# ISSUE 6 : Sep/Oct - 1977 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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ISSUE 6 : Sep/Oct - 1977 - Australian Defence Force Journal

SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1977No. 6

DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALBoard of ManagementBrigadier D. J. McMillen (Chairman)Captain M. W. Hudson RANColonel R. S. FlintGroup Captain J. A. Gibbins RAAFMr J. G. MenhamManaging EditorMr K. I. Taylorillustrations by members of the Army Audio Visual Unit, Fyshwick.Printed and published for the Department of Defence, Canberra, by RuskinPress, North Melbourne.Contributions of any length will be considered but, as a guide, 3000 wordsis the ideal length. Articles should be t_\ped, double spacing, on one sideof the paper and submitted in duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should be addressed to:1 he Managing 1 ditorDefence Force JournalBuilding I Room 1-32Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600.

DEFENCEFORCEJOURNALNo. 6ISSN 0314-1039September/October 1977A Journal of the Australian Profession of ArmsContents3 Editor's Comment4 Letters to the F.ditor5 That Factor — TerrainMajor K.J. Lyons, MSurvSc, BSurv (Hons)16 Defence Film MakingLieutenant J. R. Mucnamara19 The Emergence of the AANS, 1914-18Mm Susan Kenny. BA (Hons)26 The Military and Political DevelopmentCaptain I'. L. Cameron31 Air Strategy and the Prospect of Being HangedGroup Captain F. B. Sutton, DFC, RAF (Retd)35 A Beach Recovery on the Northern Flank of NATOLieutenant D. T. Brown, RM39 The Battlefields of Yesterday TodayLieutenant P. A. Pedersen50 A Theory of Port VisitsCommander C. F. Liardet, RN55 Book ReviewsNo article in this Journal is to be reproduced in whole or in part without authority.The views expressed in the articles arc the author's own and do not necessarily representofficial opinion or policy.Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of information contained in their articles: theBoard of Management accepts no responsibility for errors of fact.© Commonwealth of Australia 1977

(Courtesy National Annv Museum, London}SALUTE TO HER MAJESTYAbove: Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, 1897. The Premier of South Australia, the HonC. C. Kingston, with an escort of the South Australian Mounted Rifles. (From an album 'SixtyDifferent Views from Sixty Differen: Points' compiled by Mr J. A. Ccllinsl .Below: Queen Elizabeth ll's Silver Jubilee, 1977. The ship's company of HMAS Melbournemen ship as the Royal Yacht Britannia reviews the Fleet ct Spithead. HMAS Brisbane wasthe other Australian representative at the Review.(Defence Public Relations)

8 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALAny vehicle and equipment has limitations;it is necessary to know how and where theselimitations apply to Australian terrain. Theenemy's equipment will have limitations inAustralian terrain. It is necessary to knowin what terrain his various type of vehicles andequipment perform poorly or well. What arethe areas in which his vehicle gives maximumand minimum performance'.' What are theareas in which our vehicles give maximumand minimum performance? Are they thesame areas? Can we cause him to deploy interrain more favourable to us?Returning to Admiral Synnot's question,flow do we operate in a country as vast asAustralia? His question may be answered bycarrying out a terrain evaluation study. Thismav well show that a large area of northernAustralia is not suitable for military operationinvolving forces of the size of, say, five divisions.This is the type of study on the terrainthan any potential enemy would be requiredto carry out very early in his planning.What is Terrain Evaluation?Research into terrain evaluation for militarypurposes has been undertaken by the countriesshown in Table 1.Beckett' defines terrain evaluation as "theart of making useful statement about the suitabilityof the terrain for some specified purposes".He states that the requirement of thesystem was to "generate useful statements aboutterrain over large areas from which existinginformation was sparse and to do so withminimum cost and effort. The system has tobe accurate enough to offer prediction of sufficientaccuracy to guide the general and logisticplanning of a civil construction task or a militaryoperation at any site in the area ofinterest". (Author's italics)Miller' considers that the MEXE reportsarose "from the classical requirement of soldiersfor full and accurate information aboutthe ground over which they are required tooperate". Barrie" states "the need for informationwas our starting point". Aitchison andGrant 7 state that the sole function of terrainclassifications for engineering purposes is toprovide an appropriate framework for thestorage and retrieval of information pertinentto engineering land use.In note K they fully state the objectives of theirsystem and Grant" states the aims as to providea rational formulised svstem forCountryU.K.U.S.A.CANADAOrganisationMKXE (Military EngineeringExperimental Establishment)Corps of Engineers U.S. ArmyDRB (Defence Research Board)Chief ResearcherBeckett,Oxford UniversityGrabau. WaterwaysExperimental Station(Wl S)Parry,McGill UniversityThe following countries have undertaken terrain evaluation for civilian purposes:U.K. Directorate of Overseas BarrieSurveys (in close collaborationwith MEXE)SOUTH AFRICA National Institute for RoadBrinkResearchAUSTRALIA CSIRO Aitchison & GrantTABLE 1Each group has a slightly different definition of terrain evaluation and objectivefor their system.

THAT FACTOR — TERRAIN 9• planning engineering works on a regionalbasis• recognising similar and dissimilar terrainso that engineering information, knowledgeand experience gained in a particularterrain can be extrapolated overall similar terrain.• collecting, recording, collating, storingand retrieving all engineering informationknowledge and experience gained duringthe planning, construction and maintenancestages of any project.Grabau'" sees that the function of terrainevaluation for engineering purposes is to providethe planner with such precise informationabout the terrain in the operational area thathe can calculate the effects of terrain on thework forces and machines with reasonablereliability.(Note that C3rabau uses "engineering"" in avery broad sense, and embraces testing anddesign of vehicles and equipment as well ascivil engineering construction tasks).Grabau" states that there appears to be twolevels of generalisation involved in terrainevaluation.• The engineer interested in a precise estimateof cost and time for a specific site.• The planner whose interest lies in anapproximate solution.All of these various definitions say approximatelythe same thing in various ways. I considerBeckett's to be the best."Terrain evaluation is the art of making usefulstatements about the suitability of the terrainfor some specified purpose"and the requirement of the system is to"generate useful statements about terrain overlarge areas from which existing information issparse and to do so with minimum cost andeffort."This requirement matches exactly the needsof military activities in Australia.TERRAINEVALUATION:EXISTING STUDIESAll of the organisations listed above havecarried out various studies and the aims andfindings of these will not be considered in detailin this article. The studies have shown thatterrain evaluation for civil and military uses isa practical and economic proposition. (Seenotes 12 to 22 inclusive.)The MEXE group have conducted full fieldtrials in UK, Uganda and the Middle East. Itis believed that the MEXE techniques can bereadily applied in Australia and would be costbeneficial. For reports on the application ofthe MEXE system refer to notes 23 to 26 inclusive.What Are The Uses of Terrain Evaluation?From the foregoing it is possible to statesome broad military uses of terrain evaluation.0Predict the size of forces that could beeffectively deployed in various terrain.• Predict in what terrain and area a forceof a given size and composition couldbe deployed.• Predict engineering conditions in quantitativeterms at a site, without visiting it,for use in calculation of constructioneffort, and source of construction material.• Calculate effect of various types of terrainon equipment, men and tactics.• Check equipment and vehicles at thedesign stage by use of computer modellingin which the input is terrain factorsof various areas.• Select testing and training areas whichare analogous to likely area of operations.Benefits of TerrainEvaluationNone of the above uses is adequately metby existing methods of terrain evaluation sinceterrain evaluation is not practised as an art ora science in the Australian Army. Any studyof terrain is generally fragmented and conductedin isolation. Implementation of a programmeof terrain evaluation would allow itto be applied in the following military areas.The areas and application in them are notmeant to be exhaustive.Strategic• Ascertain the terrain factors in any areaand predict the size and type of force thatcould be deployed. Conversely, for a givensize and type of force, calculate the type ofterrain and area where they could deploy.

IllDEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL• Ascertain sites where large base areas wouldbe established.• Ascertain the ability of existing roads tomaintain a given force.• Ascertain what forces could be maintainedon existing roads.• Ascertain sites suitable for Tactical Reconnaissance(Tac R) airfields.Operational• In likely areas of operations, obtain therequired terrain factors and ascertain theefficiency of our existing equipment andvehicles and also those of the enemy.• Use the terrain factors as data and parametersfor equipment and vehicles to bedesigned.• Ascertain the terrain factors that will maximiseand minimise the efficiency of ours andthe enemy's equipment and vehicles. Thiswould mean a complete study of the enemyinventory as well as our own.• If an enemy has landed and is moving forward,knowing the types of equipment hehas and the terrain over which he is moving,it should be possible to assess his likelyobjectives. This of course assumes that theenemy has knowledge of our terrain andhow it effects his equipment, and that in anadvance he will be striving for maximumefficiency. From our studies of his equipmenton our terrain it is possible to calculaterates of advance and where he will probablybe at a given time.• Plan routes for the rapid deployment ofsmall forces. Terrain can be selected for thegroup to move over, giving the fastest progressfor the vehicle/equipment it is using.• Meet the special needs of air mobile forcesby selecting dropping zones, landing zonesin terrain favourable to the force. Conditionsat the landing zone can be predicted by visitinga similar site, measuring the soil characteristics,strength, etc., and applying them tothe unvisited sites, thus maintaining security.• The effectiveness of meagre forces can beenhanced by skilful use of their knowledgeof the terrain. They can occupy and travelon terrain which gives maximum advantageto their weapons, equipment and vehicles.The I.RDG did this very effectively in theMiddle East.• Increase the effectiveness of weapon systems.A knowledge of the terrain may make uswait for, say, 15 minutes until the enemyhas moved into different terrain beforeengaging him with artillery. The shells havea greater killing area in this particular terrainthan in the other.• Select positions for guns, defences, headquarters,maintenance areas, with the fullknowledge of terrain conditions at the proposedsite.Training• With given terrain factors, select trainingareas (more than one will probably be necessary)that have some or all of the requirements.It is more important to have a smallpiece of terrain with the correct factors thana large one with the wrong factors.• Write an exercise which is designed to trainand test men, vehicles and equipment usingthe terrain factors that the area exhibits.Design• Given terrain factors in which the equipmentand vehicles are to operate, they can bedesigned to give maximum efficiency in thisterrain. By the use of mathematical modelling,the design can be tested and modifiedcountless times until it is considered suitableto build a prototype. This results in considerablecost savings. Initial design can becarried out on a wide range of vehicles andprototypes need not be built until considerednecessary.Engineer Tasks• Selection of suitable sites for airfields andcalculation of the time required to constructor upgrade.• Route location: source of road making material.• Evaluation of existing roads according tothe terrain over which they pass.• Ability to apply data gained at one site toanother in the same terrain class.• Conduct reconnaissance and sampling inareas typical of the terrain class.

THAT FACTOR — TERRAIN 11Familiar Training Area —Singleton.(Australian InformationWhat much of Australia looks like— near Lake Eyre, SA.Service photograph)Tactical• A knowledge of the terrain factors and terrainclasses in the area and the effects ofthese factors on vehicles and equipment (calculatedinitially before the operation orduring contingency planning and modifiedby experience) can be factors to be consideredduring appreciations.Many of these things we already do in variousways. Terrain evaluation puts all our estimatesand calculations on a much firmer footingbecause:• It makes us analyse the terrain in a quantitativemanner, i.e. 90% of slopes are greaterthan 20 degrees, rather than in a qualitativemanner, i.e. it is fairly steep in most places.• It provides a framework for storing andretrieving terrain information.• Information gained at one site can be extrapolatedto many sites in the same terrainclass.• It provides a uniform language to describeand compare terrain.• It ensures that design, evaluation and trainingis carried out in areas that encompassall the terrain factors found in the likelyarea of operations.• It makes one think logically. More reliableestimates of time, equipment, needs, manpowerresources required can be made whenconsidering terrain.Since Australia is now our primary area ofinterest the terrain should be analysed. Terrainhas a recurrent pattern. It is then possible toselect a likely area of operations; for example,the mineral rich Pilbara area of Western Australia.If it is decided to hold a major exercisein this area then the lead up unit exercisesshould he held in terrain which exhibits someof the same terrain factors.One may ask:• Is there terrain closer than the Pilbarawhich has some of the same terrainfactors but near one of our permanentcamps? The Mt. Isa area could be lookedat. It is relatively close to Townsville.

12 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL• What type of exercises should be heldfor sub-unit training in the training areasadjacent to the main city camps? Itwould be necessary to compare the terrainfactors at the two locations.By terrain evaluation it is possible to findterrain close to our main city bases which hassome of the same terrain factors as our likelyarea of operation. No piece of terrain nearour main camps will be the same as that foundin the area of operation. However knowingthe terrain factors in the area of operation itwill be possible to find terrain which exhibitssome of the same terrain factors. Thus it maybe necessary to find six different pieces ofterrain. By intelligent testing procedures wecan gauge the effect of the required terrainfactors on men. equipment and vehicles.A complementary approach is that of mathematicalmodelling in which the terrain factorsand the characteristics of the vehicle are inputinto a suitable computer programme. This ismore suitable for the design stage.Many individual factors have not been listedand considered in detail. This is not to saythat they are not worth considering. They areall taken into account in terrain evaluation.It is necessary to consider temperature. Forexample, in the terrain 100 km south of HallsCreek in the Kimberleys in June, the maximumtemperature is about 28' while the minimumis below freezing. In some of the terrain inthis area a rainfall of 20 mm will bog mostvehicles.There is a need for terrain intelligence. Theeffect of different types of terrain on operationsand the terrain's response to the seasonsneed to be known. Commanders and plannersat all levels need accurate and timely informationconcerning the terrain.THE METHOD OF TERRAINEVALUATIONThere are three distinct approaches to terrainevaluation based on:• Environmental controls GENETICAPPROACH.• Aerial identification LANDSCAPEAPPROACH• Land attributes PARAMETRICAPPROACH.GenericThis is an attempt to arrive at distinctiveland units by repeated subdivisions on thebasis of environmental factors, i.e. temperature,rainfall, climate. Stewart- 7 criticises itbecause it does not grapple with the complexityof terrain on a scale suitable for terrainuse. This approach leads to large complexland units unsuitable for terrain evaluation.It will not be considered further.Landscape ApproachThis approach involves the recognition inthe terrain of distinctive components with onlya limited range of variation of those attributesimportant to terrain use. Landscape componentsrecur in distinctive assemblies of patterns.This approach involves the analysis of visiblefeatures on the ground. For this purpose theair photo is ideal and through tone, texture,pattern and stereoscopic measurement theobserver has an expression of the land units.Terrain classes can be mapped.When flying over Australia, the repetitivenature of the terrain becomes apparent inareas of the Pilbara, Kimberleys and Mt. Isa.This is the approach followed by MEXE,CSIRO and in South Africa.Parametric ApproachThis approach leads to the division andclassification of terrain on the basis of selectedattribute values.Attributes for this approach must be suitablefor the purpose involved. For mobilityof vehicles they must include surface geometry,surface composition, vegetation, structure andhydrologic geometry.This family of terrain factors may be subdividedinto more measurable factors i.e. slope,relief. Maps of different attributes may beprepared and then superimposed to form acomplex map.This type of approach has been carried outby WES and Canada and has been mainlyused for the study of cross country mobilityand is here concerned with micro relief. Thusrigorous parametric mapping has been undertakenin only small areas. When applied tolarge areas the parametric method is extendedusing the landscape method by associatingparametric class intervals with photo interpretedclasses.

14 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALApplication to AustraliaWhen looking at the advantages and disadvantagesof the landscape and parametricmethods and wondering which is the best forAustralia or how they could be combined tobest meet Australian conditions the followingfactors need to be considered.• To get all the terrain factors for the parametricmethod 1:25,000 mapping is necessary.Australia has very few of thesemapv• MEXE uses 1:50,000 photography,CSIRO uses 1:80,000 photography,Canada uses 1:5,000 photography. Australiais only completely covered by1:80,000 photography. It is extremelyunlikely that Australia will be coveredby 1:5,000 scale photography in the foreseeablefuture.• The landscape method does not rely onthe existence of topographic maps.• The landscape method is much quickerand cheaper than the parametric methodbut not as precise.It would seem that the cross country mobilityrequirements of the U.K. and U.S. have beenassessed differently. The U.S. is after detailedinformation at every point while the U.K. isafter general information over a wide area. Inthis context the landscape method and theparametric methods respectively achieve whatis required of them.Australia would seem to be best served bya MHXE type system in the short term as itwould produce results relatively quickly andcheaply. On a longer term basis a systemusing the best of both approaches could beevolved and used to update that evaluationwhich has been based on the MEXE typeapproach.If we are to fight a numerically superiorenemy then we must redress the balance byusing techniques that give us the advantage.We must give our troops the best informationthat can be obtained. In peace, we have thetime to try out these techniques and evolvethe required techniques. Once the techniquesand methods have been mastered, full scalepnxJuction need not necessarily occur. Productioncan occur when required. At the startof hostilities there will not be time to masterthe techniques.The expertise exists in Australia to do thiswork. Regular officers who are already traineda\ engineers and surveyors could be quicklycross-trained in terrain evaluation.Information derived from terrain evaluationcan be of benefit to all ranks from the RACTtruck driver, to the infantry section leader, tothe staff officer planner in the capital city.ConclusionThe terrain is an important factor in militaryactivities. Terrain evaluation is not practisedas an art or a science in the AustralianArmy. The study and use of terrain evaluationwill enable more effective use of our men,equipment and vehicles and enable moreaccurate planning to proceed. It will give usadvantages that we do not enjoy at the moment.RecommendationsThe following are recommended:eAdopt the MEXE system of terrainevaluation, in the first instance, for Australia.• Prepare a general terrain brief on Australiasimilar to that of Uganda preparedby MEXE.• Study the needs of special groups andevolve graphics and special purpose mapsfitted to their specific needs.• Ascertain the terrain factors that arecharacteristic of the various types ofterrain in Australia.• Set up a terrain data store to make fulluse of all existing terrain informationand be able to accept future information.• Assess the enemy's and our own inventoriesand find the terrain which maximisesand minimises our and his equipment.• Implement the suggested uses given underthe headings strategic, operational, design,training, etc.• Initiate studies on terrain evaluation thatwould lead to the best system for Australianneeds and conditions.• Carry out an education programme sothat personnel at all levels would fullyuse the terrain information provided.

