Amaliegade 33 B1256 København KTelefon: 77 40 16 11Mail:email@example.comHjemhørende i KøbenhavnsKommune.Baggrund og fundatsDen Danske Maritime Fond blevstiftet den 13. juli 2005 i forbindelsemed Folketingets lov omomdannelse af Danmarks Skibskreditfondtil aktieselskabetDanmarks Skibskredit A/S. Fondensgrundkapital udgøres af 10% afaktiekapitalen i Danmarks SkibskreditA/S, og afkastet heraf udgørFondens indtægter.Fonden er stiftet for at udvikle ogfremme dansk skibsfart og værftsindustri.Dette sker gennem økonomiskstøtte til forskning, teknologiogproduktudvikling, uddannelse,rekruttering og andre typer afinitiativer med maritimt fokus.Ifølge fundatsen er Fondens formål:”… at yde økonomisk støtte til initiativerog tiltag, der kan tjene til atudvikle og fremme dansk skibsfartog/eller dansk værftsindustri”.Der er ikke opstillet nærmere kriterierfor, hvilke typer aktiviteter Fondenønsker at støtte, men ser gerneansøgninger der er innovative,fremadrettede og forretningsorienterede.Det vil sige projekter somudvikler kompetencerne og konkurrenceevneni den danske maritimesektor. Bestyrelsen ser såledesgerne, at uddelingerne tilfaldervirksomhedsrelaterede aktiviteter,for herigennem at styrke branchensvækst og medvirke til øget beskæftigelse.
BestyrelseFonden ledes af en bestyrelsebestående af 6 medlemmer,der udpeges for 2 år ad gangen.Danmarks Rederiforening udpeger 2medlemmer, heriblandt bestyrelsensformand. Danske Maritime udpegerligeledes 2 medlemmer, heriblandtnæstformanden, og BilfærgernesRederiforening og Rederiforeningenaf 2010 udpeger i fællesskab 1medlem. Endelig udpeger økonomiogerhvervsministeren 1 medlem,der i modsætning til de øvrigebestyrelsesmedlemmer udpeges foren periode på 5 år.Bestyrelsesmedlemmer er:Formand:Direktør Knud PontoppidanNæstformand:Adm. Direktør Jenny Braat,Danske MaritimeAdvokat Jørgen Hammer Hansen,Kaalund & PartnersSkibsreder Bjørn Clausen,Corral Line ApSSkibsreder Finn Poulsen,J. Poulsen Shipping A/SDirektør Knud Degn Karstensen,Karstensens SkibsværftAdministration:Carsten MelchiorsMarianne LindahlOm at ansøgeFondens bestyrelse mødes 4 gangeom året, hvor de indkomne ansøgningerbehandles.Der kan løbende indsendes ansøgningerom støtte.På Fondens hjemmeside ses enindsendelsesfrist for ansøgninger,der vil blive behandlet på detførstkommende bestyrelsesmøde.På hjemmesiden kan man ogsåhente en vejledning til udarbejdelsenaf en ansøgning, samt se enoversigt over Fondens tidligereuddelinger.I forbindelse med udarbejdelsen afen ansøgning giver Fondens administrationgerne råd og vejledning.Fondens administration vil muligvispå eget initiativ bede en ansøgerom yderligere oplysninger eftermodtagelse af ansøgningen.
Forord3Den Danske Maritime Fond etableredes i2005 og foretog de første uddelinger tilgavn for maritime aktiviteter i 2006.Således er der igennem de fem år Fondenhar virket til gavn for Det Blå Danmark,uddelt cirka 225 millioner kroner til cirka200 projekter.Fonden ønsker med denne publikation atmarkere Fondens virke og, med de valgteartikler, at kunne bidrage med erfaringerfra rederierhvervet til hvorledes vækst erskabt og kan skabes. Den akademiskeanalyse benævnt Incentives, Capability,and Opportunity: Exploring the Sourcesof Danish Maritime Leadership beskriverog analyserer netop de forhold derudgjorde forudsætningerne for det danskerederierhvervs vækst igennem1990’erne. Den særlige danske traditionfor samarbejde mellem offentlige myndigheder,politikere, interesseorganisationerog erhvervsliv, de særlige unikkepersonligheder og det individuelle mod tilat satse, der er karakteriserende fordenne periode i dansk skibsfart. ”Nogetfor noget” – gode rammevilkår og tilgengæld sund vækst i erhvervet. Denneartikel er en ud af mange finansieret afFonden og udarbejdet som forskningsprojekterpå CBS og SDU.Fonden har så bedt to kapaciteter påhvert sit område om at perspektiveredenne ”historiske” analyse.Leif Beck Fallesen retter blikket fremadmed artiklen om den maritime klynge’sunikke styrke og hvorledes netop den idagens situation kan skabe ny vækst iDanmark. Beck-Fallesen har givet sinartikel titlen Det Blå Danmark hjælperDanmark gennem krisen og retter herblikket mod den særlige rolle Københavnkan spille.Endelig skriver Professor Torben Andersenfra CBS om den afgørende menneskeligedimension i al virksomhedsdrift: lederskabog iværksætteri. Den danske internationaletilgang med fokus på kvalitetsskibsfart, medarbejdere, et ordentlig forholdtil kunderne og service i ”verdensklasse”.Professor Andersen har givet sinartikel titlen, Lessons from CorporateLeadership in the Danish MaritimeSector.Det er således Fondens håb at kunnebringe et tankevækkende bidrag til debattenom de fremtidige vækst mulighederi det danske samfund. Der er mere atlæse om Fondens virke på Fondens hjemmesideog også i denne publikation.God debat!Bestyrelsen
4ForfattereLeif Beck Fallesener uddannet journalist, cand. scient.pol.og har eksamen fra College of Europei Brugge, Belgien. Har i 2011 ledetCopenhagen Business Task Force, sompegede på den maritime klynge som enaf Københavns vigtigste aktiver, i kampenfor at øge væksten.Erhvervsøkonomisk rådgiver for overborgmesterFrank Jensen, Københavns Kommune.Erhvervskommentator ved TV2.Adm. direktør og ansvarsh. chefredaktørved dagbladet Børsen 1995-2010, startedeGreens Analyseinstitut og Telebørsen,ekstern lektor i international økonomiog finans. Bidragyder til udenlandskemedier om danske og europæiskeforhold.Vækst i den private sektor har været LeifBeck Fallesens særlige interesseområde,og han definerede og igangsatte i 1995den årlige undersøgelse af Danmarks hurtigstvoksende virksomheder, gazellerne,blandt dem mange i den maritime sektor.Henrik Sornn-Frieseer uddannet Cand.merc. og har enph.d.-grad i industriøkonomi fra CopenhagenBusiness School (CBS), hvor hani dag er lektor og leder af Center forShipping Economics and Innovationsamt studie -leder for Cand.merc.-uddannelsen, som med 13 linjer ogmere end 3.500 studerende er flagskibetblandt CBS’s dag-uddannelser.Han modtog FUHU’s undervisningspris i2003. Henrik Sornn-Friese er desudenchefredaktør for tidsskriftet ”Mercator.Maritime Innovation, Research andEducation”. Han har udgivet en rækkeengelsksprogede bøger og artikler iførende internationale tidsskrifter omdansk skibsfart, værfts- og udstyrsindustriog maritime klynger.Hans analyser af Det Blå Danmark harhaft direkte betydning for nyere dansksøfartspolitik. Han er forfatter til grundbogen”Hvad er en virksomhed? ErhvervsøkonomiskTeori og Analyse”.Martin Jes Iversen(ph.d.) er lektor på Center for Virksomhedshistorieved Copenhagen BusinessSchool.Forskningsspecialet er de største danskevirksomheders strategiske udvikling samtde danske rederiers udvikling efter 1960.Han er forfatter til en række erhvervshistoriskebøger heriblandt "GN Store Nord– a Company in Transition" (CBS Press,2005) samt "Creating Nordic Capitalism –the business history of a competitiveperiphery" (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008)
samt en kommende antologi om shippingi de nordiske lande (Palgrave-Macmillan,2012).Martin Jes Iversen modtog i foråret 2008FUHUs undervisningspris på kr. 50.000og i efteråret 2007 de HA-IB studerendesundervisningspris på kr. 20.000.Fra juni til november 2009 var MartinJes Iversen gæsteforsker på University ofCalifornia, Berkeley. Han er leder af eliteprogrammetBSc IB (GLOBE) – et samarbejdemellem CBS, Chinese University ofHong Kong samt Kennan-Flagler BusinessSchool, University of North Carolina.Torben Juul Andersener professor i international strategiskledelse ved Institut for Strategi og Globaliseringpå Handelshøjskolen/CopenhagenBusiness School (CBS) og er ’AssociateDean’ for fuldtids-MBA programmet.Han er cand. polit. fra KøbenhavnsUniversitet, har en MBA fra McGillUniversity og modtog sin PhD fra Kenan-Flagler Business School, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill. Han harudgivet flere bøger om strategiske og finansielleforhold og har publiceret artikleri ledende internationale tidsskrifterbl.a. Strategic Management Journal,Journal of Management Studies, LongRange Planning.Han har tidligere ledelseserfaring fraUnibank A/S, Citibank, N.A. og CiticorpInvestment Bank Ltd.5
6Det Blå Danmark hjælperDanmark gennem krisenSjældent, om nogensinde, har vækstværet mere efterspurgt. Aldrig har detværet tydeligere, at økonomi ikke er eneksakt videnskab. Stik mod økonomernesnæsten enstemmige vurdering, så komverden ikke ud af finanskrisen i andethalvår 2011. Tværtimod, der kom en nynedtur. Væksten forsvandt hen over sommereni de vestlige industrilande, gældskrisernebrød ud i lys lue både i U.S.A. ogeurozonen, og finansmarkederne kvitteredemed at hejse det helt store stormvarsel.Bank of Englands topchef, MervynKing kalder det den værste krise i et halvtårhundrede.Forbrugere og virksomheder i industrilandenemistede tilliden til fremtiden og lystentil at bruge penge og investere.Finansmarkederne har mistet tilliden tilat politikerne kan håndtere gældskriser,der i U.S.A. i august 2011 var tæt på atende i en bankerot, og i eurozonen hvorden manglende evne til at håndtere engræsk gældsnedskrivning – en kontrolleretbankerot – rystede ikke bare de finansiellemarkeder i eurozonen, men ihele verden. De nye økonomier, BRIK-landenemed Kina i spidsen, klarede sigmeget bedre, men de er heller ikke gåetram forbi.Der er kun en vej ud af krisen. Vækstenskal op. I 2008 løftede regeringerne økonomierneud af krisen ved øge efterspørgslen,centralbankerne satterenterne ned og lod seddelpressen køre.Det virkede, men de ikke gøre det engang til. Regningen for den første redningsaktioner ikke betalt, staternesgæld for stor, og renterne er allerede ibund. Det bliver ikke let, men det betyderat væksten skal leveres af den privatesektor, af de virksomheder der kanog vil vokse. I Danmark er den maritimesektor et rigtigt godt bud, for den hartidligere vist at den er sødygtig i økonomiskstormvejr, en egenskab der blivergod brug for i de kommende år.Optimisterne kan håbe at økonomernestræfsikkerhed ikke forbedres i 2012.At det kommer til at gå bedre end det serud til. Det kan være de får ret. Det er bareikke tilstrækkeligt at bunden er nået, derskal også være så meget medvind, at ledighedenikke vokser, hvis væksten skal væreholdbar. Alt tyder på at de globale økonomiskerammevilkår for den danske maritimesektor bliver barskere i en længereårrække. Det får stor betydning for danskøkonomi, for skibsfarten er Danmarks størsteenkeltstående eksporterhverv, og denmaritime klynge af virksomheder beskæftigerover 100.000 danskere. Handelsflådenstonnage er fordoblet, og valutaindtjeningener mere end firedoblet de sidste ti år,og valutaindtjeningen har været, og er afgørendefor kronens stabilitet og den laverente i Danmark.
