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Mission Command and Cross-Domain Synergy - Defense ...

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Disclaimer: The views in this paper are those of the author <strong>and</strong> do not necessarily reflect theofficial policy or position of the Joint Staff, the Department of <strong>Defense</strong> (DOD), or the UnitedStates Government (USG).


This Insights <strong>and</strong> Best Practices Focus paper on <strong>Mission</strong> <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Cross</strong>-domain <strong>Synergy</strong>is written by the Deployable Training Division (DTD) of the Joint Staff J7 <strong>and</strong> published underthe auspices of the Joint Staff J7.Written by Deployable Training Division. POC is Mr. Mike Findlay.Deployable Training Division, Deputy Director Joint Staff J7, Joint Training116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697Email: js.dsc.j7.mbx.joint-training@mail.milAccessibility: Available in PDF format on the following websites:Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) (CAC enabled <strong>and</strong> registration required):https://www.jllis.mil/JSCC/apps/index.cfmJoint Doctrine, Education, <strong>and</strong> Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) (CAC enabled):https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp?pindex=0All Partners Access Network (APAN) (Registration required):https://community.apan.org/default.aspxJoint Electronic Library (Public website):http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.htmlJoint Staff J7 Joint Training Intelink (CAC enabled):https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/jcw/jt/default.aspxReleasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication. Approved for publicrelease; distribution is unlimited.Disclaimer: The views in this paper are those of the author <strong>and</strong> do not necessarily reflect theofficial policy or position of the Joint Staff, the Department of <strong>Defense</strong> (DOD), or the UnitedStates Government (USG).


1. Executive SummaryThe juxtaposing of mission comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> cross-domain synergy has clear utility at theaterstrategic<strong>and</strong> operational level for operating at the speed of the problem. <strong>Mission</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> isimportant in setting conditions for military subordinates. <strong>Cross</strong>-domain synergy leverages thecapabilities of our many mission partners to increase overall effectiveness.The so what. Three major insights:1) Building trust <strong>and</strong> gaining shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing: Our joint comm<strong>and</strong>ers increasingly notethe large number of mission partners that they must work with to build trust, shareunderst<strong>and</strong>ing, <strong>and</strong> achieve unified action. They also note how National <strong>and</strong> Internationalleaders’ viewpoints <strong>and</strong> policies change as these decision-makers interact <strong>and</strong> learn. Building<strong>and</strong> maintaining trust, continuous dialogue, <strong>and</strong> gaining shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing with the manymission partners impose significant time dem<strong>and</strong>s on comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> staffs at combatantcomm<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> JTFs. This may be a markedly different experience for those whose previousexperience was at the tactical level. However, it is this trust <strong>and</strong> shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing thatenables empowerment, cross-domain synergy, <strong>and</strong> ultimately effectiveness.2) Empowering subordinates to act: Today’s interconnected world is unpredictable <strong>and</strong>complex. The pace of change <strong>and</strong> speed of operations is accelerating. In response,comm<strong>and</strong>ers find they must share both operational context <strong>and</strong> their intent to successfullyempower disciplined initiative in their subordinates.3) Role of the support comm<strong>and</strong> relationship <strong>and</strong> the establishing authority: The need toleverage the many capabilities from other comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> partners to achieve cross-domainsynergy highlights the importance of the support comm<strong>and</strong> relationship, <strong>and</strong> requiresincreased effort by Establishing Authorities to prioritize, allocate resources, <strong>and</strong> synchronizeactions in order to act at the speed of the problem. OSD <strong>and</strong> JS level direct involvement isessential to enabling agile, cross-combatant comm<strong>and</strong> synergy.A comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy. We find that operational comm<strong>and</strong>ers view mission comm<strong>and</strong> as acomm<strong>and</strong> philosophy as noted in the CCJO. <strong>Mission</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> coupled with the reality ofinterdependence with our mission partners provides the basis for effective cross-domainsynergy – focused on achieving complementary versus merely additive employment ofcapabilities across domains <strong>and</strong> mission partners to achieve decisive advantage.Challenges. We introduce several challenges up front to set conditions for later insights:- Underst<strong>and</strong>ing the many existing perspectives, national interests, authorities, <strong>and</strong> policies.- Crafting clear guidance <strong>and</strong> intent, <strong>and</strong> sharing the continually changing context.- The pervasive information environment <strong>and</strong> its effect on increasing tempo of operations,decision-making, <strong>and</strong> real-time visibility of tactical actions in the global media.- Number, diversity, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the capabilities of the many mission partners.- The inclination to centralize decision-making to mitigate risk or gain perceived efficiencies.- Complexity of operating globally across combatant comm<strong>and</strong> boundaries <strong>and</strong> with partners.Insights <strong>and</strong> Best Practices. We share insights <strong>and</strong> best practices centered on:- Building <strong>and</strong> maintaining trust <strong>and</strong> relationships.- Dialogue to gain <strong>and</strong> share underst<strong>and</strong>ing, <strong>and</strong> ultimately a co-creation of context.- Importance of strategic reflection for guidance, intent, <strong>and</strong> empowerment.- Reality of interdependence <strong>and</strong> benefit of cross-domain synergy.- Importance of ensuring clarity in comm<strong>and</strong> relationships.i