THAT FACTOR — TERRAIN 15• Initiate studies and exercises to integrateterrain evaluation into military activities.UNOTES1 Beckett. P. H. T.. "Punched Cards for TerrainIntelligence." Royal Engineers Journal, June 1962.- Benn. B. O. and Grabau. W. E.. Terrain Evaluationas a Function of User Requirement in LandEvaluation, 1968.3 Synnot, A. M.. "The Changing Challenge For OurDefence Force." Army Journal, May 1976.4 Beckett, op. cit.•• Miller. J.. Recent Studies in Military Geography.Geographical Journal, No. 133. 1967, pp. 354-6.6 Barrie. A. O.. Terrain Evaluation — Proceedingsof a Symposium. MEXE Report 1053, October 1967.7 Aitchison. G. D. and Grant K.. "Proposals for theApplication of the P.U.C.E. Programme of TerrainClassification and Evaluation to some EngineeringProblems." C.S.I.R.O. Division of Soil MechanicsPaper No. 119, 1968." Aitchison. G. D. and Grant. K. "The P.U.C.E.programme of Terrain description, evaluation andinterpretation for engineering purposes".'•> Grant. K.. "Terrain Evaluation for EngineeringPurposes". C.S.I.R.O. Division of Applied GeomechanicsResearch Paper No. 154.10 Grabau. W. E.. An Integrated System for ExploitingQuantitative Terrain Data for Engineering Purposesin Land Evaluation. 1968.11 Ibid.uAnon. Military Evaluation of Geographic Areas,Reports on Activities to April 1953. WES Misc.Paper 3-610. 1963.13 Aitchison. G. D. and Grant. K.. "Terrain Evaluationfor Engineering". C.S.I.R.O. Division of SoilMechanics Research Paper No. 107. 1968.1 1 Grabau. W. E.. A Suggested Procedure for theSelection and Description of Reference Test Areas.WES Misc Paper 4-921. 1967.15 Parry. J. T.. The Application of Two MorphometricTerrain Classification Systems Using Air PhotoInterpretation Methods. Defence Research Boardof Canada. Report 01GR — 7070061, 1972.ia Parry. J- T.. Terrain Analysis at McGill University.Report on Progress. 1963-68.17 Parry. J. T.. Terrain Analysis at McGill University,Summary of Progress, 1969-70.7iRula. A. A.. Grabau. W. E., Orvedal. A. C. Harden.H. W.. Ansted. G. W. and Czako. T. F. EnvironmentalFactors Affecting Ground Mobilitv in Thailand.U.S. Army Engineers, WES TR 5-625. May1%3.19 Shamburger. J. H. and Grabau, W. E.. MobilityEnvironmental Research Study — A QuantitativeMethod for Describing Terrain for Ground Mobility.WES TR 3-726.-" Stewart. G. G., Tand Evaluation in Land Evaluation,1968.- 1 Synnot, A. M.. op. cit.--'Van Lopits. J. R. and Kolb. C. R.. Handbook: ATechnique for Preparing Desert Terrain Analogues.US Army Engineers. WES TR 3-506, 1969.-'•'' Lyons, K. J. A review of Some Systems of TerrainEvaluation (unpublished).The following MEXE reports show applications ofthe MEXE systems of terrain evaluation:—-> A Terrain Brief. Report 931 — November 1965.- s Field Trials of a Terrain Classification System.- K Reconnaissance of Air Field Sites, Report 995,1969.-' Stewart, G. G.. op. cit.Additional NotesBeckett. P. H. T. and Webster, R.. The Developmentof a System for Terrain Evaluation over Uarge Areas.Royal Engineers Journal, No. 4. December 1971.Grabau, W. E.. Stoll, J. K. and Stinson, B. G., APlan for Quantitative Evaluation of the Cross CountryPerformance of Prototype Vehicles. WES MiscPaper M-70-7. 1970.Uand Systems of Uganda.Parry. J. T.. Heginbottom. J. A. and Cowson. W. R..Terrain Evaluation in Mobility Studies for MilitaryVehicles Uand Evaluation. 1968.NO SENSE OF HISTORYI wish Nelson would make no more signals. We all understand what we have to do.Admiral Collingwood at Trafalgar. 1H05.

[6 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALDefence Film MakingLieutenant ./. R. MacnamaraDefence Public RelationsiJHOOTING as interpreted by the film makeris a different field to that synonymous with thearmed forces, yet the two exist together withinthe Department of Defence, and even suggestthat the former plays an important part.When the action is happening, whether itbe a disaster situation, emergency relief, war,or Service exercise, a film crew is the lastelement considered to be important. However,when it's all over, everyone wants to see thephotos and film; and if the activity hasn't beencovered by the news media they want to knowwhy.Most of us are impressed and proud of the'real' footage featured in the film "Midway":historians relish it; critics rate it as "authenticitynecessary for the film'; and the world wants tosee it. Yet the intrepid cameraman who stoodon the deck of the Enterprise probably hadlittle help or sympathy from his embattledfellow sailors.Everyone likes to identify with the finishedproduct. When "The Green Machine" wasreleased, every unit, every Corps, every soldierliked to think that he had something to dowith it. It was a success.But in the early stages, when Defence Public-Relations film men were asking for a wholesquadron of Army aircraft, or a troop oftanks — not to mention the hundreds of soldiers— there were the doubting Thomas'; thosewho thought it was a waste of defence timeand money; and the ones who simply said,'impossible'.Not many realised that it took two years ofplanning to get "The Green Machine" conceived,drafted, scripted, and through thechannels for final acceptance, even before thefirst film imasze was shot.A successful film in any field, in any country,takes time, resources, and money — all inlarge quantities. Its success when it is shownbefore an audience is the only gauge of whetherthe outlay has been worth the cost.Making a film is not something one sets outto do one afternoon with a bundle of cameragear tucked under one arm like a fishermansetting oil for a few hours fishing.Producing a professional film - and that isthe only type of film we are interested in — islike a major defence exercise. An exercise hasits stages, and its phases. Before a major exercisebegins there is a planning stage, which isboth long and detailed. A film production isa very major exercise, and requires meticulouslydetailed planning and preparation, down toevery shot the cameraman will shoot; everysound the soundsman must capture on tape,from the roar of a tank to the tweeting of abird in the background.During a military or naval exercise mistakesoccur, and even the best-laid plans go wrong,either through unforeseen circumstances orhuman error. In film making delays and holdupsare even more frequent. An Army. Navy,or Air Force exercise is a reasonably durablearrangement, in that it can proceed throughwet weather, it is not subject to poor lightconditions, and has a large degree of flexibility.Film making is subject to all the normal humanelements of mistake, error, and oversight, andadditionally subject to an array of physicalconditions beyond the control of the filmdirector. Film making is subject to a highdegree of sensitivity in cloud, light, time ofday, noise, background, etc.One scene of several soldiers deplaningfrom a helicopter may be required to be shotfive times for example. That, to the commanderof the forces involved may soundridiculous, but he is overlooking some of theimportant factors of film. Film is a preserved

DEFENCE FILM MAKING 17(Defence Public Relations)Service activities often create news. Here an ABCfilm crew interviews Army men who conducted anadventure training exercise to Cape York Peninsulato search for the grave site of the explorer EdmundKennedy.impression. Mistakes on it, which may be hismistakes, are retained in perpetuity, there forall to see, and blown up to larger than life ifit goes on the 'big screen'.It is in the Services' interest that the filmmaker seeking to portray an aspect of theirrole, takes the greatest care in presenting hisproduct.The film maker does not have the facilityto look into the camera and see what he hasshot. What is 'in the can' is an unknownquantity until the 'rushes' — the first printsof the film processed for marking up andediting purposes — are returned from thelaboratory. He therefore needs to makecertain he has what he wants before endinga scene. It is better to hold up action for onemore 'take' than to let the action go and beforced to recall it for a reshoot a week laterbecause of simple basic faults in the first take.A number of takes are required also forcutting purposes. This process occurs in editinga film. Very few of us when we view afilm at the theatre or on television, direct ourattention to the number of different anglesfrom which one scene may be filmed. Thecamera may start on a wide shot of a characterin a room; it may then cut to a medium closeshot of him talking; then to a close-up of hishand shot from one side, showing him doingsomething. Try a simple exercise next timeyou are viewing a film — watch a scene closelyand see how many different perspectives youare seeing of that one scene. This variation ofangles is necessary as a compensating factor.The human eye is a very sophisticated lenswhich can focus both as a long focal lengthand as a wide angle lens at the same time;therefore we have a 'depth of field' — the areaof vision we can see in focus — of great magnitude.The human eye can also flick around at arapid rate to take in a whole scene from anumber of different perspectives. The cameralens is limited to a particular frame of vision.This frame can be adjusted by 'panning'(swivelling sideways on the camera tripod);'tilting' (moving up or down); or 'zooming'(in or out). However there is a limit to movementsthat can be absorbed by the camerafrom one position. Too much panning, tilting,and zooming will leave the audience giddy andthrown off the track of the film. Steady imagesare preferable, yet still required from differentperspectives. Therefore we need to move thecamera itself, as opposed to swivelling it aroundon a fixed position.Think what you do in looking at an object.You firstly run your eyes over it, looking fromdifferent perspectives. If you still haven't seenall you want to see, you move your body.To achieve this variation of perspectives inone film scene, the scene needs to be shot(Defence Public Relations)Lt Col Frank Markcrow of Headquarters Field ForceCommand, Sydney, presents a plaque on behalf ofthe Director of Army Aviation, to Mr Terry Ohlsson,the director of the public relations film, 'The GreenMachine'. On left is the director of photography forthe film, Mr Gary Furner, and at right, Mr BillStacey, film editor.