Når de globale rammevilkår forværres erdet både naturligt og nødvendigt atspørge hvad der kan gøres for at forbedrede nationale rammevilkår. De nationalerammevilkår for skibsfarten er ikke dårligei Danmark som forskerne HenrikSornn-Friese og Martin Jes Iversen påviser,så har der i over 20 år været bredpolitisk opbakning om DIS, Danmarksinternationale Skibsregister, som via enlempeligere beskatning af søfolkene gørdet muligt at betale lavere lønninger, ogdermed holde omkostningerne nede.Tonnageskatten, som er lavere end denselskabsskat der ellers skulle betales,giver rederierne bedre vilkår for at opbyggekapital og investere. Det er positivtfor et erhverv, der skal kende forudsætningernefor langsigtede investeringer.Folketingsvalget i september 2011 udløsteny debat om statens rolle i dansk økonomi.Om væksten kan øges ved at udpegeog støtte særlige vinderbrancher, ensåkaldte ”pick-the-winner” strategi. Deglobale erfaringer er ikke gode, og alleundersøgelser af vækstvirksomheder iDanmark taler mod det. I praksis er derover for dansk skibsfart anvendt en andenstrategi, som kan kaldes ”support thewinner”. Det vil sige en forbedring aframmevilkårene for et erhverv, der alleredehar vist at det kan vinde på globalemarkedsvilkår uden politisk vinderetiket.Kald det en anden form for industripolitik,men det er mere udtryk for almindeligsund fornuft.Både DIS-registeret og tonnageskattenkategoriseres politisk som erhvervsstøtte,uagtet at skibsfarten blot stilles mere ligei den globale konkurrence. Fjernes de, vildet betyde udflagning og tab af arbejdspladser,og provenuet vil forsvinde sammenmed skibene. Spørgsmålet er snarerehvorfor en model der virker til søs ikkeafprøves på land. Det ville selvsagt væreaf stor betydning for den maritime sektor,ikke mindst industrivirksomhederne. Deter politisk urealistisk, og statsfinansieltprohibitivt i en overskuelig årrække. Mendet er ikke helt så virkelighedsfjernt somdet lyder. Lavere skat på arbejde er alleredepå den politiske dagsorden, og selskabsskattenkan komme det igen.De gode nationale rammevilkår er etresultat af et tæt og positivt samarbejdemellem rederierne, Søfartsstyrelsen, ministerierne,de ansattes organisationer ogpolitikerne i et kvart århundrede. Et samarbejdesom helt fra starten har væretsynonym med Det Blå Danmark. Det heltafgørende er at det er en politik, der harvirket. Rammevilkårene har sikret vækstog beskæftigelse under dansk flag ogdansk ledelse. I vort naboland Sverige,som ikke tilbyder de samme vilkår, er rederiernepå vej væk, nogle med kurs moddanske havne. De nationale rammevilkårer gode i Danmark, men de er ikke altidbedre end hos de største konkurrenter omrederiernes forretning . Singapore haringen tonnageskat, 20 pct. indkomstskatog billigere søfolk.Rammevilkår skal udnyttes for at givevækst. Forklaringerne på væksten i denmaritime sektor i Danmark skal derforfindes andre steder, først og fremmest irederierne og i virksomhederne på land.Akademiske studier har svært ved athåndtere den menneskelige faktor, personender kan gøre en forskel. Det er sværtat måle, og når det er svært at måle erdet svært at vægte i en akademisk analyse.Men det er mennesker, ikke strukturer,der træffer beslutninger om vækst.Ingen virksomhed vokser, hvis lederneikke vil vækst og det er, og har været,7
8helt afgørende at ejerne og ledelserne irederierne har viljen til at vokse.Viljen til at vokse er en nødvendig, menikke en tilstrækkelig betingelse forvækst. Evnen til at vokse og efterspørgslenpå markederne skal også være der,helst samtidig. Efterspørgslen bestemmesi den globale økonomi, men evnernetil at vokse skal, når alt kommer til alt,findes i de mennesker der ejer, leder ogarbejder i virksomhederne. To af de mestiøjnefaldende forklaringer på Det BlåDanmarks succes er det stærke globalekøbmandskab de viser og den storeviden de har om teknologi, ikke mindstforankret i den maritime sektor på landjorden.Købmandskabet og den maritimeviden har rødder i klynger, hvor menneskermødes, med København somDanmarks bedste og eneste globaletrumfkort, men der er heldigvis flereregionale klynger.Globalt købmandskab er kritisk for succesenpå virksomhedsniveau. Det er indlysende,når det gælder Danmarksstørste rederi, A.P. Møller-Mærsk, somleverer broderparten af det danske kravpå maritimt lederskab, som det beskrivesaf forskerne Henrik Sornn-Friese ogMartin Jes Iversen. Skibsreder Mærsk-McKinneys historiske bidrag er selvskrevet,men de tør også sætte navn påledere i andre rederier. Den stærkesteunderstregning af købmandskabets betydninger forskernes oplysning om atmere end halvdelen af rederiernes indtægterkommer fra at operere fremmedejettonnage, ikke af at eje skibe.Det er et godt argument for at opprioriterekøbmandskab på de danske højereuddannelser, hvor købmandskab traditionelthar haft for lav status.Viden om maritim teknologi, historiskerfaring med at producere skibe og althvad der hører til, er fundamentet for demaritime klynger. Rederierne bygger ikkemere skibe i Danmark, men der ermange danske produkter i de skibe, derbygges i udlandet. Rederiernes storekrav til danske underleverandører giverdem global konkurrenceevne i topklasse.Er det godt nok til danske redere, er detgodt nok til alle. Klyngens rammevilkårog vækstmuligheder kan forbedres vedet endnu tættere samarbejde med forskningenog de højere læreanstalter omudvikling af mere effektive, klimavenligeog sikre skibe. Fremtidens grønne skib erallerede ved at tage form.København vil være ”Capital of theOceans”, som det hedder med DanmarksRederiforenings slogan. Rederierne,forskning- og videncentre i Danmarkfindes primært i København, og der ersynergi, ikke konkurrence, med de danskeregionale klynger. Selv i internetalderenmed alle dens sociale medier erden personlige kontakt uhyre vigtig forvidendeling og værdiskabelse. Den erkernen i enhver kommerciel klynge medsucces, og i Københavns Kommune oghovedstadsregionen er der et stærkt ogbredt politisk ønske om at den maritimeklynge skal trives og vokse. De kommunaleog regionale rammevilkår skalforbedres, ikke mindst infrastrukturen,men også ved at byde nye internationalevirksomheder og udenlandske medarbejderevelkommen i byen.Danmark har ingen Silicon Valley, menfra et område på få kilometer SanktAnnæ Plads til Tuborg Havn kontrolleresen tiendedel af verdenshandelen til søs,og herfra betjenes næsten en fjerdedelaf Kinas udenrigshandel. Her er hoved-
kvarterer med mange højtlønnede, ogher kommer en helt ny bydel, Nordhavn.De globale rammevilkår har altid væretomskiftelige, men de økonomiske krystalkuglerer endnu mere slørede end sædvanligt.Det gælder især buddene påhvordan det går i de store industrilandesøkonomier, hvor politikerne er ved at løbetør for håndtag at dreje på, og hvor bådeøkonomer og markeder stiller spørgsmålstegnved de politiske systemers ikke kunvilje, men også evne , til at løse problemerne.En foruroligende udvikling, somunderstreges af de mange nye deltagerei demonstrationer verden over. For denmaritime sektor er der mindst fem udfordringeri de kommende år:1: Lavere global vækstFinanskrisen har foreløbigt skrælletmindst en pct. af den globale vækst i2012, mest i eurozonen, men også i U.S.A.hvor den næppe blive stor nok til atmindske ledigheden før præsidentvalget.Det går væsentlig bedre i BRIK-landene,med Kina i spidsen, men også her sker deren mindre opbremsning. Forudsat industrilandeneundgår det store dobbelte dyktror det amerikanske Conference Board atden globale vækst i perioden 2010-2020vil kunne blive over 4 pct., på niveau medperioden før krisen, 2000-2008. Det lyderoptimistisk, men prognosen hviler på enmeget stor geografisk forskydning afvæksten. Tre fjerdedele af den globalevækst skal nemlig præsteres af BRIK- ogudviklingslandene, mod kun halvdelen iperioden før krisen. Verden er blevet mindreafhængig af udviklingen i de vestligeindustrilande. Den lavere globale vækstvil også ramme den maritime sektor, menmest de rederier og virksomheder der ikkekan ekspandere i de nye industrilande.2: Nye mønstre iverdenshandelenOver halvdelen af de fjernøstlige landesimport kommer nu fra andre fjernøstligelande. Det gør regionen mindre følsomover for udviklingen i de krise- ellerlavvækstramte vestlige industrilande. Denintra-regionale handel i Fjernøsten er nurelativt større end i Europa, og handelenmellem BRIK-landene er også stærkt stigende.I en prognose frem mod 2030 spårkonsulentvirksomheden PwC at Kina viloverhale U.S.A., og tegne sig for 17 af de25 største bilaterale handelsruter til søs.Stærkest vækst spås Kina-Nigeria med enottedobling, men der vil også være storfremgang på andre ruter til Afrika og Latinamerika.Ruten mellem Kina og U.S.A.forbliver dog den største, og her ventesen fordobling. Rederier der tilpasser sigde nye handelsmønstre vil stå stærkest,og danske rederier er godt med og henterallerede omkring 30 pct. på disse ruter.3: Udbuddet af skibe stigerDer bliver rift om fragterne de nærmesteår. Selv med den optimistiske fremskrivningaf verdenshandelen på 4 pct., sommed de hidtidige erfaringer kan give envækst i søtransporten på 6-8 pct. vil der ibrokerfirmaet Clarksons fremskrivning afudbud og efterspørgsel være for mangeskibe frem til 2015. Det skyldes alene udbuddet.Kurven over nybygninger af skibe2000-2010 viser med næstentredobling en umiskendelig lighed medboblerne på andre markeder. Clarksonmener at denne skibsboble allerede erpunkteret, men alt for sent til at bringebedre balance mellem udbud og efterspørgselefter skibe. Resultaterne har alleredekunnet ses i 2011, med eksemplerpå helt ekstreme lave fragtrater.9
104: Konkurrencen bliverhårdereDet store udbud af skibe og en vigendevækst har allerede ført til stærkt faldendefragtrater og en indtjening derglobalt for alle skibstyper er faldet tilnær niveauet i perioden 1990-2000, dader var et lille overskud af skibe. Faldetfra toppen i perioden 2003-2008, derbeskrives som Den store Shipping Boom,er næsten to tredjedele. Der vil kommeet udskilningsløb, hvor de svageste mågive op, og de stærkeste bliver stærkere.Danmark har med Maersk Line en globalførerposition i containerfarten, med enfemdobling af kapaciteten fra 1997 til2007. Indtjeningen blev hårdt ramt afkrisen i 2009, men kom meget stærktigen i 2010. Maersk Line vil fastholde ogudbygge førerpositionen med målsætningenom at være ”Undisputed Leader”.Verdens største containerskibe, den nyeTriple E Maersk klasse, som er teknologisknyskabende, mere økonomiske,mere klimavenlige og som giver nye forretningsmulighederpå de vigtigsteruter. Kort sagt: teknologi, viden, købmandskabog så den helt kritiske forudsætningi et ekstremt volatilt marked istormvejr. Den nødvendige kapital til atholde ud til bedre tider.5: Større risiko forprotektionismeI modsætning til trediverne undgik verdeni finanskrisens første år protektionismei større omfang. Men risikoenvokser i takt med at krisen trækker ud, ogisær hvis der kommer et dobbelt dyk i denglobale økonomi. Det gælder ikke kun ivarehandelen, men også i den maritimesektor. Der har allerede været konkurrenceforvridendestatsstøtte til rederier, ogdet kan ske igen. Krisen gør det endnuvanskeligere at enes om nye liberaliseringeraf verdenshandelen i den såkaldteDoha-runde, selv om det vil være vækstskabende.VerdenshandelsorganisationenWTO har beregnet at hvis handelsbarrierneblev reduceret med 50 pct. ville dethjælpe både udviklingslandene og destore industrilande. G20, de største, villekunne øge eksporten med 20 pct., eurozonenmed 10 pct.Det store og svære spørgsmål er naturligvisom den danske maritime sektor i Danmarkkan fortsætte væksten i gennemden værste økonomiske krise i halvtredsår. Der kan meget vel komme en pause,hvor væksten skal måles i markedsandeleog finansiel styrke, og ikke så meget itonnage og beskæftigelse. Hvornår erusikkert, men der kommer helt sikkert endag efter krisen. De helt fundamentaleforudsætninger for væksten i efterspørgselenefter maritime ydelser er der nemligikke rokket ved.Globaliseringen vil fortsætte, det er denglobale arbejdsdeling og verdenshandelender driver væksten i de hurtigst voksenderegioner i verden. Investeringer i skibe erlangsigtede, dem der er bestilt leveresførst om to-tre år, hvor krisen gerneskulle være overstået. Stærkt globalt købmandskab,fornuftige nationale rammevilkår,moderne og konkurrencedygtigflåde, stærkt kapitalberedskab og satsningpå de stærkest voksende regioner iden globale økonomi kan bringe danskerederier og den danske maritime sektorsikkert gennem krisen og gøre det muligtfor den at levere et markant vækstbidragtil dansk økonomi både på kort og langsigt. Der bliver brug for det.Oktober 2011Leif Beck Fallesen
12Incentives, Capability, and Opportunity:Exploring the Sourcesof Danish Maritime LeadershipIntroductionFollowing the Second OPEC oil crisis,the Danish shipping industry faced itsdeepest and most severe challenge since1945. According to the annual reports ofthe Danish Shipowners’ Association, thesize of the merchant fleet declined from8.7 million deadweight tons (dwt) in1979 to 6.9 million dwt in 1986. 1 Thedrop in the number of ships was evenmore severe, falling from 909 in 1977 to525 in 1989. These developments hit theDanish economy hard. In the 1960s and1970s, the foreign currency incomefrom shipping had been an importantcontributor to the Danish balance ofpayments, but by the mid-1980s thiswas no longer the case. The economicimbalances and the aggravated situationfor the shipping industry were seriousissues, and in June 1987 the Danishgovernment published an importantmemorandum on shipping policy, theconclusion of which was a forecast ofsevere difficulties for the industry andthe economy. 2The Danish merchant fleet survived thecrisis and emerged stronger than ever.Two decades later, Lloyd’s List namedthe country the leading maritime nationin Europe. 3 World maritime statisticspublished by the Danish Shipowners’Association tell the story: in only twentyyears, the gross foreign currency incomeearned by the Danish shipping industryincreased eight-fold, from twenty-fourbillion Danish kroner (DKK) in 1989 toDKK 190 billion in 2008, correspondingto an increasing share of total Danishexports which rose from seven to twentypercent. 4 The size of the fleet increasedfrom seven million dwt in 1999 to aboutthirteen million in 2009, so that todayDanish companies own three percent ofworld tonnage. In addition, they controlabout six percent of global tonnage andcarry almost ten percent of world seabornetrade measured by the value of thecargo carried. As table 1 shows, Denmarkis now the world’s seventh largest shippingnation in terms of tonnage operated,controlling more than forty-one milliongross tons (gt) or fifty-six million dwt.These developments pose intriguingquestions about the competitiveness offirms, industries and nations. How can weexplain the global breakthrough of theDanish shipping industry? Why has itbeen able to take advantage of theopportunities offered by world tradeover the past two decades and attainEuropean maritime leadership? These arethe kinds of questions the present essaytries to answer. Through an embeddedcase study, 5 we show that the success ofDanish shipping was essentially a resultof a remarkable (and timely) fleet expansionwhich enabled shipping companiesto thrive in a benign market. The story
is about how competitive advantageresulted from strategic choices thatpropitiously matched institutionallyadvanced incentives and historicallyevolved capabilities with recentmarket opportunities.The essay is organized along thefollowing lines. In the next section wediscuss the sources of industrial leadershipand identify the three main perspectivesthat might explain the successof the Danish shipping industry: thefirm-level, national-institutional andcluster-based explanations. We then goon in section three to analyze thedevelopment of Danish shipping since themid-1980s. This pro-vides an historicalcontext for the company-level casestudies that follow in section four. Wetrace the recent developments of theshipping companies Norden and Tormand the diversified shipping group A.P.13Table 1Control of World Tonnage as of 1 July 2010 (’000 gt)Owner’s Country of ResidenceOperator’s Country of Residence*Rank Country Fleet Country Fleet1 Japan 128,337 Japan 109,5702 Greece 83,580 Greece 69,6003 Germany 80,161 China 61,4264 China 57,730 United States 48,4145 South Korea 31,086 South Korea 44,2856 Bermuda 29,595 Germany 41,3787 United States 24,762 Denmark 41,0658 United Kingdom 24,252 Singapore 38,9689 Denmark 23,378 United Kingdom 32,51010 Hong Kong 22,855 Hong Kong 30,777Note:*Figures for the operated fleet are somewhat uncertain because they do not include short-term time charters.Source:Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (London, 2010).
