Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

• Saddam also wrote key speeches of officials,notably that of Foreign Minister Naji Sabri AhmadAl Hadithi to the UNGA on 19 September 2002,following President Bush’s ‘Grave and GatheringDanger’ speech to the same body on 12 September.• ‘Abd-al-Tawab ‘Abdallah Al Mullah Huwaysh saidSaddam “intervened in all of his ministries andagencies where and when he saw fit.”• Saddam appointed Ramadan to lead the “HigherCommittee” in 2002 to implement UN SecurityCouncil Resolution (UNSCR) 1441. Ramadan wasunsure of his authority to deal with UN inspectorsunder this arrangement, and he would guess at boththe limits of his authority and his personal safetyfrom Saddam’s wrath, a situation compounded bythe inability to contact Saddam at critical moments.• Tariq ‘Aziz said that in reporting to Saddam on theproceedings of the Committee of Four (the Quartet),chairman ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri would guessat what he thought Saddam wanted to hear. ‘AliHasan Al Majid supported ‘Izzat Ibrahim in thisapproach.• Ramadan pointed to the overactive attitude offactory managers in 2002-2003 in blocking UNinspectors as an example of Iraqis anticipating aposition Saddam wanted them to take, when in facthis policy had moved in a different direction.Saddam was strictly opposed to corruption—in thesense of Regime personnel soliciting bribes or expropriatingpublic assets—on the part of family membersor subordinate members of the Regime, seeing it ascorrosive of respect for authority. Personal corruptioncould be punished drastically and Saddam issuedmany directions about what he expected in terms ofpersonal financial behavior. Instead, Saddam reservedfor himself the right to dispense the fruits of theRegime, thereby making those who benefited frompower sure they were doing so exclusively at his will.• According to ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, Saddamrequired all official personnel to submit periodicinventories of their assets. Assets could not beabove “sufficient” levels, nor could assets be listedunder other people’s names. He directed that halfof hidden property be given as a reward to whoeverreported the deception.Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a ByzantineSettingSaddam did not encourage advice from subordinatesunless he had first signaled he wanted it. Advisorygroups he established, such as the Committee of Four(the Quartet) on foreign, political and strategic policy,considered only those issues he referred to them.Committees generally assumed Saddam already had apreferred position on such issues and commonly spenttime trying to guess what it was and tailor their adviceto it. More conscientious members of the Regimesought to work around sycophantic or timid superiorsby cultivating alternative, direct lines of communicationto Saddam—a development that pleased Saddambecause it put another check on subordinates. Theresult, however, was a corrosive gossip culture insenior government circles that further undercut anysemblance of developing policy through conventionalgovernment procedures.• Ramadan thought Saddam’s preference for informalchains of command encouraged a gossip culturein his immediate circle that undercut good policydevelopment.• ‘Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri, Ramadan, and ‘Ali HasanAl Majid in the Quartet would usually argue forwhatever policy they thought Saddam would want,according to Tariq ‘Aziz.• In some areas, alternative channels were formalized.Special Security Organization (SSO) personnelwere able to regularly bypass superiors, andsenior SSO officers bypassed the SSO Director ifthey had links to Qusay Saddam Husayn. Similarly,certain sections of the SSO could bypass the SSODirector and report straight to Saddam.• Saddam claimed he regularly met with the Iraqipeople as he found them to be the best source ofaccurate information. Additionally, Saddam said hefound women to be great sources of information,particularly within the various government ministries.• Saddam’s interest in science meant that some Iraqiweapons-related scientists were able to use backchannels to by-pass military industry gatekeeperssuch as Huwaysh. This enabled them to sometimes10