2 years ago

Amitai Etzioni David Katz Harsh Pant - Middle East Forum

Amitai Etzioni David Katz Harsh Pant - Middle East Forum

30 Rafid Fadhil Ali,

30 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” TerrorismMonitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Jan.25, 2008.Baathists against U.S. forces in Fallujah in 2004,and this factor may limit their strategic employment.30 However, Sufi expansions into Salafi areaswill undoubtedly induce Salafi attacks,which could in turn provide the impetus forarmed Sufi response. Moreover, the use of Afghannon-Salafi sects, like the Sufis, directlychallenges Salafi claims to sacred legitimacy, fragmentstheir attempts to organize village society,and plunges those areas under Salafi control intodestructive, internecine, sectarian war.Finally, the newly-appointed ghazis couldbe induced to support the Hanafi system andSufi monasteries so as to introduce religiouscompetition at the local level in harmony with,but not a direct component of, the decentralizedsystem. On a wider level, local patriotism canreinforce the sectarian wedge. A Pashtun culturalrenaissance will compete with radical Islamas a societal motivator and organizer. A Pashtuncultural renaissance, distributed as an ethnictribalcomponent of a federally-funded, religiouseducationalsystem, could support the establishmentof specifically created local groups.In addition to providing cultural identification,these groups could become natural competitors,promoting and distributing indigenousdogma with positive or punitive scope on issues,including Pashtuntribal history, politics,Replacing U.S. and genealogy. Theirsoldiers with local grassroots patriotismnationals andcould fuel rejection offoreign concepts such astribal-based Wahhabism and the individualsand groupsprograms can bea force multiplier. carrying it.Pashtun patriotismcould be a means to isolateand drive out foreign, non-Pashtun radicalsand their religious concepts. It could directlyattack the linkage between non-traditional, nonlocalIslamic jurisprudence and militarism. Tracking,targeting, and locating foreign militantswould be consistent with such groups andhighly useful to U.S. intelligence. Promoting lowintensity conflict between the proponents ofPashtun patriotism and foreign-derived Islamicmilitarism could shut down the pipeline of foreignrecruits coming to centralized training facilities.This would force Islamic radicals to expendresources replicating training bases in eachlocale where they seek to operate.ECONOMIC STRATEGYReligious and ideological motivators providethe will. Political and cultural organizationsprovide the force. Economic programs providethe staying power. The goal of a national logisticssystem is to compete for tribal affiliation,based upon standard of living. National logisticsprograms conducted at the district level mustbe delivered as a package of goods and servicesonly to clans willing to affiliate or ally withthe national, provincial, and district governmentsor their representatives, such as thebaradur ikhan. Goods or services must not bedelivered to clans of suspect loyalty or to thoseunwilling to make a substantial, up-front commitment.This would be counterproductive andcould, in fact, serve to aid and abet nationalself-destruction. The tribes who ally will winand expand; those who oppose will lose andcontract. U.S. allied forces would be the arbitersof the difference. The advantage of a basic,franchised package of goods and services isefficient delivery, comprehensive program control,coherence of government support at thedistrict level, and ease of replication.Forces such as demographic, industrial,agricultural, distribution, and communicationsmake the strategic offensive possible but are oftenoverlooked in war planning because they donot generally require soldiers. Replacing U.S.soldiers with local nationals and tribal-basedlogistic programs can be a tremendous force multiplier.The national logistic program must generatemeasurable, positive results for allied clans,qawm, and manteqa. Demographic programssuch as public health, field medical, and mid-28 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY SPRING 2011

wifery-based prenatal and childbirth programswould need to enhance the birthrate, decreaseinfant mortality, and increase life expectancy forallied clans. The cumulative result is to engineera higher growth rate for clans opposing radicalIslam, rather than for those supporting it. Thenet effect, and strategic goal, is to create a multigenerational,in-place tribal army, and an alliedpopulation that would grow faster and live longerthan radical Islam’s supporters.Industrial economic programs may includethe creation of specialized guilds to establish,train, and support a myriad of manufacturing,mining, and engineering activities. For example,a federal fief delivered to a government alliedmanteqa could be a man-powered, machine shopfor metal and wood parts manufacture, completewith a district manufacturing contract. The provincialgovernor and interior ministry would determinewhich allied family receives it in exchangefor becoming a baradur ikhan. The regionalmanufacturing guild council would thenbe responsible for setting it up, training guildmembers, and getting the manteqa into operations.Specialized guilds have the advantage ofbeing self-organizing, self-motivating, and selfmaintaining.They could be used to seed andsupport industrial activity in allied families andacross the nation. This would develop, if notcreate, local economies. Guild-generated industrialspecialization would create local economieswith greater efficiency, diversification, andresilience. Industrial finance programs could includemicro-finance for village-based businesses,guild-based businesses, and womenandminority-based businesses. The net effectand strategic goal is to create more prosperoussocieties, capable of supporting larger, denserpopulations, full-time law enforcement, and civildefense capabilities.Agricultural programs may include seedbanks, production, distribution, and sales cooperativesas well as district and provincial levelconsulting. These programs would be measuredby the comparative increase in calories per dayprovided to allied or affiliated families and tribesversus those supporting radical Islam. The neteffect and strategic goal would be to createlarger, higher density, better fed populationswith a lower incidence of illness due to dietarydeficiency.Distribution programs make use of transportation,roads, bridges, fuel, fleet management,etc. The ability to movematerial, military, and alliedpopulations may becomethe most importantlever of pacification inAfghanistan. Targetedpopulation growth couldbe the ultimate arbiter ofsovereignty, displacingthose who oppose thegovernment with thosewho support it. The controland reformulation ofPashtun societies, twocomponents of victory,are in many ways prepped by military, political,and religious initiatives and fueled by economicprograms riding national distribution grids intothe societal battle-space. The geographic coherenceof economic programs is facilitated by thephysical distribution grid.Perceptual coherence is facilitated by theintroduction of a new communications grid distributingintellectual property. Creating and distributinga low cost, suitably engineered smartphone for disseminating information, intelligence,and knowledge to locals in hostile regionsvia one-to-one conversations, party-linediscussions, and one-to-many broadcasts prepsthe intellectual battlefield for further governmentinitiatives. This grid also serves as a platformfor collecting visual, audible, text, and other informationfrom locals in hostile regions allowingthe coordinating authorities to sequence andcalibrate future actions.CONCLUSIONSAn alliedPashtun tribalsociety andparamilitary isthe most efficientmeans ofconducting anoffensive againstradical Islam.Distributive, economic, religious, and militaryinitiatives are the means of achieving victoryin Afghanistan if expressed through naturallyoccurring enemies of armed Salafism. Thestrategic intent is to destroy Salafist military capacity,seize control of Pashtun populations un-Katz: Pashtun Society / 29

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