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Insurance/ReinsuranceJuly 2013INSURANCE BULLETINConstruction of a Claims ControlClauseBeazley Underwriting Ltd & Ors. v Al AhleiaInsurance Co & Ors. [2013] EWHC 677 (Comm)This case illustrates both the importance ofcompliance with claims control clauses and thenarrow approach that the courts will to take toconstruction of such provisions. It also raises thepossibility that parties to a reinsurance contractmay have a certain degree of autonomy when itcomes to settling their own share of a loss, evenwhere a claims control clause is present.Reinsurers brought proceedings against theirCedants, seeking a declaration of non-liability forbreach of a condition precedent claims controlclause.During the adjustment of the claim, Cedants hadentered into relatively advanced discussions withthe Insured over liability. Such discussions tookplace without the approval or knowledge of thoseReinsurers bringing the proceedings.Reinsurers alleged that Cedants were in breachof the claims control clause in both (i) conductingnegotiations with the Insured; and/or (ii) admittingliability and/or settling and/or compromising theclaim; without the approval of Reinsurers.The Court held that Cedants had not breachedthe claims control clause. The conductcomplained of did not amount to “negotiations”for the purposes of the clause. Nor did anythingthat Cedants had done amount to a settlement,compromise or admission of liability withinthe meaning of the clause. Cedants were nottherefore barred from pursuing their claim againstReinsurers.The case illustrates the narrow approach thatcourts will take to construction of claims controlclauses. Such clauses should therefore be draftedto make absolutely clear what is required. Equally,although in this case Cedants were found notto be in breach, extreme care must be taken toensure that any discussions entered into by acedant with an insured do not amount to a breachof claims control provisions in the reinsurancecontract, particularly where these are conditionsprecedent to liability.

Interestingly, although the point wasnot ultimately to be decided in viewof the court’s conclusions, supportwas offered in the judgment for theCedant’s alternative argument that aloss under the policy can be dividedup into separate “pizza slices”, eachrepresenting the proportion of therisk held by the cedant (i.e. by way ofretention) and his reinsurers. This raisesthe possibility that where, as here,there is disagreement amongst thoseconcerned, it may be open, dependingon the circumstances and the wordingof the relevant provisions, for anindividual “slice-holder” to settle hisshare of the loss without contraveninghis obligations to his reinsurers/coreinsurers.Reinsurers have soughtpermission to appeal.For more information, please contactBen Atkinson, Associate, on+44 (0)20 7264 8238, orben.atkinson@hfw.com, or Nigel Wick,Partner, on +44 (0)20 7264 8287, ornigel.wick@hfw.com, or your usualcontact at HFWChanges to the regulatorylandscape – the FCAOn 1 April 2013, the FSA was replacedby three new regulatory authorities,the Financial Policy Committee, thePrudential Regulation Authority (thePRA) and the Financial ConductAuthority (the FCA). The FCA is nowthe prudential and conduct regulatorfor insurance intermediaries and theconduct regulator for insurers. In manyways, firms may view the FCA as theFSA with a different name, however,there are some notable differencesin the approach being adopted byand the powers available to the FCAcompared to its predecessor.There are some notable differences in the approachbeing adopted by and the powers available to the FCAcompared to its predecessor.ObjectivesThe FCA has an overarching strategicobjective “to ensure that marketsfunction well”, which is complementedby three operational objectives:(a) To secure an appropriate degree ofprotection for consumers.(b) To protect and enhance theintegrity of the UK financial system.