2. <strong>Mission</strong> <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> 1General: <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ers at the joint leveluse some form of a mission comm<strong>and</strong>philosophy focused on the Art of <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong><strong>Mission</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> is the conduct of militaryoperations through decentralized executionbased upon mission-type orders.Joint Publication 3-0 “Joint Operations” 11 Aug 2011in today’s complex environment, regardless of the technological <strong>and</strong> informationalimprovements that many refer to as the Science of Control. The art of comm<strong>and</strong> is thecreative <strong>and</strong> skillful use of authority, instincts, intuition, <strong>and</strong> experience in decision-making<strong>and</strong> leadership while the science of control is about the systems <strong>and</strong> procedures that improvea comm<strong>and</strong>er’s underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> support the execution of missions. Effective jointcomm<strong>and</strong>ers leverage both the art <strong>and</strong>science.“<strong>Mission</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> is a continual cognitiveeffort to underst<strong>and</strong>, to adapt, <strong>and</strong> to directeffectively the achievement of intent.”CJCS White Paper on <strong>Mission</strong> <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>The Chairman notes in his White Paper thatthe burden is on the comm<strong>and</strong>er due to thecomplexity <strong>and</strong> uncertainty of the environment, the tempo of operations, <strong>and</strong> the number ofmission partners. Additionally, while we leverage new technology to advance our science ofcontrol, that aspect may not always be robust (e.g., in austere environments) <strong>and</strong> may bevulnerable to attack. This further reinforces the need to focus on mission comm<strong>and</strong>.A comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy: <strong>Mission</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> is a comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy as noted in theCCJO. The key attributes of this comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy (trust, underst<strong>and</strong>ing, <strong>and</strong> intent) arein current joint <strong>and</strong> service doctrine. Allcomm<strong>and</strong>ers exercise varying degrees ofcontrol in their application of missioncomm<strong>and</strong> based on several factors, such asthe situation, activity, <strong>and</strong> capabilities offorces. 2 One example of this is the positive<strong>and</strong> procedural control measures used withinairspace control. 3“One of the myths of <strong>Mission</strong> <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> is that itequals less or little control. In some ways thiscould not be further from the truth. <strong>Mission</strong><strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> is the balancing of <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> <strong>and</strong>Control, <strong>and</strong> different ways to gain control. Iwould offer that universal underst<strong>and</strong>ing of<strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>er’s Intent is a very powerful method ofcontrol.” Senior Flag Officer 2013A mission comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy allows for the Service <strong>and</strong> Functional Components <strong>and</strong>coalition partners to operate in a decentralized manner in accordance with their doctrine <strong>and</strong>concepts. The Navy’s daily intentions messages <strong>and</strong> Composite Warfare <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>er (CWC)Concept <strong>and</strong> the USAF’s centralized control <strong>and</strong> decentralized execution concept for C2 areService examples. <strong>Mission</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> provides the means (through comm<strong>and</strong>er’s intent,mission type orders, <strong>and</strong> decentralized execution) to operate at the speed of the problem by1 We also incorporate much of this in our broader Joint Operations – Insights <strong>and</strong> Best Practices paper datedMarch 2013.2 As the CCJO notes, “It is important to note that while mission comm<strong>and</strong> is the preferred comm<strong>and</strong>philosophy, it is not appropriate to all situations. Certain specific activities require more detailed control, suchas the employment of nuclear weapons or other national capabilities, air traffic control, or activities that arefundamentally about the efficient synchronization of resources.”3 See AFDD-1 <strong>and</strong> JP 3-52 (Joint Airspace Control) for good discussions on the centralized control <strong>and</strong>decentralized execution of airpower <strong>and</strong> airspace control. AFDD-1 addresses how decentralized executionallows subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers to take the initiative <strong>and</strong> increase airspace control effectiveness through realtimeintegration during execution. JP 3-52 addresses the concept of positive <strong>and</strong> procedural control measuresthat are used in airspace control. Airspace control procedures provide flexibility through an effectivecombination of positive <strong>and</strong> procedural control measures.1


increasing overall agility <strong>and</strong> effectiveness, <strong>and</strong> enables better synergistic cross-domainoperations with our joint, interagency, <strong>and</strong> multinational mission partners.Challenges: We have seen the following challenges in the exercise of mission comm<strong>and</strong>.• Underst<strong>and</strong>ing the many perspectives, national interests, <strong>and</strong> policies at the international<strong>and</strong> national level is hard for the comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> staff to digest. It is difficult to remainabreast of the continually changing geopolitical context <strong>and</strong> national guidance due to itsscope, complexity, <strong>and</strong> many players. (For example, in 2011 the mission in Libya rapidlyevolved from one initially focused on NEO to that of military intervention) It is equallyhard to rapidly share this changing underst<strong>and</strong>ing at every echelon in the military formationto enable disciplined initiative.Subordinates may not alwaysgrasp the subtleties of thebroader <strong>and</strong> changing context inwhich they may have to operate.This can result in thecomm<strong>and</strong>ers opting to retaincontrol <strong>and</strong> not empower theirsubordinates, potentially losing the initiative.“I found that common underst<strong>and</strong>ing to be the essential enablerfor fast-paced, decentralized operations. But the effort requiredto attain <strong>and</strong> maintain that level of shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing isremarkable - it takes changing how the entire comm<strong>and</strong>processes <strong>and</strong> shares information - <strong>and</strong> runs starkly against thegrain of most layered comm<strong>and</strong> structures <strong>and</strong> processes - <strong>and</strong>challenges the desire of many individuals <strong>and</strong> organizations tocontrol information.” Senior Flag Officer 2013• Authorities. The decentralized nature of mission comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> delegation of approvallevels require that subordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> appreciate the many relevantlaws, policies, <strong>and</strong> directives. Lack of a shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing of these authorities <strong>and</strong> theirlimitations can result in loss of legitimacy, trust, cohesion, <strong>and</strong> tendency to retaincentralized control.Establishing <strong>and</strong> maintaining a common <strong>and</strong> uniform underst<strong>and</strong>ing of authorities becomesespecially relevant in operationalizing a mission comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy. There are numerousU.S authorities (think of Title 10, 22, 50 <strong>and</strong> other authorities) <strong>and</strong> significant international<strong>and</strong> national authorities (including the host nation) in multinational operations. There arealso many specified authorities <strong>and</strong> responsibilities within the U.S. Armed Forces (such asthe operational direction authority of a joint force comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> Services’ Title 10 <strong>and</strong>administrative control responsibilities). An example of this lies in the complex ADCON<strong>and</strong> Title 10 relationships that the U.S. National Support Element in Afghanistan has withthe Theater Service Component <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>s (such as ARCENT) <strong>and</strong> the Service forcesunder the NATO OPCON of the <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>er, ISAF. Underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> application ofthese many authorities requires frequent special staff access to the comm<strong>and</strong>er as he framesproblems, provides guidance, <strong>and</strong> makes decisions.• Information environment. The global information environment brings several challenges.It leads to an increase in the tempo of operations as we are challenged to observe, plan,decide <strong>and</strong> act quicker than the adversary. It can also lead to instances of informationoverload as comm<strong>and</strong>ers attempt to process all information before making decisions. Insome cases we see that this onslaught of information - driven by the staff - may precludecomm<strong>and</strong>ers from taking valuable time for strategic reflection on the problem,development of a well thought-out operational approach, <strong>and</strong> crafting of clear guidance<strong>and</strong> intent. In these cases, the comm<strong>and</strong>s will often default to a centralized controlphilosophy as they react to emerging challenges with no clear overarching approach.2


