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autumn 2009Issue 008Health and SafetyNews incorporating Personal Injury Law ReviewThreshold loweredfor hearingdamageEmployers are now liable forexposure of their workers tolower noise levelsPg 4Company liable forworker’s suicideA landmark legal rulingPg 6Work equipment:seizing controlThe circumstances in whichPUWER impose obligationson an employer to protectworkers have been restrictedby the House of LordsPg 8Jackson ReportThreat to union personalinjury legal servicesPg 10www.thompsons.law.co.uk

Noise at workThreshold lowered forhearing damageEmployers are now liable for exposure of theirworkers to lower noise levels. Keith Spicer reviewsthe implications of the deafness test casesUNTIL THE Noise at Work Regulations cameinto force in 1990 employers generally assumedthat they could expose their employees to noiselevels in excess of 85 decibels (dB) without fearof facing compensation claims from those whosuffered damage to their hearing as a result ofbeing exposed to noise at work.The Court of Appeal has recently ruled inthe case of Baker -v- Quantum Clothing Ltdthat employers are liable for damage to workers’hearing where they exposed them to noiselevels between 85 and 90dB before theimplementation of the Noise at WorkRegulations.This is a welcome decision and one thatcould result in many more workers achievingjustice than was previously the case.Baker -v- Quantum ClothingIn February 2007 a number of textile workersbrought deafness test cases involving dailyIt was not untilJanuary 1990 thatlegislationprotected mostemployees in mostindustriesexposure to levels of noise below 90dB underthe Noise at Work Regulations.They had all been exposed before January1990 and the trial Judge concluded thattherefore there was no common law liability innegligence on most employers for exposure toemployees at noise levels between 85-90dB, norwas there any breach of Section 29 of theFactories Act 1961.But in the case of Baker the appeal courtJudges have said that there is.Establishing negligenceTo establish a successful claim in “common lawnegligence” it is necessary to prove that theemployer should have known that theiremployees’ exposure to noise in the workplacewas of such a level that it could cause damageto their hearing, and that the employer couldhave taken steps to reduce the noise exposure.If it can be shown that the employer knew orshould have known that the noise levels weretoo high and took no steps to prevent injurythen, subject to proof of injury, they are likelyto be found liable to pay compensation for anynoise related hearing loss.Historical adviceNoise induced deafness has been known aboutfor well over 100 years and in some jobs hearingprotection was provided in the 1940s and 1950s.In 1963, the Minister of Labour published“Noise and the Worker”, the first majorpublication on the subject. It made employersaware of the dangers of excessive noise andrecommended what they needed to do toprotect their workers from exposure toexcessive noise.At that time it was not possible to be preciseabout measuring noise levels or the amount ofdamage that could be done to a work force bynoise exposure. But it was suggested thatemployers should not be exposed to noise levelsabove 90dB over an eight hour working day.Based on later research, the “Code ofPractice for Reducing Noise” was introduced in1972. Again this referred to an average noiselevel exposure of 90 dB but did not suggestthat exposure below that level was necessarilysafe.Suggestions were made for steps that shouldbe taken by employers to reduce the level ofexposure to noise and for the provision ofhearing protection.However, no specific legislation was broughtin to protect employees from noise exposure,although in 1974 some regulations wereintroduced covering those in the wood workingindustry and in tractor cabs.It was not until 1 January 1990 through “TheNoise at Work Regulations 1989” thatlegislation protected most employees in mostindustries.This set two action levels: 85dB and 90dB.Both gave rise to steps that employers shouldtake to reduce their employees exposure tonoise.The law was extended by the “Control ofNoise at Work Regulations 2006” which gaveprotection against lower levels of noiseexposure of 80 and 85dB.Baker and the Factories ActStephanie Baker was exposed to between 85and 90dB over a period from 1971 to 1989while she was employed by a knitting company.➤2T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S

Noise at workPhoto: John Harris/reportdigital.co.ukT H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S3