(c) To promote effective competition inthe interests of consumers.It is clear from the literature producedso far, that the FCA is intending toachieve these statutory objectivesthrough a judgement based and preemptive approach, comprising afocus on business models, productgovernance, early intervention andreview of the risks caused by wholesaleand retail conduct.Supervisory approachThe FCA has indicated that there arethree pillars to its approach:1. Proactive Firm Supervision,which will involve specific firmassessment to establish that firmsare being run in a way that treatscustomers fairly, minimises riskto market integrity and does notimpede effective competition.2. Event Driven Work, coveringmatters that are emerging orhave happened and which areunforeseen.3. Issues and Products Work,involving sector risk assessment ofareas delivering poor outcomes.Conduct and prudentialsupervisory categoriesThere are new conduct and prudentialclassifications for firms regulatedand supervised by the FCA, whichwill determine the intensity of thesupervision undertaken in relationto those firms. As with the FSAregime, the intensity of supervision isdetermined on the level of risk a firmpresents to the market.The conduct classifications range fromC1 to C4. C1 and C2 firms will besupervised on a relationship managedbasis by a named supervisor, whereasC3 and C4 firms will be subject to alighter assessment and supervisionby a team of sector specialists ratherthan a dedicated supervisor. Insurancegroups with large retail operationsare likely to fall within the C1 and C2categories and smaller firms includingalmost all intermediaries are likely to fallwithin the C4 category.The prudential classifications whichapply to non-PRA regulated firms(i.e. insurance intermediaries) rangefrom P1 to P4. These will be allocatedaccording to the prudential significanceof a firm, including such factors as theknock-on effects to the market if thefirm fails and the extent of a firm’s clientmoney and asset holdings.New product intervention powersThe FCA has broader powers than itspredecessor, particularly in respectof product intervention. The FCAcan prohibit firms from entering intospecified agreements if it appearsnecessary or expedient to advancecertain statutory objectives. This will02 Insurance/Reinsurance Bulletin

include an ability to make temporaryproduct intervention rules lasting amaximum period of 12 months withoutpublic consultation. This power couldbe used to restrict certain productfeatures or the promotion of particularproduct types.The FSA HandbookThe FSA Handbook has beendivided into a FCA Handbook anda PRA Handbook, according to theapportionment of regulatory powersand responsibilities between the twoauthorities under the new regime. Theexisting substantive provisions of theFSA Handbook are largely unchangedand most of the new provisions in thehandbooks have been to implementthe new procedures and powers beingintroduced.For more information, please contactAndrew Samuel, Associate, on+44 (0)20 7264 8450, orandrew.samuel@hfw.com, orRichard Spiller, Partner, on+44 (0)20 7264 8770, orrichard.spiller@hfw.com, or your usualcontact at HFW.Extended Warranty Contracts– are they contracts ofinsurance?The UK Supreme Court upheld theCourt of Appeal’s decision in the caseof Digital Satellite Warranty CoverLimited & another v FSA (see HFW’sInsurance/Reinsurance Bulletin,January 2012) that extended warrantycontracts (EWCs) are contracts ofinsurance for the purposes of UKregulation.The case concerned EWCs provided inrelation to satellite television equipmentunder which equipment would berepaired or replaced. The High Courtand the Court of Appeal determinedthat EWCs were contracts of insurancefalling within the “MiscellaneousFinancial Loss” class in Schedule 1 ofthe Financial Services and Markets Act2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001(RAO). Consequently, the providers ofEWCs were held to be effecting andcarrying out contracts of insurancewithout authorisation, in breach ofthe Financial Services and MarketsAct 2000.In the Supreme Court, the providerssubmitted that the EWCs should notfall within the definition of a generalcontract of insurance under the RAOon the grounds that: (a) the EU FirstNon-Life Directive (NLD) required theRAO to be interpreted to include onlycontracts of insurance that provide forfinancial benefits and not benefits inkind; and (b) the business carried onby the companies did not fall withinthe classes of general insurancespecified in the RAO (in particular,the companies noted that classes1 to 17 in the NLD do not extendbeyond contracts of insurance thatprovide financial benefit). Therefore, itwas submitted that in implementingthe NLD, the UK was not entitled toregulate contracts that only provide forbenefits in kind.The Supreme Court held that the NLDonly laid down a minimum standardto be applied by the UK whendetermining which contracts shouldbe classified as contracts of insuranceand the UK was entitled to adopt awider classification than the NLD. Itwas held that the RAO included bothcontracts that paid benefits in kind,such as EWCs, as well as those thatpaid financial sums, and the appealwas