18 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALseveral times, each time from a different angle.These takes are then cut by a film editor andmatched up to produce an image as near aspossible to what the human eye would havetaken in had it been viewing the scene. Imaginea scene shot from one position without cameramovement or intervention by a film editor. Itwould be visually boring, and unrealistic,because the human eye would be wanting allthe time to see more. Most of us become restlesswhen a shot lingers a little too long on asubject. We want action, and action is essentiallymade up of movement.A good cameraman, interpreting a scriptunder a good director, with a good film editor,can produce a visual presentation better thanthe human eye could have recorded. This isthe field of truly professional film making.Film makers may impress you as fussy,meticulous — even the proverbial pain. Whena film crew is shooting on location with aService, the term "buggerising around' is frequentlyheard. Their entire consideration mustbe directed at producing a professional result.Camera work, sound recording, and directingare processes, both technical and creative,involving concentration and mental exertion.The film crew on the job may give the impressionthat they are in their own little world.They probably are, as the action they are viewinghas to be transformed through their skillto a 16 mm or 35 mm image on a piece ofcelluloid and still retain its realism and authenticity.Much compromising is necessary in filmmaking, such as crowding action together atan unrealistic spacing. This is necessarybecause the camera lens does not have thescope of the human eye. Consider the implicationsof one of the most important militarystrategies — dispersion - on film making.It makes it, without adjustment, impossible.Crowded action is not to be feared, as cameralenses also compensate distance, e.g., a telephotolens reduces space between the cameraand subject. Space can likewise be accentuatedby wide angle lenses.Defence films are produced by the Directorateof Public Relations films section, andby commercial production companies undercontract, such as Kingcroft Productions inSydney who made "The Green Machine".The Defence film section, which is distinctfrom audio-visual sections and training filmunits, has the capacity to produce 16 mm colordocumentary films, in addition to news andmagazine type films. These films are marketedthrough television news and weekend magazineprogrammes and distributed on the clubcircuit.The common characteristic of these films isthat they are produced for public information— by the Directorate of Public Relations. Theyare not intended for training purposes orinternal use, excepting general screenings tounits. The crews involved in producing thesefilms are qualified journalists, cameramen,soundsmen, and editors who have worked insimilar commercial fields.Professional film makers are artists. On locationwith a Service they, with co-operation,assistance and a simple, basic understandingof their requirements, can provide one of thebest and most widely acceptable tributes toelements and roles of the armed forces. QMONTHLY AWARDThe Board of Management has awarded the prize of $30 for the best original articlein the July August 1977 issue (No. 5) of the Defence Force Journal to Wing CommanderR. W. Howe. RAAF, for his article What Australia Needs is a Good Revolution — ThePGM Revolution. Miss E. J. Gouldfflf fMfffCfUrCf OF THE HUMS,1314 18Susan Kenn>, BA (Hons)University of MelbourneDURING the Australian convict era,untrained, frequently drunken and dissoluteconvicts purported to nurse the hospitalizedsick. Subsequently, their place wastaken by elderly women, commonly promotedfrom among the domestic servants. Sir HenryParkes initiated the first reforms when, inJuly 1866, he requested Florence Nightingaleto nominate a band of nurses who would beprepared to reform nursing at the SydneyInfirmary. Consequently, in March 1868, sixNightingale nurses arrived in New SouthWales. They were led by Miss Nightingale'sprotegee, Lucy Osborn. The progress of nursingin Australia was slow, but during the1880s the Nightingale System of nursing trainingand organization was introduced into theprincipal Australian hospitals. In December1899, the Australasian Trained Nurses' Associationwas formed with the principal objectiveof safeguarding nursing standards. 1The Australian Army Nursing Service wasformed in 1902 as part of the Australian ArmyMedical Corps.- Its inclusion in the newlyformedCommonwealth Military Forces owedmuch to the success of the twelve Australiannurses, who together with their Lady Superintendent,Miss E. J. Gould, accompanied thesecond New South Wales contingent to SouthAfrica in 1900. At the commencement of1914 members of the AANS were, in the main,Miss Kenny was born in England. She was educatedat the Methodist Ladies' College, Kew, Melbourne.She obtained a BA with First Class Honours inHistory at the University of Melbourne in 1976 andis currently in the final year of a Bachelor of Lawsdegree course. In 1976. she became co-editor of theMelbourne University Law Review.senior nurses from the principal metropolitanhospitals. To join, they were required to bebetween twenty-one and forty years of age,unmarried or a widow, resident in the metropolitanarea, and to have completed at leastthree years training in medical and surgicalnursing at a recognized civil general hospital.They were unpaid and received little specialtraining. Principal Matrons in each State werenominally in charge of the internal organizationof the Service, but the major burden ofco-ordination and direction fell upon theDirector-General of Medical Services. 3 InAustralia, prior to the outbreak of the FirstWorld War, scant attention was paid to thepeculiar position of nursing sisters in a militarysetting. Questions of authority andresponsibility were barely articulated, serviceconditions and duties were ill-defined. Theabsence of its own senior administrative headplaced the AANS in an inevitably weak positionin any contest with medical or militaryauthorities.In August 1914, on the outbreak of war,Australian nurses, like thousands of theircountrymen, volunteered for the AIF. InOctober, the AANS, CMF was mobilized, itsmembers volunteered for the AIF too. InDecember, Colonel R. H. J. Fetherston,A/DGMS, commented that he was not findingdifficulty in filling the Australian complementof nursing sisters but in eliminating volunteers.He thought that the volunteers from theAANS, CMF would prove sufficient for AIFpurposes. No great need for nursing sisterswas envisaged. The Australian Governmentwas slow to realize that the burden of providingthe AIF with an adequate medical servicelay solely with it, and in any case, it wasgenerally thought that because of their sex. 2dDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALmale medical orderlies were better suited tonursing duties in military hospitals, particularlythose in battle zones, than nursing sisters.'Only twenty-four nurses accompanied thefirst contingent of the All-' to Egypt in November1914. Subsequently, as a result of WarOffice urgings, they were joined by a furtherone hundred and sixty nurses as well as eightydoctors, the staff for two General and twoStationary hospitals. The AANS in 1915, asin peacetime, was mainly composed of experiencedand senior members of the civil nursingprofession. Many of its members had been'efficient' in the pre-war service and heldresponsible administrative positions in largecivil hospitals. They tended to be women ofdetermined and independent character, rootedin strongly-held principles.'The two Principal Matrons at No. 1 and 2AGH, Miss Jane Bell and Miss Gould, wereno exception. Miss Gould had experience ofarmy nursing in South Africa in 1901. Beforethe outbreak of war. Matron Bell had heldthe post of Principal Matron for the AANS,CMF in Victoria. Before taking charge ofthe Hospital for the Insane at Rydalmere,Miss Gould had been Matron at the SydneyHospital. Miss Bell had been Assistant LadySuperintendent at the Royal EdinburghInfirmary, and since 1910, had occupied thepost of Lady Superintendent at the MelbourneHospital.' 1 The high calibre of the early membersof the AANS suggested that the servicewas well launched.Unfortunately the AANS in Egypt in 1915was plagued by administrative chaos. Thearrival in Egypt of twenty-four nurses withthe first contingent of the AIF had causedSurgeon General W. D. C. Williams. DMS.AIF, and Major General W. T. Bridges, GOC,AIF, a little embarrassment: neither manknew quite what should be done with theAANS. In desperation, Bridges had cabledthe War Office that he hoped it had somethingto suggest! 7 The position was aggravated bythe arrival of the main body of nurses aboardthe Kyarra in January 1915. As numbers ofthe AANS in Egypt increased, the absence ofadministrative organization created worseproblems. The lack of a seniority list almostspelt disaster. In 1915. the AANS was madeup of almost too many senior and experiencednurses. As General Fetherston contended, theService was too small to support many seniorappointments, but senior nurses resented arbitrarydemotion. Dissension and dissatisfactionthreatened discipline and efficiency. Nurses'morale was not improved by poor living andworking conditions: postings among the hospitalsin Egypt were at best ill-planned, atworst haphazard. 3The disorganization was anathema to thePrincipal Matrons who were Australian productsof the Nightingale System of nursingtraining. Their training hospital, the RoyalPrince Alfred Hospital, Sydney, had adoptedthe System in 1882. Miss Gould and Miss Bellhad commenced their training there in 1883and 1894 respectively." Matron Bell in particularwas committed to the Nightingale idealsof service and discipline besides sharing MissNightingale's concern for the status of nurses.With a missionary's zeal. Miss Bell set aboutthe task of reforming the administration ofthe AANS in Egypt.To the discomfort of General Williams andthe intense annoyance of General Fetherston,DGMS, the Principal Matrons took it uponthemselves to make their own appointmentsof nursing staff to nursing posts. 1 " Miss Bellroused the enmity of the AAMC in generaland of the commanding officer of No 1 AGH.Colonel W. Ramsay Smith, in particular inher battle to have her own authority at No 1AGH. and that of AANS matrons at otherhospitals, recognized within AAMC organisation.At root, the problem concerned thestatus and responsibility of nursing servicepersonnel. On the one hand, at No 1 AGH,Coloney Ramsay Smith contended that underArmy Service Regulations, it was his duty toregulate the employment of the nursing staffattached to his unit and to supervise theirmess and living quarters. On the other hand.Matron Bell invoked the Nightingale principlesof hospital management according to whichthe hospital matron was responsible for themanagement of her nursing staff. Shortly afterher arrival at No 1 AGH, Matron Bell resigned,claiming that she found her position quiteuntenable, but she was promptly re-instatedby Senator George Pearce, Minister forDefence." As the dispute continued. MissBell's field of attack widened. In her effortto maintain and enhance the status of the THE EMERGENCE OF THE AANS. 1914-18 21army nursing sister, she sought recognition ofthe AANS as an independent and autonomousservice with power to supervise and disciplineits members, and with its own system of rankand seniority, authority and responsibility.Her scheme of reform also entailed theappointment of a senior administrative headto co-ordinate the service and protect nursinginterests.In June 1915, after six months' protest,Matron Bell was created Matron Inspectressand instructed to supervise and report uponnursing arrangements at her own and auxiliaryhospitals. It was a Pyrrhic victory.Despite increased travelling and accommodationexpenses, her pay remained 12/6 a day,with the result that she was compelled to drawfrom her own savings. She was unable tosupervise the AANS as a whole because shehad no authority over nursing staff at thewas marred by procedural irregularities. Witnesseswere not cross-examined, although sometestimonies appeared to be based on merehearsay. As the principal protagonists, ColonelRamsay Smith and Matron Bell, had beenrecalled to Australia, they were unable todefend themselves before the Court. Dissatisfiedwith the manner in which the War Officehad conducted the Inquiry, General Fetherstondismissed it as valueless, but he began toappreciate the need to strengthen Australiancontrol over Australian army medical services.Most importantly, in precipitating the Inquin.Miss Bell demonstrated the seriousness of theadministrative plight of the AANS, the necessityfor reform, and the need to define therelation of the AANS to the AAMC' ;In September 1915, General Fetherstonembarked on a tour of inspection of theAAMC, including the AANS, abroad. TheWest Australian Sisters in the Hospital Ship Saltain March 1916.(Australian War Memorial photos)Three Sisters at No. 3 Australian Auxiliary Hospital,Heliopolis.other major Australian hospital, No 2 AGH.In any case, she felt that her recommendationswere ignored and that Australian nurses weremoved unnecessarily, and lived and workedunder unduly difficult conditions. 12The dispute between Matron Bell and theAAMC smouldered until October 1915 whenthe War Office instigated an independentinquiry into medical care and nursing at No 1AGH. Its findings supported Miss Bell. Itwas said that in attempting to protect nursingstaff, she had net with a vexatious want ofsympathy. It was unfortunate that the Inquirypurpose of his mission was to inspect andreport upon the working of the AANC, AIFgenerally and to pay particular attention tothe treatment of Australian invalids in Hospitals,and on Hospital ships and transports'."He was authorized by the Australian Governmentto re-organize medical services whereverhe considered it necessary, subject to the consentof the War Office. The Report arisingfrom his tour of the Australian army medicalservices abroad which was submitted to theAustralian Government in January 1916 provedto be a milestone in the administrative historyof the AANS. 71DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALPersistent attacks on the Australian armymedical services throughout the second halfof 1915 probably contributed most to Fetherston'sdecision to make a tour of inspection.At Gallipoli, the allied medical services wereacutely aware that medical preparations hadbeen pitifully inadequate. There was a continualshortage of equipment, hospital accommodation,and trained medical and nursingstaff. In the Australian Parliament and thepress, suggestions were made that a low standardof medical practice was peculiar to theAAMC. The competence of medical officersin the training camps at Broadmeadows, nearMelbourne, and at Liverpool, near Sydney,were seriously questioned and it was fearedgenerally that AAMC deficiencies were greaterin Egypt. 1 '''A growing public consciousness of the potentialrole of army nurses probably also promptedFetherston to pay particular attention to thepart played by the AANS abroad. The inadequaciesof nurses' pay and allowances hadattracted considerable attention in July andAugust 1916. Loss of faith in the armymedical services had promoted the suspicionthat the AAMC treated its nurses poorly, discouragingthem from working to full capacity,and deterring potential volunteers from enlisting.In the popular imagination, the armynurse was type-cast as the 'Angel of Mercy',the heroine of the army medical services. 17In Fgypt, General Fetherston learnt that alack of trained medical orderlies had compelledthe army medical services to draw uponthe AANS more than he had anticipated.Despite the difficulties of nursing on sand intent hospitals or in the dark aboard hospitalships in battle /ones, Australian nurses hadworked efficiently and well, withstanding long,demanding hours and intense discomfort. Onhis tour. General Fetherston also discoveredthe extent to which administration chaosthreatened Australian army medical services.Disorganization wasted staff and equipment.Fetherston recommended a thorough re-organisationof the administrative structure of theAAMC and the AANS. Responsibility forAustralian medical services was to be placedmore firmly in the hands of Australian officers.Miss F. A. Conyers was appointed to thenewly-created post of Matron-in-Chief, AANS,AIF on the staff of General Neville Howse,DMS, AIF. With the appointment of its ownadministrative head, the AANS commencedits development as a semi-independent auxiliaryservice. 18General Fetherston's recognition of theimportance of the auxiliary medical services,especially the AANS, reflected his growingrealisation that the responsibility of the armymedical service did not end with surgery andhospitalization, but included a duty to providefor the comfort, well-being and rehabilitationof its patients. Although he deplored theVoluntary Aid Detachments of untrainedwomen, Fetherston recommended an increaseof one hundred per cent in the numbers oftrained nurses in military hospitals in orderthat, as he expressed it, 'patients were nursedand not merely waited upon'. 19After the Somme Offensive began in July1916, Australian medical services formed partof an allied medical scheme. By 1918, manymembers of the AANS were working withBritish nurses in RAMC units on the WesternFront; others were nursing in British units inFgypt, Salonika and India. In London, MissConyers, the Australian Matron-in-Chief,efficiently supervised the AAMS on the WesternFront. Together, she and Miss MaudMcCarthy, the Imperial Matron-in-Chief, BFF,conducted frequent tours of inspection of thenursing services in France, and she herselfinterviewed Australian nurses arriving inFngland. As a result, service conditions,including rates of pay improved and the AANSon the Western Front commenced to be acohesive body. Unfortunately, Miss Conyersin London was unable to control the limitsof her far-flung jurisdiction. In India particularly,the AANS suffered, and neglect occasionedresentment. 2 " Apart from this administrativedifficulty, the major stumbling blockto further development of the AANS remainedthe inherent unwillingness to employ womenin battle zones.- 1 Married women were unableto join the AANS, and army nurses whomarried automatically relinquished theirappointment. In July 1916, it was official AIFpolicy that single women and widows were toserve in military hospitals as far behind theline as possible.- 1 Circumstances on theWestern Front between 1916 and 1918 compelledthis policy to be abandoned. THE EMERGENCE OF THE AANS. 1914-18 23Between 1916 and 1918, the numbers ofAustralian army nurses sent abroad increasedrapidly until they became an integral part ofthe front line medical team. After July 1916,the allied medical services were hard pressedto provide adequately for the enormouscasualties on the Western Front. Skilledmedical and nursing staff were always needed.The demand for nurses intensified whenmedical orderlies left for duty in the trenches.The AAMC adopted a 'Six Months' Policy"in an attempt to relieve the pressure on overworkedstaff while ensuring that men wereAs a result of the campaign, it was apparentthat although there were sufficient qualifiednurses to meet immediate demands, futureneeds would have to be met by freshly qualifiednurses. General Fetherston narrowlyavoided disaster by defeating an attempt byMelbourne's major training hospitals to retainyoung nurses by lengthening the duration oftheir course from three to four years. 24The demand for trained nurses in civil andmilitary hospitals placed Australian volunteernurses in an unprecedented bargaining positionwhich enabled them to determine the termsSisters Milne and Dobson beside the Heliopolis-Ismailiya hospital train.(Australian War Memorial photos)A ward in No. 3 Australian Auxiliary Hospital, Heliopolis.returned to the Front as quickly as possible.Those who were unlikely to be fit within sixmonths were returned to Australia; the temporarilyincapacitated were retained in England.'--In August 1916, prompted by requestsby the War Office for further Australiannurses, General Howse initiated a nationalnurse recruitment campaign. The Departmentof Defence was instructed to ascertain thenumber of Australian nurses who were preparedto volunteer for army nursing in Australiaor abroad with either the AAMC orthe RAMC. Advertisements in daily newspapersand nursing journals called for volunteerswith three years training in a publicgeneral hospital or registration with either theRVTNA or the ATNA. By the end ofOctober 1916, six hundred and fifty-nine nurseshad registered, but some were married andtherefore ineligible, and others were alreadyemployedin the understaffed civil hospitals.- 3upon which they served with the AIF. Untilthe end of 1916, the War Office assumed thatthe nurses it sought from the AustralianGovernment would enter the British nursingservice, the QAIMNS, and work under Britishservice conditions, at the poorer British ratesof pay.-"' It was not surprising that Australiannurses were anxious to serve in the Australiannursing service. Agitation by volunteers ledGeneral Fetherston in Melbourne and MissConyers in London to win a reversal of thispolicy, and recognition of the principle thatAustralian army nurses should serve overseasas part of a national nursing service. In mid1917 two hundred and seventy-three Australiannurses were sent to British hospitals inSalonika and more went to India, but asmembers of the AANS.- 6Although heavy casualties alone resulted ina need for nursing staff, the development ofmedical policy on the Western Front created 24 1)1 I f \( H I ()K( [ l()l R\ \Ia larger role for the allied nursing services.At Gallipoli, lives were lost because medicaltreatment in the field had been crude: inFrance, more sophistication was required.The conditions of trench warfare compelledthe allied medical services to concentrate theirefforts upon rapid recovery rather than preventativemeasures. At the forefront of themilitary offensive, the Casualty Clearingbecame the hub of medical organization. Theywere designed to effect efficient and speedyevacuation as well as to ensure that surgicalintervention and the cleansing and dressing ofwounds took place within as short a time aspossible. Their successful operation washeavily dependent on trained nurses whosupervised evacuation of the wounded andformed an integral part of the surgical team.The Casualty Clearing Stations were intendedto aid the military offensive, and in the laterdays of the war, the posting of nurses becamea matter of strategic importance.- 7On the outbreak of war in 1914, littlethought was given to the potential role ororganization of the Australian Army NursingService. In Egypt in 1915, Matron Bell battledto bring order into administrative chaos. InAustralia, pressure in Parliament and thepress compelled General Fetherston to makea tour of inspection. His Report proved tobe the turning point in the administrativehistory of the AANS during 1914-1918. FollowingFetherston's recommendations, itcommenced its development as an autonomousauxiliary service whose members formed astrategic part of medical organization on theWestern Front after July 1916. By the endof the war. two thousand one hundred andthirty-nine Australian army nurses had seenactive service abroad; they had been as farafield as Vladivostock, Burma. India, thePersian Gulf, Palestine, Egypt, Salonika, Italy,Greece, and of course, France and England.The participation of the AANS in the FirstWorld War altered the position of nurses inthe Australian army. It may have affectedthe status of trained nurses in post-war Australiansociety. It is also possible that theunprecedented involvement of Australianwomen at the front promoted a wider acknowledgementof the part women might play inAustralian society.QNOTES1 Brodsky. I.. Sydney's Nurse Crusaders, (Sydney.1968).-General Order 1902. no. 123. s. 3. reproduced inJ. Gurner. The Origins of the R.A.A.M.C. (Melbourne.1970), pp. 52-5.Standing Orders. Army Medical Services 1913-14.ss. 196-208. MP 133/2, 20/8/3, Australian Archives(AA). Melbourne. .,' Argus, 7 December 1914; Biographical details ofMiss E. A. Conyers. Matron-in-Chief. AANS.AIF. Australian War Memorial (AWM). Canberra.> Matron-in-Chief. AANS. AIF to A. G. Butler.17 February 1919. A2663. 1013,13; Defence toGOC. AIF. 1 December 1914. A2663. 963/27.AWM. Canberra.,;Armstrong. Dorothy M.. The First Fifty Years.A History of Nursing at the Roxal Prince AlfredHospital (Sydney, 1963). pp. 86-7.' 92; Inglis. K. S..A History of the Royal Melbourne Hospital, MA.thesis. University of Melbourne (November. 1954).p. 115.' DMS. AIF to Defence. 14 November 1914; GOC.AIF to Defence. 15 November 1914; DMS. AIFto GOC. AIF. 29 November 1914; A2663. 963/27,AWM. Canberra.•DGMS. Headquarters. Melbourne to DMS, AIF.26 November 1914; DMS. AIF to DGMS. Headquarters.Melbourne. 25 February 1915; MatronGould to DMS. AIF. 30 March 1915; DMS. AIFto DGMS. Headquarters. Melbourne. 16 April1915, A2663. 509/5, AWM. Canberra.' Armstrong, op. eit. 35. 76. 86-7. 92; Inglis. op. cit.115.i" DGMS. Headquarters. Melbourne to DMS. AIF.26 November 1914. 17 April 1915. A2663. 509 5.AWM. Canberra." Matron Bell to DMS. AIF. January 1915; Defenceto DMS. AIF. January 1915; Matron Bell toDMS. AIF. 28 February 1915; April 1915. MP133/1, Box 8. 238 6 78. AA. Melbourne.1 - DMS. Egypt to Matron Bell. 30 June 1915; MatronInspectress to DMS. Egypt. 9. 12. 22 July; 4. 8.13 August; 12 October 1915. MP 133 1. Box 8.238/6/78, AA. Melbourne."DGAMS to Defence. 7 July 1915. 4 August 1915:Transcript. Court of Inquiry. 4-7 October 1915;DGMS. Headquarters. Melbourne. Minute. 12 .January 1916. MP 133/1, Box 8. 238 6 78. AA.Melbourne.' General Fetherston. Report following a tour ofinspection, 24 September to 4 December 1915. >8 January 1916. MP 729'4. Box 1. 10/3/297. AA.Melbourne.18 Surgeon General Birrell. An Account of MedicalArrangements at Gallipoli. A2663. 481/1. AWM.Canberra.unparliamentary Debates (Cth), 14 May 1915. p.3172; 20 May 1915. p. 3280: 26 May 1915. pp.3404-10. 3422. 6923; 9 June 1915. pp. 3786. 3795;18 June 1915. p. 4173; 30 June 1915. p. 4459;1 July 1915. pp. 4520-4; 26 August 1915. pp. 6183.6187; 27 August 1915. pp. 6232-3; 31 August 1915.pp. 6333. 6787. 6790-6794: 1 September 1915. p.6451; 10 September 1915. p. 6923. THE EMERGENCE OF THE AANS. 1914-18 25i~ Parliamentary Debates (Cth). 26 May 1915. pp.3597. 6923; 28 July 1915. pp. 5399-5404. 5413.5417; 12 August 1915. p. 5697; 27 August 1915.pp. 6232-3, 30 August 1915. p. 6274; 31 August1915. p. 6351; 1 September 1915. p. 6404; 9 September1915. pp. 6794-5; Argus, 29-31 July, 2-4August. 7 August 1915.l< Fetherston. Report. 8 January 1916."Ibid.-" General information regarding rates of pay formembers of the AANS. A2663. 743 6; Correspondenceregarding the administration of Australiantroops in Egypt, A2663. 9 20; Medical Organization.Egypt and Salonika. A2663. 481 116. AWM.Canberra.21 DGMS, Melbourne. Minutes. 6 November. 1 December1915; Senator Pearce. Memorandum. 18January 1916. MP 133,1, Box 10, 239/15,26, AA,Melbourne; Staffing arrangements for medicalunits, Egypt 1915-16, A2663. 481-369.--AAMC; Reports of DMS, A1F, 1916-18, MP133/1, Box 10. 239,8 214; DMS. AIF to DGMS.Melbourne. Confidential Report (England) no. 15.MP 133/1. Box 10, 239/8/185, AA. Melbourne.2;See correspondence in MP 133'2, 20,5,234, AA,Melbourne." Argus, 10. 13 February 1917; 22-5. 28-30 May1917. 6. 9, 13, 20 June 1917; 11-12. 23. 25, 30January 1918.2 >War Office to Defence, 27 July 1916. MP 133/1,Box 10, 239 8 199, AA, Melbourne.-•' DGMS. Melbourne to War Office. 24. 28 March.4 May, 15, 27 June 1916. MP 133 2. 20 5 189;DGMS. Melbourne to DGIMS. 18 August 1916;Defence to War Office. 28 August 1916. MP 133 2.20 5 232; DGAMS to DMS. AIF. 9 November1916; MP 133 1, Box 10. 239 8 199. AA. Melbourne;Medical Organization, Egypt and Salonika,A2663. 481/116, AWM. Canberra.- 7 The Organization of the work of a Casualty ClearingStation in severe fighting 1917, A2663. 173 6;Reports from No 1 ACCS, June 1918 to December1918, A2663. 173/11; ANS (Army). A2663.509/5; A descriptive narrative account of the conditionsof nursing in a CCS by Sister O'Dwyer,January 1918. A2663. 173'9. AWM. Canberra.A cruiser was trying to secure to head and stern buoys near the flagship in a congestedharbour. The Admiral watched the proceedings from his quarterdeck. The cruiser made agood approach and appeared to be judging the manoeuvre well. The Admiral signalled"Good."Then things started to go wrong for the cruiser. She missed the buoys and got moreand more tangled up. After watching for some time the Admiral again signalled; "Add tomy previous signal God."From submarine (returning from patrol) to Base:Expect to arrive 1800 if friendly aircraft will stop bombing me.From Senior Officer to submarine apparently in difficulties:What are you doing?Reply: Learning a lot.Quoted in "Make a Signal" by Captain Jack Broome. DSC. RN. London. Pitman. 1956. Captain P. L. CameronRoyal Australian InfantryIntroductionI -1 HE military has emerged in many "ThirdWorld' countries as a powerful politicalunit. Indeed, it has become the major decision-makingelement in both the Afro-Asianand Latin American sectors and accordingly,an understanding of political development inthese areas requires an analysis of its politicalrole.In this regard, military regimes are viewedon the one hand as 'saviours', rescuing thenation from the influence of corrupt politiciansor, on the other hand, as unacceptably authoritarianand incompetent. Regardless of theperformance of such regimes however, 'NewStates' seem generally to suffer from chronicpolitical instability, often to the extent thatthe military may evolve as the only grouporganized enough to take charge. Recent eventsin South East Asia and Argentina and therecurring incidence of coups in Africa indicatethat the military will continue to play animportant role in these areas, and the questionarises as to why this pattern has evolved.The Rise of the Military in the'New States'Mazrui argues that military takeovers in'Third World' countries have occurred withina Marxist-Leninist revolutionary framework. 1The military, he asserts, consists mainly of'peasant' recruits, and he sees these as thecommon masses risina asainst the essentiallyCapt Cameron graduated from OCS in July 196H.He served as a platoon comd in 2 RAR and thenin various stag appointments in HQ I TF and DOD(Army Office), where he is currently posted. He isat present completing a BA (Admin) at CanberraCollege of Advanced Education.urban elite who have been exploiting them. Inthe absence of industrialization, continuesMazrui, the proletariat are unable to use thetactic of withholding their labour and turninstead to the revolutionary power inherent inthe 'forces of destruction'.To the extent that Marxist-Leninist ideologycan be seen as a motivating factor, it may beargued that this 'one-dimensional' approachholds some relevance in the South East Asiancontext and to a lesser extent in Cuba. Moreover,the struggles in Cambodia, Vietnam andLaos began essentially as wars of nationalliberation against foreign oppressors; firstagainst Trench colonialism and later aimed atAmerican imperialism in the form of militaryand economic domination.-' The revolutionswhich occurred however, were not aimed specificallyat the overthrow of an indigenous urbanand intellectual elite, and they took the formof long term intellectual-led revolutions dominatedby political party organization andleadership. 3In Africa, where military takeovers haveoccurred largely in the form of the coup d'etatand indeed where ideological motivationsappear less discernible, it is difficult to substantiateMazrui's theory. Under these circumstancesa synthesis of the more pragmatic,empirical theories offered by such writers asFirst, 4 Zolberg"' and Welch* would seem toproduce a more appropriate explanation ofmilitary interventions in politics.Briefly, these writers identify a causal relationshipbetween military takeovers and thefailure of incumbent regimes. As Zolberg putsit, although the politicians, bureaucrats andthe military may share similar long-term goals. 7if the civil sovernment fails to achieve those THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 27goals then "... there is a high probabilitythat the military will intervene."~In this view then, it is argued that intellectualsgenerally take power in the "New States'at the time of independence and espouse thevirtues of progress, democracy, modernizationand national integration. As leaders, theseintellectuals are Utopian in philosophy andare found wanting in the areas of administrativeknowhow, authoritative techniques and the artof delegation. In addition, corruption oftensets in at high levels in the government andthe administration, and the traditional political,social and economic institutions areinadequate to facilitate rapid democratization.As a result of these factors, the massesreceive few of the benefits promised at independenceand with limited opportunities ineducation they become restless and even rebellious.Instability ensues and this is reinforcedby the resurgence of traditional rivalries. Moreover,intra-state primordial attachments remainstrong after independence and this creates subnationalsocial and political divisions, manifestedin the form of inter-tribal dissent andpower struggles. 0Faced with these adversities then, the politiciansturn increasingly to the use of force (andthus to the military) in order to achieve theirambitions. This enhances the significance ofthe military vis-a-vis the political parties andthe soldiers in turn come to realise their ownpower. 1 " In any event, the military generallyhold the incumbent politicians in low esteembecause of disorganization and corruption ingovernment and they feel that a disciplinedapplication of their superior organizationalabilities would overcome these problems.Finally, because of the inadequacy of traditionalorganizations, the reconciliation of conflicthas not yet been institutionalized in themajority of 'Third World' nations. Having noopportunity to express their social, politicaland economic grievances through legitimatepolitical channels the military thus turn to theuse of force, often to the extent of seizingpower for themselves.This is not to say, of course, that the militaryare the reluctant heroes of the 'NewStates', forced into action by decadent politicians.Indeed, as First notes, "... whateverthe political background to a coup d'etat, whenthe army acts it generally acts for army reasons,in addition to any other it may espouse. Corporatearmy interests may be predominant, orthey may be secondary to other more generalizedpolitical grievances; but army reasons areinvariably present." 11Whilst the variables of social and politicalinstability are diverse and complex, this simplifiedmodel offers an acceptable, though generalized,explanation of political events in the 'NewStates', in particular as witnessed in the Africanexperience. In this regard, First argues thatmilitary takeovers in Africa have taken placeessentially in the form of coups d'etat and thatsuch actions may be categorized into a fundamentalcyclical pattern. 12The Military CycleThe simplest of these activities are strikesand demonstrations and these are indicativeof the initial stage of the coup d'etat cycle.Often called 'pay mutinies', they are causedthrough discontent within the army overinternal matters such as pay, conditions andthe pace of Africanization and are givenimpetus by a concurrent decline in prestigeof the major political parties.The effects of such actions were witnessedin the three East African mutinies of January1964. In Tanganyika, for example, there wereonly three serving African officers at the timeof independence and a proposed 'crash' programof Africanization was officially held back.Accordingly, mutiny erupted amongst thesoldiers who arrested their officers anddemanded complete Africanization of thearmy. 13A second category is that of 'referee' actions.These often develop as a reaction to protractedparty conflict ending in a deadlock amongstpoliticians; a phenomena identified by Welchin his analysis of 'political schisms'." GeneralMobutu's interventions into Congolese politicstypify this type of action, as these occurredfirstly as a result of an impasse between PrimeMinister Lumumba and President Kasavubu,which brought government activity to a standstill,and again in 1965, when Kasavubu failedto find a premier to succeed Moise Tshombe. 1 •Similar factors were prominent in theDahomey coup of 1963. This coup wasprompted by a political struggle between threeethnic-regional leaders (Maga, Apithy and nAhomadegbe), as well as by a long drawn-outdispute between successive governments andthe trade union movement. After an initial'referee' action. General Soglo attempted a'military withdrawal' from government, however,another political deadlock ensued and in1965, a government of soldiers, techniciansand the 'odd' politician was established. 1 'Extending this cycle to its logical conclusion,Taylor argues that, once such 'referee'actions had been proved not only possible butrelatively easy in Africa, the way to power forall military leaders had been laid bare; whethermotivated by personal ambition, ideology,tribal loyalty or genuine patriotism. 17 Finally,in support of this view. Zolberg asserts thatby 1965 'referee' actions had begun to mergewith 'military take-overs' aimed specifically atsubstituting a new regime for the existingone. 1 "The emergence of this final phase was substantiatedby the Ghanaian coup of 1966, inwhich President Nkrumah was deposed. Threeelements were prominent in activating the coup:firstly, political imprisonment on a large scaleand evidence of economic chaos, which togetherundermined faith in Nkrumah; secondly,attempts to stifle the power and influence ofmilitary leaders, which had created bitterresentment, and thirdly, widespread corruptionand nepotism, which had begun to "...rot the fibre of Nkrumah's own supporters." 1Military regimes then, are a fact of life inthe 'Third World'. As noted earlier, out ofthe social, political and economic turmoilwhich follows the disruption of a traditionalsociety and the subsequent collapse of a newpolitical order, the military often emerge asthe only effective force capable of takingcharge and formulating policy.-'" Experiencehas shown, however, that military governmentshave themselves been defeated b\ militaryuprisings and doubt therefore arises as to theadequacy of such regimes and to their utility,in respect of the political development of the'New States'.The Concept of Political DevelopmentAny assessment of the strengths and limitationsof military regimes in bringing aboutpolitical development will be coloured by theway in which political development is viewed,and in Western literature there are two premisesDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALinherent in any definition of the concept. Thefirst is that political development implies someform of 'democratization", that is, mobilizationor mass participation; 1 ' 1 a goal which is generallyachievable through the creation of politicalsymbols or 'democratic' rituals and the disseminationof a strong ideological foundation.--The second, which follows from the first, isthat political development must enhance theinstitutionalization of conflict. That is to say,there is a requirement to develop institutionswhich are valued by the community at largeand through which conflicts and grievancescan be peacefully resolved; thereby preventingthe outbreak of violence as a political alternative.2 ' 1Further, a distinction needs to be drawnbetween political development and 'modernization',the latter being seen as the "... complexprocess of social and economic changecaused by and manifested in the growth ofnew towns and cities, the spread of masseducation, the extension of mass communicationand the process of industrialization". 11In making this distinction, there is a tendencyto describe politics essentially as a response tomodernity, however, whilst this may have beenthe case in Europe, in the 'New States' politicsis in fact the cause of modernity if indeedmodernization is to be attained.-''Finally, it is worth noting that political developmentas such may be viewed either as progressiveWesternization or as a progressivereduction in dependency, that is to say, aspolitical, economic and cultural decolonization.26 Again, it may be seen in the long termas a progression towards both of these ends.In any event, these various contingencies shouldbe taken into account when offering a definitionof the concept and accordingly, a relativelybroad interpretation is required.In this context, it is useful to view politicaldevelopment as the process by which a societyacquires an institutional capability to handlethe political and social pressures that are associatedwith independence, decolonization andprogressive modernization. Whilst this definitionis drawn essentially from Mazrui, 27 itexpands that illustration to encompass the relativefactors discussed earlier. In addition, thedefinition facilitates discussion of the politicalrole of the military in terms of both modernizationand traditional cultural mores. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 29Pye sees the military in the 'New States'essentially as modern institutions artificiallyintroduced into disorganized transitional societies.2 - Moreover, he argues that pre-colonialand post-colonial leaders have attempted tochange the habits of the people by creatingmodern organizations and of these, militaryorganizations have been the most successfullyestablished. It is easier to create military organizations,he continues, because the stress ondiscipline the explicit standards for individualconduct and the ritualized modes of behaviourcharacteristic of the military life-style are consonantwith tradition-bound organizations.-"Notwithstanding this link with traditionalculture during the transition phase, Pye assertsthat, due largely to the influence of Westernmilitary technology, the armies in underdevelopedcountries have generally emphasisedrationality and change as taking precedenceover custom and ritual.Briefly, as the armies are designed on themodern European model, they embody thespirit of rapid technological development.Through rapid acculturation in the military.the soldiers adjust to the secular and universalisticlife required in industrialized societies.The organization provides psychological andemotional security and soldiers learn that eventsin society are determined by human decisionsand not just by chance and fate. Moreover,they come to realise that much in life can bechanged and that in the final analysis, it is themilitary themselves who have the power tochange it. 30Again, the military are required to objectivelyexamine other countries in order toassess their potential threat. In doing so theycompare their own standards with those ofother nations and this, together with a generaladvancement in acquired military technology,alerts the soldier to the underdeveloped stateof his own society and the consequent needfor change. The army, argues Pye, is a futuristicorganization in that it looks to the needsof the nation in a future state. It is able thereforeto concentrate on achieving standardscommon to industrialized societies, divorcingitself from the realities of a transitionalsociety. 31In this view then, the military acts as amodernizing agent. The soldier becomesmodernized man as he adjusts to the requirementsof the organization, adopting the attitudesand learning the skills that are of valuein industrialized societies in general. In doingso, the military becomes self-confident in dealingwith the more developed nations, thusopening the way for 'progression" in the areasof trade and international diplomacy. In turn,the military use their power and influence inattempts to transform their own society, disseminatingtheir acquired knowledge andexpertise amongst the masses.Evidence of the modernizing influence ofthe military, Pye would conclude, is seen inMalaya and the Philippines where the armyhas been responsible for the training of civiliansin the operation and maintenance of variousforms of machinery. It is evident in LatinAmerica, where the Brazilian army has beeninstrumental in opening the vast interior andin promoting the natural sciences, and it isprominent in Asia, where military technologyhas created roads, health facilities and communicationsnetworks. 3 -Soldiers as TraditionalizersIn contrast to the view offered by Pye,Mazrui argues that in East Africa at least,experience has shown that military regimeshave a tendency to re-traditionalize societyrather than modernize it. Whilst agreeing thatthe military is indeed a modern organization,he argues that the individual soldier's attitudeto the wider society is conditioned by traditionalsympathies and primordial ties. 33Like Pye, Mazrui identifies a link betweenthe behavioural requirements of the militaryand those in traditional society. Rather thaneasing the transition to the modern organization,however, Mazrui asserts that thesesimilarities produce an attachment to thetraditional society and that this sympathy issustained by the rural origins of most Africansoldiers. In the colonial period, he continues,the army was low in the social scale andsoldiers were recruited largely from the disadvantagedand uneducated sectors of the community;areas which produce a rural orientationrather than a compatibility with urban-Westerninfluence. 34Further, Mazrui argues that the military isin fact non-effective as an acculturative body.He sees the organization operating to embodynew skills rather than new values amongst its M) DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALmembers, with the result that military leadersare less westernized than the intellectuals whomthey have followed into power. The militaryare thus more able to understand and sympathizewith village culture, a factor which mayhelp to legitimise the regime and prove advantageousin bringing about political development.35At the same time, however, the Colonialpattern of military recruitment proved to besomewhat selective in terms of ethnic communitiesand this, as mentioned earlier, hasled to a resurgence of ethnic rivalries in someareas. Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggestthat intra-army ethnic conflicts, betweenthe Hausa-Fulani and Ibo factions, were instrumentalin the Nigerian coups of January 1%6. ::,;The maintenance of traditional loyalties then,may also lead to a breakdown in the processof political development.Mazrui's view of the military as a traditionalizinginfluence in the 'New States' is relativelynew in terms of political theories andaccordingly, empirical support is less than welldocumented. Nevertheless the importanceplaced on the use of national languages inZaire and Libya, the modification of marriagelaws in Uganda in compliance with culturalmoves 17 and the Biafran secessionist movementin Nigeria suggest possible trends towardsre-traditionalization. In any event, the theoryappears to offer a plausible alternative to theestablished paradigm offered by Pye.ConclusionMilitary regimes have become a fact of lifein the 'Third World' and some contention hasarisen as to their utility in effecting politicaldevelopment. In this regard, an examinationof opposing views offered by Pye and Mazruihas shown that the military can act alternativelyas either agents of modernization or agents ofre-traditionalization and that achievements canindeed be gained in both directions.At the same time, however, the continuinginstability and recurrent incidence of militarytake-overs in the New States indicates thatpolitical development has not been achievedin any significant degree. This is because themilitary, like the intellectuals before them, havefailed to attain the goals of mobilization andinstitutionalization of conflict inherent in thevery concept of political development.If military governments wish to remain prominentin the New States, they must developinstitutions which are valued by the community.This means the creation of mass participationand a reconciliation with indigenous cultures,the formulation of ideologies and the establishmentof symbolic political routines and inthe final analysis, the fulfilment of expressedobjectives. In short, the way to political developmentis through the creation of responsibleand representative political institutions. QNOTES1 A. A. Mazrui. "The Lupen Proletariat and theLumpen Militariat . . . ". pp. 1-12.- This assumes that indigenous leaders in SouthVietnam were essentially "agents' of U.S. strategy.a See J. H. Kautsky (ed). Political Change in UnderdevelopedCountries, particularly pp. 38-41 and pp.44-49,1 Ruth First. The Barrel of a Gun.: < A. R. Zolberg, "Military Intervention in the NewStates of Tropical Africa: Elements of ComparativeAnalysis".0 C. E. Welch. "Soldier and State in Africa".7 Such as modernization, industrialization, stabilityand national unity.s Zolberg. op. cit.. p. 73.'•' Welch, op. cit.. pp. 163-164." ibid.11 First, op. cit.. p. 20.12 See First, op. cit.. pp. 205-219 for details fromwhich the following summary is drawn.« ibid., p. 206.14 See Welch, op. cit.. p. 166.18 ibid., p. 166. The first coup took place in 1960.10 For details see First, op. cit., pp. 212-213 andZolberg. op. cit.. pp. 83-84. In 1967, this governmentwas also dissolved by an Army Coup.17 D. Taylor, Africa: The Portait of Power, p. 117.11 Zolberg. op. cit.. p. 84.lriTaylor, op. cit.. p. 119.2n L. W. Pye. "Armies in the Process of PoliticalModernization", p. 302.21 See S. P. Huntington. "Political Development andPolitical Decay", p. 208.-- This point is argued in E. Feit. "Pen. Sword, andPeople . . . ". p. 252.23 ibid.24 A. A. Mazrui. "Soldiers as Traditionalizers . . .'',p. 248.- : ' See L. Binder, et. al.. Crises and Sequences inPolitical Development, pp. 15-16.- n Mazrui. op. cit.. p. 267.27 ibid., p. 248.28 Pye. op. cit.. pp. 291-306.-••' ibid., pp. 294-296.••" ibid., p. 301.31 ibid., p. 298.32 ibid., p. 301.33 Mazrui. op. cit.. pp. 246-272.51 ibid., pp. 251-254.