Noise at workAll factoryemployers have aduty underSection 29 of theFactory Act 1961to protect theirworkforce againstnoise exposureHer case had to rely on common lawnegligence and also breach of statutory dutyunder Section 29 of The Factories Act 1961which was then the only breach of duty thatapplied since her exposure pre-dated the Noiseat Work regulations.Section 29 of the Factories Act states “Thereshall, so far as is reasonably practical, beprovided and maintained a safe means of accessto every place at which any person has at anytime to work, and every such place shall, so faras reasonably practicable, be made and kept safefor any person working there.”But the first trial Judge said there was nobreach of the Factories Act and, due to thestate of knowledge in the textile industry in the1970s and 80s, the employers did not have totake any special steps if the noise levelswere below 90dB.However employers with greater thanaverage knowledge had until thebeginning of 1985 to supply hearingprotection.But the appeal court Judgesfound that activities thatlead to exposure toemployees of excessivenoise levels above85dB do, under theFactories Act, makethe workplace“unsafe”. It wasnot necessary for aJudge to look at thestate of knowledgeat a specific time (asit is to establishnegligence) toestablish a breachunder the act.Before the Baker case,courts in other deafnesscases have beensomewhat inconsistent intheir decisions as to whetherthere was a breach of Section29 of the Factories Act when an employeewas exposed to excessive noise at work. Nonewere binding on the law or on the first trialjudge in Baker.The regulations todayThe Factories Act 1961 was abolished on 1 January 1993. Health and safetyrepresentatives now rely on the following main regulations:1 The Control of Noise at Work Regulations 2005 camemainly into force on 6 April 2006. They provide lower action levels for noiseexposure, noise risk assessments, elimination or control of noise exposure toemployees, provision of hearing tests, provision of hearing protection andthe maintenance and use of such equipment, information instructions andtraining in matters concerning exposure to employees to noise.2 The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations1993 latest addition 1999. The main regulation relates to the provision ofrisk assessments.3 Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare ) Regulations1992 Regulations 5,10,11and 12 replaced section 29 of the Factories Act.But the Court ofAppeal’s ruling means thatall factory employers have aduty under Section 29 of theFactories Act 1961 to protect their workforceagainst noise exposure and that, in the textilesindustry, there would be liability on employersfor noise exposure at levels between 85 and90dB from January 1978.The difference being that some industries,such as the railway and car industries hadgreater knowledge earlier on about the risks ofnoise exposure at those levels.So, in the ASLEF backed case of Harris -vtheBritish Railways Board and others, theappeal court accepted that BRB was aware forsome years prior to the implementation of theNoise at Work Regulations, that noise levels inexcess of 85dB, but lower than 90dB, coulddamage hearing.Common law negligenceThe Court of Appeal also considered theposition of common law negligence and tookthe view that an employer would havedeveloped some knowledge by 1983 and,allowing time to investigate, if they then failedto provide hearing protection to those exposedto noise between 85 and 90dB by January 1988,4T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S

Noise at workthey were also guilty of common lawnegligence.The important issue on which MsBaker succeeded was that “the safetyof a work place” was to be judgedentirely objectively and not byreference to what was“reasonablyforeseeable at thetime”.The courtagreed, inconsideringthe evidencegiven in thetextile workerscases, that theearlier Judge’sfinding “thatexposure tolevels of noisebetween 85 to90dB was in factharmful for asignificant minorityof employees”meant that the workplacewas not safe and thatthere was a breach ofSection 29 of the FactoriesAct 1961.CommentThe Court of Appeal’s judgmentwill have binding effects on otherclaims (unless it is overturned bythe House of Lords) againstfactory employers whoseemployees have been exposed toexcessive noise or fumes andchemicals since 1961 and whohave developed chest diseases orother medical conditions over along period of time.Other claims for conditions thattake a long time to develop, suchas hand/arm vibration syndrome,could also benefit by thisJudgment. Therefore, liabilityupon an employer may be from anearlier date than previouslyallowed through court judgmentsif a breach of Section 29 of TheFactories Act 1961 can beestablished.T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S5