dismissed.CommentThis decision, whilst not surprising,clarifies the position that the UK isentitled to take a wider approachto what constitutes a contract ofinsurance than the minimum standardsset by the NLD. The Court alsoconfirmed the long established footingat common law that contracts ofinsurance include contracts in whichthe insurer offers benefits in kind (perPrudential Ins Co v IRC [1904]).A point that remains undecided iswhether classes 1-17 of the NLDexclude benefits in kind. Althoughthe Supreme Court’s view was thatthey did not exclude benefits in kind,it considered that this was ultimatelya matter for the European Court ofJustice to resolve.For more information, please contactAndrew Samuel, Associate, on+44 (0)20 7264 8450, orandrew.samuel@hfw.com, orRichard Spiller, Partner, on+44 (0)20 7264 8770, orrichard.spiller@hfw.com, or your usualcontact at HFW. Research byPhilip Kelleher, Trainee.Christchurch earthquakes –Red Zone insurance issuesclarifiedO’Loughlin v Tower Insurance Limited[2013] NZHC 670 (5 April 2013)The New Zealand High Court hasrecently provided some muchanticipated clarification on keyinsurance issues affecting thousandsof policy-holders owning residentialproperties in the Christchurch RedZone and their insurers.The court in O’Loughlin held thatthe creation of the Red Zone inChristchurch did not constitute orcause physical loss or damageor natural disaster damage to theclaimants’ house or render it a totalloss.The claimants were, however,successful in establishing that the costof repair calculation, which was thebasis of Tower’s settlement offer andpayment to the claimants, was not inaccordance with Tower’s obligationsunder the policy.Insurance/Reinsurance Bulletin 03

This decision turns on its own factsand the policy wording, but providessome comfort to insurers thatsettlements reached with Red Zoneowners on the basis of repair or rebuildcost assessments should not have tobe unwound and that insurers shouldnot be required to rebuild houses ontheir existing damaged/red zonedsites or make payments based on thenotional costs of doing so.This decision also indicates that, wheresettlement offers or payments arebased on hypothetical repair options,the repair option put forward by theinsurer must be reasonably proven andable to achieve a building consent. Ifit is not, the insurer may be found tohave failed to fulfil its obligations underthe policy.This decision is also potentially ofwider significance, outside of theChristchurch earthquakes setting,in that it provides some guidanceas to how government actions andmandates may impact upon insurance/reinsurance policy coverage.BackgroundThe claimants’ property was damagedby earthquakes/aftershocks on 4September 2010, 22 February 2011and 13 June 2011.From 23 June 2011, the NZgovernment created residential zonesin Christchurch based on the severityand extent of land damage and costeffectiveness and social impacts ofland remediation. The Red Zone wasfor the worst affected areas and itwas decided that the government,through the Canterbury EarthquakeRecovery Authority (CERA), would offerto buy properties in the Red Zone.The government may also decide toacquire compulsorily properties inthe Red Zone and the local councilmay decide not to continue providingservices to properties in the Red Zone.The claimants accepted an offerfrom CERA to purchase their landwhile retaining the right to pursuetheir insurer, Tower, in respect of thedamage to their house.The policy provided that Tower had theoption to arrange payment, rebuild,replacement or repair for loss anddamage that is caused “to the samecondition and extent as when new.”Tower offered to settle the claimby making a payment based onhypothetical repairs using injections oflow mobility grout (LMG) to re-level theconcrete slab foundation.The claimants alleged that Tower’ssettlement offer (and subsequentpayment) did not meet its obligationsunder the policy and that the claimantswere entitled to a higher payment byTower based on the cost of rebuildingthe house on the existing site.IssuesThe two key issues considered by theHigh Court were:• Whether the Red Zone designationconstituted or caused physicalloss or damage or natural disasterdamage to the claimants’ houseand rendered it a total loss?• Whether payment based on theestimated cost of repair usingLMG injections fulfilled Tower’sobligations under the policy?DecisionJustice Asher’s interim decisionheld that:• The Red Zone designation didnot itself cause any physical lossor damage (or natural disasterdamage) or render the house atotal loss. The Red Zone did notrequire physical alteration or repairto the house, and did not prohibithabitation, repair or rebuilding, orthe grant of a building consent.