Staffs may also be inclined to over rely on the “science of control” relative to the art ofcomm<strong>and</strong> by implementing more reporting, control measures, <strong>and</strong> battle rhythm events inan attempt to fully monitor, track, <strong>and</strong> control operations. Staffs may not underst<strong>and</strong> or becomfortable in operating within a mission comm<strong>and</strong> construct of trust, sharedunderst<strong>and</strong>ing, intent, <strong>and</strong> empowerment. Likewise, the opposite may also exist where thestaff may have to operate in an environment where shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> trust isinadequate at the comm<strong>and</strong> level.The information environment also has the potential to imbue tactical action with nearimmediate strategic ramifications due to visibility in the continuous 24-hour media. Thiscan lead to risk adverseness <strong>and</strong> a tendency to over-control <strong>and</strong> centralize decision makingwhen we may need to do just the opposite.Successful units fight through this by working even harder to share underst<strong>and</strong>ing, provideclear intent, <strong>and</strong> trust, decentralize, <strong>and</strong> empower subordinates to appropriately act at thespeed of the problem. We also see comm<strong>and</strong>ers using their instincts <strong>and</strong> intuitive judgmentto cut through the fog <strong>and</strong> friction induced within the information environment.• Number of mission partners. The interconnected nature of operations requires continuousinteraction with a large number of our unified action mission partners especially at thestrategic <strong>and</strong> operational level. Building <strong>and</strong> maintaining trust with these many partners isdifficult <strong>and</strong> imposes significant time dem<strong>and</strong>s on comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> staffs. This hasparticular significance to flag <strong>and</strong> general officers as they assume positions of authority instrategic <strong>and</strong> operational level positions <strong>and</strong> spend significant time engaging with thesemission partners. They will not have as much time available to directly control or guidesubordinates as they may have done in previous assignments. Thus, the concept of missioncomm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the importance of shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing, guidance, <strong>and</strong> intent may be evenmore important at this higher level as comm<strong>and</strong>ers increase efforts up <strong>and</strong> out with othermission partners. Nurturing relationships must be a constant drumbeat for the comm<strong>and</strong>er –in <strong>and</strong> out of crisis.• Diversity of mission partners / subordinates. Our mission partners - both adjacentpartners <strong>and</strong> subordinates may come from a culture or background in which decisionmakingis centralized, <strong>and</strong> where empowerment, subordinate level decision-making, <strong>and</strong>acceptance of responsibility is not comfortable or expected. Some mission partners may nothave the capability to gain the same degree of situational underst<strong>and</strong>ing or have the sameexperience in operations (think of a new U.S. or coalition member to the team) <strong>and</strong> mayrequire increased support, supervision, or control. Equally important is underst<strong>and</strong>ing howeach partner communicates. Some partners may use texting on cell phones, some needformal papers, some use fax, some prefer phone, <strong>and</strong> some will require a formal top downapproach. Each partner has a method of communicating that is unique <strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ersmust devote the time necessary to figure this out or they will waste time with ineffectivecommunication that slows down the building of trust <strong>and</strong> confidence across the team.<strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ers must recognize these differences as they build relationships, <strong>and</strong> massage <strong>and</strong>tailor the necessary level of coordination, control or supervision (think different level ofintelligence support, coaching, planning support, increased visits <strong>and</strong> SME support).Ignoring these differences can damage trust <strong>and</strong> teamwork, <strong>and</strong> risk missionaccomplishment.• Peacetime centralization tendency. The decade of learned lessons in irregular warfareinforms us of the value of decentralization to achieve operational objectives <strong>and</strong> is the basis3


for globally integrated operations described in the CCJO. History suggests there is potentialfor a return to more centralized comm<strong>and</strong> philosophies as the military transitions fromlarge-scale conflicts to a different l<strong>and</strong>scape characterized by peacetime engagements <strong>and</strong>limited conflicts. Garrison operations, tight fiscal constraints, <strong>and</strong> increased competition forpromotion could bias leaders, especially within the Services, toward centralization in aneffort to be more efficient <strong>and</strong> controlling. Our joint headquarters may also be tempted tocentrally control the myriad of more scrutinized peacetime engagements. However, whilecentralization may work to some degree in peace, it may not work in conflict (or a disasterresponse) in which higher comm<strong>and</strong>ers rely on subordinates’ initiative <strong>and</strong> speed ofdecision <strong>and</strong> action. It takes time to develop a culture of decentralization <strong>and</strong>empowerment; it can’t occur overnight when a crisis occurs. Therefore we suggest the needto deliberately determine the degree of a centralized or decentralized comm<strong>and</strong> climate <strong>and</strong>culture in peacetime.• Service-centric approach to operations. History also suggests the potential to return to aService-centric focus in the years ahead as we move away from the decade of war <strong>and</strong>close interaction. Over time we may forget the potential benefits of a unified actionapproach as we focus on Service basic skill sets. We may also lose the valuable techniques<strong>and</strong> procedures relevant to joint <strong>and</strong> combined operations with our mission partners. Thiscould move us away from a mission comm<strong>and</strong> philosophy <strong>and</strong> interdependent mindset withour partners that are essential for success in periods of conflict <strong>and</strong> other operations.Insights:• Trust <strong>and</strong> Relationships.Building <strong>and</strong> maintainingtrust is possibly acomm<strong>and</strong>er’s mostimportant action toestablishing <strong>and</strong> exercisingmission comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong>achieving cross-domainsynergy. Developing trust“In my judgment, key elements to building these criticalrelationships are frank dialogue, private conversations,underst<strong>and</strong>ing the host nation perspective, being able to explain U.S.policy, <strong>and</strong> being proactive with bad news. Frank dialogue <strong>and</strong>private conversations go h<strong>and</strong>-in-h<strong>and</strong> in terms of building a solidrelationship with our counterparts. Culturally, public appearances<strong>and</strong> meetings tend to be ceremonial in nature, where agreement <strong>and</strong>face-saving are the priorities. My experience was that realrelationship building could occur in private meetings because there itis possible to be open about contentious issues without fear ofembarrassment to either party.” Senior Flag Officer 2013up, down, <strong>and</strong> across gains synergy with mission partners <strong>and</strong> enables mission type orders<strong>and</strong> empowerment.Personal relationships are often equally or more important than comm<strong>and</strong> relationships intoday’s complex interorganizational environment. These relationships must be built <strong>and</strong>continuously maintained through both dialogue <strong>and</strong> actions – before, during, <strong>and</strong> aftercrises. This has significant time implications, especially the time to build <strong>and</strong> maintain trust<strong>and</strong> relationships with stakeholders <strong>and</strong> new mission partners (think about the time requiredfor an incoming joint comm<strong>and</strong>er to build trust through both words <strong>and</strong> actions with thecountry team(s) or a coalition partner that justjoined the team). We see comm<strong>and</strong>ers makingthis their priority.- Observed best practices: Plan how to build <strong>and</strong> maintain trust in<strong>and</strong> out of crisis.4“I think we all take building a team forgranted <strong>and</strong> think we are really good at it, butthe reality is that most military leaders areNOT as proficient at building teams as theythink. We are too service centric <strong>and</strong> oftenexclude out JIIM partners.”Senior Flag Officer 2013


