178 | PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6to respect for family life, where they serve to separate members of afamily. 640II. Justification of detention1. Different approaches to justification of immigrationdetentionThe right to liberty and security of the person under international humanrights law requires that deprivation of liberty, to be justified, must be inaccordance with law, and must not be arbitrary. 641 Deprivation of libertymay be “arbitrary” either because it is not based on a legitimate basisfor detention or because it does not follow procedural requirements. Inthis Section, it is the first dimension of “arbitrariness” of deprivation ofliberty which is addressed.Neither the ICCPR nor the ACHR, the ACHPR or the ArCHR make furtherexpress provision for the circumstances in which deprivation of libertyis permitted. They generally prohibit detention that is “arbitrary”. TheECHR, by contrast, provides for the lawfulness of detention on a seriesof specified grounds. In relation to immigration detention, it permitsdetention in two specific situations: to prevent unauthorised entry tothe country, and pending deportation or extradition (Article 5.1(f)). Thescheme of Article 5 ECHR differs from that of the ICCPR, ACHR, ArCHRand ACHPR in that detention that cannot be justified on one of thespecified grounds will always be considered arbitrary. Conversely, however,if detention can be shown to be necessary for a listed purpose,such as prevention of unauthorised entry, it will not be considered tobe arbitrary, without the need for further justification related to the circumstancesof the individual case. The protection offered by the ECHRis therefore potentially narrower than that of instruments such as theICCPR, as will be considered further below.Detention of asylum seekers and refugees is also regulated by Article31 of the Geneva Refugee Convention and associated standards andguidance, (considered further below) which establishes a presumptionagainst detention, and the principle that detention must be justified asnecessary in a particular case.640 Agraw v. Switzerland, ECtHR, Application No. 3295/06, Judgment of 29 July 2010.641 Adequate prescription by law and freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty are requirementsof the right to security of the person as well as the right to liberty. See, Zamir v.France, ECommHR, Plenary, Application No.9174/80, Admissibility Decision, 13 July 1982,holding that “it is implicit in the said right [to security of the person] that an individual oughtto be able to foresee with a reasonable degree of certainty the circumstances in which he isliable to be arrested and detained. It is further implicit in the right to security of person thatthere shall be adequate judicial control of arrest and detention.”
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW | 1792. Detention must have a clear legal basis in nationallaw and proceduresAn essential safeguard against arbitrary detention is that all detentionsmust be adequately prescribed by law. This reflects the general humanrights law principle of legal certainty, by which individuals shouldbe able to foresee, to the greatest extent possible, the consequenceswhich the law may have for them. The need for legal certainty is regardedas particularly vital in cases where individual liberty is at stake. 642The principle of prescription by law has two essential aspects:• that detention be in accordance with national law and procedures;• that national law and procedures should be of sufficient quality toprotect the individual from arbitrariness. 643For detention to have a sufficient basis in national law, the nationallaw must clearly provide for deprivation of liberty. In Abdolkhani andKarimnia v. Turkey, 644 the European Court of Human Rights held thata law that required non-nationals without valid travel documents toreside at designated places did not provide sufficient legal basis fortheir detention pending deportation. Laws imposing deprivation ofliberty must be accessible and precise. 645 Its consequences must beforeseeable to the individuals it affects. The law must provide for timelimits that apply to detention, and for clear procedures for imposing,reviewing and extending detention. 646 Furthermore, there must be aclear record regarding the arrest or bringing into custody of the individual.647 Legislation which allows wide executive discretion in authorisingor reviewing detention is likely to be considered an insufficiently precisebasis for deprivation of liberty. 648 The Inter-American Commissionon Human Rights has stressed that “[t]he grounds and procedures bywhich non-nationals may be deprived of their liberty should define with642 Medvedyev v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 51, para. 80.643 Čonka v. Belgium, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 570, para. 39; Amuur v. France, op. cit., fn. 45,para. 51. See also, Servellón-García et al. v. Honduras, IACtHR, Series C No. 152, Judgmentof 21 September 2006, paras. 88–89; Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, IACtHR, op. cit., fn. 624,para. 98. See also, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), Annual Report 1998,UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/63, 18 December 1998, para. 69, Guarantee 2; WGAD, Annual Report1999, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4, 28 December 1999, Annex II, Deliberation No. 5 “Situationsregarding immigrants and asylum-seekers”, Principle 6; WGAD, Annual Report 2008, op. cit.,fn. 624, paras. 67 and 82.644 Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627, para. 133.645 Amuur v. France, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 45, para. 51646 Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, ECtHR, op. cit., fn. 627; Vélez Loor v. Panama, IACtHR,op. cit., fn. 536, para. 117.647 Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR, Applications Nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08,Judgment of 13 April 2010; Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, IACtHR, op. cit.,fn. 537, para. 131.648 Rafael Ferrer-Mazorra et al. v. USA, IACHR, op. cit., fn. 395, paras. 222 and 226.