• As a matter of New Zealandlaw, there is no basis to followUS authorities supporting abroader interpretation of physicaldamage than that taken in theCommonwealth jurisdictionsor more generous insurancecoverage based on the “reasonableexpectations” of the cover theclaimants thought they hadpurchased.• The policy did not respond toclaims for economic loss and, inany event, the claimants had notestablished that the red zoninghad resulted in economic loss.Accordingly, the red zoning did notcause any loss covered bythe policy.• Tower had the option as to whetherit repaired, replaced or rebuilt thehouse, but Tower’s proposed repairmethodology was not reasonablyproven and may not secure abuilding consent.• On the facts, the amount Towerchose to pay had not been shownto be the replacement value, anddid not equate to the actual costof bringing the house back “to thesame condition and extent as whennew”, as required under the policy.• Tower, having failed to persuadethe Court that its proposed repairmethodology met its obligationsunder the policy, was then entitledto choose to pay either:– the cost of building acomparable house on a soundsite in Christchurch outside theRed Zone; or– the cost of buying a comparableexisting house on a sound sitein Christchurch outside the RedZone.04 Insurance/Reinsurance Bulletin

• The claimants were not entitled tothe higher costs of rebuilding thehouse on the damaged red zonedland because these costs werenot going to be incurred and theclaimants were not entitled to apayment in excess of the costs ofreplacing the house.ResolutionIt is understood that Tower and theclaimants reached a confidentialsettlement shortly after the interimdecision was released.For more information, please contactBrendan McCashin, Special Counsel,on +61 (0)3 8601 4527, orbrendan.mccashin@hfw.com, orRichard Jowett, Partner, on+61 (0)3 8601 4521, orrichard.jowett@hfw.com, orAndrew Dunn, Partner, on+61 (0)2 9320 4603, orandrew.dunn@hfw.com, or your usualcontact at HFW.D&O cover in France –sanctions and penaltiesuninsurableA recent judgment of the FrenchCour de Cassation (Supreme Court)illustrates the manner in which publicpolicy rules in the Insurance Codeoverride the terms of a policy.An insured had taken out a D&Opolicy, providing cover for the financialconsequences of its directors’ andofficers’ liability resulting from anyprofessional fault; a specific extensionof cover was obtained for “civil finesand/or penalties”.However article 113-1 of the InsuranceCode provides that an insurer is notbound to indemnify loss resulting fromintentional fault or fraud on an insured’spart.A director of the insured was finedEUR500,000 by the Autorité desMarchés Financiers (the Frenchstockmarket supervisory body) forproviding misleading information tothe public. The director sought tobe indemnified under the policy; theinsurer rejected the claim.In the ensuing proceedings, a civilcourt in Nanterre and then theVersailles Court of Appeal dismissedthe claim under the policy, on thegrounds that the misrepresentation ofthe company’s financial position hadbeen deliberate, and that the insurerswere therefore not bound to indemnifythe loss pursuant to article 113-1,notwithstanding the extension of coverwhich had been obtained for suchpenalties.The position was confirmed by theCour de Cassation, which appearsto have approved a relatively broadconcept of intent. The narrow conceptis the intent to cause the specific loss;the broader approach considers theintent to commit the fault. These areboth relatively standard approachesunder French law.The Court also referred to suchintentional fault being incompatiblewith risk (“aléa”), without which therecan be no valid insurance underFrench law; this is also a relativelystandard approach, whereby the intentto commit a fault or to cause lossnegates the notion of risk, and is thusuninsurable.The Court may however also havecreated confusion, by finding thatthe director could not be indemnifiedsince he had intended to make theinsurers pay for the consequences ofhis misrepresentation; this is howevernot a requirement under article113-1 of the Insurance Code. It isunclear whether this was a mere slipof the pen, or whether the SupremeCourt considers this to be a materialconsideration; if so, this would amountto a radical, and impractical newapproach.The main point to note is that theFrench Supreme Court in effectavoided determining