14Møller-Mærsk (Mærsk). These companieswere chosen partly to reflect the differentdynamics in the liner and trampshipping sectors and partly because theyrepresent markedly different growthstrategies. In the final section, we discussthe capabilities of Danish shippingcompanies that in combi-nation with thechanging formal institutions help explainwhy and how the industry was able toover-come the crisis and respond effectivelyto the opportunities provided bybooming markets.Using industry statistics, interviews,archival records, documents written byinsiders and annual accounts we analyzethe key developments in Danish shippingover the period as well as the concomi-tantdevelopment paths of thethree companies. For the industry,we examine the major institutional,organizational and technological developments,while for the companies welook at the ways they de-veloped, theirsignificant strategic and organizationalchoices and the important formal andinformal institutions and connectionsthat had a bearing on the process.Maritime Leadership:Company, Country or ClusterEffect?The notion of “industrial leadership”suggests industries in which some initialadvantage in organization or technologygives firms a commercial edge in worldmarkets. Maritime leadership thus refersto the global competitive advantage ofa national shipping industry, howeverdefined. 6 An on-going dispute is whetherthe sources of such leadership are foundat the company level in the form of“capabilities;” at the country-level ascomparative advantages; or some intermediarylevel in the form of sector-specificmechanisms. 7According to David Mowery and RichardNelson, the concept of industrial leadershipis similar to the notion of competitiveadvantage as that term is usedby scholars of strategy and businesshistory. It calls attention to companylevelstructures and mechanisms – andespecially to the capabilities that haveevolved within the firms which comprisean industry. In this framework, a countrymay attain a leadership position in aparticular industry if its companies enjoycompetitive advantages relative to thosein other nations.This explanation seems especially relevantto the study of the Danish shippingindustry, which is characterized by thelong-term competitiveness of individualfirms. It is dominated by companies thathave been in the industry since itsinception in the late nineteenth century(see table 2). 8 These companies havequietly built up their fleets during the1990s, thus allowing them to profit fromthe decade-long market boom. A fewnew entrants, such as the Clipper Group(which dates back only to 1971), AtlasShipping (1996-2008) and the NorwegianEitzen Group (which entered Danishshipping in 1990 by acquiring SkouInternational A/S and later by acquiringEAC Shipping A/S in 1997 and KILShipping in 2001) have also helped torevive the Danish shipping industry inrecent years. In this re-gard, it is clearthat much of the explanation for Danishmaritime leadership is located at thecompany level.In the extreme case, industrial leadershipmay be determined by the capabilities of
a single dominant player. It has beensuggested that the strength of Danishshipping hinges wholly on the performanceof Mærsk. 9 Indeed, accordingto Lloyd’s List, the status of Denmark asa shipping nation is largely tied to thefortunes of this “Copenhagen-basedshipping colossus.” 10 The idea that a largecompany can be instrumental to industrialleadership is not entirely exotic. 11It should be noted, however, that wellinto the 1960s the United Steam ShipCompany (DFDS), East Asiatic Company(EAC) and the shipping group J. Lauritzen(JL) were in many ways adjunct to Mærskand that several people from thesecompanies still play an important role inDanish shipping. Furthermore, much ofthe recent success of Danish shipping hastaken place in the dry-bulk market, whichis also where most of the boom in internationaltrade has occurred in recentyears. 12 And with more than 250 Danishoperatedproduct tankers, of which15Table 2Danish Registered Tonnage of Selected Danish Shipping Companies,1885-1999 (’000 gt)Company(Year Founded) 1885 1909 1924 1939 1949 1970 1980 1990 1999DFDS (1866) 47 151 211 176 174 154 128 91 245Norden (1871) 6 27 43 43 23 29 98 220 266Dannebrog (1883) 4 53 66 35 26 60 45 32 40Torm (1889) - - - 41 39 109 163 132 357J. Lauritzen (1895) - - 26 73 53 169 134 170 139EAC (1897) - 44 133 182 200 265 591 189 31Mærsk (1904) - - 56 178 207 1650 3302 2939 3064Total Denmark 129 635 912 1093 1054 3446 5241 4872 5726Source:Compiled from data in Jørgen Holck and Jørgen D. Simonsen, Frit hav – Dansk skibsfart i 100 år (Copenhagen, 1983); and Hans Jeppesen,Svend Aage Andersen and Hans Chr. Johansen, Dansk søfarts historie, Vol. 7: 1960-2000 (Copenhagen, 2001).
16Mærsk has an important but minor share,Copenhagen has become the major worldhub in the liquid-bulk market as well.It is apparent from table 1 that operatingships, as compared with owning them,is an important component in Danishshipping. This was not always the case.Ship operation as a distinct maritimetrade emerged in the ocean-going bulkshipping industry during the 1970s,leading eventually to structural changesin the shipping of certain maritimenations. As a new type of specialistcompany, ship operators contracted forcargo to be shipped and would thenexploit their market knowledge to assumethe risk from both ship and cargo owners.Profits were then determined by thedegree to which freight rates developedas the operator forecast. There has beena subsequent tendency by establishedshipping companies to turn to runningthe ships of others as their single mostimportant shipping activity. 13This phenomenon emerged in Denmarkthrough the network of people in andaround the ship-broking companyH. Bang and Co. (1958-1983), whichbecame the Danish ship operator parexcellence. Bang initiated a new, morerisk-friendly attitude which soon beganto flourish in Danish shipping. In recentyears, firms like Norden and JL havebuilt the main part of their businessesaround the commercial management ofchartered ships, while Torm, Norden andMærsk have become managers of bulkshippingpools. Many believe that growthin commercially operated tonnage iswhat makes Denmark an internationalcentre for knowledge-intensivecommercial ship operation.The observation that newcomers suchas the Clipper Group, the Eitzen Groupand, at least for a while, Atlas Shippinghave successfully competed againstwell-established firms suggests thatsome important factors behind industrialleadership are located at the level ofthe nation-state. Economists have longsought to explain the comparativeadvantage of nations as resulting fromdifferential access to the critical inputsneeded in different types of economicactivity. David Ricardo built his theory ofendowment-driven comparativeadvantage around the observation thatdifferences between Portugal and GreatBritain in climate and soil could explainthe pattern of trade between the twocountries, and the traditional focus inthe Heckscher-Ohlin factor-proportionsmodel on cross-country price differentialsin otherwise homogenous factorsof production is built around theassumption of a single market for everycountry. Product-cycle theories of internationalcompetition and trade similarlyassume that country-level featuresdetermine a particular technologicaladvantage of an industry and hencethe cycles in international trade. 14The product-cycle model was successfulin explaining US foreign direct investments(FDI) in Europe, and it has beeneffectively applied to explain thedynamics of the internationalization ofthe shipping industry. 15While institutions enter into traditionaleconomic theory in the form of givenconstraints, some economists have turnedto institutional differences to explainindustrial leadership. A major insight inthe literature on innovation systems isthat the possibilities for establishing“organized markets” based on strong
social capital differ from one country toanother. 16 Such national institutionaldifferences include, for example, thedevelopment of inter-firm and non-marketrelationships, organization offinancial markets, interaction betweenuniversities and industry, education andtraining system and the kinds of interactionamong specialists that arefostered by these developments. 17Analyses that focus on in-stitutions seethe supply of critical production factorsas endogenous, and hence they arguethat com-parative advantage is somethingthat is both created 18 andconstrained by past events. 19By invoking an image of particularsocietal forces that have led to theso-called “Danish miracle,” a neoinstitutionalperspective explains theupsurge of the economy after 1995 asa result of particular Danish “socialcorporatist” institutions, such as anhistorically grounded ability to reachcompromises and negotiate betweenvarious economic interests and a flexibleand highly skilled workforce combinedwith a culturally homogenouspopulation. 20 These “coordinated marketeconomy” characteristics have beenshown to influence industrial relationsin Danish shipping. 21 It is also worthmentioning that managers in the Danishshipping industry have pointed to theparticular Danish abilities, characterizingboth sea-going as well as land-basedpersonnel (e.g., brokers and charterers),to negotiate with partners worldwide andto exhibit a good sense of responsibilityas important factors for recent success. 22The institutions that may be the sourceof a nation’s leadership in a particulararea often pertain to specific industriesor sectors. The Danish International Shipregister (DIS) and the Danish tonnage-taxscheme are examples of sectoralinstitutions that may help to explainthe recent success of Danish shipping.Such institutions are importantly embeddedin the broader national institutionalstructure. It could thus beargued that the DIS came about as aparticular feature of the broadernational-institutional character ofDenmark as a coordinated marketeconomy.It has been argued that internationalregisters such as the DIS, or itsNorwegian equivalent, the NIS, willbe most successful for countries witha “vigorous shipping milieu,” that is, astrong network of qualified people workingin the cluster of shipping activities. 23Indeed, the kind of sectoral institutionalunderpinnings mentioned above are anessential aspect of industry clusters, thenotion of which generally and ratherbroadly refers to a critical mass offirms and other organizations within aparticular field of economic activity ina particular geographical locationsupported by a specific institutionalset-up. Harvard professor Michael E.Porter has even suggested that clustersare the main source of industrialleadership. 24The sources of maritime leadership maythus have to be seen in relation to therest of the Danish maritime cluster,which also includes shipyards, componentsuppliers, service providers and theoffshore sector. It has been argued thatthe success of Danish shipping owesmuch to the fact that Denmark is hostto a number of maritime industries thatare interconnected through a web of17
18pecuniary and social relationshipsand supported by a sector-specificinstitutional structure consisting of amaritime mindset and social norms,formal maritime and related organizationsand rules and regulationssuch as the DIS and the tonnage tax.Indeed, the Danish maritime cluster(nicknamed “Blue Denmark”) is believedby many to foster innovation and torepresent a critical mass of maritimecompetence, thus pro-viding anattractive setting for the conduct ofmaritime business. 25 The growing numbersof foreign shipping companiesestablishing offices in Copenhagen orplacing their vessels under the Danishcommercial management is evidence ofthis effect.Danish Shipping from Crisisto LeadershipIn the spring of 1986, the president of theDanish Shipowners’ Association,Knud Pontoppidan, and Mærsk Mc-KinneyMøller, the CEO and chairman of Mærsk,discussed the difficulties facing Danishshipping, including declining fleet size anddiminishing revenues. There were at leastthree important backdrops to this crisis.The first was global economic stagnation.Throughout the 1970s and most of the1980s the shipping industry experiencedits most difficult period since the SecondWorld War. The 1970s were marked byseveral currency crises, increasing unemployment,constantly rising inflationand two major oil crises. The first oilcrisis in 1973-1974 hit tanker shippingespecially hard, but all segments ofthe shipping industry suffered. Somecountries were hit harder than others,but few were as severely affected asNorway. 26 With the second oil crisis,international shipping confronted itsmost severe post-war economic crisis.Tanker transportation of oil peaked in1978 and subsequently fell dramatically.Even more importantly, the world economicstagnation of the early 1980sresulted in a marked decrease in totalseaborne trade. The crisis was exacerbatedby the slow structural adjustmentof supply to the difficult demandcircumstances. Orders for new shipsoften took several years to complete,and labour-intensive shipyards andprestigious national fleets continued toreceive state subsidies. 27 This helps toexplain why the total size of the worldfleet increased from 413 million dwt in1979 to almost 425 million dwt in 1982.The consequences were lower freightrates and a sharp drop in average timecharterrates. 28 Tonnage stagnated after1982.The second important context was the increasingrole of national protectionismand flag dis-crimination. After 1945, thetendency of individual countries to protecttheir own merchant fleets becamemore prevalent than ever. The US governmentdecided that at least fifty percentof the transport related to Marshall Planaid should be carried by Americanvessels, thus continuing a long-standingpolicy of protectionism. More important,national protectionism was forged bydeveloping countries which wanted tobuild up their own fleets. Such countrieslacked the financial resources to subsidizelarge shipbuilding programmes andhence turned to other mechanisms, primarilycargo preferences that deflectedseaborne trade from foreign to domestictonnage. Latin American nations, led byArgentina and Brazil, took the lead in in-
troducing new flag discriminations thatgradually, but dramatically, reduced thenumber of foreign-owned vessels, includingDanish, calling at their ports.The new pressure was most evident in theUnited Nations Conference on Trade andDevelop-ment (UNCTAD). From theUNCTAD’s beginnings in 1964, the developingcountries, represented by theso-called “Group of 77,” required that theOrganisation for Economic Co-operationand Develop-ment (OECD) recognize thelegitimacy of their efforts to secure alarger share of their own seaborne tradefor their own vessels. Also, they perceivedthat liner conferences – a form of protectionismby which Western lineroperators collaborated on freight rateson particular routes – were an unjustremnant of imperialism and colonialism;19Table 3Open Registers and Their Share of the World Merchant Fleet, 1960-2007(million gt)Country 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1997 2007Liberia 11.3 33.3 80.3 58.2 54.7 60.5 66.5Panama 4.2 5.6 24.2 40.7 39.3 98.2 151.8Cyprus - 1.1 2.1 8.2 18.3 18.3 19.2Bahamas - 1.0 1.7 3.9 13.6 27.7 39.1Singapore* - - 7.7 - - - -Others 0.3 0.7 0.6 - - - -Total 15.8 41.7 116.6 125.9 209.7 276.6Percent ofWorld Tonnage 12.0 19.0 28.0 27.0 30.0 40.0 40.0Note:*Singapore closed its open registry in 1981.Source:Danish Shipowners’ Association, annual reports, various years.