•••' ibid., pp. 255-258.3G For a detailed account of the Nigerian coups seeFirst, op. cit.. pp. 144-169 and pp. 278-301.37 Mazrui. op. cit.. p. 269. I' 'HH' L.fftc prospect of being hangedGroup Captain F. B. Sutton, DFC, RAF (Retd)RAAF Public Relations, SydneyTHIS is open season for strategy — a wargame for some, but a matter of life anddeath for professionals. Even experts pose aparticular problem. Sometimes they may seemto be presenting arguable propositions in theguise of self-evident truths as they ponderAustralia's most vital question of all — howto survive in war.The use of aircraft presents a particularproblem because one difficulty about air operationsis that an intelligent discussion aboutthem is not reducible to simplistic argument.Performance is the key, but no discussion ofperformance makes sense in the abstract. Howfar; what heights; what loads; what is theperformance of the opposition? These arebut a few of the questions to be asked andposed against a meticulous dissection of thethorniest question of all — the threat.A paper entitled "The Strategic Guidelines"and presented by Dr Robert O'Neill at theANU's Research School of Pacific Studies,Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, demandsclose study by experts if only because of theDuring his service career, Group Captain Suttoncommanded everything from a fighter flight (in No.56 Squadron RAF, Battle of Britain) through squadron(No 135 Squadron, RAF) and wing (189 and 295Wings, RAF, in Burma and Bengal) to Fighter Base.He was CO Bomber Command OCU. Basingbourn,DS at the RAF Staff College. Andover. and Secretaryof the UK Chiefs of Staffs' Committee reportingon studies into defence against low attack, underthe joint chairmanship of Dr Watson-Watt and AVMKingston-McCloughry. He was Group Captain (Ops)HQ Near East Air Force and Air Adviser to theBritish High Commissioner in Canberra. He retiredfrom the RAF in 1968, and has held commercialand instructor's licenses in Australia. He was ajournalist on the Sydney Sunday Telegraph and DailyTelegraph and PRO to the Commissioner of NSWPolice. He is author of the Manual of FighterOperations and of two books. The Way of a Pilotand Jungle Pilot (published by Macmillans). He isa student member of Grays Inn of Court, London.apparent extraordinary facility of its leapsthrough reasoning on questions which alwaysperplex expert planning staffs. The paper waspresented to a conference on "The Future ofTactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia",held on 25th and 26th November,1976.So far, except for praise and full assent bya journalist without experience in planning orflying air operations, and without qualificationsin any branch of aeronautics, there has beenlittle public comment on Dr O'Neill's address.Still less, has there been any challenge to themany propositions of the doctor's which militaryaviation experts will find hard to debate,or perhaps even to understand.Dr O'Neill concludes that "if it is acceptedthat Australia's defence posture against majorattacks should rest on deterrence, we mustmove to create a formidable maritime strikecapacity. The offensive nature of air powersuits it well for contributing to this capacity"."Therefore", continues the doctor withoutfurther argument, "Australia requires a tacticalfighter force which has a primary capabilityfor meeting attacks while they are onor over the sea, en route to their target. Thenature of possible enemies in the forseeablefuture does not seem to call for major specialisedcapacities in intercept and air defenceroles and so a flexible weapons system orientedprimarily towards the maritime strike role,but capable of adaptation to perform others, isrequired. The force should be of single aircrafttype rather than a high-low mix. Providedthat the Australian Government maintains theplanned level of defence equipment expenditureinto the 1980s, we should he able to purchasea generally adequate number of aircraftof the high capacity which is required to defenda vast area from the support of a very limitedresource base. 12 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL"Australia is fortunate to be considering thispurchase at a time when her requirements fora multi-purpose combat aircraft appear to bevery close to realization in many of the typesavailable for our selection, ft is ironic thathaving been wrong on this point for the pastfifty years, Douhet's belief in the utility of themulti-role single type of combat aircraft maynow prove to be highly relevant.'''Many aviators will readily agree. Otherswill cavil on the grounds that it begs the wholequestion and makes no concession to even asuggestion that there might be a case forbalance between this multi-purpose aircraftand the specialised aircraft, such as long rangereconnaissance aircraft.In the way of a ready acceptance of allpurposeaircraft there are too many peopleliving who have seen the disasters that canarise from attempts to use all-purpose aircraftagainst highly trained, specialised, defensivefighter forces, to name but one portion of thetotal possible threat.They point out that the British learnt thelesson first with Lysanders in France in WorldWar II. then with Bolton and Paul Defiants,both of which types suffered disastrous lossesat the hands of German fighters. The Germanslearnt it as they later suffered heavy losses withtheir JU 87s once they came up against asophisticated defence. They had the lessonrubbed in while using ME 110s in a day fighterrole. The Australians learnt the lesson inanother war, with Meteors in Korea.To many, if not all, practising experts, DrO'Neill's description, "high/low mix tacticalfighter force", will be found obscure. To them,"high'low" normally refers to flight profiles,not to types or roles of aircraft. Also, theymight argue, the term, "GA and interceptstrike models", suggests a strange mishmashin the context of the term "high/low mix".It suggests of course, that GA is conductedat low level. At least, few would quarrel withthat. Though why is GA discussed and notinterdiction? Or is "GA" meant to mean allforms of ground attack, including direct andindirect support to ground forces?In fact, modern experience shows that interceptionmust be carried out increasingly atlow level. Incidentally, Dr O'Neill describesfighters as "air defence" and "interceptors"as though there is a difference in kind betweenthe two.Every captain of aircraft knows that oncecombat is enjoined its outcome will dependon the hard facts of performance, human andtechnical. It is then that questions of kind.as well as of degree, are settled in mercilessterms of survival. In other words, it is no goodfor the defence to fly aircraft that are inferior,or even as good as those of the opposition.If they are anything less than better they willbe shot out of the sky to join the ghosts ofother compromises like the Lysander, Defiant,the JU 87, ME 110, and the Meteor.Protagonists of multi-purpose aircraft areusually careful to specify the genus by definitionif not always by name. Thus the KFIR C2is described by its makers as "a multi-rolefigher interceptor and ground attack weaponsplatform". It is not described as a maritimestrike aircraft.If it is mere counsel of perfection to demandthe best, but not practical because of the hardfacts of logistics, finance and training, anyserious student of air warfare should surelyexpect to see how planners arrive at a compromise.Meanwhile, opponents of compromise mightpoint to a simple sporting analogy: if theopponent is Connors, and the game is tennis.it is no good opposing him with an all-rounderwho is good at squash, badminton and thereforenecessarily less good than Connors attennis.As in all forms of warfare, there are noprizes for coming second in air combat: andif you can't win air superiority, however localand temporary, you are liable quicklv to loseall.So some experts will say that Dr O'Neill'sarguments also need watching on this point.He says the Soviet air force is generally highlyskilled, but being very large, it suffers fromunevenness of performance . . . "It is difficultto make a case for highly sophisticated aircrafton the basis of possible threats ..." Doeshe really mean "possible" or, perhaps "probable".The difference goes beyond meresemantics.Other experts, with world-wide reputations,might disagree with Dr O'Neill's opinion, so AIR STRATEGY AND THE PROSPECT OF BEING HANGED 33A Westland Lysander and a Gloster Meteor, two(Australian War Memorial photo:,}all-purpose aircraft which failed disastrously.long as Soviet aircraft and weapons systemsfigure in the threat. In the new edition ofthe authoritative annual, Jane's 'All the WorldsFighting Aircraft', the editor, Mr J. W. R.Taylor, said Washington had seriously underestimatedthe latest MIGs and the Soviet Backfirebomber, which could strike at targets inthe United States from Russian bases and flyon to Cuba. Mr Taylor also stressed thatwriters who treated the MIG-25 which landedin Japan as somewhat old-fashioned in designand materials were dangerously wrong.Finally, on the whole subject of compositionof the RAAF yet another body of experts,who surely ought to be heard, would arguethat it would be futile for Australia ever tothink of using aircraft in the role of pureinterceptors, still less as those which could beused for ground attack as well. They wouldpoint to the extremely limited radius of actionof the defensive fighter, particularly at lowlevel and the wide separation of vital pointsin Australia open to attack by the enemy.They would probably argue that in supportof the very principles of Douehet that DrO'Neill quotes ( . . . "aerial warfare admitsof no defence . . . ") it is idle to think ofdefending a continent with fighters and thatour effort would be better spent in strike aircraft.* * *A prelude to the latest 'silly season' forjournalism was provided during the openingphase of Kangaroo 2.At least one defence writer described howthe RAAF Mirages had been shot out of thesky by L'SN Tomcats from the carrier Enterprise.The comments were evidently writtenin ignorance of the setting of the exercise andof the careful analyses that are made ofevidence from such sources as combat reportsand radar tracks and timings — analyses thattake time - - certainly more than that takenby commentators who went into print withindays of an event which none of them saw atfirst hand.One commentator, with the most to say onthe subject, made no contact with those manningthe defence forces during the air defencephase in question. The phase consisted of aseries of attacks by carrier-borne aircraft onRAAF Base Williamtown. The commentatorneither flew as an observer nor did he visitWilliamtown. He is not a pilot, nor has heany experience of operational flying, planning,or associated staff work. Nor did he see anythingof the fighter directors at work, or attendany of the de-briefings. In short, he saw lessof the battle than the man in the street aroundWilliamtown or thousands of people on thebase, fragmentary though their glimpse was.At least they saw Tomcats, the most sophisticatedelement of the enemy attack firmh heldby Mirages throughout a mass dogfight.The spectacle, of course, was bound to beinconclusive in tactical terms, without athorough knowledge of the setting of the exercisewhich placed constraint on both attackersand defenders. It also demanded a workingknowledge of what air defence operations areall about, down to the kind of detail discussedin de-briefing.But like discussion couched in terms unknownto professional military pilots, such as thoseput forward in argument for particular typesof fighter operated as a "high/low" mix, itwas all good clean fun for the silly season 34 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALfor armchair strategists. It is only to be hopedthat like all sporting seasons, it comes to aclose.In the meantime, the planners, faced atevery turn with hard facts, must be left toponder their perennial questions of how toget a quart out of a pint pot — and to besure that it is the right brew for Australia.It is an intractable problem for many reasons.Perhaps the main one is the enormous disparitybetween the size of the continent and thevastncss of its ocean approaches on the onehand, and the lilliputian size of its air forcecompared with the major powers on the other.The role of aircraft as a deterrent/defensiveforce is one which must, however cunninglycontrived, leave an alarming amount of initiativesto the enemy.A Grumman F-14(GrummanTomcat*Aircraft)If invasion is to be the name of the enemy'sgame, planners will have been asking manyquestions as they try to keep in focus theclearest possible notions of performance inweapons they are considering as options. A"high/low" mix would not have figured intheir scheme of things, if only because of theimprecision of the term.Even well-worn definitions such as 'defensive'and 'interceptor' fighters must now callfor more precise definition by those who askwhether it is feasible that we could ever defendmore than one or two vulnerable pointsthroughout the whole of Australia with suchmeagre resources, let alone try to defend atheoretically infinite number throughout itsocean approaches.* Reproduced from "Tomcat" by James Perry Stevenson.Fallbrook. Aero Publishers Inc.'Defence Public Relations)An RAAF MirageCommentators who quote the aphorisms ofstudents of war from another era must beprepared to argue against other aphorismsfrom the same era such as, "to seek to bestrong everywhere is to be weak everywhere"as they ponder the role of a small air forceseeking to defend a large continental land massin time of war.It would not be surprising then, if someplanners, if only in the role of devil's advocate,discard the idea of any form of fighter andexamine rather, the claims for strike aircraftacting either alone or in complement to a longrange maritime reconnaissance force.Compromise, so attractive in reconcilingpoints of view in the world of human affairs,may seem to some after all to break the firstprinciple of war 'maintain the aim'.To speak loosely of aircraft with multipleroles suggests a multiplicity of aims allunrefined by nature and ill-defined in purpose.Least of all, planners who go on trying todo their job, while others without directresponsibilty for mistakes make Olympianjudgement, are scarcely likely to be swayedby those who simply either have not donetheir homework, or have not really understoodthat the question is not as simple as it looks.After all, air strategy is literally a matterof life and death, and like Dr Johnson's prospectof being hanged should 'concentrate themind wonderfully'.*Q* "Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he isto be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates hismind wonderfully." A BEACH RECOVERY ON THENORTHERN FLANIOF NATOlieutenant I). T. Brown. Royal Marineslate BARV C tmmander, IIMS /earlessBackground InformationTHE assault squadrons embarked n theLanding Platform Dock (LPD) HMSI-earless and H\1S Intrepid, consist of fourLanding Craft Medium (LCM9). four LandingCraft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) and anAmphibious Beach Unit (ABU). They aremanned by Royal Marines, with attachedRoyal Navy Personnel.The task of the ABU is to control andmaintain the rapid transit of men. vehicles.stores and equipment across the beach andthrough the beach exits. The reception anddespatch of landing craft at the beach is animportant part of this task. For control purposes,the ABU is divided into three sections.Beach Control and HO party. Recovery Sectionand Plant Section. Maximum efficiencyand flexibility is achieved by having all personnelcross-trained to carry out any of thenon-technical tasks.The sections are composed as follows:Beach Control and HQPersonnelBeachmaster: Captain, Royal MarinesAssistant Beachmaster: Colour Sergeant,Royal MarinesTwo RM SignallersThree RM DriversOne RM CookOne RN Medical AssistantThree RM MarshallersVehicles1 x 4 Ton Bedford MFC winchI x j Ton Landrover GS1 x \ Ton Landrover FFR1 x I Ton TrailerThe Beach swimmers are found from anyof the personnel above. This section is undermannedin relation to the number of differenttasks it may be called upon to do, and crosstrainingis therefore essential. It is not unusualwhen the workload is heavy for the cook toleave his galley and marshal an incoming helicopter,or guide armour through a narrow exit.Recovery SectionPersonnelOne Sergeant Vehicle Mechanic (Commanderand Ship's VM)Two Corporals Vehicle Mechanic (RecoveryMechanics)One Marine (Mne) Vehicle Mechanic(Driver)VehicleThe Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle(BARV) which is based on the CenturionMk 5 hull.The main tasks of the Recovery Sectionare the recovery and repair of all vehicles,including Armour, which fails to cross thewater gap. that is the stretch of water betweenthe bow door of the landing craft and the drybeach; the clearance of large obstacles fromthe beach and its exits, and from landing craftapproach lanes: the refloating of beached landingcraft by use of the buffer pad on the noseof the vehicle. The BARV has no winch andrelies on push,'pull methods to achieve itsresults. The fitting of winches on the BARVis in the research stage.Plant SectionPersonnelOne Corporal Vehicle Mechanic (plant fitter/'driver)One Mne (D) driver. 36 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL(Photographic Section. HMS Fearless)A BARV and Michigan 175 DS Medium Wheeled Tractor.VehiclesTwo Michigan 175 DS Medium WheeledTractors, one fitted with a Bul'dozer Bucketand the other with a Forklift attachment andhaving the ability to lay Class 30 trackwayusing special rolls and fittings, make up thevehicles of the Plant Section.Their tasks are to prepare the Beach andexits for wheeled vehicle traffic, recovery oflight vehicles and the movement of palletisedloads.In 19 months as the BARV Commander ofHMS Fearless, I was called upon only twiceto carry out a non-exercise beach recovery.On the first occasion, an FV 437 (ArmouredPersonnel Carrier) on a training exercise, threwa track on an exposed beach, with an incomingtide which did not allow time for the trackto be refitted there and then. The casualtywas towed along the beach to the high groundbehind the beaching point and the trackrepaired there.The second occasion will now be describedin detail.ExerciseTeamworkExercise Teamwork was a large scale NATOexercise held in Scandinavia during September/October 1976. in which 80,000 men, 270 ships(including 24 submarines) and 900 aircrafttook part. The exercise had been four yearsin the planning, the multi-national fleetassembled at the historic Scapa Flow anchoragein the Orkney Islands before sailing in convoyacross the North Sea to Norway.The Assault Squadrons final briefing for thelanding was held while the ship was transittingthe fjord to Namsos, the exercise area.Monday, 30 September 1976NAMSOS, NORWAYMission: The 4th Assault Squadron will land3rd Commando Brigade over NAMSOSbeaches GOLD I. GOLD II and BLUE I.Execution: LCVPs will land elements of 1Amphibious Combat Group RNLMC (RoyalNetherlands Marine Corps) on the GOLDbeaches. The remainder and all transport willland across BLUE I from LCM Mk 9s.The ABU was loaded into landing craftas follows: the BARV and the TracklayingMichigan in LCM F2, coxswain CSgt. RogerHaylor, the Bucket Michigan, 4 tonncr andthe two landrovers and the trailer in F3, coxswainC/Sgt Bernie Todd. A BEACH RECOVERY ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OF NATO 37Because of political and public relationsconsiderations, the landing was timed to takeplace at 1330 hours (Local Time) -- whichhappened to be about low water.As BARV Commander, my briefing by theOC Amphibious Beach I nit included a beachreport summary. He informed me that thereport stated the beach to be favourable,though a few sticky patches could be expectedbelow the wateriine. The beach was onreclaimed land to the east of the town.At 1323 hours F2 and F3, the first wave ofLCMs, retracted from the dock of HMSFearless and began the run-in to the beacha few hundred metres away, F2 beaching at1332 hours with F3 standing off. From myposition on top of the BARV, I called for afinal bottom check by the ABU swimmers,standard practice before landing on a strangebeach. The bottom was reported to be clearof obstacles and to be firm, the swimmersexperienced no slipping and in waist deepwater appeared to have no difficulty in standingupright. The swimmers cleared from infront of the LCM. and in first gear, we creptforward in the BARV, moved down the rampand into the water and . . . STUCK.Using different gears and throttle settingsproved to be futile, the spinning tracks werejust digging the vehicle in deeper. We switchedoff the engine and had a look. From the rearcatwalk, I could see that the toe of F2's rampwas a mere 6 inches behind my drive sprocketsand the BARV was steadily sinking.F2 retracted to deeper water and came inagain in an attempt to drive the toe of theramp further under the drive sprockets. Itwas no good, the ramp just bounced off ofthe mud and rose over the tracks. C/Sgt.Haylcr returned F2 to its original positionsquare behind the stranded BARV.Bringing the Trackway Michigan to thehead of the LCM's rounddown, the BARV's5 metre 'A' rope was split and reconnected tomake a single 10 metre rope which was thenconnected to both the BARV and the Michigan.Meanwhile the crew of F2 had brokenout their own vehicle recovery gear, this wasthen shackled to the rear of the Michigan.Two planks of Class 30 trackway were thenjammed down between the track, at thesprocket and the toe of the ramp. This wasan attempt to provide grip for the tracks toassist them in regaining the ramp.The BARV was put into low reverse gear,the Michigan into four wheel drive, lowreverse, and the LCM crew began to winchin on their «ear. When all the slack had been•~H*-*-^^S3t "^^"M. ' 1-4* ^(Courtesy the Globe and Laurel)A Mexaflore pontoon, LCVP and LCM (9' beached during an exercise in the Mediterranean. 38 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALHMS Fearless. Stern view showing dock with ICMSberthed.taken up, it was a time for all throttles to befully opened. By this time the BARV hadsunk to a depth of 1.5 metres. For long agonisingmoments the tracks spun uselessly, theplanks of trackway slowly disappeared beneathit. I was about to call for more trackway,when suddenly the BARV rose up the ramp,scrambled for a hold and drove on to thetankdeck. The trackway had disappeared.With the BARV, came about ten tons ofstinking, slimy, blue-grey mud which was soheavy that the ramp could not be raisedimmediately. F3's assistance was requiredbefore F2 could be refloated off the beach.Once clear, the mud was hosed off the rampand the ramp raised.The time from the initial beaching to F3towing us off was a little over 63 minutes butin that time the BARV had sunk 1.5 metresinto the mire.Clearing the mud for F2's tankdeck wasnecessary before we could return to the ship.This took almost a further hour of hard diggingand hosing by all ranks. The BARVwas offloaded on to Fearle.s.s's tankdeck at alittle after 1530 hours. To allow the landingto continue, the Michigan was returned to thebeach, where it had little problem landingover its own trackway. Washing and servicingthe BARV wa.s delayed until the last of the(Photos Ministry of Defence UK)HMS Fearless showing flight deck.embarked force had left and was completedat 2135 hours.Later, over a couple of jars in the Wardroom,we heard that the US Marines, onanother beach had had similar trouble with aCaterpillar D8 recovery tractor (fitted withwinch). While they were deciding what to doabout it, the tide came in. When the tidewent out again all that was left of the tractorwas a four inch length of air intake pipe stickingabove the sand. This vehicle was immediatelywritten off, the cost of recovery fromthis position far outweighing the cost of areplacement vehicle.On Wednesday 2 October, again in F2, weheaded for the beach, the same beach but thistime we were on a tide which was nearly atits height. The landing was a normal one andthe BARV was operated on the beach forabout 30 minutes to prove the point, beforereturning to the ship.The beach was reclaimed land. We foundout later what that meant in that part of theworld. On a mixture of sand, alluvial blueclaysilt and sawdust and at low water, theLCMs were beaching within feet of the edgeof a shelf, the bottom of the fjord beinghundreds of metres below them.It could have been worse, it could havebeen winter.U !i'i.if.:l l'' f H'[3l '""mw-iibattlefields-rmjf&Qr^..Of ^SfrtK ^ ^Lieutenant P. A. PedersenRoyal Australian InfantryISUPPOSE every high school history courseincludes the First World War. HoweverYpres, the Somme, Passchendaele and Verdundo not generate the same interest as the NapoleonicWars more than a century earlier. Fouryears of trench warfare, devoid of movementcould not compete with the spectacular campaignsof Napoleon that stretched from Spainto Russia. It was only at Duntroon, two yearslater, that 1 was able to study the 1914-1918battles in some detail. I realised then thatthey were the result of the mobilisation of theentire resources, manpower and production ofthe great nations involved.On a recent trip to Europe 1 was fortunateto see first-hand some of the locations wherethe major battles of the First World War tookplace. My wife and I followed the line ofthe Western Front from Ypres in the north,through Vimy Ridge and the Somme, toVerdun in the south. The aim of this articleis to describe these battlefields as they aretoday.Our first stop was at Armentieres which hasacquired a certain fame through its dubiousconnection with 'the Madamoiselle". After abrief occupation by the Germans, Armentiereswas captured by the Allies in October 1914and held for the next three and half years.Situated just behind the lines it became aforward base and recreational centre for theBritish armies. In 1918 the town was overrunby the Germans and the 1st Australian Divisionplayed a vital part in holding theiradvance at Hazebrouck, about fifteen milesLieutenant Pedersen graduated from RMC Duntroonin 1974 with a BA (Mil), majoring in History andPolitical Science. He was allocated to RA Infantryand posted to 5/7 RAR as a platoon commander.He is currently undertaking full-time post-graduatestudies in History at RMC. He contributed to theArmy Journal.to the west. Armentieres was largely destroyedin the severe fighting that accompanied thisoffensive. Today the town has been completelyrebuilt and is again supported by its age-oldindustries of brewing and linen manufacture.It is dominated by the Place General de Gaullewith its imposing Hotel de Ville. As wasthe case with most of the larger towns throughwhich we passed, the signs of actual fightingare few.Flerbaix, Fromelles and Aubers Ridge arefound to the south of Armentieres. Fromelleswas the scene of the Australians' first majoraction on the Western Front and as such wasa prelude for the bitter fighting to come. At6 pm on 19 July 1916, the 5th Australian and61st British divisions crossed the startline inan attack aimed at deterring the Germansfrom switching troops from this sector to containthe Somme offensive to the south. Aftercapturing one thousand yards of trench theAustralians were forced to withdraw whenthe enemy infiltrated their rear. In a littleover twenty-four hours the 5th Division hadsuffered over five thousand casualties in anaction described by British communiques as'some important raids'.Today there are few traces of the bitterfight that took place here. One sees a fewbunkers, that is all. Numerous cemeteriesdot the area but for us, the most importantwas at VC Corner, the centre of the actionjust described. There are no headstonesbecause this sector was not recaptured by theAllies until 1918 and by that time the bodiescould not be identified. Hence the names ofthe missing are inscribed on a white brickwall in front of which stands a simple crosson the neatly mowed lawn. We stood lookingat that wall for a long time, alone with ourthoughts. Presently a Frenchman entered thecemetery and he began to read the names tohis young son. When I told him we wereAustralians he seemed quite moved and spoke 40 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALof the sacrifice the Australians had made here.My wife and I were touched.The surrounding countryside is undulatingand here and there we could see the smallhillocks and outcrops on which were locatedthe machine-guns that reaped such a grimharvest. About two hundred yards from thecemetery lie the remains of an old bunker,standing forlorn and incongruous in the middleof a green field. The area is mainly farmlandnow and the only trenches one sees arethe furrows made by a farmer's plough orthe occasional irrigation ditch. A tractor maybe heard in the distance or the report of ashotgun as a farmer rids his crop of rodents.They are the only man-made sounds to breakthe silence. It was difficult to believe that sucha fierce struggle took place in what are nowpeaceful, tranquil fields.From Fromelles we travelled south throughBethune and Lena to Vimy Ridge. Capturedby the Canadian Corps on 9 April 1917, partof the ridge has been presented by the Frenchto the people of Canada. The crest was heldby the Germans, a strip of land which gavethem command of the battlefield to the westfor a distance of about ten miles. Extensivetunnelling operations were carried out by bothsides, twenty-two miles of tunnel being constructedby the Allies alone.The Vimy Ridge battlefield has been preservedfor posterity and with some minorexceptions, today's visitor sees it as it was in1917. As we drove up to the crest we sawthat the ground on either side of the road hadbeen fenced off and 'Danger' signs placed atregular intervals. The earth is pock-markedand uneven, a result of the tremendous shellingthat characterized the First World Warbattles and it is still full of explosive. Then,just below the crest, the undergrowth clearsand one comes into the grass-covered battlefieldpark. The front-line trenches have beenpreserved with concrete sandbags and thereare several huge mine craters. One of theseplunges to a depth of about sixty feet andaround the line of this crater, separated bylittle more than the length of a cricket pitch,are the opposing trenches. I stood in theGerman lines and was amazed at the nearnessof the Canadian trenches just a stone's throwaway.On the crest itself stands the CanadianNational Memorial with its two huge pylonsand on the terrace in front, the figure of Canadain mourning. Inscribed on its walls are thenames of over eleven thousand Canadianswho have no known grave. It is a mostimpressive monument, both in its simplicityof design and in the peaceful surroundings inwhich it is set.Leaving Vimy we headed south throughArras and Bapaume, passing a rather largesign which read 'Welcome to the Country ofthe Somme'. This was certainly not a relicfrom the First World War. We spent the nightat Albert which, until October 1916, was wellwithin range of German artillery and verybadly damaged. The symbol of Albert is itsGolden Virgin atop the impressive basilica.On 15 January 1915 the dome on which shestood was struck by a shell and although shedid not fall, she hung precariously at rightangles to the rest of the church. Today theGolden Virgin has been restored to her uprightposition.The area around Albert was the centre ofthe Somme battles and the reminders of warare many. Four kilometres to the north-eastlies the tiny village of La Boiselle where theBritish 34th Division was destroyed on 1 July1916. La Boiselle was typical of a day inwhich the British armies suffered sixty thousandcasualties, a day that has achieved notoriety.At La Boiselle today there are memorialsto the 19th and 34th Divisions and eighthundred metres to the east of the village isthe largest mine crater on the Western Front,preserved as it was in 1916. It is three hundredyards across and ninety feet deep andthe mine itself contained sixty thousand poundsof explosive. Manv small areas around LaBoiselle have been fenced off and even now.sheep cannot graze in them because the riskof detonating unexploded ordnance is so great,f remember stopping in front of a newly builthouse while I asked for directions to thecrater. Thirty shells of various calibres werepiled to the side of the road in front, productsof the clearance of the tiny block of land onwhich this house stood.A short distance to the north of La Boiselleis the village of Pozieres. Between 13 and 18July 1916 four British attempts to capture THE BATTLEFIELDS OF YESTERDAY TODAY 41Pozieres had failed. At 12.30 am on 23 Jul)the 1st Australian Division crossed the startline on the right flank of a two divisionalattack from the south. By 7.30 am the villagewas in Australian hands, the onl\ area inwhich ground had been gained on a sevenmile front. On 4 August the 2nd AustralianDivision attacked further northward and capturedthe ruins of the famous Pozieres windmill.This led to the assault on MouquetFarm and the bitter struggle that ensued hereis indelibly recorded in Australian militaryhistory.It was with a certain awe that we approachedthis area where twenty-three thousand Australiansfell in eight weeks. Pozieres todayconsists of several sheds and old dwellingsastride the road. It is lifeless, ghostlike. Theenormous Pozieres Military Cemetery is locatedto the south of the village and there isalso a memorial to the 1st Australian Division.However it was the Windmill that madethe deepest impression on us. It is a moundabout fifteen feet high, covered in long grassand smaller than the average back yard. Afootpath leads from the road to a memorialstone in the ground whose inscription statesthat more Australians fell here than in anyother part of the Western Front. Steppingover the stone I climbed the few short stepsto the top of the mound. Stretched out beforeme was an extensive view of the surroundingcountryside from Thiepval on the heights tothe west to Bapaume in the north.I stood on the Windmill for some minutes,trying to visualize the fury of July 1916. Itwas hard to believe that this insignificant lookingpiece of ground could have cost the livesof so many men. On the other side of theroad is the memorial to the Tank Corps.Tanks first went into action from this spot inSeptember 1916. The memorial consists of acentral obelisk and four models of tanks ofthe 1914-18 period. One of these bears bulletmarks, a legacy of the Second World War.From the Windmill we drove the few shortkilometres to Mouquet Farm which also commandsa fine view, looking down on theBapaume-Albert road to the east. It wasdefended ferociously by the Germans, muchof the fighting taking place below ground.Today the farm is untouched by war. As weIAit\lralinn H'tir Xii'iuoriiillCrater at La Boiselle. Photo taken in 1919.drove up the gravel driveway we passed asmall pile of rusting shells. I spoke to twoyoung Frenchmen who were working thereand they pointed out the site of the originalfarmhouse, a small hillock about one hundredyards from where the present buildings stand.What was a muddy morass in 1916 is now averitable sea of green and sheep graze peacefullyon grounds where once, thousands ofmen fought and died.To the north-west lies Thiepval. For thefirst two years of the war the Germans lookedout over its steep western slopes and had awonderful view of the Allied lines. They convertedit into an impregnable fortress with anextensive tunnel network below ground. TheAustralian sacrifice at Mouquet Farm wasmade in an attempt to drive a wedge behindthis fortress and thereby cut it off.The great Memorial to the Missing marksthe site of Thiepval today. Built on the oldGerman defence system, it consists of a hugecentral archway, flanked by smaller archesthat rest on sixteen pillars. On its walls arerecorded the names of the seventy-five thousandmen who fell in the 1916-17 Somme battlesand have no known grave. The monumentis an enormous structure set in neatly mownlawns that are enclosed by copses of smalltrees. The silence and stillness were uncanny.The only sounds to be heard were the rustlingof the wind and the singing of the birds.This was typical of all the Somme cemeteriesand memorials that we saw. An oldFrenchman clad in blue work dress might betending the graves — he is the only sign of 4: DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALmovement. Everything else is still, very stilland very quiet. It is as though the earth,destroyed by years of shelling, is sleeping ineternal peace in company with the hundredsof thousands of soldiers that she receivedbetween 1914 and 1918. It is unforgettable.Nearby lies the Schwaben Redoubt, a mazeof underground tunnels and passages thatsheltered the Germans in this area from themassive bombardments which preceded theSomme offensive of July 1916. When theartillery ceased they set up their machine-gunsand wreaked havoc among the attackingforces. Mill Road cemetery marks the site ofSchwaben Redoubt today. The headstoneshere are laid flat because of the continualsubsidence as the tunnels crumble. As westood in this cemetery I noticed streaks ofchalk in the soil. Later I ascertained that thesewere the remains of the German trenchesleading up to the Redoubt. Sixty years ofploughing have not eradicated this legacy ofwar.Leaving Thiepval and Schwaben we droveon to Beaumont-Hamel about two kilometresto the north-west. The Royal NewfoundlandRegiment was decimated here on 1 July 1916and the preserved battle field is now knownas the Beaumont-Hamel Newfoundland MemorialPark. As we left the car we were againconfronted by the shell-torn ground with whichwe had become so familiar. The trenches aresilent now and as we followed their course wecame across spent shell-casings, barbed wire,pickets and other debris. The ground slopesgently down towards the German lines andthe distance between the opposing trenchesvaries from fifty to one hundred yards. Infront of the Allied trenches stands a forlornline of rusting barbed wire pickets, awaitingan attack that will never come. Dominatingthe battlefield is the great Caribou monumentto the Newfoundlanders and in the middleof no-man's-land stand the remains of a lonetree that somehow survived the war. Theground is covered by a thick cloak of grassand enclosed by fir trees. Three cemeterieslie at the northern end of the park, overlookinga small dip that was once a main killingarea for German machine-guns.Our next stop was Flers, about six kilometreseast of Pozieres. It is noteworthybecause tanks were used for the first time inits capture. Flers is typical of the many smallvillages in this area of northern France thatwere destroyed by the war. The atmosphereis morbid, almost deathk. There are nomajestic churches, no tree-lined streets, nobeautiful shops. Nothing from pre-1914 dayssurvives. Only old people seem to live thereand we gained the impression that the worldhad passed them by. As we drove throughFlers men stopped their work and womenleaned out of windows to look at us. It wasas though they had never seen anyone fromoutside the confines of their village. We feltlike intruders from another age.There are many cemeteries and memorialsclose to Flers. Some of them bear famousnames such as Gueudecourt, the scene of anight attack in terrible conditions by the AIFin November 1916. We found the beautifulmemorial to the South Africans at DelvilleWood where they received their baptism offire. Between 14 and 20 July 1916 they capturedall of the wood except for the southwestcorner, sulfering heavy casualties in thebitter fighting.Today Delville Wood is covered by SouthAfrican oak trees, setting off the magnificentarchway that is the basis of the memorial.Signposts indicate the old trench lines thatwere named after streets in London and Capetown.The greenness of the trees mixed withhues of various colours as the sun filtersthrough the leaves onto the ground belowmake the woods a place of rare beauty. Thesecool, peaceful glades are suggestive of a lover'swalk or a family picnic area, far removedfrom the inferno of July 1916.From here we drove south through Corbieto Villers-Bretonneux. On 4 April 1918 theGermans reached the outskirts of this townand were prevented from taking it by thespectacular bayonet charge of the 36th AustralianBattalion. In the two weeks followingthis action the Australians were relieved bytwo British divisions. Then on April 24Villers-Bretenneux fell to a German assaultsupported by tanks. At 10.00 pm that nightthe Australians launched a counter-attack andshortly after dawn next morning the town wasagain in Allied hands.On the high ground to the north of thevillage stands the Australian National War THE BATTLEFIELDS OF YESTERDAY TODAY 43Memorial and Cemetery. The Memorial is amassive structure whose walls list the manyAustralians who have no known grave. Itscentre is surmounted by a tower from whichpanoramic views of the battlefield can beobtained. To the west the ground slopes awayin an endless series of green and brown fieldsuntil one sees the haze of Amiens in the distance.To the south, on the next ridge, liesthe village. To the east the chalk streaks inthe fields outline the German trenches. Thecemetery is beautifully kept. We walked slowlyup the steps from the road to the gates andthrough the endless rows of white headstonesto the memorial. We stood looking at thenames on the walls and just ga/ing at thesurrounding countryside until the shadows oflate afternoon told us it was time to move on.We spent that night at St Quentin and nextmorning headed for the scene of the crudestbattle of the war, a battle that dragged on forten months: Verdun. Initially the Germansconfined their assault here to the right bankof the Meuse and their plan placed greatemphasis on artillery. They aimed to bleedthe French white, to draw them into a battlein which they would be obliged to fight to thelast man. The French defence was based ona series of forts arranged in concentric rinsisJ SOMME. 1916on the key hills that surrounded Verdun. Theywere mutually supporting and had their ownartillery. However, with the lack of foresighttypical of the generalship of that period, theFrench High Command stripped the forts ofall but a few of their heavy guns just beforethe battle. By the end of 1916 at least sevenhundred thousand men had fallen along thefifteen miles of front.We entered Verdun along the last few kilometresof the road from Bar-le-Duc. In 1916this road was the only means by which Frenchreinforcements and supplies could reach thefront. Jammed with traffic and packed withendless columns of marching troops it achievedimmortality as the 'Voie Sacree'. Wreathedhelmets on the kilometre stones reminded usof its significance.Today Verdun seems peaceful enough asthe Meuse winds its way lazily through thetown. The skyline is dominated by the VictoryMonument which has been built into theold town walls. An enormous flight of stepsleads up to a huge pillar surmounted by thefigure of a knight resting on his sword. Underneath,a small crpyt houses the 'Golden Books'in which are inscribed the names of all thosewho fought at Verdun. There is an interestingmuseum in the Hotel de Ville where we saw\ .Saill,BAPAUMEP^Miraumont. ' \ .&Le Stars "-' V V /CourceletteCILJ_J WatershedV .*•"* ft t V* " O0D I *FncourtQ , ' 0\ > Ki v. ' X / THE BATTLEFIELDS OF YESTERDAY TODAY 45VERDUN. 1916_ Original Lint on .'hi Feb_ Lint on evening of 21st FIB•• Line on even.ng of 25th Fem. Line on eiening of 7th March,_ line on eiening ol 1st Julyoffensive at Verdun. On the other side of theroad is the subterranean command post knownas 'Four Chimneys'. This was besieged forseveral days, the Germans dropping grenadesthrough the four ventilator shafts. Today ismall shelter covers each of these 'chimneys'.We climbed down the steep slopes to theentrances of the command post. Inside wecould see the smoke-blackened walls and thescattered rubble and it was easy to imaginethe stiffling, choking atmosphere as the occupantstried to hold out.Two thousand metres to the north-east andon the same ridge is the famous Ossuaire ofDouaumont. A massive building, the Ossuaireis visible for miles around, standing guardover the fifteen thousand graves of the FrenchNational Cemetery. It is dominated by a hugetower from which a light shines forth overthe battlefield and under which is located asmall chapel. The cloisters of the monumentare lined with the tombs of forty-six unknownsoldiers, each taken from a different sector ofthe battlefield. The Ossuaire contains thebones of over one hundred thousand dead,French and German. These remains can beseen through ground level windows.Five hundred yards to the south-west of theOssuaire stand the battered remains of ThiaumontRedoubt. In June 1916 this unimportantlookingfortification, little more than an oversizedbunker, changed hands sixteen times.Today Thiaumont consists of a few batteredchips of concrete and twisted steel rods barelyvisible above the long grass. It is no longeridentifiable as being made by man.The famous 'Tranchee des Baionettes' waspart of a trench system that covered thenorthern approaches to Thiaumont. Thereare various versions as to how its occupantswere killed. Some say the Germans overranthe trench and buried the defenders wherethey fell, indicating the graves with rifles.Others say they were buried by artillery asthey waited for the German attack. After thewar an imposing concrete memorial was erectediiver the trench and as we peered through itspillars we could see the rusty bayonets protrudingfrom the ground and next to each, across honouring an unknown French soldierwho rests there. The trench has been leftundisturbed and in its few square yards issymbolizes the whole battle of Verdun.Fort Douaumont is situated a short distanceto the east. It was a five-sided structure, aboutfour hundred yards across. Encircling thewalls was a dry moat at whose corners weresited concrete casemates from which enfiladefire could destroy any attacker who might tryto cross. None of this is recognizable today. 4hDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALLike its smaller counterpart at Vaux, Douaumontis just another of the incoherent concretemasses that once constituted the fortificationsof Verdun.Standing on the cold, windswept remainsof the superstructure, we viewed in silencethe panorama of the battlefield before us. Tothe north were the woods from which theGermans launched their initial surprise attackon 21 February 1916. To the east a Frenchflag flew high above the sinister hulk of FortVaux. To the west the hills of the left bankcould be discerned. It was easy to envisagethe battle unfolding.The interior of the fort consists of a labyrinthof tunnels and passages. It must be one ofthe most depressing places on earth. Waterdrips from the walls and stalactites hang fromthe roof. On 8 May 1916 a huge explosionburied over six hundred of the German garrisonin a casemate on the western side of thefort. We stood looking at their tomb, drapedwith regimental colours and decorated bywreaths, all dripping wet from the everpresentmoisture. Never before have 1 appreciatedfresh air so much as when we left Douaumont.As the day drew to a close we made a quicktrip to the left bank battlefields, symbolizedby the aptly named Mort Homme. This is along ridge which runs at right angles to theriver and withering enfilade fire from Frenchguns sited here broke up many German attackson the right bank. By the end of Februarythe German High Command realized that theMort Homme would have to be taken. On6 March 1916 their offensive on the left bankopened and at tremendous cost, the ridge fellto the Germans two months later.The Mort Homme is now covered by firtrees. Its summit is crowned by a memorialto the 40th Division, emblazoned with theimmortal words 'They shall not pass'. Theground has the usual ravaged, lunar appearance.As we walked around the crest the windwhistled through the trees and low. blackclouds scudded overhead. There were no signsof life and if ever a place can be describedas eerie this was it. We felt that we were notmeant to be here and we expected the ghostsof soldiers to appear from behind the trees.Distinctly uneasy, we drove off, glad to leavethe Mort Homme behind.Our visit to Verdun was at an end. We hadtrodden the grounds of one of the mightiestbattles of all time, grounds that have hardlychanged in the sixty years that have elapsedsince. Both of us now understood why thename Verdun is sacred in French history. Wealso left the Western Front battlefields inFrance at this point and travelled on to thepleasant little town of Ypres in the north-westof Belgium.The first battle of Ypres took place in October1914 and it saw the demise of the oldBritish Regular Army. It also gave birth tothe infamous Ypres salient. During the secondbattle of Ypres in April 1915, the Germansmade the first use of gas. The third and finalbattle commenced on 31 July 1917 and constitutesone of the saddest episodes of Britishmilitary history. It is better known by thetitle of Passchendaele.Completely destroyed by the war, Ypreswas reconstructed in the same style and accordingto the original town plans. Thus the GrandPlace is again dominated by the Cloth Hall,now housing the Salient 1914-1918 WarMuseum. Across the courtyard is the magnificentSt Martin's Cathedral opposite whichstands St George's Memorial Church, erectedin memory of those who fell in the salient.For us however, the highlight of our visitto Ypres was located on the eastern side ofthe town, a short walk from the Grand Place.It was the Menin Gate, built after the war tocommemorate the fifty-five thousand Commonwealthsoldiers who died in the salient andhave no known grave. Their names areinscribed on the inside of the massive archway,on the terraces and on the walls of thestairways. The lists seem endless and manynames are Australian. The road underneathwas the artery along which thousands ofsoldiers made their way to the salient beyond.Every night at 8 pm traffic through the gateis halted and the Last Post is sounded, followedby one minute's silence. In Ypres theyremember.We returned to the Grand Place and caughtthe bus to Passchendaele. Situated astride aridge about five miles north-east of Ypres, itis a picturesque little village with red-roofedhouses and trim, neat gardens. We walkedback to where a glade of trees sheltered a THE BATTLEFIELDS OF YESTERDAY TODAY 47small area of lawn. In the middle of this tinysecluded park stands a small tablet in memoryof the Canadian Corps who finally capturedPasschendaele village in November 1917.A rather long two kilometres later we stoodat the gates of Tyne Cot British Cemetery andMemorial to the Missing. Tyne Cot containsthe greatest number of graves of any Commonwealthwar cemetery, over twelve thousandin all. Two Australian VCs, Sgt L. McGee,40th Bn AIF and Capt C. S. Jeffries, 34th BnAIF are buried here, close to the spot wherethey were killed. On the panels of thememorial are listed the names of thirty-fivethousand soldiers who fell in the salient inthe period from 16 August 1^17 to the endof the war.At Passchendaele the Germans used strongpointsand concrete pillboxes, unconnectedbut mutually supporting and sited in greatdepth. Hence the front-line could be coveredeffectively by a relatively small number ofmen, saving the remainder for prompt counterattack. This defence system, in conjunctionwith the muddy, water-logged ground madethe offensive a nightmare for the unfortunateinfantry who participated. On many occasionsthese were the soldiers of the ANZACdivisions and they performed heroically underthe appalling conditions.The countryside around Tyne Cot is litteredwith the remains of these bunkers and threeare located within the cemetery itself. TheCross of Sacrifice is mounted on the largest.a blockhouse captured by the 2nd AustralianDivision. From the base of the Cross I couldsee how this main bunker supported the othertwo and how an attack on any one of thesepositions would result in a pitched battleLooking to the horizon I realized the importanceof Passchendaele Ridge for it overlookedthe British positions in the salient and in thedistance the spires of Ypres were clearlyvisible. Today, cows graze and crops growin fields which were once a muddy morass.We spent some time wandering through TyneCot Cemetery, reading the details inscribedon the headstones. On few occasions havesenior commanders been so completely outof touch with the reality of conditions at thefront.'Australian War Memorial)Gibraltar Pillbox and the 1 st Division Monument,Pozieres. Photo taken in 1919.This marked the end of our tour of thebattlefields. Several impressions remain. Iremember being introduced to an old Frenchmanwho owned an ancient American minedetectorand whose hobby was collecting warrelics. As his farm was just outside Poziereshe was ideally placed to pursue his interest.As we entered his backyard I was staggeredby the sight of huge piles of shells, rustybayonets and helmets, broken waterbottlesand so forth. I did not ask him how muchof it was live for I dreaded his answer. Ideclined his offer of a few light shells andsome rifle ammunition but I did accept anAustralian rising sun badge that he had foundnear Mouquet Farm. On the serious sidethough, it must be remembered that manyFrench children are killed and maimed everyyear by these dangerous relics of war.Then there were the cemeteries. Scatteredall over northern France, they seemed innumerable.The most common inscription on theirheadstones reads 'A Soldier Known Unto God'.We were staggered by the endless lists ofsoldiers who have no known grave. The wallsof Menin Gate, Tyne Cot, Thiepval and theOssuaire of Verdun are covered with theirnames.We were struck by the extent of Australia'sinvolvement. From Ypres to the Somme,almost every cemetery, even the smallest, bearseloquent testimony to the cost of Australia'scontribution to the final victory. We weredeeply impressed by the French people wemet in cemeteries and villages for they wereconscious of the sacrifice made by our sol- 4SDEFENCE FORCE JOURNALdiers. At the same time we were saddened oozing quagmire they once were. For me abecause these people seemed to have greater dream had come true. I had seen first handrespect for our fallen than do our own coun- places thai 1 had read about for some yearstrymen.and I was able to relate events that I hadThe battlefields are quiet now for the sounds studied to the ground on which they occurred.of war have gone. Birds sing, cattle graze, 1 had trodden the paths of history. It was ancrops grow. It is hard to imagine them as the experience 1 shall never forget. QAUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIALThese Australian War Memorial publications may be purchased from theBook Room or by writing to Director Australian War Memorial, P.O. Box 345,Canberra Citv, ACT. 2601. Postage must be added. Within Australia (pervolume): N.s'w. SI.20: Old, Vic, & S.A.$2.00; Tas. $2.30; W.A., N.T. S2.80.Overseas:$2.80.Recommended prices and postages are subject to alteration without notice.OFFICIAL HISTORY — AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR OF 1939-1945122 volumes)RecommendedPriceThe following 21 volumes have been published:Series 1 TO BENGHAZI. Gavin Long $2.50(Army) GREECE. CRETE AND SYRIA. Gavin Long$3.00TOBRUK AND EL ALAMEIN. Barton Maughan S4.00THE JAPANESE THRUST, Lionel Wigmore S4.00SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA — FIRST YEAR. Dudley McCarthy S3.00THE NEW GUINEA OFFENSIVES, David Dexter $4.00THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS. Gavin Long$3.50Series 2 ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY. 1939-1942. G. Hermon Gill *(Navy) ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY. 1942-1945, G. Hermon Gill $4.00Series 3 ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE. 1939-1942. Douglas Gillison$4.00(Air) AIR WAR AGAINST JAPAN. 1943-1945. George Odgers $3.50AIR WAR AGAINST GERMANY AND ITALY. 1939-1943. JohnHerington$3.00AIR POWER OVER EUROPE, 1944-1945, John Herington $3.50Series 4 THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. 1939-1941. Paul Hasluck S3.00(Civil) THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. 1942-1945. Paul Hasluck *WAR ECONOMY. 1939-1942. S. J. Butlin$2.50THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY, D. P. Mellor $3.00Series 5 CLINICAL PROBLEMS OF WAR$3.50(Medical) MIDDLE EAST AND FAR EAST $3.50THE ISLAND CAMPAIGNS Alan S. Walker$3.50MEDICAL SERVICES OF THE R.A.N.AND THE R.A.A.F. $3.50* Out of printThe unpublished volume: AVAILABLE AUGUST 1977Civil WAR ECONOMY. 1942-1945 THE BATTLEFIELDS OF YESTERDAY TODAY 49OFFICIAL HISTORY — AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR OF 1914-1918< 1 2 volumes >RecommendedPriceThe following 2 volumes are still available:Vol. II THE STORY OF ANZAC (Part II). C. E. W. Bean$2.10Vol. VI — THE A.IF. IN FRANCE, 1918. C. E. W. Bean S2.10ANZAC TO AMIENS, C. E. W. Bean $3.00A concise history of the 1914-1918 War.THE SIX YEARS WAR. Gavin Long$7.50A concise history of the 1939-1945 War.PICTORIAL HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA AT WAR. 1939-1945 $23.00A five-volume photographic record.AUSTRALIANS AT THE BOER WAR. R. L. Wallace SI 1.95A historical account of the first significant force to leaveAustralia to fight in a conflict overseas.BLAMEY: CONTROVERSIAL SOLDIER. John Hetherington$7.50A new and original biography of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blarney.the only Australian to have reached the rank of field marshal.THE DARED MIGHTLY. Ed. Lionel Wigmore in collaboration withBruce Harding. The story of Australian V.C. and G.C. awards. S4.20AUSTRALIA AT ARMS. Ed. Norman Bartlett S2.50From the Maori Wars to World War II.WITH THE AUSTRALIANS IN KOREA. Ed. Norman Bartlett S2.50A cover of the Korean War.THE SHELLAL MOSAIC. A. D. Trendall. Paperback, illustrated $0.60Description of the discovery, origin and design of this relic.OTHER BANNERS. Ed. J. T. Laird$3.90An anthology of Australian prose and verse of the 1914-18 War.MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF AUSTRALIA. 1909-1918, Keith Isaacs $6.50The first of four volumes of a history of Australian military aviation since 1909.In addition, there are booklets, reproductions, postcards and other souvenirs rangingin price from$1.60 down to 10c.