Identify the organization(s) the comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>and</strong> staff will be most dependent on orwork with as the target for early engagement <strong>and</strong> team-building. A comm<strong>and</strong>er’s timeis finite so they have to pick where to invest with regard to critical relationships. Establishing a personal relationship between comm<strong>and</strong>ers built on mutual respect thatstaffs see will spread throughout the organizations <strong>and</strong> become a critical enabler whenthe staffs are required to execute operations in the chaos <strong>and</strong> fog of war. Actively build trust through words <strong>and</strong> actions, <strong>and</strong> continue reinforcing it. Allocate the necessary time to build trust before a crisis (in phase 0 - Shape). Subordinates can help by demonstrating competence to gain the confidence of theirleaders. This is a factor in trust. Include mission partners in comm<strong>and</strong>erconferences, circulation, <strong>and</strong> battle rhythmevents. Establish private means <strong>and</strong> theatmosphere to engage directly withsubordinate comm<strong>and</strong>ers. Leverage both the ability for frank discussions in private meetings <strong>and</strong> publicengagements with mission partners to fully share perspectives. Focus on aligning actions <strong>and</strong> words (e.g., follow through on promises).“Intelligence sharing is an important foundation for building trust.The comm<strong>and</strong>er of a US-led JTF will arrive with information <strong>and</strong>intelligence capabilities that will dwarf the next largest partner.Traditional foreign disclosure mechanisms are slow <strong>and</strong>cumbersome resulting in a comm<strong>and</strong>er being unable to share muchmore than open source information. This can/will slow the buildingof trust <strong>and</strong> confidence unless it is attacked early. Rather than ask“what can I share”, perhaps a better question for a comm<strong>and</strong>er is“what can’t I share.” Once this is determined through a set ofoperating rules, the comm<strong>and</strong>er would be well served to floodmission partners with shareable data <strong>and</strong> intelligence.”Senior Flag Officer 20135“Trust must also be earned. If a subordinatehas not shown adequate competence in aparticular area, they may have not yet earnedthe complete trust of their superior. There isa difference between earned trust <strong>and</strong> blindtrust.” Senior Flag Officer 2013 Broaden engagement to more than just the comm<strong>and</strong>er (e.g., staff <strong>and</strong> subordinates). Consider the advantages of using st<strong>and</strong>ing Service <strong>and</strong> Functional Component HQs toemploy forces versus default to st<strong>and</strong>ing up adhoc JTF HQs due to the trust <strong>and</strong>relationships already built within the permanent st<strong>and</strong>ing HQs with both theCombatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>HQs <strong>and</strong> AOR missionpartners. Maintain sensitivity toguard against / correct thepotential for a falseperception of U.S.military leaders’disregard of othercoalition members / rolesthrough over-emphasizeduse of US SIPRNET <strong>and</strong> US-only meetings.• Dialogue to Gain <strong>and</strong> Share Underst<strong>and</strong>ing. Gaining <strong>and</strong> maintaining a commonunderst<strong>and</strong>ing of the situation, problem, <strong>and</strong> intent is a significant challenge. This canaffect what right looks like. National leadership may have different geopoliticalperspectives than field comm<strong>and</strong>ers. A theater-strategic comm<strong>and</strong>er might very well have adifferent perspective on the environment <strong>and</strong> problem than an individual at the tacticallevel. Similarly, a military comm<strong>and</strong>er may have a different perspective than a StateDepartment Foreign Service Officer. Thus, doing the right thing for one may not be thesame right thing for another. This also has a temporal aspect to it – the environment iscontinually changing <strong>and</strong> the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of what’s right may not keep up (think aboutthe changes in nighttime tactical operations <strong>and</strong> evidence-based operations in Afghanistan


as the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) matured <strong>and</strong> assertedits sovereign authority).We observe that one must continually dialogue with higher authorities <strong>and</strong> mission partnersto better underst<strong>and</strong> the changing environment <strong>and</strong> perspectives <strong>and</strong> what a sharedunderst<strong>and</strong>ing of right looks like. This continuingdialogue deepens trust, clarifies authorities foraction, assists problem framing as part of design,enriches guidance <strong>and</strong> intent, enables synergy“Trust <strong>and</strong> communication with national level comm<strong>and</strong> is key- <strong>and</strong> should be far more carefully executed than it has been inthe past. Expecting an ad hoc collection of civilians <strong>and</strong>military - many new to their positions - <strong>and</strong> coming fromstarkly difference experience-backgrounds to mold themselvesrapidly into a cohesive team capable of processing complexinformation <strong>and</strong> conducting effective decisionmaking -particularly in times of crisis - is a stretch. We should respectthe difficulty of the tasks before them <strong>and</strong> do everythingpossible to build cohesion…” Senior Flag Officer 20136“We’ve got to develop leaders who can takethe facts of the situation, apply context <strong>and</strong>underst<strong>and</strong>.” CJCS January 2013with mission partners, <strong>and</strong> coupled with mission-type orders, enables us to release thedisciplined initiative of subordinates to do the right thing. One Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ernotes “collaboration releases theinitiative of subordinates.” Thiscollaboration <strong>and</strong> informationsharing has significant timeimplications for joint forcecomm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> subordinates.- Observed best practices: Recognize the geopoliticalchallenges that nationallevel leaders will likely facein a crisis. <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ers can assist them by underst<strong>and</strong>ing their perspectives whilealso keeping them informed of theater-strategic <strong>and</strong> operational military-relatedperspectives, potential risks, <strong>and</strong> feasible options. This will enhance trust betweennational leadership <strong>and</strong> operationalcomm<strong>and</strong>ers required for the resultantdelegation of authorities <strong>and</strong> st<strong>and</strong>ingpermissions. Recognize the “contract” made withsubordinates as a result of sharingunderst<strong>and</strong>ing. Shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing is“<strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ers must consider <strong>and</strong> anticipatepossible changes in the geopolitical dynamic.This is not a staff function, but rather is confinedto the comm<strong>and</strong> group so it does not detractfrom the business of the day. This is wherestrategic "thinking time" is well spent.”Senior Flag Officer 2013a “trust” contract for subsequent disciplined initiative on the part of the subordinates.The word disciplined is key here, signifying recognition (<strong>and</strong> agreement) on bothparties that the actions taken will be consistent with higher intent <strong>and</strong> the sharedcontext. Emphasize use of comm<strong>and</strong>er conferences (both physical <strong>and</strong> virtual). Direct staff-level interaction <strong>and</strong> sharing (i.e., not just comm<strong>and</strong>ers sharinginformation). Assess this interaction <strong>and</strong> emphasize as required. Focus attention on underst<strong>and</strong>ing authorities. This takes effort <strong>and</strong> is often led by theJ5 <strong>and</strong> SJA. Conduct significant comm<strong>and</strong>er circulation (<strong>and</strong> staff circulation) sharingperspectives (up, down, <strong>and</strong> across). Scheduling discipline is required here to preventcirculation fratricide due to multiple visits overwhelming the same subordinate – allwith different messages. Provide feedback to the staff from comm<strong>and</strong>er circulation; they don’t have the benefitof the underst<strong>and</strong>ing gained through this circulation <strong>and</strong> discourse.


