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Kuhn vs Popper - About James H. Collier

Kuhn vs Popper - About James H. Collier

the Viennese inter-war

the Viennese inter-war culture that spawnedPopper and the logical positivists may be gainedfrom David Edmonds and John Eidinow, Wittgenstein’sPoker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argumentbetween Two Great Philosophers (London: Faber andFaber 2001). Kuhn’s mentor, James Bryant Conant,wrote a thorough autobiography, My Several Lives:Memoirs of a Social Inventor (New York: Harper andRow, 1970), and is subject to an equally thoroughbiography: James Hershberg, James B. Conant:Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the NuclearAge (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993). Together theyprovide a panoramic sweep of science, politics andthe academy as seen from a key gatekeeper in ColdWar America. The hand of Kuhn in recent Europeanscience policy thinking may be felt in MichaelGibbons et al, The New Production of Knowledge(London: Sage, 1994).Some more specialised historical works may berecommended to fill in the details: Cyril Barrett,‘Believing in order to understand’, in Verstehen andHumane Understanding, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.223–34; J. Peter Euben, ‘Corruption’, in PoliticalInnovation and Conceptual Change, eds T. Ball, J. Farr,R. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1989), chapter 11; Gillian Evans, A BriefHistory of Heresy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); James222

Franklin, The Science of Conjecture (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 2001); Ian Hacking, TheEmergence of Probability (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1975); Paul Hoyningen-Huene,‘Two Letters of Paul Feyerabend to Thomas Kuhnon a Draft of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’,Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 26 (1995),pp. 353–88; Ian Jarvie, The Republic of Science: TheEmergence of Popper’s Social View of Science, 1935–1945 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001); Larry Laudan,Science and Hypothesis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1981);Origins of Logical Empiricism, eds Ronald Giere andAlan Richardson (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1996); George Reisch, ‘Did KuhnKill Logical Empiricism?’, Philosophy of Science58 (1991), pp. 264–77; Martin Roiser and CarlaWillig, ‘The Strange Death of the AuthoritarianPersonality’, History of the Human Sciences 15 (2002),4, pp. 71–96; Michael Ruse, Mystery of Mysteries: IsEvolution a Social Construction? (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1999); Skuli Sigurdsson, ‘TheNature of Scientific Knowledge: An Interview withThomas Kuhn’, Harvard Science Review, Winter1990, pp. 18–25; Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy:The Legacy of Franz Brentano (La Salle: Open CourtPress, 1994); V. Betty Smocovitis, Unifying Biology:The Evolutionary Synthesis and Evolutionary Biology(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): R.223

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    Kuhn vsPopperThe Struggle for theSo

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    CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chapter 1: In

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    more than ever preoccupied with fac

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    paradigmatic pedigree than by its p

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    . CHAPTER 1 .IN SEARCH OF THE CAUSE

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    second concerns how the debate mana

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    Watkins, who relied on the student

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    actual precursor but who are no les

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    debate, especially as they bear on

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    extended encyclopaedia entry, as th

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    means by which people become scient

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    happened to be an apt vehicle for a

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    logic is for. For positivists, logi

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    suppressed by the first great autho

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    Russell and Popper shared an antipa

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    theories. Kuhn’s reception was he

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    was Conant who recommended Kuhn to

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    Legend has it that while Popper lik

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    new paradigm. For Kuhn, a paradigm

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    matters of ‘tradition’, ‘trac

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    studies practitioners is sufficient

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    The series of exchanges alluded to

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    already doing, not over whether the

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    disciplines, can determine the best

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    considerations to influence the cou

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    associated with the civic republica

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    own aversion to Hegel’s authorita

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    digms relates to a public good conc

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    looking standard, one based on enti

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    the 19th-century roots of modern ma

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    Lakatos believed he had improved on

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    est track record, a kind of evoluti

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    more than Kuhn himself - concluded

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    the incommensurable theories are tr

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    systematically misunderstood. Consi

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    progress. However, Kuhn and Popper

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    . CHAPTER 7 .WHY PHILOSOPHERS GET N

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    Darwin’s theory of natural select

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    But the complete alienation of phil

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    having supped on the gruel of norma

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    permits the survival of chance muta

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    iochemist Lawrence J. Henderson (18

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    . CHAPTER 8 .SO, WHY ARE PHILOSOPHE

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    Cold War science policy - namely, t

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    pure inquiry. Exceptionally disappo

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    would seem to require the abandonme

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    what an omnipotent deity friendly t

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    the rather technical and tedious wo

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    narrator considers herself at least

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    would now say) awaiting propitious

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    were secular Jews who did not exhib

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    ‘conjectures and refutations’.

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    At various points in Western histor

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    is how second-order colonialism fee

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    external grants, scientists have be

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    . CHAPTER 11 .DO WE BELIEVE BY EVID

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    case through acquaintance with chur

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    showed how Galileo had to resort to

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    grounds for what the Jesuits call t

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    is rather different. For him, a sci

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    Kuhn was that if design in nature i

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    except that the venue should provid

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    effectively preoccupied with the pr

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    whereby our liabilities simulate vi

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    Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), f

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    However, from its inception, the un

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    the uncharted domain. This rather l

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    producers in their domains. Here it

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    original distinction between the tr

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    Indeed, what had made the natural s

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    influence dissipated in the long te

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    philosophical disciplines?) that sh

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    Here we see an important difference

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    tendency of experimental psychology

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    that the Enlightenment has yet to b

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    people would need to come to regard

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    . CHAPTER 14 .POPPER AND ADORNO DIV

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    idealised understanding of scientif

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    new evidence), criticism must opera

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    oth of which were in evidence in th

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    translated into emancipatory action

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    egan in the Weimar Republic as a by

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    address their own. For the many soc

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    ment of their ideals. By failing to

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    . CHAPTER 15 .HOW TO BE RESPONSIBLE

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  • Page 197 and 198: . CHAPTER 17 .IS THOMAS KUHN THEAME
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  • Page 231: lishers, 1997). Kuhn’s views on h
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