the mostinteresting point of law in thiscase, which was whether insuringadministrative sanctions was itselfcontrary to public policy, bearing inmind the near-criminal nature thereof.For more information, please contactOlivier Purcell, Partner, on+33 (0)1 44 94 40 50, orolivier.purcell@hfw.com, or your usualcontact at HFW.Proportionate liability andconcurrent wrongdoers –professional advisers andfraudstersOn 3 April 2013, the High Court ofAustralia handed down a decisionthat will impact insurers of lawyersand other advisers who negligently failto protect clients against the fraud ofanother party. In Hunt & Hunt Lawyersv Mitchell Morgan Nominees PtyLtd [2013] HCA 10, the High Courtoverturned an earlier NSW Court ofAppeal decision holding that a solicitorwho had negligently drawn a mortgagefor a lender could not limit its liabilityto its client as a concurrent wrongdoerunder the Civil Liability Act (NSW)2002, where the primary cause ofthe loss to the lender was due to theactions of fraudsters.The factsTwo fraudsters conspired to forge asignature on the mortgage and loanagreement and then pocket fundsadvanced on the mortgage by themortgagor, Mitchell Morgan NomineesPty Ltd (Mitchell Morgan). The solicitorsfor a borrower, Hunt & Hunt Lawyers(Hunt & Hunt) had negligently, butwithout knowledge of the fraud,drawn a mortgage that preventedMitchell Morgan from enforcing againstproperties securing the borrowings.Insurance/Reinsurance Bulletin 05

Hunt & Hunt sought to limit its liabilityunder the applicable proportionateliability legislation in NSW.The proportionate liability regimeUnder the legislation, a “concurrentwrongdoer” can limit its liability forphysical damage or pure economicloss arising from a breach of a dutyof care (or misleading and deceptiveconduct) to such amounts as a courtconsiders just, having regard to theextent of the defendant’s responsibilityfor the damage or loss.This overcomes the common law ruleof joint and several liability under whichjoint tortfeasers are liable to a plaintifffor the entire loss even though they arepartially to blame.Were Hunt & Hunt concurrentwrongdoers?To qualify as a concurrent wrongdoerunder the legislation, a person mustbe “one of two or more personswhose acts or omissions caused,independently of each other or jointly,the damage or loss that is the subjectof the claim”.The key issue for Hunt & Hunt waswhether, together with the fraudsters,they caused the same damage or lossto Mitchell Morgan. The Court of FirstInstance held that they did but theCourt of Appeal disagreed holding thatanalysing the immediate consequencesof the wrongdoers actions, the losssuffered by Mitchell Morgan as a resultof the actions of the fraudsters was thepaying out of money when it would nototherwise have done so, whereas theloss suffered as a result of the actionsof Hunt & Hunt was the consequenceof not having the benefit of security forthe money paid out.Thorny issue of same damageor lossThe majority of the High Court heldthat the Court of Appeal’s approach ofisolating the immediate consequencesof the breach was not alwaysappropriate. The Court consideredthe intertwined nature of events. Inrelation to the breach by Hunt & Hunt,for example, there were two conditionsnecessary for the mortgage to becompletely ineffective: (a) that the loanagreement was void; and (b) that themortgage document was negligentlydrafted. Hunt & Hunt was responsiblefor (b), but the fraudsters wereresponsible for (a).The High Court held that theCourt of Appeal’s approach harksback to a “but for” test: but forHunt & Hunt’s negligence, loss wouldnot have been suffered. However, itnoted that the same can be said“but for” the fraudsters’ conduct. TheCourt considered that the legislationcalled for a broader approach-basedjudgment and policy consideration.Good news for insurers?For insurers of professionals in similarcircumstances to Hunt & Hunt, thisis good news as they will only beresponsible for the amount the courtapportions against the professional; inthis case 12.5%.But is this a highly unusual case or onethat could apply more generally? It isclear that the approach of the HighCourt is not applicable in every case.For example, the Court distinguishedthe case of an owner’s claim against adelayed builder that was impaired bynegligent certification of an architect,holding the losses to each be different.It is, however, not always easy tosee why the Court accepted that thedamage in these cases was different,but not in Hunt & Hunt. For example,the Court considered it relevant thatthe negligence of Hunt & Hunt