FeaturesFeatures<strong>Plunging</strong> <strong>into</strong> <strong>Afghanistan</strong>Is <strong>the</strong> surge a tonic for peace or a recipe for disaster?Timeby nathan raabThat every brave man andwoman who leaves his orher country to fight cancome back in a casket is anunalterable truth of war.Bearing this in mind, America cannotsend her soldiers to foreign lands withoutgood reason; we may instead onlyput <strong>the</strong>m in danger when <strong>the</strong> benefitsto <strong>the</strong> safety and security of our nationoutweigh <strong>the</strong> terrible toll of human lifeand limb. President Obama’s recent escalationof <strong>the</strong> war in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> doesnot pass that test: terrorists will thrive in<strong>Afghanistan</strong> whe<strong>the</strong>r it has a strong, prowesterngovernment or not, and a militaryoccupation of <strong>the</strong> area will only breedresentment and hatred among those wholive <strong>the</strong>re. Thus, <strong>the</strong> best thing we can doIt is an unalterable truth ofwar that every man and womanwho leaves his or her countryto fight could come home in acasket.for our troops, for our nation, and for ourworld is send those fighters back to <strong>the</strong>irfamilies and take o<strong>the</strong>r, more effectivesteps to halt terrorism.Islamic extremism is primarilya religious and transnational movement,not a political organization, and suppressingit in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> will do little or nothingto stop its overall success. Because itis so diffuse and ingrained, it will not disintegrateif what it views as an imperialWestern power exerts military pressureagainst its members. Instead, <strong>the</strong> Talibanwill merely shrink <strong>into</strong> far off corners of<strong>Afghanistan</strong> and Pakistan, where <strong>the</strong>rehas been no effective central governmentor police for six thousand years, and everysingle military force since <strong>the</strong> Greekshas been ravaged by insurgents and guerillas.There, <strong>the</strong>y will continue to planterrorist attacks with a renewed vigor.No army could occupy or control <strong>the</strong>sesemi-autonomous areas and we would befoolish to try; our last attempt in Vietnamended only with <strong>the</strong> loss of over 50,000soldiers. Occupation would also breed resentmentamong <strong>the</strong> local Pashtuns, eventhose not affiliated with <strong>the</strong> Taliban, andcollateral damage—accidental shootings,poorly aimed bombs, and o<strong>the</strong>r mishapscaused by <strong>the</strong> fog of war—would devas-12HM Review Vol. XIX
FeaturesTimetate <strong>the</strong> region and add to <strong>the</strong> povertythat drives so many unemployed youngmen to jihad. A U.S. drive to deny extremistsa safe haven in <strong>Afghanistan</strong> willfail, merely provoking <strong>the</strong>m. While in <strong>the</strong>short term <strong>the</strong>y may retreat, in <strong>the</strong> longrun <strong>the</strong>y will spring back more motivatedthan before.Even if an occupation only partiallyfails, <strong>the</strong> loss in space and resourcesfor Al Qaeda (which currently is not evenofficially affiliated with <strong>the</strong> Taliban, makingeven more tenuous <strong>the</strong> connectionbetween a strongAfghan governmentand safetyfrom terrorism)in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>would not significantlyimpact<strong>the</strong>ir operations.Training terroristsdoes not requirelarge amounts ofland or labor; onlya few square mileswill suffice. Theycan make bombsin small apartments.Even if afew are caught,what can happento <strong>the</strong>m? Twooptions present<strong>the</strong>mselves: ei<strong>the</strong>r<strong>the</strong>y are be summarilyexecuted,in which case <strong>the</strong>ybecome martyrsfor Islam, or <strong>the</strong>yare sent to prisonand <strong>the</strong>n released,Timein which case <strong>the</strong>y rejoin <strong>the</strong> jihad withgreater resentment toward <strong>the</strong>ir captorsand a better knowledge of how <strong>the</strong> systemof capture and trial works. Nei<strong>the</strong>roption appeals, to say <strong>the</strong> least.History itself is telling concerning<strong>the</strong> probability of success in eventemporarily occupying and building astable government in <strong>Afghanistan</strong>. Alexander<strong>the</strong> Great managed to hang ontoit only for a brief while, as did GenghisKahn; Britain did not keep it as a colonyfor very long and Russia bogged itselfdown in a war <strong>the</strong>re that eventually led to<strong>the</strong> fall of communism and <strong>the</strong> U.S.S.R.Nor have foreign interventions in o<strong>the</strong>rlands proven <strong>the</strong>mselves successful in recentyears. Somalia, for example, is still afailed state even after <strong>the</strong> United Nationsdeployed a peacekeeping force <strong>the</strong>re (andironically, only began to see a rise in itsstandard of living after <strong>the</strong> peacekeepingforce left). After eight years of bloodshed,Iraq is about as stable as it was before <strong>the</strong>United States sent troops in, and although<strong>the</strong> U.S. did remove a brutal dictator, <strong>the</strong>ydid it at a cost of some three thousandlives and one trillion dollar—enough,more or less, to buy all Iraq’s land insteadof fighting for it (Iraq’s GDP was $19 billionin 2001 and 2002, and $12.5 billionin 2003). Everyone knows how Vietnamand Korea turned out. All <strong>the</strong>se failedinterventions inspired what is known as“blowback” or resistance to military occupationfor ideological reasons. We canexpect <strong>the</strong> same blowback and failure in<strong>Afghanistan</strong>.Just because Islamic terrorism isan indestructible ideology does not meanwe cannot neuter it without massive lossof life; it merely means we must be morecareful in our fight. In our quest to makejihad against America cease, we must firstseek to minimize <strong>the</strong> collateral damage topeople and property and avoid <strong>the</strong> blowbackthat has caused previous attempts tomake peace to end in failure. We mustensure every strike against a member of<strong>the</strong> Taliban is exactly that, and not <strong>the</strong>murder of an innocent civilian. We mustuse our massive technological advantageeffectively, through precise surveillanceand proper targeting. We must foster relationshipswith <strong>the</strong> Afghan people, andinvest in development in <strong>the</strong>ir economy,so that <strong>the</strong>y turn tohonest work andnot suicide bombing.We must notoccupy <strong>the</strong>ir landor remain an overbearingpresence in<strong>the</strong>ir lives but insteadwatch carefullyfrom afar, destroyingonly what requiresit via tactical strikeswith drones ando<strong>the</strong>r, less invasivemeasures. This ishow we can suppressviolence and terrorsuccessfully andwith minimal loss oflife. We will succeednot through tearingdown but by buildingup, not throughkilling innocents butby singling out <strong>the</strong>guilty, not throughbrute force but byclever strategy, notthrough <strong>the</strong> dirtand grime of war but by <strong>the</strong> warm fire ofpeace and prosperity, interfering with <strong>the</strong>lives of <strong>the</strong> Afghan people only when utterlynecessary. If we leave <strong>the</strong> Afghansalone and give <strong>the</strong>m no reason to hate us,but instead lend a helping hand in <strong>the</strong>irdevelopment, <strong>the</strong>y will abandon <strong>the</strong> Taliban.The fanatics who are left will beabandoned in a dark corner of <strong>the</strong> country,helpless to harm <strong>the</strong> rest of <strong>the</strong> world.HMRJanuary 2010 HM Review 13