Worker suicideEmployer liable forworker’s suicideA landmark legal ruling has held an employer responsible for the suicide of anemployee. Trevor Sterling analyses the decisionWHEN THOMAS Corr, a maintenance manemployed by IBC Vehicles, was seriously injuredin a workplace accident in June 1996, it led tosuch severe depression that he took his own lifesix years later.Nearly 13 years on, the House of Lords hasfinally confirmed that Mr Corr’s employer wasresponsible for his death.“It is in no way unfair to hold the employerresponsible for this dire consequence of itsbreach of duty, although it could well bethought unfair to the victim not to do so,” theLaw Lords ruled in February 2009.Thomas Corr, a Unite member, narrowlymissed being decapitated when a robot arm shotout of a prototype press line and struck him inthe ear. If Mr Corr had not instinctively movedhis head, he would almost certainly have beenkilled.Much of Mr Corr’s ear was amputated in theincident. It was later reconstructed but he alsodeveloped tinnitus, headaches and posttraumaticstress disorder (PTSD) which led tosevere depression.This was exacerbated by the constantreminder of the accident due to his appearanceand the need for repeated treatment. Althoughhe tried to return to work, he was anxiousaroundmachinery and had lost his confidence. Hebegan to suffer the symptoms of clinicaldepression and made a suicide attempt inFebruary 2002.He was admitted to a mental health unit andsubsequently discharged. But the severity of hisdepression increased dramatically and theevidence indicated that he began to suffer asense of hopelessness which led him to believethat there was no way in which treatment couldalleviate his suffering.He killed himself in May 2002 by jumping offthe roof of a multi-story car park.Legal proceedings for compensation forpersonal injuries and losses were issued againstIBC in June 1999. It admitted liability for theaccident in November of that year. The claimcontinued in Mr Corr’s wife’s name after hisdeath and also included a claim on behalf of hisdependants for losses resulting from his death.The trial was eventually set for October 2003.The defendant employer then amended itsdefence, alleging that the cause of death resultedfrom the clinical negligence of the psychiatristwho treated Mr Corr before his death rather thanas a result of PTSD brought on by the accident.The employer also brought proceedingsagainst the health authority to this effect. It thenfurther amended its defence raising new issuesincluding contributory negligence by Mr Corrand arguing that thesuicide amounted toself inflicted harmrather than being a symptomof depression. The case wastransferred to the High Court in2004.The High CourtWhen the case reached the High Court inApril 2005 the judge found that the dutyof care owed by the employer did notextend to the prevention of suicide andso it was not liable for losses arising fromMr Corr’s death.The court also ruled that the suicide was notreasonably foreseeable and found it unnecessaryto decide the issues raised by the other defencesbut made some observations in particular,including that there was no known risk ofsuicide in this case and that suicide was not theact to which the defendant’s duty of care wasdirected to prevent.The judge also commented that Mr Corrknew that what he was doing was wrong.The Court of AppealWe appealed the High Court decision. TheCourt of Appeal, in December 2005, overturnedthe High Court ruling and allowed the appeal.One of the Court of Appeal judges concluded:“On the evidence, the accident caused the posttraumatic stress disorder, that caused thedepression, and the depression caused the suicide.There is a clear causal link between the breach ofduty by the defendants and the deceased’s decisionto take his own life.”The accidentcaused the posttraumatic distressdisorder thatcaused thedepression andthe depressioncaused the suicide6T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S

Worker suicidePhoto: Tom Parker/reportdigital.co.ukIt was also pointed out that suicide is nolonger a crime and the link between whatcaused the depression and the suicide had notbeen broken.And, if the depression was foreseeable, then itwas equally foreseeable that the depressedperson may take their own lifeThe House of LordsThe employer petitioned the House of Lords tooverturn the Court of Appeal.By a unanimous decision the Law Lordsdismissed IBC’s appeal and upheld the Court ofAppeal judgment that the company wasresponsible for the death of Thomas Corr. LordBingham said:“Mr Corr’s suicide was not a voluntary, informeddecision taken by him as an adult of sound mind,making and giving effect to a personal decisionabout his future. It was the response of a mansuffering from a severe depressive illness whichimpaired his capacity to make reasoned andinformed judgments about his future, such illnessbeing, as is accepted, a consequence of theemployer’s [actions].”CommentIn their judgment, the Law Lords mention, that until relatively recently,suicide was illegal. They also highlight the fact that medical knowledge issuch now that it is understood that suicide can be an involuntary act if theperson involved is depressed, as Mr Corr was, and so it is possible to derive adirect link from an accident that caused depression to the suicide itself.Many injury victims who suffer from severe psychiatric conditions takeintentional decisions that cause themselves loss or harm. If each intentionalact had to be foreseen at the time of the employer’s breach of duty, therewould be no liability for any of them. For example:● A teenager who has suffered facial scarring in a road traffic accident andconsequently suffers severe depression, becomes anorexic and refuses toeat or becomes bulimic;● The mesothelioma sufferer who becomes depressed having been diagnosedwith a fatal illness and commits suicide.Such cases are not unique to the extent that they do not require exceptionsto the law. In each case, factual causation would be needed and, ifestablished, the claimant should be able to recover compensation. These areall matters that would fail if the defendants understanding of the law hadbeen deemed to be correct by the Court of Appeal.T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S7