20they therefore demanded that internationalliner shipping should be controlledby the UN. In 1974, the UNCTADLiner Code was adopted. A key elementwas its “40-40-20” division of cargoeswhich reserved forty percent of theshipping for the exporting and importingcountry, respectively, and twenty percentfor cross-traders. Denmark, Finland, GreatBritain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland andthe United States voted against this plan“which minimized unhappiness and maximizednothing,” 29 and Denmark and GreatBritain began lobbying within theEuropean Community (EC) for a newshipping policy. Nevertheless, in 1979 theEuropean countries agreed that UNCTADrules should apply within the OECD andthat the developing countries would havepreference for forty percent of theirtrade, while sixty percent would besubject to open competition. This“Brussels Compromise” enabled the codeto be ratified in 1983. For the first time,the EC had become engaged in shippingpolicy.The package did not, however, solvethe growing problem of ships beingregistered on open registries, also referredto as flags of convenience. Thefirst open registers had been establishedin Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica inthe 1920s at the initiative of US multinationalcorporations seeking to reduceoperating costs by employing cheaperseafaring labour. In 1960, only twelvepercent of world tonnage sailed underopen registers, but their importance grewsubstantially in the 1970s (see table 3),leading to the erosion of the merchantfleets in traditional shipping countries(TMNs). During the 1980s, open registersbecame a real problem for Europeanshipping. France lost two-thirds ofits merchant fleet, and Norway andDenmark were also hard hit. In 1980 onlyfive percent of the Danish merchant fleetsailed under open registry, but by April1988 this had grown to an alarmingfortyseven percent.Technological change constituted athird important backdrop to the crisis.Prolonged loading times in ports and thestruggles for general-cargo vessels toexploit scale economies meant that theprofitability of traditional liner shippingcame under pressure in the late 1960sand early 1970s. Companies such asMærsk, EAC, Torm and Norden had longtraditions in tramp and liner shippingusing small general-cargo vessels, butthrough large investments in bulkcarriers, product tankers and containerships this structure changed dramaticallybetween the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s. During the late 1980s, Danishshipowners made further strategicdecisions by making major investmentsin new technology and quality shipping(that is, reliable shipping using technologicallyadvanced ships and relativelyexpensive personnel).Table 4 shows the dramatic rise in the relativeimportance of Danish liner services,which rose from about one-fifth to onethirdof the fleet from 1980 to 1985, reflectingthe huge investments in newcontainerships. In the same period, theaverage age of the Danish fleet fell fromjust below fifteen to just above eightyears. The problem was that, as late as1980, the Danish merchant fleet wasoutdated in terms of age and specializedtypes of ships. The dominant tanker fleet
22received its first fleet of containerships in1975-1976. It then made huge investmentsin ports and onshore infrastructureto create a successful container tradingsystem that linked North America withSouth East Asia.A New Strategy forDanish ShippingAgainst this historical background,Mærsk Mc-Kinney Møller asked KnudPontoppidan to consider how to clearaway any legal-political encumbrancesto the industry’s growth. The resultingreport, published in October 1986, madethirty-five suggestions for legal improvementsfor national shippingcapabilities, including changing therequirements for crews and adoptingmore flexible certification procedures. 31Still, it was clear that more radicalsteps were needed. With more shippingcom-panies registering their vessels onopen registries, the size of the Danishmerchant fleet was rapidly shrinking.At the same time, the Norwegianauthorities were in the process ofestablishing the NIS.On 3 June 1987 the Danish Ministry ofIndustry published perhaps the mostimportant public shipping document inrecent Danish maritime history: theShipping Policy Memorandum of 1987.It laid out the first real suggestion forestablishing a Danish International ShipRegister (DIS) to “make it attractive tothe shipping industry to continueoperating under the Danish flag” becauseit felt that an accelerated re-flaggingwould have “serious consequences forthe Danish economy and society.” 32The proposal triggered a heated publicdebate. The trade unions and the SocialDemocrats opposed the DIS proposalbecause they feared it would lead to lossof Danish jobs and lower safety standardson Danish ships. The shipownersand the Conservative-Liberal government,on the other hand, assured themthat every ship would still employ Danishseamen and would adhere to all standardsagreed upon by the InternationalMaritime Organization (IMO).Pontoppidan wrote an interesting featurearticle in the Danish daily MorgenavisenJyllands-Posten where he introduced theterm “Blue Denmark,” arguing that apassive maritime policy would have consequencesnot only for the Danishshipping industry but also for the entiremaritime cluster, including the shipyards,specialized sub-suppliers and maritimeresearch units. 33In March 1988, Danish politicianswere about to decide on the matter. Thegovernment needed the vote of the smallbut influential Social-Liberal Party, whichwas rather concerned about the employmenteffects of the DIS. At first it wantedwritten guarantees that the DIS wouldincrease Danish employment on domesticships, but it soon relaxed this demandand instead indicated it would be satisfiedwith oral statements from the shipownersthat they “would anticipatemore Danish seamen, were DIS to passthrough Parliament.” 34 Several Danishshipping companies came to thegovernment’s aid. JL announced that tento twelve large ships would immediatelybe re-flagged to the DIS. The EAC, Norden,Torm and a few smaller shippingcompanies followed. 35 Taken together,these companies controlled more thantwenty-five percent of the Danish-ownedfleet sailing under foreign flags. TheSocial-Liberal Party voted in favour of
the proposal on the condition that theregister would be open for revisionafter two years. The DIS was passed byParliament on 23 June 1988. In contrastto the NIS, it was open only for Danishownedships. Perhaps most important,the labour on Danish-owned ships underthe DIS was now to be free from all taxesand subject to new competitive labouragreements. In addition, while stillcomplying with the IMO safety andsecurity agreements, crewing regulationswere relaxed so that shipowners couldreduce the number of seamen.In its annual report for 1988-1989, theDanish Shipowners’ Association statedthat the DIS had the expected results.Almost all the relevant Danish-registeredships, plus about fifty others which formerlyhad sailed under open registries,had been placed on the DIS. The shipownersstated that the DIS was a strongcollaboration between government,shipping companies and seamen.Subsequent DevelopmentFigure 1 demonstrates that while it tookeighteen years (1973-1991) for worldseaborne trade to in-crease from threeto more than four billion tons, over thesubsequent fifteen years (1991-2006) itsoared to seven billion tons. This growthmirrored three important developments:an extraordinary expansion of NorthAmerican markets from 1994 to 2007; asharp increase in offshore outsourcing;and the opening of East Asian (particularlyChinese) markets after 2003.Since the mid-1990s, Danish shippinghas expanded through a further specializationin container shipping, focusedon building comprehensive logistics systems,and an increasing focus on operatingrather than owning ships,entailing among other things the flexiblechartering and pooling of ships generallyoperated for large customers with whoma relationship of trust is required. Mærskrepresents the first type of growth. Oneof the lessons Mærsk learned from thefailure of the EAC was that substantialinvestments in logistics were needed toexploit the advantages of the container.Mærsk therefore invested in containerports, onshore infrastructure and speedycontainer vessels. At the turn of themillennium, it operated about 250containerships. An aggressive growthstrategy has brought the number tomore than 500 today.The strongest proponents of the seconddirection were Norden and Torm (seebelow). Danish shipowners have increasinglyentered into co-operativerelationships with foreign shipowners,thus complementing classical shipowningwith capabilities in commercialmanagement. The total tonnage controlledfrom Copenhagen has more thandoubled since 1998, and more than halfthe income of Danish shipowners todayderives from operating foreign-ownedtonnage. This development can be tracedback to the early 1970s but has been especiallynoticeable since the late-1990s.It was contingent upon the fact thatmost Danish shipowners lacked thefinancial strength to buy the shipsnecessary to meet the opportunitiespresented by growing seaborne trade.The institutional structure of Danishshipping was marked by stability in the1990s and 2000s with the DIS continuingunaltered. Until 2002 Danish shipownerspaid ordinary corporate taxes, albeit withadvantageous rules for depreciation, but23
24with the passing of the Danish TonnageTaxation Act they started to pay a relativelylow flat-rate tax based on thetotal tonnage they operated. Accordingto the Minister of Taxation, this “reflectssimilar conditions in other countries,and it would not have been possible toretain the fleet in Denmark by havingconsiderably worse conditions here.” 36The tonnage tax was not a peculiarDanish invention because importantEuropean shipping nations such asNorway, Greece, Great Britain and theNetherlands had previously introducedtonnage tax systems. 37 When it was implemented,however, the Danish tonnagetaxregime differed from those in otherEuropean countries by including foreignownedtonnage operated commerciallyby Danish companies in a ratio of four toone between foreign and Danish-ownedFigure 1World Seaborne Trade, 1970-200880006000OtherBulkOil40002000019701972197419761978198019821984198619881990199219941996199820002002200420062008Source: Fearnley and Eger, Review (Oslo, various years).