onlyrendered the mortgage ineffectivebecause of the fraud, i.e. the fraud isinextricably tied up with the negligenceof the lawyers. But the same couldbe said of the builder’s delay, withoutwhich the architect’s negligentcertificate would not have causedany loss.Ultimately, it may have been that theCourt was influenced by the fact thatthe fraudsters were so clearly at faultthat it would be unfair to burden thesolicitors with 100% of the blame andthat the broad value judgments andpolicy considerations in the legislationallowed them to come to a view thatwas based on fairness rather than coldhard logic.The better view is that the High Courthas broadened the test for determiningwhether wrongdoers have caused thesame loss or damage from a narrowenquiry based on the immediateeffects of the breach to one thatalso looks at the wrongdoer’s overallmoral responsibility for the loss. Whilethis may introduce an element ofuncertainty, it does make for flexibilityand common sense.For more information, please contactBrian Rom, Special Counsel, on+61 (0)3 8601 4526, orbrian.rom@hfw.com, orRichard Jowett, Partner, on+61 (0)3 8601 4521, orrichard.jowett@hfw.com, orAndrew Dunn, Partner, on+61 (0)2 9320 4603, orandrew.dunn@hfw.com, or your usualcontact at HFW.Construction of a publicliability policyM J Gleeson Group PLC v AXACorporate Solutions S.A. [2013]UnreportedThis case concerned the scope ofcover under a contractor’s publicliability policy, and more particularlythe construction of an extension tothat policy, which provided coverfor defective workmanship of subcontractors.The case also involved06 Insurance/Reinsurance Bulletin

Following rectification work, a substantial claim inrespect of the defective workmanship in questionwas intimated against the Assured, who soughtconfirmation from the Insurer that cover would beprovided under the sub-contractors’ extension.consideration of what might constitutea valid claim against the insured for thepurposes of such claims-made cover.The Assured was a constructioncontractor who had carried out adevelopment at a site in Watford.Some months after completion of thedevelopment, the Assured received aletter sent on behalf of the funder ofthe development, identifying concernsin respect of the installation of thecladding cappings and deficienciesin the make-up of areas of the roof,and seeking the Assured’s commentsand proposals for rectification. Thedefective work in question had beencarried out by the Assured’s subcontractors.Although the court didnot hear evidence on the questionfor the purposes of this preliminaryissue hearing, it appears to havebeen at least arguable that, asidefrom the defective workmanshipitself, no damage had been causedto the development property andthat there was therefore no “Damageto Property”, as required under thegeneral insuring clause in the policy.Following rectification work, asubstantial claim in respect of thedefective workmanship in questionwas intimated against the Assured,who sought confirmation from theInsurer that cover would be providedunder the sub-contractors’ extension.A dispute arose and certain issueswere submitted for preliminarydetermination, including (i) the scope ofthe extended cover; and (ii) whether ornot the 25 May 2007 letter amountedto a claim against the Assured for thepurposes of the policy.The Assured argued that, on atrue construction of the extension,cover in respect of sub-contractors’defective workmanship respondedwhether or not “Damage to Property”had occurred. On this analysis, theextension would amount to a separate,self-contained insuring clause, underwhich cover would be triggerednot by property damage but simplyby Assured’s legal liability arisingfrom a sub-contractor’s defectiveworkmanship. The Insurer disagreed,arguing that the extension did notdisplace the general insuring clause,and therefore only provided coverwhere the sub-contractor’s defectiveworkmanship had caused “Damage toProperty” (that is to say, damage otherthan the defective workmanship itself).The Court preferred the Insurer’sconstruction, which was supportedby the language of the policy and inparticular by the words “This Sectionof the Policy extends to indemnify...”at the beginning of the extension.Moreover, adopting the Assured’sconstruction would in effect turn theextension into a guarantee of theworkmanship of its sub-contractors.This would in the Court’s view bean extraordinary extension of publicliability cover, requiring clear words.It would also call into question whetherthe policy could in fact properly bedescribed as public liability