Develop appropriate CCIR, organize the staff, <strong>and</strong> discipline the battle rhythm toensure the staff optimally supports agile comm<strong>and</strong>er decision-making. Use instincts<strong>and</strong> intuitive judgment when appropriate to cut through the fog <strong>and</strong> friction ofinundation of information. Develop a communicationsinfrastructure that allows forinformation sharing <strong>and</strong> collaborationwith mission partners (e.g., DOD,USG Interagency, <strong>and</strong> Coalition).This will likely require some form ofcommon mission network much like“It is important to have comm<strong>and</strong>ers think throughwhat they "can" know <strong>and</strong> what they "need" to know,how they prepare themselves <strong>and</strong> their entire team tofunction in that environment, <strong>and</strong> how they must sortthrough what will likely drive events at higher levels<strong>and</strong> what is just noise to disregard. Not easy, exactor static by any means.”Senior Flag Officer 2013the Afghanistan <strong>Mission</strong> Network (AMN), All Partners Access Network (APAN), orthe emergent <strong>Mission</strong> Partner Environment (MPE) discussed later in the paper.• Intent. <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ers are responsible to provide quality guidance <strong>and</strong> intent that linksstrategic direction to operational approaches to tactical action, the essence of operationalart. This starts with insightful dialogue to inform <strong>and</strong> be informed by national <strong>and</strong>international leadership. Quality guidance <strong>and</strong> intent, coupled with risk guidance, enablesmission comm<strong>and</strong>.- Observed best practices: Make the time to dialogue <strong>and</strong> strategically reflect on the problem before crafting <strong>and</strong>providing guidance <strong>and</strong> intent. Bring external players into the inner circle to discuss the environment <strong>and</strong> challenges.Attempt to see the various perspectives on the problem – the political-military aspectsfrom the national (<strong>and</strong> international level), the regional level, <strong>and</strong> from theadversaries’ perspective (value of red teaming). Consider how the operational approach <strong>and</strong> intent can place the adversary on anoperational horns of a dilemma by exploiting vulnerabilities <strong>and</strong> maintainingadvantage. Recognize the value of continuous circulation <strong>and</strong> sharing of intent, particularly in theearly stages of a crisis. Consider how intent enables the comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> subordinates to take on an adaptivestance to be able to rapidly adapt to a thinking adversary. Co-develop intent with mission partners (including higher <strong>and</strong> subordinates) to gaintheir perspectives <strong>and</strong> subsequent underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> buy-in. Sample interpretationbefore issuing is often helpful. What the comm<strong>and</strong>er writes <strong>and</strong> what subordinatesread may be very different - better to fix before sending. Personally craft comm<strong>and</strong>er’s intent. We recognize this is a common dictum, but westill see planners drafting intent. These draft intents often predispose comm<strong>and</strong>ers’final intent <strong>and</strong> guidance documents <strong>and</strong> do not reap the benefit of the comm<strong>and</strong>ers’personal reflections on the problem <strong>and</strong> approach. Continuously share intent, not only in orders, but also during circulation, <strong>and</strong> inmeetings <strong>and</strong> other battle rhythm events. Be prepared to change intent based on the situation <strong>and</strong> reframing of the problem.7


