Views
3 years ago

Kuhn vs Popper - About James H. Collier

Kuhn vs Popper - About James H. Collier

debates about matters

debates about matters that were not properly airedat the time Kuhn and Popper first raised them topublic consciousness. While no one doubts thatKuhn has won the debate, I intend to questionwhether it has been for the better.My own intellectual trajectory belies the nostrumthat greater study of a phenomenon engendersgreater sympathy for it. For me, to explain is mostemphatically not to excuse. Like most others of mygeneration, I have been under Kuhn’s spell. Butgradually I wondered why the uptake of his radicalsoundingideas has eventuated in the timidunderstandings of science we find today. Theanswer, I submit, lies in the poor grasp we continueto have of the social implications of alternativeregimes of knowledge production. Overridingconcerns about rationality and progress in scienceas a whole, so characteristic of Popper and previousphilosophers of science, have been replaced bymore technical analyses of the relationshipbetween evidence and inference in particular fields.The only remaining questions seem to be whetherthe appropriate ‘techniques’ are philosophical orsociological. Lost is an ongoing and wide-rangingdiscourse about the direction that should be givento a form of inquiry that could command universalassent.Epistemology – the theory of knowledge – is now4

more than ever preoccupied with face-savingexercises to shore up expertise, the elusive quest forwhat philosophers call ‘credible testimony’ andsociologists call, more brutally, ‘boundarymaintenance’. This is a project that Kuhn couldunderstand. In contrast, when founding a fieldcalled ‘social epistemology’ fifteen years ago, Idefined the social character of knowledge in termsof the need to bring order to an inherently divisivesituation consisting of many self-interested andfallible agents. This is a project Popper could understand.However, most of those who nowadays callthemselves social epistemologists are concernedwith determining the spontaneous patterns ofdeference in a socially distributed knowledgesystem: Who should I believe? This pressingquestion is more likely to be answered by delegatingthan assuming responsibility for whatever informsone’s actions. As students of political thought willappreciate, it is as if Kuhn’s triumph over Popperhas enabled social epistemologists to take the greatleap backward: after all, who needs an explicit socialcontract for science, when science’s own socialrelations constitute a natural aristocracy?Popper’s view that a non-scientist might criticisescience for failing to abide by its own publiclyavowed standards is rarely found inside academiatoday. For those who have inherited Kuhn’s Cold5

  • Page 1 and 2: Kuhn vsPopperThe Struggle for theSo
  • Page 3: CONTENTSIntroduction 1Chapter 1: In
  • Page 11 and 12: paradigmatic pedigree than by its p
  • Page 13 and 14: . CHAPTER 1 .IN SEARCH OF THE CAUSE
  • Page 15 and 16: second concerns how the debate mana
  • Page 17 and 18: Watkins, who relied on the student
  • Page 19 and 20: actual precursor but who are no les
  • Page 21 and 22: debate, especially as they bear on
  • Page 23 and 24: extended encyclopaedia entry, as th
  • Page 25 and 26: means by which people become scient
  • Page 27 and 28: happened to be an apt vehicle for a
  • Page 29 and 30: logic is for. For positivists, logi
  • Page 31 and 32: suppressed by the first great autho
  • Page 33 and 34: Russell and Popper shared an antipa
  • Page 35 and 36: theories. Kuhn’s reception was he
  • Page 37 and 38: was Conant who recommended Kuhn to
  • Page 39 and 40: Legend has it that while Popper lik
  • Page 41 and 42: new paradigm. For Kuhn, a paradigm
  • Page 43 and 44: matters of ‘tradition’, ‘trac
  • Page 45 and 46: studies practitioners is sufficient
  • Page 47 and 48: The series of exchanges alluded to
  • Page 49 and 50: already doing, not over whether the
  • Page 51 and 52: disciplines, can determine the best
  • Page 53 and 54: considerations to influence the cou
  • Page 55 and 56:

    associated with the civic republica

  • Page 57 and 58:

    own aversion to Hegel’s authorita

  • Page 59 and 60:

    digms relates to a public good conc

  • Page 61 and 62:

    looking standard, one based on enti

  • Page 63 and 64:

    the 19th-century roots of modern ma

  • Page 65 and 66:

    Lakatos believed he had improved on

  • Page 67 and 68:

    est track record, a kind of evoluti

  • Page 69 and 70:

    more than Kuhn himself - concluded

  • Page 71 and 72:

    the incommensurable theories are tr

  • Page 73 and 74:

    systematically misunderstood. Consi

  • Page 75 and 76:

    progress. However, Kuhn and Popper

  • Page 77 and 78:

    . CHAPTER 7 .WHY PHILOSOPHERS GET N

  • Page 79 and 80:

    Darwin’s theory of natural select

  • Page 81 and 82:

    But the complete alienation of phil

  • Page 83 and 84:

    having supped on the gruel of norma

  • Page 85 and 86:

    permits the survival of chance muta

  • Page 87 and 88:

    iochemist Lawrence J. Henderson (18

  • Page 89 and 90:

    . CHAPTER 8 .SO, WHY ARE PHILOSOPHE

  • Page 91 and 92:

    Cold War science policy - namely, t

  • Page 93 and 94:

    pure inquiry. Exceptionally disappo

  • Page 95 and 96:

    would seem to require the abandonme

  • Page 97 and 98:

    what an omnipotent deity friendly t

  • Page 99 and 100:

    the rather technical and tedious wo

  • Page 101 and 102:

    narrator considers herself at least

  • Page 103 and 104:

    would now say) awaiting propitious

  • Page 105 and 106:

    were secular Jews who did not exhib

  • Page 107 and 108:

    ‘conjectures and refutations’.

