Abetti - Intranet - Department of Computer Science: Login


Abetti - Intranet - Department of Computer Science: Login

HistoryFrameworkConclusion1978-19831983-19861986-1996History 1978-19831978: Toshiba withdraws from mainframe market.Mizoguchi + Koga vision: Information systems will move awayfrom mainframes toward communication networks, distributedprocessing and PC’s.Important to preserve and develop Toshiba’s corecompetencies in computing.1978: Mizoguchi develops first Japanese PC, headquartersvetoed commercialization in Japan.1979-81: NEC succeeds with first PC in Japan. Toshibalaunches Pasopia 7 and fails.1983: Mizoguchi + engineers visits USA, gets idea of fullyIBM-compatible PC (one of the reasons for failure earlier).1983: Headquarters denies request for funding of project.Vetoes transfer of personnel to project.2 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusion1978-19831983-19861986-1996History 1986-19961986: Laptop success, reincorporate PC business intomainstream business.1986: Introduce laptop in Japan. New market created.1987: Competitors respond to introduction of laptop.1990: Start notebook ”under-the-table” project, hide fromheadquarters to avoid leaks. Very strict specifications.1991-1992: Marketing innovation to sell new notebook topeople/businesses who have computers.beyond: promotions of key personnel. Still successful as of1996.4 / 15

FrameworkHistoryFrameworkConclusionUnder-the-Table DevelopmentChampioning ProcessStrategic VisionCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsThey mainly look at the following things:1 The role of ”under-the-table” development.2 The unexpected success of the first product, followed by thesecond.3 The championing process.4 Toshiba’s/Mizoguchi + Koga’s strategic vision.5 Cultural context + critical success factors.5 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionUnder-the-Table DevelopmentChampioning ProcessStrategic VisionCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsUnder-the-Table DevelopmentThere are some other stories of under-the-table development,though not quite comparable.Mostly, top management does not know about it, or has giventhe OK.Laptop project was turned down by management.Even rarer to see such defiance in Japan, due to their culture.By necessity laptop project was hidden, and on a tight budgetof people, money and time.Created ”pressure cooker” environment, in which Mizoguchithrived.Turned constraints of project to their advantage and made themost of it.6 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionUnder-the-Table DevelopmentChampioning ProcessStrategic VisionCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsDay’s Processes for Championing Innovative CorporateVentures1 ”The lower the principal champion’s hierarchical level, themore innovative the venture”Mizoguchi was relatively low in the hierarchy (only promotedlater on). Hypothesis hold.2 Second hypothesis concerns champions from corporateheadquarters. Not applicable since the project was hidden.3 ”Within corporate headquarters, the higher the level of theprincipal champion, the greater the innovativeness of theventure”Supported, since after launch executives turned enthusiasticallysupportive.4 ”Complex, science-based technology ventures thrive best withdivision of championing roles.”not directly applicable.7 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionUnder-the-Table DevelopmentChampioning ProcessStrategic VisionCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsBusiness StrategyToshiba should:1 Stay in the computer business (even only in market niches), inorder to develop and preserve core competencies.2 Continuously test new markets with technical and businessapproaches until right ones are found (Learn by doing)3 Strive to maintain at least marginal profit, to justify continuedexistence.This gave:Credibility with headquarters and Continuous feedback fromthe market for fine-tuning marketing.Learning and feedback meant the team was ready when theright opportunity came (EU marketing guy visiting).Refined vision after laptop success for notebook venture.9 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionUnder-the-Table DevelopmentChampioning ProcessStrategic VisionCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsTechnology StrategyAt first, like others: Engineers build products based ontechnical abilities/preferences and not market inputs.Refined technology strategy shaped by business strategy: Aportable, fully IBM-compatible PC.Strategy for products:Envision product as it would appear 5 years later based onperceived market needs and technology advancements.obtain data from all sources: customers, dealers, competitors,suppliers. But NO market research is performed. No formalreviewsOnce design is done, R&D are told what components must bedeveloped.unlike standard way for new technology, where prototype isestablished after which design is started to better satisfyfunctional needs.10 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionUnder-the-Table DevelopmentChampioning ProcessStrategic VisionCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsCultural Context and Critical Success FactorsOften, innovators/entrepreneurs leave company afterincorporation into mainstream business, because they mustadhere to bureaucracy again.Japanese culture expects engineers etc. to stay with the samecompany for the rest of their lives.11 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionConclusionEvaluationConclusionThe authors find that these are the success factors:The venture had potential of achieving worldwide leadershipin a mainstream area of the corporation.PC markets in EU and US were fragmented and highlyreceptive to unique innovations.Long-range vision of the business, with focused strategies andchallenging, well-defined objectives.persistence and undeterred by early failures and headquartersdisapproval.Organizational context, slack internal controls alloweddiversion of funds and personnel to ”under-the-table” project.The entrepreneurs were able to changes roles fromunderground innovators to product, executive and corporatechampions.12 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionConclusionEvaluationSoftware Entrepreneurship ThemesVisionCore CompetenciesUnder-the-table development (+ ”Creative book-keeping”)InnovationChampioningMarket ResearchMarketing StrategiesBusiness StrategyTechnology Strategy13 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionConclusionEvaluationParadigmA little bit of both.Analyse-Design-Enact:Special design process first and then development of prototype.No real feedback from outside during development.Consider-Do-Adjust:Laptop designed in a underground manner (more informalprocess).Learn by doing.”Trial-and-error” prototype creation.14 / 15

HistoryFrameworkConclusionConclusionEvaluationEvaluationSometimes hard to see what they are trying to say.Some concepts are assumed to be known by the reader.Applicability to others limited, due to the very special natureof the case.Writing etc. is fine. Case is somewhat interesting and unique.Some of their conclusions seems a little weird (e.g. ”Day’shypotheses are good way to analyze the case”, but they canonly apply 50% of the model)Grade: 715 / 15

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