Do not abrogate the higher headquarters design <strong>and</strong> planning responsibilities as partof the concept of decentralization.• Risk guidance. Provide risk guidance as an important aspect of mission comm<strong>and</strong>. It helpsto share intent <strong>and</strong> share underst<strong>and</strong>ing by communicating the comm<strong>and</strong>er’s perspective ofhis perceived impediments (or hazards) to the mission <strong>and</strong> force, together with respectivedecision approval authorities (often through some form of decision approval matrix). Thisis directly related to empowerment.- Observed best practices: Deliberately analyze risks to the mission <strong>and</strong> force. Use red teams. Underst<strong>and</strong> national caveats of mission partners before publicly outlining risk.Publicly outlining risk before underst<strong>and</strong>ing national caveats creates the possibility ofplacing a team member in an embarrassing position (since it is not their decision whatthey can/can’t do in the operation). Delineate these risks to the mission <strong>and</strong> the force together with risk mitigationdirection (including decision approval authorities). Be clear where the comm<strong>and</strong>er is willing to accept risk. Don’t be vague <strong>and</strong> requiresubordinates to “suck it up.” Make it very clear who is allowed to take what level of risk. Correlate key risks with CCIR. CCIR helps share to the staff <strong>and</strong> subordinates whatthe comm<strong>and</strong>er feels is important; such as future decisions <strong>and</strong> potential risks.• Empowerment. The last ten years of combat reinforce the need to decentralize <strong>and</strong>empower our subordinates <strong>and</strong> staff to act at the speed of the problem. Those who didn’tappropriately decentralize lost agility <strong>and</strong> initiative, <strong>and</strong> risked mission failure. We haveseen how comm<strong>and</strong>er’s intent focused on the what <strong>and</strong> why versus the how enables thedisciplined initiative in the subordinates to gain agility <strong>and</strong> effectiveness.<strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>ers need to take the time to underst<strong>and</strong>, recognize, <strong>and</strong> develop a subordinate’sability for empowerment <strong>and</strong> initiative, together with the skill to know how <strong>and</strong> when toadjust the necessary level of supervision. (Think how some comm<strong>and</strong>ers in Iraq <strong>and</strong>Afghanistan would focus their attention <strong>and</strong> coaching on a new member of the team,developing his or her tactical prowess until up to st<strong>and</strong>ard, <strong>and</strong> then incrementallyempower them.)Combatant comm<strong>and</strong>s also recognize the need for empowerment. Every GeographicCombatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> we visit has numerous ongoing missions, including multiplepeacetime engagements as they work with the many U.S. Ambassadors, nations, <strong>and</strong>stakeholders throughout their AOR. Similarly, Functional Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>s areworking with all of the Geographic <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>s. Each of these Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>s relyon mission comm<strong>and</strong> to set conditions for numerous subordinate actions. These higherheadquarters focus on design <strong>and</strong> planning activities <strong>and</strong> share their underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong>provide guidance <strong>and</strong> intent to help set conditions for their subordinates to execute.- Observed best practices: Recognize the need not just for intent, but also for a shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing of contextin order to empower disciplined initiative - particularly important at strategic <strong>and</strong>operational level. This is related to the earlier discussion on disciplined initiative.8


Delegate authorities to the lowest appropriate level capable of integrating assets towork inside the adversary’s decision cycle. Within this, balance decentralization withthe need for the requisite level of supervision. Accept becoming uncomfortablydecentralized to achieve mission success. This may include providing assets tosubordinates as well. Develop Terms of Reference (TOR) documents laying out roles <strong>and</strong> responsibilitiesof deputy comm<strong>and</strong>ers <strong>and</strong> key staff within the HQ. Tailor decision approval matrices applicable to decision approval authorities bothwithin the HQs <strong>and</strong> for subordinate headquarters. For example, J-code directors maybe empowered with certain decision authorities to maintain decision agility <strong>and</strong>effectiveness within the headquarters in addition to empowering subordinatecomm<strong>and</strong>ers. Align CCIR <strong>and</strong> other reporting requirements with decision approval levels. Whilerecognizing the requirement for shared underst<strong>and</strong>ing, guard against establishingCCIR <strong>and</strong> other reporting requirements that may have the effect of impinging on theinitiative or slowing agility of subordinate units. Conduct quality in-briefs with new leaders / key personnel coupled with focusedvisits <strong>and</strong> circulation to assess strengths, degree of experience, <strong>and</strong> comfort inexercising initiative <strong>and</strong> accepting responsibility. Make subsequent decisions onnecessary coaching <strong>and</strong> mentoring, <strong>and</strong> tailoring of degree of empowerment. (Somemembers of the team may be empowered more than others based on varying levels intheir abilities, their propensity for initiative, <strong>and</strong> their mission set.) Be attentive to not overwhelm subordinates with collaboration or visits as they arealso planning <strong>and</strong> conducting their missions with their subordinates. We often seedeliberate limiting of dem<strong>and</strong>s on subordinates for extensive updates during higherHQ battle rhythm updates, rather tasking the higher HQ staff to report on thesituation, <strong>and</strong> then giving subordinates freedom to surface issues <strong>and</strong> questions. Define your fight. Ask the key questions: What is the Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>’s fight,the JTF’s fight, <strong>and</strong> the Subordinate’s fight? If we don’t do that up front, everyonefocuses on fighting the subordinate’sfight; no one is focused on setting theconditions upfront for their success. Discipline your organization to stay atthe right level from a higher“Regarding defining the fight, I recommendcomm<strong>and</strong>ers monitor the lanes, not just to keepthemselves in check, but to give theirsubordinates the cleanest water to move forward.”Senior Flag Officer 2013headquarters perspective. We’ve heard the common adage before “One is morecomfortable <strong>and</strong> will default to doing their last job, <strong>and</strong> not their new job.”Operational <strong>and</strong> strategic level HQs will be tempted to operate at the tactical level.One comm<strong>and</strong>er deliberately kept his headquarters lean to not give the staff thecapacity or opportunity to take on subordinate headquarters tasks. We continuallyhear the wisdom in focusing higher headquarters on setting conditions for the successof their subordinates. This is all part of staying at the right level to enable missioncomm<strong>and</strong>.9


3. <strong>Cross</strong>-domain <strong>Synergy</strong> 4<strong>Cross</strong>-domain synergy <strong>and</strong> the ideaof interdependence is a quantum(but not new) mindset change froma vertical orientation (receiving <strong>and</strong>unilaterally accomplishing tasksdirected by the higher comm<strong>and</strong>er)OtherCCMDsNationalLeadershipJoint Force<strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong>erDImEL<strong>and</strong> SOF Air MaritimeDImEExamples of cross-domain synergy:NationalLeadershipOther Nations’EffortsOther Nations’Assetsto that of working much more closely with your horizontal mission partners as depicted bythe shaded areas in the above figure. The attributes of mission comm<strong>and</strong>, coupled with thereality of interdependence with our mission partners, provide the basis for cross-domainsynergy. General Mattisnotes the very clear humanaspect to cross-domainsynergy in his quote oncreating harmony.Interdependence. Weoperate as one team with ourmission partners – joint,“In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationallybrilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony – even viciousharmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines,across coalition <strong>and</strong> national lines, <strong>and</strong> across civilian/militarylines, you really need to go home, because your leadership intoday’s age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who cancreate harmony across all those lines.”Gen Mattis [Joint Warfighting Conference 2010]coalition, USG interagency, <strong>and</strong> other interorganizational players. These are not just words ora slogan; we depend on each other to succeed in today’s complex security environment. Thisis de facto interdependence: the dependence on access to each other’s capabilities to succeedin assigned tasks (even though you don’t own them).<strong>Cross</strong>-<strong>Domain</strong> <strong>Synergy</strong>. We continually observe that the directed combination of military<strong>and</strong> interorganizational capabilities typically dedicated to one domain (e.g., l<strong>and</strong>, sea, air,cyber, or space) - or realm of responsibility – can produce effects beyond just in that singledomain to enhance the effectiveness <strong>and</strong> compensate for the vulnerabilities of other domains.Our nation’s strength is in the fact that we are generally without equal when one looks acrossall five above noted domains; 5cross-domain synergy is aboutusing every advantage we have toachieve overmatching power.The value of synergy (cross-domainor within a domain) is not new. Anexample is airpower operatingwithin the air domain that hasbeneficial effect in the l<strong>and</strong> or seadomain. The same could be said forcyber or space. Other examples arein the text box. We find this crossdomainsynergy can apply to more• Theater air support to a ground comm<strong>and</strong>er. Implementedthrough a support comm<strong>and</strong> relationship, exchange of liaison,<strong>and</strong> provision of robust integration elements capable ofharmonizing air power at the operational <strong>and</strong> tacticalechelons.• Homel<strong>and</strong> ballistic missile defense. Implemented throughsupport comm<strong>and</strong> relationships between combatantcomm<strong>and</strong>s, prioritization, <strong>and</strong> detailed authorities, includingROE, <strong>and</strong> responsibilities across mission partners.• Overflight rights in support of an operation. Implementedthrough open dialogue with Department of State on DODrequirements for subsequent DOS lead in gaining overflightrights.4 <strong>Cross</strong>-domain synergy. Definition from the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC 2012): Thecomplementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhancesthe effectiveness <strong>and</strong> compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others.5 A general statement... Obviously we have competition in the cyber arena.10