  • Page 109 and 110:

    At various points in Western histor

  • Page 111 and 112:

    is how second-order colonialism fee

  • Page 113 and 114:

    external grants, scientists have be

  • Page 115 and 116:

    . CHAPTER 11 .DO WE BELIEVE BY EVID

  • Page 117 and 118:

    case through acquaintance with chur

  • Page 119 and 120:

    showed how Galileo had to resort to

  • Page 121 and 122:

    grounds for what the Jesuits call t

  • Page 123 and 124:

    is rather different. For him, a sci

  • Page 125 and 126:

    Kuhn was that if design in nature i

  • Page 127 and 128:

    except that the venue should provid

  • Page 129 and 130:

    effectively preoccupied with the pr

  • Page 131 and 132:

    whereby our liabilities simulate vi

  • Page 133 and 134:

    Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), f

  • Page 135 and 136:

    However, from its inception, the un

  • Page 137 and 138:

    the uncharted domain. This rather l

  • Page 139 and 140:

    producers in their domains. Here it

  • Page 141 and 142:

    original distinction between the tr

  • Page 143 and 144:

    Indeed, what had made the natural s

  • Page 145 and 146:

    influence dissipated in the long te

  • Page 147 and 148:

    philosophical disciplines?) that sh

  • Page 149 and 150:

    Here we see an important difference

  • Page 151 and 152:

    tendency of experimental psychology

  • Page 153 and 154:

    that the Enlightenment has yet to b

  • Page 155 and 156:

    people would need to come to regard

  • Page 157 and 158:

    . CHAPTER 14 .POPPER AND ADORNO DIV

  • Page 159 and 160:

    idealised understanding of scientif

  • Page 161 and 162:

    new evidence), criticism must opera

  • Page 163 and 164:

    oth of which were in evidence in th

  • Page 165 and 166:

    translated into emancipatory action

  • Page 167 and 168:

    egan in the Weimar Republic as a by

  • Page 169 and 170:

    address their own. For the many soc

  • Page 171 and 172:

    ment of their ideals. By failing to

  • Page 173 and 174:

    . CHAPTER 15 .HOW TO BE RESPONSIBLE

  • Page 175 and 176:

    sciences. (Back then, the philosoph

  • Page 177 and 178:

    a certain way would have increased

  • Page 179 and 180:

    over time. In other words, it is al

  • Page 181 and 182:

    A good model for understanding the

  • Page 183 and 184:

    . CHAPTER 16 .FAILING THE POPPERIAN

  • Page 185 and 186:

    use ‘philosopher’ as the name o

  • Page 187 and 188:

    whenever someone infers the validit

  • Page 189 and 190:

    The genetic fallacy is not designed

  • Page 191 and 192:

    unwitting captives to that context

  • Page 193 and 194:

    Heidegger’s ideas from Heidegger

  • Page 195 and 196:

    However, this question became diffi

  • Page 197 and 198:

    . CHAPTER 17 .IS THOMAS KUHN THEAME

  • Page 199 and 200:

    philosophers came to rely on Heideg

  • Page 201 and 202:

    alternative contemporaries - have c

  • Page 203 and 204:

    say something similar in the case o

  • Page 205 and 206:

    1960s - he did not believe that a p

  • Page 207 and 208:

    world-historic spirit has played a

  • Page 209 and 210:

    out what is now often called the

  • Page 211 and 212:

    mention the analytic philosophy tha

  • Page 213 and 214:

    physical sciences than Kuhn, but th

  • Page 215 and 216:

    features from two or more historica

  • Page 217 and 218:

    I have already raised the examples

  • Page 219 and 220:

    self-serving over time, since we ar

  • Page 221 and 222:

    1978). Kuhn’s historiographical e

  • Page 223 and 224:

    Rather than listing many texts of v

  • Page 225 and 226:

    ‘received view’ in the philosop

  • Page 227 and 228:

    Franklin, The Science of Conjecture

  • Page 229 and 230:

    qualified defence of genomic-based

  • Page 231:

    lishers, 1997). Kuhn’s views on h

Steve Fuller. Kuhn vs. Popper - The Canadian Journal of Sociology ...
The Normative Structure of Science - About James H. Collier
Philosophy of the Social Sciences - About James H. Collier - Virginia ...
"Philosophy Bro: Is-Ought Problem". - About James H. Collier