tonnage, thus reflecting the Danishspecialization in commercial management.At that time, the comparable ratiowas three to one in most other Europeancountries. Some of the other Europeannations, especially the Netherlands, havesubsequently increased the opportunityto include ships on time charters.The DIS and the tonnage tax, combinedwith increasing world seaborne trade,obviously created a business environmentthat was friendly to shipping and gavegenerous incentives for shipowners toregister their vessels under the Danishflag. In fact, the Danish Shipowners’Association has emphasized theinstitutional stability of the 1990s andearly 2000s as a main reason for Danishmaritime leadership. Since shipping hasalways been marked by large, long-termcapital investments, the stability of thelegal environment is especially important.Company Case StudiesIn the following sections we examinethree of the most important incumbentfirms in the Danish shipping industry –Norden, Torm and Mærsk – discussedchronologically according to the dateof their founding. These companies arearchetypical cases in that they representdifferent growth strategies and in thesense that Mærsk is the most prominentproponent of specialization in containershipping, while Norden and Torm arestrong advocates of the other directionin Danish shipping mentioned above.Especially noteworthy has been the exceptionalexpansion capacity of Norden,Torm and Mærsk from the mid-1990s.The recent fleet development of thesecompanies reflects the general growthof the Danish merchant fleet.NordenNorden, founded in 1871 by Mads C.Holm, is a successful tramp shippingcompany operating globally in dry-bulkshipping and product tankers. From thestart it carried homogeneous dry-bulkcargoes in the cross-trades around theworld on a “one ship, one cargo” basis.Although the company has developedsignificantly over its lifetime, this centralbusiness concept remained for more than100 years. From the mid-1990s, underthe direction of CEO Steen Krabbe, it hasbecome a strong global player in thedry-bulk sector, with headquarters inCopenhagen and offices around theworld. In this period, the company hasgrown at such a rapid pace that today itranks among the world’s top dry-bulkoperators. One analyst has described itsgrowth as based on “very good foresightand some luck.” 38 This best translatesinto a profound knowledge of shippingmarkets, which in turn has allowed thecompany to exploit, well in advance of itscompetitors, opportunities for charteringtonnage and to manage commercial risksin a timely fashion by trading freightderivatives.Steen Riddervold Krabbe was headhuntedfor president of the company in 1988. Hecame with twenty-seven years experiencefrom Mærsk where he had occupiedseveral management positions and hadbeen stationed abroad. From a numberof years in New York and Tokyo he hadgained international experience andformed important personal networks.Krabbe changed the company in anumber of ways. He diversified it intotankers, thus leveraging existingcapabilities and reducing market uncertainty,and initiated a move awayfrom the spot-charter market towards25
26long-term contracts of afreightment(COAs), increasing the company’splanning horizon and further reducinginsecurity. Most important, however, heestablished a belief in the companythat successful shipping is more aboutoperating than owning ships. Norden’srecent developments have in many waysreflected his values, which include afocus on customers, modesty, trustworthiness,respect for other peopleand cultures, and professionalism. Thesevalues have been carried on by thenew president of the company,Carsten Mortensen. 39From the late nineteenth century andwell into the 1990s, Norden focusedexclusively on the dry-bulk sector. Yet theway it has approached this market haschanged markedly over time. By 1971, thecompany’s fleet was down to four ships,and employees were pessimistic aboutthe future. A critical board meeting inApril 1972 decided that Norden shouldcontinue to own ships. With the developmentof a new large bulk carrier by theJapanese Mitsui Engineering and ShipbuildingCompany (MES), some of thedirectors saw an opportunity for Nordento expand. The company contractedfor its first bulk carrier, a 34,000-dwtHandymax vessel delivered by MESin 1973.The switch from traditional trampshipping using general cargo vesselsto modern bulk shipping, which inretrospect was done quickly andsmoothly, marked the beginning of anew era for Norden. 40 As part of thisshift, the ownership relationships thathad existed since 1970 – with Motortrampas the majority shareholder inOrient and Orient as the majority shareholderof Norden – were made official. 41Between 1974 and 1985 MES deliveredfive more bulk carriers to Norden, whichnow operated under the name NordtrampI/S. Subsequent investments in bulkcarriers positioned Norden as a seriousand committed participant in the bulksector.Since the end of the 1990s, Norden’s drybulkfleet has grown considerably and atan accelerating rate, mostly through thechartering-in of vessels. The years 1997-1998 marked a paradigm shift in whichNorden negotiated advantageous accessto a number of Japanese-owned Handymaxbulkers on long-term time charterswith purchase options (t/c-pops). 42This happened at a time when the outlookfor the dry-bulk sector was bleakdue particularly to commotion in theSouth East Asian dry-cargo market thatcreated a devastating slump lasting intothe new millennium. The timing, however,was propitious since the control overJapanese-owned tonnage prepared thecompany for the Chinese-led boom indry-bulk shipping in 2002.The company was able to charter-intonnage at much lower than expectedrates and thus acquired an extraordinarilyinexpensive fleet. This hasto be seen in light of the mid-1980sfinancial crisis in Japan. The Japaneseshipping industry was hit hard by therapid appreciation of the value of the yenand the concurrent weakening of the USdollar between 1985 and 1987. Japaneseshipowners faced skyrocketing costs andplummeting earnings, and they continuedto face hardship until the latter part ofthe 1990s. Norden was in a particularlyprivileged situation for engaging with therelevant Japanese companies becauseof its ability to bring long-standing
maritime traditions, trust-based personalrelationships and empathic leadershipto bear. 43Norden also operates oil and producttankers. The oil tankers carry crude andfuel oil and navigate in the North Seaand East Asia, while the product tankersmostly carry refined oil products in theAtlantic region and East Asia. The company’stanker business is much smaller thanits dry-bulk section, but expansion in theformer has a high priority. On a smallscale, Norden had been active in the tankermarket since 1984, when it had bareboatcharters for two product tankers,only to re-charter them (again as bareboatcharters) to the Norwegian companyA/S Ugland Rederi. That same year, NordtrampI/S bareboat chartered one vessel,and Nordic Shipping I/S – a partnershipin which Nordtramp held a ten percentshare via a subsidiary – bareboatchartered three vessels, all of which hadbeen ordered by two Difko K/S companiesand were delivered from the Burmeisterand Wain Shipyard (B&W) in 1986 and1987. The four product tankers were tofly the Danish flag, be technicallymanaged and crewed by Norden andcommercially managed from Norway. 44This diversification was a naturaldevelopment for the company, since itssmall-scale tanker activity had givenit the relevant financial and technicalcapabilities. While the diversificationextended the operating scope of the firm,it also increased its robustness againstcyclical changes in the dry-bulk market.Norden now has its own tanker departmentwhich operates the company’sAframax tankers. Its product tankers areengaged in the spot market andcommercially managed by the NorientProduct Pool A/S, which was foundedin 2005 by Norden and the CyprusincorporatedInterorient NavigationCompany Ltd.TormTorm, founded in 1889 by ChristianSchmiegelow and Ditlev E. Torm, hasalso expanded greatly in recent years,resulting in strongly increasing revenuesand a huge increase in operated tonnage.For the first three-quarters of a centuryof its existence Torm remained atraditional tramp and liner shippingcompany, carrying goods on generalcargo ships, but by the mid-1960s itventured into the modern dry-bulkmarket. Since the mid-1970s, Torm hasinvested heavily in modern bulk carriersand advanced product tankers. 1974 wasa landmark year in which the companymerged with Bornholm’s SteamshipCompany of 1866. This meant an almostcomplete replacement of the board ofdirectors and the charting of a newcourse. 45 Kai Engell-Jensen became thenew chairman, and he believed stronglythat the company should become atanker operator. To carry out this vision,he recruited Erik Behn from Mærsk tobecome Torm’s CEO. That was in 1976,the same year that the firm received itsfirst two product tankers, sold its fiveoldest bulk and liner carriers and dismisseda quarter of its seamen. TodayTorm is one of the world’s leadingoperators of product tankers, carryingrefined products such as gasoline, jet fueland naphtha. It is still active in the drybulkPanamax sector, carrying majorbulk cargoes like coal, iron ore, grain,bauxite and fertilizers.Growth through fleet expansion is one ofTorm’s stated aims, not least as a27
28strategic response to the consolidationthat took place in the oil and chemicalindustries. According to its 2008 annualreport, the optimal fleet would beapproximately fifty to seventy percentowned. Fleet growth is pursued bypurchasing vessels, acquiring companiesand networking in product-tanker pools.Through its participation in three pools(LR1, LR2 and MR) Pool), each focusingon a particular class of ship, the companycurrently owns seventy-five producttankers (after taking delivery of fournew-buildings in 2011). It also has longtermcharter arrangements for twentyfiveproduct tankers owned by others(four with purchase options) and managesan additional twenty-five producttankers. On top of this, Torm has anextensive new-building program. Thismeans that Torm controls some thirtypercent of the global tonnage in the LR1and LR2 product-tanker spot markets. 46By the end of 2010, the company ownedtwo bulk carriers and held thirteen bulkcarriers on longer time charter agreements(eleven with purchase options).The recent success of Torm has beenachieved under the leadership of KlausKjærulff, who succeeded Behn as CEO inSeptember 2000. After training at EAC,Kjærulff came to Torm in 1976 and in1981 became the manager of its tankerdepartment, which at that time operatedtwo ships. During his years at EAC hegained significant experience in shippingmarkets, but most importantly he learnedto collaborate with global partners. Hehad been transferred to a position in theonce-famous ScanDutch consortia, wherehe gained important knowledge abouthow to build and manage a shippingpool. 47This experience proved vital to Torm’sstrategy of expanding its tanker fleet.The use of pools has been instrumentalin giving Torm global leadership in thePanamax (tankers between 75,000 and85,000 dwt) and Aframax (90,000-110,000 dwt vessels) product-tankersegments. Torm was the first shippingcompany to apply the pool concept toproduct tankers, and it has been highlysuccessful in achieving critical mass,increasing unit income for owners andproviding better services for itscustomers.The pools form a horizontal collaborativenetwork within the clean product-tankersegment and comprise Danish as well asmany foreign ships owned by some of theworld’s largest shipping companies (seetable 5). Through the pools, Tormprovides spot charters for a number ofregular customers, primarily major oilcompanies and Japanese and Koreantrading houses with whom Torm hasbuilt up trust relationships over manyyears. The pools have the competitiveadvantage of operating modern tonnagesubject to strict pool-specific requirementsregarding fleet, crews, safetymanagement, quality control andcustomer relations. A main challenge forTorm as commercial manager of the poolsis to ensure a high level of quality andcredibility.In 1991 Torm and BurWain Tankers Internationalestablished a joint venture. 48 Theresulting chartering office was a limitedpartnership created to manage the twocompanies’ own and chartered-in producttankers. The agreement achieved co-ordinatedemployment of the companies’vessels, making the venture one of theworld’s three major tonnage operators
in this sector. It also strengthened theopportunity to develop new market areas,which is an important elementin spreading risk. The partnership hassubsequently been renamed the LR1 Pool(operating Panamax vessels) and todayincludes eight shipping companies contributingships under Torm’s commercialmanagement. The pool is the world’slargest operator of Long-range vesselsand a considerable market player,controlling an estimated thirty percent ofthe world’s total LR1 tonnage. In 1998,Torm established two additional tankerpools, LR2 (Aframax vessels) and MR(45,000-dwt ships). Torm is the commercialmanager of the MR Pool, while itshares the management of the LR2 Poolwith Mærsk Tankers.In collaboration with three foreignshipping companies, Torm has establishedan MR Ice-class Pool (as a sub-poolwithin MR) to service mainly Russian oilcompanies whose expanding exports haveto be carried through icy waters in thewinter. Torm has ordered six A1 SuperIce-class MR vessels, which togetherwith ships belonging to its partners willmake the new pool a very strong playerin an emerging, highly-specialized nichemarket. The pool will managed andoperated by Torm and is a direct spin-off29Table 5The Torm Pools and Their PartnersLR1 Pool LR2 Pool MR PoolTorm Torm TormDifko Primorsk Shipping Corporation Primorsk Shipping CorporationRederi AB Gotland Rederi AB Gotland Rederi AB GotlandNordic Tankers Mærsk Tankers Sanmar ShippingMitsui OSK LinesSkagerack Invest LimitedWaterfront Shipping ASSource: Torm, Annual Report (Copenhagen, 2006 and 2008).