PUWERWork equipment:seizing controlThe circumstances in which the Provision and Use of Work EquipmentRegulations 1998 (PUWER) impose obligations on an employer to protect workershave been restricted by the House of Lords, writes Keith PattenTHE LAW LORDS have decided that, incertain circumstances, an employee workingaway from the workplace need not have thesame health and safety protection as someonebased on site.They have effectively “invented” a limitationin the applicability of the regulations that is notfound in the regulations and which has thepotential to restrict significantly the protectionsoffered to injured workers.In Smith -v- Northamptonshire CountyCouncil [2009] UKHL 27, a case pursued byThompsons on behalf of UNISON, the Houseof Lords ruled that the PUWER obligations onan employer only apply as far as the employerhas some measure of control over the workThey read intoRegulation 3(2)some limitingfactor that couldbe described as arequirement thatthe employershave somemeasure of controlequipment, even though Regulation 3 (2)contains no such requirement.Wooden rampMrs Smith worked for the defendant localauthority as a carer and driver. Part of herduties involved taking disabled people fromtheir homes to a day centre.She attended the home of one wheelchairuser, as she had done many times before. Therewas a wooden ramp leading up to the door.This had been installed years previously by theNational Health Service, not by the localauthority.The local authority had however inspectedthe ramp as part of their general duties to riskassess the claimant’s work and had trained theiremployees to make brief visual checks on theramp on every visit. The accident happenedwhen Mrs Smith was pushing the wheelchairdown the ramp. The edge of the ramp gave wayand she was injured. She sued the localauthority alleging a breach of the PUWER.Though all sides agreed that the defect waslatent and could not have been discovered onreasonable inspection, the issue was not thenature of the obligations imposed by theregulations, but the more fundamental questionof when they apply and against whom.The Court of Appeal decision in Stark -v-Post Office [2000] PIQR P105 confirmed thatliability for failure to maintain work equipmentis strict – liability will arise even if the causativedefect was latent and could not have beenidentified on reasonable inspection. When andwhere PUWER applies is, therefore, a keyhealth and safety battleground.Two issuesThere are two issues in determining whetherPUWER applies. First, whether the item is workequipment within the very wide definitioncontained in Regulation 2(1).The House of Lords decision in Spencer-Franks -v- Kellog, Brown & Root [2008]UKHL 46 confirmed that work equipment didindeed have the very wide meaning assigned toit by Regulation 2(1).On that basis the defendants conceded (inthe House of Lords) that the ramp in Smithwas work equipment.However, the regulations do not apply to allwork equipment. They apply to a sub-set ofwork equipment defined in Regulation 3, and sothe second issue is what is in that sub-set.This would seem to depend on whether thedefendant is an employer or someone else. SoRegulation 3(2) imposes the obligations onemployers in respect of work equipment that is“provided for use or used by an employee ofhis at work”.Regulation 3(3) imposes the obligations onnon-employers only in so far as they havecontrol over the work equipment, the way inwhich it is used or the person who uses it, andthen only to the extent of that control.8T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S

