CNAS Maritime 7 Report FINAL

I. INTRODUCTIONBy Amy Chang, Ben FitzGerald,and Van JacksonIn the context of strategic competition, militarycapabilities and technologies that are not wellunderstood pose unique risks to stability in Asia.Many aspects of technology’s role in Asian securityhave been widely recognized: It is a key componentof the diffusion of power in the region, 1 anasymmetric advantage for smaller powers, 2 andthe primary source of U.S. military superiority. 3Technology, both legacy and emerging, has alsobeen a critical enabler of military modernization inAsia, accelerating over recent years due to low trustand strategic competition. 4 Technology developmentand acquisition for the sake of operationalmilitary capabilities remain paramount prioritiesin Asian nations’ strategies against their adversaries.Less well recognized is technology’s potential— particularly that of new capabilities — toincrease the risks of unintentional crisis escalation,regional instability, and inadvertent conflict.This report examines how risks of instability fromregional geopolitical competition can be exacerbatedby nations seeking to take advantage ofemerging technologies and military capabilitiesaround which clear precedents or shared expectationshave yet to be established. The exploitationof gray zones in Asia, defined as a state of securitycompetition between peace and war, isincreasingly documented and understood in themaritime domain. 5 In addition to, and at timesin combination with, these gray zone challenges,the proliferation of military technology presentsopportunities to exploit ambiguity about how atechnology’s employment should be interpretedwhen used for coercive purposes in the context ofregional competition.We contend that Asian militaries’ acquisitionof new capabilities should be understood as anextension of strategic competition: As states buildadvanced capabilities, untrusting neighbors arecompelled to keep pace in order to avoid vulnerabilitiesand maintain a favorable military balance. 6While military technology serves many purposes,| 3

also about the consequences of nuclear weaponsuse by either side. 24 Today, following a similarlogic, the deployment and use of U.S. aircraft carriershave become a signal of U.S. resolve not onlybecause of the high cost of fielding them, but alsobecause of what they are capable of and how theyhave been employed in the past. 25 When U.S. aircraftcarriers deploy to the Yellow Sea, for example,China and North Korea chafe at the implied threat,but it reinforces shared expectations that can helpstabilize the rivalry. 26 Even in the fog of crisesbetween rivals, consistent behavior and signalingmake it possible to establish stable expectationsthat mitigate escalatory actions by either side,especially if the capabilities used for signaling arewell-understood. 27By contrast, the use of reconnaissance unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) on the Korean Peninsula andover Japanese territorial waters by North Korea andChina, respectively, has introduced uncertainty inthe South Korean and Japanese governments abouthow best to respond, adding an additional wrinkleinto preexisting geopolitical competition andhistories of coercion. 28 Because drone use in thesecontexts and between these competitors lacks precedent,the burden of deciding to retaliate fell to theRepublic of Korea (ROK) and government of Japan,both of which lacked experience dealing with thisspecific kind of intrusion. The result was not onlyparalysis in response to the immediate incident,but also a determination not to be caught unawaresin the event of a similar provocation in the future.North Korea and China exploited a vacuum ofprotocol and behavioral norms. North Korea wasable to probe the resolve and defensive detectioncapabilities of the U.S.-ROK alliance withoutdirectly violating any specific alliance “red lines.” 29China similarly managed to assert its territorialclaims without the use of violence. Both supportedtheir political-military objectives without puttingtheir forces directly at risk. Most importantly, theyboth also forced South Korea and Japan to choosewhether and how to retaliate or to simply acceptUAV intrusions in order to avoid escalation. Inboth instances, the burden of escalation shifted tothe defenders.Absent established norms of use or measurableeffects, such as soldier deaths or the observabledestruction of property, judging the proportionalityof a new capability used for coercion becomes adifficult task. It is difficult to distinguish betweenproportionate and escalatory responses whenthe capability’s use is unprecedented. So, to theextent that coercion works by leaving “somethingto chance,” 30 the poorly understood significanceand proportionality of new capabilities can posea unique type of challenge to a defender, as illustratedby the above cases.The opportunity to establish new, self-servingnorms presents a significant temptation for powerfulactors to undertake coercive action thatpresents some risk in the short term but with thepotential for significant long-term benefits. While alogical option, these actions lend themselves to twotypes of dangers: greater willingness to risk conflictand the risk of miscalculation.Conflict PropensityThe coercive use of new capabilities makes sense inthe context of strategic competition, but it also maydisrupt the somewhat predictable and regularizedpatterns of interaction that currently constituteregional stability. One way that this risk to regionalstability manifests is in the creation of a powderkeg — a net increased conflict propensity acrossthe region.When an emerging technology or military capabilityenters a state’s strategic calculus, it eitherenables an alternative approach (e.g., lesseningburdens on manpower, cost, time) to achieve thesame effect as an existing technology, or it achievesan alternative effect compared with existing capabilities(e.g., higher kill rates, disablement without| 7