cover.The Court also held that the funder’sletter did not amount to a claim withinthe relevant policy period, because itdid not amount to an assertion of aright to relief. Cover under the subcontractors’extension dependedupon a claim having first been madeagainst the Assured (or notification of acircumstance having been given to theInsurer) within the policy period.Generally speaking, in the absenceof express provision, a public liabilitypolicy will not cover liability in respectof pure economic loss suffered bya third party. This is because suchpolices are, broadly speaking, intendedto provide cover against the assured’sliability for its negligence towards thepublic at large, which liability does notas a matter of law include liability forpure economic loss. Where required,extensions providing cover in respectof liability for pure economic lossesare available, sometimes for little or noadditional premium. However, thosewishing to purchase such extensionsshould consider carefully with theiradvisers the gap in cover to be filledand the scope of any extensionproposed, as there are a wide rangeof clauses available, offering varyingdegrees of cover.For more information, please contactBen Atkinson, Associate, on+44 (0)20 7264 8238, orben.atkinson@hfw.com, orAndrew Bandurka, Partner, on+44 (0)20 7264 8404, orandrew.bandurka@hfw.com, or yourusual contact at HFWInsurance/Reinsurance Bulletin 07

NEWSHFW has hosted or participated in a range of industry events duringJune and July. Below is a short summary of each.9th Annual JLT Global Communications Technology andMedia ForumHFW co-sponsored this prestige invitation only event (18–20 June).Peter Schwartz presented, with industry leaders, Benedict Burke(Crawfords), Candy Holland (Echelon) and Charlotte Barnekow (Ericsson) on“ Being Cat-Ready “ – dealing with natural and man-made catastrophes –legal and practical issues in claims handling. Peter also presented withJohn Barlow, Luke Foord-Kelcey of JLT and James Tuplin of Allianz onData Breach Claims, Breach Response and Risk Management.HFW Seminar – Reform of s.53 Marine Insurance ActOn 27 June, HFW hosted a seminar on the reform of s53 of theMarine Insurance Act 1906 with guest speaker David Hertzell, the LawCommissioner responsible for insurance contract reform. HFW Partners,Jonathan Bruce and Costas Frangeskides spoke at the seminar. Costasprovided a summary of the present unsatisfactory state of the law undersection 53, while Jonathan presented the case for reform. David Hertzell,concluded by giving a summary of the Law Commission’s consultation onreform of section 53 and the position regarding implementing legislation.IRLA Members Breakfast BriefingHFW Partner Andrew Bandurka and Associate Edward Rushton spoke at awell attended breakfast seminar organised by IRLA on 4 July. The subjectof the presentation was the recent High Court appeal of an arbitrationaward regarding whether the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks amountedto one or two “events”, and on the related issues facing insurers andreinsurers faced with aggregation questions.CLT Insurance Litigation Conference, LondonHFW Partner John Barlow spoke at CLT’s recent Insurance LitigationConference, discussing the mis-selling of financial products and insurers’responses to the claims which have arisen. John also discussed the roleof the FOS/FCA and the implications of their findings when relied uponby Courts of Law. Finally, John examined the impact of the Standard Lifedecision on mitigation of loss covers and what steps can be taken topreserve such cover.Conferences & EventsInternational Marine ClaimsConferenceLondon25-27 September 2013Attending: Toby Stephens, RichardNeylon & Alex KempLondon Market Claims ConferenceLondon24 October 2013Attending: Paul WordleyFor more infromation about anyof these events, please contactevents@hfw.com.HOLMAN FENWICK WILLAN LLPFriary Court, 65 Crutched FriarsLondon EC3N 2AET: +44 (0)20 7264 8000F: +44 (0)20 7264 8888Lawyers for international commerce hfw.com© 2013 Holman Fenwick Willan LLP. All rights reservedWhilst every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of this information at the time of publication, the information is intended as guidance only. It should not be considered as legal advice.Holman Fenwick Willan LLP is the Data Controller for any data that it holds about you. To correct your personal details or change your mailing preferences please contact Craig Martinon +44 (0)20 7264 8109 or email craig.martin@hfw.com

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