52 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALmaintenance period in Hong Kong; or betweenan exercise briefing at Den Helder and KielWeek; but the gradations between theseextremes are less well understood and thereforeworthy of descriptions in a study of thisnature.One Day VisitHardly worth the name of Visit. Only thePort Watch gets ashore. Useful for haircuts,telephone calls, buying picture post-cardstowards the globe-trotter image.Two Day VisitStarboard Watch gets ashore and makes thesame errors as the Port Watch; daymen havetime to buy rabbits and do a little sightseeing.Three Day VisitBegins to qualify as a Port Visit proper.Structured approaches to locals become worthwhile.Official cognisance of the visit as aVisit will probably be taken by shore authorities.The Aim may be achieved under coupde foudre circumstances. Unfair to the StarboardWatch.Four Day VisitFair to both watches. Qualifies as a visitwithin the meaning of the act and calls up theneed for an advanced liaison officer and somedetailed planning. Official calls and the officialcocktail party must be compressed into thefirst day. Towards the end, people ashorerecognise you when they see you again, andmay even remember your name.Five Day VisitAspirants find themselves with enough eveningsfree from official entertainment and obligatoryself-destructive runs ashore to throw aprivate party of an informal nature. OfficialCocktail Party on the first night, private partyon the fourth night. This gives enough timeto build up the guest list and leaves one freeevening to capitalise on developments. Fatiguemakes its first appearance in the dog watchesof the fifth day.Six Day VisitWe are now entering Big Trouble Country.Some experts feel that in a six day visit theofficial entertainment should be spread overtwo days, with the Official Cocktail Party onday two. Certainly this gives the DFC andthe gangway staff something to do on twodays, and allows the organisation to salt theofficial guest list with the product of its owninvestigations. Remember however that theport was not built yesterday, like one of thosestand-up cut-outs in a children's book, foryour entertainment; and that to modify theguest list can sometimes cause the most terribleoffence. Be guided by the local Flag Lieutenant,and tune up the liaison officer's sensoryperception equipment. No one profits from aserious social mis-match under such circumstancesand a heavy foot through the web oflocal customs and relationships can result ina visit memorable only for the sightseeingand the opportunities for sleep.Ashore, one begins to build relationships,share little jokes and experiences, repay hospitality,get involved. They remember yourname. You recognise the car, and can dialthe telephone number without looking it up.Seven Day VisitA two-day journey up-country can be fittedin without detriment to the overall pattern ofthe visit. Those prone to alcoholic remorsewill have had to pace themselves carefully byDay Seven. The physique begins to adjust toa daily routine which allows sleep between4 p.m. and the hot bath at 6.45 p.m., boostedby cat-naps taken in the early morning on theStar Ferry, along the Bukit Timah. or in trainsfrom Cape Town and Perth to Simonstownand Fremantle.Eight Day VisitEight days represents a watershed or climactericin the nature of Port Visits. It is possibleto do a Seven Day Visit in one powerful burstwithout suffering bankruptcy, nervous exhaustion,or protein deficiency. Anything longerrequires a different pace, like the contrastbetween running one and three miles. Retrospectively,many observers have said, afterexperiencing visits of eight days or more, thatthey should without doubt have sailed on theseventh.If all has gone well, either she, or you. orboth, will be in love by the eighth day. Sailnow Ulysses, or you are lost!Nine Day VisitHuman memory is short, and by the endof the nine day visit it seems to those ashore