M A R C H 2 0 1 5Shades of Gray:Technology, Strategic Competition and Stability in Maritime Asia10 |doctrine developed several years ago suggests itwould. 39Lastly, potential miscalculation can result from achallenger’s shifting calculation of its own resolvebased on defender reactions; that is, classical conflictescalation spirals spurred by the introductionof a new or unprecedented military capability. Achallenger may employ drones or conduct an ASATattack as a way to signal resolve without fully committingto a path to war, yet may find its hands tiedwhen a defender chooses to shoot down the droneor retaliate against the ASAT launch site. In thisscenario, what starts out as tailored coercion toprobe the resolve of a competitor quickly transformsinto limited war.IV. REDUCING THE TECHNOLOGYFOG IN MARITIME ASIA:RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESSGRAY ZONES AND RISKSAsia’s evolving security environment means policymakersinterested in preserving stability needto understand and cope with not just the risks oftraditional military competition, but also new risksas they emerge. Despite the temptation to gainadvantage through acquisition and employmentof emerging technologies and military capabilities,it is in all nations’ interests to have a commonunderstanding of how they may affect stabilityin maritime Asia. This will remain the case eventhough some states will inevitably continue to takeadvantage of technologies and gray zones.Removing the fog of technologies and gray zoneswhere possible is crucial to managing stabilitybecause both involve a lack of clarity that aggressivestates exploit and hide behind. This createscomplex decision making challenges for status quostates seeking to manage or prevent crises amidongoing friction. The United States should, in concertwith qualified and willing allies and partners,leverage technological capabilities in a consistentmanner, promote common real-time awareness ofactivities in contested territories, relax technologyexport controls, and enhance partner ability todeter and defend against aggression.Removing the fog of technologiesand gray zones where possibleis crucial to managing stabilitybecause both involve a lack ofclarity that aggressive statesexploit and hide behind.We believe the following prescriptions — rangingfrom the political and economic to the militaryand technological — promote regional stabilityamid the spread of both emerging technologyand military capabilities. These recommendationsmatter just as much for states that are investingheavily in cutting-edge technologies as for stateswith more limited resources. All benefit from moretransparency and shared expectations relating tothe employment and consequences of new capabilitiesin maritime Asia.1. ESTABLISH NORMS AND REGIMES FORTECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES INASIA.Asian nations should pursue the establishment of a“legacy- and emerging-technology regime,” focusingin particular on the maritime domain, whichpromotes consistent behavior, precedent recognitionand discussions of emerging behavioral andtechnological trends in multilateral fora. Ideally,such a regime would promote disclosures of performanceparameters and declarations of intendeduse for new capabilities. Rather than placing bets

on the viability of any single multilateral venueto host this kind of discussion, it may be better toconsistently raise the profile of technology normson the agenda of the region’s many multilateralinstitutions.Diplomatic relationships at both senior and lowerlevels could foster dialogue on legacy militarycapabilities as they proliferate, and economiccollaborations in support of research and developmentcould help incentivize such cooperation.Multilateral venues would then serve more as amatchmaker, facilitating various forms of cooperationwhere aligned interests exist, and agendasetter, catalyzing discourse on this important topic.This would help set and cement norms of behaviorin the region.2. DEVELOP A COMMON OPERATING PICTURE(COP) NETWORK IN THE SOUTH AND EAST CHINASEAS.The construction of a COP network is a powerfulmeans of minimizing the fog around new orunprecedented capabilities and gray zones. A COPnetwork can provide real-time, persistent domainawareness of contested territories among willingstates, helping to distinguish aggressor anddefender in high-friction areas, which in turn clarifiesthe intentions of competing claimants. A morecommon view of what is happening where andwhen may facilitate a convergence of threat perceptionsamong neighbors over time, making it easierfor security-seeking states to band together againstaggression. The process of building a COP networkalso compels technical and operational cooperationby requiring states to work out interoperabilityand data sharing arrangements; these are tractableforms of cooperation under conditions of strategiccompetition.A COP network represents the kind of militarycapability that improves national defense and collectivesecurity without posing an inherent threatto security-seeking states – only states seeking tooverturn the status quo through force fear operationaltransparency in disputed territories.The construction of a COPnetwork is a powerful means ofminimizing the fog around newor unprecedented capabilities andgray zones.3. RELAX CONSTRAINTS ON FOREIGN MILITARYRELATIONSHIPS.To facilitate coalition-building and interoperabilityacross countries in Asia, the United Statesshould relax constraints on foreign military sales(FMS) and foreign military financing (FMF).Additionally, the United States should promoteco-development and cooperative development fortrusted allies and partners in the region. As manyAsian governments place a premium on indigenousdevelopment of defense technologies and can createcompetitive hurdles for U.S. and other defenseindustry partners to support the goal of indigenousdevelopment, partnering with Asian defenseindustries early — and securing export licensesfor technology developed — should lead to muchgreater defense cooperation.The spread of new capabilities poses distinct risksto regional stability, and yet, perhaps counterintuitively,our principal recommendation is to notlean on export control regimes as a way to blockacquisitions of new capabilities. Not only willsimply restricting exports not address the underlyingstrategic drivers of military modernization, butsuch an approach also rests on the shaky assumptionthat the United States is the only source fordesired capabilities and severely hampers U.S.power to shape the military technological environmentin Asia.| 11