30from the LR1 Pool, having been bornout of LR1 member Gotland’s closerelationship with the Chinese GuangzhouShipbuilding International (GSI), whereGotland in the spring 2005 had orderedtwo Ice-class A1 super tankers. Itfollowed up with additional orders andpassed on to Torm the opportunity tobuild identical vessels and thus establishitself in the Ice-class tanker market. 49This illustrates the additional advantageof pools in that new opportunitiesemerge through long-term collaborationwith other companies.Torm has combined its pool concept withorganic growth and acquisition. In June2002 it bought a third of the shares inNorden (after a deduction of Norden’sown ten percent shares), and in July itpresented a voluntary public tender offerto acquire all the remaining shares ofNorden. The stated purpose was to mergethe two companies in order to carry oncombined tanker activities under thebanner of Torm and the combined bulkactivities under the name and flagof Norden. Considering this to be anattempt at a hostile takeover, Norden’smanagement declined. In April 2007 Tormsold its shares in Norden at a profit ofUS $643 million.Only a few weeks later Torm and theTeekay Corporation announced the jointacquisition of the entire share capital ofthe OMI Corporation. Besides taking overtwenty-six product tankers from OMI,Torm took over OMI’s technical organizationin India and part of its office inStamford, Connecticut, thus building apresence in the US. Torm will continue itsAmerican activities under the name ofOMI, since this is a well-recognized andrespected brand in the US, not leastamong institutional investors. Torm hasdecided to transfer the major part of theships acquired from OMI from their presentMarshall Islands register to the DIS.The company announced recently that itwill no longer focus its product-tankeroperations around the pool concept. Thesize of the fleet, a desire to move closerto its customers and a goal of setting theindustry standard in technical qualityhas led top management to call for aredefinition of the model. The company’stanker division will enter into strategicpartnerships with owners that willcomplement Torm’s service level,customer reach, quality and marketapproach.MærskIn 1904, Arnold Peter Møller and hisfather Peter Mærsk Møller, founded theSteamship Company Svendborg. Tofacilitate expansion independently of theoriginal investors, A.P. Møller foundedthe Steamship Company of 1912 eightyears later. These two firms constitutedthe core of the A.P. Møller Group untilJune 2003 when they were merged intoA.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S (Mærsk). Sixmonths later, the chairman of Mærsksince 1965, ninety-year-old MærskMc-Kinney Møller, resigned. 50 In spite ofglobal economic recession, Mærsk todayis in a historically unique situation with anew top management team with limitedshipping experience. Nils Smedegaard-Andersen left Carlsberg to become CEO ofMærsk in December 2007, and the formerpresident of the insurance companyTopdanmark, Michael Pram Rasmussen,was appointed chairman of the board inJune 2003. This duo now leads a global
conglomerate with about 110,000employees involved in container shippingand related activities, oil and gas,tankers, offshore and other shippingactivities, and retail and otherbusinesses.Two key concepts seem to summarize thedevelopment of Mærsk: diversificationand acquisitions. When Mc-KinneyMøller took over from his father,A.P. Møller, in 1965, the company wasstill focused on shipping, although theinitial steps towards diversification hadbeen taken. As other Danish shipownershad done, A.P. Møller invested in a shipyardin 1917, and the firm possessedblocks of shares in several Danishmanufacturing firms and a bank. Moreover,in 1962 it signed a concession foroil exploitation in Danish internationalwaters. These initial steps wereaccelerated through a series of unrelateddiversification moves. By 1970, thecompany could be regarded as a conglomerate,and when Mc-Kinney Møllerresigned as CEO in 1993, the associatedcompanies in the Mærsk Group (i.e.,companies outside the core interests ofshipping and oil) consisted of MærskMedical, Mærsk Data, Mærsk Air, DanskSupermarked and five manufacturingcompanies.At the same time, diversification has alsobeen an essential part of the group’sshipping development. Mærsk began as atramp shipping company. In 1928, A.P.Møller acquired a tanker and establisheda liner service between the United Statesand South East Asia. This service wasexpanded in 1932 with investments infour general cargo vessels above 8,000dwt. Mærsk thus established three pillarsof shipping which would later constituteits postwar growth. Between 1949 and1952 the company invested in thirteennew tankers followed by sixteen morebetween 1953 and 1956. Most ofthese were built at the company’sown shipyard.In the early 1970s Mærsk began to investin container shipping. In 1975-1976, inwhat was the largest investment in thecompany’s history, it bought nine fast,fully cellular container vessels for itstranspacific service. Massive investmentsin land-based transport facilitiesprovided new opportunities for relateddiversification, including the establishmentin 1977 of Mærsk Logistics, whichprovided new systems for handlingcontainer traffic, and Mærsk ContainerIndustry (1992), which producedcontainers at a factory in Denmark. In themid-1980s, Mærsk initiated a forcefulexpansion within container shipping.In 1985, Mærsk introduced a new transpacificroute connected to an exclusivemile-long Mærsk train from the US westcoast via Chicago to New York. New routesbetween Europe and the Middle Eastwere established in 1986, together with anew terminal in Algeciras in southernSpain. The worldwide connection wasstrengthened in 1988 through a newroute from Northern Europe to the UnitedStates and Canada.Between 1986 and 1995 Mærsk’scontainer fleet almost tripled fromthirty-six to ninety-six vessels. Thisexpansion was related to the growthpattern of the next phase of Maersk’sdevelopment: acquisitions. 51 In 1993Jess Søderberg took over as CEO of thegroup, and Mærsk acquired all theshipping activities of EAC, which includednine large containerships and a strong31
32position on Europe-East Asia routes.While the previous decades had beenmarked by both related and unrelateddiversification, the 1990s and 2000swere characterized by a focus on specificindustries and shipping segments,particularly specialized gas tankers, supertankers and container vessels. The bulkcarriers were sold in April 2001 to theNorwegian Klaveness Group.The focus on container shipping led totremendous growth in the size of thecompany’s container fleet from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, enabling Mærskto exploit opportunities generated byincreasing consumer demand in the USand South East Asia. This growth wasfounded on the liner shipping alliancesthe company established from the mid-1980s and enforced first by theacquisition of the EAC fleet in 1993 andlater by the purchases in 1999 of theSouth African container shippingcompany Safmarine and the AmericanSea-Land Corporation. The integration ofSea-Land into Mærsk was eased by thelong-term operational cooperation thatexisted between the two, particularly ontransatlantic routes. In 1993, Mærskinitiated an alliance with the British P&OContainers, but this alliance wasterminated in 1996 when P&O mergedwith the Dutch Nedlloyd. By the late1990s, a strong process of concentrationwas taking place in container shippingcaused by a combination of large infrastructuralconditions and the obviousneed to smooth out business fluctuationsin a different way than in the old linerconferences.In May 2005, Mærsk acquired P&ONedlloyd; the new company, now namedMærsk Line, became by far the world’slargest container shipping company.Unfortunately, the costs of integrationproved unexpectedly high, and MærskLine lost market share. In 2007, the topmanagement team was replaced byoutsiders, thus ending the company’slong-standing policy of inside recruitment.The diversifications of the 1960sand 1970s made it possible to maintainhigh group profits, but the focus oncontainers in the 1990s and 2000s hadcreated a corporate colossus.Discussion and ConclusionThis essay has attempted to explainthe remarkable success of the Danishshipping industry since the mid-1990s.The responses of Danish companies to theeconomic and institutional changes overthe past couple of decades were centralto the establishment of Denmark as amajor maritime nation. These responsesinvolved a complex process in whichvarious economic, technological, politicaland other institutional factors interacted.We have sought to comprehend thiscomplexity by taking into account thelong-term organizational dynamics ofindividual shipping companies as well, asthose of the shipping industry as a whole,primarily since the mid-1980s.Our analysis was inspired by a large anddiverse literature that seeks to explainthe sources of industrial leadership.According to this body of work, thereappear to be three broad explanationsfor why Denmark has achieved Europeanmaritime leadership. The first stresses theparticularities of Denmark compared toother TMNs. It used an establishedtradition in economics, as well as an importantedge in new institutional theorizing,to construct country-levelcomparative advantages. The second
explanation downplays the causalinfluence of broad national features andinstead calls attention to the importanceof the capabilities of the companies thatcomprise the Danish shipping industry.According to this company-level explanation,Denmark is a strong maritimenation because its shipping companiesare highly competitive players in internationalshipping. Finally, the thirdexplanation identifies the sources of maritimeleadership in structures smallerthan the nation but larger than theindividual company. Such structures canreside in local geographical areas, interorganizationalnetworks and supportinginstitutions. According to this approach,Denmark has obtained maritime leadershipbecause it has a well developedmaritime cluster (Blue Denmark).In our analysis, structural aspects at allthree levels have been identified assources for Denmark’s current strong positionin the international shippingindustry. Important features at a fourthlevel, the global economic system, andthe ways in which a country’s shippingcompanies navigate it, should be included,since for an industry like shipping,sector-specific pressures and institutionalincentives feed back into the nationalstructure and provide differential opportunitiesand constraints for variouscountries. Similar arguments have beenmade within the international businessliterature. 52 A basic insight from internationalbusiness studies is that Porter’s“national diamond” needs to be complementedby multinational activitiesbecause these are important aspects ofa country’s competitiveness withinparticular businesses.The real issue is not, however, whetherthe sources of maritime leadership are tobe found squarely within one or anotherlevel. Instead, it is clear that a company’scapabilities interact with sector-specificcharacteristics and national and globalfeatures so that both adaptation andselection are important. In the literatureon the sources of industrial leadership,this insight is emerging under theconceptual umbrella of “co-evolution.”The historically contingent combinationof institutionalized incentives anddistributed company capabilities in anational industry at any particular pointin time has to match the paralleldemands and opportunities of themarket. A co-evolutionary perspectivewould help to explain why Danish shippingcompanies were better able thantheir rivals in other TMNs to exploit theopportunities of booming shippingmarkets since the late-1990s.Our analysis has pointed to the importantrole played by a few individuals in devisingindividual company strategies aswell as tactics for the entire Danishshipping industry, the latter legitimatedwithin the framework of the DanishShipowners’ Association and through themobilization of its members in thepolitical process. The analysis furthermorehas shown how the developmentsand counter-measures taken in Norwayinspired the efforts of these few individuals.Key characteristics of a fifth,much more micro-analytical level – theindividual agent of change – should thusbe hypothesized as a significant source ofindustrial leadership. Although we shouldavoid falling back on simple voluntaristexplanations, this part of our analysisreminds us that we cannot understandthe sources of industrial leadershipwithout considering the role of agency.33
34Agency does not figure prominently inthe literature on industrial leadership,the dominant explanations of which arefocused instead on structures at variousanalytical levels.Some notion of history, time and timingtherefore seems crucial and needs to beexplored much further. Why were competingmaritime nations with similarlylong-standing maritime traditions,supporting institutions and internationallycompetitive firms, not as ableto exploit the emerging opportunities?What were the momentous events that ina particular period allowed Danishshipping companies to outdo theirpreviously superior rivals? How can suchhistorical characteristics be included inmore general co-evolutionary thinkingwhich underpins a growing part of theindustrial leadership literature? Howhistorically-remote do momentous eventsneed to be to qualify as explanations inco-evolutionary theories?Of importance with respect to explainingthe timing of behaviour is the notion ofthe foresight of the people in command.Even if Mærsk was a laggard in containershipping, its massive entry into thissector between 1985 and 1988 is anexample of the importance of foresight.At that time, the shipping industry was incrisis, and the global economy wasfragile. Mærsk nevertheless invested innew liners, fleet modernization and infrastructure.The present-day post-crisisresponses of Mærsk mirror the situationof the company in the mid-1980s.With its decision to build ten “Triple-E”container ships at South Korea’s DaewooShipyard (with the possibility of extendingthe order for an additionaltwenty such ships), each carrying 18,000Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs), thecompany is once again using its financialclout to pre-empt the market and, interms of capacity, to outpace its nearestcompetitors in the coming years.Moreover, the paradigmatic change inNorden’s strategic orientation in 1997-1998 profited from the continuingdownturn of the Japanese economyand coincided with the beginnings of ageneral slump in the dry-bulk marketswhich prevented competitors frommaking similar moves. Equally important,this prepared Norden for the laterChinese-led boom in dry bulk.Discovering whether such foresightdepends on true entrepreneurship andthe visions of key individuals, grows outof either internal organizational slackand excess resources or from informal,trust-based external relationships, orsimply happens as a stroke of randomluck is a promising topic for research onthe sources of industrial leadership.Going further, an important questionwould be to consider national differencesin the entrepreneurship patterns of anindustry, thus considering the subtletiesthrough which a country’s natural or institutionalendowments might determinethe strategies and capabilities of itsfirms.These insights open up for a plethoraof dynamics concerned with path dependencies,the unfolding of nationalindustrial trajectories, the individual andcollective enactment of relationshipsbetween organization and environmentand the timing of behaviour. In short,what our analysis suggests is that inorder to understand the sources ofindustrial leadership, we should focuson the interplay between demand and
supply-side structural aspects, such ascapabilities, routines, resources, norms,incentives schemes, consumptionpatterns and income; on agency in theform of individually and collectivelydevised strategies, actions and conceptions;and on the circumstancesunder which the historical embeddednessof structure and agency matters. Inmethodological terms, the first of thesecalls our attention to multi-levelresearch, the second to the study ofenactment, and the third to theincorporation of historical methods.35June 2011Henrik Sornn-Friese andMartin Jes IversenThis essay appeared originally in the InternationalJournal of Maritime History, Vol. 23,No. 1 (June 2011), pp.193-220, and is reprinted here with thekind permission of the International MaritimeEconomic History Association
36NotesIncentives, Capability, and Opportunity:Exploring the Sources of DanishMaritime Leadership1: The Danish merchant fleet is defined as allprivately owned cargo and passenger ships,ferries, cruise ships and the like (excludingfishing vessels) of more than 100 gross tons(gt), where gt is a cubic measurement of thetotal of all enclosed spaces within a shipexpressed in tons equivalent to 100 cubic feet.2: Denmark, Ministry of Industry, SkibsfartspolitiskRedegørelse (Copenhagen, 1987).3: Lloyd’s List, 22 May 2006.4: Danish Shipowners’ Association, Skibsfarteni tal, Oktober 2009 (Copenhagen,2009).5: Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research:Design and Methods (4th ed., Thousand Oaks,CA, 2009).6: Definitions of what constitutes a nationalshipping industry differ among maritimenations, reflecting the different institutionalenvironments within which the maritimeevolution of different countries has takenplace; see Basil N. Metaxas, Flags ofConvenience:A Study of Internationalisation (Aldershot,1985).7: Bruce Kogut, “Country Capabilities and thePermeability of Borders,” Strategic ManagementJournal, XII, special summer issue(1991), 33-47; Arthur Francis, “The Processof National Industrial Regeneration andCompetitiveness,” Strategic ManagementJournal, XIII, special issue 2 (1992), 61-78;Richard R. Nelson, “The Evolution ofComparative or Competitive Advantage:A Preliminary Report on a Study,” Industrialand Corporate Change, V, No. 2 (1996), 597-617; David C. Mowery and Richard R. Nelson(eds.), Sources of Industrial Leadership:Studies of Seven Industries (Cambridge,1999); and Johann Peter Murmann,Knowledge and Competitive Advantage:The Coevolution of Firms, Tech-nology, andNational Institutions (Cambridge, 2003).8: By comparison, Greek shipping has beenmarked by intervals of growth typically drivenby new entrants. For example, its post-WorldWar II growth was largely due to new shipownerssuch as Aristotle Onassis and StavrosNiarchos. See Stavros Ioannides andIoanna Pepelasis Minoglou, “Explaining theLongevity of Market-embedded Clans: TheCase of Greek Shipping” (Unpublished paperpresented at the Fourteenth World EconomicHistory Congress, Helsinki, 21-25 August2006).9: Erik W. Jakobsen, et al., Attractingthe Winners: The Competitiveness of FiveEuropean Maritime Industries (Oslo, 2004).10: Lloyd’s List, 7 July 2004.11: Similar accounts can be found aboutthe role of other large companies in smallcountries, such as Nokia in Finland. See, forexample, Jyrki Ali-Yrkkö, “The Role of Nokiain the Finnish Economy,” Finnish Economyand Society, I (2001), 72-80; or TimoHirvonen, “From Wood to Nokia: The Impactof the ICT Sector in the Finnish Economy,”ECFIN Country Focus, I, No. 11 (2004), 1-7.12: In this regard, it is worth mentioning thatMærsk, which has always been admired forits foresight, sold its bulk division a few yearsprior to the boom in that market.13: Bruce Farthing, International Shipping:An Introduction to the Policies, Politics andInstitutions of the Maritime World (London,1987).14: Raymond Vernon, “International Investmentand International Trade in the ProductCycle,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,LXXX, No. 2 (1966), 190-207.