PUWERPhoto: Jess Hurd/reportdigital.co.ukThe decision in SmithBut, in Smith, all five law lords declined toapply the plain words of Regulation 3(2), whichwould have led to the conclusion that MrsSmith was manifestly using the ramp (admittedto be work equipment) at work and wastherefore covered by the regulations.They all read into Regulation 3(2) somelimiting factor that, in general terms, could bedescribed as a requirement that the employershave some measure of control over the workequipment. Their only disagreement was at themargins as to what exactly was required tosatisfy the appropriate test of control. Thismade no difference to the outcome.The majority of them said Regulation 3(2)was satisfied only where there was a specificconnection between the equipment and theemployer’s undertaking. This connection wasdefined as being where the work equipment hasbeen “incorporated into and adopted as part ofthe employer’s business or other undertaking”.The minority of the Judges accepted the needfor a connection but said it was satisfied wherethe employer can inspect the equipment and/orinstruct the employee not to use it.The distinction is essentially betweenrequiring the employer to have control over theequipment itself and simply having control overthe employee’s use of the equipment.CommentRegulation 3(2) was clear enough and,if followed, would produce a particularresult. It seems that the Law Lords didnot like this and so have re-writtenthe regulation to make it saysomething it simply does not.But even if the control test isaccepted, it is still quite hard to seehow Mrs Smith fails to win on thefacts: the council knew she wasusing the ramp, had inspected it andhad the power to instruct her not touse it and to provide her with analternative.One of the judges did say that, evenif the control test was the correcttest, he would have found it to besatisfied on the facts.So, where does Smith leave theapplicability of the Provision andUse of Work Equipment Regulations?The wide definition of workequipment was not in issue andappears to have been approved of.Most items of equipment used atwork will continue therefore to fallwithin the regulation 2(1) definitionthat the item in question must insome way be related to the job.But whether the Regulations applyto an employer is now clearlysubject to the test of controlnotwithstanding the completeabsence of any reference to suchrequirement in Regulation 3(2).In practice, this will mean muchlegal wrangling in the future. Clearlyexcluded will be items of equipmenttotally outside the control of theemployer, such as items used by thetravelling employee at the premisesof customers about which hisemployer knows nothing.What remains unclear is the positionof those items of which employersare aware but do not own, butwhose use they can influence.T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S9

Civil litigation costsCompensationclaims threatenedTom Jones, Thompsons' head of policy and public affairs, examines the possibleimpact on union legal services of the Jackson review of civil litigation costsUNIONS ARE facing a potentially devastatingattack on their legal services under proposalsbeing considered by one of Britain’s top Judges.One of the options being considered by SirRupert Jackson would deter thousands of unionmembers from making claims against employersand their insurers.As part of his review of civil litigation costs,Sir Rupert is considering whether to increasethe “small claims” limit from £1,000 to either£2,500 or even £5,000.What may seem a minor technicality, couldhave huge consequences for union membersand anyone else making a “small claim”.Anyone making a claim in the small claimscourt has to pay legal costs out of their ownpockets, even if they win. As a consequencemany of them do not have legal representation.In cases where compensation is above thesmall claims limit, courts can award costs to thewinning side. This is the so-called “loser pays”principle. Because union lawyers usually win thecases they run, the principle makes it mucheasier for unions to fund litigation.Increase in small claimsIf the proposal is implemented, there would bea huge increase in the number of potentialclaims regarded as “small”. That would meanfar fewer claimants taking their cases to courtfor fear of incurring legal costs.We estimate that an increase to £2,500 wouldfree insurers from paying costs in around 50 percent of union-backed personal injury cases.Just because an injury claim is valued at lessthan £5,000 or £2,500, it doesn’t mean that itrequires less work to prove that someone such asan employer was liable for an injury.And who says £1,000 is a “small” amount, letalone £2,500 or £5,000? The answer is well-paidJudges and insurers!Lower value claims are as hotly contested bydefendants as high value ones. Even now in thesmall claims court defendant insurers routinelyengage lawyers. They take the risk of having topay the costs themselves out of their own deeppockets if they lose.The claimant is very unlikely to be able toafford to do the same. To deny the injured partylegal representation in this way would be adenial of access to justice and means therewould be no equality between the parties.Sir Rupert, a judge in the Court of Appeal, iscarrying out the review because of what he saysare “mounting concerns” that legal costs aretoo high.Blocking tacticsBut claimants’ legal costs are often made muchhigher by the blocking tactics used by insurancecompanies’ lawyers. Too often they delay theprocess, or even fight cases where they areclearly in the wrong.And if the court believes that costs are toohigh in any particular case, it can demand anexplanation – and if necessary a reduction. Sowhy the fuss?The review, carried out at the request of theMaster of the Rolls, follows the media myth thatthere is a compensation culture in the UK. Infact, insurance companies, which helped to whipup the myth, are trying anything to stop accidentvictims and those made ill through their workfrom receiving compensation. Fewer casesmeans bigger profits for insurance companies.Sir Rupert acknowledges that unions havesaid that they would not have the resources todeal with the huge increase in the number ofclaims their members would bring in the smallclaims court should the upper limit beincreased. We believe that any significant rise inthe small claims limit, would be a gift toemployers and their insurers and a disaster forboth union legal services and access to justice.Sir Rupert’s preliminary report also appearsto have accepted insurance companies’arguments that there should be more take-up ofbefore-the-event (BTE) insurance.This is the legal expenses insurance that isadded to motor and domestic insurance policiesand which trade union members don’t need.The document suggests that it could becomecompulsory, like motor insurance.BTE enables insurers to gain control of casesbrought against them because the claimant whouses BTE to fund their legal claim is referred to asolicitor on an insurer’s approved list. This meansAny extension ofBTE willconsiderablyundermineindependent legalservices and willalso be bad forunions and theirmembership10T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S