M A R C H 2 0 1 5Shades of Gray:Technology, Strategic Competition and Stability in Maritime Asia12 |These days, there are few technologies and capabilitieswhich only one state possesses a monopoly.Moreover, the spread of key emerging technologies– UAVs, various forms of cyber offense anddefense, stealth – has already happened and isoften commercially driven, and reversing it couldthus adversely impact national economies.Rather than trying to disrupt a powerful trend,our recommendations concentrate efforts on thebehavioral aspect of new technologies and capabilitiesto manage risks and maintain stability. Byparticipating actively in the flow of military andother technology to Asia, the United States has achance to influence norms about the ways in whichthey are adopted and employed.4. NEXT-BEST ALTERNATIVE: BUILD A2/ADCAPACITY OF LOCAL PARTNERS.The first three recommendations will inevitablytake time to develop and implement. If in theinterim nations continue to exercise coercivebehavior in maritime Asia, the United States andpartner countries should consider an alternativeof developing A2/AD capacity given thatsuch measures do not pose escalation risks in theregion. The promotion of local A2/AD capacityfor willing partners can be structured to incentivizeinformation sharing and collaboration amonglocal partners and would improve deterrence anddefense in case of aggression. To the extent possible,the United States should therefore distinguishbetween power projection capabilities, the proliferationof which it should hope to constrain, andlocal A2/AD capabilities, including ISR capabilities,sea mines, minesweepers, cyber, integratedair and missile defenses, and midrange anti-shipcruise missiles.V. THE WAY AHEADSeveral challenges to implementing these prescriptionsremain. Culture, history and strategiccompetition in Asia constrain how the UnitedStates and its allies and partners manage securitydilemma dynamics, establish and enforce normsand proliferate new capabilities.First, managing security dilemma dynamics whileimproving deterrence and defense is not easy. 40When low trust and high uncertainty combinewith occasional periods of high friction betweenneighbors, any military investments and actionsare more likely to be viewed warily, further spurringcycles of hedging or counterbalancing.Second, Asia’s existing security architecture,in part related to unresolved historical issues,makes predictable cooperation and normativeconvergence an enduring challenge. Absent therules-based institutional model, like the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization, or a supranationalentity like the European Union, Asia’s institutionalizedforms of cooperation are necessarilycoalition- and consensus-based. Asia’s lack ofan enforcement capacity for norms and nearlyabsolute reliance on a patchwork of bilateral andtrilateral arrangements for security exacerbate thealready difficult challenges of coordinating andaligning interests.Finally, there is a risk that our prescriptions onlymake the coercive use of technological capabilities– and thus regional instability – more likely.According to this line of thinking, “ … if there areunusually useable weapons in the arsenal, therewill be unusual pressures to use them.” 41 If thegoal of our prescriptions is to maintain stability,allowing or promoting the proliferation of militarycapabilities could be counterproductive.These challenges are significant but surmountable,and our recommendations were made to accountfor each. To address security dilemma concerns, weemphasize transferring and developing localizedA2/AD capabilities because they are most usefulfor defending against power projection, not foroffensive actions. Although some capabilities, such

as cruise missiles, are admittedly difficult to classifyas inherently offensive or defensive, we believean emphasis on overall defensive orientations inmilitary modernization can help dampen securitydilemmas, especially when coupled with our othertransparency-oriented recommendations.The United States must playa leading role in facilitating amaturation of precedents, butminimizing the fog aroundemerging technology andmilitary capabilities is in theinterest of every nation.associated with the coercive use of military technologies,the United States can begin addressingthose dangers in a responsible way. The risks ofhigher conflict propensity, miscalculation and eveninadvertent escalation depend on the fog of uncertaintyand lack of precedent surrounding newor contextually unprecedented capabilities. Ourrecommendations aim at a simple goal: Reduce thefog. The United States must play a leading role infacilitating such a maturation of precedents, butminimizing the fog around emerging technologyand military capabilities is in the interest of everynation.While cooperation is a major challenge inlow-trust environments, the specific forms ofcooperation we recommend are compatible withexisting institutions and relations. The idea of anemerging-technologies regime can be pursued andcoordinated within the context of the East AsiaSummit, Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum, or ASEAN DefenseMinisters Meetings. Even absent the imprimatur ofthese regional mechanisms, the venues themselvescan facilitate discussion about concerns relating tonormative and legacy capabilities at the bilateraland trilateral level among willing participants. Aswell, COP networks can in principle function withvarying levels of trust and technological sophisticationamong participants because much of thenecessary technological infrastructure is commerciallyavailable.Military technology and capabilities often spreadin response to strategic competition. In Asia, notonly have they begun to spread, but they have alsobeen introduced into operations in existing areasof high friction. By identifying the distinct risks| 13