15: Gunnar K. Sletmo, “Shipping’s FourthWave: Ship Management and Vernon’s TradeCycles,” Maritime Policy and Management,XVI, No. 4 (1989), 293-303.16: Bengt-Åke Lundvall, Product Innovationand User-Producer Interaction (Aalborg,1985): Richard R. Nelson, “NationalInnovation Systems: A Retrospective on aStudy,” Industrial and Corporate Change, I,No. 2 (1992), 347-374; and Nelson, NationalInnovation Systems: A Comparative Study(New York, 1993).17: Henrik Sornn-Friese, “Frontiers ofResearch in Industrial Dynamics andNational Systems of Innovation,” Industryand Innovation, VII, No. 1 (2000), 1-13.18: Richard R. Nelson, “Co-evolution ofIndustry Structure, Technology and SupportingInstitutions, and the Making of ComparativeAdvantage,” International Journal ofthe Economics of Business, II, No. 2 (1995),171-184; and Nelson, “The Sources ofIndustrial Leadership: A Perspective onIndustrial Policy,” De Economist, CXLVII,No. 1 (1999), 1-18.19: Douglass C. North, Institutions,Institutional Change and EconomicPerformance (Cambridge, 2000).20: See, for example, Peter A. Hall andDavid Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism:The Institutional Foundations of ComparativeAdvantage (Oxford, 2001); and John L.Campbell, John A. Hall and Ove Kaj Pedersen,National Identity and the Varieties ofCapitalism: The Danish Experience(Copenhagen, 2006).21: Thomas Klikauer and Cliff Donn,“Varieties of Labor Relations in the ShippingIndustry: A Comparison of Two Anglo-SaxonLiberal Market Economies and Two EuropeanCoordinated Market Economies,” New ZealandJournal of Employment Relations, XXIX,No. 1 (2004), 39-61.22: We often heard this insight expressed inpersonal interviews with executives from theDanish shipping industry (February-July2007).23: Gunnar K. Sletmo and Susanne Holste,“Shipping and the Competitive Advantageof Nations: The Role of International ShipRegisters,” Maritime Policy and Management,XX, No. 3 (1993), 243-255.24: Michael E. Porter, The CompetitiveAdvantage of Nations (New York, 1990);Porter, On Competition (Boston, 1998;updated and expanded ed., Boston, 2008);and David Newlands, “Competition andCooperation in Industrial Clusters: TheImplications for Public Policy,” EuropeanPlanning Studies, XI, No. 5 (2003), 521-532.25: Denmark, Ministry of Industry, Det BlåDanmark (Copenhagen, 1991); DanishMaritime Authority, Det Blå Danmark 1999(Copenhagen, 1999); Danish MaritimeAuthority, Søfartspolitisk Vækststrategi:Kompetencer og vækst (Copenhagen, 2003);Henrik Sornn-Friese, Navigating BlueDenmark: The Structural Dynamics andEvolution of the Danish Maritime Cluster(Copenhagen, 2003); Mogens Schrøder Bech,“The Danish Maritime Cluster,” in NikoWijnolst (ed.), Dynamic European MaritimeClusters (Amsterdam, 2006), 65-80; andDenmark, Ministry of Economic and BusinessAffairs, Danmark som Europas førendesøfartsnation (Copenhagen, 2006).26: Stig Tenold, “The Shipping Crisis ofthe 1970s – Causes, Effects and Implicationsfor Norwegian Shipping” (unpublished PhDthesis, Norwegian School of Economics andBusiness Administration, 2001); Tenold,Tankers in Trouble: Norwegian Shipping andthe Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s (St. John’s,2006); and Atle Thowsen, and Stig Tenold,Odfjell: The History of a Shipping Company(Bergen, 2006).37
38 27: In that regard, we may learn a lot fromcomparing the current financial crisis andworld economic recession with the crisesof the 1970s and early 1980s.28: Danish Shipowners’ Association, Skibsfartsberetning1986/1987 (Copenhagen, 1987).29: S.G. Sturmey, “The Code of Conductfor Liner Conferences: A 1985 View (1),”Maritime Policy and Management, XIII,No. 3 (1986), 185-221.36: Denmark, Ministry of Taxation (2005),j. nr. 2005-618-0052.37: Evangelia Selkou and Michael Roe,Globalisation, Policy and Shipping: Fordism,Post-Fordism and the European UnionMaritime Sector (Cheltenham, 2004).38: Michael Clemens, Equity Research –Company Report: D/S Norden (Stockholm,2005).43: Norden’s first steamer, SS Norden, calledNagasaki as early as 1876. As Krabbe put it,“I think that having a long historicaltradition means a lot. When we go to Japanand tell them that our first ship calledNagasaki in 1876, they lend an ear.”Reuter Finans, 1 December 2004.44: Three of the vessels were later toenter the world’s first product tanker pool,established jointly by Torm and BurWainTankers International (see below).30: Chresten A. Bjerrum, ØK i uvejr: Da ØK’saktiekapital sank i Stillehavet (Copenhagen,1993).31: Danish Shipowners’ Association, DanskSkibsfarts konkurrencevilkår (Copenhagen,1986).32: Denmark, Ministry of Industry, SkibsfartspolitiskRedegørelse.33: Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten, 30September 1987. In the following years,several maritime reports referred to themaritime cluster.34: Politiken, 8 March 1988.35: Danish Shipowners’ AssociationArchives, Danish Shipowners’ Associationto Hans Larsen-Ledet, Social-Liberal shippingspokesman, 15 March 1988.39: Lloyd’s List, 15 July 2005.40: Jorgen Falkensteen, Dampskibsselskabet“NORDEN” 1871-1996: 125 Years on theHigh Seas (Copenhagen, 1996).41: In 1994 Orient and Norden merged andcontinued under Norden’s name, but withOrient as the operating company. Motortrampcontinued as holding company, owning themajority of shares in Norden.42: The company has been active in enteringinto buy-options, which has proven highlyprofitable in recent years when the surge inthe prices of second-hand ships has translatedinto high option values. This asset-playpolicy has given Norden a competitive edge,and many other global shipping companiesare now trying to imitate it.45: Erik Eriksen, TORM i 115 år: Fra dampskibsselskabtil globalt rederi (Copenhagen,2005).46: Henrik B. Lund and Philip Christensen,Danske Equities Company Report: Torm(Copenhagen, 2006). Torm has also engagedin bulk-carrier pooling as part founder of theInternational Handybulk Carriers Pool (IHC).Torm’s membership in IHC lasted until April2006 when it sold its remaining two vesselsin the pool.47: ScanDutch, a container shipping pooloperating between Europe and East Asia, wasestablished when the Dutch Nedlloyd, FrenchCGM and Malaysia International Shippingjoined the Scandinavian Joint Servicecon-sortia, a partnership between the EAC,the Norwegian Wilh. Wilhelmsen and theSwedish East Asiatic Company (Ostasiat).ScanDutch was formally dissolved in 1992
after more than two decades of operations.For an historical analysis, see René TaudalPoulsen, “Liner Shipping and TechnologicalInnovation: Ostasiat and the ContainerRevolution, 1963-75,” ScandinavianEconomic History Review, LV, No. 2 (2007),83-100.48: BurWain Tankers International wasestablished a year earlier by a merger of threeoperating companies: Nordic Shipping I/S,Scandic Tankers I/S and DanTankers I/S,which had been owned partly by BurWainShipholdings, Difko Shipping A/S, the Nordensubsidiary Nordtramp I/S, Global Finans A/S(and its subsidiaries Overseas Tankers A/Sand Domestic Tankers A/S) and Torm. In1995 BurWain Tankers International was soldto Tschudi and Eitzen Tankers in Norway.52: John H. Dunning, “The CompetitiveAdvantage of Countries and the Activities ofTransnational Corporations,” TransnationalCorporations, I, No. 1 (1992), 135-168;Dunning, The Globalization of Business(London, 1992); and Alan M. Rugman andJoseph R. D’Cruz, “The Double DiamondModel of International Competitiveness:The Canadian Experience,” ManagementInternational Review, XXXIII,No. 2 (1993), 17-39.3949: TradeWinds, 3 March 2006.50: Typical of a family business, Mærskhas been characterized by a high degree ofmanagerial stability with only three chairmenand four managing directors over a periodof more than a century.51: No new areas of business have beenadded since the 1980s, and the last substantialunrelated diversification was anunsuccessful attempt to establish a newtelecommunications company in Denmarkthrough a state-based concession in 1990.
