Volume 1 - Iraq Watch

family, who was not necessarily competent, suchas ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid, weakened good decisionmaking,according to former Vice President Ramadan.Nonetheless it was accepted as a seeminglynormal part of administration in Iraq.• Ramadan thought, “The last three years withSaddam bothered me the most. There were toomany relatives in sensitive jobs. When I was put incharge of inspections, I was qualified to do the job.My staff will tell you I could have fixed it.”• He said, “Saddam was weak with his family members.He punished them, but let them go right backto doing what they were doing in the first place.”Moreover, ‘Ali Hasan Al Majid thought the onlyoccasions he saw Saddam yield under “pressure”was in dealing with relatives. “He used to stand bytheir side regardless of any reason.”It seems clear that Saddam was grooming Qusay ashis heir by gradually giving him increasing responsibilitiesstarting in the late 1990s. According to ‘AliHasan Al Majid, “He was paving the way for his sonQusay more than ‘Uday, because Qusay was lovely,having a noble character.” For many senior Iraqis,however, Qusay’s significance stemmed from hisperceived influence on his father. These former seniorofficials dismiss Qusay’s intelligence and leadershipability. Saddam gave him security, and some militaryresponsibilities, but never significant political, scientificor economic tasks in government. There was alsoa view that Qusay already had more responsibilitythan he could handle.• Saddam gave Qusay control of the RG, SRG, andSSO. He was elected in 2001 to the Ba’th PartyCommand, a stepping-stone to eventual RCC membership,which would have been the most significantmark of his growing importance in the Regimehierarchy.• Saddam also assigned Qusay to the Higher Committeeas a watchdog in 2002 in response toSaddam’s dissatisfaction with committee concessionsto the UN, according to Ramadan.The Heir ApparentDifferent sources portray Qusay Saddam Husayn,Saddam’s potential successor, as ambitious, distrustfuland fawning.• Qusay in 1998 began to marginalize certain seniorRegime offi cials who had been appointed bySaddam and installed his own trusted aides in keypositions, including within the SSO, according to aformer senior offi cial.• Qusay was a member of the (military) Committeeof Three, which controlled armed forces officerpromotions and recommended to Saddam GeneralOffi cer appointments and promotion. He showedhimself profoundly suspicious of recommendationsfrom within the army and often disregarded them,according to a former senior offi cer.• Qusay was keen to provide Saddam with goodmilitary news, according to Walid Hamid Tawfi q.However, he lived in fear of incurring Saddam’sdispleasure and optimistically exaggerated informationthat he gave to Saddam.• The former MIC director, Huwaysh, recounted thaton one occasion in late 2002 when he met withSaddam and Qusay, Qusay boasted to his father,“we are ten times more powerful than in 1991.”Immediately disagreeing, Huwaysh said, “Actually,we are 100 times weaker than in 1991, becausethe people are not ready to fight.” Saddam did notrespond, but Qusay was angry that Huwaysh hadcontradicted him.Saddam and His Sense of LegacySaddam was most concerned with his legacy, andhe saw it in grand historic terms. His managementof the present was always with a view to its appearancein the future, and this tended to distort foreignprotagonists’ perceptions of his current motivations.He wanted to be remembered as a ruler who had beenas significant to Iraq as Hammurabi, Nebuchadnezzarand Salah-al-Din [Saladin]. His problem lay in how todefine and to achieve this greatness. Even what it was22