sAIR POWER AT SEA 1939-45, by JohnWinton, Sidawick & Jackson. London. 1976.187 pp.Reviewed by Lieutenant M. P. Fretwell. RoyciiNavy (Retd.).JOHN WINTON has established a tine reputationfor himself as a writer whose agiletalent spans the range from light comedy tothe more sober works of historical study. Hislatest book, Air Power at Sea 1939-45. is adocumentary work which maintains the highstandard we have come to expect.In 1939 there were many people, on all sides,who regarded the aircraft as a "passing irrelevance".In this book. Winton analyses therole of air power in World War II and demonstrateshow the sceptics were pressured intoa grudging acceptance, and finally a full appreciationof its decisive significance as witnessedby the 3rd Fleet's operations off Japan in Julyand August 1945, which were 'the most polishedprofessional aerial performances of the warat sea'. In a finely balanced overview of thetheatres of war in which air power was a crucialfactor, the author draws upon examples fromboth Allied and Axis deployment of aircraftin a variety of offensive and defensive tasks.Winton examines the campaigns in Norway,the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Arcticand the Pacific. With an admirable economyof detail he gives succinct but impressivelyadequate accounts of specific actions to substantiatehis case, the highlights of which areTaranto, Pearl Harbor and I.eyte Gulf. Ofconsiderable interest is the section devoted tothe Kamikaze force, 'the tissue-paper dragon',which so perplexed Western psychology, butwhich also wreaked so much havoc uponAllied shipping.However Air Power at Sea is not merely acatalogue of the success and failure of aircraftin action, nor just a record of tactical andstrategic moves and countermoves in the fightfor supremacy. The effectiveness or otherwiseof the aircraft depended upon their crews andthe men who planned their operational missions,and Winton is always conscious of thishuman element. Unobtrusively, but capturingperfectly the excitement, bravery, fear andmisery of those flying the planes, he includesa number of first hand experiences. We arereminded also of the bad weather, poor communications,inexperienced crews and defectiveand often obsolete machinery which frustratedand bedevilled the tacticians' calculations.Attention is focused briefly on the personalityclashes at command level over priorities andstrategy and, with the advantage of hindsight,the author points out the errors and lost opportunitieswhich hampered both sides.The text is more than complemented bythe magnificent collection of photographs.many full or double page, of personalities,ships, 'action' shots, and, not the least of aircraft.For these alone the book must beregarded as a collector's item. For the technicallyminded, Winton has furnished performancedetails for all featured aircraft. For thosewith a less technical bent, the author, obviouslyunable to repress his undoubted sense ofhumour, has embellished the text with anumber of amusing Wren cartoons with jinglesthat describe the distinguishing characteristicsof the aircraft depicted. The book is comprehensivelyindexed, and to assist the reader infollowing the action there are well-producedmaps inside both front and back covers. Clearlyin this short work Winton cannot give morethan an outline of his subject. However, forthe reader who wishes to investigate moredeeply, Winton includes a select bibliographywhich would provide ample detailed materialof the areas and campaigns to which he refers.Very few would argue against the vital rolethat air power had. and still has, to playwhether in an offensive or defensive capacity.To this extent Winton may be "preaching tothe converted'. But should there still bedoubters, his book will «ive some food for