Civil litigation costsinjured people will be herded off to lawyers whoare reliant on insurers for their work.Any extension of BTE will considerablyundermine independent legal services and willalso be bad for unions and their membership.Union members already have a legal servicededicated to fighting for the maximumcompensation. Why should they be made to payfor a service that is beholden to the insuranceindustry? They shouldn’t be forced to use BTE.The report is also enthusiastic aboutelectronic (software based) assessment ofdamages. These computer programmes havebeen developed by insurers for insurers – andthe only data on which they are based, comesfrom insurance companies.Substantially lowerDefendant insurers are inevitably reluctant toadmit when they have used such a programme,but it is often possible for Thompsons to spotwhen they have. The compensation offer isalmost always substantially lower than ourcalculation and any increased offers appear tofollow low and formulaic amounts.There is a big business agenda at play hereand Sir Rupert will need to show he hasgenuinely listened to all sides.One thing is for sure, if some of the ideasand proposals in Sir Rupert’s preliminary reportare repeated in his final report (due inDecember) then there will have to be a seriousfight to mitigate the impact on trade union legalservices specifically and access to justicegenerally.T H O M P S O N S S O L I C I T O R S H E A L T H A N D S A F E T Y N E W S11

Thompsons is the most experienced personal injuryfirm in the UK with an unrivalled network ofoffices and formidable resources.HEAD OFFICECongress House,Great Russell Street,LONDON WC1B 3LW020 7290 0000BELFAST028 9089 0400BIRMINGHAM0121 262 1200BRISTOL0117 304 2400CARDIFF029 2044 5300CHELMSFORD01245 228 800DAGENHAM0208 596 7700Derby0133 222 4680EDINBURGH0131 225 4297Exeter0131 225 4297GLASGOW0141 221 8840HARROW020 8872 8600LIVERPOOL0151 2241 600MANCHESTER0161 819 3500MIDDLESBROUGH01642 554 162NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE0191 269 0400NOTTINGHAM0115 989 7200PLYMOUTH01752 675810SHEFFIELD0114 270 3300SOUTHAMPTON023 8021 2040SOUTH SHIELDS0191 4974 440STOKE-ON-TRENT01782 406 200SWANSEA01792 484 920Wimbledon020 8543 2277Wolverhampton01902 771 551LEEDS0113 205 6300Download a copy of Health and Safety Newsat www.thompsons.law.co.ukFor more information about Health and Safety Newsemail hsn@thompsons.law.co.ukHealth and Safety News aims to give news and views ondevelopments in health and safety issues and law as they affecttrade unions and their members.This publication is not intended as legal advice onparticular casesTo join the mailing list email hsn@thompsons.law.co.ukContributors to this edition:Tom Jones, Keith Patten, Keith Spicer, Trevor SterlingEditor: Jennie WalshDesign: www.rexclusive.co.ukCover picture: Jess Hurd/reportdigital.co.ukPrint: www.dsicmmgroup.com

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