countries however, identity <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> recognition as a national citizen is closely tied toownership <strong>of</strong> property. Once l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> is lost <strong>the</strong>refore, so may be <strong>the</strong> ability to register as a citizen, to vote orbe recorded in censuses or o<strong>the</strong>r demographic data, or have access to judicial <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> non-judicial forms <strong>of</strong>redress. In o<strong>the</strong>r situations, households who have lost l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> have no choice but to be employed as labourersfor <strong>the</strong> pl<strong>an</strong>tation comp<strong>an</strong>y which took <strong>the</strong>ir l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong>, <strong>the</strong>reby losing <strong>the</strong> last vestige <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir right to denounce<strong>the</strong> comp<strong>an</strong>y’s operations.c) Exp<strong>an</strong>sion <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> “resource curse” from extractive industries to <strong>large</strong>-<strong>scale</strong> l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> investmentsFor a number <strong>of</strong> years, Global Witness has documented <strong>the</strong> way in which m<strong>an</strong>y countries rich in oil, gas <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r minerals are none<strong>the</strong>less mired in poverty due to <strong>the</strong> so-called “resource curse” (also known as <strong>the</strong>paradox <strong>of</strong> plenty). According to economist Jeffrey D Sachs, this curse c<strong>an</strong> be attributed to threephenomena: when resource-related capital inflows inflate currency values <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> crowd-out unrelatedindustries; <strong>the</strong> volatility <strong>of</strong> commodity prices; <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong>the</strong> negative impacts <strong>of</strong> resource abund<strong>an</strong>ce on fragilepolitical institutions. 9 It is this third phenomenon on which Global Witness has traditionally focused; inparticular <strong>the</strong> need for <strong>the</strong> international community to recognise its potential <strong>role</strong> in fur<strong>the</strong>r undermininggovern<strong>an</strong>ce in fragile states, <strong>the</strong> devastating impact this c<strong>an</strong> have on local communities <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong>the</strong>environment, <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong>the</strong> necessity <strong>the</strong>refore <strong>of</strong> proactively leveraging reforms.Countries such as Angola, Cambodia <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> Liberia are examples where natural resource abund<strong>an</strong>ce combinedwith poor govern<strong>an</strong>ce, inadequate rule <strong>of</strong> law <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> l<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> resource tenure insecurity has enabled political<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> business elites to capture <strong>the</strong> state <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> its natural resource assets for personal pr<strong>of</strong>it. 10 It is this failure<strong>of</strong> govern<strong>an</strong>ce which me<strong>an</strong>s that citizens <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries have paid <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> resource extraction butreceived very few <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> benefits, <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> have no me<strong>an</strong>s to hold ei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> government or comp<strong>an</strong>ies toaccount for decisions or actions which negatively affect <strong>the</strong>m. In some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se countries, <strong>the</strong> gap between9 For fur<strong>the</strong>r information, see: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ECSPReport13_Brown.pdf (last accessed 8thOctober 2012) as well as <strong>the</strong> additional references given in footnote three.10 Please see Global Witness reports for fur<strong>the</strong>r details: for Cambodia - Cambodia’s Family Trees (2007) <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> Country for Sale(2009); for Liberia - The Usual Suspects (2003) <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> Curse or Cure (2011); <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> for Angola - Time for Tr<strong>an</strong>sparency (2004). Allare available for download at: www.globalwitness.org__________________________________Global Witness <strong>Corruption</strong> <strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> Large-Scale L<strong><strong>an</strong>d</strong> Acquisitions, Global Witness, October 2012 Page 4 <strong>of</strong> 10