than across domains; it also applies within domains, such as across combatant comm<strong>and</strong>AOR boundaries <strong>and</strong> functions, SOF - Conventional Force integration, <strong>and</strong> synergy withinterorganizational partners within the l<strong>and</strong> domain.As noted earlier, cross-domain synergy <strong>and</strong> the idea of interdependence is a quantum mindsetchange from a vertical orientation to that of working with your horizontal mission partners.This synergy results from more than just interoperability, i.e. the technical ability to worktogether even though this aspect is important. It is recognition that the Armed Forces operateas part of a team of joint, interagency, <strong>and</strong> multinational partners – <strong>and</strong> depend on access toeach other’s capabilities to succeed.This synergy is comm<strong>and</strong>er-driven; it is directed in guidance <strong>and</strong> intent, <strong>and</strong> implemented inorders. It is much more than “HANDCON,” an often-quoted term expressing the decision onthe part of subordinates to voluntarily work together absent direction by their highercomm<strong>and</strong>er. Higher comm<strong>and</strong>ers are responsible to deliberately craft the task organization<strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> relationships shaping a comm<strong>and</strong> environment in which the components mustwork together, supporting each other in an atmosphere of trust <strong>and</strong> confidence to accomplishthe mission.Challenges: There are challenges in achieving cross-domain synergy. 6• Recognizing the reality <strong>and</strong> need for interdependence. There remains a sub-culturebelieving that you must own a capability to use it. We have never had the luxury of owningeverything we need nor will we in the future. We are interdependent on others; any otherview is counter to the lessons learned from operations, the idea of unified action, whole ofgovernment approaches, jointness, <strong>and</strong> the ability to accomplish strategic objectives. Wedon’t have to own a capability to use or gain benefit from it; however, we need assuranceof its availability within the overall priorities of the higher comm<strong>and</strong>er.• Gaining synergy <strong>and</strong> harmony. The challenges of gaining synergy <strong>and</strong> harmony withother USG agencies <strong>and</strong> multinational partners are somewhat greater than with our jointpartners because there may be no clear authority directing a clear relationship with them tomitigate risks of interdependence. We also find that just because you are talking to aninteragency partner does not mean there is underst<strong>and</strong>ing; the phrase silence is consentdoes not always apply. We see comm<strong>and</strong>ers mitigating these challenges <strong>and</strong> risks throughdevelopment of personal relationships <strong>and</strong> trust, use of liaison elements, <strong>and</strong> consciousdecisions on the degree of reliance upon those mission partners for critical tasks.• Limited underst<strong>and</strong>ing of other domain mission partners’ authorities, competencies<strong>and</strong> capabilities (such as SOF, cyber, or space). This lack of knowledge may result in a“supported comm<strong>and</strong>er” not knowing what to ask for, or how to best leverage it. We seethis challenge frequently. A staff, <strong>and</strong> sometimes even the comm<strong>and</strong>er, may not be awareof what another mission partner can provide <strong>and</strong> therefore does not incorporate thatcapability into the plan. This directly limits cross-domain synergy, results in less thanoptimal solution sets, <strong>and</strong> may result in mission failure. We see a requirement for partnersto be advocates for their competencies <strong>and</strong> capabilities. Not in a parochial sense, but with acommon underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the problem <strong>and</strong> intent, they need to professionally advocate forthe use of their capability where it can best serve the mission.6 Many of the challenges <strong>and</strong> insights noted for mission comm<strong>and</strong> are also relevant to cross-domain synergy.11


