Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and ...

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<strong>the</strong>y provide personal observations, but primary sources now allow us to see somenew aspects of <strong>the</strong> policy process, revealing high level consultations betweenPolish officials <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir counterparts from <strong>the</strong> USSR, o<strong>the</strong>r bloc countries, <strong>and</strong><strong>the</strong> West, as well as providing researchers with numerous studies <strong>and</strong> expertreports which offer better opportunities to evaluate both Polish contributions to <strong>the</strong>conference <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> policy process behind <strong>the</strong>m. This rich documentary record iscomplemented by information ga<strong>the</strong>red through interviews with severalparticipants of <strong>the</strong> CSCE. 4This article does not seek to explore all aspects of <strong>the</strong> CSCE or all aspectsof <strong>the</strong> Polish attitude regarding <strong>the</strong> conference, instead concentrating on specifictopics, especially those in which it is possible to infer particular Polish interest, aswell as specific ideas which were important to <strong>the</strong> liberalization of <strong>the</strong> politicalsystem <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> end of communism. Much attention will be devoted to Polishpreparations for <strong>the</strong> conference, where <strong>the</strong> Poles distinguished betweenconceptions <strong>and</strong> expectations at <strong>the</strong> conference. This is followed by an analysis of<strong>the</strong> official Polish attitude toward <strong>the</strong> Helsinki Final Act, with an evaluation ofgains <strong>and</strong> losses. Finally, <strong>the</strong> paper will show what Pol<strong>and</strong> expected from <strong>the</strong>CSCE after 1975, how <strong>the</strong> Polish authorities wanted to participate in shaping <strong>the</strong>CSCE process, what <strong>the</strong>ir attitude was towards <strong>the</strong> stipulations <strong>and</strong>recommendations accepted at subsequent conferences <strong>and</strong> meetings, <strong>and</strong> how thisprocess influenced <strong>the</strong> domestic situation in Pol<strong>and</strong>.From Helsinki to Madrid, CSCE 1973 – 1983, PISM, Warszawa 1983; A.D. Rotfeld, Europejski systembezpieczeństwa in statu nascendi, PISM, Warszawa 1990. The participants of <strong>the</strong> conference were alsoauthors of <strong>the</strong> articles in a book on implementation of <strong>the</strong> CSCE decisions, Polska a realizacja uchwałKBWE, v. 1,2, PISM, Warszawa 1988.On Western attitude, i.e: V-Y. Ghebali, La diplomatie de la détente, la CSCE, d’Helsinki à Vienne, 1973 –1989, Brussels 1989. On negotiations during <strong>the</strong> Helsinki conference: L.V. Ferraris, Report on aNegotiation: Helsinki, Geneva, Helsinki:1972 – 1975, Alphen aan den Rijn, Geneve 1979. On humanrights: D.C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Demise ofCommunism, Princeton University Press, Princeton <strong>and</strong> Oxford 2001.4 Interviews were conducted with ministers Józef Czyrek, Adam D. Rotfeld, deputy ministers Jan Bisztyga,Marian Dobrosielski, <strong>and</strong> foreign ministry experts Andrzej Skowroński, Bogumił Rychłowski.3
1. Polish Preparations1.1. The Birth of <strong>the</strong> IdeaPolish communists were interested in maintaining power <strong>and</strong> controlling<strong>the</strong> country’s political, social, <strong>and</strong> cultural life. But in many situations communistideology was not <strong>the</strong> dominating factor motivating <strong>the</strong>ir behavior, a case in pointbeing Polish foreign policy, especially in <strong>the</strong> 1960s. Polish authorities did not trustMoscow entirely, as <strong>the</strong>y doubted that <strong>the</strong> Soviets would protect Polish nationalinterest in every situation. Especially after Gomułka’s return to power, Warsawgrew increasingly active diplomatically, as <strong>the</strong> Polish government aimed atsecuring <strong>the</strong> nation’s interests as perceived by <strong>the</strong> government at that time. Thefirst diplomatic initiative of this type was <strong>the</strong> Rapacki Plan of 1957. Scholarsdiffer on how it originated, with some viewing it as a Polish idea, o<strong>the</strong>rs as aSoviet initiative merely presented by <strong>the</strong> Poles. Polish documents support <strong>the</strong> ideathat <strong>the</strong> plan was a Polish initiative (even when placed in context with <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rplans for a nuclear-free zone presented contemporaneously), conceived in <strong>the</strong>Ministry of Foreign Affairs <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n presented in bilateral talks with <strong>the</strong> Soviets<strong>and</strong> coordinated with <strong>the</strong>m. Newly uncovered documents suggest that <strong>the</strong> Sovietswere not initially satisfied with <strong>the</strong> plan. 5After <strong>the</strong> second Berlin Crisis (1958–1962) Polish authorities began tothink that an opportunity to mitigate Soviet–German animosities was emerging<strong>and</strong> that it could happen at Polish charge. The Poles were afraid of being betrayedby <strong>the</strong> Soviets, by ending public support for permanently settling <strong>the</strong> border issueor encouraging <strong>the</strong> West German government to collaborate at an eventual peaceconference. Warsaw was especially alarmed by <strong>the</strong> public statements of AlexeiAdzhubei, Nikita Khrushchev’s son-in-law, who visited Germany in July 1962. In5 P. W<strong>and</strong>ycz, Adam Rapacki <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> Search for European Security, in: The Diplomats 1939 – 1979, ed.G. A. Craig, F. L. Loewenheim, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994, p. 311. The Sovietsdemonstrated <strong>the</strong>ir dissatisfaction i.e. to <strong>the</strong> Polish diplomats in Moscow - see: W. Jarząbek, W sprawachniemieckich …, p.123.4
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