BOOK REVIEWS "however: suffice to say that it covers the ravingsof RR represeniatives around the worldduring World War II. the sometimes futileefforts to secure orders after the war and somevery interesting tit-bits on why various aircraftended up with the engines they did. His viewson why the Australian Mirage didn't have theAvon fit and his project to fit twin Speys inthe Harrier, are examples.There is one recurring theme worth mentioningas it is as true today as ever, yet alltoo often neglected. That theme is the necessityfor a good working relationship betweenthe company and the customer which must bebuilt on a willingness by the company to changeand modify their wares, instruct the user onopera ing procedures and keep the personaltouch going from squadron level to AirMinistry.Historians may be able to pick some (lawswith Mr Harker's statements, and grammarianshis syntax, but as a personal writing whichties the web of history together with anecdoteand behind-the-scenes revelation there is littleto find fault with. 1 wouldn't expect to seethis book listed as a best-seller, but I wouldcertainly recommend that you pick it up fromthe library shelf if you're feeling like a littleentertaining education.Q* Available in Australia through LothianPublishing Co. Pty. Ltd., 4-12 Tattersalls Lane,Melbourne, 3000.PANZER BARON THH MILITARYEXPLOITS OF GENERAL HASSO VONMANTEL!FFEL. by Donald Grey Brownlow,The Christopher Publishing House, NorthQuincy, Massachusetts, 1975. (This copy fromNapoleon's Military Bookshop, Pitt Street.Sydney.)Reviewed by W02 A. //. McAulayHQ FlCornelDESPITE the victories achieved by theGerman panzer formations in WorldWar Two, relatively few pan/er commandersare well-known in the West. Both Rommeland Guderian have received a large amountof attention from writers, and others such asRundstedt and Kleist are fairly well known.Now. Mr. Brownlow has produced a bookon Baron Hasso von Manteutfel whom Hitlergreeted as late as September 1944 as "a generalwho can win battles". Baron von Manteulfel'smilitary career ranged from service as a Lieutenantwith the Prussian 6th Division in WorldWar One to the command of the Fifth PanzerArmy in the Ardennes Offensive in December1944. After 1945 the Baron entered politicsin West Germany.He served under Guderian when the lattercommanded 2nd Panzer Division in 1934. butdid not sec active service in World War Twountil the invasion of Russia. During the campaignsin Poland. France and the Balkans,the Baron commanded an Officer TrainingSchool.Finally he was given command of a Panzer-Grenadier Battalion in 7th Panzer Division.From there he rose to command the regiment,then a battle group of the Division, fought inTunisia, then again in Russia, commanding7th Panzer Division, commanded the elite'Gross-Deutschland* Division in Russia and inEast Prussia, and was selected by Hitler tocommand 5th Panzer Army for the Ardennesoffensive.For his services. Baron von Manteulfel wasawarded the complete series of Iron Crossesto include the Knight's Cross with Oakleaves.Swords and Diamonds.With all this service to draw on, Mr. Brownlow'sbook is disappointing in that only 116pages of the 176 page book deal with WorldWar Two. Thirty-one pages are devoted tophotos, and six are maps. For some reason,the maps are in German. So, unless the readerhas some knowledge of German which includesmilitary terminology and abbreviations, orperseveres with a dictionary, the maps are ofless than full value as a picture complementaryto the text.Mr. Brownlow spends over seventy pageson the Baron's early life, World War Oneservice and between-the-wars service, with arelatively detailed description of the Nazi riseto power. Hitler's purge of the SA and hismanipulation of the Generals. Similarly a greatdeal of the text about World War Two describesthe overall situation in relatively fine detailwhile the subject of the book seems to bementioned only in passing.However, as the book includes the words"Military Exploits" in the title one would