• The complexity of operating globally across combatant comm<strong>and</strong> boundaries <strong>and</strong> withfunctional combatant comm<strong>and</strong>s. Despite our leadership embracing the benefits of crosscombatantcomm<strong>and</strong> activities, we have not yet fully come to grips with all of thechallenges in cross-Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> coordination <strong>and</strong> specifically the OSDestablishing authority responsibility (<strong>and</strong> necessary JS support) associated with globallyintegrated operations noted in the CCJO. Think about the planning <strong>and</strong> rapid prioritizationefforts necessary at OSD <strong>and</strong> JS level for things like reallocation of critical munitions,intelligence support, strategic lift assets, <strong>and</strong> cyber support. This affects coordination <strong>and</strong>authorities, <strong>and</strong> could limit cross-domain synergy <strong>and</strong> mission success.• Interoperability of networks <strong>and</strong> C2 architecture. We continually see limitations in thevarious mission partners’ network ability to support analysis, fusion <strong>and</strong> disseminationinformation, intelligence <strong>and</strong> operational orders to enable cross-domain synergy. In order toachieve the desired level of interdependence, comm<strong>and</strong>ers require C2 processes <strong>and</strong>networks that enable required coordination across domains.Insights:• Interdependence. As discussed earlier, we need to recognize de facto interdependence inthe interorganizational environment, defined as the necessary dependence on access toeach other’s capabilities in order to succeed. Interdependence requires trust in missionpartners. It is comm<strong>and</strong>er-driven, instilled through an inclusive comm<strong>and</strong> climate, <strong>and</strong>directed in guidance, intent, <strong>and</strong> orders. Dem<strong>and</strong> an interdependence mindset to yourorganization, <strong>and</strong> implement this mindset through development of trust, clear supportcomm<strong>and</strong> relationships <strong>and</strong> exchange of liaison. Be inclusive <strong>and</strong> reach out to missionpartners; don’t only focus on what you control. At the same time, we find that one mustrecognize potential risks in relying on access to limited capabilities <strong>and</strong> developappropriate risk mitigation efforts.- Observed best practices: Continue emphasis on building <strong>and</strong> maintaining trust <strong>and</strong> relationships. Instill a comm<strong>and</strong>er-driven comm<strong>and</strong> environment of a one-team mentality (teambuilding). Continue inclusion <strong>and</strong> crosstalk even under stress. Use <strong>and</strong> leverage the support comm<strong>and</strong> relationship. Use of appropriate networks to enable interdependence. One emergent capability isthe <strong>Mission</strong> Partner Environment (MPE), formerly known as Future <strong>Mission</strong> Network(FMN). (This is an offshoot of the Afghanistan <strong>Mission</strong> Network (AMN) developedfor operations in Afghanistan) The goal of this system is to enable comm<strong>and</strong>ersaccess to a common mission network which supports both the required training <strong>and</strong>the conduct of operations from Phase 0 through Phase V with any mission partner atany time while operating in the same security domain.• Focus on unity of effort. Unity of effort is directly related to the above concept ofinterdependence. While unity of comm<strong>and</strong> is still important <strong>and</strong> a principle of war,comm<strong>and</strong>ers at the theater-strategic <strong>and</strong> operational level often must orient toward unity ofeffort to leverage every possible capability. This does not negate the goal of unity ofcomm<strong>and</strong>; use it where feasible to keep the comm<strong>and</strong> relationships <strong>and</strong> interaction simple.12


That said, underst<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> leverage others’ capabilities across domains, echelons, physicalboundaries, <strong>and</strong> organizations to gain unity of effort (think cyber <strong>and</strong> space support toGCCs). Gain synergy through recognition of interdependencies <strong>and</strong> development ofappropriate comm<strong>and</strong> relationships, particularly the support comm<strong>and</strong> relationship.Supported <strong>and</strong> supporting comm<strong>and</strong> relationships coupled with shared situationalawareness help mitigate seams <strong>and</strong> gain synergy. We’ve seen more delineation ofsupported <strong>and</strong> supporting comm<strong>and</strong> authorities <strong>and</strong> responsibilities <strong>and</strong> clearerprioritization by the establishing authorities in OPORDs, FRAGOs, <strong>and</strong> battle rhythmevents. We have also seen more recognition of the unique Service authorities (i.e., the Title10 aspects of administrative control), <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing of coalition unique comm<strong>and</strong>relationships <strong>and</strong> the contributing nations’ national comm<strong>and</strong> lines, prerogatives, <strong>and</strong>caveats in coalition operations. We have seen comm<strong>and</strong>s delineating specific authoritiesassociated with these different aspects, even as much as delineating the various authoritiesof mission partners in a matrix-like construct.Many Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> HQs also see the value of OSD level involvement (<strong>and</strong>supporting JS actions) as the establishing authority over the combatant comm<strong>and</strong>s torapidly prioritize, allocate resources, <strong>and</strong> synchronize across combatant comm<strong>and</strong>s – againacting at the speed of the problem.- Observed best practices: Identify <strong>and</strong> work with the key relevant interorganizational decision makers such asU.S. Ambassadors, FEMA, UN, NATO, <strong>and</strong> NGO <strong>and</strong> PVOs. Find the commonground that can be exploited, the non-negotiable areas, <strong>and</strong> the middle ground thatcan be worked to achieve unity of effort. This will take significant comm<strong>and</strong>er time,<strong>and</strong> must be prioritized <strong>and</strong> managed to be effective. Emphasize use of the Support <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> relationship as a comm<strong>and</strong> authority at thejoint force level <strong>and</strong> the similar lead federal agency terminology across USGagencies. Clarify establishing authority, <strong>and</strong> supported <strong>and</strong> supporting comm<strong>and</strong>erauthorities <strong>and</strong> responsibilities. These authorities <strong>and</strong> responsibilities are well laid outin doctrine <strong>and</strong> addressed in the broader Joint Operations Insights <strong>and</strong> Best Practicespaper dated March 2013. Increase establishing authority focus on resource allocation <strong>and</strong> prioritizationincluding preparedness to step in <strong>and</strong> referee disagreements between subordinateswhen they cannot come to agreement. We also see higher comm<strong>and</strong>ers emphasizingthe requirement to have subordinates work horizontally with one another to directlysolve problems between them where possible (what one comm<strong>and</strong>er called selfregulation). Where applicable, exercise the agility of OSD as the establishing authority togetherwith the JS under crisis conditions to plan <strong>and</strong> direct responsive <strong>and</strong> synchronizedcross-Combatant <strong>Comm<strong>and</strong></strong> operations. Clearly identify supported comm<strong>and</strong>ers to ensure common direction of effort (this ismuch like the importance of designating a “battlespace owner” as the supportedcomm<strong>and</strong>er in the physical domain). Ensure supported comm<strong>and</strong>ers fully underst<strong>and</strong> both their authority <strong>and</strong> theirresponsibility to provide general direction to the supporting comm<strong>and</strong>ers. They oftenrequire additional liaison <strong>and</strong> planning assistance from supporting comm<strong>and</strong>ers to13


est incorporate their assistance. Likewise, ensure supporting comm<strong>and</strong>ers areproactive in ascertaining supported comm<strong>and</strong>er requirements. Direct cross talk between supported <strong>and</strong> supporting comm<strong>and</strong>ers without thenecessary presence of the higher comm<strong>and</strong>er (allowing them to self-regulate). Direct liaison officer exchange – at a minimum from supporting to supportedcomm<strong>and</strong>ers. This assists in underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> leveraging capabilities. Develop matrices identifying authorities <strong>and</strong> responsibilities in a coalitionenvironment in which both coalition <strong>and</strong> U.S. national comm<strong>and</strong> lines co-exist toshare underst<strong>and</strong>ing of authorities <strong>and</strong> responsibilities.14

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