- Text
- Bundling,
- Equilibrium,
- Consumers,
- Prices,
- Conglomerate,
- Proposition,
- Shoppers,
- Conglomerates,
- Discount,
- Bundle,
- Multimarket,
- Collusive,
- Cemfi

Multimarket Contact, Bundling and Collusive Behavior - Cemfi

use = + − to refer to the price that charges for the bundle). 12 All pricesare set simultaneously in each period. We focus on symmetric equilibria throughout.2.2 Equilibria in unrelated marketsBefore looking at non-linear pricing, it is useful to have the equilibrium solutions thatwould prevail in the absence of conglomerates or price alliances, as they would provide therelevant benchmarks. Since markets are totally unrelated, the preference of consumersfor the two products, as captured by , is irrelevant for the equilibrium solution. Theequilibrium of the one-shot game is well known (Tirole, 1988) = − = = + 2(1)for = . 13 And since firms split the market, a firm’s profit under the static Nashequilibrium (i.e., the "unrelated markets" equilibrium) is equal to = 4.It is also well known that in a repeated interaction firms may be able to sustainbetter outcomes in equilibrium. Assuming that firms rely on grim trigger strategiesto sustain collusion (i.e., deviations are punished with reversions to the static Nashequilibrium forever), the incentive compatibility constraint that must be satisfied forsustaining collusion in market = is 1 − ≥ + 1 − (2)where is the discount factor common to all firms, is each firm’s collusive profit**and** is the profit afirm earns in one period if it (optimally) deviates from thecollusive agreement. Note that an optimal deviation here is to undercut the collusiveprice by 2 **and** take the entire market. 14We know then from (2) that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome in (subgameperfect)equilibrium, which is to charge = − 4 in every period, if is above thecritical level =− − 2( − (3) − )+ 2Note that despite an increase in product differentiation leads to both a softer punishment**and** lower profits along the collusive path, it nevertheless makes it easier for firms tosustain monopoly profits in the sense that it exp**and**s the range of discount factors where12 As we discuss below, there will be cases in which conglomerates would like to charge a bundlepremium, as opposed to a discount, to one-stop shoppers. This make collusion more profitable but notnecesarily easier to sustain. Yet, its implementation requires of perfect monitoring of sales which seemsdifficult in many cases. See McAfee et al. (1989) for a discussion on the latter.13 Recall that for this to be an equilibrium we need − (Tirole, 1988).14 When the collusive price is the monopoly price ( − 4), this optimal deviation requires 4( − )7, which we assume to hold since ’s are large enough.8

that can happen in equilibrium (i.e., lower ). The reason is that a higher makesdeviation less attractive **and** this deviation effect dominates the other two effects. We willsee a similar phenomenon when conglomerates try to sustain collusion in that bundlingmakes deviation from the collusive agreement very attractive.The multimarket-contact result of Bernheim **and** Whinston (1990) can also be easilyillustrated using (3). Suppose markets **and** differ in such a way that .If now firms 1 **and** 1 merge to form conglomerate 1 **and** likewise 2 **and** 2 to formconglomerate 2, but stick to linear prices at all times, there will be cases in which thecritical factor above which conglomerates can sustain monopoly profits in both markets, ,isbelowthefirms’ discount factor (i.e., ). If so, the multimarketcontact generated by the mergers has allowed firms to transfer monopoly discipline frommarket to market . In this paper we are interested in a fundamentally different effectof multimarket contact on collusion –that of non-linear pricing– that will arise evenif markets are identical from a Bernheim-Whinston’s perspective ( = ). Obviously,the two effects are likely to be present but to keep the analysis clean (**and** simplify someof the proofs) we will impose symmetry in most places.3 The competitive bundling equilibriumIn this section we will derive the static (symmetric) equilibrium when conglomeratesmay offer discounts to one-stop shoppers; we do so for a Salop city characterized by someexogenously given correlation in consumers’ preferences ∈ [0 12]. In the Extensions weargue that the outcome of such equilibrium is not that differentfromtheonethatemergesin a supposedly more general square-city model that also allows for any correlation level.Consider then the Salop-city of Figure 3. While conglomerates set three prices each(i.e., , **and** ), consumers really care about four prices, the prices of each of thefour choices they have: either buy both products from =1 2 or from **and** from −.Given the vector of prices ( ) in the figure, conglomerate ’s dem**and** for its product is ( ) = 1 2 + − − + 2 − −2 (4)where =1 2 **and** = . Thefirst two terms are the familiar "Hotelling terms". Thethird term, 2 , corresponds to the additional dem**and** for product conglomerate isable to attract with the bundling discount ,thatis,thetwo-stopshoppersthatbeforethe discount were buying product from − **and** − from . These two stop-shoppers arenow willing to travel the extra distance 2 (in the -dimension) in order to pocketthe discount . Similarly, the last term, − 2 , is the dem**and** losses to conglomerate− from the two-stop shoppers that now buy (**and** −) from−.*** figure 3 here or below ***9

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