58 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALexpect more attention to be paid to the actualcampaign experiences. Tunisia is dismissedin four pages; May 1942 to May 1944 in tenpages of text, and the Battle of Targul Frumosin which "Gross Deutschland" destroyed over200 Russian tanks in three days of defensivefighting against two Armies and ten rifle divisionsis dealt with in one page.The photograph captions are also disappointing.When the same people are shown in manyof the photographs, it would provide thatextra item of interest if those persons werenamed. Several subordinate commanders mentionedin the text, and could appear in thephotographs.Manteuffel the man and soldier has not comealive under Mr. Brownlow's pen as haveRommel and Guderian under the pens of theirbiographers. Hopefully, some other historianwill flesh out the bare Manteuffel bones ofMr. Brownlow's book.ySEA BATTLE GAMES, by P. Dunn. Modeland Allied Publications Ltd., London, 1970.Reviewed by Lieutenant A. M. StackpooiRoyal Australian NavyEA BATTLE GAMES is an introductorymanual concerning — in Mr. Dunn'swords — "the art of naval battle gaming".The book covers all aspects of the art fromsimple two ship actions by two people lastingabout half an hour, to vast complicated worldwar-type actions which involve up to a scoreof people and may be played over severalmonths.Mr. Dunn has divided his book into tworecognisable parts. The first part provides ageneral background to sea wargaming: thesecond part deals with different types of actionfrom different periods of history. In the firstsection Mr. Dunn suggests that naval wargamingis more than a juvenile pastime ofpushing toy ships around the floor. Indeed.to be proficient, it is a game requiring morethought and research than chess or the recognised'adult' card games. In this section healso discusses the rules required to preparethe game, and he provides a list of pointswhich need to be researched before a set ofrules can be written. Mr. Dunn completes thefirst part of his book by discussing the typesof models available to the would-be War»amer.Unfortunately, most of the commercial typesare only available in the L'nited Kingdom, butthere are many good tips for building one'sown models. As the best scale sizes are given,an afternoon spent searching the hobby shopsshould produce satisfactory results.In the second part of the book Mr. Dunndeals with the rules for fighting battles. Inturn, he looks at the Napoleonic period, 1800-1860. the pre-Dreadnought period, 1860-7(1.World War 2. 1939-45, and a hypotheticalworld war, from 1945 to the present day. Theperiod 1870-1939 has no separate rules because"the main differences between the periods issimply increases in rates of fire, gun rangesand so on." The World War 2 rules, modifiedas necessary, are suitable for earlier periodbattles. The book closes with a chapter dealingbriefly with the pre-1800 period andincludes the Armada, the Anglo-Dutch Wars.Lepanto and the Roman and Greek battles.No rules are included, but the reader whointends fighting one of these naval battlesshould be able to write his/her own based onthose described in earlier chapters.The author achieves his aim most successfully.The book is concisely written and easyto understand. It is well illustrated with linediagrams and photographs of model ships, butis somewhat marred by a number of typographicalerrors and an inadequate bibliography.The book is the fourth on Wargamingby Model and Allied Publications but theirfirst concerning sea warfare. It is recommendedreading for all those interested in the intricateart of Wargaming.yCOMMAND OF THE SEA,* by Clark G.Reynolds, London, Robert Hale, 1976, 642 pp..$20.80.Reviewed byLieutenant Commander R. M. JonesRoyal Australian NavyTHE aim of this book is defined by the subtitle"The History and Strategy of MaritimeEmpires'. The author states he intendsto produce a resume of all naval history —not in the narrow sense of ship and fleet movementsor naval actions but maritime historyand its inter-action with geographical andeconomic forces. Expressed otherwise it isnaval history from a global viewpoint. BOOK REVIEWS >4This global perspective is slightly unusual.Judging from the coverage of recent history,specifically the Second World War 1939-45,it is useful. In 42 pages, all the major actionsare outlined and the political and militarvreasoning (and consequences) are explained.This section provides background to the manybooks and articles available covering the individualbattles and actions.This is not to say the book dwells on recenthistory. The author's intention is to study anddefine seapower wherever it has been exercisedin the last four thousand years. To cover sucha long period - - even in resume - - needs asubstantial book. This volume contains over6(K) pages including 30 of bibliography, 13 ofmaps and 18 of index. Size could be dauntingwere it not for an unusual arrangement.The body of the work is divided into sevendistinct sections, each described as a 'Book'.Book One is an introduction to sea-power asthe author sees it; here he sets out his principledefinitions and premises. Books Two to Seveneach deal with a period of history. In these,the arguments and reasoning for the conclusionsof Book One are presented. In manyrespects Book One is both introduction andconclusion. The Books cover consecutiveperiods in history and, except for Book Seven(1945-73), each begins with a chapter entitled'Ships and Seafaring' establishing the technicalsetting for that particular phase of history.Because of the way each Book has beenwritten as an independent unit, the whole workhas several uses. The reader with the timecan read it through and follow the authordeveloping his conclusions. Readers withnarrower interests (or less time) can select aspecific Book and be confident that all theinformation relevant to that historical periodis included. Additionally, the book is an excellentreference for the basic historical data -dates of battles, etc.Many other examples of the varied use ofmaritime power much further back in historywill be found in this book; notable are thedevelopment of the conventions concerningneutral shipping and territorial waters or theideal composition of a coastal navy. It isdifficult to think of any aspect of maritimeoperations in peace or war that is not included.This book has many uses — as a simplereference for dates, as an exposition of theuse and importance of sea power throughrecorded history, as a summary of the rise andfall of maritime powers, or even as a chronicleof the development, use and demise of a formof naval warfare (e.g. rowed galleys). Usedin any of these ways it is food for thought.A basic premise is that nations of the worldfall into two categories continental andmaritime. Continental powers are land based,need standing armies to defend against neighbours,trade predominantly across land bordersand do not have much interest in, or understandingof, maritime power. .Maritime powersare geographically isolated and do not needstanding armies, they have developed economicwealth by using the sea. This dependence onthe sea would make them vulnerable to outsideinterference (piracy, privateering and thelike) if they did not maintain standing naviesto protect their interests. Such standing naviehavepoliced the world during long periods ofapparent international peace during whichmerchants could go about their business freely.These periods of stability have been periodsof naval domination by one power for its ownends: the British Empire is a recent example.This proposal that continental powers tendto look inland while maritime powers deliberatelyset out to gain command of the sea isa theme of the book. Command of the seain this sense must not be confused with theterm of 'sea control' now frequently used todescribe tactical control of a portion of theocean; in the historical sense command of thesea meant strategic freedom to send a nation'sshipping anywhere at any time.A concept of continental and maritimepowers is historical/strategic in scope andtends to overshadow another hypothesis whichonly appears at the end of the book but ma\be more relevant to daily naval life. In thepast hundred years two schools of thoughthave arisen. Oldest is the 'historical' schoolwhich maintains that a study of the past historyof the competing nations (and of the typeof warfare involved) will reveal the availablealternatives — a major advocate of this thinkingwas Mahan. The newer school — the'material' — contends that current technologycan create such national superiority thatobstacles which the historical school wouldregard as important or insuperable the materialschool will disregard. An example of the two 60 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALapproaches is the Vietnam War. The materialschool in the United States was confident ofvictory while the historical school pointed tothe glaring historical mistake of the US, as amaritime power, trying to isolate a countrywhich was not geographically isolated. TheNorth Vietnamese were exponents of the historicalapproach.QNAVIES AND FOREIGN POLICY, by K.Booth, London, Croom Helm, 1977.Reviewed by Lieutenant D. Taylor, RANTHE author's objective in writing this volumeis to provide "an introduction to thinkingabout the manifold inter-relationship betweenNavies and Foreign Policy". Mr K. Booth,the author, is a lecturer in International Politicsat the University College of Wales. Hehas provided the reader with an academicdiscussion of the role of the Navy and itslimitations in today's environment.Booth's basic premise is that during the20th Century the relationship between naviesand associated foreign policies has increasedin complexity. Much of this has been theresult of the decline of the single nationdominance which is associated with the riseof the Soviet Navy and new emerging nations.The author has divided his dissertation intotwo sections. Firstly he deals with navies asinstruments of a foreign policy and secondlylimitations placed on navies by domestic andinternational constraints.Navies he sees as being able in theory toperform three roles:• Military• Policing• Diplomatic.The military role is what sets the naval shipapart from all others. The author does nothesitate to draw the readers' attention to thefact that approximately a third of the world'snavies are only capable of performing a policingfunction as well as the common basicmilitary role.The Diplomatic Role the author sees asranging from the threatening use of force, tothe more relaxed duty of "showing the flag"Common to all forms is the continual problemof misinterpretation by the recipient nation.Some third world nations often do not see awarship as a diplomatic instrument but ratheras representing the old imperial order withthe objective of returning the ex-colony to thebondage of Empire.The Military Role also is seen as providingresults which cannot be easily calculated.Booth does not see a general outbreak, butrather limited, localized operations. He hastensto bring to the readers attention that only fournavies have the capability of strategic nucleardeterrence. Thus, automatically limitationsare placed on all other navies, which are evenfurther increased by individual national constraints.The author does not see the relationshipbetween a nation's navy and its foreign policyas being one way. For example requirementsfor port facilities mean nations often find theyhave to modify policy with littoral nations inmaritime areas of interest. The Indian Oceanprovides one such area with the Sovietsattempting to gain friends, such as Pakistan,and in return receive access to their ports.The second section is devoted to the capabilitiesof the navies themselves. However,the author is more concerned with factorswhich limit these capabilities. These factorshe sub-divides into two areas, domestic andinternational. The domestic limitation revolvesaround competition for dollars, for procurementof hardware, which provides a visibleindication of a nation's objectives and desires.Navies are then further limited by the internationalarena. Thus the combination of bothwill determine the objectives of a navy whichin turn will contribute to the composition ofthe navy itself.The author sees the role of the naviesincreasing and gaining in importance. This isthe hypothesis on which he bases the growingexploitation of the seas resources, in turn iscreating a new turbulent period. To the forewill be navies, as Iceland has already shown.The conventional standards are departing andare being replaced by new standards and ideas,such as new "Laws of the Sea".In one single volume the author has dealtwith a complex subject in a concise manner.However, a major disappointment is thatalthough the text is well foot-noted, there isno bibliography. But apart from this, it wouldbe a worth-while addition to the library ofany student of modern naval policy. %) BOOK REVIEWS 61A SHORT HISTORY OF ANGLESEABARRACKS (FOUNDED 1811). publishedb) the Director of Public Relations for theCommander 6th Military District*Reviewed by Major P. //. B. Pritchard, AMDistrict Support Unit, HobartTHIS well presented booklet is one of aseries constantly issued and revised b\various Commanders since 1947 with the currentedition being commissioned by ColonelI. D. Stewart, MC It is the result of aco-operative effort by various officers of thestaff who have been given due credit for it.The information came basically from the considerablehistorical research undertaken by thelate Brigadier Max Dollery, MVO, OBE, MCand which was incorporated into brochuresproduced for beating the retreat ceremonies,and a tourist guide ("Let's talk about AngleseaBarracks") produced by the Director of PublicRelations for the Tasmanian Tourist CouncilInc. Without detracting from the finishedarticle the booklet tends to wander from thepoint in that several pages are devoted to a"potted" history of the Maori War of 1845-47because of a memorial located at the barracksto the dead of the 99th Regiment. Two furtherpages refer to the reason why the barrackswere named after the Marquis of Anglesey,and dwells upon his service in the BritishArmy. O her than these minor irrelevanciesthe contents are pertinent although somewhat'broad brush' when one considers that thebarracks have stood since 1811 and are probablythe oldest extant buildings anywhere inthe Commonwealth. Of particular interest tothe military historian are accurate lists of theBritish Regiments and Corps (25 in all) whichserved in Tasmania in 187(1, and a list ofCommandants past and present whose presencegraced the barracks. There are many famousor well known names listed amongst them notthe least being Lt Col D. COLLINS (1804-10),Col W. SORELL (1817-24), Col G. ARTHUR(1824-26), Brie Gen C. H. JESS (1925-27). Bri-C A. CLOWES (1939-40), Col C A. E^.ERASER (1962-64), and Bri» J. D. STEVEN­SON (1973-76).O* The booklet ean only be obtained by visitingAnglesea Barracks. Hobart. Contact should be madewith Defence Public Relations. Tasmania.COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD1976/77, edited by Jean Labayle Couhat,translated b_\ Commander I. J, McDonald,USN (Retd). London. Arms and ArmourPress, 1976, 575 pp.Reviewed by R. /'.. WrightDefence Central. CanberraAS the biennial guide 'Flottes de Combat",the French version of this book has beenpublished since 1897. The translation intothis first English edition of 'Combat Fleets ofthe World' has been prepared under the directionof the US Naval Institute.'Combat Fleets' lists and describes the ships,aircraft and weapons of 116 navies, from AbuDhabi to Zanzibar. The entry for each ship,or class of ship, includes construction historyand specifications, with data given concerningdisplacement, speed, armament, machinery,dimensions, range, manning, electrical equipmentand fuel capacity. Dimensions are givenin metric units and conversion tables are supplied.The editor's introduction highlights tacticalanti-ship missiles as a development which willgive rise to completely new concepts and doctrinesof surface warfare. On the defensiveside, he states that microelectronics and digitalcomputers have reduced reaction times, solessening the danger to ships from saturationattacks by aircraft. Reviewing various shipbuilding programmes, the editor assesses thatthe USSR is now concentrating on quality,rather than compensating for technologicalinferiority with superiority in numbers.Readers who have frequently seen Britishpublications claim that the Royal Navy isbecoming inferior to that of France, will bestruck by the editor's comment that the R.N.has a modern and mobile logistic force whichis eight times greater in tonnage than its Frenchequivalent. They may be less convinced byhis claim that the "essential element in thedefence of France is now the navy", particularlyas the editor's brief justification makesno reference to the "Force de dissuasion",which recently commissioned its fourth submarine.The R.A.N, rates five pages packed withtechnical data, even including a list of sonartypes allegedly carried by our River classescorts. The detail does not go far enough 62 DEFENCE FORCE JOURNALhowever, to distinguish the lesser numbers ofBofors guns carried by Duchess as comparedwith Vampire and Vendetta. Thirteen photosillustrate the R.A.N, section, but only one ofthem is taken after 1972, so that a numbershow ships without the numerous smallchanges which have occurred since that time.New Zealand readers will find that theirNavy occupies only one page and that thedata is restricted to the point of there beingno mention that Waikato is a narrow beamedLeander. while Canterbury is wide beamed.Despite these deficiencies, it is easy to findexamples where 'Combat Fleets* excels itse'fin detail. The following entry appears und:rthe heading "armour" for the new US Nimitzclass aircraft carriers."The decks and the hull are of extrastrong high tensile steel which can limit theimpact of semi-armour piercing bombsIndependent of the longitudinal bulkheads.there are 23 watertight transverse bulkheads(more than 2000 compartments) as well as10 firewall bulkheads which rise to the flightdeck. Fire fighting means with foam devicesare very well developed and pumping equipmentis excellent, a 1.5° list being correctablein 20 minutes. There arc 30 damagecontrol teams available at all times. Nimitzclass ships can withstand three times thesevere pounding given the Esse.x class aircraftcarriers during 1944-45 and they cantake impacts and shock waves in the sameproportion."Nor are yesterday's capital ships neglected.In discussing the four Iowa Class battleshipswhich the US Navy has in reserve, CombatFleets explains why the New Jersey was thelogical choice to be recommissioned for bombardmentwork off Vietnam. Among her threesisters, the Missouri was not restored to heroriginal condition and speed after groundingin 1950, the Wisconsin had electrical circuitrynear A and B turret destroyed by fire duringher inactivation, and the Iowa's electricalequipment was even more out of date.In contrast to these serious matters of navalconstruction, it comes as light relief to findthat in the new French 3880 ton "corvettes",special efforts have been made, inter alia,towards "improving the sanitary facilities".The mind boggles at what progress may havetaken place in this area of technology.'Combat Fleets' obviously draws on its ownband of dedicated photographers, in additionto official sources, for the 1400 good qualinphotographs which illustrate the book. Australianreaders will be interested in the shot ofthe Turkish Ayvalik, ex HMAS Geraldton.which shows some small changes from herdays as an Australian Bat hurst. Students ofChinese naval construction can study a largedetailed shot of Sierra Leone's two Shanghai IIclass patrol boats. The Russian section is alsoparticularly well illustrated. Some 50 or morefinely done line drawings support the photographs.It is inevitable that any overall summationof this book must compare it with Jane's Fig/itingShips, which is better known to English,speaking readers. 'Combat Fleets' is physicallysmaller, lighter and easier to handle. This isachieved by not having paid advertisements,by restricting photographs to about half thenumber in Jane's, and by giving less space tolesser ships and lesser navies. The result ofthis approach is a price which is only twothirdsthat of Jane's, and a book which givesgood value for money expended.QFLYING MINNOWS — Memoirs of a WorldWar One Fighter Pilot,* by Vivian Voss, Armsand Armour Press, pp. 318,$14.50.Reviewed bySquadron Leader J. R. De BomfordAir Force OfficeOF the lessons to be learned from WorldWar I, one, at least for this reviewer,shines above all others, and that is how mencan endure and survive impossible hardship.^such as were experienced in that War. 'FlyingMinnows', the personal memoirs of a pilot inthe Royal Flying Corps from training in Canadato war's end, well illustrates this belief.The author entered the fray in February1918 and continued on operations, with onlybrief respite, until the Armistice. During thosenine months, Vivian Voss flew the renownedBristol F2B Fighter on a variety of tasks rangingfrom offensive patrols up to 20,000 ft., sansoxygen, to hair-raising ground strafing missions.His adventures are related in a matterof-factstyle with no heroics and plenty ofdetail.* Available in Australia through Thomas C. LothianPly Ltd, 4-12 Tattersalls Lane, Melbourne.