40Lessons from Corporate Leadershipin the Danish Maritime SectorHenrik Sornn-Friese and Martin Jes Iversen’sauthoritative account of the evolutionin the maritime sector in Denmarkover the past decades provides insightfulanalytical angles that can help academics,politicians, and practicing managersunderstand how this importantindustry became so successful. In thearticle they identify a number of factorsthat were instrumental for the successfulreversal and revival of this strained industrialsector following the second OPECoil crisis in the mid-1970es and outlinethe core characteristics of a powerfulnational industry cluster. It is fairlyapparent that good management andleadership skills were paramount in thismonumental development effort garneredwith strong doses of international experience,durable business relations, globalnetworks, and pursuit of promisingopportunities as they arose. However,this is not the full account. The story iscomplemented with a quite extraordinaryengagement by national politicians, publicauthorities, industry organizations andunions around long-term workable solutions.This may speak favorably of collaborativebehaviors, possibly as a specialnational trait, or one could hope this isthe case. But, there are obviously noguarantees that past success will lead tosimilar successful outcomes in the future.We can try to learn the best lessons frompast events with the aim of adaptingsuch insights in dealing constructivelywith future demands, and there areindeed many challenges looming in thehorizon.In recent years, we have seen a generalreversal in the prospects for global economicgrowth with periods of economicrecession and an unprecedented financialmarket crisis that has affected thebusiness outlook for society as a wholeand the maritime industry in specific. Thelevel of maritime business activities is toa large extent a consequence of globaltrade volumes that have been affectedunusually hard by the reversal in economicoutlook and remain surrounded bysignificant uncertainty. Hence, the economicchallenges abound and will continueto expose the industry for years tocome. This situation obviously poses anumber of threats to ongoing businessdevelopment that will require effectiveresponses as we move forward. But, italso represents opportunities for astuteand entrepreneurial companies. This iswhy the historical lessons may be usefulto understand what caused the revival ofthe maritime sector when it was exposedto periods of global economic recession.It does seem like the capabilities demonstratedby leading Danish shippingcompanies during the period from themid-1970s have had at their core anability to respond effectively to marketopportunities. But, there is obviouslymore to it. Many of the associated capa-
ilities are company specific and derivefrom good leadership and managementskills combined with a willingness toengage in development efforts and prudentinvestment in ongoing expansion ofnew business activities. In some instancesinvestments were directed towardslucrative emerging market niches tailoredto specific shipping segments. In othercases they were intended to developrelated business activities includinginfrastructure, such as, ports and terminals,feeder vessels, cargo handlingfacilities, logistics support, door-to-doorground transportation, document andadministrative processing systems, etc.However, the implied skill set has astrong public-private relationship componentas government entities and publicauthorities helped facilitate the businessexpansion. This seems to reflect effectivestakeholder management capabilitieswhere public interests were consideredalong with those of the major shippingcompanies and unions. The successful‘business expansion also built on strongbusiness relationships established withinternational shipping companies oftendriven by personal friendships fromoverseas experiences with operatingpartners. Leading executives had gainedimportant international operational managementexperience that gave profoundinsights and industry related knowledgewhile shaping important social networkswith counterparts across the globalmaritime industry. This was a necessarybackdrop for the establishment of longtermcollaborative relations within internationalpartnerships and alliances. Italso paved the way for cross-borderacquisitions that although potentiallytricky, often seemed to work out particularlywhen tied to firms where strongcollaborative relationships had been inplace. Hence, the ability to build durablealliances among industry partners wouldserve to create cultural compatibility andreduce the integration costs of mergersand acquisitions. Looking across themajor players in the industry, corporatevalues seemed to play an important roleby emphasizing important things likecustomer focus, modesty and humbleness,trustworthiness and credibility,professionalism, reliability and quality,respect for individual and cultural differences.In addition to these core valuesthere appear to have been substantialopenness for change that made it possibleto make relatively swift and smoothbusiness transitions. The leadership styleseemed characterized by trust-basedpersonal relationships across all importantstakeholder groups where empatheticmanagerial traits allowed inclusionof helpful expertise and experience.It is mentioned that the good results alsowere favored by foresight and a certaindose of good ‘luck’. However, luck as aconcept may be more manageable thanwe think as luck often appears to cometo those that pursue it. Hence, it isargued that we can learn to live withuncertainty by dropping our ‘illusion ofcontrol’ and accepting the possibilitiesassociated with uncertainty as a futurefull of opportunities. So, foresight andluck may be related to a particularmanagement philosophy and approach todealing with the unknown. Among otherthings lucky people seem to maintainstrong networks, because that is hownew opportunities arise and are discovered.Lucky people appear to be calm,which increases their chances of seeingand identifying opportunities, and they41
42 are open to new experiences. That is,they want to learn and experiment andthereby find new ways to conduct businessand deal with challenges. In thiscontext, it may seem like the managementapproaches and leadership stylesadopted in the industry were conduciveboth to explore and exploit new opportunities.At the country level it is quite apparentthat particular institutional, social, andbehavioral factors were in play. The traditionof open discussions and direct negotiationsbetween different stakeholdergroups with a willingness to compromisefor the common good was probablyinstrumental for effective institutionaloutcomes. These traditions and societalvalues provided flexibility and willingnessto change where diverse skills, insights,and experiences could influence proposedsolutions. This also counted open interactionbetween politicians, public administrators,industry representatives andcompany executives as was the casearound the implementation of the DanishInternational Ship register (DIS) and thetonnage-tax scheme. Similarly, officialgovernment support was frequentlysolicited to reach fair internationalagreements on global transportationaccords where timely intervention,credibility, and stability of rules andregulations are essential.Another important leadership trait wasan international and inclusive pursuit ofnew business opportunities often basedon collaboration between different sectorparticipants. Many activities were gearedto develop complementary businesses inoperations and service processing thatwould separate handling and financingtasks and emphasize the operation ofships rather than owning them. Theseactivities were able to expand the volumeof adjacent business services significantlywhile reducing the direct capital requirementswith associated investment risks.These activities were garnered with newtechniques to handle commerce aroundchartered ships and gaining scale economiesfrom the management of largeinternational pools of shipping capacity.This formed into a regional center forcompetence driven commercial shipoperations where organized markets forshipping services were extended to alarge global business network over time.This national center of shipping serviceswas based on open interaction acrossvarious specialist industries includingbrokers, charterers, shipyards, componentsuppliers, service providers, etc. So, todaythe Danish maritime sector is characterizedby fairly strong complementaryindustries, e.g., in marine products andpaints, life saving equipment, environmentaltechnologies and instruments,radio transmission and satellite communication,shipbroker services, logisticssystems, maintenance, base supplies, etc.This reflects an openness to developrelated maritime industries throughcommercial and social relationships. Thedevelopment of an industry cluster witha diversity of complementary maritimeservices became self-reinforcing andattracted partners and collaborators fromthe international shipping community.These insights can have important implicationsfor future considerations in theDanish maritime industry and maybeparticularly the development of futuremanagers and leaders to the industry.The skills and competences of the comingmanagement cadres and the importantlessons from the past may help lead theway towards continued success of the
maritime sector with Denmark emergingas a significant, if not dominant, centerfor global maritime businesses.It seems clear that we can draw a numberof basic conclusions from the developmentsobserved in the recent historyof the Danish maritime industry withrespect to some of the underpinningmanagerial and leadership traits that ledthe way:> The maritime industry was good atmanaging important stakeholder relationships.This has emerged as animportant aspect of effective managementand receives some face validationfrom the story of the Danish maritimeindustry. Stakeholders are entities andindividuals that can affect, or are affectedby the corporate activities and assuch should be considered when importantbusiness decisions are made. This isso for a number of reasons, e.g., to obtainconsensus and buy-in, to attract a multiplicityof views and insights, to avoidpotential pitfalls, and to create a goodworking atmosphere. Here the mutualdependence between public services tobusiness and corporate wealth creationfor tax revenues also comes to the fore.So, business is simply seen as the way allparties to corporate activities includingcustomers, suppliers, employees, managers,owners, bankers, and the communityinteract to create value. If each andeveryone gain value from this, it will beto the mutual benefit of all.> The successful industry cluster wasformed around extensive social networkswhere like-minded entrepreneurs andexecutives created a common platform todiscuss, develop, and execute new opportunitiesand exploiting them throughjoint efforts and complementary businessactivities. This resonates with a newergame theoretical view that competitiveinteraction can actually help conjointvalue creation through collaborativeefforts sometimes referred to asco-opetition. Here the development ofnew industry-related businesses formsas interdependent and co-specializedactivities operating around a commoneconomic infrastructure as a joint platform.So, the health and growth potentialof the industry very much hinges uponthe ability to build and maintain aninclusive international business networkand industry cluster of complementaryactivities as drivers of future expansion.> The companies that paved the way forthe successful expansion of the Danishmaritime industry seemed to abide bystrong corporate values with clear ideasof an overarching purpose setting prioritiesfor preferred practices and inspiringconstructive efforts to advance businessactivities. The evidence from a numberof other studies similarly suggests thatsuccessful firms often are driven bystrong ideologies imposed by influentialleaders where essential corporate valuesare shared by people across all functionalareas throughout the organization.Outlining a common purpose to strive forand setting behavioral yardsticks fororganizational members can imposemeaning and ambition into all corporateactivities. This might prove particularlyhelpful when organizations are facedwith unexpected changes in the environmentas a strong guidance for goodresponsive decisions.In sum, the positive historical resultsseem to derive from managerial skillsthat consider a broader set ofconstituents and abilities to engage all43
44 of these in business networks aroundcommon value creating aims throughsomething we might refer to as inclusiveleadership. This approach derives fromthe premise that we as human beingsaccomplish things in groups where boththe need for relationships and a cravingto understand are essential drivers ofhuman activity. The ability to learn andevolve is associated with ongoingdecision-making and action outcomes atall parts of the organization and sectorsof the industry. So, many people need tobe involved and motivated where durableresults depend on collaboration betweenpeople that can bond across a broaderset of activities and experiences. Hence,good leadership will influence importantstakeholders to take actions towardscertain ends while ensuring a decentbalance between the core needs and driversof all the constituents.rapidly changing world. Future successwill most likely depend on managerialpractices honed by the best leadershiptraining possible and continued updatingof international business experiencesand social relationships.October 2011Torben AndersenWe cannot of course be sure that theseimprints of good management compriseenduring traits in the national characterthat will ensure future success. Insteadthey can hopefully inspire furtherthinking about the continued need todevelop superb leadership skills in a
46Publikationen er illustreret med et stortudvalg fotografier fra danske skibe, tagetaf søfolk og med søfolk og deres hverdagsom motiv. På nær et er alle billedervenligst stillet rådighed af SøfartensVelfærdsråd. Det sidste billede, ”Absalon”,er stillet til rådighed af Danmarks Rederiforening.Søfartens Velfærdsråd har siden1952 årligt afholdt en fotokonkurrenceog det er fra de seneste års bidrag hertil,Torben Jantzen har udvalgt og sammensaten spændende illustration til teksterne.
Om Fondens uddelingeri perioden 2006 til 2011Den Danske Maritime Fond er oghar været en faktor i udviklingen afdet danske maritime miljø – Det BlåDanmark. Fonden har støttet bredti det private erhverv, de offentligemyndigheder, universiteter, uddannelsesinstitutionerm.v. De temaerog aktiviteter Fonden overordnethar støttet er kortfattet beskreveti det følgende.Fonden har siden 2006 uddelt i altkr. 230 millioner.Denne støtte er fordelt på 202 projekterudvalgt af i alt 511 modtagneprojektansøgninger. Fondens praksiser at støtte almennyttige aktivitetermed donation og erhvervsmæssigeuddelinger som et lån på op til 50 %af projektomkostningerne. Dette låner på favorable vilkår. Fonden hargenerelt været åben overfor projektidéerog har i vid udstrækning reageretpositivt på fremsendte forslag.Således er såvel meget store somsmå forslag blevet støttet.Projekterne favner fra etableringaf Ph.d. studier over bygning af detnye Søfartsmuseum til forskning inanoteknologi og IT systemer.Geografisk er virksomheder og institutioneri hele landet blevet støttetinklusive naturligvis de størremartitime klynger i Nordjylland,Esbjerg og Svendborg/Marstal områderneforuden det Københavnskeområde. Flere projekter fra Færøerneer også blevet støttet.Af de kr. 230 millioner der er uddelti alt, er cirka kr. 165 millioner gåettil 138 almennyttige projekter ogkr. 65 millioner gået til 64 projektersom erhvervsstøtte. Fondens Administrationhar i alt siden etableringeni 2005 kostet cirka 7,5 % af detuddelte samlede beløb.Tematisk kan Fondens uddelingeropdeles i følgende overordnedegrupper:-Miljø.-Rekruttering-Uddannelse-Driftsoptimering-Det Blå Danmark/Den Blå KlyngeMiljø:kr. 44 millionerPerioden siden 2005 har været prægetaf en intens samfundsmæssiginteresse for klima og miljøpåvirkningerog dette har afspejlet sig ilovgivningsinitiativer der fordrerbetydelig innovativ indsats på produktudviklingog innovation. Isæri perioden op til afholdelsen afCOP15 mødet i december 2009 iKøbenhavn blev mange spændendeprojekter sat ”i søen” som for eksempel”The Green Ship of theFuture” samarbejdet.Temaopdelt2005 til efteråret 2011AntalstøttemodtagereAntal uddelingerUddelinger i kr.Antal ProcentMio. kr. ProcentMiljø 37 18 43,5 19Rekruttering 16 8 39,7 17Uddannelse 56 28 33,2 14Driftsoptimering 42 21 77 34Blå Danmark/Blå klynge 51 25 36 16Sum 202 100 229,4 100
Driftsoptimering:kr. 77 millionerI perioden er prisen på olie stegetbetydeligt og alle energieffektiviserendetiltag har umiddelbar interessefor rederierne. Således erprojekter der fokuserer på driftsoptimeringden største samlede støttemodtager.Rekruttering:kr. 40 millionerIgennem årene har dette emnemodtaget støtte på i alt mio. kr. 40heraf mio. kr. 33 til DanmarksRederiforenings rekrutteringskampagne”World Careers”, etablerettil gavn for Det Blå Danmark.Uddannelse og forskning:kr. 33 millionerFonden har støttet etableringen afDCMT, Danish Center for MaritimeTechnology ved DTU med i alt kr. 25millioner og også andre forskningsprojekterer gennemført på DTU,ved CBS, SDU og KU. Fonden harstøttet i alt 11 Ph.d. studier indenforden maritime sektor igennemårene.Det Blå Danmark/Den Blå Klynge,kr. 36 millionerFonden har støttet mange store initiativerpå vegne af det Blå Danmarksåsom afholdelsen af møde iFN’s Internationale Maritime Organisations(IMO’s) søsikkerhedskomitéhvor Danmark havde værtsskabetfor det 83. møde (MSC83),som var et prestigefyldt arrangementi internationale søfartskredse.Fonden har også i 2011 støttetDanmarks værtskab af mødet mellemEU og Kina på det søfartspolitiskeområde. Generelt har Fondenstøttet mange konferencer afholdtindenfor det Blå Danmark og harbidraget til at skabe rammer for vidensdelingog netværksdannelser.Den tematiske opdeling af Fondensuddelinger fremgår af grafer anførtnedenfor ligesom vi her har vist desamme uddelinger blot fordelt påbrancher.På Fondens hjemmeside forefindesbeskrivelser af samtlige projekterhvortil Fonden har ydet støtte ligesomder i Fondens årlige beretningforefindes mere detaljerede beskrivelseraf enkelte projekter.Fondens Hjemmeside er:www.dendanskemaritimefond.dkBrancheopdelt2005 til efteråret 2011AntalstøttemodtagereAntal uddelingerAntal ProcentUddelinger i kr.Mio. kr. ProcentForskning og teknologiudvikling 34 17 61,5 27Undervisning og rekruttering 67 33 69,4 30Rederier 5 2 5,6 2Værfter, udstyrsproducenter, havne m.m. 47 23 49,6 22Organisationer og myndigheder 44 22 35,2 15Andet/andre 5 2 8,2 4202 100 229,5 100